INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS

MERIDA V. PEOPLE G.R. No. 158182 June 12, 2008 Ponente: Carpio FACTS: Petitioner was charged in the RTC of Romblon with violation of Section 68 of PD 705for "cutting, gathering, collecting and removing a lone narra tree inside a private land over which private complainant Oscar Tansiongco claims ownership. When confronted during the meeting about the felled narra tree, petitioner admitted cutting the tree but claimed that he did so with the permission of one Vicar Calix who, according to petitioner, bought the Mayod Property from Tansiongco in October 1987 under a pacto de retro sale. It was later found out that he converted the narra trunk into lumber. He was found guilty by the Trial Court but he appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his defense of denial. Petitioner also contended that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because it was based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a forest officer as provided under Section 80 of PD 705. CA affirmed the lower court’s ruling, but ordered the seized lumber confiscated in the government's favor. Also, it sustained the trial court's finding that petitioner is bound by his extrajudicial admissions of cutting the narra tree in the Mayod Property without any DENR permit. ISSUE:

1) W/N the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2207 even though it was
based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a DENR forest officer. – YES.

2) W/N petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705. – YES.
RATIO: 1. The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure list the cases which must be initiated by a complaint filed by specified individuals, non-compliance of which ousts the trial court of jurisdiction from trying such cases. However, these cases concern only defamation and other crimes against chastity and not to cases concerning Section 68 of PD 705. Further, Section 80 of PD 705 does not prohibit an interested person from filing a complaint before any qualified officer for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. Moreover, here, it was not "forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest Development” who reported to Hernandez the tree-cutting in the Mayod Property but Tansiongco, a private citizen who claims ownership over the Mayod Property. Thus, Hernandez cannot be faulted for not conducting an investigation to determine "if there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report." At any rate, Tansiongco was not precluded, either under Section 80 of PD 705 or the Revised Rules, from filing a complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor for petitioner's alleged violation of Section 68 of PD 705. 2) Petitioner is guilt of the second paragraph of section 80, which is the cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing of timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority. The court also said that the lumber or “processed log “is covered by the “forest products” term in PD 705, as the law does not distinguish between a raw and processed timber.

PROVIDENT TREE FARMS V. BATARIO

ATTY. VILLEGAS

1

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS

G.R. No. 92285 March 28, 1994 Ponente: Bellosillo FACTS: Petitioner PTFI is a Philippine corporation engaged in industrial tree planting. It grows gubas trees in its plantations which it supplies to a local match manufacturer solely for production of matches. In consonance with the state policy to encourage qualified persons to engage in industrial tree plantation, Sec. 36, par. (1), of the Revised Forestry Code confers on entities like PTFI a set of incentives among which is a qualified ban against importation of wood and "wood-derivated" products. On 5 April 1989, private respondent A. J. International Corporation (AJIC) imported 4 containers of matches from Indonesia and 2 or more containers of matches from Singapore. On 25 April 1989, upon request of PTFI, Secretary Factoran of the DENR issued a certification that "there are enough available softwood supply in the Philippines for the match industry at reasonable price." In light of this, PTFI filed with the RTC of Manila a complaint for injunction and damages with prayer for a TRO against respondents Commissioner of Customs and AJIC to enjoin the latter from importing matches and "wood-derivated" products, and the Collector of Customs from allowing and releasing the importations. The case was raffled to respondent Judge Demetrio M. Batario. Lower court ruled in favor of respondents, stating that it had "no jurisdiction to determine what are legal or illegal importations." ISSUE: W/N The Commissioner of Customs under Sec. 1207 of the Tariff and Customs Code and not the regular court, has "exclusive jurisdiction to determine the legality of an importation, and other incidental matters relating to such. – YES. RATIO: The enforcement of the importation ban under Sec. 36, par. (l), of the Revised Forestry Code is within the exclusive realm of the Bureau of Customs, and direct recourse of petitioner to the Regional Trial Court to compel the Commissioner of Customs to enforce the ban is devoid of any legal basis. An order of a judge to impound, seize or forfeit must inevitably be based on his determination and declaration of the invalidity of the importation, hence, an usurpation of the prerogative and an encroachment on the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. Also, PTFI's correspondence with the Bureau of Customs contesting the legality of match importations may already take the nature of an administrative proceeding the pendency of which would preclude the court from interfering with it under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

PEOPLE V. CFI

ATTY. VILLEGAS

2

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS

G.R. No. L-46772 February 13, 1992 Ponente: Medialdea FACTS: The private respondents were charged with the crime of qualified theft of logs, defined and punished under Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines. The information provided that Godofredo Arrozal and Luis Flores, together with 20 other John Does whose identities are still unknown, the first-named accused being the administrator of the Infanta Logging Corporation, conspired and entered the privately-owned land of one Felicitacion Pujalte, titled in the name of her deceased father, Macario Prudente, and proceeded to illegally cut, gather, and take, therefrom, without the consent of the said owner and without any authority under a license agreement, 60 logs of different species. On March 23, 1977, the named accused filed a motion to quash the information on 2 grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense; and, (2) that the information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form. Trial court thus dismissed the information based on the respondent’s grounds. ISSUE: W/N the information correctly and properly charged an offense and WON the trial court had jurisdiction over the case. – YES. RATIO: The elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs are: 1) That the accused cut, gathered, collected or removed timber or other forest products; 2) that the timber or other forest products cut, gathered, collected or removed belongs to the government or to any private individual; and 3) that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removing was without authority under a license agreement, lease, license, or permit granted by the state. The failure of the information to allege that the logs taken were owned by the state is not fatal. It should be noted that the logs subject of the complaint were taken not from a public forest but from a private woodland registered in the name of complainant's deceased father, Macario Prudente. The fact that only the state can grant a license agreement, license or lease does not make the state the owner of all the logs and timber products produced in the Philippines including those produced in private woodlands. Thus, ownership is not an essential element of the offense as defined in Section 60 of P.D. No. 705. As to the second issue raised, the regular courts still has jurisdiction. Sec. 80 of PD 705 covers 2 specific instances when a forest officer may commence a prosecution for the violation of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines. The first authorizes a forest officer or employee of the Bureau of Forestry to arrest without a warrant, any person who has committed or is committing, in his presence, any of the offenses described in the decree. The second covers a situation when an offense described in the decree is not committed in the presence of the forest officer or employee and the commission is brought to his attention by a report or a complaint. In both cases, however, the forest officer or employee shall investigate the offender and file a complaint with the appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary investigation and file the necessary informations in court. Unfortunately, the instant case do not fall under any of the situations covered by Section 80 of P.D. 705. The alleged offense was committed not in the presence of a forest officer and neither was the alleged commission reported to any forest officer. The offense was committed in a private land and the complaint was brought by a private offended party to the fiscal. As such, the OSG was correct in insisting that P.D. 705 did not repeal Section 1687 of the Administrative Code giving authority to the fiscal to conduct investigation into the matter of any crime or misdemeanor and have the necessary information or complaint prepared or made against persons charged with the commission of the crime. In short, Sec. 80 does not grant exclusive authority to the forest officers, but only special authority to reinforce the exercise of such by those upon whom it is vested by general law.

LAGUA V. CUSI

ATTY. VILLEGAS

3

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS

G.R. No. L-44649 April 15, 1988 Ponente: Guiterrez, Jr. FACTS: This is a mandamus case filed against respondents for closing a logging road without authority. The private respondents extended that as the acts complained of by the petitioners arose out of the legitimate exercise of respondent Eastcoast Development Enterprises’ rights as a timber licensee, more particularly in the use of its logging roads, therefore, the resolution of this question is properly and legally within the Bureau of Forest Development, citing as authority Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705. The lower court affirmed the respondent’s defense, stating that the petitioners must first seek recourse with the Bureau of Forest Development to determine the legality of the closure of the logging roads, before seeking redress with the regular courts for damages. ISSUE: W/N the regular courts can take cognizance of the damages case without first seeking the determination of the Bureau regarding the legality of the closure. – YES. RATIO: P.D. No. 705 upon which the respondent court based its order does not vest any power in the Bureau of Forest Development to determine whether or not the closure of a logging road is legal or illegal and to make such determination a pre-requisite before an action for damages may be maintained. Moreover, the complaint instituted by the petitioners is clearly for damages based on the alleged illegal closure of the logging road. Whether or not such closure was illegal is a matter to be established on the part of the petitioners and a matter to be disproved by the private respondents. This should appropriately be threshed out in a judicial proceeding. It is beyond the power and authority of the Bureau of Forest Development to determine the unlawful closure of a passage way, much less award or deny the payment of damages based on such closure. Not every activity inside a forest area is subject to the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development.

MUSTANG LUMBER V. CA G.R. No. 104988

ATTY. VILLEGAS

4

Robles then submitted a memorandum report to Factoran. VILLEGAS 5 . FACTS: A consolidation of three cases. RATIO:While PD 705 explicitly provides that timber is included in the term “forest products”. the law uses the word “lumber” in its plain and common usage. Jr. 68 of the Revised Forestry Code. were able to execute an administrative seizure of different kinds of lumber. ordering the cancellation of petitioner’s Dealers Permit. it is safe to conclude that the law makes no distinction whether the forest product is processed or not. 1996 Ponente: Davide. filing of criminal charges. Hence. Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in a lumber dealer registered with the Bureau of Forest Development. Factoran and Atty. Lower court ruled in favor of respondents. to which the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the documents such as corresponding certificate of lumber origin and auxiliary invoices which shall prove the legitimacy of their source and origin. ATTY. the term lumber is found in paragraph (aa) of Section 3 which states that the latter is a processed log or processed forest raw material. it shall be interpreted as such. – NO. Respondents are DENR Sec. and in the absence of a legislative intent to the contrary. Robles of the Special Actions and Investigations Division (SAID) of the DENR. Therefore. Clearly. ISSUE: W/N a lumber cannot be considered timber and that petitioner should not be held for illegal logging under Sec. Judge Teresita Capulong committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case. the SAID team went to the lumberyard of petitioner and based on a search warrant. and confiscation of the trucks and lumbers. stating that possession of lumber without permit or authority is not a crime.INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS June 18. Acting based on an information.

and upon inquiry. VILLEGAS 6 . – YES. the drivers could not produce any permit for the lumber. he was not around when Bertodazo loaded the trucks with the lumber hidden under the bags of cement.INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS TIGOY V. He. was allegedly introduced by his friend Gamad Muntod to Lolong Bertodazo who signified his intent to rent the trucks of Ong to transport construction materials from Lanao del Norte to Dipolog City. CA G. even offered grease money to the policemen. A Contract to Transport was supposedly entered into between Ong and Bertodazo. 2) by possessing timber or other forest products without the required legal documents. RATIO: There are two ways of violating Section 68 of the above Code: 1) by cutting. 2006 Ponente: Azcuna FACTS: On August 3. the police officers discovered piles of sawn lumber beneath the cement bags in both trucks. No. In offenses considered as mala prohibita. policemen apprehended the trucks driven by Tigoy. Nestor Ong. and. 1993. the commission of the prohibited act is the crime itself. Also. Sumagang and the rest of their companions were apprehended by the police officers in flagrante delicto as they were transporting the subject lumber from Larapan to Dipolog City. He believed that what he was transporting were bags of cement in view of the contract between Ong and Bertodazo. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law. who had been engaged in the trucking business in Iligan City since 1986. Thereafter the Forester of the DENR named Dingal investigated and then charged petitioner with violation of Section 68 of PD 705 for illegal possession of lumber without permit. 144640 June 26. ISSUE: W/N Tigoy is guilty of conspiracy in possessing or transporting lumber without permit. Petitioner Tigoy and a certain Sumagang were then employed as truck drivers of Ong.R. gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest products without a license. based on a suspicion that “hot items” were loaded therein. however. Petitioner maintains that he could not have conspired with Lolong Bertodazo as he did not know about the unlicensed lumber in the trucks. and that it is done knowingly and consciously. the court is unconvinced because Tigoy refused to stop at a checkpoint and when accosted. Upon inspection. ATTY.Petitioner was charged with and convicted of transporting lumber without a permit which is punishable under Section 68 of the Code. Due to a dispatch.

