CUTARAN vs. SEC.

OF DENR

FACTS:

Assistant Secretary for Luzon Operations of the DENR issued Special Order No. 31 1 entitled “Creation of
a Special Task force on acceptance, identification, evaluation and delineation of ancestral land claims in
the Cordillera Administrative Region.” The special task force created thereunder was authorized to accept
and evaluate and delineate ancestral land claims within the said area.

the Secretary of the DENR issued Special Order no. 25 3entitled “Creation of Special Task Forces
provincial and community environment and natural resources offices for the identification, delineation and
recognition of ancestral land claims nationwide” and Department Administrative Order no. 02, 4 containing
the Implementing Rules and Guidelines of Special Order no. 25.

 In the same year Special Order no. 31 was issued, the relatives of herein petitioners filed separate
applications for certificate of ancestral land claim (CALC) over the land they, respectively occupy inside
the Camp John Hay Reservation. In 1996 the applications were denied by the DENR Community Special
Task Force on Ancestral Lands on the ground that the Bontoc and Applai tribes to which they belong are
not among the recognized tribes of Baguio City. Also pursuant to the assailed administrative issuances
the heirs of Apeng Carantes filed an application 5 for certification of ancestral land claim over a parcel of
land also within Camp John Hay and overlapping some portions of the land occupied by the petitioners.
Petitioners claim that even if no certificate of ancestral land claim has yet been issued by the DENR in
favor of the heirs of Carantes, the latter, on the strength of certain documents issued by the DENR, tried
to acquire possession of the land they applied for, including the portion occupied by herein petitioners. 

this petition for prohibition originally filed with the Court of Appeals to enjoin the respondent DENR from
implementing the assailed administrative issuances and from processing the application for certificate of
ancestral land claim (CALC) filed by the heirs of Carantes on the ground that the said administrative
issuances are void for lack of legal basis. CA held the assailed DENR Special Orders Nos. 31, 31-A, 31-B
issued in 1990 prior to the effectivity of RA 7586 known as the National Integrated Protected Areas
Systems (NIPAS) Act of 1992, are of no force and effect “for preempting legislative prerogative” but
sustained the validity of DENR Special Order No. 25, and its implementing rules (DAO No. 02, series of
1993) by the appellate court on the ground that they were issued pursuant to the powers delegated to the
DENR under section 13 of RA 7586.

Hence, this petition.

The petitioners further allege that the subsequent passage in 1997 of Republic Act 8371, otherwise
known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act, wherein the power to evaluate and issue certificates of
ancestral land titles is vested in the National Commission on Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous
People (NCIP) is unmistakable indication of the legislature’s withholding of authority from the DENR to
confer title over lands occupied by indigenous communities

ISSUE:

WON DENR issuances and special orders were valid.

RULING:
From a reading of the records it appears to us that the petition was prematurely filed. Under the
undisputed facts there is as yet no justiciable controversy for the court to resolve and the petition should
have been dismissed by the appellate court on this ground.

We gather from the allegations of the petition and that of the petitioners’ memorandum that the alleged
application for certificate of ancestral land claim (CALC) filed by the heirs of Carantes under the assailed
DENR special orders has not been granted nor the CALC applied for, issued. The DENR is still
processing the application of the heirs of Carantes for a certificate of ancestral land claim, which the
DENR may or may not grant

This Court cannot rule on the basis of petitioners’ speculation that the DENR will approve the application
of the heirs of Carantes. There must be an actual governmental act which directly causes or will
imminently cause injury to the alleged legal right of the petitioner to possess the land before the
jurisdiction of this Court may be invoked. There is no showing that the petitioners were being evicted from
the land by the heirs of Carantes under orders from the DENR. The petitioners’ allegation that certain
documents from the DENR were shown to them by the heirs of Carantes to justify eviction is vague, and it
would appear that the petitioners did not verify if indeed the respondent DENR or its officers authorized
the attempted eviction. 

MINERS ASSOCIATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FACTORAN

FACTS:

Former President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order Nos 211 and 279 in the exercise of her
legislative powers. EO No. 211 prescribes the interim procedures in the processing and approval of
applications for the exploration, development and utilization of minerals pursuant to Section 2, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution. EO No. 279 authorizes the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint-
venture, co-production, or production- sharing agreements for the exploration, development, and
utilization of mineral resources.

