Contitutional Law Set 7 Prepared by : Atchel

Estrada v. Desierto Facts: This is a petition to question the legitimacy of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyos assumption of the presidency of the Philippines, filed by her immediate predecessor Joseph Estrada. What actually happened: May 11, 1998: Estrada wins the presidency with an overwhelming lead. Arroyo is elected as Vice-President. October 4, 2000: Ilocos Sur governor Luis Chavit Singson starts publicly accusing Estrada and his family of receiving jueteng payoffs. October 5, 2000: Echoes of Singsons accusations resound in both the Senate and House of Representatives, mainly through opposition members / members of the Minority. October 11-November, 2000: Several advisers resign, including Department of Social Welfare and Development Secretary Arroyo. Estradas allies in the Majority defect to the other camp. Past presidents and Archbishop Cardinal Sin call for Estradas resignation. November 13, 2000: House Speaker Manuel Villar transmits the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate. November 20, 2000: the Impeachment Process formally starts, with 21 Senators as judges, and Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. presiding. December 7, 2000-January 11, 2001: the Impeachment trial proper. Presentation of evidence. On January 11, 11 senators vote against the opening of the second envelope, which allegedly contains evidence to prove that Estrada indeed kept a secret bank account worth 3.3 billion pesos under the name Jose Velarde. These 11 outnumbered the 10 senators who wanted to have the envelope opened. January 17, 2001: Public prosecutors resign, and the impeachment proceedings, postponed indefinitely. January 18, 2001: Hundreds of people march to EDSA in a mass movement calling for Estradas resignation (dubbed the EDSA II Movement). January 19, 2001: the Military withdraws support from Estrada, and more members of the Executive branch resign. Estrada agrees to holding a snap election for President where he would not be a candidate. January 20, 2001: Estradas and Arroyos advisers start negotiations on a peaceful and orderly transfer of power, only to be cut short by Arroyos oathtaking as the 14th President of the Philippines. That same day, Estrada and his family leave Malacaang. Estrada releases a statement which said that he was leaving Malacaang for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He also sends a letter to both chambers of Congress saying that he [is] unable to exercise the powers and duties of [his] office. January 22, 2001: Congress issues a Resolution recognizing and expressing support for the Arroyo presidency. Other countries expressed the same.

February 6, 2001: Sen. Teofisto Guingona is nominated by Arroyo to be her Vice-President February 7, 2001: Senate passed Resolution No. 83 terminating the Impeachment Court. What the parties to this case did: February 5, 2001: Estrada files a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ or preliminary injunction to enjoin Ombudsman Desierto from continuing the probe on the criminal cases filed against him (OMB Case No. 0-00-1629, 1754-1758), supposedly until his term as President is over. February 6, 2001: Estrada files another petition, this time a quo warranto petition, against Arroyo. He wanted to be confirmed as the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines and Arroyo only as temporary / acting president until he is able to resume his duties. February 24, 2001: Respondents file their replies to Estradas consolidated petitions. Petitioners Arguments: He has not resigned as President yet, and so Arroyos presidency was void since the position was not vacant at the time she was sworn in. He is only temporarily unable to fulfill his duties as President, and that he is merely on leave. Given the above arguments, Estrada is still President, especially since he was never impeached, and he thus enjoys Presidential Immunity from all kinds of suit. The Ombudsman has to stop the investigation since he had already developed a bias against him (Estrada) from the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt. Respondents Argument: The cases pose a political question ( the legitimacy of the Arroyo administration ) and are therefore out of the Courts jurisdiction, especially since Arroyo became president through people power, and has already been recognized as such by other governments. They compare the present case with Aquinos revolutionary government (Lawyers League for a Better Philippines v. Aquino).

Issue: Whether or not Estrada is merely a President on leave, which makes Arroyo just an Acting President. (Whether Estrada resigned from his position)

Held: Estrada resigned from his position. There are two elements that must be present to consider someone to have resigned: first, the intent to resign, and second, the act/s of relinquishment. Both elements were evident in Estradas actuations before he left Malacaang, and so he must be considered to have resigned.

Using the Totality Test (i.e., the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing material relevance on the issue), the Court found that Estradas acts to be tantamount to his resignation. For intent: the Court mainly used Angaras Diary, Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada, in order to intuit Estradas intent. The Diary, which was published in a major publication, described Estradas acts following the massive withdrawal of support by former Estrada allies. Here, Estrada is quoted to have proposed a snap election of which he would not be a part. He was also shown to have conceded to the idea that he had to resign. For acts of relinquishment: the Court enumerated five. Estrada acknowledged Arroyos oath-taking as President of the Republic. He said he was leaving the seat of presidency for the sake of peace but did not say that he would return or that he was leaving only temporarily. He did not specify what kind of inability it was that prevented him from discharging his presidential duties at that time. He thanked the people for the opportunity to serve them. The Court took this as a past opportunity. He also said he was ready for any future challenge, and the Court took to mean a future challenge after occupying the [presidency]. He called on his supporters to join efforts at reconciliation and solidarity. The Court said that these would not be possible if Estrada refuses to give up the presidency. Estrada also argues that he could not have resigned as a matter of law, since Section 12 of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) prohibits the resignation or retirement of any public officer pending a criminal or administrative investigation for any case filed against him under RA 3019 or the Revised Penal Codes provisions on bribery. The Court interpreted this provision according to the intent of the lawmakers, and that is that the provision was included supposedly to prevent the act of resignation or retirement from being used as a protective shield to stop the investigation of a pending criminal or administrative case against him and to prevent his prosecution under [RA 3019] Estrada therefore cannot invoke this provision to violate the very practice it was supposed to prevent. Almonte v. Vasquez (1995) Facts: This is a case wherein respondent Ombudsman, requires petitioners Nerio Rogado and Elisa Rivera, as chief accountant and record custodian, respectively, of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce "all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the year 1988" and all evidence such as vouchers from enforcing his orders. Petitioner Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB, while Perez is Chief of the EIIB's Budget and Fiscal Management Division. The subpoena duces tecum was issued by the Ombudsman in connection with his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed. The letter, purporting to have been written by an employee of the EIIB and a

concerned citizen, was addressed to the Secretary of Finance, with copies furnished several government offices, including the Office of the Ombudsman. May be erased: [The letter reads in pertinent parts: that the EIIB has a syndicate headed by the Chief of Budget Division who is manipulating funds and also the brain of the so called "ghost agents" or the "Emergency Intelligence Agents" (EIA); that when the agency had salary differential last Oct '88 all money for the whole plantilla were released and from that alone, Millions were saved and converted to ghost agents of EIA; Almost all EIIB agents collects payroll from the big time smuggler syndicate monthly and brokers every week for them not to be apprehended.] In his comment on the letter-complaint, petitioner Almonte denied all the allegations written on the anonymous letter. Petitioners move to quash the subpoena and the subpoena duces tecum but was denied. Disclosure of the documents in question is resisted with the claim of privilege of an agency of the government on the ground that "knowledge of EIIB's documents relative to its Personal Services Funds and its plantilla . . . will necessarily [lead to] knowledge of its operations, movements, targets, strategies, and tactics and the whole of its being" and this could "destroy the EIIB." Issue: Whether petitioners can be ordered to produce documents relating to personal services and salary vouchers of EIIB employees on the plea that such documents are classified without violating their equal protection of laws. Held: YES. At common law a governmental privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to state secrets bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters and in addition, privilege to withhold the identity of persons who furnish information of violation of laws. In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Indeed, EIIB's function is the gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding "illegal activities affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting." Consequently, while in cases which involve state secrets it may be sufficient to

determine from the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters without compelling production, no similar excuse can be made for a privilege resting on other considerations.

