Political Papers To The Comrades June 4, 2012 The Revolutionary Socialists The Revolutionary Socialists issued a statement dated

May 28, 2012 calling for opposition to the schemes of the counterrevolution and its candidate, Ahmed Shafiq. The statement included a call not to vote for Shafiq in the runoff elections, and to vote for his one competitor, Muhammad Morsi, if the Muslim Brotherhood accepted certain fundamental conditions. Among these conditions were: the formation of a presidential coalition including Abd el Moneim Abou el Futouh and Hamdeen Sabbahi; the selection of cabinet ministers from outside the Muslim Brotherhood and its party; agreement to the law of trade union freedoms; and consensus with the other political forces on a civil constitution. This statement has provoked a negative response among a number of the members of the RS, which calls for a detailed discussion of the contents and timing of the statement, as well as the method in which the decision was reached. Following are a few preliminary comments on this subject: 1) Regarding the timing of the statement, subsequent developments have confirmed that the state of urgency was unwarranted in announcing a definitive position on the issue of the runoff elections, seeing as the statement was published before the appeals were presented to the judiciary. We do not want in this context to make excuses for this haste but only explain the hurried announcement itself, and to sum it up as the desire of the leadership to take initiative in establishing a specific position after having suffered for months a lag in taking decisions and positions, or occasionally taking positions that were vague or in the nature of a compromise. This desire for decisiveness and speed has led us to believe that we have erred in publishing this rushed statement. But in any case we are obliged now not only to acknowledge the error that the leadership has made but also to apologize to the membership of the movement for the muddling and confusion that we have caused by this mistake. 2) Regarding the method of reaching this decision, many members of the movement are of the opinion that this position was reached in a unilateral way without sufficient discussion before the membership. This criticism has elicited a broad discussion on the relationship between centralism and democracy in decision making within the movement, and around a shared understanding of democratic centralism and how to enable this. Does the leadership have the right to take a decision regarding a tactical issue or political position, without exhaustive discussions before the cadre and membership of the movement? And what is the correct balance between the necessity of centralism for unity of action and efficient execution on the one hand, and the necessity of democracy for correct decisions and their relations with revolutionary practice for the cadre? These issues require further discussion and debate among the ranks of the organization to arrive at the correct balance. As for the previously mentioned statement, it is evident that the haste in issuing it has meant the minimizing of opportunities to discuss it. But what is important is the clarification that the contents of the statement present a position which was the direct result of previous discussions, which had ended with the necessary certainty of participating in the runoff elections, and voting against the candidate of the old regime, whoever his rival. For that reason, the statement was, from a formal standpoint, exceedingly democratic, as it was the result of previous discussions on the topic. 3) However, a fundamental piece of democratic practice in arriving at decisions, whether strategic or tactical, requires that the discussion reach all of the membership, and this was not completed in the publication of the statement, which led many of the comrades to feel that their opinions were disregarded, and that the position was imposed on them not only without their discussion, but without any explanation or clarification of this position to them. And here also we must apologize to all who felt this way, and to assure them of the importance of participation of all members in discussion of all positions and policies, as long as this does not affect unity of action and ability to take initiative. And it is this point which requires a degree of confidence in the leadership of the movement and its ability to occasionally arrive at speedy decisions compelled by the necessities of the political moment, without waiting for lengthy discussion of that decision, along with the right of the membership to criticize those decisions and to request review and discussion of them.

4) As for the contents of the statement, discussions following its publication have clarified a number of ambiguous issues, as well as differences within the ranks of the movement. Perhaps the most significant of these is the position on the Muslim Brotherhood. Some have imagined that the call not to vote for Ahmed Shafiq, and therefore to vote for the Brotherhood candidate Morsi, is a type of support by the movement for the Brotherhood itself, or a kind of alliance with them. And this image is the farthest thing from reality. Everyone knows that from the first days of the Egyptian revolution, the Revolutionary Socialists have directed scathing criticisms toward the Brotherhood for their reluctance to participate in the revolution. We have criticized their positions from the very first days, during the meetings of their leadership with Omar Suleiman before the fall of Mubarak, up until their alliance, complicity and bargaining with the Supreme Council of Armed Forces. We have critiqued their right-wing neoliberal economic program which supports the same class of businessmen that were supported by the old regime, as well as their concessions and mutual understanding with the American administration, and therefore indirectly with the Zionist enemy. It was our attacks and exposure of the positions of the Muslim Brotherhood leadership that led the Brotherhood media to launch a campaign against the Revolutionary Socialists at the end of 2011 in complicity with the media of the regime. Therefore, for those who accuse the Revolutionary Socialists today of wishing to ally themselves with the Muslim Brotherhood, either they have not been following the official position of the movement and its sharp class analysis, or perhaps in the case of some of the anarchists and liberals they want nothing more than to distort the image of the Revolutionary Socialists at every possible opportunity. 5) The Revolutionary Socialists distinguish with all clarity between those Muslim Brothers in the ranks of the opposition during the era of Mubarak who were arrested and tortured in the struggle, and the group itself which has begun in actuality to share power with the remnants of the old regime. But those who infer from this that there is no difference between the candidate of the counterrevolution and the Muslim Brotherhood candidate make a fatal error which supports catastrophic conclusions incompatible with the traditions of the Revolutionary Socialists. It is true that the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood reconciles and bargains, to the point of occasional complicity with the remnants of the old regime. But the Muslim Brotherhood is a tremendous mass organization with well-established bases among the middle class in the cities and the countryside, as well as among the poor, the workers, and the farmers. The leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood, even as it is submitting to pressure from the businessmen and the old regime, cannot ignore its sociological bases. We have seen how the votes of the Muslim Brotherhood have been broken down to half of what they were from the parliamentary elections to the presidential elections. We have seen the divisions and resignations that the group has suffered. The Muslim Brotherhood is an organization filled with class contradictions concealed behind vague religious slogans. But whenever the leadership has been forced to take concrete and decisive positions, these contradictions have erupted. It is impossible to understand the continuous vacillation of the leadership toward the military council, between conciliation and opposition, between alliance and enmity, if we do not understand the contradictory class nature of this organization. 6) As for the candidate of the counterrevolution, he represents no other than the Supreme Council of Armed Forces, the security apparatus of the state, and the class of big businessmen. He has a clear agenda without contradictions, uninfluenced by any pressure from the masses. This agenda can be summed up as the utter termination of the Egyptian revolution, and a return to the fundamental interests of the old regime, with the same external alliances and overt and violent hostility to the interests of the Egyptian masses. He is the candidate of revenge and reprisal against the revolution and against the Egyptian people. 7) The choice between Shafiq and Morsi is not a choice between a revolutionary candidate and a counterrevolutionary candidate. It is not a choice between a program that represents the interests of the nation and another that represents the interests of the ruling class. It is rather a choice between a military bourgeois candidate hostile to the revolution and a vacillating bourgeois candidate who wants neither a return to the old order nor the completion of the revolution to its end. This means a choice between two enemies. And the question is who among them do we prefer to struggle against: a general who will send out tanks against the citizens, or a waffling opportunist Brother subject to pressures from below, who can possibly be exposed before his own base and citizens? 8) To consider that this choice is simply an empty choice between military fascism on one hand and religious fascism on the other is not just a gross error in understanding the roots and nature of fascism, but it also serves the candidate of the counterrevolution in the long term, for it creates an atmosphere of nihilism, frustration and fear, the perfect atmosphere for the success of the counterrevolution.