The issuance and the impeding implementation by the DENR of Administrative Order Nos. 57 which
declares that all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution…shall be converted into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from the
effectivity of these guidelines.” and Administrative Order No. 82 which provides that a failure to submit
Letter of Intent and Mineral Production-Sharing Agreement within 2 years from the effectivity of the
Department Administrative Order No. 57 shall cause the abandonment of the mining, quarry, and sand
and gravel claims, after their respective effectivity dates compelled the Miners Association of the
Philippines, Inc., an organization composed of mining prospectors and claim owners and claim holders, to
file the instant petition assailing their validity and constitutionality before this Court.

Issue :

Are the two Department Administrative Orders valid?

Ruling :

Yes. Petitioner's insistence on the application of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, as the
governing law on the acceptance and approval of declarations of location and all other kinds of
applications for the exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources pursuant to Executive
Order No. 211, is erroneous. Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pertains to the old system of
exploration, development and utilization of natural resources through "license, concession or lease"
which, however, has been disallowed by Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. By virtue of the
said constitutional mandate and its implementing law, Executive Order No. 279 which superseded
Executive Order No. 211, the provisions dealing on "license, concession or lease" of mineral resources
under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining laws are deemed repealed
and, therefore, ceased to operate as the governing law. In other words, in all other areas of administration
and management of mineral lands, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other
existing mining laws, still govern. Section 7 of Executive Order No. 279 provides, thus:

Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other existing mining laws, and their
implementing rules and regulations, or parts thereof, which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Executive Order, shall continue in force and effect.

Well -settled is the rule, however, that regardless of the reservation clause, mining leases or agreements
granted by the State, such as those granted pursuant to Executive Order No. 211 referred to this petition,
are subject to alterations through a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State.

Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may not be precluded by the
constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering, modifying and amending the mining
leases or agreements granted under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pursuant to Executive
Order No. 211. Police Power, being co-extensive with the necessities of the case and the demands of
public interest; extends to all the vital public needs. The passage of Executive Order No. 279 which
superseded Executive Order No. 211 provided legal basis for the DENR Secretary to carry into effect the
mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

TANO vs. SOCRATES

FACTS:

On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an ordinance banning the
shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from January 1, 1993 to January 1, 1998.
Subsequently the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted a resolution
prohibiting the catching , gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of a several species of live
marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for 5 years, in and coming from Palawan waters.

Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the court declare the said
ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground that the said ordinances deprived them of
the due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in
violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:

Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held that the challenged
ordinances did not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws. There is
absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman.
Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay
stress on the duty of the State to protect the nation’s marine wealth. The so-called “preferential right” of
subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute.

In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the state and pursuant to the first
paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their “exploration, development and
utilization...shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.

In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in
municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily includes the enactment of
ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters. In light of the principles
of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein to LGUs which
unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned ordinances cannot be
doubted.

HIZON vs. CA Hizon vs. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 517, [G.R. No. 123784], (June 18, 1996)

FACTS:

On September 30, 1992 at about 2:00 in the afternoon, the Task Force Bantay Dagat reported to the PNP
Maritime Command that a boat and several small crafts were fishing by muro ami within the shoreline of
Barangay San Rafael of Puerto Princesa. The police, headed by SPO3 Romulo Enriquez, and members
of the Task Force Bantay Dagat, headed by Benito Marcelo, Jr., immediately proceeded to the area and
found several men fishing in motorized sampans and a big fishing boat identified as F/B Robinson within
the seven-kilometer shoreline of the city. They boarded the F/B Robinson and inspected the boat with the
acquiescence of the boat captain, Silverio Gargar. In the course of their inspection, the police saw two
foreigners in the captains deck. SPO3 Enriquez examined their passports and found them to be mere
photocopies. The police also discovered a large aquarium full of live lapu-lapu and assorted fish weighing
approximately one ton at the bottom of the boat. They checked the license of the boat and its fishermen
and found them to be in order. Nonetheless, SPO3 Enriquez brought the boat captain, the crew and the
fishermen to Puerto Princesa for further investigation. At the city harbor, members of the Maritime
Command were ordered by SPO3 Enriquez to guard the F/B Robinson. The boat captain and the two
foreigners were again interrogated at the PNP Maritime Command office. Thereafter, an
Inspection/Apprehension Report was prepared and the boat, its crew and fishermen were charged with
the Conducting fishing operations within Puerto Princesa coastal waters without mayors permit.

