Constitutional Law Case Digest Matrix Set 2 Stef Macapagal

EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS Title Mirasol v. DPWH GR No. 158793 8 June 2006 Carpio, J. Facts In 1957, RA 2000 (Limited Highways Act) was enacted. Subsequently, DPWH Administrative Order 1 (prohibiting motorcycles on limited access highways), DPWH Department Order 74 (declaring certain portions of the NLEX and SLEX as limited access facilities), and DPWH Department Order 215 (declaring Coastal Road as a limited access facility) were issued. James Mirasol, Richard Santiago, and the Luzon Motorcyclists Federation, Inc. sought to have the DPWH issuances invalidated for violating RA 2000. Consequently, the Toll Regulatory Board issued Department Order 123, which allowed motorcycles with engine displacements of 400cc inside limited access facilities. The trial court dismissed petition but declared DO invalid. Salvador Parreo served in AFP for 32 years before retirement, after which received pension payments. the 123 the his he W/N Section 27 of PD 1638 discriminates against AFP retirees who have changed their nationality. NO. Petitioners loss of Filipino citizenship constitutes a substantial distinction that distinguishes him from other retirees who retain their Filipino citizenship. A retiree who had lost his Filipino citizenship already renounced his allegiance to the state. Thus, he may no longer be compelled by the state to render compulsory military service when the need arises, The constitutional right to equal protection of the laws is not absolute but is subject to reasonable classification. To be reasonable, the classification (a) Must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (b) Must be germane to the purpose of the law; (c) Must not be limited to Issue/s W/N Administrative Order 1 is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause. Ruling NO. It is neither warranted nor reasonable to say that the only justifiable classification among modes of transport is the motorized against the nonmotorized. Not all motorized vehicles are created equal. Real and substantial differences exist between a motorcycle and other forms of transport sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the tollways. The most obvious and troubling difference would be that a two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a four-wheeled vehicle. Public interest and safety require the imposition of certain restrictions on tollways that do not apply to ordinary roads. As a special kind of road, it is but reasonable that not all forms of transport could use it. Doctrine/s Classification by itself is not prohibited. It can only be assailed if it is deemed invidious, that is, if it is not based on substantial differences. A police power measure may be assailed upon proof that it unduly violates constitutional limitations like due process and equal protection of the law.

Parreo v. Commission on Audit GR No. 162224 7 June 2007 Carpio, J.

Parreo then migrated to Hawaii and became a naturalized American citizen. The AFP subsequently stopped Parreos pension, in accordance with Section 27 of PD 1638 which provides that a retiree who loses

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his Filipino citizenship shall have his retirement benefits terminated. Parreo requested for reconsideration but the Judge Advocate General of the AFP denied his petition. Thus, he filed a claim before the COA for the continuance of his monthly pension. The COA denied Parreos claim for lack of jurisdiction, and advised Parreo to file the case in the proper court. With the passage of PD 269, electric cooperatives were decreed to be permanently exempted from income taxes, and exempted from paying national or local government taxes until it has become completely free of indebtedness incurred by borrowing. From 1971 to 1978, the Philippine government and the electric cooperatives entered into 6 loan agreements with USAID to finance their electrification projects. These obligations still exist. However, the petitioners contend that their tax exemptions were invalidly withdrawn by the passage of the Local Government Code. They assail Sections 193 and 234 for giving different tax treatments on electric cooperatives registered under PD 269 and those registered under RA 6938, thereby violating the equal protection clause.

which the state may require of not only its private citizens, but also citizens who have retired from military service.

existing conditions only; and (d) Must apply equally to each member of the class. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another.

PHILRECA v. DILG Secretary GR No. 143076 10 June 2003 Puno, J.

W/N the difference in treatment of electric cooperatives registered under PD 269 and those registered under RA 6938 constitute a violation of the equal protection clause.

NO. First, substantial distinctions exist between cooperatives under PD 269 and cooperatives under RA 6938. Cooperatives under RA 6938 are funded by capital contributions by members and are envisioned to be self-sufficient and independent organizations with minimal government intervention or regulation. In contrast, cooperatives under PD 269 are government-funded, and are largely controlled by the National Electrification Administration to ensure that the loans granted to them would be repaid to the government. Second, the classification of taxexempt entities in the LGC is germane to the purpose of the law. The limited and restrictive nature of the tax exemption privileges under the LGC is consistent with the State policy to ensure autonomy of LGUs and the objective of the LGC to grant genuine and meaningful autonomy to enable LGUs to

The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances. Thus, the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a law based on reasonable classification.

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People v. Lacson GR No. 149453 7 October 2003 Callejo, Sr., J.