The Ombudsman is investigating a complaint that several items in the EIIB were filled by fictitious persons and that the allotments for these items in 1988 were used for illegal purposes. The plantilla and other personnel records are relevant to his investigation as the designated protectors of the people of the Constitution. Nor is there violation of petitioners' right to the equal protection of the laws. Petitioners complain that "in all forum and tribunals . . . the aggrieved parties . . . can only hale respondents via their verified complaints or sworn statements with their identities fully disclosed," while in proceedings before the Office of the

Ombudsman anonymous letters suffice to start an investigation. In the first place, there can be no objection to this procedure because it is provided in the Constitution itself. In the second place, it is apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints "in any form and in a manner," the framers of the Constitution took into account the well-known reticence of the people which keep them from complaining against official wrongdoings. As this Court had occasion to point out, the Office of the Ombudsman is different from the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the government because those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who, through official pressure and influence, can quash, delay or dismiss investigations held against them. On the other hand complainants are more often than not poor and simple folk who cannot afford to hire lawyers. Finally, it is contended that the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum would violate petitioners' right against self-incrimination. It is enough to state that the documents required to be produced in this case are public records and those to whom the subpoena duces tecum is directed are government officials in whose possession or custody the documents are. Moreover, if, as petitioners claim the disbursement by the EII of funds for personal service has already been cleared by the COA, there is no reason why they should object to the examination of the documents by respondent Ombudsman. Ormoc Sugar Co., Inc v. Treasurer of Ormoc City (1968) | the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well Facts: On January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964, imposing "on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries." Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. on March 20, 1964 for P7,087.50 and on April 20, 1964 for P5,000.00, or a total of P12,087.50. On June 1, 1964, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, a complaint against the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging that the afore-stated ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause (Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution) and the rule of uniformity of taxation (Sec. 22[1], Art. VI, Constitution), aside from being an export tax forbidden under Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code. It further alleged that the tax is neither a production nor a license tax which Ormoc City under Section 15-kk of its charter and under Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, is authorized to impose; and that the tax amounts to a customs duty, fee or charge in violation of paragraph 1 of Section 2 of Republic Act 2264 because the tax is on both the sale and export of sugar. Answering, the defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within defendant city's power to enact under the Local Autonomy Act and that the same did not violate the afore-cited constitutional limitations.

Issue: Whether constitutional limits on the power of taxation, specifically the equal protection clause and rule of uniformity of taxation, were infringed.

Held: YES. Ordinance No. 4 Series of 1964: UNCONSTI The Constitution in the bill of rights provides: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." (Sec. 1[1], Art. 111) In Felwa v. Salas, We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class. A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, from the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FACTS: The two petitions in this case sought to declare unconstitutional Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino. The assailed law provides that: Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his position, a member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the government and government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor; Provided, that this limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or committees, or to boards, councils or bodies of which the President is the Chairman.

The petitioners alleged that the cited provision of EO 284 contravenes the provision of Sec. 13, Article VII which declares: The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be

financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office. The petitioners maintained that the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" used in Section 13 of Article VII meant that the exception must be expressly provided in the Constitution. Public respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the phrase "unless otherwise provided in the Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII makes reference to Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB insofar as the appointive officials mentioned therein are concerned. The provision relied upon by the respondents provides: Sec. 7. . . . . . Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. ISSUE No. 1 : Does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB? No. The intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned Although Section 7, Article I-XB already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or employment in the government subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself. While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.

ISSUE No. 2: Does the prohibition apply to positions held in ex officio capacity? The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said officials' office. The reason is that these posts do no comprise "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. The term ex-officio means "from office; by virtue of office." Ex-officio likewise denotes an "act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by the office." The additional duties must not only be closely related to, but must be required by the official's primary functions. If the functions required to be performed are merely incidental, remotely related, inconsistent, incompatible, or otherwise alien to the primary function of a cabinet official, such additional functions would fall under the purview of "any other office" prohibited by the Constitution.

ISSUE No. 3: Can the respondents be obliged to reimburse the perquisites they have received from the offices they have held pursuant to EO 284? During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be considered de facto officers and as such entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered. It has been held that "in cases where there is no de jure officer, a de facto officer, who, in good faith has had possession of the office and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in an appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the office. Any per diem, allowances or other emoluments received by the respondents by virtue of actual services rendered in the questioned positions may therefore be retained by them. Overall, Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional as it actually allows a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself. Marcos Vs. Manglapus [177 SCRA 668; G.R. No. 88211; 15 Sept 1989]

Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.

Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines. Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's country, a distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any country, including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security, public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel. The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of International Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land. The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime. The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Marcos vs. Manglapus, 178 SCRA 760 (1989)

Fast facts The wish of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines, after having been exiled, has been barred by President Corazon Aquino, in exercise of her executive power. Article 7, Section 1 The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines. Article 7, Sections 14-23 Powers (executive) expressly provided for the Constitution. Issue (WON) The President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines Held & Ratio Yes. The President, who has been expressly granted powers by the Constitution, also has implied residual powers inherent to the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The President has powers other than those expressly stated in the Constitution. She did not act in grave abuse of discretion. As long as there is some factual basis for the presidents decision, there is no grave abuse of discretion.

Notes in class Exclusive list of powers there are inherent limitations. Executive power is what the president can/cannot do, restricted by the doctrine of separation of powers. Supreme court proved that Aquino can prevent Marcos from returning by defining and establishing that the president has residual powers Residual powers Inherent powers exercised by the President in accordance with her position, derived from the oath she has taken during her inauguration. All powers that is not under judicial or legislative. There should be no gap in the exercise of power. Residual Powers Whatever is not judicial, whatever is not legislative is residual power exercised by the President (Marcos v. Manglapus, 178 SCRA 760) CASES As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." [Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it does not define what is meant by "executive power" although in the same article it touches on the exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power, the powers

under the commander-in-chief clause, the power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of Congress, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the power to submit the budget to Congress, and the power to address Congress [Art. VII, Secs. 14-23]. The inevitable question then arises: by enumerating certain powers of the President did the framers of the Constitution intend that the President shall exercise those specific powers and no other? Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated. Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the President is, under the Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest. To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. To paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the President but also his duty to do anything not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws that the needs of the nation demand. It is a power borne by the President's duty to preserve and defend the Constitution. It also may be viewed as a power implicit in the President's duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed [see Hyman, The American President, where the author advances the view that an allowance of discretionary power is unavoidable in any government and is best lodged in the President (Marcos vs. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668). Biraogo vs Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Respondents. When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. --- Justice Jose P. Laurel Facts: The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May 2010 elections, when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan, "Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap." The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency. The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of

the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor. The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitionerslegislators) as incumbent members of the House of Representatives.

Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission). Issues: 1. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file their respective petitions and question Executive Order No. 1; 2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions; 3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ; 4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause; and 5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to injunctive relief. Held: Legal Standing of the Petitioners The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Where the issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, they should be resolved for the guidance of all. Undoubtedly, the Filipino people are more than interested to know the status of the Presidents first effort to bring about a promised change to the country. The Court takes cognizance of the petition not due to overwhelming political undertones that clothe the issue in the eyes of the public, but because the Court stands firm in its oath to perform its constitutional duty to settle legal controversies with overreaching significance to society. Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission The Chief Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry. Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate

The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate was delineated by the Court in Cario v. Commission on Human Rights.59 Thus: The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters." In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x. Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the findings of the PTC are to be accorded conclusiveness. Much like its predecessors, the Davide Commission, the Feliciano Commission and the Zenarosa Commission, its findings would, at best, be recommendatory in nature. And being so, the Ombudsman and the DOJ have a wider degree of latitude to decide whether or not to reject the recommendation. These offices, therefore, are not deprived of their mandated duties but will instead be aided by the reports of the PTC for possible indictments for violations of graft laws. Violation of the Equal Protection Clause The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this constitutional safeguard. They contend that it does not apply equally to all members of the same class such that the intent of singling out the "previous administration" as its sole object makes the PTC an "adventure in partisan hostility." Thus, in order to be accorded with validity, the commission must also cover reports of graft and corruption in virtually all administrations previous to that of former President Arroyo. The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.

Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration"only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order. Decision

The issue that seems to take center stage at present is - whether or not the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its constitutionally mandated power of Judicial Review with respect to recent initiatives of the legislature and the executive department, is exercising undue interference. Is the Highest Tribunal, which is expected to be the protector of the Constitution, itself guilty of violating fundamental tenets like the doctrine of separation of powers? Time and again, this issue has been addressed by the Court, but it seems that the present political situation calls for it to once again explain the legal basis of its action lest it continually be accused of being a hindrance to the nations thrust to progress. WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared

UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby ordered to cease and desist from carrying out the provisions of Executive Order No. 1. Jose Mondano vs Governor Silvosa On November 3, 2011 Political Law Control Power Revised Administrative Code Supervision Mondano was the mayor of Mainit, Surigao. A complaint was filed against him for rape and concubinage. The information reached the Assistant Executive Secretary who ordered the governor to investigate the matter. Silvosa then summoned Mondano and the latter appeared before him. Thereafter Silvosa suspended Mondano. Mondano filed a petition for prohibition enjoining the governor from further proceeding. Silvosa invoked the RAC which provided that he, as part of the executive and by virtue o the order given by the Asst Exec Sec, is with direct control, direction, and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction . . . and to that end may order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his Department and in connection therewith may appoint a committee or designate an official or person who shall conduct such investigations. ISSUE: Whether or not the Governor can exercise the power of control. HELD: The executive departments of the Government created and organized before the approval of the Constitution continued to exist as authorized by law until the Congress shall provide otherwise. The Constitution provides: The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. Under this constitutional provision the President has been invested with the power of control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, but not of all local governments over which he has been granted only the power of general supervision as may be provided by law. The Department head as agent of the President has direct control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for in section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, but he does not have the same control of local governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction. Likewise, his authority to order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his

department is confined to bureaus or offices under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments over which, as already stated, the President exercises only general supervision as may be provided by law. If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code are to be construed as conferring upon the corresponding department head direct control, direction, and supervision over all local governments and that for that reason he may order the investigation of an official of a local government for malfeasance in office, such interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of par 1, sec 10, Article 7, of the 1935 Constitution. If general supervision over all local governments is to be construed as the same power granted to the Department Head in sec 79 (c) of the RAC, then there would no longer be a distinction or difference between the power of control and that of supervision. In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. Such is the import of the provisions of sec 79 (c) of the RAC. The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal officials in the provincial governor who is authorized to receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude. And if the charges are serious, he shall submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question. Sec 86 of the Revised Administrative Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised by the Department Head over the administration of . . . municipalities . . . If it be construed that it does and such additional power is the same authority as that vested in the Department Head by sec 79 (c) of the RAC, then such additional power must be deemed to have been abrogated by sec10(1), Article 7, of the Constitution. Villena vs Secretary of the Interior On November 4, 2011 Political Law Control Power Supervision Suspension of a Local Government Official Villena was the then mayor of Makati. After investigation, the Secretary of Interior recommended the suspension of Villena with the Office of the president who approved the same. The Secretary then suspended Villena. Villena averred claiming that the Secretary has no jurisdiction over the matter. The power or jurisdiction is lodged in the local government [the governor] pursuant to sec 2188 of the Administrative Code. Further, even if the respondent Secretary of the Interior has power of supervision over local governments, that power, according to the constitution, must be exercised in accordance with the provisions of law and the provisions of law governing trials of charges against elective municipal officials are those contained in sec 2188

of the Administrative Code as amended. In other words, the Secretary of the Interior must exercise his supervision over local governments, if he has that power under existing law, in accordance with sec 2188 of the Administrative Code, as amended, as the latter provisions govern the procedure to be followed in suspending and punishing elective local officials while sec 79 (C) of the Administrative Code is the genera law which must yield to the special law. ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Interior can suspend an LGU official under investigation. HELD: There is no clear and express grant of power to the secretary to suspend a mayor of a municipality who is under investigation. On the contrary, the power appears lodged in the provincial governor by sec 2188 of the Administrative Code which provides that The provincial governor shall receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude. The fact, however, that the power of suspension is expressly granted by sec 2188 of the Administrative Code to the provincial governor does not mean that the grant is necessarily exclusive and precludes the Secretary of the Interior from exercising a similar power. For instance, counsel for the petitioner admitted in the oral argument that the President of the Philippines may himself suspend the petitioner from office in virtue of his greater power of removal (sec. 2191, as amended, Administrative Code) to be exercised conformably to law. Indeed, if the President could, in the manner prescribed by law, remove a municipal official; it would be a legal incongruity if he were to be devoid of the lesser power of suspension. And the incongruity would be more patent if, possessed of the power both to suspend and to remove a provincial official (sec. 2078, Administrative Code), the President were to be without the power to suspend a municipal official. The power to suspend a municipal official is not exclusive. Preventive suspension may be issued to give way for an impartial investigation. Lacson-Magallanes Co. vs Pao & Executive Secretary Pajo On November 3, 2011 Political Law Delegation of Control Power to the Executive Secretary Magallanes was permitted to use and occupy a land used for pasture in Davao. The said land was a forest zone which was later declared as an agricultural zone. Magallanes then ceded his rights to LMC of which he is a coowner. Pao was a farmer who asserted his claim over the same piece of land. The Director of Lands denied Paos request. The Secretary of Agriculture likewise denied his petition hence it was elevated to the Office of the President. Exec Sec Pajo ruled in favor of Pao. LMC averred that the earlier decision of the Secretary is already conclusive hence beyond appeal. He also averred that the decision of the Executive Secretary is an undue delegation of power. The Constitution, LMC asserts, does not contain any provision whereby the presidential power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary. It is argued that it is the constitutional duty of the President to act personally upon the matter.

ISSUE: Whether or not the power of control may be delegated to the Exec Sec and may it be further delegated by the Exec Sec. HELD: The Presidents duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. executive departments. So, too, is his control of all

Thus it is, that department heads are men of his confidence. His is the power to

appoint them; his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure. Naturally, he controls and directs their acts. Implicit then is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his department secretaries. In this context, it may not be said that the President cannot rule on the correctness of a decision of a department secretary. Parenthetically, it may be stated that the right to appeal to the President reposes upon the Presidents power of control over the executive departments. And control simply means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. It is correct to say that constitutional powers there are which the President must exercise in person. Not as correct, however, is it to say that the Chief Executive may not delegate to his Executive Secretary acts which the Constitution does not command that he perform in person. Reason is not wanting for this view. The

President is not expected to perform in person all the multifarious executive and administrative functions. The office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President. The rule which has thus gained recognition is that under our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue. DADOLE, ET AL. V COA GR No 125350 3 December 2002 Petitioners RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City Respondent Commission on Audit FACTS The local government of Mandaue City gave P1,500 allowance for RTC and MTC judges The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued Local Budget Circular 55 (LBC 55), which capped the allowances given to government officials at a maximum of P1,000 only The City Auditor ordered the judges to return the amount received in excess of P1,000, and the Commission on Audit (COA) upheld this decision in a motion for reconsideration The COA also said that Mandaue Citys issuing of allowances violated the appropriation laws of Congress, because there is no provision that allows them to get allowance money from the IRA (Internal Revenue Allocation). ISSUES W/N LBC 55 was void for exceeding the supervisory powers of the president.