The PNP Maritime Command of Puerto Princesa City filed the complaint at bar against the owner and
operator of the F/B Robinson, the First Fishermen Fishing Industries, Inc., represented by herein
petitioner Richard Hizon, the boat captain, Silverio Gargar, the boat engineer, Ernesto Andaya, two other
crew members, the two Hongkong nationals and 28 fishermen of the said boat.

As defense, petitioners claimed that they are legitimate fishermen of the First Fishermen Industries, Inc.,
a domestic corporation licensed to engage in fishing. They alleged that they catch fish by the hook and
line method and that they had used this method for one month and a half in the waters of Cuyo Island.
The trial court found the thirty one (31) petitioners guilty of the offense of illegal fishing with the use of
obnoxious or poisonous substance penalized under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 704, the Fisheries
Decree of 1975. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners are guilty of illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances.

RULING:

No. The offense of illegal fishing is committed when a person catches, takes or gathers or causes to be
caught, taken or gathered fish, fishery or aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use of explosives,
electricity, obnoxious or poisonous substances. The law creates a presumption that illegal fishing has
been committed when: (a) explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substances or equipment or device for
electric fishing are found in a fishing boat or in the possession of a fisherman; or (b) when fish caught or
killed with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substances or by electricity are found in a
fishing boat. Under these instances, the boat owner, operator or fishermen are presumed to have
engaged in illegal fishing.

The validity of laws establishing presumptions in criminal cases is a settled matter. It is generally
conceded that the legislature has the power to provide that proof of certain facts can constitute prima
facie evidence of the guilt of the accused and then shift the burden of proof to the accused provided there
is a rational connection between the facts proved and the ultimate fact presumed.To avoid any
constitutional infirmity, the inference of one from proof of the other must not be arbitrary and
unreasonable.In fine, the presumption must be based on facts and these facts must be part of the crime
when committed.

The third paragraph of section 33 of P.D. 704 creates a presumption of guilt based on facts proved and
hence is not constitutionally impermissible. It makes the discovery of obnoxious or poisonous substances,
explosives, or devices for electric fishing, or of fish caught or killed with the use of obnoxious and
poisonous substances, explosives or electricity in any fishing boat or in the possession of a fisherman
evidence that the owner and operator of the fishing boat or the fisherman had used such substances in
catching fish. The ultimate fact presumed is that the owner and operator of the boat or the fisherman were
engaged in illegal fishing and this presumption was made to arise from the discovery of the substances
and the contaminated fish in the possession of the fisherman in the fishing boat. The fact presumed is a
natural inference from the fact proved.

The court stress, however, that the statutory presumption is merely prima facie. It can not, under the
guise of regulating the presentation of evidence, operate to preclude the accused from presenting his
defense to rebut the main fact presumed. At no instance can the accused be denied the right to rebut the
presumption.

METRO ILOILO WATER DISTRICT vs. CA

Petitioner is a water district organized under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 198 (P.D. 198), as
amended. It was granted by the Local Water Utilities Administration Conditional Certificate of
Conformance No. 71   4
etitioner filed nine (9) individual yet identical petitions for injunction with prayer for preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order  against herein private respondents.
5

Petitioners alleged that That pursuant to the provisions of Section 31 (a) of P.D. 198, as amended, the
petitioner as a Water District was authorized to adopt laws and regulations governing the drilling,
maintenance and operation of wells within its boundaries for purposes other than single family domestic
use on overlying land, with then provision that any well operated in violation of such regulations shall be
deemed an interference with the waters of the district;

That the respondent has abstracted or withdrawn ground water within the territorial jurisdiction of the
petitioner at ___________________ Iloilo City, without first securing a Water Permit from the National
Water Resources Council nor had its well driller registered as such with said council, and sold said water
so extracted to commercial and other consumers in Iloilo City, within petitioner’s service area nad it is a
violation of the rules and regulations prescribed by the BOD of petitioner.

private respondents uniformly invoked the lack of jurisdiction of the trial court, contending that the cases
were within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the National Water Resources Council (Water
Council) under Presidential Decree No. 1067, aka as Water Code of the Philippines,

TC dismissed the petition on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. CA likewise
denied the petition because the controversy arose from the fact that the petitioner Iloilo Water District
was granted water rights in Iloilo City Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WON petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies in filing the case of injunction.

RULING:

No.