9) The results of the first round of elections were a shock to many revolutionaries, including the Revolutionary Socialists. The results of Hamdeen Sabbahi and, to a lesser extent, Abd el Moneim Abou el Futouh, clarified without doubt that the majority of the voters support continuing the revolution since they have voted for candidates outside the military-Brotherhood binary. However, the inclusion of Shafiq in the runoff elections by a combination of terror and fraud, and the renewed operations of all sections of the security and military apparatus, as well as the National Democratic Party machine on his behalf as the clear candidate of the counterrevolution, has created a situation of panic for some and frustration for others. But in our estimation neither terror nor frustration have any justification in this moment. It is natural that the counterrevolution would attempt with all its capabilities, with the support of the businessmen, the American, Zionist, and Saudi administrations behind it, to return to the old order and to smash the revolution with every method possible. But perhaps the most important sign of optimism is the result achieved by Hamdeen Sabbahi. He earned the majority of votes in most of the urban centers that represented for the Egyptian revolution, and in most of the regions in which are concentrated the most organized and conscious sectors of the working class. And it is this which indicates that the revolutionary camp has not been defeated, and that there are new rounds upcoming in the war against the counterrevolution. But this situation requires organization and unification of the revolutionary ranks to create a barrier preventing the return of the old regime. And narrow interests among the different political forces are standing as a dangerous obstacle to this unity. 10) On the heels of this development came the rulings in the Mubarak case, confirming that the counterrevolution is serious in its intention to prey upon the revolution. This was followed by the response of the people, confirming from the other side that the revolutionary masses will only allow the counterrevolution to succeed in its schemes over their dead bodies. All of this places a huge responsibility on the shoulders of the revolutionary movements of all currents to clinch the battle. 11) The rulings, and the results of the elections before them, have erupted into a new revolutionary surge. It is up to the revolutionary forces to crystallize clear and fundamental political demands to present to the revolutionary masses. Perhaps the most important of these is the creation of revolutionary tribunals for the retrial of Mubarak and his men, among them Ahmed Shafiq, as well as the termination of the General Prosecutor and the issuance of the Political Exclusion Law to include in a clear fashion all of the symbols and leadership of the old regime. 12) From another angle, we must place pressure on the candidates of the first electoral round who are closest to the revolution, foremost Hamdeen Sabbahi and Abd el Moneim Abou el Futouh, to close their ranks and create a third alternative, to place pressure in every way possible on the Muslim Brotherhood and crystallize an alternative to Morsi in the event that we do not receive the expected response. This third alternative must put forth a clear position for the runoff elections, whether by the formation of a revolutionary presidential council in which the Muslim Brotherhood candidate will participate, upon accepting the conditions of the revolutionary forces, a matter which has become exceedingly difficult, or by an escalation of the revolutionary surge so that the masses can respond by cancelling the elections and imposing a transitional presidential council. 13) The determining factor for the success of any of these positions is the development of a distribution of forces in the squares on the one hand and the ability of the revolutionary forces to unite ranks on the other. 14) And it is upon us, the Revolutionary Socialists, to exert the maximum effort in organizing, propaganda, and agitation, in the most unified and effective manner to be at the heart of the new revolutionary surge. 15) The people have granted us an extraordinary second chance, and we must respond to this historical opportunity and learn from the positives and negatives of the previous waves of struggle to move forward together in a centralized and democratic fashion. We must avoid leaping to conclusions without explaining and discussing them democratically, while at the same time avoid hesitating, vacillation, and lagging in making decisions. Original Arabic here: http://www.e-socialists.net/node/8812