Mejoff vs. Dir.

Of Prisons
Facts Boris Mejoff, a Russian, was captured as a Japanese spy by the US Army Counter Intelligence Corps on March 18, 1948. He was turned over to the Phil Commonwealth Government for appropriate disposition. His case was decided on by the Board of Commissioners of Immigration who declared him as an illegal alien. The Board ordered his immediate deportation. In the meantime, we was placed in prison awaiting the ship that will take him back home to Russia. Two Russian boats have been requested to bring him back to Russia but the masters refused as they had no authority to do so. Two years passed and Mejoff is still under detention awaiting the ship that will take him home. This case is a petition for habeas corpus. However, the respondent held that the Mejoff should stay in temporary detention as it is a necessary step in the process of exclusion or expulsion of undesirable aliens. It further states that is has the right to do so for a reasonable length of time. Issue Whether or not Mejoff should be released from prison awaiting his deportation. Ruling The Supreme Court decided that Mejoff be released from custody but be placed under reasonable surveillance of the immigration authorities to insure that he keep peace and be available when the Government is ready to deport him. In the doctrine of incorporation, the Philippines in its constitution adops the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of Nations. Also, the Philippines has joined the United Nations in its Resolution entitled Universal Declaration of Human Rights in proclaiming that life and liberty and all other fundamental rights shall be applied to all human beings. The contention that he remains a threat of to the security of the country is unfounded as Japan and the US or the Phils are no longer at war.

Kuroda vs. Jalandoni Facts Shinegori Kuroda, a former Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines was charged before the Philippine Military Commission for war crimes. As he was the commanding general during such period of war, he was tried for failure to discharge his duties and permitting the brutal atrocities and other high crimes committed by his men against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Japanese forces, in violation of of the laws and customs of war. Kuroda, in his petition, argues that the Military Commission is not a valid court because the law that created it, Executive Order No. 68, is unconstitutional. He further contends that using as basis the Hague Conventions Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare for the war crime committed cannot stand ground as the Philippines was not a signatory of such rules in such convention. Furthermore, he alleges that the United States is not a party of interest in the case and that the two US prosecutors cannot practice law in the Philippines. Issue 1.Whether or not Executive Order No. 68 is constitutional 2.Whether or not the US is a party of interest to this case

Ruling The Supreme Court ruled that Executive Order No. 68, creating the National War Crimes Office and prescribing rules on the trial of accused war criminals, is constitutional as it is aligned with Sec 3,Article 2 of the Constitution which states that The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation. The generally accepted principles of international law includes those

formed during the Hague Convention, the Geneva Convention and other international jurisprudence established by United Nations. These include the principle that all persons, military or civilian, who have been guilty of planning, preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses in violation of laws and customs of war, are to be held accountable. In the doctrine of incorporation, the Philippines abides by these principles and therefore has a right to try persons that commit such crimes and most especially when it is committed againsts its citizens. It abides with it even if it was not a signatory to these conventions by the mere incorporation of such principles in the constitution. The United States is a party of interest because the country and its people have been equally, if not more greatly, aggrieved by the crimes with which the petitioner is charged for. By virtue of Executive Order No. 68, the Military Commission is a special military tribunal and that the rules as to parties and representation are not governed by the rules of court but by the very provisions of this special law.

Agustin vs Edu 88 SCRA 195

Facts This case is a petition assailing the validity or the constitutionality of a Letter of Instruction No. 229, issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos, requiring all vehicle owners, users or drivers to procure early warning devices to be installed a distance away from such vehicle when it stalls or is disabled. In compliance with such letter of instruction, the Commissioner of the Land Transportation Office issued Administrative Order No. 1 directing the compliance thereof. This petition alleges that such letter of instruction and subsequent administrative order are unlawful and unconstitutional as it violates the provisions on due process, equal protection of the law and undue delegation of police power. Issue Whether or not the Letter of Instruction No. 229 and the subsequent Administrative Order issued is unconstitutional Ruling The Supreme Court ruled for the dismissal of the petition. The statutes in question are deemed not unconstitutional. These were definitely in the exercise of police power as such was established to promote public welfare and public safety. In fact, the letter of instruction is based on the constitutional provision of adopting to the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. The letter of instruction mentions, as its premise and basis, the resolutions of the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the discussions on traffic safety by the United Nations that such letter was issued in consideration of a growing number of road accidents due to stalled or parked vehicles on the streets and highways.