W/N the allowances given by the Mandaue City local government violated the appropriation laws of Congress. HELD The SC decided in favor of the petitioner judges. LBC 55 was VOID. LBC exceeded the supervisory powers of the President Supervisory powers the executive cant interfere with local government autonomy unless there has been a violation of law (can only make sure that laws by the legislative are implemented) The Presidents power of control only applies to executive departments LBC 55 was clear interference because the law it was supposedly based on (RA 7160) did not authorize the setting of a ceiling in allowances. It only said as long as finances permit. LBC 55 was also void for not being published.Only internal and interpretative regulations are exempt from publication. The DBM cant claim that the Mandaue appropriations violated the general appropriations act because the DBM failed to: Conduct a formal review of the appropriations Order a disapproval of the appropriation within 90 days of receipt of the appropriation ordinance. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. MiltonSpringer Executive Power

Act 2705 created the National Coal Company. It was amended by Act 2822 which provided that the officers of NCC may be voted upon by a select committee comprising of the senate president, house speaker and the governor general [as ex officio officers]. The GG excepted and he issued EO 37 which declared the amendments introduced by Act 2822 as null and void. The GG then ordered that he have the sole power to appoint pursuant to his appointing power as provided in the Administrative Code. The voting committee however ignored the EO and proceeded to the election w/o the GG and they elected Springer et al as officers of the NCC. The government then filed suit. ISSUE: Whether or not the amendments introduced by Act 2822 is constitutional. HELD: Section 22 of the Organic Act, "That all executive functions of the government must be directly under the Governor-General or within one of the executive departments under the supervision and control of the Governor-General." The Philippine Legislature, as we have seen is authorized to create corporations and offices. The Legislature has lawfully provided for the creation of NCC, but has unlawfully provided for two of its members to sit in the committee for the same is considered as a public office. Hence, section 4 of Act No. 2705, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2822, as purports to vest the voting power of the government-owned stock in the National Coal Company in the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, is unconstitutional and void.

DISSENTING OPINION: (Avancea CJ, Villamor & Villareal JJ) The only prohibition to the appointment of members of the Philippine Legislature to executive public offices is that contained in section 18 of the Jones Law, which says that "No Senator or Representative shall, during the time for which he may have been elected, be eligible to any office the election to which is vested in the Legislature, nor shall be appointed to any office of trust or profit which shall have been created or the emoluments of which shall have been increased during such term." The present Speaker of the House of Representatives is clearly not within said prohibition, as Act No. 2705 creating said committee was enacted in 1917, before his term of office began in 1922; so the now President of the Senate, for which the said Act was passed during his term of office, that term had already expired in 1922, and he is not serving another term (1922-1928). Therefore, the Philippine Legislature may not only create the voting committee but designate the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives as ex-officio members of said committee, always granting, for the sake of argument, that membership therein is a public office. The minority averred that: 1. That the National Coal Company is not an agency or instrumentality of the Government of the Philippine Islands.

2. That the Government of the Philippine Islands, as mere corporator, if it had to vote its own stock would have to do so in the capacity of a private citizen, and not in its sovereign capacity. 3. That the voting committee in exercising the power delegated to it does so in the same capacity as its principal. 4. That the voting of the stock of the Government is a private act, and the committee in doing so performs a private function, and therefore membership therein is a private and not a public office. 5. That membership in the voting committee being a private position and not a public office, the designation by the Philippine Legislature of the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives as exofficio members thereof was not an encroachment upon the power of supervision and control over all executive functions of the Government vested in the Governor-General. 6. That even granting that membership in said committee is a public office, still the Philippine Legislature has the power to designate the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives as ex-officio members of said committee, by virtue of the residuum of power placed in its hands by the Congress of the United States. 7. That whether we consider the delegation of the voting power as for public or private purposes, the GovernorGeneral alone cannot exercise that power as it requires discretion and judgment, and at least a majority must concur.

8. That, finally, the Congress of the United States by its reserved power and authority to annul any law of the Philippine Legislature, has by its silence impliedly ratified Act No. 2705, as amended by Act No. 2822. NOTE: The Administrative Code provides the following: "In addition to his general supervisory authority, the Governor-General shall have such specific powers and duties as are expressly conferred or imposed on him by law and also, in particular, the powers and duties set forth," including th special powers and duties "(a) To nominate and appoint officials, conformably to law, to positions in the service of the Government of the Philippine Islands. (b) To remove officials from office conformably to law and to declare vacant the offices held by such removed officials. For disloyalty to the Government of the United States, the Governor-General may at any time remove a person from any position of trust or authority under the Government of the Philippine Islands." (Sec. 64 [a], [b].) The Administrative Code lists the officers appointable by the Governor-General. (Sec. 66.) Sarmiento v. Mison

Facts:

Petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the IBP and professors of Constitutional Law, seek

to enjoin Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of Misons salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Misons appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain the constitutionality of Misons appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.

The Supreme Court held that the President has the authority to appoint Mison as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs without submitting his nomination to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation, and thus, the latter is entitled the full authority and functions of the office and receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto. Thus, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and the petition in intervention, without costs. Issue: Whether the appointments of Mison et. al. in unconstitutional? Held: No. Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution empowers the President to appoint 4 groups of

officers: (1) the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; (2) all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; (3) those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and (4) officers lower in rank 4 whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. The first group is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints. The second and third groups of officers can be made by the President without the consent (confirmation) of the

Commission on Appointments, as can be determined through the recorded proceedings of Constitutional Commission. It is an accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated. In the case at bar, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. A constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed and adopted in the light and understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference to them. Courts are bound to presume that the people adopting a constitution are familiar with the previous and existing laws upon the subjects to which its provisions relate, and upon which they express their judgment and opinion in its adoption. In the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments required the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. Under the 1935 Constitution, the commission was frequently transformed into a venue of horse-trading and similar malpractices. On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution, consistent with the authoritarian pattern in which it was molded and remolded by successive amendments, placed the absolute power of appointment in the President with hardly any check on the part of the legislature. Given the above two in extremes, one, in the 1935 Constitution and the other, in the 1973 Constitution, it is not difficult for the Court to state that the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, struck a middle ground by requiring the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments for the first group of appointments and leaving to the President, without such confirmation, the appointment of other officers, i.e., those in the second and third groups as well as those in the fourth group, i.e., officers of lower rank. The proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional Commission support this conclusion. The word also could mean in addition; as well; besides, too besides in like manner which meanings could stress that the word also in said second sentence means that the President, in addition to nominating and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appointing the officers enumerated in the first sentence, can appoint (without such consent or confirmation) the officers mentioned in the second sentence, contrary to the interpretation that the President shall appoint the officers mentioned in said second sentence in the same manner as he appoints officers mentioned in the first sentence. Rather than limit the area of consideration to the possible meanings of the word also as used in the context of said second sentence, the Court has chosen to derive significance from the fact that the first sentence speaks of nomination by the President and appointment by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, whereas, the second sentence speaks only of appointment by the President. And, this use of different language in 2 sentences proximate to each other underscores a difference in message conveyed and perceptions established. Thus, words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition. The power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character. Limitations on or qualifications of such power should be strictly construed. Such limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. In the case at bar, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII clearly stated that appointments by the President to the positions therein enumerated require the consent of the Commission on Appointments. After a careful study of the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the Court found the use of the word alone after the

word President in said third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII is, more than anything else, a slip or lapsus in draftmanship. In the 1987 Constitution, the clear and expressed intent of its framers was to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence. Consequently, there was no reason to use in the third sentence the word alone after the word President in providing that Congress may by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of departments, because the power to appoint officers whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint is already vested in him, without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, in the second sentence. The word alone in the third sentence, as a literal import from the last part of par. 3, section 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant in the light of the second sentence. This redundancy cannot prevail over the clear and positive intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential appointments, except those mentioned in the first sentence, are not subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. The 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position of heads of bureaus from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (RA 1937, Tarifff and Customs Code of the Philippines, Section 601, as amended by PD34 on 27 October 1972). RA 1937 and PD 34 were approved during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, under which the President may nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of bureaus, like the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, however, RA 1937 and PD 34 have to be read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that, while the appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that devolves on the President, as an appointment he is authorized by law to make, such appointment, however, no longer needs the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Aytona vs Castillo Facts: December 29, 1961, Outgoing President Carlos Garcia appointed petitioner (Dominador Aytona) as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona took the corresponding oath. On the same day, at noon, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office; and on the next day, he issued administrative order no. 2 recalling, withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim appointments made by former President Garcia. There were all in all, 350 midnight or last minute appointments made by the former President Garcia. On January 1, President Macapagal appointed Andres Castillo (respondent herein) as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank.