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS PEOPLE V. ATTY.O. the court rejected Que’s argument that the law only penalizes possession of illegal forest products and that the possessor cannot be held liable if he proves that the cutting. The phrase should be construed to refer to laws and regulations existing at the time of possession of timber or other forest products. 277 considers the mere possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents as malum prohibitum. gathering. 1994. 68 of PD 705. Statutory construction should not kill but give life to the law.R. There were three persons on board the truck: driver Cacao. but inserted therein where sewn lumber. who was the owner of said truck. collecting or removal of such forest products is legal. gathering. did not indicate the particular documents necessary to make the possession legal. The suggested interpretation is strained and would render the law inutile. Acting on said information. – YES. The police then checked the cargo and found that it contained coconut slabs. There are 2 distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of P. or from private land without any authority. In the second offense. The facts show that two weeks before March 8. however. QUE G. a member of the Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging. No. and an unnamed person. Also. it is immaterial whether the cutting. In the first offense. or timber from alienable or disposable public land.O. O. ISSUE: W/N petitioner violated Section 68 of P. Mere possession of forest products without the proper documents consummates the crime. Wilson Que. 277 that amended Section 68. and (2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under existing forest laws and regulations. DENR Administrative Order No. collecting or removing timber or other forest products by presenting the authorization issued by the DENR. 120365 December 17. 705.D. to wit: (1) Cutting. 705. received an information that a ten-wheeler truck loaded with illegally cut lumber will pass through Ilocos Norte. VILLEGAS 7 . 277. Thus Que’s possession of the subject lumber without any documentation clearly constitutes an offense under Section 68 of P. Que failed to do so and thus was charged for violation of Sec. 705 because E. When required to show a permit. as admitted by Que himself.D. 59 series of 1993 specifies the documents required for the transport of timber and other forest products. and considering that other laws and regulations did not exist at the time of the enactment of said E. gathering. collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest land. which penalizes the possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents. Held: Appellant interprets the phrase “existing forest laws and regulations” to refer to those laws and regulations which were already in effect at the time of the enactment of E. Whether or not the lumber comes from a legal source is immaterial because E.D. collecting and removal of the forest products is legal or not.O. gathering. 1996 Ponente: Puno FACTS: Accused-appellant Wilson Que appeals from his conviction for violation of Section 68 of PD 705. members of the Provincial Task Force went on patrol several times within the vicinity of General Segundo Avenue in Laoag City and eventually saw the truck. one can raise as a defense the legality of the acts of cutting.

stating that the mere seizure of a motor vehicle pursuant to the authority granted by Section 68 of P. CA G. again were not able to report the seizure to the DENR Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because private respondents immediately went to court and applied for a writ of replevin. 705 as amended by E. and even granted recovery of possession to them via replevin.O. in failing to follow such procedure. series of 1990. Hence. 115634 April 27. It would be absurd to require a confiscation order or notice and hearing before said seizure could be effected under the circumstances. Gabon and Abuganda. then filed a criminal complaint against Abuganda.R. Petitioner. Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer. RATIO: Upon apprehension of the illegally-cut timber while being transported without pertinent documents that could evidence title to or right to possession of said timber. regulations. respondent CA noted that the petitioners failed to observe the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. the apprehending team seized and impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber. The DENR Administrative Order No. was confirmed by the admission of petitioners’ counsel that no confiscation order has been issued prior to the seizure of the vehicle and the filing of the replevin suit. 59. No. added the appellate court. 277 does not automatically place said conveyance in custodia legis. series of 1990. No. a warrantless seizure of the involved vehicles and their load was allowed under Section 78 and 89 of the Revised Forestry Code. is one such regulation. Thus. when one of the motor vehicles was apprehended and impounded for the second time. 59. the drivers of the vehicles. For it is property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of the law. petitioners’ failure to comply with the procedure laid down by DENR Administrative Order No. for violation of Section 68 of PD 705 as amended by Executive Order 277.INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS CALUB V. series of 1990 was justifiably explained. and not otherwise ATTY. Moreover. The seizure of the vehicles and their load was done upon their apprehension for a violation of the Revised Forestry Code. 59. They were unable to submit a report of the seizure to the DENR Secretary. 59. No. It is subject to pertinent laws. failed to present proper documents and/or licenses. drivers of the seized vehicles. the Court of Appeals denied said petition. forcibly took the impounded vehicles from the custody of the DENR. Lower court ruled in favor of accused. – YES.D. Therefore. according to the appellate court. VILLEGAS 8 . series of 1990. Then again. Felipe Calub. Upon petitioner’s appeal. to give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle. It could not be subject to an action for replevin. Additionally. the appellate court said. the subject vehicles could not be considered in custodia legis ISSUE: W/N said motor vehicles are in custodial legis pursuant to Section 68 of PD 705. (Revised Forestry Code). since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in accordance with law. and to render a report of their findings and recommendations to the Secretary. 2000 Ponente: Quisumbing FACTS: the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR apprehended 2 motor vehicles wherein Constancio Abuganda and Pio Gabon. Petitioners did not submit a report of the seizure to the Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because on the 3rd day following the seizure. or policies on that matter. the petitioners. such authority of the Department Head of the DENR or his duly authorized representative to order the confiscation and disposition of illegally obtained forest products and the conveyance used for that purpose is not absolute and unqualified. According to the appellate court. Note further that petitioners’ failure to observe the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. in our view the subject vehicles were validly deemed in custodia legis.

to which the court denied because of lack of service to the respondents. if any. petitioner Factoran.) No. there would be interference with the possession before the function of law had been performed as to the process under which the property was taken. and discovered the discrepancies in the documentation of the narra lumber. and brought the truck and its cargo to the Personnel Investigation Committee/Special Actions and Investigation Division (PIC/SAID) of the DENR Office in Quezon City. petitioner Atty. CA G. RATIO: Firstly. Vicente Robles of the PIC/SAID investigated them. When a thing is in official custody of a judicial or executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ. Consequently. Due to the failure of respondents to show the required documents. 1999 Ponente: De Leon. the said order to the Office of the President. 705. Sec. Nevertheless. 705 which requires delivery of the seized forest products within 6 hours from the time of the seizure to the appropriate official designated by law to conduct preliminary investigations applies only to criminal prosecutions provided for in Sec. In the case at bar. If only a mechanistic averment thereof is offered. 1988. No. Private respondents neither asked for reconsideration of nor appealed.R. – NO. VILLEGAS 9 . ATTY. in order for replevin to prosper. They apprehended the truck driver.D. Jr. No. However. No. committed in the administrative forum. 277. Property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is deemed to be in custodia legis. to which the trial court acceded. 68. 2 police officers of the Marikina intercepted a six-wheeler truck. 1989. the writ should not be issued. D. Court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision.O. No. Respondents then filed for preliminary injunction and replevin. carrying narra lumber as it was cruising along the Marcos Highway. should not entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have been given an appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors. 93540 December 13. 8 of P. Petitioner then refused to obey the writ of seizure and filed a counterbond. Courts. for reasons of law. Otherwise. petitioners waived this ground for failure to raise such in their motion to dismiss. FACTS: On August 9. the subject narra lumber and six-wheeler truck were confiscated by petitioner Secretary pursuant to Section 68-A of P. 80 of P. ISSUE: WON respondents can validly be restored possession of their trucks and lumber based on the writ of replevin. private respondent Jesus Sy. 705. and not to administrative confiscation provided for in Section 68-A. replevin will not lie to recover it. comity and convenience. herein respondents never appealed the confiscation order of petitioner Secretary to the Office of the President as provided for in Sec. as amended by Executive Order (E. They were subsequently advertised to be sold at public auction on March 20.D. then Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources issued an order for the confiscation of the narra lumber and the six-wheeler truck.INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS FACTORAN V. these items were then forfeited in favor of the government. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. There. Lastly. the wrongful detention by the defendant of the properties sought in an action for replevin must be satisfactorily established.

277. which the CA affirmed upon petitioner’s appeal. the Court held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court. the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao. Pending resolution however of the appeal. 1989. 68. Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court contending. Petitioner Jovito Layugan. – NO. “SECTION 68-A. – YES. ISSUES: 1. inter alia. which thereafter issued a writ ordering the return of the truck to private respondents. W/N an action for replevin prosper to recover a movable property which is the subject matter of an administrative forfeiture proceeding in the DENR pursuant to Section 68-A of P. or possessing forest products without authority constitutes a distinct offense independent now from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly authorized representatives are given the authority to confiscate and forfeit any conveyances utilized in violating the Code or other forest laws. Cagayan.D. In all cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws. 1997 Ponente: Torres.INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS PAAT V. 111107 January 10. 705. the Regional Executive Director of DENR sustained petitioner Layugan’s action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No. Private respondents. may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. 1989. Later. as to the contention that since they are not liable for qualified theft. issued an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner 15 days within which to submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited. gathering. the act of cutting. there is no question that the controversy was pending before the Secretary of DENR when it was forwarded to him following the denial by the petitioners of the motion for reconsideration of private respondents through the order of July 12. Secondly. rules and regulations. in the resolution of their case. Respondents then appealed. 1989. it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. that private respondents had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies.R. CA G. Jr. In their letter of reconsideration dated June 28. or possessed or abandoned. D. RATIO: Firstly. a suit for replevin was filed by the private respondents against petitioner Layugan and Executive Director. VILLEGAS 10 . Lastly. failed to submit the required explanation. Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly Authorized Representative To Order Confiscation. was seized by DENR personnel in Nueva Vizcaya because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck. 2. collecting. water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws. 277 amending Section 68 of P. 705. and all conveyances used either by land. the Department Head or his duly authorized representative. rules and regulations. FACTS: On May 19.” It is. No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. W/N the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products in favor of the government. however. removed. This is unmeritorious. The premature invocation of court’s intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action. as to the power of the DENR to confiscate. With the introduction of Executive Order No. regulations and policies on the matter. but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised ATTY. thus. private respondents clearly recognize the presence of an administrative forum to which they seek to avail. then they should not have necessarily have committed a crime under Sec. as they did avail. removing. the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman while on its way to Bulacan from Cagayan. In the case at bar. gathered.

VILLEGAS 11 . 277 when it eliminated the phrase “ shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code ” and inserted the words “ shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code ”. This is clear from the language of Executive Order No. ATTY.INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS Penal Code.

Instead. – NO. collect. The Presidential Warranty cannot be considered a contract distinct from PTLA No.R. but upon appeal to the Supreme Court. VILLEGAS 12 . 1969) at once reveals that it simply reassures PICOP of the government’s commitment to uphold the terms and conditions of its timber license and guarantees PICOP’s peaceful and adequate possession and enjoyment of the areas which are the basic sources of raw materials for its wood processing complex. occurring within the concession. 43 converted into an IFMA (Integrated forest management agreement). It is merely a collateral undertaking which cannot amplify PICOP’s rights under its timber license. Lower court ruled in favor of respondents. execute and deliver an IFMA to PICOP. ATTY. such as mineral resources. but a mere collateral undertaking pursuant to the TLA. Factoran that a timber license is not a contract within the purview of the nonimpairment clause is edifying.A. RATIO: An examination of the Presidential Warranty (Doc. PICOP filed before the RTC of Quezon City a Petition for Mandamus1 against then DENR Secretary Heherson T. ISSUE: W/N PICOP is entitled to the IFMA by way of mandamus and due to the non-impairment clause of the Constitution in relation to Document 1969. Alvarez. 162243 December 3. on 2 September 2002. In the middle of the processing of PICOP’s application. Document 1969 is not a contact. 35. and does not extend to the utilization of other resources. The ruling in Oposa v. Now PICOP files a Motion for Reconsideration. PICOP refused to attend further meetings with the DENR. PICOP seeks the issuance of a privileged writ of mandamus to compel the DENR Secretary to sign. Also. CA affirmed. The warranty covers only the right to cut. No.INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS ALVAREZ V. and remove timber in its concession area. 2009 Ponente: Chico-Nazario FACTS: PICOP (Paper Industries Corp of the Phil) filed with the DENR an application to have its Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. it reversed the judgment of the CA. however. 8371 and Sanggunian consultation and approval for environmentally critical projects based on the Local Government Code. PICOP failed to secure NCIP Cerification based on R. 47 and FMA No. PICOP G.

