Professional Documents
Culture Documents
EU ENLARGEMENT
TOWARDS SOUTH-EAST EUROPE
th
Decemcer 15 , 2005
AUDITORIUM
Edited by
Dr. Ozan ERÖZDEN
Copyright
Foundation for Middle East and Balkan Studies (OBIV)
Citation.
Dr. Ozan ERÖZDEN, Proceedings of the International Conference on the EU
Enlargement towards South-East Europe, December 15 th, Istanbul.
Istanbul: OBIV, 2005
Available From
Foundation for Middle East and Balkan Studies (OBIV)
Kasap Veli Sokak No.10
Salacak 34668
Üsküdar - Istanbul
EU ENLARGEMENT
TOWARDS SOUTH-EAST EUROPE
10.00-10.10
Prof. Dr. Fulya ATACAN
(Head of DPSIR / YTU)
10.10-10.20
Ambassador Güner ÖZTEK
(Chairman of OBIV)
I.SESSION
Chairperson
Prof.Dr. Haldun GÜLALP
(DPSIR / YTU)
10.30-12.30
11.15-11.30 Coffee Break
II.SESSION
Chairperson
Dr. Cengiz ARIN
(DPSIR / YTU)
14.30-17.00
15.30-15.45 Coffee Break
I.SESSION
10.30-13.00
Chairperson
Prof.Dr. Haldun GÜLALP
(DPSIR / YTU)
Chairperson
Dr. Cengiz ARIN
(DPSIR / YTU)
Dr.Ozan ERÖZDEN,
(DPSIR / YTU)...........................................................................................................
Dr. Anneli Ute GABANYI,
(German Institute for International and Security Affairs)..........................................
Dr.Emilian KAVALSKI,
(Lougborough University)...........................................................................................
Prof.Dr. Cengiz AKTAR,
(Bahçesehir University) ..............................................................................................
Dr.Martin MAYER,
(Advisor to the Commission Delegation Zagreb)........................................................
Prof.Dr. Jovan TEOKAREVIC,
(Belgrade University).................................................................................................
Assoc.Prof.Dr. Bertil Emrah ÖDER,
(University of Istanbul) ..............................................................................................
Prof.Biljana GABER,
(Ph.D.University St. Cyril and Methodius Skopje, R. Macedonias)............................
Dr. Eno TRIMÇEV,
(Albanian Institute for International Studies)...............................................................
CONTENTS
CONTRIBUTORS ................................................................................................................12
Güner ÖZTEK.......................................................................................................................
ROMANIA’S EU ACCESSION: 2007 OR 2008? OR: SHOULD ROMANIA PAY FOR SPILT
EU MILK?, ............................................................................................................................ 29
Dr.Emilian KAVALSKI..........................................................................................................
Prof.Dr.Cengiz AKTAR..............................................................................................................
MEMBERSHIP, .................................................................................................................... 61
Dr.Martin MAYER......................................................................................................................
Jovan TEOKAREVIC..........................................................................................................
Prof.Biljana GABER.......................................................................................................
WELCOMING REMARKS
I am delighted to see all participants here and thank you for accepting our invi-
tation.
On this occasion I would like to thank those from the Department who organized
this Conference. My gratitude goes to Dr. Erözden, Research Assistants Ayþe Kollu
and Yetkin Baþkavak from the Department and to Ambassador Öztek and his staff
from OBÝV for their efficiency.
* Prof Dr. Fulya ATACAN, YTU / DPSIR
The EU has successfully grown from six to 25 members. Bulgaria and Romania
are expected to join in 2007 and Croatia will probably gain membership between
2008 and 2010. 2015-2020 is the projected time for Turkey's full membership. As
you know Turkey's EU membership has become a matter of major significance and
considerable controversy in recent years.
It is clear that the EU has tended to enlarge along regional lines adding groups of
nearby nations. The EU is presently very interested in the integration of the Balkan
states, namely Bosnia Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, Macedonia and
Albania. However France and the United Kingdom have shifted their positions
regarding these states. I am sure we will have an opportunity to discuss these mat-
ters in detail.
I hope that this will be an informative, inspiring and fruitful meeting for all those
who participate.
Thank you.
Prof. Dr. Fulya Atacan
*
* *
OPENING REMARKS
Güner ÖZTEK*
With the fall of the Berlin Wall, a new political geography of Europe has
emerged. The Iron Curtain’s artificial division of Europe ceased to exist and the
classical geographical terms ‘Western’, ‘Central’ and ‘Eastern’ Europe have resur-
faced. Within this context, the Balkans, which has played a significant role in
European and World history, has become an integral part of Europe. The political
center of gravity has begun to shift from Western Europe to Central and Eastern
*Ambasador (Rtd.), Director of Foundation for Middle East and Balkan Studies - OBÝV
Europe.
The end of the Cold War had an important impact on the Balkans and on
Southeastern Europe. The countries involved were faced with important problems
such as the transition from totalitarian regimes to democracy and from centralized,
state-ruled economies to free market economies with vast freedom and opportuni-
ties. However, due to a lack of democratic and political traditions, backgrounds and
proper infrastructure, these vast freedoms, particularly in the West Balkans,
inflamed national feelings and awakened old enmities leading to bloody clashes and
serious separatism.
Aggressive nationalistic raids beyond borders not only caused partition within
countries and the region, but they reached the dimension of ethnic cleansing. Ethnic
clashes resulted in the collapse of already fragile and weak economies based on out-
dated technologies. These economic difficulties forced masses to immigrate.
Presently, in most parts of the Balkan region, especially in the South-East Balkans,
security is almost assured.
The entire area faced an important challenge: the modernization and reorganiza-
tion of the state. What we are witnessing today is all the countries of the region try-
ing to complete transition of their political, social and economic structures in order
to build a democratic political system and a free market economy in multiethnic and
multicultural states. To develop a culture of region-wide reconciliation, good neigh-
borhood relations and close cooperation in all fields is a pre-condition for peace and
stability; there is no alternative.
The level of individual well-being and prosperity in the Balkan nations has a
direct impact on the security and stability of the region. In turn, as the region is an
important element in the overall security of the continent, stability and security in
Europe as a whole cannot be achieved and sustained if this part of the continent is
dragged into economic and social turmoil.
The enlargement process towards the South-East Balkans is a new, historic step
of great importance and is an encouragement to carry out the necessary political,
social and economic reforms to promote democracy, the rule of law, and to create a
zone of lasting peace, stability, prosperity and freedom. There is no doubt that the
more integrated Europe is the more effective and better equipped it becomes to over-
come conflicts. Thus the enlargement process is a two-way street beneficial to both
parties. However, the key element of success lies in the determination of the region’s
countries to complete their programs of reforms and to meticulously commit them-
selves to respect for human rights and the protection of minorities.
It is high time for the Euro-Atlantic and European institutions to embrace the
region with a vision of projecting lasting peace, stability and prosperity and, at the
same time, to cultivate the diverse historical heritages as constitutive elements of
European culture and civilization. This will speed the process of democratization
and reform for the establishment of basic universal standards of human and minor-
ity rights in cultural, educational, linguistic and other fields.
For the first time in history, the Balkans, with its eastern and western regions, are
willingly getting together around Europe and Euro-Atlantic organizations with the
purpose of achieving more democracy, peace and stability. It is a chance not to be
missed for both parties.
The time is right for the word ‘Balkans’ to be freed from its negative connota-
tions and to come to stand for such positive things as ‘mutual respect’ and ‘peace-
ful cohabitation’. The various peoples of the region should spare no effort to avoid
the falling again into balkanization.
I am certain that this day in Istanbul will bring forth fruitful discussions and will
help us all to understand better the EU Enlargement towards South-East Europe and
its consequences.
With these thoughts in mind, I wish you all every success in your deliberations.
*
* *
Dear Participants,
In this, the first presentation of the conference, ‘EU Enlargement towards the
Balkans’, my main aim is to draw a conceptual framework concerning the issues
that my colleagues in two of today’s consecutive panels will discuss in detail. While
doing so, I intend to take a multidisciplinary stance. As you know, political science
is a scientific branch that welcomes a multidisciplinary approach. In my presenta-
tion, I will test the limits of this multidisciplinary tolerance by drawing on one of the
basic scientific branches, physics. You, the participants, are the ones who will assess
my success or failure at this.
As you might already know, in physics the main principles of dynamics for large
* Department of Political Science & International Relations, Yildiz Technical University, Istanbul
objects, such as planets, and for atomic and sub-atomic particles differ from each
other. Within the terminology of political science, we can consider these two
domains as different entities governed by different legal systems. Big objects, in
their movements, obey Newton’s laws of motion and laws of universal gravitation,
while sub-atomic particles are governed by the laws of quantum physics. In princi-
ple, by applying Newton’s laws, one gets precise results, meaning that as long as one
has enough data, one can precisely determine or calculate the current and future
position of an object. Quantum physics, on the other hand, is ruled by uncertainty.
Called the Uncertainty Principle, this notion means that the position and the veloc-
ity of an object cannot be simultaneously measured exactly, even in theory.
According to this principle, the very concepts of precise position and precise veloc-
ity together have no meaning in nature. Instead, only a series of probabilities may
indicate the possible results of an interaction between atomic and subatomic parti-
cles. Such a scientific concept, which requires uncertainty, is extremely strange for
minds shaped by the idea that science, especially applied sciences, brings exact
results. Hence, even the founder of Relativity Theory, Albert Einstein, furiously
objected to the uncertainty principle with the assertion that “God does not play dice
with the universe.”
At this stage, I invite you to imagine the EU, especially the one of 15 states as it
was before May 2004, as a separate universe – a universe that has its own laws that
determine with exactitude the results of physical and legal acts of objects and sub-
jects appertaining to that universe. Let us call these laws ‘acquis communautaire’
and add the Copenhagen Criteria to them. In this universe, everything, even sizes
applicable to agricultural products, is defined by treaties, regulations, directives or
decisions. Everything in this universe is conceived to ensure the greatest possible
stability.
Now, let us look at the Balkans. Can we consider the Balkans a universe on its
own? My personal answer to this question is positive. Nevertheless, to avoid any
possible misunderstanding, I would like first to make clear what I understand by the
term ‘Balkans’. When I say ‘Balkans’, I do not mean a geographical entity in which
each community is the natural enemy of the neighbouring one. The term ‘Balkan’
that I use does not bear the pejorative meaning crystallized in the term of ‘balkaniza-
tion’. Neither do I intend to enter a polemic on whether those who ‘Balkanized’ the
entire planet in the First and Second World Wars could reproach the peoples of the
Balkans. Deferring to Maria Todorova’s valuable book ‘Imagining the Balkans’,
when I say ‘Balkans’, I mean both a geographical entity and a mental state that is
physically situated in Europe but considers itself (and is also considered) outside of
Europe. I think in this sense, one would not be greatly mistaken if one defines the
Balkans as a separate universe whose dynamics are governed by laws different from
the ones ruling the universe of Europe or, more concretely, the EU.
From the political scientist’s point of view, the first issue to consider for all
Balkan societies is stability, in fact the lack of it. In the Balkans, the end of the Cold
War in the last decade of the twentieth century marked the beginning of a disinte-
gration process that brought back on the agenda, inter alia, the applicability of
some, so to say, nineteenth-century ideas on the role of states and borders. In the first
years of the new millennium, this disintegration process reached such an extent that
today nobody is able to say the exact number of states that exist in the region.
Today’s political map of South Eastern Europe consists of a patchwork of sovereign
states, international protectorates, semi-sovereign sub-state entities or provinces,
The antagonism between disintegrating and integrating forces that plays a role
over political developments in the Balkans can be seen in the general methodologi-
cal lines that shape scholarly work that analyses post-Cold War developments in the
region. Up to the end of 1990s, the mushrooming literature on nation- and state-
building in the contemporary Balkans was overwhelmingly couched in the classical
theoretical schemes of ‘transition to democracy’ and insisted on the pathological
character of nationalism in the region. The new trend in recent years is, however, to
emphasize the so-called ‘crisis of statehood’. In this framework, the capacity and
coherence of bureaucratic structures are analysed in depth. Such an approach
reflects the presupposition that lack of administrative capacity is one of the main
obstacles to socio-economic advancement, which is a view Brussels’ technocrats
largely share.
On the other hand, as the messenger of a brand new research paradigm, one
observes the emergence of more recent studies based on an alternative approach that
questions the view that state building in the Balkans can be reduced to EU-guided
reform of public administration. In other words, this approach does not take it for
granted that perspective EU membership has been the main engine for the far-reach-
ing reform processes throughout the region over the past ten years that has put all
countries on track for membership. Nevertheless, even within this approach one can
note that the EU accession process or incentive is a factor in the analysis.
Thus, as policy level approaches and scholarly work point out, the relation
between these two distinct universes, i.e. the EU and the Balkans, is a highly asym-
metric one. One of the universes (the EU) openly tells the other (the Balkans) that
if it starts to apply the other’s laws of dynamics, they may merge. My colleagues
who are going to present papers today will discuss in detail what each Balkan state
has done and what remains to be done. Thus, I do not intent to discuss this subject
in my presentation. Nevertheless, I would like to discuss the basic assumption of this
approach, i.e. whether the EU as a dynamic universe is as predictable as it presents
itself to be. In other words, does the EU reflect the stability that it claims is ensured
in its ranks and that it requires potential newcomers to achieve?