At first, both exercised the powers of their office; however, later on Castillo was prevented from holding the office in the Central Bank. He, petitioner, instituted a case (quo warranto) against respondent, contending that he was validly appointed, thus the subsequent appointment to Castillo by the new President, should be considered void. Castillo replies that the appointment of Aytona had been revoked by administrative order no. 2. Issue: WoN the 350 midnight appointments of former President Garcia were valid. Held: No it is not. Such appointments must be decline. Ratio: After the proclamation of then Pres. Macapagal, precedent President Garcia administration was no more than a care-taker administration. He was duty bound to prepare for the orderly transfer of authority to the incoming President, and he should not do acts which ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his successor. An ad interim appointment is exercised by the president as hes special prerogative and is bound to be prudent to insure approval of his selection either previous consultation with the members of the Commission on Appointments or by thereafter explaining to them the reason such selection. It is expected that the President should exercise double care in extending such appointments. In the case at bar, it is hard to believe that in signing 350 appointments in one night, President Garcia exercised double care; and therefore, such appointments fall beyond the intent and spirit of the constitutional provision granting the Executive authority to issue ad interim appointments. De castro vs JBC FACTS: The movants present their arguments on the main issue at several levels. Some argue that the disputed constitutional provisions Article VII, Section 15 and Article VIII, Section 4(1) are clear and speak for themselves on what the Constitution covers in banning appointments during the election period.23 One even posits that there is no conflict because both provisions can be given effect without one detracting against the full effectiveness of the other,24 although the effect is to deny the sitting President the option to appoint in favor of a deferment for the incoming Presidents action. Still others, repeating their original arguments, appeal to the principles of interpretation and latin maxims to prove their point. Issues: Whether or not Section 15, Article VII of the Phil Consti. does not lead to an interpretation that exempts judicial appointments from the express ban on midnight appointments RULING:

The court denies the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit, for all the matters being thereby raised and argued, not being new, have all been resolved by the decision of March 17, 2010. Nonetheless, the Court opts to dwell on some matters only for the purpose of clarification and emphasis. Most of the movants contend that the principle of stare decisis is controlling, and accordingly insist that the Court has erred in disobeying or abandoning Valenzuela ruling, It has been insinuated as part of the polemics attendant to the controversy we are resolving that because all the Members of the present Court were appointed by the incumbent President, a majority of them are now granting to her the authority to appoint the successor of the retiring Chief Justice Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court. We cannot permit the meaning of the Constitution to be stretched to any unintended point in order to suit the purposes of any quarter Topic: Power of Appointment Matibag v. Benipayo Carpio, J. Facts: Petitioner Angelina Matibag was appointed acting Director IV of the COMELECs EID on February 2, 1999. Her appointment was subsequently renewed in 2000 and 2001 in a temporary capacity. On March 22, 2001, then President, GMA, appointed, ad interim, Alfredo Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman, Resurreccion Borra and Florentino Tuason as COMELEC Commissioners. Their appointments were submitted to the Commission on Appointments (COA) for confirmation but were not acted upon. These ad interim appointments were then renewed without the COAs action on June 1, 2001 and June 8, 2001. In a memorandum dated April 11, 2001, Benipayo issued an order designating Velma Cinco as officer-in-charge of the COMELECs EID and assigning petitioner to the Law Department without any consultation from the then Commissioner-in-Charge of EID. Petitioner now assails the constitutionality the appointments and right to hold office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason as they are violative of constitutional provision prohibiting temporary appointments and reappointments of COMELECs Chairman and members, specifically, Sec. 1(2), Article IX-C Issue:

Was the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Sec. 1(2), Article IX-C? Was the renewal of their ad interim appointments and subsequent assumption of office to the same positions violates the prohibition on reappointment under Sec. 1(2), Article IX-C? Held: No. The Court held that an ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the COA does not alter its permanent character as the second paragraph or Sec. 16, Article VII clearly provided that such appointments shall be effective until disapproval by the COA or the next adjournment of Congress. Thus, an ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next adjournment of Congress without the COA acting on the appointment. The Court also found no merit on the petitioners theory on the very meaning of ad interim defined by Black as for the mean time. The Court held that an ad interim appointment is not descriptive of the nature of the appointment rather it denotes the manner in which the appointment was made, that is, while Congress is in recess. The Court also held that such appointment need not be acted upon by the COA where the very intention of the framers of the Constitution merely reinstated such part of the provision to avoid interruptions in vital government services that would otherwise result from prolonged vacancies in government offices. No. The Court held that the appointments being by-passed by the COA denotes that there is still no final decision made by the COA either to give consent or withhold the appointments. Absent such decision, the President is free to renew the ad interim appointment of a by-passed appointee as recognized by Sec. 17 of the Rules of the COA. Rodolfo Llamas vs Exec Sec Orbos & Mariano Ocampo III On July 12, 2011 Pardon Applicable to Administrative Cases Ocampo III was the governor of Tarlac Province. Llamas together with some other complainants filed an administrative case against Ocampo III for alleged acts constituting graft and corruption. Ocampo III was found guilty. He was suspended for office for 90 days hence his vice governor, Llamas, assumed office. In not less than 30 days however, Ocampo III returned with an AO showing that he was pardoned hence he can resume office without completing the 90 day suspension imposed upon him. ISSUE: Whether or not pardon is applicable to administrative cases. HELD: The SC held that pardon is applicable to Administrative cases. The SC does not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is a considered view that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.

Wilfredo Torres vs Hon. Neptali Gonzales On October 28, 2011 Constitutional Law Pardon Not Subject to Judicial Review/Scrutiny In 1978, Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the president w/ the condition that he shall not violate any penal laws again. In 1982, Torres was charged with multiple crimes of estafa. In 1986, Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of Torres pardon. Hence, the president cancelled the pardon. Torres appealed the issue before the SC averring that the Exec Dept erred in convicting him for violating the conditions of his pardon because the estafa charges against him were not yet final and executory as they were still on appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before Torres can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence. HELD: The SC affirmed the following: 1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny. 2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon. 3. Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because the conditionally pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice. In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the RPC which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon. Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the Presidents executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.

Vera v. People, 7 SCRA 152 (1963)

Fast facts Teofilo Santos (resp) was found guilty of estafa and sentenced to six (6) months of arresto mayor and the accessories provided by law. He was imprisoned from March 14 to August 18, 1932 and paid the corresponding costs of trial. Despite his conviction and imprisonment, Santos continued to be a registered voter in his municipality and was, between 1934 and 1937, the municipal president of that municipality. He applied for pardon in view of a newly promulgated Election Code which disqualifies the respondent from voting for having been declared by final judgment guilty of any crime against property. He was granted pardon on December 24, 1939. Miguel Cristobal (pet) filed an action on November 16, 1940 to exclude the name of Santos from the list of voters in their municipality. Effect of pardon granted to Santos Restored his full civil and political rights, except that with respect to the right to hold public office or employment, he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature and involving no money or property responsibility. Contention c/o Cristobal The pardon extended by the President to Santos did not restore the full enjoyment of respondents political rights because: (a) the pardoning power of the President does not apply to legislative prohibitions; (b) the pardoning power here would amount to an unlawful exercise by the President of a legislative function, and; (c) the respondent having served his sentence and all the accessory penalties imposed by law, there was nothing to pardon. Limitations on pardoning power of the Chief Executive 1. That the power be exercised after conviction 2. That such power does not extend to cases of impeachment Nature and extent of absolute pardon It not only blots out the crime committed, but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. When granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, it removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction.

