Regional Cooperation for Spent Fuels and Radioactive Waste Management in East Asia A Projection Paper

By Frances Therese M. Roxas Introduction While European countries and the United States substantially decreased their nuclear production when they became members of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the reverse happened to states in the East Asian Region (EAR) as well as in Eastern Europe. Because East Asian states are energy resource-scarce and export-dependent in oil, most of them highly invested in research and development for the establishment and expansion of their civilian nuclear power industry. Generally, the industry contributed much to satisfy the energy needs of the states and there has been a growing demand for nuclear energy as these countries economies are rapidly developing. Nuclear energy production had been viewed as a wise alternative to carbon-emitting coal-fire power plants and since global warming threats had been more alarming. However as nuclear accidents increase since the Chernobyl accident in 1986, concerns regarding the safety of nuclear production escalated both in domestic and international level. One of the safety issues concerns the handling of nuclear wastes and this has sparked nuclear debates in the past years. Nuclear wastes retain their radioactivity for a half or full century and could pose threat to health and the environment. The paper contends that proper management of radioactive wastes are crucial to public acceptance of nuclear energy as the best option among other sources. Thus, a sound management of spent fuels is a prerequisite in achieving the goals of building a nuclear industry. These objectives involve economic growth and stable supply of energy and at the same time preserving the environment. The paper argues that radioactive waste is a regional issue in East Asia and must be addressed through a collective action. Although Mongolia does not yet have a nuclear industry, the country engages in mining and processing of radioactive ores which makes radioactive waste a relevant issue for the said country. The paper employs three variables in determining the possibility of regional cooperation for an integrated radioactive waste management (RWM): (1)

state policy, (2) conduct of states with regards to RWM matters, and (3) capability to conduct RWM. The first variable will look into the safety standards the country adopts in the disposal or reprocessing of nuclear wastes. These may be in the form of national legislations or safety standards imposed by a government agency for nuclear energy. The congruency in the context of their policies is important in determining whether cooperation is possible. The second variable will look into the stance of states in light of radioactive waste issues. Specifically, their stance shall be seen in their diplomatic engagements with other states in the regional and international level. These may be in the form of tacit or expressed consent. The foreign relations they have with relevant states in light of radioactive waste issue is also viewed in this paper as an important factor of cooperation in the EAR. Lastly, the paper will look at each states capability to perform radioactive waste management. Capability here is measured through the states availability of necessary technology. It is an important factor for a possible cooperation as it could foster exchange or transfer of knowledge and machinery between technology haves and technology have-nots. State Policy on Radioactive Waste Management The variable is not only limited to written laws of the state but also includes their practices in the management of nuclear wastes. Japan When the country ratified the London Convention and accessioned to the amended Protocol, the country had incorporated their relevant provisions in its domestic law. Radioactive waste management standards were patterned from IAEA safety frameworks. The IAEA had also allowed Japan as a member to conduct reprocessing activities after certain qualifications were met. South Korea As of the moment, South Korea is only allowed by the IAEA (and the United States) to conduct an immediate disposal of spent fuels. But the country has been reconsidering the option for reprocessing due to its inadequate storage sites. In July of this year, IAEA conducted an inspection to South Koreas nuclear facilities and regulations. Its findings suggest that the country has been complying with the