By giving this clearance for the conversion of PICOP’s TLA into an IFMA. 162243 November 29. the "Regulations Governing the Integrated Forest Management Program (IFMP). 2. by withholding the conversion of PICOP’s TLA No. the court ruled in the negative. 99-53. the following are the requisites for the automatic conversion of the TLA into an IFMA. and is not a property in the constitutional sense. PICOP failed to comply with DAO. On 23 December 1999." As to the compliance with the DAO. To construe these investments as consideration in a contract would be to stealthily render ineffective the settled jurisprudence that "a license or a permit is not a contract between the sovereignty and the licensee or permittee. to which herein petitioners now appeal. and WON there was compliance with DAO No. Pursuant to the application for conversion. negotiations were held to assure PICOP’s compliance with DAO 99-53. – NO. 2006 Ponente: Chico-Nazario FACTS: This is a consolidation of three cases. 99-53 and thus conversion had already been effected. hence. Proper evaluation was conducted on the application. Court of Appeals eventually affirmed the lower court’s ruling. The TLA holder has satisfactorily performed and complied with the terms and conditions of the TLA and the pertinent rules and regulations. be claimed to have granted the conversion itself. Gozun was substituted in the case as the new DENR Secretary.INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS ALVAREZ V. as evidenced by the memorandum submitted to the DENR Secretary by the Performance Evaluation Team. this is all purely academic because of the above-discussed settled jurisprudence that logging permits are not contracts within the NonImpairment Clause and thus. modified. as to which the constitutional proscription against the impairment of contracts may extend. can be amended. Later on. The letter is clear that the "conversion" could not be final since its conditions and details still have to be discussed as stated in the second paragraph of said letter. 43 into an IFMA. the DENR Secretary cannot. then DENR Secretary Cerilles promulgated DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. that the IFMA has already been converted. as well as overdue and unpaid forest charges. VILLEGAS 13 . if not finality. 43. as to whether or not conversion already took place. the same letter could not have reduced to a mere formality the approval of the conversion of PICOP’s TLA No. Chapter III of DAO No. Findings of facts of administrative agencies are generally accorded great respect. RATIO: A timber license agreement is not a contract. PICOP signified its intention to convert its TLA No. All licensees put up investments in pursuing their businesses. The TLA holder had signified its intent to convert its TLA into an IFMA prior to the expiration of its TLA. ISSUE: W/N PICOP is entitled by way of mandamus to the conversion of its TLA to IFMA. replaced or rescinded when the national ATTY. neither is the presidential warranty of President Marcos a contract. Finally. Even assuming. Alvarez’ letter of clearance. by the courts because of the special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction. the Performance Evaluation Team of DENR conducted a report indicating violations by PICOP of existing DENR Rules and Regulations governing TLA No. however PICOP later claimed that the conversion had already been completed pursuant to Sec. however. Lastly. 43 into an Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) invoking the provisions of Section 9. Upon submission of the memorandum to the DENR Secretary. the DENR. PICOP then filed for a petition for mandamus against petitioner which was granted by the trial court. by any stretch of imagination. In the case at bar. 43 into an IFMA. to wit: 1.R. such as the non-submission of its five-year forest protection plan and seven-year reforestation plan as required by the DENR rules and regulations. PICOP G. and 3. has made a factual finding that PICOP has not yet complied with the requirements for such a conversion. 99-53 which had for its subject. No."In a 28 August 2000 letter to the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO). The argument that the Presidential Warranty is a contract on the ground that there were mutual considerations taken into account consisting in investments on PICOP’s part is preposterous.

finds that the IFMA would be in violation of statutes. VILLEGAS 14 . rules and regulations are the very same requirements mentioned above for the conversion of the TLA No. These same statutes. particularly those protecting the rights of the local governments and the indigenous peoples within the IFMA area. 43 into an IFMA.INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS interest so requires. rules and regulations. therefore. If the DENR Secretary. then it behooves the DENR Secretary to revoke such IFMA. ATTY.

No. the lumber properly came under the custody of the DENR and all actions seeking to recover possession thereof should be directed to that agency. DENR officers then seized the truck and lumber. 1993. PNP. and since there were no claimants after posting the notice of confiscation. to which respondent Lausa filed a motion for approval of counterbond and dismissal of the replevin since the seizure was pursuant to the Revised Forestry Code. Butuan City. as amended. 1999 Ponente: Mendoza FACTS: On May 31. ISSUE: WON the Regional Trial Court could in fact take cognizance of the replevin suit. the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action. CA G. if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before a court’s judicial power can be sought. 705. 705 (Revised Forestry Code). The appellate court’s directive to the trial court judge to allow the respondent agent of the DENR to file a counterbond in order to recover custody of the lumber should be disregarded as being contrary to its order to dismiss the replevin suit of petitioner. For. 93-01 creating Task Force Kalikasan to combat “illegal logging. what it should have done was to dismiss the case without prejudice to petitioner filing her claim before the DENR . ATTY. Hence. petitioner herein filed a suit for replevin to recover the trucks and lumber. No.D. The premature invocation of a court’s intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action. 2 months after the said forfeiture. In a long line of cases. flitches and other forest products” in that city. indeed. but was reversed in the CA in favor of Lausa. Trial court for petitioner. The team was composed of personnel of the Philippine Army. Having been forfeited pursuant to P. we have consistently held that before a party may be allowed to seek the intervention of the court. Respondent Odel Bernardo Lausa. as amended by Executive Order No. the members of the task force received confidential information that two truckloads of illegally cut lumber would be brought to Butuan City from the Ampayon-Taguibe-Tiniwisan area. log smuggling or possession of and/or transport of illegally cut or produced logs. Accordingly. the team set up a checkpoint along kilometer 4 in Baan. absent any finding of waiver or estoppel. was a member of the team.R.D. 1993. – NO. 121587 March 9. considering that the object was the recovery of lumber seized and forfeited by law enforcement agents of the DENR pursuant to P. who was the acting chief of civilian security in the mayor’s office. the caretaker of the compound was not able to produce any documents proving the legality of possession of the forest products. On July 1. the Mayor of Butuan City issued Executive Order No. As petitioner clearly failed to exhaust available administrative remedies. Accordingly. VILLEGAS 15 . the Court of Appeals correctly set aside the assailed orders of the trial court granting petitioner’s application for a replevin writ and denying private respondent’s motion to dismiss. it was deemed forfeited in favor of the government. Therafter upon catching up with the two cars in the latter’s compound. RATIO: The rule is that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies before he can resort to the courts.INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS DY V. Hence this petition. DENR and the Office of the City Mayor of Butuan. it is a pre-condition that he should have availed himself of all the means afforded by the administrative processes. No. lumber. 277.

Sec. Thus. On March 10.R. Banahaw Mining. a Timber license agreement is not a contract. The Panel Arbitrator initially ruled for petitioner. On April 29. No. 15(b) of DAO 96-40 provides that government reservations may be opened for mining applications upon prior written clearance by the government agency having jurisdiction over such reservation. recognizing the equiponderance between mining and timber rights. Banahaw Mining was issued a Mines Temporary Permit authorizing it to extract and dispose of precious minerals found within its mining claims. development. Marcos merely confirmed the timber license granted to PICOP and warranted the latter's peaceful and adequate possession and enjoyment of its concession areas. Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement. 1997. immediately approved the assignment made by Banahaw Mining in favor of private respondent Base Metals. There is no evidence in this ATTY. Sec. The transfer included those covered by its mining operating agreement with CMMCI. 6 of RA 7942 also provides that mining operations in reserved lands other than mineral reservations may be undertaken by the DENR. an Opposition to private respondent Base Metals' application because it violate the non-impairment clause and will be prejudicial to herein petitioner. Banahaw Mining filed applications for Mining Lease Contracts over the mining claims with the Bureau of Mines. – NO. 1997. subject to certain limitations. petitioner PICOP filed with the Mines Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB). the Central Mindanao Mining and Development Corporation (CMMCI for brevity) entered into a Mines Operating Agreement with Banahaw Mining and Development Corporation whereby the latter agreed to act as Mine Operator for the exploration. Upon being informed of the development. Secondly. 1988. BASE METALS G. 2006 Ponente: Tinga FACTS: In 1987. thereby recognizing private respondent Base Metals as the new operator of its claims. decided to sell/assign its rights and interests over 37 mining claims in favor of private respondent Base Metals Mineral Resources Corporation. CA affirmed stating that the Presidential Warranty of September 25. VILLEGAS 16 . private respondent Base Metals amended Banahaw Mining's pending MPSA applications with the Bureau of Mines to substitute itself as applicant and to submit additional documents in support of the application. the non-impairment clause finds no application. such does not necessarily preclude mining activities in the area. 1968 issued by then President Ferdinand E. On November 18. In 1991. 163509 December 6. Since a portion of Banahaw Mining's mining claims was located in petitioner PICOP's logging concession in Agusan del Sur. Issue: W/N the concession area of petitioner is closed to mining activities and that the conversion of the agreement into MPSA will run counter to the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. on December 18. and eventual commercial operation of CMMCI's 18 mining claims located in Agusan del Sur. assuming that the area covered by Base Metals' MPSA is a government reservation. Firstly. defined as proclaimed reserved lands for specific purposes other than mineral reservations. judgment was in favor of respondent. 1996. Banahaw Mining converted its mining claims to applications for Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA for brevity). gives a mining contractor the right to enter a timber concession and cut timber therein provided that the surface owner or concessionaire shall be properly compensated for any damage done to the property as a consequence of mining operations. but a mere privilege. as required. developed. as claim owner. CMMCI. RA 7942 does not disallow mining applications in all forest reserves but only those proclaimed as watershed forest reserves. The Presidential Warranty did not convert PICOP's timber license into a contract because it did not create any obligation on the part of the government in favor of PICOP. In like manner. but upon appeal to the Mines Adjudication Board. Area clearances from the DENR Regional Director and Superintendent of the Agusan Marsh and Wildlife Sanctuary were submitted.INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS PICOP V. RATIO: We should state at this juncture that the policy of multiple land use is enshrined in our laws towards the end that the country's natural resources may be rationally explored. utilized and conserved. RA 7942. While the MPSA were pending. It was only given upon the request of the Board of Investments to establish the boundaries of PICOP's timber license agreement. Banahaw Mining and petitioner PICOP entered into a MOA whereby petitioner PICOP allowed Banahaw Mining an access to its mining claims.

which provides the guidelines in the issuance of area status and clearance or consent for mining applications pursuant to RA 7942. provides that timber or forest lands. reservations and reserves. presidential decree. NO. presidential proclamation or executive order as required by RA 7586. forest reservations. TUASON G. are open to mining applications subject to area status and clearance. 03-98. PICOP failed to present any evidence that the area covered by the MPSA is a protected wilderness area designated as an initial component of the NIPAS pursuant to a law. DENR Memorandum Order No. VILLEGAS 17 . ASAPHIL V. Lastly. military and other government reservations. and existing DENR Project Areas within timber or forest lands. 134030 ATTY. among others.INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS case that the area covered by Base Metals' MPSA has been proclaimed as watershed forest reserves.R. forest reserves other than critical watershed forest reserves.

Later. based on the same alleged violation. – YES. also on ground of lack of jurisdiction. Asaphil filed its Answer. entered into a Contract for Sale and Purchase of Perlite Ore with Induplex wherein Induplex agreed to buy all the perlite ore that may be found and mined in Tuason’s mining claim located in Taysa. Tuason sought the nullity of the Contract for Sale and Purchase of Perlite Ore. but the government’s interest as well. Also. the ground upon which the contract is sought to be annulled is not due to Asaphil’s refusal to abide by the terms and conditions of the agreement. who is a stockholder of Induplex. Daraga. but the Mines Adjucation Board reversed. rather. respondent Vicente Tuason. Tuason claimed that said acts adversely affected. The DENR is not called upon to exercise its technical knowledge or expertise over any mining operations or dispute. and second. 2006 ATTY. VILLEGAS 18 . Romero. Induplex contended that to fall within the jurisdiction of the DENR. DIDIPIO EARTH SAVERS V. praying for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the DENR has no jurisdiction over the case. Thus. DENR affirmed. and the protagonists are claimholders (Tuason) and a buyer (Induplex). which is proper for determination by the regular courts. or approving. this raises a judicial question. Tuason filed with the Bureau of Mines. Obviously. GOZUN G. Asaphil and Ibalon. In exchange. and the Agreement to Operate Mining Claims between Tuason and Asaphil. Jr. an entity whose purpose is to mine any and all kinds of minerals. permits. it is being asked to determine the validity of the agreements based on circumstances beyond the respective rights of the parties under the two contracts.. 1975. but due to Induplex’s alleged violation of the condition imposed by the BOI in its Joint Venture Agreement with Grefco. the MAB committed an error in taking cognizance of the appeal. Tuason alleged in his complaint that the stockholders of Induplex formed and organized Ibalon Mineral Resources. or deciding conflicting applications. DENR a complaint against Asaphil and Induplex for declaration of nullity of the said Contracts. Tuason executed an Agreement to Operate Mining Claims in favor of petitioner Asaphil Construction and Development Corporation. and that the dispute in this case involves “mineral product” and not a mining property. stating that the complaint is for the cancellation and revocation of the Agreement to Operate Mining Claims.INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS April 25. reinstating or canceling applications. and in ruling upon the validity of the contracts. that this is in violation of the condition imposed by the Board of on Induplex in its Joint Venture Agreement with Grefco. WON the MAB erred in invalidating the Agreement to Operate Mining Claims. Issue: W/N the DENR has jurisdiction over Tuason’s complaint for the annulment of the Contract for Sale and Purchase of Perlite Ore between Tuason and Induplex. such as granting of license. Inc. Induplex will assist Tuason in securing and perfecting his right over the mining claim . 157882 March 30. 2006 Ponente: Austria-Martinez FACTS: On March 24. and Induplex’s assumption of the mining operation violated the BOI prohibition. Thereafter. consequently. the Court recognized a distinction between (1) the primary powers granted by pertinent provisions of law to the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (and the bureau directors) of an executive or administrative nature. rejecting. lease and contracts. Induplex filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint.R. that Induplex acquired the majority stocks of Asaphil and that 95% of Ibalon’s shares were also transferred to Virgilio R. prohibiting Induplex from mining perlite ore. Inc. Albay. not only his interest as claimowner. through an operating agreement or any other method. the controversy should involve a mining property and the contending parties must be claimholders and/or mining operators. The MAB also found that the acquisition by Induplex of the majority stocks of Asaphil. No. While the Agreement to Operate Mining Claims is a mining contract. which is within the jurisdiction of the DENR under Section 7 of PD 1281. the DENR Regional Executive Director was correct in dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over Tuason’s complaint.The allegations in Tuason’s complaint do not make out a case for a mining dispute or controversy within the jurisdiction of the DENR. RATIO: In several cases on mining disputes. and (2) controversies or disagreements of civil or contractual nature between litigants which are questions of a judicial nature that may be adjudicated only by the courts of justice.