J.B.L. Reyes vs Bagatsing GR No. 65366 October 25, 1983

Facts Retired Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, in behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition, sought for a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 starting from Luneta to the gates of the United States embassy. The objective of the rally was to peacefully protest the removal of all foreign military bases and to present a petition containing such to a representative of the Embassy so it may be delivered to the United States Ambassador. This petition was to initially compel the Mayor of the City of Manila to make a decision on the application for a permit but it was discovered that a denial has already been sent through mail. It also included a provision that if it be held somewhere else, permit may be issued. The respondent mayor alleges that holding the rally in front of the US Embassy is a violation of the resolutions during the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations adopted in 1961 and of which the Philippines is a signatory. In the doctrine of incorporation, the Philippines has to comply with such generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. The petitioner, on the other hand, contends that the denial of the permit is a violation of the constitutional right of the freedom of speech and expression. Issue Whether or not the Anti-Bases Coalition should be allowed to hold a peaceful protest rally in front of the US Embassy Ruling The Supreme Court ruled to allow the rally in front of the US Embassy to protect the exercise of the rights to free speech and peaceful assembly and on the ground that there was no showing of the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that could justify the denial of the permit. These rights are not only assured by our constitution but also provided for in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Between the two generally accepted principles of diplomatic

relations and human rights, the former takes higher ground. The right of the freedom of expression and peaceful assembly is highly ranked in the scheme of constitutional values.

The facts: At the core of the controversy are the "Shangri-La" mark and "S" logo. Respondent DGCI claims ownership of said mark and logo in the Philippines on the strength of its prior use thereof within the country. As DGCI stresses at every turn, it filed on October 18, 1982 with the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer (BPTTT) pursuant to Sections 2 and 4 of Republic Act (RA) No. 166,3 as amended, an application for registration covering the subject mark and logo. On May 31, 1983, the BPTTT issued in favor of DGCI the corresponding certificate of registration therefor, i.e., Registration No. 31904. Since then, DGCI started using the "Shangri-La" mark and "S" logo in its restaurant business. On the other hand, the Kuok family owns and operates a chain of hotels with interest in hotels and hotel-related transactions since 1969. As far back as 1962, it adopted the name "Shangri-La" as part of the corporate names of all companies organized under the aegis of the Kuok Group of Companies (the Kuok Group). The Kuok Group has used the name "Shangri-La" in all Shangri-La hotels and hotel-related establishments around the world which the Kuok Family owned. To centralize the operations of all Shangri-la hotels and the ownership of the "Shangri-La" mark and "S" logo, the Kuok Group had incorporated in Hong Kong and Singapore, among other places, several companies that form part of the Shangri-La International Hotel Management Ltd. Group of Companies. EDSA Shangri-La Hotel and Resort, Inc., and Makati Shangri-La Hotel and Resort, Inc. were incorporated in the Philippines beginning 1987 to own and operate the two (2) hotels put up by the Kuok Group in Mandaluyong and Makati, Metro Manila. It is principally upon the foregoing factual backdrop that respondent DGCI filed a complaint for Infringement and Damages with the RTC of Quezon City against the herein petitioners SLIHM, Shangri-La Properties, Inc., Makati Shangri-La Hotel & Resort, Inc., and Kuok Philippine Properties, Inc., docketed as Civil Case No. Q-91-8476 and eventually raffled to Branch 99 of said court. The complaint with prayer for injunctive relief and damages alleged that DGCI has, for the last eight (8) years, been the prior exclusive user in the Philippines of the mark and logo in question and the registered owner thereof for its restaurant and allied services. As DGCI alleged in its complaint, SLIHM, et al., in promoting and advertising their hotel and other allied projects then under construction in the country, had been using a mark and logo confusingly similar, if not identical, with its mark and "S" logo. Accordingly, DGCI sought to prohibit the petitioners, as defendants a quo, from using the "Shangri-La" mark and "S" logo in their hotels in the Philippines. In their Answer with Counterclaim, the petitioners accused DGCI of appropriating and illegally using the "Shangri-La" mark and "S" logo, adding that the legal and beneficial ownership thereof pertained to SLIHM and that the Kuok Group and its related companies had been using this mark and logo since March 1962 for all their corporate names and affairs. In this regard, they point to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property as affording security and protection to SLIHM's exclusive right to said mark and logo. They further claimed having used, since late 1975, the internationally-known and specially-designed "Shangri-La" mark and "S" logo for all the hotels in their hotel chain. There are two preliminary issues, however, that respondent DGCI calls our attention to, namely: 1. Whether the certification against forum-shopping submitted on behalf of the petitioners is sufficient; 2. Whether the issues posed by petitioners are purely factual in nature hence improper for resolution in the instant petition for review on certiorari. The term "trade mark" includes any word, name, symbol, emblem, sign or device or any combination thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and distinguish them from those manufactured, sold or dealt in by others. The term "service mark" means a mark used in the sale or advertising of services to identify the services of one person and distinguish them from the services of others and includes without limitation the marks, names, symbols, titles, designations, slogans, character names, and distinctive features of radio or other advertising. [Emphasis supplied] Clearly, from the broad definitions quoted above, the petitioners can be considered as having used the "Shangri-La" name and "S" logo as a tradename and service mark. The new Intellectual Property Code (IPC), Republic Act No. 8293, undoubtedly shows the firm resolve of the Philippines to observe and follow the Paris Convention by incorporating the relevant portions of the Convention such that persons who may question a mark (that is, oppose registration, petition for the cancellation thereof, sue for unfair competition) include persons whose internationally well-known mark, whether or not registered, is identical with or confusingly similar to or constitutes a translation of a mark that is sought to be registered or is actually registered.37 However, while the Philippines was already a signatory to the Paris Convention, the IPC only took effect on January 1, 1988, and in the absence of a retroactivity clause, R.A. No. 166 still applies.38 Under the prevailing law and jurisprudence at the time, the CA had not erred in ruling that:

The Paris Convention mandates that protection should be afforded to internationally known marks as signatory to the Paris Convention, without regard as to whether the foreign corporation is registered, licensed or doing business in the Philippines. It goes without saying that the same runs afoul to Republic Act No. 166, which requires the actual use in commerce in the Philippines of the subject mark or devise. The apparent conflict between the two (2) was settled by the Supreme Court in this wise "Following universal acquiescence and comity, our municipal law on trademarks regarding the requirement of actual use in the Philippines must subordinate an international agreement inasmuch as the apparent clash is being decided by a municipal tribunal (Mortensen vs. Peters, Great Britain, High Court of Judiciary of Scotland, 1906, 8 Sessions 93; Paras, International Law and World Organization, 1971 Ed., p. 20). Withal, the fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over national law in the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of international law are given a standing equal, not superior, to national legislative enactments (Salonga and Yap, Public International Law, Fourth ed., 1974, p. 16)."39 [Emphasis supplied] Consequently, the petitioners cannot claim protection under the Paris Convention. Nevertheless, with the double infirmity of lack of two-month prior use, as well as bad faith in the respondent's registration of the mark, it is evident that the petitioners cannot be guilty of infringement. It would be a great injustice to adjudge the petitioners guilty of infringing a mark when they are actually the originator and creator thereof. Nor can the petitioners' separate personalities from their mother corporation be an obstacle in enforcement of their rights as part of the Kuok Group of Companies and as official repository, manager and operator of the subject mark and logo. Besides, R.A. No. 166 did not require the party seeking relief to be the owner of the mark but "any person who believes that he is or will be damaged by the registration of a mark or trade name."40 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated May 15, 2003 and September 15, 2003, respectively, and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City dated March 8, 1996 are hereby SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the complaint for infringement in Civil Case No. Q-91-8476 is ordered DISMISSED. PHILIPP MORRIS v. CA Petitioner Philip Morris, Inc. is a corporation organized and existing under the law of Virginia, U.S.A. Petitioners Benson & Hedges (Canada), Inc. and Fabriques de Tabac Reunies, S.A., both wholly owned subsidiaries of Philip Morris, Inc., are organized and existing under the law of Canada and Switzerland, respectively. Philip Morris, Inc. is registered owner of the trademark "MARK VII" for cigarettes. Its ownership thereof is evidenced by Philippine Patent Office Trademark Certificate of Registration No. 18723, dated 26 April 1973. The statement attached to the Certificate of Registration states that the trademark "MARK VII" had been registered in the United States Patent Office, on the Principal Register, under Certificate of Registration No. 888,931 issued on 7 April 1970. The statement also requested that the trademark be registered in the Philippine Patent Office on the Principal Register in accordance with Section 37 of R.A. No. 166, as amended. Benson & Hedges (Canada), Inc. is the registered owner of the trademark "MARK TEN" also for cigarettes, as evidenced by Philippine Patent Office Trademark Certificate of Registration No. 11147, dated 28 May 1964, on the Principal Register. This Trademark Certificate of Registration was originally issued in the name of Canadian Tabacofina Ltd. and later assigned to Benson & Hedges (Canada), Inc. Petitioners alleged that the name Canadian Tabacofina Ltd. was later changed to Benson & Hedges (Canada) Ltd. This trademark Certificate of Registration was renewed on 28 May 1984. The statement attached thereto stated that the "date of first use of the trademark 'MARK TEN' in trade in or with the Philippines is April 15, 1963," and that trademark had "been in actual use in commerce over the Philippines continuously for two months." Fabriques de Tabac Reunies, S.A. is registered owner of the trademark "LARK" also for cigarettes, as evidenced by Philippine Patent Office Trademark Certificate of Registration No. 10953, dated 25 March 1964. This Trademark Certificate of Registration was originally issued in the name of Ligget and Myres Tobacco Company was later assigned to Fabriques de Tabac Reunies, S.A. Petitioners alleged that the name of Liggett and Myres Tobacco Company was changed later to Fabriques de Tabac Reunies, S.A. The statement attached to this Certificate of Registration states that the trademark "LARK" was first used by Ligget and Myres Tobacco Company on 31 May 1920, and first used by it "in commerce in or with the Philippines on February 6, 1963" and has been continuously used by it "in trade in or with the Philippines since February 6, 1963." Sometime before 17 October 1981, private respondent Fortune Tobacco Corporation ("Fortune") commenced manufacturing and selling in the Philippines cigarettes under the brandname "MARK." Fortune also filed on 13 February 1981 with the Philippine Patent Office an application for registration of "MARK" as a trademark for cigarettes. By a letter dated 17 October 1981, petitioner through their lawyers wrote to Fortune stating that the manufacturing, selling and advertising of "MARK" cigarettes by Fortune constituted an "infringement or an act of unfair competition with" petitioners' "well-known international trademarks used on cigarettes and tobacco products which were registered worldwide and with the Philippine Patent Office." Petitioners listed their Philippine Certificates of Registration for the trademarks "MARK VII," "MARK TEN," and "LARK." Petitioners then asked Fortune "to cease and desist from further manufacturing; selling or advertising 'MARK' cigarettes," otherwise appropriate court actions would be filed without further notice. On 18 August 1982, petitioners commenced action before the Court of First Instance of Pasig, Metro Manila (Civil Case No. 47374). In their complaint, petitioners alleged that they were not doing business in the Philippines but had nonetheless the right and the capacity to bring the instant suit; that they were owners of Philippine Patent Office