Let us consider the EU, for a moment, as a stabile and predictable entity as far as
its inner structure is concerned. The external politics of the Union, however, has
never been a clearly defined line. This means, in exact terms, that the EU has never
had an external policy line of its own, except for its strong stand in support of the
International Criminal Court in the face of US attempts to undermine the very basis
of this institution. Instead, the national interests of the member states, and especial-
ly those of the strongest ones, still prevail. This failure was clearly seen first when
the EU (then the EC) was called to take control of the crisis that broke in former
Yugoslavia. The region, especially the countries that emerged from the former
Yugoslavia are still facing the enduring effects of this shock.
the Union’s external and internal affairs. As mentioned above, despite the European
Commission’s efforts to keep the Union’s position vis-à-vis the future enlargement
process as stable as possible, member states’ internal political concerns affect this
standpoint, causing unpredictability. The disturbances encountered at the Union’s
last summit over the decision on the start of accession talks with Turkey and Croatia
are among the best examples of this instability. There are strong indications that the
EU member states will increasingly enrich the accession criteria for South East
European making their EU membership perspective more and more unforeseeable.
In the light of the above, I argue that the EU integration process is now much less
one-sided than before. The idea of a closed EU universe administered under the
principle of predictability and stability has proved itself for some time, especially
since the end of the Cold War, is a fiction. It is inconceivable that the EU will turn
this fiction into a reality by stopping its enlargement towards the Balkans. On the
other hand, it is also inconceivable that Europe will become Europe without one of
its components, namely the Balkans. Thus, the enlargement towards its South East
is the destiny of a Union claiming to be European.
Now let us for a moment again return to the world of physics. As I mentioned
before, physics currently treats big objects and small atomic particles as if they
belong to separate universes. Nevertheless, in reality these two different types of
material are part of the same universe, situated inseparably next to each other. Thus,
the major issue for current theoretical physics is to provide a unified theoretical
framework that encompasses laws of dynamics valid for both big and small objects.
Without it, it is impossible for physicists to explain the rules of dynamics for the
whole universe.
In our universe of politics, maybe this task should be taken into consideration
seriously. Europe and the Balkans are not separate universes but inseparable parts of
the same political entity. Maybe it is high time for the EU to recover from the dream
that it is a strongly stable unit and to allow the Balkan states into its ranks to formu-
late together softer and more realistic ways of multicultural, democratic and peace-
ful cohabitation.
To make my standpoint clear, I emphasize that this is not a plea for the EU to
abolish all criteria for joining the Union. This does even not mean that the criteria
should not be scrutinised even more closely than before. It is completely under-
standable that the EU has learned some lessons from the last two rounds of enlarge-
ment. Nevertheless, those EU politicians who feel they were too lenient in giving
the green light to countries joining the Union should consider the fact that the unity
of Europe should be built up on basic principles considered universal and not on cal-
culations over petty issues such as the percentage of vote to be obtained in the fol-
lowing elections. What I would like to underline here is that the EU should behave
fairly and equitably towards both itself and future members by not demanding some-
thing that it does not itself possess. Finally, yet importantly, the EU must demon-
strate its trustworthiness by not renouncing its own words for the sake of internal
politics in some member states.
*
* *
On 14 December 2004, Romania was the last of the 10 Eastern and Central
European countries to conclude accession talks with the EU. This is paradoxical
considering that it had was the first Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(Comecon, or CMEA) country to engage in formalized trade cooperation with the
EU in the early 1970s after it had started reorienting its foreign policy towards
Western Europe and the US in the early 1960s. In 1974, Romania signed a prefer-
* Dr. Anneli Utan GABANYÝ, German Institute for International and Security Affairs
In 1982, under the impact of Poland’s political, economic and financial crisis,
Romania defaulted on its hard currency debt with western financial institutions.
Constrained to repay its debt Romania, was forced to impose hard austerity meas-
ures on the population. Moreover, the EU stopped negotiations on a new trade agree-
ment with Romania. In 1990, Romania was the last former communist East
European country to establish diplomatic relations with the EU. In 1991, Bucharest
signed a trade and cooperation agreement and, in 1993, an association (‘Europe’)
agreement with the EU. On 22 June 1995, Romania was the fourth former commu-
nist East European state to apply for EU membership.
lagging behind Bulgaria in its efforts to close the 31 negotiation chapters. While
Bulgaria succeeded in closing negotiations at the June 2005 EU summit in Dublin,
Romania only succeeded on 14 December of the same year due to problems with
Chapters 3 (freedom of services), 21 (regional policy), 22 (environment), 6 (compe-
tition) and 24 (justice and home affairs). The reasons for Romania lagging behind
were manifold: the size of the country, its bad reputation with the European
Commission owing to its perceived unreliability and, most importantly, Romania’s
lack of support in the European Parliament. Romania fell victim to the power strug-
gle between the European Parliament and the European Commission, on the one
hand, and the partisan criticism of European Parliament’s conservative and liberal
members of the performance of Romania’s social democratic government, on the
other. An additional factor in the final stage of its accession negotiations was the
appointment of a new European Commission which was far more critical of
Romania than its predecessor. Pressed by countries such as Finland and Hungary,
which had long opposed the timely integration of Romania, the Commission did not
recommend the conclusion of negotiations with Bucharest. Eventually, a compro-
mise was found which imposed a severe monitoring process and an additional and
particularly harsh safeguard clause in the Romania (and Bulgaria) Accession Treaty,
which was signed on 25 April 2005. The Treaty contains three types of safeguard
clauses. A first set of three clauses that was included in prior accession treaties refers
to the post-accession period. Such clauses can be triggered during the first three
years after accession if a member state encounters difficulties adjusting to the EU
internal market or meeting EU standards in the field of justice and home affairs. The
decision on whether to revert to these clauses must be by unanimous vote of the
European Council.
When Bulgaria concluded accession talks with the EU in June 2004 the
Commission imposed an additional clause and, half a year later, also on Romania.
Other than the general post-accession clauses, this new clause refers to the period
leading up to accession. It stipulates that, if Bulgaria or Romania turns out to be
unprepared for accession in one of several important fields, the European Council
can propose a year’s delay on the accession date – 1 January 2008 instead of 1
January 2007. This decision would be by unanimous voting of the European
Council.
main impediment on their country’s road to accession. Once they have joined the
EU, they expect the EU’s institutions to assist them in their struggle against corrupt
dignitaries at home. The issue of corruption played a decisive role during the 2004
parliamentary and presidential elections. However, after winning the presidential
elections and after forming the new government, the battle against corruption degen-
erated into a power struggle between the Prime Minister, Mr C?lin Popescu
T?riceanu, and the President, Mr Traian B?sescu, and their respective parties. While
the EU Commission appreciated Romania’s progress on imposing European legal
standards, misusing the struggle against corruption poses a danger to Romania’s
overall goal of joining the EU on 1 January 2007.
However, the main factor that threatens to delay Romania’s accession for a year
is an external one. Following Romania’s (and Bulgaria’s) signing of the Accession
Treaty in April 2005, the political climate in EU member states underwent a drastic
change. The public mood in the EU-25 was particularly affected by:
While the problems confronting the EU countries after the outbreak of the ratifi-
cation and budget crisis this summer are real, it is questionable whether imposing a
delay on Romania’s accession would solve their internal problems. It is, however,
equally doubtful whether such a decision would be beneficial for Romania.
Opponents of Romania’s accession in 2007 argue that a longer preparation time
would offer Romania more time to better prepare for the challenges of EU member-
ship. However, in the light of the specific conditions outlined in the Accession
Treaty, this expectation will most certainly prove wrong. To put it bluntly: one-year
conditionality is no conditionality. Since accession as such has been agreed in the
Treaty, the EU lacks forceful means of further influencing the reform process in this
country beyond 2008. Therefore, any problem arising after accession could be bet-
ter addressed with Romania inside, and not outside, the EU.
that these two countries are part and parcel of the same wave of EU enlargement and
have explicitly been promised equal treatment with the ten other accession coun-
tries. This is why the EU should be particularly intent on projecting the image of an
organization whose foreign policy is predictable and reliable. Any indication of the
EU reneging on its principles and promises will undoubtedly send negative signals
to regions such as the Western Balkans or the countries of the EU Eastern neighbour-
hood. Romania’s geo-strategic importance as a missing link between the two arch-
es of instability cannot be overestimated. Stabilizing these areas, furthering democ-
racy, introducing good governance in these countries and drawing them closer to the
EU is a major strategic task serving the Em’s best interest. All this should be con-
sidered when it comes to “sacrificing” the two South East European countries to pay
for the EU milk spilt this summer.
Those who argue appeasing disenchanted voters in the ‘old’ EU member coun-
tries by delaying Romania’s EU accession by a year would not hurt Romania are
wrong. The contrary is true.
direct and indirect economic losses for Romania. The direct losses
would amount to about euro2 billion in cash-flow facilities and pay-
ments from the EU structural fund. Romania would also incur indirect
economic losses that, according to an estimate by Vasile Pusca?,
Romania’s former chief EU negotiator, would be about euro10 billion.
Does the EU need to solve its complex crisis and improve its communication
strategy vis-à-vis its national constituencies? The answer is decidedly ‘yes!’
Will a delay in Romania’s accession date solve these EU problems? The answer
is decidedly ‘no!’
No, it would be neither logical nor fair to change the rules of the game before the
current game with 12 participants is over.
No, it would not be fair for the EU to treat Romania with greater severity than
Bulgaria for the only reason that, for various reasons, Bulgaria enjoyed a better pub-
lic image in 2004 than Romania but was identified as the true problem candidate in
the October 2005 comprehensive monitoring report. Since the special safeguard
clause applicable exclusively to Romania allows for a delay whereas the simple
safeguard clause applicable to Bulgaria (and Romania) is practically impossible to
activate for procedural reasons, EU politicians would be well advised to allow for a
timely accession of the two South East European countries.
But: Yes, the EU should draw lessons from its inconsequent negotiation policy in
the case of the EU 12. Future enlargement rounds should abide to the criteria
(respect for conditionality and accession according to individual performance),
which the EU proclaimed but did not hitherto respect.
And: Yes, the EU should go about consolidating its conceptual basis no matter in
what form.
*
* *
Emilian KAVALSKI*
The words of Olli Rehn (especially in light of the October 2005 Luxemburg
European Council) seem to confirm the membership prospect (albeit distant) of cur-
rent and prospective candidates for EU-membership. It has also to be acknowledged
that Mr. Rehn is not merely the EU Commissioner on Enlargement, but de facto the
EU’s Commissioner on the Balkans as all current and (possible) prospective candi-
dates are from the region. In this context, Brussels has tended to give Bulgaria as an
example that is to be emulated by its neighbors. In fact, Mr. Rehn’s predecessor in
the Enlargement Office, Gunter Verheugen, set up the country as a model for the
Balkans, by declaring that “Bulgaria is not part of the Balkan problems – it is part
of their solution! Hence, the EU’s assistance is an investment in the future of the
country. Bulgaria is already starting to pay back for this support by developing the
foundations of a strong economy and a strong market, and also, one should not for-
get, by its political stability, which is a major factor for the stability of the Balkan
region.”
In this context, this paper reviews the process and progress of Bulgaria’s bid for
EU-membership and also relates Sofia’s experience to that of the Balkans as a
whole. At the same time, it identifies some problems with the EU’s strategy of
exporting the rules and practices of its zone of peace to the region. In particular, the
paper focuses on the persistence of the elite-society cleavage, which underwrites the
failure of successive governments to create the conditions for sustainable social,
political and economic transformation and development.
In order to illuminate its inferences, this paper briefly sketches the EU’s agency
in the Balkans as a background for its involvement in Bulgaria and subsequently
reviews the export of its rules and standards to the country. Finally, this study looks
at some of the problems and prospects for the EU integration of Bulgaria, which
might be of relevance to candidates – such as Turkey – which are currently embark-
ing on the accession trail.
This paper makes two complementary claims as regards the EU’s role: FIRST:
that the process of Bulgaria’s accession is intimately linked to the EU’s approaches
to the Balkans; and SECOND: that the EU’s role in the region altered qualitatively
as a result of the Kosovo crisis (Kavalski, 2005). As a report by the EU Institute for
For the purposes of clarity the EU involvement is divided in two main periods:
Just to recap briefly, the suggestion here is that up to the Kosovo crisis, the
Balkans influenced the reform process WITHIN the EU; yet, this did not seem to
affect its agency in the region. There are different reasons for the EU’s lack of
agency during this period. One of the most overlooked was the construction of the
Balkans as outside the EU area of responsibility. Simon Duke famously referred to
such reluctance as ‘a reverse-realist paradigm’, where instead of competition for
power and influence, there is attempt to avoid positions of leadership and responsi-
bility (Duke, 1994: 94).
During this period, the EU bundled Bulgaria in the group of CEE states. On 8
March 1993 Sofia signed a Europe Agreement with Brussels, which entered into
force in February 1995 and in December 1995, Bulgaria applied for EU member-
ship. Such chronology, however, overlooks that in Bulgaria, itself, the better part of
the 1990s was dominated by pro-/anti-EU/West debates. Although Bulgaria dealt
fairly successfully with the challenge of ethnic conflict after restoring the rights of
its large Turkish minority in the winter of 1989-90, its economic performance, how-
ever, was far more unconvincing. Successive governments failed to carry out criti-
cally important structural reforms to launch privatization, cut subsidies to loss-mak-
ing enterprises, consolidate the ailing banking sector and stabilize the national cur-
rency. In this context, it can safely be claimed that in contrast to CEE states,
Bulgaria wasted the greater part of the 1990s as reforms lacked a sense of purpose
and nervous governments sought to spare the population the pain of restructuring but
instead condemned the majority of the people to a deterioration in living standards.