occupant. To wit: Section 76. (2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period. (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. or concessionaire thereof as a consequence of the mining operations or as a result of the construction or installation of the infrastructure mentioned in 104 above shall be properly and justly compensated. education. RATIO: The SC noted the requisites of eminent domain. or concessionaire as a consequence of such operations shall be properly compensated as may be provided for in the implementing rules and regulations. 149927 March 30. – YES. 7942 and DAO 96-40 as unconstitutional.Didipio. Further. They assert that public respondent DENR. on its own. Compensation of the Surface Owner and Occupant.R. (3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority.INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS Ponente: Chico-Nazario FACTS: In 1987. Cory promulgated EO 279 which empowered DENR to stipulate with foreign companies regarding technical or financial large scale exploration or mining. In 1995. Indeed there is taking involved but it is with just compensation. petitioners reasoned that these in effect allow the unlawful and unjust “taking” of property for private purpose in contravention with Section 9. an Australian company.000 hectares of land in Quirino and Nueva Vizcaya including Brgy . In the case at bar. Article III of the 1987 Constitution. permit entry into a private property and allow taking of land without payment of just compensation. Sec. After the passage of the law. Ramos signed into law RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act. The FTAA authorized AMC (later CAMC) to explore 37. 76 of RA 7942 provides for just compensation as well as section 107 of the DENR RR.Any damage done to the property of the surface owners. mandating that private property shall not be taken except for public use and with the corresponding payment of just compensation. Public respondents on the other hand avers that Section 76 is not a taking provision but a valid exercise of the police power and by virtue of which. This government regulation involves the adjustment of rights for the public good and it endeavors potential for the use or economic exploitation of private property. that any damage to the property of the surface owner. peace. No. the state may prescribe regulations to promote the health. Act No. through the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. safety and general welfare of the people. 2004 ATTY. Ramos already signed an FTAA with Arimco Mining Co. xxx Provided. In 1994. They are following: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property. mining is a public policy and the government can invoke eminent domain to exercise entry. DENR then issued its Implementing Rules and Regulations. (4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected. In seeking to nullify Rep. cannot. acquisition and use of private lands. good order. Public respondents concluded that “to require compensation in all such circumstances would compel the government to regulate by purchase. Section 107.” Issue: W/N RA 7942 and the DENR RRs are valid. PEOPLE VS ROSEMOOR G. VILLEGAS 19 . morals. occupant. Didipio failed to show that the law is invalid.

RAMOS G. granting that Rosemoor’ license is valid.that are inconsistent with it. PN 84 is also not a bill of attainder because the declaration that the license was void is not a punishment. because it concerns a subject impressed with public welfare. ET AL. executive orders. – YES. This was replaced by RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 repealed or amended all laws. And an ex post facto law is limited in its scope only to matters criminal in nature.INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS Ponente: Panganiban FACTS: Rosemoor Mining And Development Corporation Corporation (Rosemoor).R. property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. pertained to the old system of exploration. After Ernesto Maceda was appointed Minister of DENR. V. because it is not a contract. rules and regulations -. giving them the right to quarry 330 hectares of land. the terms of Rosemoor’s license was subject to PD 463. it is settled that provisions of existing laws and a reservation of police power are deemed read into it. as amended. the existing law when it was granted. Even if the license were. The CA also said that Proclamation 84. and such right was supposedly violated when the license was unjustifiably cancelled without notice and hearing. he cancelled Rosemoor’s license. for the issuance of the corresponding license to exploit said marble deposits. it is clear that a license should only cover 100 hectares without exceptions or consideration to the number of applications. Proclamation 84 does not impair the non-impairment clause because the license is not a contract. RATIO: Validity of License PD 463. Bulacan. 127882 27 January 2004 Ponente: Carpio-Morales ATTY. development and utilization of natural resources through licenses. 84 is clearly in accord with the regalia doctrine which reserves to the State ownership of all natural resources. And under such law. which ruled in their favor. VILLEGAS 20 . Validity of Proclamation No. it nonetheless respects previously issued valid and existing licenses. and that the 100 hectare limitation was superseded by RA 7942.or parts thereof -. The exercise of such power through Proclamation No. Rosemoor filed for injunctive relief from the RTC. which confirmed the cancellation of the license. which was issued to them. succeeded in discovering marble deposits of high quality and in commercial quantities. it can still be validly revoked by the State in the exercise of police power. This condition to the license was acknowledged by Rosemoor in its permit. a bill of attainder and an ex post facto law. No. The intent of the law would be brazenly circumvented by ruling that a license may cover an area exceeding the maximum by the mere expediency of filing several applications. presidential decrees. ISSUE: W/N Rosemoor’s license was validly cancelled. impaired the non-impairment clause of contracts. Such ruling would indirectly permit an act that is directly prohibited by the law. It is also not an ex post facto law because the proclamation does not fall under any of the enumerated categories of an ex post facto law. 84 Rosemoor’s license may be revoked or rescinded by executive action when the national interest so requires. Moreover. The CA sustained the RTC decision because the license was embraced by four (4) separate applications. concessions or leases. Petitioners aver that the license contravenes PD 463 because it exceeds the maximum area that may be granted to a Licensee for quarrying (100 hectares). They applied with the Bureau of Mines (now Mines and Geosciences Bureau). after having been granted permission to prospect for marble deposits in the mountains of Biak-na-Bato. LA BUGAL B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC. but was omitted in the 1987 Constitution as it was deemed violative of its provisions.. which renders the license void. In this case. The RTC said that Rosewood’s respondents’ license had already ripened into a property right. which was protected under the due process clause. While RA 7942 has expressly repealed provisions of mining laws that are inconsistent with its own.

giving the DENR fifteen days from receipt to act thereon. 1987. and other mineral oils. assignment/transfer and withdrawal. 1995. development or utilization of natural resources. 7942. 7942 as unconstitutional and null and void. VILLEGAS 21 . – YES. all forces of potential energy. which. waters. and other natural resources are owned by the State. 7942.” Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions authorizing the State to grant licenses. No. Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. 1996. Inc. In January 2001. 1995. 7942 defines the modes of mineral agreements for mining operations. fisheries. wildlife. illegal and null and void.O. coal. petroleum. minerals.A. 1996 which was adopted on December 20. On August 15. flora and fauna. RATIO: RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for permitting fully foreign owned corporations to exploit Philippine natural resources.387 hectares of land in South Cotabato. Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian doctrine which states that “All lands of the public domain. ISSUE: W/N the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully foreign-owned corporations to exploit Philippine mineral resources. Y such omission. (c) Declaring the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Philippine Mining Act contained in DENR Administrative Order No. DENR approved the transfer and registration of the FTAA in Sagittarius’ name but Lepanto Consolidated assailed the same. Shortly before the effectivity of R. No. 279 authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept. 96-40. R. however. or leases for the exploration. Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. MMC – a publicly listed Australian mining and exploration company – sold its whole stake in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines. No. and utilization of minerals. two newspapers of general circulation. The DENR. Aquino issued Executive Order (E. and (d) Cancelling the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement issued to Western Mining Philippines. as unconstitutional. coal. s. WMCP contends that the annulment of the FTAA would violate a treaty between the Philippines and Australia which provides for the protection of Australian investments. concessions. They pray that the Court issue an order: (a) Permanently enjoining respondents from acting on any application for Financial or Technical Assistance Agreements.A. 96-40. utilization and processing of all mineral resources.A. 1995. the utilization of inalienable lands of ATTY. Sultan Kudarat. then President Fidel V. 7942 and DAO No.INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS FACTS: On July 25. 7942 took effect. then President Corazon C. 30 days following its publication on March 10.A. development.) No. “exploration and development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. the President may execute with the foreign proponent. 60% of which is owned by Filipinos while 40% of which is owned by Indophil Resources. Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 96-40 and all other similar administrative issuances as unconstitutional and null and void. then DENR Secretary Victor O. 1995 in Malaya and Manila Times. Similar provisions govern financial or technical assistance agreements. On January 10. No.A. upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary. 1997. 1995. consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration.” The same section also states that. development. 7942 to "govern the exploration. No. This was later repealed by DAO No. the President entered into an FTAA with WMCP covering 99. (b) Declaring the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 or Republic Act No. outlines the procedure for their filing and approval." R. counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the DENR Secretary demanding that the DENR stop the implementation of R. otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R. On March 3. and fixes their terms. On April 9. 95-23. has yet to respond or act on petitioners' letter. Ramos approved R. forests or timber. No.A. however. 1995. and other minerals. petroleum. an Australian company. exploitation. s. or on March 30.

The present Constitution now allows only “technical and financial assistance. The same provisions.” These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken together. Therefore RA 7942 is invalid insofar as said act authorizes service contracts. and personnel necessary for the Mining Operations. The concession amounts to complete control by the concessionaire over the country’s natural resource. When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions. development and utilization of Philippine natural resources. LA BUGAL B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC. Under the concession system. By allowing foreign contractors to manage or operate all the aspects of the mining operation. inducements or compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole. The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an exception to the rule that participation in the nation’s natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP. Section 1. technology. The FTAA between WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise unconstitutional since the agreement itself is a device contract. the concessionaire makes a direct equity investment for the purpose of exploiting a particular natural resource within a given area. permit a circumvention of the constitutionally ordained 60-40% capitalization requirement for corporations or associations engaged in the exploitation. December 1. These stipulations are abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution. considerations. Accordingly such provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. development and utilization of minerals. They are precisely the vices that the fundamental law seeks to avoid. granting the Petition and declaring the unconstitutionality of certain provisions of RA 7942 (Philippine Mining Act). the Court en banc promulgated its Decision. then if some parts are unconstitutional. ET AL. conditional or connected must fall with them.” Section 1.2 of the same agreement provides that WMCP shall provide “all financing. a fully foreign owned corporation. the “exclusive right to explore. the contract from which they spring must be struck down. exploit. foreign owned corporations are limited only to merely technical or financial assistance to the State for large scale exploration.” The management or operation of mining activities by foreign contractors. concession or lease is no longer allowed under the 1987 Constitution. petroleum and other mineral oils. Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter. all provisions that are thus dependent. Consequently. leaving the State with nothing but bare title thereto. No. The 1987 Constitution. moreover. ISSUE: W/N the FTAA between WMCP and the Pgilippines is a service contract. 2004 Ponente: Panganiban FACTS: In the January Decision. 127882.R.INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS public domain through license. RAMOS G. the primary feature of service contracts was precisely the evil the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to avoid. its pertinent provisions actually treat these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law. RA 7942 has in effect conveyed beneficial ownership over the nation’s mineral resources to these contractors. V. the evils that it aims to suppress. Although the statute employs the phrase “financial and technical agreements” in accordance with the 1987 Constitution. whether by design or inadvertence. utilize and dispose of all minerals and by-products that may be produced from the contract area. for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a particular resource at the point of extraction. – YES. DENR ATTY. management. The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign contractor manages the mineral resources just like the foreign contractor in a service contract. grant WMCP beneficial ownership over natural resources that properly belong to the State and are intended for the benefit of its citizens. has deleted the phrase “management or other forms of assistance” in the 1973 Charter.. VILLEGAS 22 .