Held & Ratio Santos cannot be excluded for the list of voters since he has already been granted pardon. While the pardon in the case at bar is conditional in the sense that it limits the positions he may occupy or be eligible for, it is still absolute insofar as it restores the respondent to full civil and political rights. Right of suffrage is expressly restored by the pardon. The pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action Cristobal vs. Labrador, 71 Phil. 34 (1941) Pelobello vs. Palatino, 72 Phil. 441 (1941) In Re Lontok, 43 Phil 293 (1923) Torres v. Gonzales, 152 SCRA 273 (1987)

f. Commander-in Chief The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it. The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in, or directly connected with, invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released. Salvacion Monsanto vs Deputy Exec Sec Fulgencio Factoran On July 12, 2011 Pardon Does not Extinguish Civil Liabilities & It is Prospective Monsanto was the Asst Treasurer of Calbayug City. She was charged for the crime of Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents. She was found guilty and was sentenced to jail. She was however granted pardon by Marcos. She then wrote a letter to the Minister of Finance for her to be reinstated to her former position since it was still vacant. She was also requesting for back pays. The Minister of Finance referred the issue to the Office of the President and Factoran denied Monsantos request averring that Monsanto must first seek appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate her former position. Also, Monsanto avers that by

reason of the pardon, she should no longer be compelled to answer for the civil liabilities brought about by her acts. ISSUE: Whether or not Monsanto should be reinstated to her former post. HELD: A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required. This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits. On the other hand, civil liability arising from crime is governed by the RPC. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioners civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and novation. MARE ! RULING RANI Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 122338 December 29, 1995 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF WILFREDO SUMULONG TORRES, (LYDIA DELA ROSA TORRES, Wife of Wilfredo Sumulong Torres, and daughters RAMONA ELISA R. TORRES and MARIA CECILIA R. TORRES), Petitioners, vs. THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, NEW BILIBID PRISONS, MUNTINLUPA, MM., Respondents. HERMOSISIMA, JR. J.: chanrobles virtual law library We ruled consistently, viz., in Tesoro v. Director of Prisons, 1Sales v. Director of Prisons 2 Espuelas v. Provincial Warden of Bohol 3and Torres v. Gonzales, 4that, where a conditional pardonee has allegedly breached a condition of a pardon, the President who opts to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code need not wait for a judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime or for his conviction therefor by final judgment, in order to effectuate the recommitment of the pardonee to prison. The grant of pardon, the determination of the terms and conditions of the pardon, the determination of the occurrence of the breach thereof, and the proper sanctions for such breach, are purely executive acts and, thus, are not subject to judicial scrutiny. We have so ruled in the past, and we so rule now.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In this original petition for habeas corpus, the wife and children of convicted felon Wilfredo Sumulong Torres pray for his immediate release from prison on the ground that the exercise of the President's prerogative under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code to determine the occurrence, if any, of a breach of a condition of a pardon in violation of pardonee's right to due process and the constitutional presumption of innocence, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Of two counts of estafa Torres was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila some time before 1979. These convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The maximum sentence would expire on November 2, 2000. On April 18, 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to Torres by the President of the Philippines on condition that petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. 5" Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement. 6 On May 21, 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to Torres because Torres had been charged with twenty counts of estafa before, and convicted of sedition by, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On September 8, 1986, the President cancelled the conditional pardon of Torres. On October 10, 1986, then Minister of Justice Neptali A. Gonzales issued "by authority of the President" an Order of Arrest and Recommitment 7 against petitioner. The petitioner was accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence. Torres impugned the validity of the Order of Arrest and Recommitment in the aforecited case of Torres v. Gonzales 8. There we ruled that: Succinctly put, in proceeding against a convict who has been conditional pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code . . . Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President's executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny. 9 chanrobles virtual law library Now, Torres, apparently through his wife and children, seeks anew relief from this court. Unfortunately, there is no adequate basis for us to oblige him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library A conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the sovereign power or the Chief Executive and the convicted criminal to the effect that the former will release the latter subject to the condition that if he does not comply with the terms of the pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence or an additional one. 10 By the pardonee's consent to the terms stipulated in this contract, the pardonee has thereby placed himself under the supervision of the Chief Executive or his delegate who is duty-bound to see to it that the pardonee complies with the terms and conditions of the pardon. Under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, the Chief Executive is authorized to order "the arrest and re-incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions of his pardon, parole, or

suspension of sentence." It is now a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that this exercise of presidential judgment is beyond judicial scrutiny. The determination of the violation of the conditional pardon rests exclusively in the sound judgment of the Chief Executive, and the pardonee, having consented to place his liberty on conditional pardon upon the judgment of the power that has granted it, cannot invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered. 11 It matters not that in the case of Torres, he has allegedly been acquitted in two of the three criminal cases filed against him subsequent to his conditional pardon, and that the third case remains pending for thirteen (13) years in apparent violation of his right to a speedy trial. Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a person's liberty has been judicially adjudged as illegal or unlawful. In the instant petition, the incarceration of Torres remains legal considering that, were it not for the grant of conditional pardon which had been revoked because of a breach thereof, the determination of which is beyond judicial scrutiny, he would have served his final sentence for his first conviction until November 2, 2000.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Ultimately, solely vested in the Chief Executive, who in the first place was the exclusive author of the conditional pardon and of its revocation, is the corrollary prerogative to reinstate the pardon if in his own judgment, the acquittal of the pardonee from the subsequent charges filed against him, warrants the same. Courts have no authority to interefer with the grant by the President of a pardon to a convicted criminal. It has been our fortified ruling that a final judicial pronouncement as to the guilt of a pardonee is not a requirement for the President to determine whether or not there has been a breach of the terms of a conditional pardon. There is likewise nil a basis for the courts to effectuate the reinstatement of a conditional pardon revoked by the President in the exercise of powers undisputedly solely and absolutely lodged in his

office.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library WHEREFORE, the instant petition for habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs. Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur. [G.R. No. 122338. December 29, 1995.] In this original petition for habeas corpus, the wife and children of convicted felon Wilfredo Sumulong Torres pray for his immediate release from prison on the ground that the exercise of the President's prerogative under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code to determine the occurrence, if any, of a breach of a condition of a pardon in violation of pardonee's right to due process and the constitutional presumption of innocence, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Of two counts of estafa Torres was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila some time before 1979. These convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The maximum sentence would expire on November 2, 2000. On April 18, 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to Torres by the President of the Philippines on

condition that petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines." 5 Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement. 6 On May 21, 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to Torres because Torres had been charged with twenty counts of estafa before, and convicted of sedition by, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On September 8, 1986, the President canceled the conditional pardon of Torres. On October 10, 1986, then Secretary of Justice Neptali A. Gonzales issued "by authority of the President" an Order of Arrest and Recommitment against petitioner. The petitioner was accordingly arrested and confined in Muntiniupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence. Torres impugned the validity of the Order of Arrest and Recommitment thru a petition for habeas corpus before the Supreme Court, alleging that the Secretary of Justice and the President gravely abused their discretion in ordering his arrest without due notice and hearing. Question: Is the contention of Wilfredo Sumulong Torres correct? Explain your answer. INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, GEN. PANFILO M. LACSON, GEN. EDGAR B. AGLIPAY, and GEN. ANGELO REYES, respondents. Facts: At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to nullify on constitutional grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines (the Marines) to join the Philippine National Police (the PNP) in visibility patrols around the metropolis. In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings and

carnappings, the President, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (the AFP), the Chief of the PNP and the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government were tasked to execute and implement the said order. In compliance with the

presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000 (the LOI) which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted. Task Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila. Subsequently, the President confirmed his previous directive on the deployment of the Marines in a Memorandum, dated 24 January 2000, addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the PNP Chief. In the Memorandum, the President expressed his desire to improve the peace and order situation in Metro Manila through a more effective crime prevention program including increased police patrols. The President further stated that to heighten police visibility in the metropolis, augmentation from the AFP is necessary. Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of

the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. Finally, the President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The selected areas of deployment under the LOI are: Monumento Circle, North Edsa (SM City), Araneta Shopping Center, Greenhills, SM Megamall, Makati Commercial Center, LRT/MRT Stations and the NAIA and Domestic Airport. On 17 January 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the IBP) filed the instant petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines, null and void and unconstitutional, arguing that: I THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINES IN METRO MANILA IS VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION, IN THAT: A) NO EMERGENCY SITUATION OBTAINS IN METRO MANILA AS WOULD JUSTIFY, EVEN ONLY REMOTELY, THE DEPLOYMENT OF SOLDIERS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT WORK; HENCE, SAID DEPLOYMENT IS IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE II, SECTION 3 OF THE CONSTITUTION; B) SAID DEPLOYMENT CONSTITUTES AN INSIDIOUS INCURSION BY THE MILITARY IN A CIVILIAN FUNCTION OF GOVERNMENT (LAW ENFORCEMENT) IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE XVI, SECTION 5 (4), OF THE CONSTITUTION; C) SAID DEPLOYMENT CREATES A DANGEROUS TENDENCY TO RELY ON THE MILITARY TO PERFORM THE CIVILIAN FUNCTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT. II IN MILITARIZING LAW ENFORCEMENT IN METRO MANILA, THE ADMINISTRATION IS UNWITTINGLY MAKING THE MILITARY MORE POWERFUL THAN WHAT IT SHOULD REALLY BE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION. Asserting itself as the official organization of Filipino lawyers tasked with the bounden duty to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution, the IBP questions the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement. Issue: WON the Integrated Bar of the Philippines has legal standing to petition for the annulment of the LOI and to assail the constitutionality of the declaration of deployment of the Philippine Marines Ruling: NO Rationale: In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is

shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. Based on the standards, the IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case. Its fundamental purpose which, under Section 2, Rule 139A of the Rules of Court, is to elevate the standards of the law profession and to improve the administration of justice is alien to, and cannot be affected by the deployment of the Marines. It should also be noted that the interest of the National President of the IBP who signed the petition, is his alone, absent a formal board resolution authorizing him to file the present action. To be sure, members of the BAR, those in the judiciary included, have varying opinions on the issue. Moreover, the IBP, assuming that it has duly authorized the National President to file the petition, has not shown any specific injury which it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned governmental act. Indeed, none of its members, whom the IBP purportedly represents, has sustained any form of injury as a result of the operation of the joint visibility patrols. Neither is it alleged that any of its members has been arrested or that their civil liberties have been violated by the deployment of the Marines. What the IBP projects as injurious is the supposed militarization of law enforcement which might threaten Philippine democratic institutions and may cause more harm than good in the long run. Not only is the presumed injury not personal in character, it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing. Since petitioner has not successfully established a direct and personal injury as a consequence of the questioned act, it does not possess the personality to assail the validity of the deployment of the Marines. This Court, however, does not categorically rule that the IBP has absolutely no standing to raise constitutional issues now or in the future. The IBP must, by way of allegations and proof, satisfy this Court that it has sufficient stake to obtain judicial resolution of the controversy. (Having stated the foregoing, it must be emphasized that this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is involved. In not a few cases, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure. In this case, a reading of the petition shows that the IBP has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Moreover, because peace and order are under constant threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal controversy raised in the petition almost certainly will not go away. It will stare us in the face again. It, therefore, behooves the Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issue now, rather than later.) LACSON VS. PEREZ [357 SCRA 756; G.R. No. 147780 ;10 May 2001] Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion (Proclamation No. 38) on May 1, 2001 as well as General Order No. 1 ordering the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion in the NCR. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the rebellion were thereafter effected. Petitioner filed for prohibition, injunction, mandamus and habeas corpus with an application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners assail the declaration of Proc. No. 38 and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof. Petitioners furthermore pray that the appropriate court, wherein the information against them were filed, would desist arraignment and trial until this instant petition is resolved. They also contend that they are allegedly faced with impending warrantless arrests and unlawful restraint being that hold departure orders were issued against them.

Issue: Whether or Not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with the warrantless arrests and hold departure orders allegedly effected by the same.

Held: President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on May 6, 2006, accordingly the instant petition has been rendered moot and academic. Respondents have declared that the Justice Department and the police authorities intend to obtain regular warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts committed prior to and until May 1, 2001. Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion in suppressing the rebellion if the circumstances so warrant, thus the warrantless arrests are not based on Proc. No. 38. Petitioners prayer for mandamus and prohibition is improper at this time because an individual warrantlessly arrested has adequate remedies in law: Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, providing for preliminary investigation, Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, providing for the period in which a warrantlessly arrested person must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities, otherwise the officer responsible for such may be penalized for the delay of the same. If the detention should have no legal ground, the arresting officer can be charged with arbitrary detention, not prejudicial to claim of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Petitioners were neither assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders, nor were they expressing any intention to leave the country in the near future. To declare the hold departure orders null and void ab initio must be made in the proper proceedings initiated for that purpose. Petitioners prayer for relief regarding their alleged impending warrantless arrests is premature being that no complaints have been filed against them for any crime, furthermore, the writ of habeas corpus is uncalled for since its purpose is to relieve unlawful restraint which Petitioners are not subjected to.

Petition is dismissed. Respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking earlier adverted to, together

with their agents, representatives, and all persons acting in their behalf, are hereby enjoined from arresting Petitioners without the required judicial warrants for all acts committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacaang. David v Arroyo GR No. 171396, May 3, 2006

Facts: As the nation celebrated EDSAs 20th anniversary, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and thereby commanded the AFP and PNP to immediately carry out necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence. This declaration led to cancellation of all programs and activities related to the EDSA People Power I celebration. Rally permits were revoked and warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities, including the media, were implemented. Assemblies and rallyists were dispersed. Along with the dispersal, petitioner was arrested without warrant. A week after PP 1017, PP1021 was issued lifting the state of emergency. Issue: Whether or not there is an actual controversy or case subject for judicial review. Whether or not there petition is with legal standing particularly on his qualification to sue. Ratio Decidendi: The Solicitor Generals refute that the case has been moot and academic was not upheld by the Court. According to the Supreme Court, courts will decide cases otherwise found moot and academic if: there is grave Constitutional violation, the situations exceptional character and paramount public interest involved, issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and public, and lastly it is capable of repetition yet evading review. Petitioner was found to be of legal standing on the grounds that his personal rights were involved. The petitioner qualifies under the direct injury test. The personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury qualifies him to impugn the validity of the statute. To wit some of these direct injuries he sustained are the illegal arrest and unlawful search he experienced. Given this fact, the court entertained his petition as he has adequately shown that he entitled to judicial protection. However, the court does not liberally declare statutes as invalid although they may be abused and misabused and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application. The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular case. The Court ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees, taking into consideration that legislative power is vested only in congress.

The Court partly grants the petitions. PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it allows the President to call the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence are declared unconstitutional. Such proclamation does not also authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utilities or business affected with public interest without prior legislation. General Order No. 5 is constitutional as it is a standard on how the AFP and PNP would implement PP1017, but portion where acts of terrorism has not been defined and punishable by congress is held unconstitutional. Furthermore, the following acts of the government were held unconstitutional: warrantless arrest of the petitioner, dispersal and warrantless arrests of rallyists in the absence of proof that said petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, or violating BP 800; imposition of media standards and any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as warrantless search of the Tribune Offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other materials. Mare ! dili ni case digest pero basaha lang. AmpatuanVs. Puno, G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011 Was the Presidents exercise of emergency powers pursuant to Proclamation 1946 violative of Section 23, Art.VI of the Constitution? Petitioners contend that the President unlawfully exercised emergency powers when she ordered the deployment of AFP and PNP personnel in the places mentioned in the proclamation. But such deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides: SECTION 23. x xx (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof. The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same. which provides. SECTION 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. x xx While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the Presidents exercise of the above power, it would generally defer to her judgment on the matter. As the Court acknowledged in Integrated Bar of the

Philippines v. Hon. Zamora,it is clearly to the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence. Unless it is shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord respect to the Presidents judgment. Thus, the Court said: If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted without factual basis, then this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of textual standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof.