Domestically, this had the effect of portraying the EU (as well as the accession
process) in very abstract terms, polarizing public opinion on the issue along party
lines, and, ultimately introducing the possibility of experimenting with an indige-
nous ‘Bulgarian way’ of reform. Yet, by the winter of 1996/97 as a result of gross
economic mismanagement and criminal privatization, the ‘Bulgarian way’ had led
to hyperinflation and a visible slump in living standards (Dimitrov, 2001: 82). The
concomitant deterioration in almost all spheres of social, economic and political life
led to the removal of the then Socialist government and ushered in pro-reform-mind-
ed and clearly pro-EU politicians. The former Bulgarian President, Petar Stoyanov
insisted that:
most of the period between 1989 and 1997 we only had the pretence of
reform. We deluded ourselves that we could survive without great sac-
rifices, but things kept getting tougher and we got deeper and deeper
into debt. 1997 marked the turning point when we shed our illusions.
(Financial Times, 1997).
Over the last ten years, the Union has gone through many changes and
is reaching the third phase in its geopolitical re-definition. The first
stage was the 1989 fall of the Berlin wall, which led to German re-uni-
fication and the start of the enlargement process to the east. The second
phase came in 1992 with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, there-
by fundamentally changing the dynamics within the European conti-
nent. We are now entering the third phase, which is the stabilization of
the Balkans and their integration into the process of European Union
enlargement.
At first, this recognition came in the form of a very explicit ‘Statement of the
EU on Bulgaria and Romania’ on 26 April 1999 (EIS). On the one hand, this
Statement noted ‘the contribution of Romania and Bulgaria, two associate States, to
stability in the wider region’. On the other, it recognized that this situation imposes
heavy burdens on these countries’. Therefore, their ‘governments are to be com-
mended for their positive responses’ by underlying ‘the special relationship [the
EU] enjoys with Romania and Bulgaria’.
for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA) on 21 June 1999. According to the
division of ISPA funds, Bulgaria was earmarked as the third largest beneficiary –
nearly 11% (COM(2001)616: 9). Simultaneously, it was also granted access to
SAPARD (agricultural aid) funds. The next step, which the EU undertook was to
upgrade the special relationship it had with Bulgaria, by noting its eligibility for
negotiations on membership. As Romano Prodi (1999) suggested at the time, this
softening of the Copenhagen criteria towards Bulgaria (and Romania) was intended
to prevent:
the countries concerned, having already made great efforts and sacri-
fices [from becoming] disillusioned and turn their backs on us. Their
economic policies will begin to diverge and a historic opportunity will
have been lost – perhaps forever. In the changed political landscape,
especially in the Balkan region, some countries may also let slip the
progress they have made towards democracy and human rights, and the
EU will have seriously failed the people of those countries.
later in December 1999, the accelerated completion of its negotiations with the EU
on 15 June 2004 and the signing of its Accession Treaty on 25 April 2005 underlie
the effectiveness of post-1999 instruments. The Foreign Minister Solomon Passi has
insisted this points to the country’s ‘transition from a national Bulgaria to a
European Bulgaria, whose policy-practice reflects the values of peace and democra-
cy’ (Focus, 22 December 2004).
In order to correct this, pre-accession assistance was increased. Whereas for the
1990-1999 period PHARE assistance has averaged €93 million per year (Dimitrova
and Dragneva, 2001: 83), from 2000 to 2004 Bulgaria’s allocation under PHARE
nearly doubled to €178 million annually (SEC(2004)1199: 7). Together with ISPA
and SAPARD, the EU’s financial leverage in the country for the period 1999-2005
rang to the tune of €1.7 billion. The projection is that this sum would rise from €564
million in 2006 to some €1.6 billion by 2009 (EIS, 30 November 2005). As one
Bulgarian diplomat acknowledged, such assistance has ‘encouraged’ Sofia to bring
its policy-making in line with EU-standards. Furthermore, the European
Commission declared in 2002 that ‘Bulgaria IS a functioning market economy’,
with economist remaining upbeat about the country’s macroeconomic record, cur-
rently projected to grow by 5% for the next four or five years.
Sofia has maintained throughout that its performance and compliance with EU
demands derives from the contractual nature of its relations with the EU. As the
Deputy Foreign Minister, Gergana Grancharova has insisted ‘the accelerated com-
pletion of the accession negotiations confirms that the assessment is premised on the
individual merits of each candidate country and not on the principle of group
enlargement’ (Focus, 17 June 2004). Such perceptions of the requirement of domes-
tic congruence of Bulgarian elites have been confirmed by Olli Rehn, the
Commissioner on Enlargement who insisted that ‘it is according to its own merits
that Bulgaria will be judged and I am convinced that it will win the qualification
match for the premier league of the Member States of the EU’ (Focus, 18 March
2005). Hence, policy-makers in Sofia have become increasingly worried that the
widening gap between Bulgaria and Romania might have a negative impact on the
country’s accession. In order to prevent a postponement scenario and having to wait
for Bucharest to catch up, Sofia has used every occasion to insist on the EU’s
upholding the principle of differentiation.
The socializing impact of the EU has been facilitated by the lack of alternative
centers of normative attraction for Bulgaria. As Foreign Minister Passi emphatical-
ly declared: ‘The European Union is our promised land!’ (Focus, 9 July 2003). The
former Head of the Bulgarian Mission to the EU, Antoinette Primatarova points that
this conviction derives from the fact that ‘the EU has already proven that it can
deliver in terms of prosperity through enforcing the principles of democracy, rule of
law and a market economy’ (Open Society News, 2002: 7). Hence, Sofia’s
Europeanization has been ensured by the broad political support for EU accession
and as the Bulgarian Minister of European Affairs maintains ‘there is no political
formation, which would be opposed to the country’s entry into the EU’ (Focus, 23
January 2004). Thus, one commentator insisted that the case of Bulgaria indicates
that the EU is capable of increasing the prospect of economic development by mak-
ing the countries attractive for foreign investment, while binding the decision-mak-
ing to a system of politics that awards domestic democratic practice, by eschewing
illiberal political sentiments (Bojkov, 2004: 511). Such inference, however should
not blind one to the problems accompanying Sofia’s conditioning by Brussels.
The essence of this normative divergence is that Sofia’s political elites are mov-
ing in the direction of justifying their decision-making according to a rationale out
of step with that of society at large. Gallagher (2005: 188) reasons that the ‘condi-
tioning of communist times and the fact that the democratic era has resulted in fail-
ing living standards for most citizens has instilled a powerful distrust of politics’. In
this respect, Bulgarian decision-makers increasingly perceive their policy-making
reality from the context of Brussels’ demands, while the overwhelming majority of
society perceives their environment from the framework of their surrounding cir-
cumstances characterized by insecurity and dissatisfaction with their conditions of
existence. The low income level, low living standards and high unemployment rep-
resent the main points of concern. Bulgaria underwent historical changes during the
1990s, yet the political and economic transformations proved to be very slow and
did not yield the result the population had hoped for. The macroeconomic growth of
the recent period has not been sufficient to narrow the income gap between Bulgaria
and the EU member states. Average per capita income in Bulgaria is still low, stand-
ing at 25% of the EU average (in purchasing power terms) or around €2,200. At the
same time only 15% of all households in the country have an adequate income to
cover the costs and needs sufficient to ensure their living standards. Thus, the evo-
cation of closer ties with the EU is reflected in the popular dissatisfaction with the
deteriorating conditions of existence.
Such persistent elite-society cleavage poses some issues for the path-depend-
ence of the Europeanization process. As Karl Deutsch (1953: 171-72) maintains,
populations which perceive that they ‘lack direct participation’ in the decision-mak-
ing process, often fall prey to ‘mobilization’ by opportune leaders or rabble-rousers.
For instance, the government of Prime Minister Ivan Kostov lost the June 2001 elec-
tions because of its emphasis on compliance with EU-conditions rather than domes-
tic pressures. Thus, despite ‘saving Bulgaria from economic disaster’, Kostov’s gov-
ernment – which The Economist (22 November 2003) called ‘the most successful
reformist government Southeastern Europe had seen’ – fell victim to its inability to
involve the society at large in the transformation process (Barany, 2002: 149). In this
respect, the arrival of the former king on the Bulgarian political horizon in 2001, the
emergence at the 2005 parliamentary elections of the freshly-formed neo-fascist
front ‘Attack’ as the fourth largest political formation (out of seven) to be represent-
ed in the National Assembly (Focus, 27 June 2005) are instances of these sugges-
tions. As already suggested such normative discrepancy between societies and elites
is not expected to impede the export of the EU-rules to Bulgaria in the short- to
medium-term. However, its persistence in the long-term can pose problems for the
institutionalization of the European zone of peace not only in Bulgaria, but also in
the Balkans. Therefore, in a recent analysis, Freedom House classified Bulgaria’s
political institutionalization of its democratic process as far from consolidated.
Perhaps rather harshly, but not too far off the mark, Freedom House’s survey insists
that on this reckoning, the country is closer to the levels of democratization in states
like Serbia or Albania than Hungary or Poland.
CONCLUSION
This paper claims that Bulgaria’s Europeanisation has been plagued by the
unwillingness of governing elites in the beginning of the transition to pay the short-
term political cost of domestic transformation. They committed to democratic insti-
tutions but undertook only partial economic reforms. The societal demand for socio-
economic change was very weak and failed to produce stable reformist majorities
during parliamentary elections. As a result, partial reforms and abuse of office for
narrow political and personal gains became commonplace. The reform gaps provid-
ed ample opportunities for clientelism and corruption which proved more difficult
to displace in the later transition years than to reform the socialist-era institutions in
the early 1990s
The issue that Bulgaria is facing now is no longer related to the dilemma “enter
or not”. Instead the problem is that EU-membership is not treated as a process but
as an aim in itself. The conclusion from the process of Sofia’ Europeanization is that
the main strategy for conducting social and economic policy in Bulgaria has been
primarily based on entering the EU and not on achieving best economic perform-
ance and consensus-politics of social responsibility. This is because there is a firm
perception that transition ends with integration into the EU. What has emerged is
the conviction that membership seals the process of transition to democracy and a
market economy. It is this perspective that the aim justifies the means that makes
problematic (mainly politically) a possible postponement of the accession process
(even if the General Safeguard Clause the Accession Treaty has to be signed by all
25 Member States, and so far none of the big MS (apart from Italy) have done that).
On the positive side, there are already Bulgarian commentators who insist that
although politically detrimental, a postponement of accession might have a positive
impact on the economy, not least in terms of getting ready for the pressures of the
common market. Also, others have pointed out that the longer Bulgaria waits, the
more the EU will be reshaped by the demands of the countries that joined in 2004.
Each year will make it a more diverse and broadminded club, in which Bulgaria and
other prospective members – such as Turkey – should feel more at home.
At any rate, the case of Bulgaria is a possible model for a fairly successful
accession process. Yet in terms of emulation, it sets a number of practices that
should be avoided – mainly, the sidelining of public concerns and also the presenta-
tion of the accession process as an aim in itself. In this context, perhaps Bulgaria fol-
lows the suggestion of the 1961 Nobel literature laureate, Ivo Andric that in “the
Balkans the expected does happen, but more often than not it happens in unexpect-
ed ways”.
*
* *
Afin d'étayer notre propos nous allons nous baser sur des exemples concrets en
rapport avec les processus de pré-adhésion de la Bulgarie, la Lettonie, la République
Tchéque et de la Roumanie. Nous allons, dans le même but, évoquer le sort des
communautés tziganes vivant dans les pays candidats.
Lorsque l'on a décidé en décembre 1997 à Luxembourg que les six premiers
candidats pouvaient entamer la phase des négociations, la Commission était en
quelque sorte prise au dépourvu. En effet ni à Bruxelles ni dans les squelletiques
représentations dans les pays concernés, les structures en place ne répondaient aux
besoins, qu'il s'agisse de la conceptualisation ou d'appui technique. C'est au fil des
années que s'est formée la mécanique de la pré-adhésion et il ne serait pas exagéré
d'affirmer qu'on a souvent avancé par tâtonnement.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Les critères de Copenhague
"L'adhésion requiert de la part du pays candidat qu'il ait des institutions stables
garantissant la démocratie, la primauté du droit, les droits de l'homme, le respect des
minorités et leur protection, l'existence d'une économie de marché viable ainsi que
C'est que, lorsque les services de la Commission ont été rendus responsables des
divers aspects de la phase préparatoire pour les candidats, ils n'avaient comme
repère que l'énoncé des critères de Copenhague et les vagues d'élargissement
passées des années 70,80 et 90 ne correspondaient pas à ce que l'on se préparait à
mettre en place. Ceci ni en termes politiques ni en matière technique.
C'est dans un tel environnement que les structures se sont établies et une certaine
mécanique s'est mise en route. Et évidemment, dans la longue séquence qui va de la
création du G-24 (du nom des 24 pays membres de l'OCDE) établi au sein de la
Commission au tout début des années 1990 pour soutenir les réformes dans les pays
ex-communistes au sommet d'Acropole du 16 avril 2003 qui a consacré l'adhésion
des 10 premiers membres parmi les candidats en place, les degrès de préparation des
pays ont considérablement varié. Alors que l'Hongrie et la Pologne par exemple, ont
fait la connaissance des mécanismes européens dès le début des années 1990, la
Lithuanie et la Bulgarie n'ont vraiment commencé leur appentissage qu'en 1999, c-
à-d presque 10 ans plus tard. Or la Lithuanie va devenir membre en même temps que
la Pologne. C'est que les 15 ont décidé de donner un coup d'accélérateur au
processus d'élargissement à partir de 1999, année qui va sûrement rester dans les
annales.