development and utilization of mineral or petroleum resources. It is obvious from their discussions that they did not intend to ban or eradicate service contracts. Philippines. development and utilization activities. The Court said RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 and its implementing rules are unconstitutional for allowing “service contracts” now prohibited by the 1987 Charter. RATIO: The Proper Interpretation of the Constitutional Phrase “Agreements Involving Either Technical or Financial Assistance” Section 2 Article XII does not reveal any intention to proscribe foreign involvement in the management or operation of mining activities or to eliminate service contracts. Foreign corporations may indeed participate in the exploitation. Had the framers intended to prohibit direct participation of an alien corporation in the exploration of the country’s natural resources.9 of the FTAA however are objectionable and void for being contrary to public policy. nor does it have express prohibition to this effect.8 and 7. an Australian corporation. which reserves or limits to Filipino citizens and corporations that are at least 60 percent owned by such citizens the exploration. (WMCP). during its deliberation regarding foreign investment in and management of an enterprise for large-scale exploration. The Meaning of “Agreements Involving Either Technical or Financial Assistance” A constitutional provision specifically allowing foreign-owned corporation to render financial or technical assistance in respect of mining or any other commercial activity was clearly unnecessary. its implementing rules (DAO 96-40) and the FTAA entered into by then Government and WMCP grant the Government full control and supervision over all aspects of planned exploration. as well as of the entire FTAA executed between the government and Western Mining Corp. and measures for the protection of the interests of the foreign corporation. deprives the Government of its share in the net mining revenues in the event the foreign stockholders of a foreign mining company sell 60% or more of their equity to a Filipino citizen or corporation. they would employed clearly restrictive language barring foreign corporation from directly engaging in the exploration of the country’s natural resources. necessarily gave implied assent to everything that these agreements entailed or that could reasonably be deemed necessary to make them tenable and effective – including management authority with respect to the day-to-day operations of the enterprise. meanwhile. Instead. at least to the extent that they are consistent with Philippine sovereignty over natural ATTY.9. RA 7942. The drafters. The framers of the Constitution. RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 are declared constitutional. leaving the State with nothing but bare title thereto. Section 7.INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS AO 96-40. – YES.9 of the subject FTAA. the provision meant to refer to more than mere financial or technical assistance. The Court said FTAA is a service contract that grants control or beneficial ownership over the nation’s mineral resources to foreign contractors. It was also on this ground that the Court struck down as constitutionally infirm the FTAA between the government and WMCP. ISSUE: Whether or not the phrase “Agreements Involving Either Technical or Financial Assistance” contained in paragraph 4 of Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution was properly interpreted in the previous decision to warrant the unconstitutionality of RA 7942 and the FTAA of WMCP. VILLEGAS 23 . they were intent on crafting provisions to put in place safeguards that would eliminate the abuses prevalent during the martial law regime. Section 7. development and utilization of minerals spoke about service contracts as the concept was understood in the 1973 Constitution.8 and 7. development and use of Philippine natural resources but subject to the full control and supervision of the State.8 permits the sum spent by government for the benefit of the contractor to be deductible from the State’s share in the net mining revenues since it constitutes unjust enrichment on the part of the contractor at the government’s expense. Sections 7. the FTAA. by specifying such agreements involving assistance. Thus. This was prompted by the perceived insufficiency of Filipino capital and the felt need for foreign expertise in the EDU of mineral resources. with the exception of Sections 7. They were going to permit service contracts with foreign corporations as contractors – but with safety measures to prevent abuses – as an exception to the general norm established in the first paragraph of Section2 of Article XII.

and beneficial ownership of natural resources remains vested in the State. the State definitely has a pivotal say in the operation of the individual enterprises. ATTY. conditions and requirements. It is clear that agreements involving either technical or financial assistance referred to in paragraph 4 are in fact service contracts. far from constituting a surrender of control and a grant of beneficial ownership of mineral resources to the contractor in question. and the use of anti-pollution technology and facilities. and (3) the President report the executed agreement to Congress within thirty days. development and utilization of natural resources must be upheld. The contractor is also mandated to open its books of accounts and records for scrutiny. and its full control and supervision over all aspects of exploration. There is likewise no relinquishment of control on account of specific provisions of the WMCP FTAA.INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS resources. Once they have been approved. Also. Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to mineral oils. The provisions of the WMCP FTAA. Section 3 (aq) of RA 7942 is not unconstitutional. technology and technical know-how. And violation of any of FTAA’s terms and conditions. Thus. may be penalized by cancellation of the FTAA. and makes all required actions. the permit grantee (and prospective contractor) is spending and investing heavily in exploration activities without yet being able to extract minerals and generate revenues. which allows exploration but not extraction. and government through its agencies (DENR. Hence. including the charging of pre-operating and operating expenses. and/or noncompliance with statutes or regulations. Ultimate Test: Full State Control The primacy of the principle of the State’s sovereign ownership of all mineral resources. indispensable to the proper functioning of the mining enterprise. MGB) actively exercises full control and supervision over the entire enterprise. and the disposition of mineral products. During the exploration phase. The exploration permit issued under Section 3 (aq). whereby the foreign contractor provides the capital. the government need not micro-manage the mining operations and day-today affairs of the enterprise in order to be considered as exercising full control and supervision. The State’s full control and supervision over mining operations are ensured through the different provisions in RA 7942. the contractor’s compliance with its commitments therein will be monitored. the exploration works already conducted. detect deviations and non-compliance by the contractor. but such new service contracts are between foreign corporations acting as contractors on the one hand. foreign or local. The contractor is also obligated to assist the development of the mining community. to enable the State to determine if the government share has been fully paid. Section 3(aq) of RA 7942 was objected to as being unconstitutional for allowing a foreign contractor to apply for and hold an exploration permit. 20 and 23 of RA7942. the constitutional requirement of State control. as this would render impossible the legitimate exercise by the contractor of a reasonable degree of management prerogative and authority. VILLEGAS 24 . The State may likewise compel compliance by the contractor with mandatory requirements on mine safety. Overall. may end up only benefiting claim-jumpers. Such sanction is significant to a contractor who may have yet to recover the tens or hundreds of millions of dollars sunk into a mining project. development and utilization phases of the enterprise. and pay royalties to the indigenous peoples concerned. (2) the President be the signatory for the government. health and environmental protection. serves to protect the interests and rights of the exploration permit grantee (and would-be contractor). The government agencies concerned are empowered to approve or disapprove the various work programs and corresponding minimum expenditure commitments for each of the exploration. and can set directions and objectives. RA 7942 and DAO 9640 vest in government more than a sufficient degree of control and supervision over the conduct of mining operations. and expenditures already made. Otherwise. and managerial expertise in the creation and operation of the large-scale mining/extractive enterprise. But “full control and supervision” cannot be taken literally to mean that the State controls and supervises everything down to the minutest details. and enforce compliance and impose sanctions should the occasion arise. among them: (1) that the service contract be crafted in accordance with a general law setting standard or uniform terms. vest the State with control and supervision over practically all aspects of the operations of the FTAA contractor. The grant of such service is subject to several safeguards. and on the other hand government as principal or “owner” )of the works).

duties and fees. The terms and conditions of petroleum FTAAs cannot serve as standards for mineral mining FTAAs. when an exploration permittee files with the MGB a declaration of mining project feasibility. cost structures and investment needs of off-shore petroleum exploration and drilling companies do not have the remotest resemblance to those of on-shore mining companies. but also an additional government share. regardless of circumstances. The Charter did not intend to fix an iron-clad rule of 60 percent share.INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS The FTAA provisions do not reduce or abdicate State control: No Surrender of Financial Benefits The second paragraph of Section 81 of RA7942 has been denounced for allegedly limiting the State’s share in FTAAs with foreign contractors to just taxes. The government has the opportunity to approve or reject the proposed work program and budgeted expenditures for development works. if approved. The Government is able to know ahead of time the amounts of pre-operating and other expenses to be recovered. it is feared that such expenses could be bloated to wipe out mining revenues anticipated for 10 years. containing a yearly budget of proposed expenditures. exploration and development expenditures. comprised of all direct taxes. which will become the pre-operating and development costs that will have to be recovered. in FTAAs with a foreign contractor. the collection of the State’s share is rendered uncertain. which are real and actual benefits enjoyed by the Filipino people. and that such share is the equivalent of the constitutional requirement that at least 60 percent of the capital. of mining companies should remain in Filipino hands. as there is no time limit in RA 7942 for this grace period or recovery period. total government share increases to 60 percent or higher (as much as 77 percent. JVA and MPSA). it must submit a work program for development. Even if the State is entitled to a 60 percent share from other mineral agreements (CPA. fees and royalties. as consisting of not only a basic government share. applicable to all situations. with corresponding budget. the applicant for exploration permit is required to submit a proposed work program for exploration. the same will subsequently be recorded as pre-operating expenses that the contractor will have to recoup over the grace period. the inclusion of the phrase “among other things” in the second paragraph of Section81 clearly and unmistakably reveals the legislative intent to have the State collect more than just usual taxes. and duties. the “Guidelines Establishing the Fiscal Regime of Financial or Technical Assistance Agreements” spells out the financial benefits government will receive from an FTAA. which the State passes upon and either approves or rejects. for approval by the Bureau. or until the date of actual recovery. whichever comes earlier. being a share in the earnings or cash flows of the mining enterprise. Allegedly. so as to achieve a fifty-fifty sharing of net benefits from mining between the government and the contractor. because the technical and operational requirements. Thus. the concerned agencies (DENR and MGB) in formulating the 1995 and 1996 Implementing Rules and Regulation provided that the period of recovery. VILLEGAS 25 . However. The basic government share and the additional government share do not yet take into account the indirect taxes and other financial contributions of mining projects. reckoned from the date of commercial operation. To avoid compromising the State’s full control and supervision over the exploitation of mineral resources. It is sufficient that the State has the power and ATTY. exploration and development expenses of the foreign contractors. and the approximate period of time needed therefore because under Section 24. But although RA7942 did not limit the grace period. DAO 99-56. and depriving the State of a share in the after-tax income of the enterprise. if these are taken into account. and 89 percent in one instance) of the net present value of total benefits from the project. the State must receive at least 60 percent of the after-tax income from the exploitation of its mineral resources. there must be no attempt to impose a “minimum 60 percent” rule. before government may grant an FTAA or MPSA or other mineral agreements. Under Section 23 of RA 7942. shall be for a period not exceeding five years. fees. as well as other payments made by the contractor during the term of the FTAA. The argument is based on incorrect information. and hence 60 percent of the income. there is no concrete basis for the view that. that would not create a parallel or analogous situation for FTAAs. Since RA 7942 allegedly does not require government approval for the pre-operating. with the result that the State’s share is zero for the first 10 years. The third or last paragraph of Section 81 of RA7942 is slammed for deferring the payment of the government share in FTAAs until after the contractor shall have recovered its pre-operating expenses. . Moreover.

MIWD filed an injunction case against private respondents (Nava et al. METRO ILOILO WATER DISTRICT VS CA G. VILLEGAS 26 . to get a 60 percent share (or greater).) for withdrawing ground water within the former’s jurisdiction without securing a water permit from NWRC. which was still being done upon filing the petition. saying that the NWRC has jurisdiction to hear and decide disputes relating to appropriation.INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS means.R. utilization and control of water which was the subject matter of the case. as the cases were within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the National Water Resources Council (Water Council). The RTC dismissed the petitions saying it had no jurisdiction and that MWID failed to exhaust administrative remedies. should it so decide. ATTY. Private respondents averred that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the matter. 2005 Ponente: Tinga FACTS: Metro Iloilo Water District (MIWD). which was granted water rights to extract and withdraw ground water within its jurisdiction. and it is not necessary that the State does so in every case. The CA affirmed the RTC Decision. No. 122855 March 31.

increased water rates by authority of the latter. VILLEGAS 27 .R. RATIO: The petitions filed before the RTC were for the issuance of an injunction order for private respondents to cease and desist from extracting or withdrawing water from MIWD’s well and from selling the same within its service areas. in reality the matter is at most merely collateral to the main thrust of the petitions. 1987 Ponente: Melencio-Herrera FACTS: BF Homes. visa-a-vis MIWD’s vested rights as a water district. INC. Transportation and Communications. which was granted a certificate of public convenience by National Water Resources Council (NWRC) [formerly the Board of Power and Waterworks]. Inc. MIWD had an approved Water Rights Grant from the Department of Public Works. At issue is whether or not private respondents’ extraction and sale of ground water within petitioner’s service area violated petitioner’s rights as a water district. Inc (ASSOCIATION) filed a petition enjoin BF Homes. but the enjoyment of a right to water use for which a permit was already granted. from collecting from ASSOCIATION members the adjusted water rates for being arbitrary and unreasonable and to annul NWRC’s Order granting HOMES authority to charge the increased water rates on the ground that it was rendered without procedural due process and without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. (HOMES). Inc. No. Thus. which took over the functions of the Public Service Commission. This issue does not so much provide occasion to invoke the special knowledge and expertise of the Water Council as it necessitates judicial intervention. VS IAC AND BF HOMES. the CA reversed and held that the RTC was without jurisdiction to entertain the case since NWRC. BF NORTHWEST HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION. – NO. However. the trial court’s jurisdiction must be upheld where the issue involved is not the settlement of a water rights dispute. 72370 May 29. upon petition by HOMES. While initially it may appear that there is a dimension to the petitions which pertains to the sphere of the Water Council. The petitions focus on the violations incurred by private respondents by virtue of their alleged unauthorized extraction and withdrawal of ground water within petitioner’s service area. The instant case certainly calls for the application and interpretation of pertinent laws and jurisprudence in order to determine whether private respondents’ actions violate MIWD’s rights as a water district and justify an injunction. INC.INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS ISSUE: W/N NWRC had jurisdiction over the case. HOMES filed a motion to dismiss but was denied. G. BF Northwest Homeowners Association. The trial court was not asked to grant MIWD the right to use but to compel private respondents to recognize that right. has the rank of a Regional Trial Court and its decision on water rates may only be ATTY.