In the analogous case of Amistoso v. Ong, petitioner had an approved Water Rights Grant from the
Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communications. The trial court was not asked to grant
petitioner the right to use but to compel private respondents to recognize that right. Thus, we declared that
the trial court’s jurisdiction must be upheld where the issue involved is not the settlement of a water rights
dispute, but the enjoyment of a right to water use for which a permit was already granted.

the present petition calls for the issuance of an injunction order to prevent private respondents from
extracting and selling ground water within petitioner’s service area in violation of the latter’s water
permit. There is no dispute regarding petitioner’s right to ground water within its service area. It is
petitioner’s enjoyment of its rights as a water district which it seeks to assert against private respondents.

MMDA G.R. No.s 171947-48, December 18, 2008

Concerned Citizens

vs MMDA

Ponente: Velasco
Facts:

January 29, 1999, concerned residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the RTC Imus, Cavite
against several government agencies for the clean-up, rehabilitation and protection of the Manila Bay/
The complaint alleged that the water quality of Manila Bay is no longer within the allowable standards set
by law (esp. PD 1152, Philippine environment Code).

DENR testified for the petitioners and reported that the samples collected from the beaches around
Manila Bay is beyond the safe level for bathing standard of the DENR. MWSS testified also about
MWSS efforts to reduce pollution along the bay. Philippine Ports Authority presented as evidence its
Memorandum Circulars on the study on ship-generated waste treatment and disposal as its Linis Dagat
project.

RTC ordered petitioners to Clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay.

The petitioners appealed arguing that the Environment Code relate only to the cleaning of the specific
pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. Raising the concerns of lack of funds
appropriated for cleaning, and asserting that the cleaning of the bay is not a ministerial act which can be
compelled by mandamus.

CA sustained the RTC stressing that RTC did not require the agencies to do tasks outside of their usual
basic functions.

Issue:

(1) Whether PD 1152 relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents.

(2) Whether the cleaning or rehabilitation of the Manila Bay is not ministerial act of petitioners that can
be compelled by mandamus.

Held:

(1) The cleaning of the Manila bay can be compelled by mandamus.

Petitioners’ obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on one hand, and how they are to carry
out such duties, on the other, are two different concepts. While the implementation of the MMDA’s
mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing
what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus.

The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set forth not only in the
Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper
waste disposal system cannot be characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier stated; discretion
presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries to act officially according to their
judgment or conscience.

(2) Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code

Include Cleaning in General

The disputed sections are quoted as follows:

Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.––Where the quality of water has deteriorated to a degree where
its state will adversely affect its best usage, the government agencies concerned shall take such measures
as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such water to meet the prescribed water quality standards.

Section 20. Clean-up Operations.––It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to contain, remove and
clean-up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the government
agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up operations and expenses incurred
in said operations shall be charged against the persons and/or entities responsible for such pollution.

Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned ought to confine themselves to
the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the
contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water
quality “has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage.” This section, to
stress, commands concerned government agencies, when appropriate, “to take such measures as may be
necessary to meet the prescribed water quality standards.” In fine, the underlying duty to upgrade the
quality of water is not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident.

Note:
- The writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. Ministerial duty is one that
requires neither official discretion nor judgment.A vs. Concerned Citizens of Manila Bay

HILARION vs. HENARES vs. LTFRB

FACTS:

Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding respondents Land
Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC) to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use compressed natural gas (CNG)
as alternative fuel.

ISSUES:

(1) Do petitioners have legal personality to bring this petition before us?

(2) Should mandamus issue against respondents to compel PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel?

APPLICABLE LAWS:

• Section 16,12 Article II of the 1987 Constitution

The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

• Section 414 of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the "Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999." SEC.
4. Recognition of Rights. – Pursuant to the above-declared principles, the following rights of citizens are
hereby sought to be recognized and the State shall seek to guarantee their enjoyment:

a) The right to breathe clean air;

b) The right to utilize and enjoy all natural resources according to the principle of sustainable
development;

c) The right to participate in the formulation, planning, implementation and monitoring of environmental
policies and programs and in the decision-making process;
d) The right to participate in the decision-making process concerning development policies, plans and
programs, projects or activities that may have adverse impact on the environment and public health;

e) The right to be informed of the nature and extent of the potential hazard of any activity, undertaking or
project and to be served timely notice of any significant rise in the level of pollution and the accidental or
deliberate release into the atmosphere of harmful or hazardous substances;

f) The right of access to public records which a citizen may need to exercise his or her rights effectively
under this Act;

g) The right to bring action in court or quasi-judicial bodies to enjoin all activities in violation of
environmental laws and regulations, to compel the rehabilitation and cleanup of affected area, and to
seek the imposition of penal sanctions against violators of environmental laws; and

h) The right to bring action in court for compensation of personal damages resulting from the adverse
environmental and public health impact of a project or activity.