"(a) poursuivre strictement dans la ligne adoptée par les Conseils européens de
Luxembourg et de Cologne, à savoir de ne recommander l'ouverture de négociations
qu'avec les pays ayant suffisamment progressé dans leur préparation à l'adhésion
pour être en mesure de satisfaire à moyenne échéance aux conditions auxquelles elle
est surbordonnée. Cette formule a l'avantage de maintenir la méthodologie objective
établie par le Conseil européen, appliquée à un certain nombre des candidats actuels
et garantissant que chacun des pays invités à entamer des négociations ait atteint le
même niveau minimal de préparation;
(b) recommander l'ouverture de négociations avec tous les pays qui satisfont aux
critères politiques de Copenhague. Cette option a l'avantage de reconnaître la
nécessité, largement ressentie, d'imprimer un nouvel élan au processus
d'élargissement, compte tenu des mutations spectaculaires que subit le paysage
politique européen par suite principalement de la crise de la région des Balkans.
Cette crise a souligné la contribution fondamentale que le modèle d'intégration
Et après avoir relaté les avantages et les inconvénients des deux options elle
recommande la deuxième option tout en se réclamant des caractéristiques optimales
de la première: "?les négociations devraient s'ouvrir en 2000 avec tous les pays
candidats qui remplissent les critères politiques d'adhésion et qui ont fait la preuve
qu'ils sont prêts à prendre les mesures nécessaires pour remplir les critères
économiques, à savoir la Bulgarie, la Lettonie, la Lituanie, Malte, la Roumanie et la
Slovaquie. C?ompte tenu de l'importance extrême de la sûreté nucléaire, l'ouverture
de négociations avec la Bulgarie devrait être subordonnée à l'obligation, pour les
autorités bulgares, de décider, avant la fin de 1999, de dates acceptables de
fermeture des unités 1 à 4 de la centrale nucléaire de Kozloduy ainsi qu'à une
confirmation des progrès significatifs réalisés dans le processus de réforme
économique. L'ouverture de négociations avec la Roumanie devrait être
subordonnée à la confirmation, par les autorités roumaines, du lancement d'une
action efficace visant à allouer aux centres de l'enfance les ressources budgétaires
nécessaires et à y mettre en oeuvre les réformes structurelles qui s'imposent avant la
fin de 1999. Cette ouverture formelle des négociations est également subordonnées
à une évaluation supplémentaire de la situation économique, dans l'attente que les
mesures appropriées auront été prises au regard de la situation macro-économique."
Allons à présent vers la mer Baltique. Sur les quelque 2,43 millions d'habitants
que compte la petite Lettonie, environ 1 million ne sont pas des ressortissants lettons
et sont Russes pour la plupart. Voici quelques extraits du rapport régulier de la
Commission d'octobre 1999(p.18): "Étant donné que pour l'instant, environ 43 % de
la population a une langue autre que le letton comme première langue, la formation
linguistique restera l'un des principaux instruments d'intégration des minorités
ethniques au cours des années à venir. Une loi sur l'usage des langues a été adoptée
par le Parlement en juillet 1999. Elle n'a pas été promulguée par le président en
raison des préoccupations exprimées à diverses reprises au cours du premier
semestre de 1999 par l'OSCE, le Conseil de l'Europe et la Commission européenne
quant à son éventuelle incompatibilité avec les normes internationales et
communautaires définies dans l'Accord européen. Telle qu'elle a été adoptée, elle
n'intègre pas suffisamment les normes de proportionnalité et de précision. Elle
considère l'utilisation obligatoire de la langue nationale dans le secteur privé comme
la règle et non comme l'exception. L'adoption définitive de la loi est prévue pour le
9 décembre 1999. Plusieurs autres éléments limitant l'intégration des non-citoyens
subsistent en matière économique. Les non-citoyens ne sont toujours pas autorisés
à exercer certaines professions (avocat, garde de sécurité armé et détective privé)
pour des raisons liées à la sécurité de l'État et les pouvoirs publics comptent réviser
ces dispositions pendant l'année 2000." Et de déclarer:"la Lettonie remplit les
critères politiques de Copenhague. Bien que des progrès considérables aient été
réalisés sur la voie de l'intégration des non-citoyens, il faudra assurer que le texte
final de la loi sur l'usage des langues soit compatible avec les normes internationales
et l'accord européen."
La Commission a en effet recommandé sur la foi de la déclaration du
gouvernement pour faire adopter une nouvelle loi sur l'usage des langues que la
Lettonie commence le processus de négociation en fin 1999. En 2002, selon
l'information de International Herald Tribune de 8 Août 2002 citant des sources
gouvernementales il existait toujours 522.000 personnes apatrides en Lettonie.
En Estonie voisine sur un total de 1.4 million 500.000 sont des non-estoniens.
Parmi ces personnes qui sont pour la plupart des Russes, 170.000 n'avaient pas
encore été naturalisées au 20 mai 2003, selon l'information de l'Agence France
Presse, c-à-d à un an de l'adhésion finale de l'Estonie à l'Union. Il y a de fortes
chances que ces personnes n'aient pu voter au réferandum d'adhésion organisé
récemment en Estonie.
Il va sans dire que le problème de l'apatridie n'a pas été un élément détérminant
dans la recommendation de la Commission pour l'ouverture des négociations avec
l'Estonie en 1997 et avec la Lettonie en 1999.
Voici comment la Commission réitère ses remarques dans son rapport régulier de
la République Tchéque datant d'octobre 1999 (p.12), c-à-d de deux ans après le
début des négociations:"alors que la situation des autres minorités reste satisfaisante,
celle des tsiganes ne s'est pas vraiment améliorée depuis juillet 1997" et en
conclusion que "la République Tchéque doit rester attentive à la réforme du système
judiciaire, combattre plus efficacement la corruption et améliorer la situation des
tsiganes."
Que penser de ces exemples? Que l'on pourrait d'ailleurs démultiplier à souhait.
A ce propos on pourrait se référer aux travaux des experts des pays candidats dans
le cadre du programme de suivi de l'adhésion à l'Union européenne, geré par le Open
Society Institute de Budapest. Ils ont déjà publié en 2001 et 2002 six épais recueils
sur la capacité judiciaire, la protection des minorités et la lutte contre la corruption.
(www.eumap.org)
Mais dans les exemples que nous avons cités parmi les recommendations de la
Commission pour l'ouverture des négociations comme pour toutes les décisions du
Conseil d'entamer ce processus avec les candidats, c'est la substance première de
l'élargissement actuel de l'Union européenne, à savoir la fermeture de la parenthèse
ouverte à Yalta en 1945 et la volonté de faire du continent un.
*
* *
Martin MAYER*
That means that Croatia had not only to undergo the transition from Communism
to democracy, from state economy to market economy, like all the other Eastern
European countries that joined the EU in May 2004. It means that Croatia had also
to overcome the legacy of war, both internally, as well as with regard to its relations
with its neighbours. It is well known that this is a difficult and painful process.
Germany’s reconciliation with its neighbours after World War II is a telling examp-
le.
The functioning of the judiciary remains a major challenge for Croatia. There
is inefficiency of courts, excessive length of court proceedings, weakness in the
selection and training of judges and, what is of most concern, difficulties with the
enforcement of judgements. These structural difficulties have created an enormous
backlog of about 1 million cases (as of 31 December 2005).
3 The membership conditions were laid down in the 1993 European Council at Copenhagen. They require that the
The previous and the current Government adopted National Strategies to tackle
corruption, however, they remain mainly only a piece of paper. The Government
Office for Fighting Corruption and Organised Crime, set up few years ago as part of
the State Prosecution, is not efficient: it lacks trained staff, proper funding, and deals
mainly with petty offences rather than tackling the big issues. Almost all highly pub-
licised and political cases (like the case of former Foreign Minister Granic, suspect-
ed of being involved in illegal trading in company shares and taking bribes) have not
even reached the phase of an official court investigation
Public Administration is, in general, still very much marked by the old social-
ist system, with strong hierarchic and centralised structures, leaving civil servants
little room to decide, so to say, on the spot. There is still little understanding that the
purpose of public administration is to serve citizens and not govern them.
Public administration reform is one of the issues covered under the EC CARDS
Programme, the EC financial assistance to the Western Balkans. However, public
administration reform is not very high on the Government agenda. There is no over-
all strategy in Croatia, and a lot needs to be done in this respect, because without a
functioning public administration it will be difficult to implement the acquis com-
munitaire, the common EU legislation, properly.
With regard to Human Rights and rights of National Minorities, Croatia has
signed all the relevant international documents. However, in reality the situation is
not that rosy: Violence in the family, for instance, and violation of children’s and
women’s rights are still a taboo topic in the Croatian society. Women often do not
receive any maintenance after they get divorced (because the former husband
refused to pay or ignores the court decision), homosexuals are still considered
abnormal and, thus, excluded from public life. This is maybe not surprising in a tran-
sition country, particularly in Croatia, where the influence of the Catholic Church is
still, or again, enormous. However, public awareness of these problems is growing
slowly, and various local NGOs stand up increasingly for the rights of all kind of
minority groups.
This goes particularly for National minorities, whose rights the European
‘Community of Values’ links so closely to Human Rights. In Croatia there is since
2001 a Constitutional Law on the Protection of National Minorities in place, which
guarantees far reaching rights to national minorities – sometimes going even beyond
what is common practice in some EU members states: political representation in
national and local parliaments, representation in public administration, cultural
rights (e.g. the right to education in their script and language), etc. However, imple-
mentation is slow, particularly with regard to representation in public administration
(courts, police, etc) and at the local level.5
5 According to the 2001 Census results, the share of minority members of the total population is 7.5%. Data from
the Central State Administration Office of June 2006 indicate that the share of minority members in State bodies
(ministries, government offices, etc) is less than 4%. The share of minority members in public administration at the
local level is even less.
And there is one aspect, which makes the issue of national minorities sensitive
because it is related to the war. Croatia fought for, and gained independence to cre-
ate a national State; this implied, at least under the Tudjman regime, a State for eth-
nic Croats. At that time, and after the ‘Yugoslav experiment’, which had been wide-
ly perceived as a failure, the idea of a multi-national and multi-cultural state was not
very attractive. And even more so as the biggest minority became the Serbs 6, who –
generally speaking – have been perceived as aggressors to Croatia and the ‘fifth col-
umn’ of Milosevic. But, also, the Serb community had to come to terms with the fact
that with Croatia’s independence, their status changed from a nation in former
Yugoslavia (and actually the dominant one) to a minority. It is not surprising that 11
years after the war, the relation between Croat majority and Serb minority is still
marked by mutual distrust.
But there is also the very concrete issue of return of refugees. Some 370,000
Serbs fled Croatia, mainly during and after the military operations ‘Flash and
‘Storm’ in May and August 1995, when the Croatian army retook Serb occupied
Croatian territory. Today, 11 years later, one can say that the process of return comes
slowly to an end.
This does not mean that the Serb refugees who returned to Croatia are really inte-
6 4.5% (Census 2001); Other relevant minorities are Italians, Hungarians, Bosniacs and Albanians accounting ca.
0.3% each.
7 According to data from UNHCR (April 2006) about 140,000 Serb refugees, out of 370,000, have returned to
Croatia. This indicates that a large number of the Serb refugees have opted - for a number of reasons - for local inte-
gration in the country they reside in (mainly Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina).
grated in the local communities; discrimination is still going on; e.g. it is quite dif-
ficult for a Serb to get a job, particularly in underdeveloped areas where unemploy-
ment is high anyway. And, unfortunately, there are still incidents against Serbs
although these are individual cases.8 Regrettably, top State officials, and, particular-
ly local authorities, are reluctant to condemn these incidents through public state-
ments.
Overall, there is still a lot to do to achieve peaceful coexistence. And the best
way to achieve this is economic development, as experience has shown. But again,
compared to the situation 11 years ago, Croatia is on the right way.
This goes also for regional cooperation, which is a basic condition for EU mem-
bership, because the EU does not want to import bilateral problems into its system.
Under Tudjman, and of course under conditions of war, separation was the slo-
gan, not cooperation. After Croatia gained independence, there was for a long time
the suspicion that the international community would force Croatia back to a kind
of Yugoslav federation. Also, the term ‘Western Balkans’, as the EC calls the region,
is possibly not the right one to dispel that fear.
It was only under the former Racan Government when the first steps were taken,
in the year 2000. Since then, multilateral, as well as bilateral relations have
improved considerably. This goes particularly for relations with Serbia, Montenegro
and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Although there are still many problems to be settled
(mainly in the context of the Yugoslav Succession Agreement, like restitution of
property, final demarcation of the State border at sea, etc), it is evident that the per-
spective of EU membership is an enormous incentive for the Governments in the
region to settle outstanding problems in the context of European integration. That
means that Croatia looks increasingly towards the future rather than the past and
8 In the period January-November 2005, a local Serb NGO, SDF, noted 41 ethnically motivated incidents against
Serb individuals, mainly in return areas and particularly in the Zadar hinterland.
Cooperation with ICTY was for a long time the most difficult issue in Croatia’s
relation with the EU. Croatia’s position towards the Hague Tribunal is, again, linked
closely linked to the experience of the war and affects directly the self-conception
of the young Croatian State, namely Croatia was forced to wage a justified defence
war against Serbian aggression. Thus, for a long time, it was unconceivable that in
the so-called ‘Homeland War’ war crimes could have been committed also on the
Croatian side.