1984 Ponente: Cuevas FACTS: Amistoso and Neri are owners of adjoining parcels of agricultural land.fixing is merely an incident to the grant of a certificate of public convenience. Considering that rate. AMISTOSO VS ONG AND NERI G.INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS reviewed by the Supreme Court. despite repeated demands. and questions of fact and law. under the SC Interim Rules and Guidelines are listed as the Metropolitan Trial Courts. the latter agency should be impleaded as an indispensable party defendant in order that any judgment could be effective and binding on it. Amistoso filed a complaint for Recognition of Basement with Preliminary Injunction and Damages against Neri and Ong(cultivator of Neri’s land) for refusal. the latter being the privilege granted by the government to appropriate and use water and. it would be irregular if disputes over water rates. particularly. Resolutions and/or Decisions of the National Water Resources Council (NWRC) relative to water rates.R. and "water rates disputes" which it says are appealable to the Court of Appeals. would be appealable only to the Regional Trial Court. No. Jurisdiction over actions for annulment of NWRC decisions lies with the Regional Trial Courts. The distinction made by the CA between "water rights controversies" which it maintains are appealable to the Regional Trial Courts. VILLEGAS 28 . it is to be noted that since Decision Orders of the NWRC are assailed. questions of law. ISSUE: W/N the RTC has jurisdiction over actions to annul Orders. nor was there any contract. it explicitly states that decisions of the NWRC on water rights controversies may be appealed to the Court of First Instance. Neri denied any right of Amistoso over the use of the canal." which. is not well taken. deed or encumbrance on their property and assert that they have not performed any act prejudicial to the petitioner that will warrant the filing of the complaint against them. a primary right. However. – YES. Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. and so that complete relief may be accorded to the parties. therefore. Neri asserts that the complaint should be dismissed because Amistoso’s claim is based on his right to use water coming from the Silmod River and prays that Amistoso’s right to the utilization ATTY. L-60219 June 29. The NWRC is thus ranked with "inferior courts. An irrigation canal traverses the land of Neri through which irrigation water from the Silmod River passes and and flows to the land of the Amistoso for the latter's beneficial use. when we take note of the fact that the appellate jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over NWRC decisions covers such broad and all embracing grounds as grave abuse of discretion. to recognize the rights and title of the former to the beneficial use of the water passing through the irrigation canal and to have Amistoso's rights and/or claims annotated on the Certificate of Title of Neri. should be held appealable to the Court of Appeals while controversies over water rights. RATIO: Under PD 1067.

– YES. a corporation engaged in mining in the province of Marinduque. RATIO: Based from the stipulation of facts between the parties.D. it affirmed the decision of the RTC. The different laws involve cannot absorb one another as the elements of each crime are different from one another.D. The grant contradicts the erroneous findings of the respondent Judge. the WATER RIGHTS GRANT of Amistoso does not fall under "claims for a right to use water existing on or before December 31. The grant was made three (3) years before the promulgation of P. the proper authority to determine such a controversy is the National Water Resources Council. The dispute is thus on the use.. That right is now a. for violating various laws (The Water Code. otherwise it is deemed waived and the use thereof deemed abandoned.R. do not show any other irrigation water going to petitioner's property passing thru respondents' lot aside from that coming from the Silmod River. Neri contends that the said grant does not pertain to the beneficial use of irrigation water from Silmod River. however. The Mining act. making Neri’s allegations invalid. 2006 Ponente: Carpio FACTS: Loney et al. which is vested with exclusive jurisdiction over such question.D. 152644 February 10. The RTC said that there can be no absorption by one offense of the three other offenses. 1067. The water rights grant partakes the nature of a document known as a water permit recognized under Article 13 of P. The DOJ separately charged Loney et al. and the National Pollution Control Decree). 1067. has an approved Water Rights Grant issued by the Department of Public Works. Amistoso is not asking the court to grant him the right to use but to compel Neri to recognize that right and have the same annotated on the latter’s TCT. – NO. moved to quash the informations claiming that the informations were "duplicitous" as the DOJ charged more than one offense for a single act. Loney et al. Transportation and Communications. Neri admits that Amistoso . ISSUE: 1. vested one and may no longer be litigated as to bring petitioner's case within the jurisdiction of the National Water Resources Council. LONEY et al. The MTC held that Loney et al. is liable under the Philippine Mining Act but dismissed the violation of other laws. RPC. 2. the corporation discharged millions of tons of tailings (mine waste) into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. The trial court dismissed Amistoso’s complaint for lackof jurisdiction. W/N Amistoso has the right over the use of the canal. conservation and protection of the right to water and the annotation is merely the relief prayed for on the basis of the claim to the use and protection of water passing through the land of Neri. it affirmed the decision and ordered the other charges reinstated. W/N National Water Resources Council has exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. 1974" which under P. as [the] acts penalized by these laws are separate and distinct from each other.D. No. The records.INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS thereof be respected and not be disturbed and/or obstructed by Neri. which decidedly do not fall within the domain of the authority of the National Water Resources Council. On petition to the RTC. In one of Marcopper’s operations. are officers of Marcopper Mining Corporation ("Marcopper"). and incontrovertibly entitles petitioner to the beneficial use of water from Silmod River. And since the controversy hinges on the right to use and protect the water from the Silmod River that passes on the land of Neri to Amistoso's property. VILLEGAS 29 . The record clearly discloses an approved Water Rights Grant in favor of Amistoso. VS PEOPLE G. 1067 (Water Code of the Philippines). 1067 are required to be registered with the National Water Resources Council within two (2) years from promulgation of P. On petition to the CA. To resurrect that issue will be violative of the rule on res judicata. The interruption of the free flow of water caused by the refusal to re-open the closed irrigation canal constituted petitioner's cause of action in the court below. ATTY.

Relova not in Point In the case of People v. TACC requested LLDA to condone the imposition of the penalty of P1. however. However. the court held that a person charged with theft of electric power under the RPC after being acquitted of violating a City Ordinance penalizing the unauthorized installation of electrical wiring violates the right against double jeopardy because the act giving rise to the charges was punished by an ordinance and a national statute. Inc. 169228 September 11. prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other.5M. although both offenses arise from the same facts. the prosecution charged each petitioner with four offenses.are being prosecuted for an act or incident punished by four national statutes and not by an ordinance and a national statute. were charged. erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the Informations The Filing of Several Charges is Proper The filing of the multiple charges against petitioners. The Rules prohibit the filing of such Information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing his defense. Relova. People v. Subsequently (after 5 years). (PhilRealty). transferred to The Alexandra Condominium Corporation (TACC) such condominium complex by virtue of a Deed of Conveyance. TACC tried to experiment with other methods of cleaning its wastewater. Thus.The charge for violation of RPC does not absorb the charges for the other laws because mala in se felonies cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes. W/N Branch 94’s ruling. THE ALEXANDRIA CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION (TACC) VS. as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. LLDA issued an Order requiring TACC to pay the fine (~P1M) representing the penalty from until the STP was constructed. contravenes People v. However. Relova. 2009 Ponente: Carpio FACTS: Philippine Realty and Holdings. RATIO: No Duplicity of Charges There is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges more than one offense. Under Section 3(e). they can be charged for offenses arising from the same incident. duplicity of offenses in a single information is a ground to quash the Information. Although Loney et al. Moreover. For this violation. which constructed and developed The Alexandra Condominium Complex. LLDA imposed a P1000 daily fine on TACC until the wastewater discharge complies with the government standard.R. Since constructing an STP would be expensive (P15M). A comparative analysis between the laws shows that each of these laws on which Loney et al. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (LLDA) G. with each Information charging only one offense. the offenses punished by special law are mala prohibita in contrast with those punished by the Revised Penal Code which are mala in se. – NO. No. VILLEGAS 30 . if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other. TACC then entered into an agreement with World Chem Marketing for the construction of the STP for P7. and informed TACC that it must put up its own Sewage Treatment Plant (STP) for its effluent discharge to meet government standards. Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure.INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS ISSUE: 1. 2. such is not the case here because Loney et al.000 per day in recognition of the remedial and corrective measures it undertook to ATTY. In this case. the wastewater still failed to meet government standards. is consistent with settled doctrine that where two different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes. Loney et al. there is one essential element not required of the others. although based on the same incident. Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) advised TACC that its wastewater did not meet government effluent standards. W/N all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed for duplicity of charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property should stand. cannot be for multiple prosecuted for the same offense. thus falling within the proscription against multiple prosecutions for the same act.

as amended. a subsequent EO 192 mandates the DENR to "promulgate rules and regulations for the control of water. 4-A. as claimed by TACC. It is clear that the responsibility to comply with government standards lies with TACC. LLDA is entitled to compensation for damages resulting from failure to meet established water and effluent quality standards. punishable under the law shall be awarded to the Authority to be earmarked for water quality control and management.12 In this case. And although under the same order. VILLEGAS 31 . Under Section 4-A of RA 48501.11 A premature invocation of a court’s intervention renders the complaint without cause of action and dismissible. – NO. DENR only has administrative power over LLDA. TACC’s recourse is to file an action. This is because under Executive order No. the noncompliance was due to the omission and fault of PhilRealty. air and land pollution" and to "promulgate ambient and effluent standards for water and air quality including the allowable levels of other pollutants and radiations. because PhilRealty turned over the project to TACC five years before LLDA advised TACC that its wastewater did not meet government effluent standards. if warranted. Hence. ATTY. This was denied by LLDA. 149 transferred LLDA from the Office of the President to the DENR "for policy and program coordination and/or administrative supervision. If. W/N TACC’ complied with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. TACC then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order. TACC cannot escape its liability to LLDA by shifting the blame to PhilRealty. TACC has an administrative recourse before the DENR Secretary which it should have first pursued before filing a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS comply with government standards." Powers of the LLDA to Impose Penalty LLDA. 1 Sec. by virtue of its special charter. Compensation for damages to the water and aquatic resources of Laguna de Bay and its tributaries resulting from failure to meet established water and effluent quality standards and from such other wrongful act or omission of a person. W/N TACC is the one liable to pay the fine. 2. against PhilRealty in a proper court. TACC further argues that the non-compliance with government standards was due to the omission and fault of PhilRealty. RATIO: Non-Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies The doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that resort be first made with the administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the controversy may be elevated to a court of justice for review. The CA denied TACC’s petition. ISSUE: 1. the LLDA did not abuse its discretion in issuing its 4 September 2003 Order. private or public. juridical or otherwise. has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas. – YES.

The CA held that the power to grant fishing permits is now vested with the LGUs and the provisions of the LLDA charter insofar as fishing privileges in Laguna de Bay are concerned had been repealed by the LGC. the LLDA notified the public that all unregistered fishpen or fishcages are declared illegal and dismantled otherwise demolition will be effected. was partially amended by Marcos due to the rapid expansion of Metro Manila and its impact on the environment.INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (LLDA) VS COURT OF APPEALS (CA) G. FACTS: RA 4850. Municipal governments thereupon assumed the authority to issue fishing privileges and fishpen permits. ISSUE/S: Which agency of the Government (the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the region) should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance ATTY. The affected fishpen owners filed injunction cases against the LLDA. 1995 Ponente: Hermosisima. Jr. where the municipalities in the Laguna Lake Region interpreted the provisions of this law to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters. This further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of LLDA. Because of this. the LGC took effect.R. LLDA’s motions to dismiss were denied by the RTC and affirmed by the CA. Nos. 120865-71 December 7. Fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion which gave rise to sharp increase in unregulated fishpen and fish cages. VILLEGAS 32 . which created the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA). Subsequently.