Trademark Certificates of Registration which were in full force and effect, covering "MARK VII," "MARK TEN," and "LARK," all for cigarettes (except the last which also covered chewing and smoking tobacco); that they had registered those trademarks in their respective countries of origin and in other countries the world and that by virtue of their "long and extensive use [had] gained international fame and acceptance;" that they had their respective real and effective industrial or commercial establishments in the United States, Canada and Switzerland, which countries were, like the Philippines, members of the Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property; that under that Convention each member-country undertakes to prohibit the use of a trademark which constitutes a reproduction, imitation or translation of a mark already belonging to a person entitled to the benefits of the Convention and use for identical or similar goods; that petitioner Fabriques de Tabac Reunies, S.A. had long been using trademark "LARK" throughout the world, including the Philippines where its products bearing the trademark "LARK" had been sold in the duty-free market, and advertised and marketted in the Philippines at least since 1964 and have continued to be so to present; that Fortune had without previous consent, authority or license from petitioners, with knowledge of the popularity of petitioners' marks and their Philippine registrations, manufactured, advertised and sold cigarettes bearing the identical or confusingly similar trademark "MARK" which unauthorized use constituted an act of infringement under Section 22 of R.A. No. 166, as amended; that thereby the public and the patronizers of petitioners' products were being deceived into buying Fortune's cigarettes under the impression and mistaken belief that Fortune's cigarettes were identical with, or came from the same source as, petitioners' products or that Fortune was licensee of petitioners, which it was not; that the infringement by Fortune of petitioners' trademarks have inflicted damages upon petitioners; that the continued unauthorized and unlicensed manufacture and sale by Fortune of its infringing products during the litigation would work injustice and cause irreparable injury to petitioners in violation of their property rights and moreover tend to render the judgment which the court might render ineffectual. Petitioners accordingly asked for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain Fortune from manufacturing or selling "MARK" cigarettes, and after trial, to make such preliminary injunction permanent and to order Fortune's infringing materials to be destroyed, and for damages. Fortune filed an Opposition to petitioners' prayer for preliminary injunction. On 28 March 1983, the trial court 1issued an Order denying petitioners' motion for preliminary injunction. In rendering that order, the trial court, while noting that petitioners were holders of Philippine Certificates of Trademark Registration, relied heavily on three (3) factors: Firstly, that petitioners were foreign corporations not doing business in the Philippines; Secondly, that Fortune's application for a registration as trademark of the word "MARK" for cigarettes was then pending before the Philippine Patent Office; and Thirdly, that Fortune was the "only party authorized" by the Bureau of Internal Revenue ("BIR") to manufacture cigarettes bearing the mark "MARK" in the Philippines Following universal acquiescence and comity, our municipal law on trademarks regarding the requirement of actual use in the Philippines must subordinate an international agreement inasmuch as the apparent clash is being decided by a municipal tribunal (Mortensen vs. Peters, Great Britain, High Court of Judiciary of Scotland, 1906, 8 Sessions 93; Paras, International Law and World Organization, 1971 Ed., p. 20). Withal, the fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over national law in the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of international law are given a standing equal, not superior, to national legislative enactments (Salonga and Yap, Public International Law, Fourth ed., 1974, p. 16).