The Tudjman regime considered the Hague Tribunal a political court that
equalises the victim, i.e. Croatia, with the aggressor, i.e. Serbia. Therefore, despite
the adoption of a constitutional law on cooperation with ICTY in 1996, cooperation
with the Tribunal was systematically obstructed. Requested documents were not
transferred, ICTY indictees, like Ivica Rajic, for instance, were given new identities
and hidden in Croatia with the support of the Croatian authorities.
It was only under the former Racan Government, coming to power in 2000, that
cooperation started, i.e. mainly with regard to submission of documents to the
Tribunal. The new HDZ Government, coming to power in November 2003, contin-
ued cooperation, under the strong leadership of PM Sanader. Eight Croat ICTY
indictees (6 from Bosnia and two from Croatia) have been transferred to The Hague
since March 2004. 9 Or, more precisely, the Government convinced them to surren-
der voluntarily.
9 On 11 March 2004, Croatian Generals Cermak and Markac were transferred to The Hague. They are charged with
crimes against humanity and violations of the laws and customs of war committed against Serb civilians during and
after military operation 'Storm'.
On 5 April 2004 Slobodan Praljak, Milivoj Petkovic, Bruno Stojic and Jadranko Prlic, Valentin Coric and Berislav
Pusic were transferred. They are all former political leaders and military officials of the self-declared Croatian para-
state, Herceg-Bosna, that was established by Bosnian Croats during the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia. They are charged
with crimes against humanity, serious breaches of the Geneva conventions and violations of the laws and customs
of war, committed against Muslim civilians from several areas in central Bosnia.
This strategy of voluntary transfer did obviously not work out in the case of
General Gotovina, who had been on the run since the indictment was published in
summer 2001. In the end, the Gotovina case became the only, yet decisive problem
with regard to fulfilling the political criteria of full cooperation with ICTY. The
ICTY’s Chief Prosecutor until spring 2005, Carla del Ponte, was unconvinced that
the Government was playing a sincere game and trying to do everything to locate
and arrest Gotovina. Therefore, on 16 March 2005, based on Carla del Ponte’s
assessment that full cooperation is not achieved, 10 the European Council decided to
postpone the start of accession negotiations with Croatia.
It was only after this negative Council decision that the Government undertook a
number of measures to step up efforts to locate Gotovina (investigating Gotovina’s
support network, introducing structural and staff changes in the secret services, etc).
Apparently, these efforts were convincing enough for Carla del Ponte to report to the
EU Croatia’s full cooperation. 11 This prompted the European Council on 3 October
to decide to open negotiations with Croatia.
The arrest of Gotovina on 7 December 2005 on the Canary Islands and his trans-
fer to The Hague, eventually, put an end to the ‘Gotovina saga’. Regardless of the
outcome of the trial, it is good for Croatia that it can now focus on accession nego-
tiations without being burdened by the Gotovina sword of Damocles (it should be
borne in mind that the European Council decision of October 2005 to open acces-
sion negotiations included a pre-emptive clause, saying that negotiations can be sus-
pended at any time should it be established that the full cooperation with the ICTY
that led to the tracking down and arrest of Gotovina, is not maintained).
10 It should be mentioned that the EC, as well as the EU member states, in evaluating the political criteria of coop-
eration with the ICTY, decided to rely fully on the assessment of the ICTY Chief Prosecutor. One could argue
whether or not it was the right decision to refrain from forming its own assessment. However, as the EC, for
instance, has no intelligence service on their own, there seemed to be no other option.
11 According to media reports, Croatian State Prosecutor Bajic provided Carla del Ponte in a meeting in autumn
2005 in Zagreb with clear evidence that Gotovina was hiding outside of Croatia.
Whereas the fulfilment of the Copenhagen Political Criteria is the basic prereq-
uisite for EU accession, the ability to cope with the economic challenges of EU
membership and the ability to develop the administrative capacity to implement
the acquis communitaire, i.e. the joint EU legislation, are of equal importance. It is
not enough just to incorporate the acquis communitaire into national legislation.
What is crucial is to ensure its effective application through appropriate administra-
tive and judicial structures.
With regard to the ability to implement the acquis communitaire, there is still
too little administration capacity in many fields (institutions to regulate and/or
supervise e.g. market competition, food safety, environmental pollution, border con-
12 Commission of the European Communities: Opinion on Croatia's Application for Membership of the European
trol, etc.). In this respect, a lot needs still to be done. And this is exactly what the dif-
ferent pre-accession funds are for. Under PHARE, ISPA and SAPRD, Croatia is
allocated for 2005 and 2006 €245 million. 14 This financial support will be stepped
up in the following years under the IPA (Integrated Pre-accession Instrument)
*
* *
14 PHARE concerns institution-building and economic and social cohesion (€80 million in 2005 and €80 million
in 2006). ISPA is for the development of environment and transport infrastructures (€25 million in 2005 and €35
million in 2006), and SAPARD for rural development (€25 million in 2006).
Jovan TEOKAREVIC*
At the end of 2005 Balkan countries moved significantly closer to the European
Union. Croatia and Turkey began accession negotiations in October, Serbia and
Montenegro and Bosnia Herzegovina began negotiations in October and November,
respectedly, that should lead to the signing of the Stabilisation and Association
Agreements (SAA), and Macedonia in mid-December became official candidate for
EU membership.
Could the process continue in the same way, and with the same pace, in future,
in the region as a whole? How will the balance between the achievements of the
Western Balkan countries and challenges they are facing influence their future Euro-
Atlantic integration? What will it take to solve the remaining few but big unresolved
issues in the central part of the Western Balkans? These are the topics that will be
dealt with, in this order, in the text that follows.
*By Dr. Jovan Teokarevic, University of Belgrade
Up and up again?
Never before have more countries from the region moved up the ladder of Euro-
Atlantic integration in a more simultaneous way, reaching nevertheless different lev-
els of integration, because of the different starting points (for details see tables 1 and 2).
Table 1 - Western Balkan countries and the EU: Stabilisation and Association Process
Short-term prospects look equally good. By the end of 2006, most countries will
be able to make another step up. Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia and
Herzegovina are capable of closing the SAA negotiations by then, it is estimated
both in Brussels and in those countries’ capitals. Albania is expected to sign the
Stabilisation and Association Agreement even before, i.e. during the first half of
2006, as the first specific “grand step” Western Balkan countries are supposed to
make towards the EU membership. If these plans come true, two countries that had
already signed the SAA (Macedonia and Croatia in 2001), will be joined by the three
remaining ones, and this chapter of the region’s EU integration will be hopefully
closed.
By the same time, in a year from now, perhaps at the European Council in
December 2006, Macedonia might be offered the date of the beginning of the acces-
sion negotiations. The actual EU accession date for Bulgaria and Romania will have
to be set in Spring 2006, but January 1st, 2007 is a very realistic target according to
most analytical predictions.
All this means that after a very significant move in the EU integration at the end
of 2005, the region is perhaps capable of keeping the same ambitious pace, i.e. of
moving resolutely once again, at the end of 2006. If achieved, this success would
from a broader perspective help confirm and cement European perspective of each
and every country in this part of Europe. Although this perspective was offered long
ago to Turkey, and to the Western Balkan countries at the Thessaloniki EU Summit
(in June, 2003), it has been now at least unofficially put in question by some politi-
cal forces and by some EU member states, making a sharp contrast to the bold
moves the EU is currently making in its relations with the Balkan countries.
From many sides Balkan countries are being offered special memberships
instead of full EU membership. Also, further EU enlargement might be considerably
slowed down, in comparison with the previous wave, started with the accession of
ten countries in May 2004, which will end in January 2007 or 2008 with the acces-
sion of Bulgaria and Romania, as EU members Nos. 26 and 27. In addition to all
these discouraging signs, some countries (France) are connecting future member-
ships of the Balkan and other countries (once Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia are in)
with obligatory referendums. Judging by the low popularity of the Balkans coun-
tries’ EU entry (see Table 3), it seems highly unlikely that any of them could attract
the majority of “yes” votes in many years to come.
Ten new EU members have a better attitude towards the Balkan countries’
chances for EU membership: most countries from the region would be welcome to
the club, except for Albania and Turkey which even here do not cross the 50%
threshold. If the results from the old and the new countries are taken together,
Croatia is again the only one which could count on a little more than 50% of the
votes on an immagined referendum (52% to be precise). Bulgaria rates fifty-fifty,
while all the others are below this line: Romania 45%, Macedonia 43%, Bosnia and
Herzegovina 42%, Serbia and Montenegro 40%, Albania 36% and Turkey 35%.
Table 2 could also be understood as a traffic light turned upside down. Contrary
to the traffic light in the street, the green zone is on top, the yellow one in the mid-
dle and the red one in the bottom. Bulgaria and Romania make the green zone,
because they already joined NATO in 2004, and their accession to the EU cannot be
ruled out; the only variable is whether it will occur at the beginning of January 2006,
or twelve months later. The possible time difference is of no significance, at least in
the context of the comparison we are making here.
The yellow zone consists of Croatia and Macedonia, both of which have made
more progress so far in races towards EU and NATO memberships than the rest of
the Western Balkan competitors from the table, and also have more open Brussels
gates. These two countries were not only the first ones to sign SAAs in 2001 (five
years later they are still the only ones), but are also candidates for EU membership.
Croatia is an important step ahead, because it has already started accession negotia-
tions, unlike Macedonia that will have to wait a lot until this decision is made.
The NATO integration part of the story looks much brighter for these two, as
well: they are within the Alliance’s Membership Action Plan (MAP), as a kind of
preparatory phase for full NATO membership. Albania belongs to the MAP, too, and
makes with Croatia and Macedonia the (US-sponsored) Adriatic Charter. Albania’s
results are nevertheless less impressive, as well as its perspectives within the
Alliance. In addition, this country – unlike Croatia and Macedonia - has still to sign
the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU, which is why the
proper place for it on table 2 is not the yellow, but rather the red zone.
Albania leads this slowest part of the Western Balkans, with Bosnia-Herzegovina
(BiH) and Serbia and Montenegro (SM) in it. BiH and SM have still not managed
to pass the first NATO step: they are not even members of NATO’s programme
Partnership for Peace (PfP). As for the EU membership, it could be expected only
in the long run from now, and is very difficult to give any firmer predictions. Despite
many challenges, within a very optimistic scenario the whole Western Balkans
might expect to gain both EU and NATO memberships within the next ten years or
so.
Western Balkans has gone a long way from the military conflicts, chaos, suffer-
ing and despair that marked the 1990s in this part of Europe. Together with inter-
national community, and more specifically with enormous efforts and resources of
the European Union and NATO, a radical move from war to peace was first made,
only to be followed now with the joint move to the European mainstream. In some
areas the pace of change is unexpectedly high, and certainly higher than in post
World War II reconciliation within Western Europe. Let us mention the biggest
achievements and remaining problems in security, politics and economy.
Security. Perhaps the best proof that the region has genuinely moved far, very
far away from the turbulent 1990s is the fact that despite challenges, and some con-
tradicting signs, most foreign and domestic observers are not expecting new military
conflicts in future. The reconciliation process has advanced, and taken roots; indi-
vuduals, firms and political actors meet in order to cooperate, not to fight. In many
spheres of life, from trade to energy, to infrastructure, to media and culture, differ-
ent cooperation initiatives have prevailed, various fora have been established, many
billateral and multilateal agreements have been signed and regional cooperation – as
one of the prime requirements for the EU integration and for the normalisation of
life – is advancing.
Borders have been relaxed, visa requirements have vanished in most directions,
but not in all. With the exception of Serb refugees from Kosovo, and partly from
Croatia, most other refugees have been able to go back to their homes, or what’s left
of them.
Countries of the region cooperate in security matters, too, despite various levels
of integration within the NATO structures. Security and defence reforms have pro-
gressed with different results, but one has to note that in addition to smaller and
more capable armed forces in all countries (and also under stricter civilian control
than before), in Bosnia former enemies from the war are making now the new uni-
fied Army of the country. Even big optimists could not predict such things a decade
ago, when Dayton and Paris Accords November-December, 1995) put an end to the
war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Despite all positive and important achievements, stability and security in some
parts of the Western Balkans are still not self-sustainable, as evidence from mass
Albanian attacks on Serbs in Kosovo in March 2004 suggests. Peace and stability in
those and some other areas are still to a large degree still possible due first of all to
the heavy presence of international troops. Their number keeps going down, to be
sure, and further reductions are being made, except in the case of Kosovo.
Unlike in other corners of Europe, Western Balkans has still not left behind the
nation-state building. Several nations are still striving to make their own nation
states, and consequently break the existing complicated institutional arrangements,
created in the region, that are preventing that. From that perspective, Western
Balkans is facing a much more complex transition than Central Europe - a triple one,
in fact, that includes more traditional simultaneous political and economic reforms,
but also nation-state building.
Although the number of non-state, not-defined territories has been reduced in the
last years, some are still there, plaguing the atmosphere, and undermining the
achievement in security. Several existing borders between states still remain unrec-
ognized and challenged from many sides and actors.
What contributes to the lack of complete security is the fact that the region has
unfortunately more than one weak state, with low administrative capacities, that do
not allow democratically elected governments to fight properly many of the inherit-
ed problems. Thus, organized crime and corruption keep threatening “the unfinished
peace” in the Balkans in a profound way. Alliances between the criminals and state
structures operate regardless of borders, which is why the threat is spread in a gen-
uinely regional way, and asks consequently for wider regional cures.