BUYING.1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS. Thus. GATHERING . Jr. 23. and insofar as the Airline Shippers Association are concerned. . They also claim that it took away their right to earn their livelihood in lawful ways. Thus. – LLDA has jurisdiction. and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade. POSSESSING. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of Ordinances2 issued by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Puerto Princesa and its Governor (Socrates). The power of the local government units to issue fishing privileges was clearly granted for revenue purposes. No. LLDA’s charter should prevail over the LGC. 15-92 "AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVEFISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1. in violation of Section 2. SOCRATES G. LLDA’s charter constitutes a special law while the LGC is a general law. TANO v. 110249 August 21. the special statute should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. SELLING AND SHIPMENT OF LIVE MARINECORAL DWELLING AQUATIC ORGANISMS” ATTY. unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest. they were unduly prevented from pursuing their vocation and entering 2 (1) Ordinance No. Accordingly. their livelihood. the LLDA has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it. 1993 TO JANUARY 1. Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution and that the Mayor had the absolute authority to determine whether or not to issue the permit. Tano et al contend that the said Ordinances deprived them of due process of law. PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF" (2) Office Order No. calling or profession or having in his possession any of the articles for which a permit is required to be had. trade. fishcages and other aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region and for lake quality control and management. (3) Resolution No. VILLEGAS 33 . The LGC does not contain any express provision which categorically expressly repeal the charter of the LLDA. 33. although the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law. FACTS: TANO et al. 2 entitled: "A RESOLUTION PROHIBITING THECATCHING. On the other hand. 1997 Ponente: Davide. the charter of the LLDA which embodies a valid exercise of police power should prevail over the LGC on matters affecting Laguna de Bay. requiring any person engaged or intending to engage in any business. It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. the power of the LLDA to grant permits for fishpens. to obtain first a Mayor’s and authorizing and directing to check or conduct necessary inspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out from Puerto Princesa and. Ordinance No.R. occupation. RATIO: The LGC do not necessarily repeal the aforementioned laws creating the Laguna Lake Development Authority and granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region. Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute.INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS of permits for fishery privileges is concerned.

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS "into contracts which are proper. lakes. Socrates wt al. The LGC vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters and impose rentals. Section 7. a substantial distinction existed "between a fisherman who catches live fish with the intention of selling it live. and other deleterious methods of fishing. What the provision merely recognizes is that the State may allow. by law. to penalize. the ordinances in question are meant precisely to protect and conserve our marine resources to the end that their enjoyment may be guaranteed not only for the present generation. the use of explosives. inter alia. One of the devolved powers enumerated in the section of the LGC on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. It is clear that both Ordinances have two principal objectives or purposes: (1) to establish a "closed season" for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a period of five years. or of ecological imbalance." i. ordinances that "[p]rotect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing and such other activities which result in pollution. Ordinances banning the catching of certain species of fishes and corals need not be approved by the DENR before they can be effective because in the exercise of devolved power. and essential to carry out their business endeavors to a successful conclusion. had a lawful purpose and employed reasonable means. undoubtedly. by appropriate ordinances. Socrates et al. but of their protection. they likewise maintained that there was no violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. particularly. This necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters. cooperative fish farming. necessary. Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen. the Ordinance applied equally to all those belonging to one class. fees or charges therefor. acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes. muro-ami. and a fisherman who catches live fish with no intention at all of selling it live.e. with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers. bays and lagoons. Furthermore. but to lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nation's marine wealth. ATTY. ISSUE: W/N the Ordinances in question are unconstitutional. which shall include. electricity. the validity of the questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted. In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein to LGU under Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause). and other provisions. reasoned that public hearings were conducted before the enactment of the Ordinance which. such approval is not necessary. – NO. speaks not only of the use of communal marine and fishing resources. qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman to invoke as defense of violation of Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII. the sangguniang panlungsod and the sangguniang panlalawigan are directed to enact ordinances for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants." Further. VILLEGAS 34 . defended the validity of the Ordinances as a valid exercise of the Provincial Government's power under the general welfare clause. and to prosecute any violation of the provisions of applicable fishery laws. and (2) to protect the coral in the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities. IN addition. As hereafter shown. but also for the generations to come. noxious or poisonous substances. development and conservation. while as to the latter. the sangguniang bayan. Further. RATIO: There is absolutely no showing that any of the Tano et al. "the former uses sodium cyanide while the latter does not..

were charged with violating PD 704 for supposedly fishing without the use of a poisonous substance (sodium cyanide). however. ISSUE/S: 1. together with the Solicitor general now question the admissibility of the evidence against petitioners in view of the warrantless search of the fishing boat and the subsequent arrest of petitioners. VS CA G. are guilty of illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances. The police (PNP Maritime Command and the Task Force Bantay Dagat) directed the boat captain to get random samples of the fish from the fish cage for testing. NO. guilty and sentenced them to imprisonment and forfeiture of the fishes. 1996 Ponente: Puno FACTS: HIZON et al. W/N fish samples seized by the NBI in the F/B Robinson without a search warrant are admissible in evidence. The rule is. Search and seizure ATTY.. W/N Hizon et al. No. VILLEGAS 35 . RATIO: As a general rule. any evidence obtained without a judicial warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Hizon et al. The CA affirmed this decision.R. the RTC found Hizon et al. 2.. – YES. A report that some fishing boats were fishing by "muro ami" led to the apprehension of such boat (F/B Robinson). subject to certain exceptions. a second set of fish samples yielded a negative result on the sodium cyanide. 119619 December 13. where Hizon et al were present. The initial results tested the fish positive for sodium cyanide and that was the basis of the information against Hizon et al. Notwithstanding this.INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS HIZON et al. However.

through Executive ATTY. et al. DPWH." This method of fishing needs approximately two hundred (200) fishermen to execute. the Executive Secretary. Hizon et al. The authorities found nothing on the boat that would have indicated any form of illegal fishing. All the documents of the boat and the fishermen were in order. VILLEGAS 36 . DENR subsequently granted the Metropolitan Manila Authority (formerly MMC) an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) for the operation of the garbage dumpsite. GR 129546. revealed that there was no permit issued to MMC to utilize these portions of land for dumping purposes. were caught with the use of sodium cyanide.D. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY.INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations of customs laws have been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant. Thus. No action was taken on these letters. What the apprehending officers instead discovered were twenty eight (28) fishermen in their sampans fishing by hook and line. is made with "the use of a big net with sinkers to make the net submerge in the water with the fishermen surround[ing] the net. the report submitted by the forest officers of the Forest Engineering and Infrastructure Unit of the Community Environment and Natural Resource Office (CENRO). however. et al. v. that petitioners were charged with illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances. The same exception ought to apply to seizures of fishing vessels and boats breaching our fishery laws. the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of San Mateo wrote to MMC. or even the same four specimens. stating that it was ascertained that ground slumping and erosion have resulted from improper development of the site. "Muro ami". It further states that the use of the areas as dumping site greatly affects the ecological balance and environmental factors in that community. albeit under suspicious circumstances. it was the police who were the ones engaged in an illegal fishing expedition. were charged with illegal fishing penalized under sections 33 and 38 of P. 13 December 2005 Ponente: Chico-Nazario FACTS: A Memorandum of Agreement was signed by DPWH. Less than six months after the issuance of the ECC. DENR then sent a letter to MMA recommending that the all facilities and infrastructure in the garbage dumpsite in Bocaue be dismantled. informing them of the SB resolution banning creation of dumpsites for Metro Manila within its jurisdiction. Under the circumstances of the case. It was only after the fish specimens were tested. DENR suspended the ECC in a letter addressed to the DPWH. Apparently. Despite the various objections and recommendations raised by the government agencies. However. PROVINCE OF RIZAL. the only basis for the charge of fishing with poisonous substance is the result of the first NBI laboratory test on the four fish specimens. In this case. DENR-IV. 704. as what was reported the fishermen were doing. this finding does not warrant the infallible conclusion that the fishes in the F/B Robinson. Rizal as a sanitary landfill by MMC. It was also found out that the land subject of the MOA was part of the Marikina Watershed Reservation Area. The apprehending officers who boarded and searched the boat did not find any sodium cyanide nor any poisonous or obnoxious substance. the Office of the President. and the DENR. DENR and the Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC) Governor. These provisions create a presumption of guilt for possession of explosives or poisonous substances. this presumption is merely prima facie and the accused has the right to present evidence to rebut this presumption. allowing DENR to utilize Bocaue. Rizal Province. SB also asked to suspend all operations with respect to the San Mateo Landfill Dumpsite. However. Neither did they find any trace of the poison in the possession of the fishermen or in the fish cage itself.

makes particular reference to the agency’s being subject to law and higher authority. The contaminated water was also found to flow to the Wawa Dam and Boso-boso River. Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. MMA was also informed that the heavy pollution and risk of disease generated by dumpsites rendered the location of a dumpsite within the Marikina Watershed Reservation incompatible with Laguna Lake Development Authority’s (LLDA) program of upgrading the water quality of the Laguna Lake. It is the height of irony that the public respondents have vigorously arrogated to themselves the power to control the San Mateo site. Three short months before Proclamation No. Section 2. prohibition and mandamus with application for a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction. 635 was passed to avert the garbage crisis. Investigation Reports regarding the respiratory illnesses among pupils of a primary school located approximately 100 meters from the site. 9003. and industrialization process. 635. CA denied the petition for lack of cause of action. as well as the constant presence of large flies and windblown debris all over the school’s playground were also submitted. No 7160. contaminating the nearby creeks that were sources of potable water for the residents. while specifically referring to the mandate of the DENR. MMDA officials agreed to abandon the dumpsite after six months President Joseph E.” Claiming the above events constituted a “clear and present danger of violence erupting in the affected areas.” Province of Rizal (PROVINCE) filed before the CA a civil action for certiorari. signed and issued Proclamation No. Proclamation No. pointing out that the effects of the El Niño phenomenon would be aggravated by the relentless destruction of the Marikina Watershed Reservation. or the Local Government Code. they have. Adverse effects of the site were reported as early as of June 1989. Congress had enacted the National Water Crisis Act to “adopt urgent and effective measures to address the nationwide water crisis which adversely affects the health and well-being of the population. ISSUE/S: 1. The SC issued the TRO.INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS Secretary Ruben Torres. 635. but have deftly ignored their corresponding responsibility as guardians and protectors of this tormented piece of land. While the appeal was pending. which was passed on ATTY. The Reorganization Act of the DENR defines and limits its powers over the country’s natural resources. and 2.” Respondents’ actions in the face of such grave environmental consequences defy all logic. Title XIV. 9003. 192 entrust the DENR with the guardianship and safekeeping of the Marikina Watershed Reservation and our other natural treasures. food production. and sources of water should always be protected. Province filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. RATIO: San Mateo Landfill will remain permanently closed. VILLEGAS 37 . Act No. The circumstances under which Proclamation No. it is but is defined by the declared policies of the state. which in turn empties into Laguna de Bay. Proclamation No. “Excluding from the Marikina Watershed Reservation Certain Parcels of Land Embraced Therein for Use as Sanitary Landfill Sites and Similar Waste Disposal Under the Administration of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. The petitioners rightly noted that instead of providing solutions. The Court held that a mere MOA does not guarantee the dumpsite’s permanent closure.A. The Local Government Code gives to LGUs all the necessary powers to promote the general welfare of their inhabitants. Meanwhile. Estrada issued a Memorandum ordering the closure of the dumpsite and directed DILG Secretary Alfredo Lim and MMDA Chairman Binay to reopen the San Mateo dumpsite “in view of the emergency situation of uncollected garbage in Metro Manila. and is subject to the law and higher authority. With great power comes great responsibility.” the Province filed an Urgent Petition for Restraining Order.” was signed into law by President Estrada. The Administrative Code of 1987 and Executive Order No. W/N the permanent closure of the San Mateo landfill is mandated by Rep. Although the DENR owns the Marikina Reserve. As a result. worsened the problem. with unmitigated callousness. One of the issues the law sought to address was the “protection and conservation of watersheds. 635 is illegal. Protection of watersheds is an “intergenerational” responsibility that needs to be answered now. The San Mateo site has adversely affected its environs. RA. resulting in a critical and imminent health and sanitation epidemic. otherwise known as “The Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000. W/N respondent MMDA agreed to the permanent closure of the San Mateo Landfill as of December 2000. 635 was passed also violates R. Leachate treatment plant eroded twice already.