agencys standards on quality of facilities and adequacy of rules and regulations. (Anonymous, IAEA team finds S. Korea's nuclear safety regulations adequate 2011) China The development policy on reprocessing and fast breeder reactors is a response to Chinas interest on reprocessing spent fuels for civilian purposes. The country is not a member of IAEA but according to China, its rules and regulations were based from IAEA standards on safety and disaster preparedness. Mongolia The legal institutions in Mongolia for regulating nuclear energy activities and processes were relatively young (Kotkin 1999). It was only in 2009 that a regulating body for nuclear energy was established as the Nuclear Energy Agency. It was only after its creation that laws were drafted and enacted such as the State Policy for Utilization of Radioactive Minerals and Nuclear Energy and the Nuclear Energy Law (Batjargal 2010). The Nuclear Energy Agency has been conducting reviews and amendments to its radiation safety standards to comply with them with IAEA regulations. The country has been a member since 1983 and has accessioned 105 of its multilateral and safety agreements (IAEA 2011). Taiwan Three laws were promulgated, adding to the Atomic Energy Act which is the first law on nuclear energy matters. These three were Ionizing Radiation Protection Act, the Nuclear Materials and Radioactive Waste Management Act, and the Nuclear Reactor Facilities Regulation Act (Ouyang 2003, p.1). The Ionizing Radiation Protection Act consequently had nineteen supplementary rules which include Nuclear Materials and Radioactive Waste Management Act. (Huang 2010) From an outsiders vantage point, the countrys Cabinet members attempts to quiet down the anti-nukes protests by promising to the public that there will be a phase out process on nuclear power plants, a strict regulation of nuclear waste repository banks and a support to cleaner energy initiatives. There had been policy proposals regarding the ban of nuclear power plants in Taiwan such as Democratic Progressive Party of Taiwans 2025 Nuclear-Free Homeland Initiative. The policy

brief endorses the phasing out of four nuclear power plants and replacing them with alternative energy sources which is viewed as cleaner and environment-friendly. (AEC 2004) Although Taiwan is not a member of IAEA, the country has adhered to the institutions RWM standards specifically on a number of its safeguard agreements. North Korea The spent fuels from the production of nuclear weapons undergo reprocessing in the Radiochemical Laboratory which is suspected by IAEA as a reprocessing site. There had been a nuclear waste depot in Yongbyon but had reached its maximum storage capacity in 1990. There were two others that have not been declared. The country has been defying IAEA standards. Although the country is at times complying to pass annual reports, they are confirmed as inadequate data by the agency through its verification processes. Furthermore, the paper sees the relevance of the proposed denuclearization policies in the issue of radioactive waste management. The country has long been receiving international pressures especially from the United States to dismantle its facilities for building nuclear weapons. Specifically, these are its two plutonium facilities at Yongbyun, the 5MWe nuclear reactor and the Radiochemical Laboratory reprocessing facility (Jooho and Baldwin 2005, iii). However, a critical point in the denuclearization that is neglected by negotiations between North Korea and other states is the management of radioactive wastes derived from dismantling the facilities. From a feasibility study by Sandia National Laboratories, dismantling the two plutonium facilities would entail handling of 50 to 100 metric tons of uranium spent fuels and an additional 500,000 liters of liquid high-level waste from the Radiochemical Laboratory, not to mention hundreds of tons of contaminated concrete and metal from facility dismantlement (Ibid.). The study also projected that there should be established facilities for the dismantlement, decontamination, waste treatment and packaging, and storage (Ibid.) of nuclear wastes. Moreover, the proponents of denuclearization in the Korean Peninsula should first ensure the transhipment of radioactive wastes as the facilities in North Korea would be insufficient for a massive volume of radioactive wastes. Conduct of States Regarding Radioactive Waste Issues

The paper will look into two relevant issues in East Asia today and its countries stance towards it. Stance here would mean states diplomatic actions with other states. The two issues discussed are: (1) reprocessing spent fuel issue and (2) the Fukushima nuclear disaster and implications on nuclear safety. Japan Japan is constantly seeking for United States approval regarding their pursuit of reprocessing spent fuels. It has been doing so not only on matters of radioactive waste management but all aspects of nuclear issue. Its actions have been dependent on what was and what was not agreed by both parties. Mongolia In response to Japans (headed by Toshiba and General Electric) interests in storing in Mongolian soil their spent fuels and other radioactive substances from the Fukushima nuclear crisis, the Ambassador of Mongolia expressed the countrys stance before the IAEA General Assembly. According to Amb. Enkhsaikhan, Mongolia is not prepared to enter into any commercial nuclear fuel leasing agreement that would allow import of foreign spent nuclear fuel nor build an international storage depot for spent nuclear fuel in the country (Enkhsaikhan 2011, p.3). China The United States has been worrisome of Chinas reprocessing activities in light of its non-proliferation policy. Despite the campaign of US to change into direct disposal instead of a closed spent fuel cycle (involves reprocessing), Peoples Republic of China is firm in its commitment to reprocessing as it addresses its growing energy needs and the lack of permanent storage facilities for nuclear wastes. As a response to growing public concern on the threats of radiation leaks brought about by the Fukushima incident, the government expressed its plans for a large-scale expansion of their nuclear industry is to be delayed or be subject to amendments. However, based from the states actions in some nuclear-related incidents in their territory, the postponement will just be on a short period of time