Nations that had been engaged in wars in the past decade have not yet faced in a
critical way their recent past, and have not done enough to bring to justice those who
committed war crimes. Although Croatia made a big step forward, this task is still
far from being finished in this country, let alone in Serbia and Bosnia, that in a much
more profound way still do not fully cooperate with the Hague Trubunale for war
crimes in former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The size of the problem is seen best from the
perspective of the obstacle that such behaviour is making to the Euro-Atlantic inte-
gration of the two countries. Neither of them could proceed further towards the EU
and NATO membership because of this reason, or more precisely because govern-
ments have not been willing to impose this issue resolutely in the public, and to take
responsibility for the much wanted action.
Politcs. All Western Balkan countries have to a great degree stabilized their
political institutions, and brought back political process into them. All have now free
and fair elections, too. The respect of human and minority rights has essentially
increased in most countries. Well-known Freedom House ratings put all Balkan
countries into the second best group – democracies with some level of consolida-
tion. Above them are all new EU members from Central Europe, and beneath them
– three more categories. Within the first one - transition governments, or hybrid
regimes – one finds only Bosnia from the Balkans, together with Moldova, Ukraine,
Armenia, Georgia and Russia. The second, even worse group, are autocracies, and
the third – consolidated autocracies, and former Soviet non-European states are
members of both categories.
Civil society is still weak, in some cases weaker than in used to be when former
authoritarian systems were being dismantled. Of all actors, political parties have
changed the least, which also means that they want to keep monopoly on the polit-
ical market, pushing civil society organisations out. Media are either not free com-
pletely, or are condemned to extinction in chaotic circumstances created by vested
economic and political interests.
Rule of law is often more of an ideal than a reality. Parliaments are slow in pass-
ing good laws, and governments in implementing them, but even more importantly
/ the judicial sector has remained mostly unreformed, under heavy political influ-
ence, and the same is true for all law-enforcing agencies. Civilian control over the
police and the armed forces has taken roots, but has not progressed enough.
Economy. The past several years have witnessed big recovery of the Western
Balkan national economies, that had been crippled during the 1990s, not only
because of direct war damage, but also indirectly, in many ways (UN and EU sanc-
tions against Serbia and Montenegro, lack of foreign investment…). All of them are
currently having very high levels of growth (4-5% or even more at a year level), but
some of them are still unable to achieve the level of growth they used to have before
the wars of the 1990s. The whole region is, it should be noted, pretty insignificant
in economic terms: total GDP of all countries equals the one of Greece, for instance.
The analysis presented here offers a picture of the region that is very different
from what it used to be ten years ago, and has potential to be much more different
in ten years from now.
States like Serbia-Montenegro and other Western Balkan countries, that are late
in Euro-Atlantic integration, share one common problem. By the time they get to the
EU and NATO doors that should open the way for their long-awaited memberships,
they realize that these organizations have in the meantime changed, together with
the regional and global contexts. Once they are eventually granted access and their
membership cards, they see they’ve become part of a group that looks like some-
thing they’ve been targetting for a long time, but is not exactly that. This realization
is usually followed by the question on whether the benefits are bigger than the price
payed. Disappointments often replace hyper-inflated and unrealistic expectations.
Why is this so?
First of all, our goals – the EU and NATO as symbols of better alliances than our
previous ones – naturally change from within in harmony with new global and local
dynamics and challenges. The North Atlantic Alliance was thus created half a cen-
tury ago, in order «to keep the Americans in, Soviets out and Germans down». This
formula for the protection of Western Europe from both the Nazi and the Communist
threats managed to safeguard the «free world», and the whole world indeed, from
yet another world war, and finally triumphed peacefully fifteen years ago over the
crumbling Soviet empire.
A decade ago, when NATO’s programme Partnership for Peace was launched,
former Soviet satelites rushed enthusiastically towards NATO’s opened arms,
expecting a permanent security protection from Russia, in case this country would
change its new course of cooperation and integration with the West. And while most
of East and Central European countries were still travelling towards NATO mem-
bership, instead of that threat that has in the meantime disappeared, a new one was
suddenly born: global terrorism that stroke the US first, and then other parts of the
world, including Europe. Adjusting to such a change, NATO’s ship has changed the
course, counting seriously on Russia and other states as partners in global battles
that have only begun.
This is how new NATO members found themselves, instead in the protected zone
under the Alliance’s umbrella, as they expected, on the hot soil of Afghanistan and
Iraq, facing great challenges, suffering human losses and being hardly capable of
coping with the growing dissatisfaction of its citizens at home. Many old and impor-
tant European NATO allies of the United States failed to support Washington in its
military campaign against Iraq’s dictator Saddam Hussein. This division among the
allies put new members and aspirants for NATO membership in a very difficult posi-
tion to chose between two sides of something that used to be one, and that those
countries still want to see as one.
To make things even more complicated, the US as the backbone of the Alliance,
has practically given up NATO in the Iraq war, preaching instead a new philosophy,
according to which the mission defines the allies, not the other way round as before.
NATO has thus found itself marginalized because of the reborn American unilater-
alism, and to a great extent also sacrificed for the US intererests. All this happened
on the eve of the biggest enlargement that NATO has ever had in its history: seven
Central and East European countries joined the Alliance in 2004, following the first
three ones that had accomplished the same in 1999.
A serious row surrounding the Iraq war between some European countries and
the US has in the meantime disappeared, and misunderstandings were also official-
ly burried at the NATO Istanbul summit, in June, 2004. It is still unclear, however,
whether preemptive actions (as the main point of the transatlantic dispute) – with-
out prior consensus among all NATO members - have been delegitimized or not, and
whether from now on allies will determine the mission (like until few years ago) or
not.
In other words, it is still not certain whether NATO has ended the creation of its
new image, i.e. whether it has finally found the identity and raison d’etre it has been
looking for ever since the end of the bipolar world.
For all of us that are eager to join this organization only now, at least two new
circumstances are important in this context. Both of them have become obvious
despite changes that NATO has gone or will go through by the time we knock on its
door. The first one is the new image of Europe after the parallel and almost identi-
cal enlargements of the European Union and NATO, and the second one – a region-
al (Balkan) and internal political aspect of our future membership in Partnership for
Peace, and in NATO.
Two parallel enlargements have brought a new quality to the Old Continent: a
unique zone of stability, security and prosperity to most of the European territory.
Western Balkans and the majority of ex-Soviet republics are still out of this zone as
non-memebers, but both of these two groups of countries are firmly oriented in this
direction and essentially interested in becoming part of it. This is exactly what some
pre-membership programmes have been created for, in order to facilitate internal
reforms and harmonization, preparing countries for eventual full membership.
NATO’s Partnership for Peace has several counterparts - similar programmes of the
European Union (Stabilisation and Association Process, EU neighborhood policy...)
and they all make together a network of relationships of a new kind.
This EU-NATO zone in Europe does not recognise the division of labor that
existed in the past: EU is not only paying for the security provided by the United
States, while NATO and the US, on the other hand, perform much more functions
than the security one. Economy, politics and security are thus intertwinned for the
first time in a new way and in principle they strengthen each other. States and soci-
eties are more secure if they are also members of the European Union, while they
have more chances of attracting foreign investments if they are in NATO’s orbite.
The same is true for the Balkans, as well, or will become completely true when
our region one day becomes fully covered with EU-NATO strings. The latest indi-
cator of this type came from the NATO Istanbul Summit, where NATO agreed to
allow the EU to take over the military mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In addition to that, the two organizations have made the biggest steps in common
action exactly because of and for the Balkans, and all that happened during the very
bitter and unprecedented transatlantic dispute they had. For the first time offical
institutional ties between the Alliance and the Union are being built, primarely in
order for the Balkan mission to succeed, despite so many challenges. It is equally
clear to them and to us in the Balkans that the formula for success in this part of
Europe lies in their joint action. Without that, the loser will not be only the Balkans,
but all of us in Europe together.
Last, but not least, our alliance with the European Union and NATO is crucial for
us also for internal political reasons. Much more than many domestic factors, this
alliance guarantees the success of the reforms that we would have to perform for our
sake anyway, even if our two key allies had not existed. In other words, only with-
in such a context – EU and NATO orbite and eventually memberships – we could
hope that consolidated democracy and market economy will be our destiny, as well.
No country similar to ours has managed to do this on its own, and the same is true
for the Western Balkan countries. That’s why Euro-Atlantic integration is to remain
our true priority, rather than a slogan used in domestic political infighting.
Common and determined action of the EU and NATO in the Balkans will remain
crucial for the solution of the few but significant remaining security and political
challenges in our region. Despite a great deal of stabilisation and improvement in all
domains, achieved in the aftermath of military conflicts of the 1990s, at least three
issues still remain unresolved, threatening to plague the region and prevent it from
further prosperity. All three of them have to do with the state and nation building:
firstly, Bosnia and Herzegovina is still to be made a functional state; secondly, a
framework of permanent relations between Montenegro and Serbia have to be deter-
mined, possibly after the referendum for independence in Montenegro; and, thirdly,
a future status of Kosovo should be found, too.
Neither of the solutions will be easy to find, but it seems certain that none of
them will be found without a dedicated engagement of the international communi-
ty, within which a joint action of two key players, the EU and NATO, is essential.
The need for a coordinated EU-NATO approach and joint action stems from sever-
al reasons.
The first of them is very simple and equally convincing: who else is capable of
such an endevour but those leading global players, that have already committed
themselves and contributed so much in the Balkans during the last decade and a
half? This point is furhter strenghtened by the fact that the two seem to think strate-
gically in the same way about the Balkans. This was clearly expressed in their
«Concerted approach for the Western Balkans», from July, 2003. This important
document states that NATO and the EU share a common vision for the future of the
Western Balkans: “self-sustaining stability based on democratic and effective gov-
ernment structures and a viable free market economy, leading to further rapproche-
ment towards European and Euro-Atlantic structures”.
Further on, as it was already mentioned, EU and NATO established their official
institutional ties for the first time exactly because of the Balkans. The so-called
“Berlin plus arrangements” became the essence of such a cooperation. EU-NATO
joint Declaration of December, 2002 puts it like this: “Where NATO as a whole is
not engaged, the EU, in undertaking an operation, will choose whether or not to have
recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, taking into account in particular the
Alliance’s role, capacities, and involvement in the region in question. That process
will be conducted through the “Berlin plus” arrangements.”
Another reason for the two to keep joint engagement in the region draws on their
common success in dealing with the region’s crisis, as a pool of important lessons
for the future. Balkan wars from the 1990s could not have been stopped without a
creative cooperation of the EU and NATO, as symbols of one predominantly soft
and the other predominantnly hard power, not only during the conflicts, but also in
the post-conflict period.
Joint action might still work also because it corresponds to the nature of the
Balkan crisis, or to the remaining problems, three of which are most important:
unfinished nation and state building, economic underdevelopment and still not fully
consolidated democratic regimes. Although regional ownership is key to solving all
the issues, taken together these issues could be best addressed in cooperation with
the two actors in question, that would be guided by one and the same platform.
Western Balkans could also profit from the spillover of the already mentioned
zone of stability, security and prosperity in recently created in East and Central
Europe by joint efforts of the EU and NATO.
Although the Balkans ceased to be the priority of the US policy, there is still an
ample place and need for its engagement in this region. The outgoing US could very
well match at this particular moment with the incoming EU as the next prevailing
force and agent of change in the Balkans.
Last, but not least, the EU and NATO should finish together a common job in the
Balkans because some Balkan nations would prefere NATO or the US to dominate
in the process, while some other would rather see the EU in the driving seat.
*
* *
INTRODUCTION
This paper highlights the constitutional dimension of the accession process from
stand point of a national constitution. It will, through the concepts of “transforma-
tion” and “resistance”, introduce the constitutional impact of Europeanization on
Turkey.1 The first part, on transformation, follows a descriptive approach, concen-
trating on the content of constitutional amendments, while the second part, on resist-
ance, inclines towards a normative analysis of the challenges.
*Bertil Emrah ÖDER, Associate Professor of Constitutional Law, Istanbul University, Faculty of Law.
1 Views expressed in the present paper are based on previous essays of the author. For detailed references on the
subject see Oder, B. E., Enhancing the Human Face of Constitution through Accession Partnership, in Turkey - the
Road Ahead?, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Dunér, Bertil (Ed.), (Stockholm: The Swedish Institute
of International Affairs, 2001), pp. 72-104: also available under http://www.ui.se (please click "Documents
Online"); Oder, B. E., Übertragung von Hoheitsrechten im Spannungsverhältnis zur nationalen Souveränität -
(1) As a recognized principle, the preamble is not only a text of political value
revealing the philosophy of the constitution. All constitutional norms are to be inter-
preted and implemented with ‘respect for and absolute loyalty to its letter and spir-
it’. In other words, the underlying logic of the preamble is an integral part of the
constitution and it has supreme constitutional value for the interpretation and imple-
mentation of the constitutional provisions. The preamble of the constitution of 1982
speaks of patriotic ‘ideas, beliefs and resolutions’ and constitutional principles such
as popular sovereignty, the supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law, the
separation of powers, the unitary state and the right to self-development ‘under the
aegis of national culture, civilization and the rule of law’. The constitutional pack-
age of 2001 amends paragraph 5 of the preamble. That paragraph eliminated the pro-
tection of ‘thoughts and opinions’ which are contrary to four categories of values:
‘Turkish national interests; the principle of the existence of Turkey as an indivisible
entity with its state and territory; Turkish historical and moral values; and the nation-
alism, and principles, reforms and modernism of Atatürk’. The package replaces the
phrase ‘thoughts and opinions’ with ‘activities’. The amendment to the preamble is
significant in that it determines limits to the freedom of statement and of association.