In 1999, Judge Agnir provisionally dismissed 11 murder cases against Panfilo Lacson. In 2000, the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure took effect, Section 8, Rule 117 of which prescribes a time-bar rule of 2 years for the revival of the prosecution of cases which were provisionally dismissed. In 2001, the case against Lacson was revived. Lacson invoked Section 8, Rule 117 of the RRCP, stating that the rule should also apply retroactively on the basis of being favorable to the accused. Lacson contended that if the rule would only be applied prospectively, the petitioners would be given more than 2 years from the dismissal of the case to revive the criminal cases, thus violating his right to due process and equal protection of the law. RA 7719 (National Blood

W/N the non-retroactive application of the new time-bar rule would violate the accuseds right to equal protection of the law.

attain their fullest development. The obvious intention of the law is to broaden the tax base of LGUs to assure them of substantial sources of revenue. Finally, Sections 193 and 234 of the LGC permit reasonable classification as these exemptions are not limited to existing conditions and apply equally to all members of the same class. Exemptions from local taxation, including real property tax, are granted to all cooperatives covered by RA 6938 and such exemptions exist for as long as the LGC and the provisions therein on local taxation remain good law. NO. The institution and prosecution of criminal cases are governed by existing rules and not by rules yet to exist. It would be the apex of injustice to hold that Section 8 had a platonic or ideal existence before it was approved by the Court. As a matter of fact, it would be a denial of the States right to due process and a travesty of justice for the Court to apply the new rule retroactively in the present case as Lacson insists, considering that the criminal cases were provisionally dismissed by Judge Agnir in 1999 before the new rule took effect in 2000. A retroactive application of the time-bar will result in absurd, unjust and oppressive consequences to the State and to the victims of crimes and their heirs. NO.

The State is entitled to due process in criminal cases as much as the accused.

Beltran v. Secretary of Health

W/N RA 7719 violates the equal

Class legislation, discriminating

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GR Nos. 133640, 133661, and 139147 25 November 2005 Azcuna, J.

Services Act) was enacted in 1994, seeking to provide an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and by regulating blood banks in the country. Section 7 thereof provided for the phase-out of all commercial blood banks within 2 years after its effectivity. The Act was passed after studies showed that blood transfusions could lead to transmission of diseases, and that blood sold by persons to commercial blood banks are three times more likely to have blood transfusion transmissible diseases than those donated to the Philippine National Red Cross. Prior to the expiration of the commercial blood banks licenses, they filed a petition assailing the constitutionality and validity of RA 7719 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, for discriminating against free standing blood banks in a manner which is not germane to the purpose of the law.

protection clause.

One, RA 7719 is based on substantial distinctions. Nonprofit blood banks operate for purely humanitarian reasons and as a medical service, and encourage voluntary blood donation. On the other hand, commercial blood banks are motivated by profit and treat blood as a sale of commodity. Two, the classification and the consequent phase-out of blood banks is germane to the purpose of the law, which is to provide the nation with an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and treating blood transfusion as a humanitarian or medical service rather than a commodity. This necessarily involves the phase-out of commercial blood banks based on the fact that they operate as a business enterprise, and they source their blood supply from paid blood donors who are considered unsafe. Three, the Legislature intended for the general application of the law. Its enactment was not solely to address the peculiar circumstances of the situation nor was it intended to apply only to existing conditions. Four, the law applies equally to all commercial blood banks without exception. NO. In serving the interest of the public, and to give meaning to the purpose of the law, the Legislature deemed it necessary to phase-out commercial blood banks. This action may seriously affect the owners and operators,

against some and favoring others is prohibited; but classification on a reasonable basis and not made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted.

W/N Section 7 of RA 7719 constitutes unlawful deprivation of personal liberty and property.

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Dycaico v. Social System GR No. 161357 30 November 2005 Callejo, Sr., J.

Security

Bonifacio Dycaico was a member of the SSS, with his common-law wife Elena and their eight children named in his data record as beneficiaries. In 1989, Bonifacio was considered retired and began receiving his monthly pension from the SSS. He married Elena on the same year that he passed away. Shortly after Bonifacios death, Elena filed with the SSS an application for survivors pension. However, the same was denied on the ground that under Section 12-B(d) of RA 8282 (Social Security Law), she could not be considered Bonifacios primary beneficiary became they were not married at the time of his retirement. Elena brought her case to the Social Security Commission, which still denied her claim.

W/N the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12B(d) of RA 8282 violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution.

as well as the employees, of commercial blood banks but their interests must give way to serve a higher end for the interest of the public. YES. The classification violates the equal protection clause because: (1) it is not germane to the purpose of the law. Classifying dependent spouses with respect to their entitlement based on whether the marriage was contracted before or after the retirement of the other spouse, regardless of the duration of the said marriage, bears no relation to the achievement of the police objective of the law, which is to provide meaningful protection to members and their beneficiaries against the hazard of disability, sickness, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies resulting in loss of income or financial burden. (2) it is not based on real and substantial distinctions. It is arbitrary and discriminatory. It unfairly lumps marriages contracted after the members retirement as sham relationships or were contracted solely for the purpose of acquiring benefits accruing upon the death of the other spouse. The proviso also violates the due process clause as it outrightly deprives the surviving spouses whose respective marriages to the retired SSS members were contracted after the latters retirement of their survivors benefits. There is outright confiscation of benefits due such surviving spouses without giving them an opportunity to be heard.