which is enough to appease the public apprehension against the dangers of having nuclear facilities. Taiwan The state vowed not to conduct reprocessing spent fuels because of its due regard to the United States approval on nuclear matters. The pronouncement of President Chiang Ching-kuo not to conduct any reprocessing in September 1976 landmarked its current stance (Feldman and Boureston 2011). Still, getting rid of its spent fuels acquired from their previous nuclear weapons production remains a key problem. There is still a nuclear debate existing among government officials in Taiwan today. However, basing from the foreign relations of the state among others, it seemed that they are maintaining, if not expanding its nuclear industry. After the Fukushima nuclear crisis, Taiwan has engaged in monitoring and evaluation of their nuclear facilities as a response to domestic and international concerns on the capacity of nuclear industries to handle disasters and the safety measures they employ. In line with this, Taiwan and Peoples Republic of China had expressed their willingness to cooperate with one another in order to mitigate such disasters (Anonymous, Taiwan, China plan nuclear safety pact 2011). This would include addressing the issue of radioactive waste disposal. North Korea North Korea laid open to the international community that it had resumed its reprocessing activities in 2009. Whenever its adversaries e.g. United States would take actions against the state such as when US enlisted North Korea as part of the Axis of Evil, one of its retaliating strategy is to re-install its reprocessing sites for spent fuels. South Korea Despite the urgency to conduct reprocessing because of its stockpiled spent fuels, the country is still not able to do so because of its former agreements with the United States and North Korea.

Capability to Conduct Radioactive Waste Management This section of the paper is limited to discussions on two general processes involved in managing nuclear spent fuels. These are spent fuel reprocessing and disposal. When spent fuels undergo reprocessing, uranium and plutonium are separated from other waste substances since a processed nuclear fuel contains plutonium and uranium-235. A separated uranium and plutonium can be utilized as fuels in nuclear reactors. A MOX fuel fabrication plant converts plutonium into Mixed Oxide fuels. Disposal involves a process of In the analysis part of the paper, there will be a discussion on the possibility of addressing RWM capability issues regionally. Japan Reprocessing Capacity Japan has established reprocessing policies on nuclear spent fuels. Reprocessing entails recycling the converted plutonium and residual uranium (nuclear wastes) into mixed oxide (MOX) which can be used as fuels for light water reactors. Reprocessing could also involve mere reprocessing of plutonium which end-product can be used to fuel fast-breeders. The country had been doing reprocessing efforts at Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (LWR) and intends to establish another factory. However, the efforts to a large-scale reprocessing is being halted by the United States reproach on recycling spent fuels as it produces a kind of plutonium that could be used in making nuclear weapons and thus increases the cynicism of the former to Japan non-proliferation commitments. Since the operation in the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant was halted, Japan exports its spent fuels to France and Russia for reprocessing. The substances produced from a reprocessing plant could only be more useful fuel in fast breeder reactors. Thus, the countrys nuclear energy development includes establishment of fast breeder reactors in the future. Monju fast breeder reactor had operated in 1994 but stopped the next year due to a sodium fire. It reopened in 2010 but was again discontinued due to some accidents that happened in the process. Fast-breeders are planned to push-through only after 2050. For the mean time, it plans to purchase light-water reactors accepting Mixed Oxide as fuels and intends to build 16 to 18 power plants in 2016. Furthermore, the temporary storage facility in Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant cannot keep up with the increasing nuclear

energy production. Thus, the country plans to open another reprocessing plant in 2050. Geologic Disposal Capacity Rokkasho Power Plant has hosted the place for Low-level Radioactive Waste
Disposal Centre, a temporary storage facility owned by Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited. It has a capacity to store 400 000 drums of low-level radioactive wastes and the latest secondary data found by the researcher suggests that 130 000 drums had already been buried at the site as early as 1999. The nuclear energy development policy of Japan also highlights research and development programmes on RWM. Japans Special Committee has been exploring possibilities on how to manage high-level radioactive wastes. Japan has not yet closed the option of dumping HLW in the sub-seabed despite the ban in the London Convention. Together with UK, France, the US, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium and the Netherlands, the country contends that with the adequate drilling gears and containers (i.e. free-fall penetrators