It is clear that the term ‘activities’ is an improvement in favor of freedom of state-
ment compared with ‘thoughts and opinions’. Nevertheless, ‘activities’ can be com-
posed of cumulative and deliberate ‘expressions’ against the values and principles
set forth in the preamble.
(2) The core of the amendment package relates to general principles for the
restriction of fundamental rights and freedoms. Before the amendment, article 13 of
the constitution has a general clause stating the grounds and principles for the
restriction of all kinds of rights and freedoms. The general grounds were: ‘The indi-
visible integrity of the state with its territory and nation, national sovereignty, the
Republic, national security, public order, general peace, the public interest, public
morals and public health’. Furthermore, article 13/3 read as follows: ‘The general
grounds for restriction set forth in this article shall apply for all fundamental rights
and freedoms’.
specific grounds for restriction. The Constitutional Court stressed that not only spe-
cific grounds for the restriction of the freedom of statement, such as ‘preventing
crimes or punishing offenders’, but also general grounds, such as ‘public morals or
the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation’, could justify the
restriction of freedom of statement.2 Moreover, the specific provisions on rights and
freedoms which did not prescribe specific restriction grounds were to be interpreted
in the light of the general restrictions. Consequently, the freedom to claim rights and
the right of petition, which do not contain specific restriction grounds, could be
restricted with reference to general restriction grounds. The constitutional amend-
ment reformulates article 13 on restriction of fundamental rights and freedoms. It
alters the most disputed feature of the Turkish constitutional paradigm, namely the
cumulative restriction dynamic, which was achieved by general and specific grounds
of restriction. The new version of article 13 prescribes that the fundamental rights
and freedoms shall be restricted only in accordance with the specific grounds con-
tained in the relevant provisions of fundamental rights and freedoms.
terms of German constitutional order, which was also adopted by the Turkish
Constitution of 1961. The amendment limits restrictions and establishes the princi-
ples for the legislation and constitutional review.
(3) Article 14 of the constitution prohibits the abuse of fundamental rights and
freedoms. The amendment reformulates article 14 and shortens the forms of abuse.
Before the amendment of 2001, article 14/1 prescribed several forms of abuse of
fundamental rights and freedoms:
Violating the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation, endan-
gering the existence of the Turkish state and Republic, destroying fundamental
rights and freedoms, placing the government of the state under the control of an indi-
vidual or a group of people, establishing the hegemony of one social class over oth-
ers, creating discrimination on the basis of language, race, religion or sect, or estab-
lishing by any other means a system of government based on these concepts and
ideas. The amendment prohibits ‘activities’ which aim at destroying the ‘indivisible
integrity of the state with its territory and nation, and the democratic and secular
state based on human rights’. It is apparent that in the amendment the forms of abuse
are not described in detail. The values protected by article 14/1 are defined in accor-
dance with some of the irrevocable characteristics of the republic. The new version
of article 14/2 follows the wording and purpose of article 17 of the European
Convention. The distinctive feature of the amendment is the extension of the
addressees. According to the amendment, the prohibition of abuse extends explicit-
ly to the state. None of the constitutional provisions may be interpreted as implying
for the state or persons any right to engage in ‘activities’ aimed at the destruction of
constitutional rights and freedoms or at their limitation to a greater extent than is
provided for in the constitution.
political reluctance with regard to the death penalty. The amendment in 2001 as to
the principles relating to offences and penalties introduced a provision limiting the
cases where the death penalty can be applied. It could be applied in time of war or
an imminent threat of war and for crimes of terrorism. Recognition of the death
penalty for acts committed in time of war and of imminent threat of war was in com-
pliance with protocol 6 to the European Convention of Fundamental Rights and
Freedoms. As regards crimes of terrorism, protocol 6 does not provide any justifi-
cation grounds for the death penalty. Through the amendment of 2004, the death
penalty was abolished.
3 In 2001 The General Assembly of Parliament rejected article 32 of the proposal which provided for the suprema-
cy of international agreements in cases where they conflicted with the laws. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasasýnýn
Bazý Maddelerinin Degistirilmesi Hakkýnda Kanun, Kanun no. 4709, Kabul Tarihi: 3 October 2001, at
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k4709.html (7.10.2001).
4 See, e.g., E. 1987/1, 1987/18, K.t. 11 September 1987, AYMKD 23, 305/307; E. 1993/4, K. 1995/1, K.t. 19 July
1995, AYMKD 33/2, p. 635; E. 1995/1, K. 1996/1, K.t. 19 March 1996, AYMKD 33/2, pp. 722-724; E. 1997/1, K.
1998/1, K.t. 16 January 1998, AYMKD 34/2, p. 1034; E. 1997/62, K. 1998/52, K.t. 16 September 1998, AYMKD
36/1, p. 271; E. 1999/10, K. 1999/22, K.t. 7 June 1999, AYMKD 36/1, p. 492. The Fifth Chamber of the Council
of State recognized the supremacy of international agreements over national law in a decision in 1991. See E.
1986/1723, K. 1991/933, Danýþtay Dergisi, Sayý: 84-85, 1992, pp. 325-328.
5 The Turkish National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis, 'Political criteria' (unofficial translation), para. 1,
see http://www.abgs.gov.tr (20.10.2001); Türkiye Ulusal Programý, 23.6.2003 tarih ve 2003/5930 sayýlý Bakanlar
Kurulu kararý, RG 24.7.2003, Sy. 25178 Mükerrer.
6 Council Decision 2006/35/EC on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership
7 Ünal Tekeli v. Turkey, Application no. 29865/96, Fourth Section, 16 November 2004, par. 66.
8 E. 2002/146, K. 2002/201, K.t. 27 December 2002, AYMKD 39/I, Ankara, 2004, p. 295.
9 E. 2002/146, K. 2002/201, K.t. 27 December 2002, AYMKD 39/I, Ankara, 2004, p. 323.
10 For detailed references on constitutional disputes and facts mentioned in this paragraph see Oder, Übertragung
von Hoheitsrechten im Spannungsverhältnis zur nationalen Souveränität - Verfassungsrechtliche Vorgaben und ver-
fassýngspolitischer Änderungsbedarf, pp. 93-99.
grounds of stability for international relations. It has been provided that -in princi-
ple- the ratification of international agreements shall be subject to adoption by the
Parliament by a law approving the ratification. This principle applies without any
exception for agreements resulting in amendments to Turkish laws. For certain types
of agreements under the conditions prescribed in the Constitution, such as agree-
ments implementing an international treaty, the approval of the Parliament is not
necessary. This system is fully adopted by the constitutional convention after mili-
tary intervention in 1980. However, the discussions in the advisory body of the con-
stitutional convention seem interesting to identify the sensitivities as to sovereignty.
The discussion was based on the Draft of constitutional committee which proposed
a specific provision on transfer of sovereignty. According to article 5 of the Draft,
the membership in international organizations should be regarded as an exception of
national sovereignty. Members of the advisory body could not achieve consensus on
the provision since some of them regarded it as “foreign hypothec”. They also
ignored the explanations that such a provision is a “future clause” for normative
facilitation of accession in the EEC. In the meantime, there have been various con-
stitutional amendment drafts prepared by different platforms. Among the others, the
draft prepared by Social Democrat People’s Party is the most comprehensive text
suggesting referendum for international agreements which prescribe “common exer-
cise of sovereign powers” with the other nations. The Draft does not use the termi-
nology of “transfer”, but the “common exercise” of sovereignty. Moreover, the
addressee of the proposed constitutional norm is not the state, but the “nation” -as
the owner of national sovereignty- under equal circumstances with the other nations
of international community.
adopted in the EU Constitution as article I-5 reads: “The union shall respect the
equality of Member States before the constitution as well as their national identities,
inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, (…).It shall
respect their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of
the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security.” Without
falling into traps of nationalism oriented discussions, it seems necessary to provide
a constitutional basis for Turkey’s full membership in the EU. Here, it should be
kept very central that from point of national constitution Turkey’s accession is a
question of democratic legitimacy. Taking into account supranational character of
the EU departed from traditional international organizations and Member State’s
resistance to supremacy of EU law11 , an explicit constitutional clause on EU is to be
accepted. Disguised references such as supranational organizations –as if they are
usual forms in international order- are not appropriate, since they blur democratic
transparency in case of EU. That is the underlying logic of German constitutional
amendment in 1992 –after Maastricht Treaty- containing a specific provision on
European integration. French approach after Maastricht process is a step-by-step
constitutional integration of EU through specific norms. Constitutional provisions
for EU in disguise of “international clauses” observed in new acceding states might
tender Eurosceptics, even though such norms make the EU invisible in constitution-
al order. Terminology as to “transfer” or “common exercise of powers” subject to
principle of subsidiarity as well as referendum is a matter of political choice in con-
stitutional amendment procedure. However, involvement of Turkish Parliament in
decision making process of Community acts by way of notification and direct effect
of Community acts are to be constitutionally secured in a detailed way. To empha-
size the harmony of constitutional values between EU and Turkey and constitution-
al limits of integration, the constitutional clause could refer to basic concordance
between irrevocable principles of Turkish Constitution and EU values as provided
11 In a study based on Friedman Goldstein's method, I remark in years 1958-2003 more than 24 disputes /cases on
Member State's resistance, including judgments of national courts, see for table of resistance Oder, B. E., Avrupa
Birliði'nde Anayasa ve Anayasacýlýk, (Istanbul: Anahtar Kitaplar, 2004), pp. 492-502; for Friedman Goldstein's
method and chronology see Friedman Goldstein, L. Constituting Federal Sovereignty, The European Union in
Comparative Context, (Baltimore & London: The John Hopkins University Press, 2001), pp. 38-40.
in article 6 of TEU. 12
CONCLUSION
12 In the National Program of 2001 the Turkish Government expresses the political will to complete the accession
process 'on the basis of the fundamental principles of the Republic as articulated in the Turkish Constitution'. These
principles are, without any doubt, the structural and irrevocable principles contained in articles 1, 2 and 3 of the con-
stitution. These refer to the form of government as a republic (article 1), the 'characteristics of the republic' (article
2), a unitary state, Turkish as the official language, the flag, the national anthem and Ankara as the capital (article
3). The 'characteristics of the republic' are listed in article 2 of the constitution in a cumulative way as follows: 'The
Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social state governed by the rule of law; bearing in mind the con-
cepts of public peace, national solidarity and justice; respecting human rights; loyal to the nationalism of Atatürk,
and based on the fundamental tenets set forth in the preamble'. The National Program emphasizes that, where the
process of accession to the EU is concerned, those 'fundamental principles' of the constitution imply 'basic concor-
dance' between the constitutional values of the EU countries and Turkey. It says indirectly that through the 'charac-
teristics of the republic' Turkey shares the values that arise from the constitutional traditions of the EU member
states. The program sets out the limits to the changes that EU accession will imply. Those limits are of political
choice, mostly based on historical facts as regards the unitary state, the official language, the flag, the national
anthem and the capital.
*
* *
Biljana GABER*
There is no other project in the Republic of Macedonia that has ever enjoyed
such wide political, social and multi-ethnic consensus as the process of EU integra-
tion. Despite numerous challenges that it had to face, especially the crisis in 2001,
the Republic of Macedonia never hesitated in its commitment to achieve this objec-
tive. So, going in this ‘one way’ direction, the country has quickly managed to trans-
form itself from a consumer of international military and political assistance into
generator of stability and cooperation throughout the region.
Integration has always been a strategic goal in relations between the Republic of
Macedonia and the EU. This started unofficially in October 1992, when the
Republic of Macedonia appointed its representative in Brussels, and officially on 22
December 1995, when the Republic of Macedonia and the EU established diplomat-
ic relations. In March 1996, the Republic of Macedonia became a partner in the
PHARE Programme and, immediately after that (March 1996), the EU opened
negotiations with the Republic of Macedonia with a view to signing a broad agree-
ment about for cooperation in the fields of trade, financial arrangements and trans-
port. The culmination was the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA),
signed between the Republic of Macedonia and the European Union on 9 April
2001, within the SAP (Stabilization and Association Process) framework, which
helped western Balkan countries to move to EU accession.
The SAA was a historical event of political, economic and practical significance,
not only for the Republic of Macedonia, but also for the EU. For the Republic of
Macedonia, it conferred potential candidate status, while for the EU it accomplished
the proposed potential membership for western Balkans countries, endorsed at the
Zagreb Summit in November 2000. In doing so, the EU opened its doors ajar to
enlargement for this group of countries though, at the same time, it stressed the
importance of the time provision that each country, including the Republic of
Macedonia, would need to bring its political, economic, social, cultural and other
systems into accordance with EU requirements (the ‘Copenhagen Criteria’).
Thus, the SAA can be viewed as the main instrument for completing SAP, with
the main goal of establishing an association within a transitional period. The purpose
of the SAA was also to respect international peace and stability, establish political
dialogue and a free trade area, make provisions not only on the movement of work-
ers, services, capital and current payments, but in wide range of fields, including jus-
tice and home affairs. It had to assure approximation of national legislation, as well
as enhance regional cooperation. Finally, it had to provide for the establishment of
a Stabilization and Association Council to supervise the implementation of the
agreement, as well as a Stabilization and Association Committee and a Stabilization
and Association Parliamentarian Committee.