Generally, a statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of the equal protection clause of the law. Irrebuttable presumptions have long been disfavored under the due process clause, as they could presume facts which are not necessarily or universally true.

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Coconut Oil Refiners v. Torres GR No. 132527 29 July 2005 Azcuna, J.

In 1992, RA 7227 was passed for the conversion of the Clark and Subic military reservations into special economic zones. In 1993, the Bases Convertion Development Authority passed a resolution allowing the tax and duty-free sale at retail of consumer goods imported via Clark for consumption outside the Clark Special Economic Zone. Subsequently, several Executive Orders allowed the bringing out of purchased tax-free items from the Subic Special Economic and Free Port Zone. It prescribed a $100 monthly limit to those who live within the SSEFPZ but outside the Secured Area, and $200 yearly limit to those who live outside the SSEFPZ. Petitioners assail the $100 monthly and $200 yearly tax-free privileges.

W/N EO 97-A (which prescribes the tax-free privileges) violates the equal protection clause.

The proviso creates the presumption that marriages contracted after the members retirement date were entered into for the purpose of securing benefits under RA 8282. This presumption is conclusive because the said surviving spouses are not afforded any opportunity to disprove the presence of the illicit purpose, thereby also depriving them the opportunity to be heard. NO. Substantial distinctions lie between the establishments inside and outside the zone, justifying the difference in their treatment. Enterprises outside the SEZ maintain their businesses within the Philippine territory, while SEZ enterprises operate within a separate customs territory. To grant the same tax incentives given to enterprises within the zones to businesses operating outside the zones would clearly defeat the statutes intent to carve a territory out of the military reservations in Subic Bay where free flow of goods and capital is maintained; thus, the classification is germane to the purpose of the law. The classification moreover, is not limited to existing conditions when the law was promulgated, but to future conditions as well, inasmuch as the law envisioned the former military reservation to ultimately develop into a selfsustaining investment center. Finally, the classification applies equally to all retailers found within the secured area. The individuals and businesses within

The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on a reasonable classification.

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Villarea v. Commission Audit GR Nos. 145383-84 6 August 2003 Azcuna, J.

on

Atty. Rudy Villarea was assigned as Auditor of Marikina by the Commission on Audit from 1994 to 1997. Ordinances passed by Marikina entitled him to receive special allowances and benefits, which were later discovered by a Special Audit Team constituted by COA. It was then declared that these were received in violation of Section 18 of RA 6758, which prohibited payment of additional compensation to COA personnel by government units to which they were assigned. Atty. Villarea was then found guilty by the COA for neglect of duty, simple misconduct, and violation of reasonable office rules and regulations. Atty. Villarea appealed, stating that he was among the other national government officials which were entitled to whatever additional allowances and benefits the City of Marikina gave to such officials according to the LGC. He then contended that to discriminate COA personnel from other national government officials would constitute a violation of the equal protection of the laws. Accused Jimmy Mijano was convicted by the lower court of the crime of rape of five-year-old

W/N Section 18 of RA 6758 violates the equal protection clause.

the secured area, being in like circumstances or contributing directly to the achievement to the end purpose of the law, are not categorized further. They are all similarly treated, both in privileges granted and in obligations required. NO. There are valid reasons to treat COA officials differently from other national government officials. The primary function of an auditor is to prevent irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures of government funds. To be able to properly perform their constitutional mandate, COA officials need to be insulated from unwarranted influences, so that they can act with independence and integrity. The prohibition under Section 18 of Act 6758 was designed precisely to serve this purpose.

The equal protection clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is reasonable and not arbitrary.

People v. Mijano GR No. 129112 23 July 1999

W/N the death penalty violates the equal protection clause.

NO. The death penalty makes no distinction. It applies to all persons and to all classes of

The equality the Constitution guarantees is legal equality, or as it is usually put, the equality of all

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Per Curiam

Hazel Ramirez, for which the penalty of death was given. Mijano assails the death penalty for being violative of the equal protection clause, stating that it only punishes people like him who are uneducated and jobless.

personsrich or poor, educated or uneducated, religious or nonreligious. No particular person or classes of persons are identified by the law against whom the death penalty shall be exclusively imposed. Obiter: Compassion for the poor is an imperative of every human but only when the recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege.

persons before the law. Under this guarantee, each individual is dealt with as an equal person in the law, which does not treat the person differently of who he is or what he is or what he possesses.