15. 2. which was approved four years earlier. among other things. specifically that the site selected must be consistent with the overall land use plan of the local government unit. non-governmental and people's organizations. – YES. The CA upheld the jurisdiction of the NCIP and affirmed the TROs. W/N the NCIP has the jurisdiction over the matter. the project’s implementation is illegal. on 10 October 1991. education and public information. VILLEGAS 38 . Masweng. The said law mandates the formulation of a National Solid Waste Management Framework. Regional Hearing Officer of the NCIP issued TROs to refrain from enforcing the Demolition. and utilize environmentally sound methods that maximize the utilization of valuable resources and encourage resource conservation and recovery. “The Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000” was enacted pursuant to the declared policy of the state “to adopt a systematic. They further claim that their ownership over the lands has been expressly recognized Proclamation No. The Mayor contends that the NCIP has no jurisdiction to hear and decide main actions for injunction as it was not a case pending before such Commission. Approved on 26 January 2001. 15 dated April 27.’s ancestral land claim is recognized by by Proclamation No. is subject to the provisions of the Local Government Code. cannot convert the same into private property. 2009 Ponente: Tinga FACTS: The Baguio City Mayor ordered demolition of illegal structures located in Busol Watershed Reservation. opposed the demolition. Section 2(c) of the said law declares that it is the policy of the state “to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government units. the handling and disposal of special wastes. private respondents cannot claim their alleged ancestral lands under the provisions of the IPRA. W/N Gumangan et al. and that the site must be located in an area where the landfill’s operation will not detrimentally affect environmentally sensitive resources such as aquifers. processing. comprehensive and ecological solid waste management system which shall ensure the protection of public health and environment. Under the Local Government Code. ISSUE/S: 1.R. and subsequently the NCIP granted a writ of preliminary injunction. Any landfills subsequently developed must comply with the minimum requirements laid down in Section 40.” It requires the adherence to a Local Government Solid Waste Management Plan with regard to the collection and transfer. the method and procedure for the phaseout and the eventual closure within eighteen months from effectivity of the Act in case of existing open dumps and/or sanitary landfills located within an aquifer. Absent either of these mandatory requirements. therefore. recycling.INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS 28 August 1995. and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions.. and prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian. – NO. 3. CITY OF BAGUIO VS MASWENG G. W/N Baguio City is exempt from IPRA.” Likewise. Section 27 requires prior consultations before a program shall be implemented by government authorities and the prior approval of the sanggunian is obtained. Another contention is that the IPRA that Baguio City shall be governed by its Charter. which should include. no matter how long. 180206 February 4. groundwater reservoirs or watershed areas. Thus. composting and final disposal of solid wastes. and the funding of solid waste management projects. two requisites must be met before a national project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be implemented: prior consultation with the affected local communities. Lastly. Gumangan et al. the Mayor claims that the Busol Forest Reservation had already been declared by jurisprudence as inalienable and possession thereof. No. in ATTY. claiming that the lands where their residential houses stand are their ancestral lands which they have been occupying and possessing openly and continuously since time immemorial. source reduction. 1922 and recommended by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) for exclusion from the coverage of the Busol Forest Reserve. groundwater reservoir or watershed area.

Although the NCIP has the authority to issue temporary restraining orders and writs of injunction. 15 explicitly withdraws the Busol Forest Reservation from sale or settlement.INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS which case. The IPRA. Baguio City is not exempt from IPRA. on the basis of the allegations in their petition. however. The IPRA demands that the city’s charter respect the validity of these recognized land rights and titles. Private respondents. VILLEGAS 39 . Although IPRA states that is governed by its own charter. The declaration of the Busol Forest Reservation as such precludes its conversion into private property. whether private respondents are members of ICCs/IPs. petitioners must show that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which injunction is directed are violative of said right. their right thereto may be protected by an injunctive writ. furthermore. ATTY. 15. – NO. the predecessors-in-interest of private respondents. that the Busol Forest Reservation was declared by the Court as inalienable by jurisprudence. Proclamation 15 does not recognize the ancestral land claim Before a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued. The proclamation merely identifies the Molintas and Gumangan families. RATIO: The NCIP has jurisdiction In order to determine whether the NCIP has jurisdiction over the dispute. as members of the Ibaloi tribe. its exemption from the IPRA. cannot ipso facto be deduced because the law concedes the validity of prior land rights recognized or acquired through any process before its effectivity. it is necessary to resolve. Proclamation No. Proclamation No. does not appear to be a definitive recognition of private respondents’ ancestral land claim. endows the NCIP with the power to issue temporary restraining orders and writs of injunction without any prohibition against the issuance of the writ when the main action is for injunction. too. as claimants of a portion of the Busol Forest Reservation but does not acknowledge vested rights over the same. The fact remains. however. These thus qualifies the action as as a "dispute(s) or controversy(s) over ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs" within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the NCIP. Relatedly. were asserting ownership over portions of Busol Forest Reservation which they claim to be their ancestral lands. In fact. The petition for injunction sought to prevent the enforcement of the demolition orders issued by the City Mayor. we are not convinced that private respondents are entitled to the relief granted by the Commission. the courts are not endowed with jurisdictional competence to adjudicate forest lands.

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO V. who represents respondents. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL G. specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD. the Province of North Cotabato and Vice-Governor Emmanuel filed a petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. negotiate with sincerity in the resolution and pacific settlement of the conflict. On July 23. petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments. summarizes the MOA-AD by stating that the same contained. were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur. protect and respect human rights. through the Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels. The Solicitor General. the commitment of the parties to pursue peace negotiations. 2008 Ponente: Carpio Morales FACTS: The Philippines and the MILF. Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern. pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a public consultation thereon. among others. and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD. The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiation and the concluding of several prior agreements between the two parties beginning in 1996. VILLEGAS 40 . The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF did not push through because upon motion of petitioners. No.R. ATTY. Malaysia. when the GRP-MILF peace negotiations began. 183591 October 14. and refrain from the use of threat or force to attain undue advantage while the peace negotiations on the substantive agenda are on-going. this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same. 2008.

The Constitution. Petitioners assert that the powers granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any local government under present laws. it would be useful to turn first to a general idea that serves as a unifying link to the different provisions of the MOA-AD. however. cities. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces. and barangays. a defined territory. specifically the following provisions of Article X: SECTION 1. city. IT IS ALMOST LIKE A STATE. No province. a status closely approximating it. among others. it would conflict with Article X. Firstly. the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. the commitment of the Central Government to ensure the BJE's participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies. and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage. RATIO: The MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Constitution and laws as presently worded. delegates certain responsibilities to the other. THE BJE IS NOT JUST AN AUTONOMOUS REGION. Free associations represent a middle ground between integration and independence. specifically the following: the BJE's capacity to enter into economic and trade relations with foreign countries. or municipality. the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the powers conceded therein to the BJE. In the basic model. AMONG OTHERS. economic and social structures. SECTION 15.” The MOA-AD it contains many provisions which are consistent with the international legal concept of association. that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or. and the continuing responsibility of the Central Government over external defense. These amendments would be necessary because the BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the Constitution. the status of its relationship with the national government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. territorial or political subdivision. IT IS NOT BECAUSE ITS ADOPTION WOULD ENTAIL THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLE 10. cities. In general. namely. ISSUE: W/N the MOA-AD is constitutional? NO. These provisions of the MOA indicate. Indeed. therefore. while maintaining its international status as a state. Before assessing some of the specific powers that would have been vested in the BJE. does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State. SECTION 20 OF THE CONSTITUTION. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. the principal. municipalities. at any rate. what is an association? “[a]n association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links. and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain. Indeed. is recognized under our laws as having an "associative" relationship with the national government. The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution. and a capacity to enter into relations with other states. environmental protection. however. and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines . the international law concept of association. one state. a permanent population. much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence. BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces.INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS Supplementarily. municipalities. Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD's provisions. petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional insofar as by creating and recognizing the Bangsamoro Juridicial Entity as a separate state or a juridical. Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of ATTY. namely. It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM. and even go beyond those of the present ARMM. not even the ARMM. VILLEGAS 41 . already requires for its validity the amendment of constitutional provisions. the associate. a government. Section 20 of the Constitution. among other things. BJE was also granted the right to participate in Philippine official missions bearing on negotiation of border agreements. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.

9 of said constitutional provision would not suffice.. that such relationships and understandings do not include aggression against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines x x x. The Bangus Fry Fisherfolk. The Sangguniang Bayan of Puerto Galera has declared the Minolo Cave which was a mangrove area and breeding ground for bangus fry a eco-tourist zone.INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS Philippine territory. claiming to be fisherfolks from Minolo.which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association . Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region. moreover. The Provincial Government of Mindoro moved to dismiss the complaint for the failure to exhaust administrative remedies. No. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws. since any new law that might vest in the BJE the powers found in the MOA-AD must. The RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies since there was no appeal ATTY. BANGUS FRY FISHERFOLK ET AL.R. It would not do. By this time. it is only the President who has that power. The MOA-AD.runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic. 131442 July 10. for the issuance of a writ of injunction to stop the construction of the mooring facility. would not comply with Article X. VILLEGAS 42 . rendering the complaint without cause of action. the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over: xxx 9. The Bangus Fry Fisherfolk then filed a complaint with the RTC of Manila for the cancellation of the ECC. authorizing the corporation to construct a temporary mooring facility in the Minolo Cave in Puerto Galera. comply with other provisions of the Constitution. however. (Underscoring supplied) Again on the premise that the BJE may be regarded as an autonomous region. Section 20 of the Constitution since that provision defines the powers of autonomous regions as follows: SECTION 20. the MOA-AD would require an amendment that would expand the above-quoted provision. to merely pass legislation vesting the BJE with treaty-making power in order to accommodate paragraph 4 of the strand on RESOURCES which states: "The BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries: provided. Puerto Galera. The mere passage of new legislation pursuant to sub-paragraph No." Under our constitutional system. VS. The mooring facility would serve as the temporary docking site of Napocor's power barge. itself. the spirit animating it . the provincial government of Mindoro manifested that it was the one undertaking the construction of the mooring facility. for instance. and further prayed for the demolition of mooring structures that has already been built. sought reconsideration of the ECC issuance. which was denied by the DENR. JUDGE LANZANAS ET AL. 2003 Ponente: Carpio FACTS: DENR Regional Executive Director Principe issued an Environmental Clearance Certificate (ECC) in favor of Napocor. G. and that Manila RTC had no jurisdiction as the mooring facility is outside its territorial jurisdiction.

climatic change. it could not issue an injunctive writ against the DENR or NAPOCOR. However. 7160. Sections 26 and 27 do not apply to this case because as petitioners admit. this does not apply in the present case. not the operation of the power barge. a final decision of a regional Director may be appealed to the Office of the Secretary of DENR. It is another matter if the operation of the power barge is at issue. within its territorial jurisdiction. As an environmentally critical project that causes pollution. On the Alleged Patent Illegality of the ECC While the patent illegality of an act exempts a party from complying with the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. the jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts to issue injunctive writs is limited to acts committed or about to be committed within their judicial region. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Under the DENR Procedural Manual. The failure of this method of appeal deprived the DENR Secretary to review the decision of his subordinate.” Again. ATTY. Thus. the operation of the power barge needs the prior approval of the concerned sanggunian. rangeland. loss of cropland. VILLEGAS 43 . There is no statutory requirement for the concerned sanggunian to approve the construction of the mooring facility.INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS before the DENR Secretary prior to filing the case with the trial court. – NO. This omission renders the complaint dismissible for lack of cause of action. what is before this Court is only the construction of the mooring facility. ISSUE/S: 1. the issuance of the ECC does not violate Sections 26 and 27 of RA No. one of which was Sections 26 and 27 of the Local Government Code. Therefore. or forest cover and extinction of animal or plant species. W/N RTC erred in dismissing the complaint for lack of cause action and lack of jurisdiction.” These provisions require every national government agency or government-owned and controlled corporation to hold prior consultations with the local government unit concerned and to secure the prior approval of its sanggunian before implementing “any project or program that may cause pollution. depletion of non-renewable resources. Whether the sangguniang bayan of Puerto Galera was required to approve the construction of a mooring facility – NO. Sections 26 and 27 are inapplicable to projects which are not environmentally critical RATIO: Jurisdiction of the Manila RTC over the Case The Manila RTC has jurisdiction to determine the validity of the issuance of the ECC because the office of the Regional Director Principe is in Manila. 2. Congress introduced Sections 26 and 27 in the Local Government Code to emphasize the legislative concern “for the maintenance of a sound ecology and clean environment. However. The Bangus Fry Fisherfolk contend that they are exempt from filing an appeal with the DENR Secretary because the issuance of the ECC was a patent violation of existing laws and regulations. the mooring facility itself is not environmentally critical and hence does not belong to any of the six types of projects mentioned in the law.

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