The SAP was further enriched during the Greek presidency in 2003: “The
European Council in its Thessalonica Meeting between June 19 and 20, 2003 reiter-
ated its determination to fully and effectively support the European perspective of
Western Balkan countries, which will become an integral part of the EU, once they
meet the established criteria” 1. For that purpose, A New Partnership for Western
Balkans (European Partnership) was introduced.2
One month before the SAA entered into force, the Republic of Macedonia sub-
mitted an application for EU membership (March 2004). In May 2004, the Council
of the EU considered the Macedonian application and asked the European
Commission to prepare an Opinion. On 9 November 2005, the European
Commission presented its Opinion on the application of the Republic of Macedonia
for membership in the European Union. It recognized Macedonia’s achievements in
building a functional democracy in a multi-ethnic society, especially after success-
fully implementing the legislative agenda of the Ohrid framework agreement
(2001), which contributed to major political and security improvements in the coun-
try, concluding that Macedonia is “well on its way to satisfy the political criteria.”
The Commission also found that Macedonia had begun the process of adopting and
implementing the EU legal framework (acquis communautaire), recognizing
Macedonia’s efforts to establish a modern market economy and to harmonize with
and enforce European laws and standards.
1 Palankai, Tibor (2004), Economics of Enlarging the European Union, Akademiai Kiado, p. 365.
2 The conclusions of the Thessalonica summit were:
• European Integration Partnership (under the CARDS program) to speed up progress towards EU
membership
• Enhanced support for institution building (expanding twinning programs and TAIEX assistance)
• Supporting the rule of law - cooperation in justice and home affairs
• Participation in Community programmes
• Promoting economic development (the creation of free trade area, extension of the system of
pan-European diagonal cumulating of origin, promoting greater interregional trade, endorsing the
European Charter for Small Enterprises)
• Responding to new needs - financial support (the Commission proposed an increase in the
CARDS budget)
• Enhancing regional cooperation (creation of a regional electricity market)
• Strengthening democracy - parliamentary cooperation (establishing Stabilization and
Association Parliamentary Committees and European Affairs Committees in parliaments)
• Improving political cooperation (to associate with EU declarations, common positions and other
decisions in the framework of the CFSP)
However, in common with all the other candidates, an enormous amount of work
will be required over the coming years to complete the process. Considerable chal-
lenges remain in a large number of internal market related areas, such as the adop-
tion of technical norms and standards, competition and state-aid control, transparent
public procurement, energy, and telecommunications. In most of these areas, it is
particularly the implementation and enforcement of the legislation where most work
remains. What is even more important, there is an inevitable need to open the way
for an intensification of EU support to help Macedonia meet its remaining obliga-
tions.
Does Republic of Macedonia deserve its place in the United Europe, and why?
Yes, it does because:
accession goals
*
* *
Eno TRIMÇEV*
Let me start by telling you what I will not do. In measuring Albanian commit-
ment to European integration, I will not look at opinion polls or surveys. First, opin-
ion polls do not show us the basic values that underwrite a political community’s
commitment to some type of political action – that is, we have no means of separat-
2 Albanian Institute for International Studies, Albania and the European Union: Perceptions and Realities 2005
community have its own cognitive bias – otherwise the term ‘political’ would lose
its meaning. Following a tradition of sociology of knowledge, I consider that in
order to draw this map of potentialities for a political community, an analysis of the
discourse of the intellectuals of that community is sufficient.
Thus, I will analyze Albanian intellectual discourse and see how it interprets the
idea of ‘Europe’, Albania’s commitment to the process of European integration as
well as the related concepts that may impact this view directly in the foreseeable
future. The analysis is based on one major assumption that I consider axiomatic: if
the Albanian intellectual discourse is deeply committed to the idea of ‘Europe’ and
moreover, it partakes of the European tradition of discourse – defined as “a contin-
uous discussion in which there has been considerable agreement on the nature of the
problems to be faced, the procedures and concepts of analysis, the values to be
2 Edward Shils, 'The Intellectuals and the Powers: Some Perspectives for Comparative Analysis', in Philip Rieff
(ed.), Intellectuals: Theoretical Studies, Case Studies (New York: Doubleday, 1969), 28-29.
3 Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, 22.
4 Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, 24. As Michael Mann put it, "we cannot understand (and thus act upon) the
world merely by direct sense perception. We require concepts and categories of meaning imposed upon sense per-
ception." Quoted in Gianfranco Poggi, Forms of Power (Malden, MA: Polity), 60.
sought and the evils to be eliminated” 5 – with the ease that indicates membership in
that tradition, than Albania’s commitment to Europe is strong and actual member-
ship is simply dependent on the politics of the real world. Any deviations from this
ought to indicate that there are potentialities for deviation from the European path
(prior to or after EU membership). How significant these potentialities are depends
on the idiosyncrasies of Albanian intellectual discourse as well as, in the final analy-
sis, on the profane world of politics.
There are two basic strands of Czech thought vis-à-vis Europe. First, there is the
Masaryk-Havel humanist tradition and, second, the Kundera Mitteleuropa tradition.
The first tradition is firmly rooted in the world of pre-revolutionary humanist France
and despite its internal variations – Masaryk’s outlook is firmly Christian and anti-
authoritarian while Havel’s is more explicitly humanist and less deterministic – lib-
5 Sheldon S. Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought (Boston: Little,
eral democracy emerges not simply as a realist option, but as a Kantian categorical
imperative, a moral prerequisite for living a proper life. In this context, EU mem-
bership was but a logical historical consequence of over one hundred years of Czech
yearning for self-realization through democratization. The second outlook, which is
best described by Kundera’s revival of the term Mitteleuropa, is less detached and
rather frantic in its call for Europeanisation. It claims that Central Europe is experi-
entially, historically, and culturally firmly part of the West. In this grand process of
equalization, Kundera of course annihilates any trace of Czech distinctiveness – the
difference between Paris and Prague seems to be reduced to the historical ‘triviali-
ty’ of Russian tanks in the latter. This homogeneous outlook was firmly opposed by
Havel and other Central European intellectuals (such as Konrád or Michnik) for
whom the West was a choice that enabled one to live authentically.
6 James F. Keeley, 'Toward a Foucauldian Analysis of International Regimes', International Organization, Vol. 44,
never gained any formal recognition as a potential regime of truth and, therefore, it
is classified as a ‘subjugated knowledge’. As such, the nationalists have been unable
to formulate a coherent set of political ideas that may provide a platform for politi-
cal action. Hence, non-democratic political systems in Albania have lost the battle
of legitimacy a priori.7
Below is a graph of the different thought structures that make-up the Albanian
political worldview:
There are three orientations in the horizontal political spectrum: the anti-anti-
communists, the centrists, and the nationalists. On the other hand, there are two ori-
entations belonging to the teleological axis: the nationalists and the cosmopolitans.
The anti-anti communists and the centrists are placed in the political spectrum
because they tend to be more directly concerned with the real political struggle
3 This may explain why no anti-democratic political parties/groups gained any type of following during Albania's
tempestuous transition.
occurring in Albania. The purpose of the polity is largely assumed to have been the-
oretically determined: the consolidation of a liberal democracy with a functioning
market economy fully integrated in Europe. More generally, the goal of
Westernization is assumed to be consensually accepted by the Albanian polity.
Therefore, these two orientations are more focused on the means by which this goal
is to be achieved. On the other hand, the cosmopolitans belong to the teleological
axis because they believe that the declared goal of Westernization is not as safe as
the two former groups assume. The cosmopolitans either believe that the nationalist
Weltanschauung represents a direct threat to Albania’s democratization or that
Albanian experienced history and culture contains the germs of a potential threat to
the Occidental project that may materialize in the future. Finally, the nationalists
belong to the political axis because they clamor for immediate political action in
favor of their stated goal – the creation of Greater Albania – at the expense if need
be of Europeanization. On the other hand, they are classified as a teleological orien-
tation because the system of meanings, values and goals they propagate represents
a direct challenge to the existing self-representation of the Albanian political mind.
Nationalists try to impact the political world through the roundabout approach of
changing the teleological interpretations of the Albanian worldview.
8 Hysamedin Feraj, Kriza e Perkryer e Shqiperise: Ese Kritike e Shoqerise (Albania's Perfect Crisis: a Critical Essay
in the political outlook of the body politic, the nationalists are pessimistic over their
chances of success.10
The logical means through which the rehabilitation of the irredentist thesis is to
occur includes a representation of Islam as a natural part of being Albanian, use of
Realpolitik concepts of competition among nations to make the idea of Ethnic
Albania palatable, and explaining Albanian history in terms of constant clashes
between ‘good Albanians’ – the ones that cooperated with the Ottoman Empire
against Balkan neighbors – and ‘bad Albanians’ who fought the Ottomans in coop-
eration with Balkan neighbors.11 Being revisionist in its orientation, this orientation
justifies the need to rewrite history through the use of objective science in the serv-
ice of Truth alone.12
10 "The analysis shows that the possibilities of overcoming the crisis within several decades remain close to zero."
Scanderbeg, the leader of Albania's fight against the Ottoman Empire, and Albania's national hero especially
because of the title Athleta Christi as a traitor to the national cause. On the other hand, Hamza Kastrioti,
Scanderbeg's nephew who led a Turkish army against his uncle is declared a hero. This thesis hits the very heart of
existing Albanian representations: a European country hijacked from its European course by the invading Turks-a
thesis that has been patiently built since the end of the nineteenth century.
12 The nationalists accuse the 'cosmopolitans' of using science in the way Merxhani conceptualized it, i.e. science
as a means to a political end goal. See, Hysamedin Feraj, Pavaresia eshte e Shenjte (Independence is Sacred),
(Tirana: Koha, 1997), 40-42.
13 Differently than in other East European countries, nationalist parties in Albania have not been able to garner any
Yet, the nationalists have failed to unseat or to provide a viable alternative to the
liberal democratic mainstream. Politically, the nationalist program has garnered no
support throughout the transition period. Teleologically, the nationalist system of
thought has been plagued by parochialism, radicalism and particularism. It has
remained on the very margins of the intellectual and political debates of the time,
too poor in quantity as well as quality to make an impact on the systems of belief
that drive Albanian intellectual thought. Indeed, the nationalist orientation may be
classified as subjugated knowledge that has never challenged liberal democracy as
the hegemonic discourse in Albania. As “hegemonic discourse,” liberal democracy
does not simply rate the choices available to political actors and intellectuals.
Instead, it endorses a set of symbols, assumptions, words and conclusions that are
14 Abdi Baleta, Shqiptaret perballe Shovinizmit Serbo-Grek (Albanians and Greek-Serb Chauvinism), (Tirana:
Koha, 1995), 3.
15 Baleta writes "Islam is the outcome of a natural historical process and it has left a deep mark on the Albanian
national psyche. Islam has become an internalized feature of the identity of the Albanian nation." Quoted in Fuga,
Rozafa, 98.
16 This refers to existing state boundaries that, in nationalist discourse, are superseded by the feelings of brother-
imperative for political communication. By rejecting this set of tools and failing to
provide a working alternative, the nationalist orientation suffers from “a fundamen-
tal legitimacy problem arising in [its] ability… to understand and respond.”17
Fifteen years from its inception, the nationalist orientation now has by and large
ceased to exist – the intellectuals that used to expound it have either abandoned the
public scene or refocused their efforts elsewhere.
So, is Albania’s European future safe from internal challenges? Here it is worth
recalling our initial assumption: Albania’s European future is dependent simply on
fulfilling the technical criteria of membership if the Albanian intellectual discourse
is deeply committed to the idea of Europe and moreover, it partakes of the European
tradition of discourse with the ease that indicates membership in that tradition. At
this point, I will allow myself to speculate about the future not in a conclusive way,
but as a thought that may be worth thinking about. At present, the commitment of
Albanians to Europe is unquestionable – as a matter of fact it is even more power-
ful, more obsessive and more demanding than the Czechs’. It seems to me that the
Achilles heel of the Albanian worldview stands in the second half of our assump-
tion. The Albanian worldview stands apart or aside from what we have come to rec-
ognize as ‘the European tradition’. It is like the outsider looking in with envy at the
home denied to him for so long. It is obvious to him that joining the home has not
only the utilitarian benefit of security, predictability and the warmth of belonging,
but it has the much greater benefit of ending the period of homelessness. Becoming
a member of the (European) family is a good a priori. But joining a family means
not only accepting the family’s rules and habits, but sharing naturally in the com-
mon interpretations of its past, present and future. That is, desire to join is not
enough. The modern Albanian has incorporated European discourse at some level –
or, at any rate, attempted to do so. But its content, thought structures and the sheer
diversity of its viewpoints escape him. Albanian discourse has not become a part of
the vital, coherent whole that today we call Europe. When faced with this inability
to participate in Europe, Albanians either console themselves with some kind of pro-
11 Keeley, 91.
*
* *
18 The opening paragraph of Misha's Duke Kerkuar Rrenjet expresses this well: "whenever one becomes ready to
give oneself to this reality [the West-E.T.], to inhale the multitude of its alluring messages, to become a part of it,
from the depths of one's being an old sadness separates one from it as if by thick glass, behind which all surround-
ings become distant and unreal." See, P. Misha, Duke Kerkuar Rrenjet ose Kthimi i Shqiptareve ne Histori
(Searching for the Roots or the Return of Albanians in History), Tirana: Toena, 199, 4.