RULING:

(1) YES. There is no dispute that petitioners have standing to bring their case before this Court.
Moreover, as held previously, a party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which may,
in the exercise of the Court's discretion, be set aside in view of the importance of the issue raised. We
brush aside this issue of technicality under the principle of the transcendental importance to the public,
especially so if these cases demand that they be settled promptly.

(2) NO. plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by petitioners, i.e., a writ of mandamus
commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is available only to
compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the
respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. Mandamus will not
generally lie from one branch of government to a coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that neither is
inferior to the other.

It appears that more properly, the legislature should provide first the specific statutory remedy to the
complex environmental problems bared by herein petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus
is taken.

MMDA vs. JANCOM

FACTS:

After bidding for a waste management project with the MMDA, Jancom won a contract for the MMDA’s
San Mateo waste management project. A BOT contract for the waste to energy project was signed on
Dec 19, 1997, between Jancom and the Philippine Government, represented by the Presidential Task
Force on Solid Waste Management through DENR Secretary Victor Ramos, CORD-NCR chair Dionisio
dela Serna, and MMDA chair Prospero Oreta.

The contract, however, was never signed by President Ramos as it was too close to the end of his term.
He endorsed it to President Estrada, but Estrada refused to sign it, for two reasons: the passage of RA
8749, or the Clean Air Act of 1999 and the clamor of San Mateo residents for the closure of the dumpsite.

When the MMDA published another call for proposals for solid waste management projects for Metro
Manila, Jancom filed a petition with the Pasig RTC asking the court to declare as void the resolution of the
Greater Metropolitan Manila Solid Waste Management Committee disregarding the BOT contract with
Jancom, and the call for bids for a new waste management contract.

On May 29, 2000, the lower court decided in favor of Jancom. Instead of appealing, the MMDA filed with
the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and a TRO. When the CA dismissed the petition, the MMDA
went to the Supreme Court, arguing that the contract with Jancom was not binding because it was not
signed by the President, the conditions precedent to the contract were not complied with, and there was
no valid notice of award.

The Supreme Court ruled that MMDA should have filed a motion for appeal instead of for certiorari,
because a certiorari would only apply in cases where there was grave abuse of jurisdiction, something
which the petition did not allege. Correction may be obtained only by an appeal from the final decision.
Since the decision was not appeal, the Court said it has become final and “gone beyond the reach of any
court to modify in any substantive aspect.”

Though saying it was unnecessary to discuss the substantive issues, the court took it up just the same, “if
only to put the petitioner’s mind to rest.”

The contract with Jancom is valid: citing Article 1305, 1315 and 1319 of the Civil Code.

In asserting that there was no valid and binding contract, MMDA can only allege that there was no valid
notice of award; the contract does not bear the signature of the President; the conditions precedent
specified in the contract were not complied with.

But the Court said that the lack of notice was the government’s fault; though the President did not sign,
his alter-ego did; and anyway his signature was only necessary for the effectivity of the contract, not its
perfection; and that the two-month period within which Jancom should comply with the conditions had not
yet started to run because the contract had not yet taken effect, precisely because of the absence of the
President’s signature.

HELD:

We, therefore, hold that the Court of Appeals did not err when it declared the existence of a valid and
perfected contract between the Republic of the Philippines and JANCOM. There being a perfected
contract, MMDA cannot revoke or renounce the same without the consent of the other. From the moment
of perfection, the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but
also to all the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage,
and law (Article 1315, Civil Code). The contract has the force of law between the parties and they are
expected to abide in good faith by their respective contractual commitments, not weasel out of them. Just
as nobody can be forced to enter into a contract, in the same manner, once a contract is entered into, no
party can renounce it unilaterally or without the consent of the other. It is a general principle of law that
no one may be permitted to change his mind or disavow and go back upon his own acts, or to proceed
contrary thereto, to the prejudice of the other party.