that would drill the seabed open and force the container into it), dumping radioactive wastes in the sub-seabed is a safe option. Furthermore, the countrys Nuclear Waste Management Organization has yet to find for a final geological repository site for high-level radioactive wastes but strives to have one in 2030. (Parmentier 1999) South Korea Geologic Disposal Capacity South Korea sought to have a full-scale expansion of its nuclear industry and aspires to become a major exporter of nuclear technology. This is evident on its development policy to further build 18 nuclear power plants before 2030. However, the management of radioactive wastes is lagging behind the rapid growth of nuclear energy industry. Because of protests of local citizenry whenever the government declares an area a potential repository site, it is gridlocked on the problem. Furthermore, the local government of South Korea possesses veto powers to central government decisions that affect their area. Thus, coming up with legal mandates on repository sites are often caught in a gridlock. But temporarily, the government allows the spent fuel to be kept in water-filled storage pools (Adler, et al. 2011). When a centralized temporary nuclear waste depot is already available, the spent fuels will be transferred there. However, the capacity of storage pools is decreasing and there are lesser rooms to accommodate for more spent fuels.

Reprocessing Capacity The government is opting for pyroprocessing as a way to address the lack of repository sites of spent fuel despite its promises not to in the 1992 agreed framework with North Korea. This recycling process is aimed at reusing the spent fuels while reducing the volume and radioactivity of nuclear wastes. This would imply that the number of years that the waste remains radioactive would be reduced and thus would also lessen health and environmental risks in the future. (Adler, et al. 2011) The official research agency of South Korea, the Korean Atomic Energy Research promotes pyroprocessing as the method could provide for a solution to the limited space problem in underground repository sites. Peoples Republic of China Reprocessing Capability As of the moment, the countrys initiatives on establishing and operating reprocessing sites and fast breeder reactors could not satisfy with the rapidly increasing rate of nuclear energy production. However, China is trying to bridging the gap by building a reprocessing facility in Gansu Province and an experimental fast breeder reactor in the exterior of Beijing. Moreover, China is securing reprocessing plants for the future by commissioning AREVA, a French company to build reprocessing site with an 800-ton/year capacity (Adler, et al. 2011). Reprocessing spent fuels is considered to be a better option than direct disposal as it would add up to its fuel supply and lessen uranium exports. The country has been exploring possible uranium sources around the world for its future consumption and saw that it might exhaust these resources given the current rate of their energy increase and the current value of uranium. Reprocessing intentions of China has brought apprehension to the United States and convinces China for an alternative fuel cycle but the latter didnt give notice yet to the proposal. Geological Disposal Capacity For the countries Japan and South Korea, their efforts to find geologic repository sites have been stalled by public protests. This scenario is unlikely in the case of China as its citizens remained quiet in the issue of radioactive wastes and will face minimal problems in locating for waste depot within their territory. The country

temporarily stores its spent fuels on reactor sites. A permanent storage facility for high-level nuclear waste is yet to be built in 2050 while there is one for low- and intermediate level nuclear waste which is the Lanzhou Nuclear Fuel Complex. The growing nuclear energy production overwhelms the storage facility in China as spent fuels also continue to rise in volume. Mongolia Since nuclear industry is yet to be established until 2020, there is no discharge of purely radioactive wastes. However, there are mining and thermal energy production which give out ash wastes and have radioactive substances on it. These are disposed in landfills. (Batjargal 2010) Taiwan Inadequate technology is used in containing radioactive wastes and is evident in the diminishing quality of waste containers which is attributed to the low-quality method of fortifying the wastes and the poor condition of the storage facilities. This may pose risks of radiation leakage. Furthermore, there is still no permanent storage site for radioactive wastes since the proposal for Lan-yu Island as a potential location sparked protests from the local citizenry in 2003 (Ouyang 2003). Thus the government had to calm down the public by removing the proposed location from the list. North Korea Reprocessing Capacity The IAEA identified the radiochemical laboratory of North Korea as a nuclear waste reprocessing site. The facility started to conduct reprocessing activities as early as 1987 and since then, the operations would at one point discontinue operations (e.g. due to the 1994 Agreed Framework) and then resume operations (e.g. when US termed the state as Axis of Evil). Disposal Capacity