On the other hand, the President, as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all. x xx. SECTION 24 & 25: REVENUE AND APPROPRIATIONS BILL Bayan v. Zamora (Visiting Forces Agreement) G.R. NO. 138570 (October 10. 2000) November 10, 2010 FACTS : On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a military bases agreement which formalized, among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory by the US military personnel. To further strengthen their defense and security relationship, the Philippines and the US entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951. Under the treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels and aircraft. In 1991, with the expiration of RP-US Military Bases Agreement, the periodic military exercises between the two countries were held in abeyance. However, the defence and security relationship continued pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty. On July 18, 1997 RP and US exchanged notes and discussed, among other things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). Negotiations by both panels on VFA led to a consolitdated draft text and a series of conferences. Eventually, President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA. On October 5, 1998 President Joseph E. Estrada ratified the VFA thru respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs. On October 6, 1998, the President, acting thru Executive Secretary Zamora officially transmitted to the Senate,

the Instrument of Ratification, letter of the President and the VFA for approval. It was approved by the Senate by a 2/3 vote of its members. On June 1, 1999, the VFA officially entered into force after an exchange of notes between Secretary Siazon and US Ambassador Hubbard. The VFA provides for the mechanism for regulating the circumstances and conditions under which US Armed Forces and defense personnel may be present in the Philippines. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition, assailing the constitutionality of the VFA and imputing grave abuse of discretion to respondents in ratifying the agreement. ISSUE : Whether or not the VFA is unconstitutional. RULING : Petition is dismissed. The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of the Senate on treaties or international agreements. Sec. 21 Art. VII, which respondent invokes, reads: No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least 2/3 of all the Members of the Senate. Sec. 25 Art. XVIII provides : After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the RP and the US concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in and when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the Senateby the other contracting state. The first cited provision applies to any form of treaties and international agreements in general with a wide variety of subject matter. All treaties and international agreements entered into by the Philippines, regardless of subject matter, coverage or particular designation requires the concurrence of the Senate to be valid and effective. In contrast, the second cited provision applies to treaties which involve presence of foreign military bases, troops and facilities in the Philippines. Both constitutional provisions share some common ground. The fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under Sec. 21 Art. VII, and that Senate extended its concurrence under the same provision is immaterial. Undoubtedly, Sec. 25 Art. XVIII which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases and troops should apply in the instant case. Hence, for VFA to be constitutional it must sufficiently meet the following requisites : a) it must be under a treaty b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate, and when so required by Congress, ratified by a majority of votes cast by the people in a national referendum c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State There is no dispute in the presence of the first two requisites. The third requisite implies that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. Moreover, it is inconsequential whether

the US treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. They are equally binding obligations upon nations. Therefore, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the constitution. The court also finds that there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the executive department as to their power to ratify the VFA. G.R. No. L-23846 September 9, 1977 GO TEK petitioner-appellee, vs. DEPORTATION BOARD, respondent-appellant. Facts: -the Chief Prosecutor of the Deportation Board filed a complaint against Go Tek, a Chinaman, residing in Ilagan, Isabela and in Sta. Cruz, Manila.

-it was alleged in the complaint that in December 1963, a number of NBI agents searched an office on O' Donnel St. in Sta. Cruz, which was believed to be the headquarters of a guerilla unit of the "Emergency Intelligence Section, Army of the United States" and among those arrested was Go Tek.

- Go Tek was an alleged sector commander and intelligence and record officer of that guerilla unit.

- Also, as further alleged, there were several fake dollars found in his possession and that he had violated Art. 168 of the RPC and rendered himself an undesirable alien.

-The prosecutor prayed that after trial the Board should recommend to the President of the Philippines the immediate deportation of Go Tek as an undesirable alien, and that "his presence in this country having been, and will always be and a menace to the peace , welfare, and security of the community".

-Go Tek filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint was premature because there was a pending case against him in the city fiscal's office of Manila for violation of Article 168.He contended that the board had no jurisdiction to try the case in view of the obiter dictum in Qua Chee Gan that the board may deport aliens only on the grounds specified in the law. -The Board, in its resolution of April 21, 1964 denied Go Tek's motion. The Board reasoned out that a conviction is not a prerequisite before the State my exercise its rights to deport an undesirable alien and that the Board is only a fact finding body whose function is to make a report and recommendation to the President in whom is lodged the exclusive power to deport an alien or a deportation proceeding. -Go Tek filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a prohibition action against the Board.

- CFI ruled in favor of Go Tek, citing the obiter dictum in Qua Chee Gan, stating that mere possession of fake dollars is not a ground for deportation under the Immigration Law; and that under section 37(3) of the law before an alien may be deported for having been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for a term of one year or more for a crime involving moral turpitude a conviction is and that since Go Tek had not been convicted of the offense punished in article 168, the deportation was premature. -The Board appealed to the SC alleging that the decision was contrary to law. -The parties stipulated that the Deportation Board is an agency of the President of the Philippines charged with the investigation of undesirable aliens and to report and recommend proper action on the basis of its findings therein.

Issue: Whether the President has the power to deport undesirable aliens? Ruling: Yes. The President's power to deport aliens and the investigation of aliens subject to deportation are provided for in the following provisions of the Revised Administrative Code: SEC. 69. Deportation of subject of foreign power. A subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippine Islands shall not be deported expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own country by the Governor-General except upon prior investigator, conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which such action is contemplated. In such case the person concerned shall he informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be allowed not less than three days for the preparation of his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses. On the other hand, section 37 of the Immigration Law provides that certain aliens may be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the Commissioner's warrant "after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien." Thirteen classes of aliens who may be deported by the Commissioner are specified in section 37.

So, under existing law; the deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected (1) by order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code and (2) by the Commissioner of Immigration upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners under section 37 of the immigration Law. The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens .That power may be exercised by the Chief Executive "when he deems such action necessary for the peace and domestic tranquility of the nation". According to Justice Johnson, that when the Chief Executive finds that there are aliens whose continued in the

country is injurious to the public interest, he may, even in the absence of express law, deport them. The right of a country to expel or deport aliens because their continued presence is detrimental to public welfare is absolute and unqualified . The Deportation Board is composed of the Undersecretary of Justice as chairman , the solicitor General, and a representative of the Secretary of National Defense (Executive Order No. 455 dated June 25, 1951, 47 O.G. 28M). Section 69 and Executive Order No. 398 provides that, the Deportation Board, do not specify the grounds for deportation. Paragraph (a) of Executive Order No. 398 merely provides that "the Deportation Board, motu proprio or upon complaint of any person is authorized to conduct investigations in the manner prescribed in section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code to determine whether a subject of a foreign power in the Philippines is an undesirable alien or not, and thereafter to recommend to the President of the Philippines the deportation of such alien. As observed by Justice Labrador, there is no legal nor constitutional provision defining the power to deport aliens because the intention of the law is to grant the Chief Executive "full discretion to determine whether an alien's residence in the country is so undesirable as to affect or injure the security welfare or interest of the state. The adjudication of facts upon which deportation is predicated also devolves on the Chief Executive whose decision is final and executory." The reasons may be summed up in a single word: the public interest. Also, It is fundamental that an executive order for deportation is not dependent on a prior judicial conviction in a criminal case.