DPRK had been three dumping sites for radioactive wastes in Yongbyon. The first one commenced operation in 1976 and ended in 1990. The two others were undeclared facilities to IAEA. Analysis State Policy on RWM Although there is yet a regional institution for cooperation in the East Asian Region, the presence of congruent domestic laws and the adherence to same international treaties and standards is substantial enough to create an integrated management and regulation of radioactive wastes in the region. Most of the countries have ratified or are signatories of international treaties such as London Convention/Protocol and other related treaties. A number of them are also participative members of International Atomic Energy Agency, except for North Korea which is blacklisted for its nuclear weapons production. But then again, IAEA is viewed in this aspect as an important factor for the integration of policies in RWM. Mongolia has been expressing its interest in nuclear safety efforts in several IAEA meetings in preparation for its future nuclear energy industry. Formal policy integration in East Asia will most likely be supported by Mongolia. In the case of North Korea, it cannot fully participate in regional cooperation initiatives as long as there is animosity by its neighbours and the United States. Full integration of North Korea to the regional community will be a long process as it would involve series of compromise in light of the denuclearization issue. RWM Capability Japan, China and South Korea pose similar issues in managing radioactive wastes. First, they lack a strategic geological location for repository sites. Second, they do not have enough facilities i.e. reprocessing facilities and equipments and limited fast breeder reactors. Third, they are dependent on reprocessing facilities from foreign countries e.g. France and Russia. Fourth, they are receiving constant pressure from the United States to find for spent fuel cycle alternatives as it fears for a possible nuclear proliferation. Reprocessing would involve a trans boundary transport of spent fuels which might pose risk of the spent fuels being stolen and be used for nuclear weapons.

The resemblance of issues faced by East Asian countries could open the possibility of taking actions collectively. A proposal from the School of Public and International Affairs in Princeton University suggests East Asian states could pursue international repository sites since having individual national repositories would be more expensive to maintain. It would also be viewed as a rational action if we take into consideration the geopolitics in the state. For instance, Japan and South Korea have thriving nuclear energy industries but with dense populations and very scarce strategic locations to build upon a repository site. Several countries have shown their interests in accommodating an international repository site in their territory such as Mongolia and Russia. Mongolia is viewed to be a less strategic location since they have yet to have adequate facilities and infrastructures. Furthermore, its land-locked position was seen as a disadvantage. However, some scholars would argue that an international repository sites could heighten transit disputes in the region. This would call for an establishment of a regional body that would regulate the transportation of spent fuels. Conduct of States Peoples Republic of China, Japan and South Korea has expressed its plans to pursue reprocessing spent fuels to address the lack of storage facilities for nuclear wastes, high reliance on uranium export and growing energy needs. Their similar predicaments may allow for a joint research and development on reprocessing activities. The cooperation however will not be participated by the whole region as there are countries that will be adamant in their commitments not to involve themselves with reprocessing activities. Taiwan will be most likely not to join if it could not get the consent of United States. In the 6th Jeju Forum, Ambassador Kim of South Korea that the agenda of the Global Nuclear Security Summit in 2012 should add nuclear safety and disaster management in response to the Fukushima nuclear crisis (Hayes 2011). This would include discussions for possible integration of radioactive waste management standards and agreements to provide technological assistance for such cause.

Conclusion Radioactive wastes are an indispensable part of any nuclear energy development and these must be managed in order to maintain safety and prevent disasters. East Asia comprises of nuclear energy states and states having potentials to establish this kind of industry. As nuclear energy industries continue to expand, there would be greater need to explore for possible means to manage its spent fuels. The radioactive waste issue should be addressed regionally as it is an issue faced by every East Asian state and would be cost-effective to conduct multilateral actions to solve the problem.

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