Dr.

RamManoharLohiya National Law University Lucknow

Project On: Mischief Rule Of Interpretation Of Statutes and Recent Cases

Submitted to Mr. Abhishek Tiwari Assistant Professor Dr. RML NLU, Lucknow

Submitted by Sarvesh Singh Yadav Roll No- 109 9th Semester, Sec.B

Table Of Content Contents: (i) Introduction (ii) Meaning of mischief (iii)Applicability of mischief rule (iv)Limitations of mischief rule (v) Recent cases (vi)Bibliography

(I) Introduction

When the material words are capable of bearing two or more constructions the most firmly established rule for construction of such words of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law) is the rule laid down in Heydons case1which has now attained the status of classic. The rule is also known as purposive construction or mischief rule, enables consideration of four matters in construing an Act : (i) What was the law before the making of the ACT, (ii) What was the mischief or defect for which the law did not provide , (iii) What is the remedy that the Act has provided , and (iv) What is the reason of the remedy. The rule then directs that the courts must adopt that construction which Shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.

(ii) Meaning of mischief

In the above mentioned formulations of the rule, as pointed out by Lord Reid , the word mischief is traditional. He expanded it to include the facts presumed to be known to Parliament when the Bill which came the Act in question was before it and the unsatisfactory state of affairs disclosed by these facts which parliament can properly be supposed to have intended to remedy by the Act. The Supreme Court in Bengal Immunity CO.s case applied the rule in construction of Art. 286 of the Constitution. S.R. Das C.J.I. proceeded to say: It was to cure this mischief of multiple taxation and to preserve the free flow of inter-state trade or commerce in the Union of India regarded as one economic unit without any provincial barrier that the constitution makers adopted Art. 286 in the Constitution.

(1584) 3 Co. Rep. &a ,p. 7b : 76 ER 637

(iii) Applicability of mischief rule

The supreme court in Sodra Devis case expressed the view that the rule in Heydons case is applicable only when the words in question ambiguous and are reasonably capable of more than one meaning. It was pointed out that the rule in Heydons case is applicable only when language is ambiguous and it should be applied only after first finding that the words in the setting are ambiguous.

(iv) Limitations of mischief rule

It has also been said that the application of the rule in Heydons case should not be taken to extremes; that if there were many problems before the enactment of the statute it does not follow that in an effort to solve some of them the Parliament intended to solve all; and that the loyalty to the rule does not require the adoption of a construction which leads manifestly to absurd results.

(v) Recent cases

(a) KoppisettiSubbharaoSubramaniam v. State Of A.P. (Criminal Appeal No. 867 Of 2009)

Supreme court in this case gave wide meaning to the definition of the `dowry' contained in Section 2 of the Dowry Act. It cannot be confined merely to be `demand' of money, property or valuable security' made at or after the performance of marriage. That is why the legislature has in its wisdom while providing for the definition of `dowry' emphasized that any money, property or valuable security given, as a consideration for marriage, `before, at or after' the marriage would be covered by the expression `dowry' and this definition as contained in Section 2 has to be read wherever the expression `dowry' occurs in the Act. Meaning of the

expression `dowry' as commonly used and understood is different than the peculiar definition thereof under the Act. Under Section 4, mere demand of `dowry' is sufficient to bring home the offence to an accused. Thus, any `demand' of money, property or valuable security made from the bride or her parents or other relatives by the bridegroom or his parents or other relatives or vice-versa would fall within the mischief of `dowry' under the Act where such demand is not properly referable to any legally recognized claim and is relatable only to the consideration of marriage. Marriage in this context would include a proposed marriage also more particularly where the non-fulfilment of the demand of dowry leads to the ugly consequence of the marriage not taking place at all. The expression dowry under the Dowry Act has to be interpreted in the sense which the statute wishes to attribute to it. The definition given in the statute is the determinative factor. The Dowry Act is a piece of social legislation which aims to check the growing menace of the social evil of dowry and it makes punishable not only the actual receiving of dowry but also the very demand of dowry made before or at the time or after the marriage where such demand is referable to the consideration of marriage. Dowry as a quid pro quo for marriage is prohibited and not the giving of traditional presents to the bride or the bridegroom by friends and relatives. Thus, voluntary presents given at or before or after the marriage to the bride or the bridegroom, as the case may be, of a traditional nature, which are given not as a consideration for marriage but out of love, affection or regard, would not fall within the mischief of the expression `dowry' made punishable under the Dowry Act. The concept of dowry is intermittently linked with a marriage and the provisions of the Dowry Act apply in relation to marriages. If the legality of the marriage itself is an issue further legalistic problems do arise. If the validity of the marriage itself is under legal scrutiny, the demand of dowry in respect of an invalid marriage would be legally not recognizable. Even then the purpose for which Sections 498A and 304B-IPC and Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 were introduced cannot be lost sight of. Legislations enacted with some policy to curb and alleviate some public evil rampant in society and effectuate a definite public purpose or benefit positively requires to be interpreted with certain element of realism too and not merely pedantically or hyper technically. The obvious objective was to prevent harassment to a woman who enters into a marital relationship with a person and later on, becomes a victim of the greed for money.

(b)MuhammedBasheer, Solo Arts v. The State Of Kerala, AIR HC Ker 456 In this case the learned counsel for the accused contended that the golden rule of literal interpretation and the Mischief Rule in Heydonhave got to be adopted while considering the scope of the amendment to Section 202 Cr.P.C. The legislature knew that under Section 202 Cr.P.C prior to amendment also, enquiry was optional. Conscious of the law that prevailed prior to amendment, the legislature has chosen to introduce the amendment which makes it obligatory to conduct an enquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C when it comes to the class of persons who reside outside the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. The counsel contended that the golden rule of literal interpretation must persuade this Court to accept that the legislature had consciously introduced a mandatory requirement in the case of one class of persons that enquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C must be invariably conducted. Counsel argued quoting the celebrated decision in Taylor v. Taylor that when the statute mandates a particular act to be performed in a particular manner, courts cannot by interpretation render such stipulation optional. It must be held that a mandatory section 202 Cr.P.C enquiry must be conducted and that having not been conducted, cognizance taken is unjustified and deserves to be quashed. The amendment of the law was intended to prevent a mischief and that mischief is of Magistrates issuing process against persons residing outside the jurisdiction without due and sufficient application of mind. It is that mischief which was sought to be curbed. An alert appreciation of the mischief which was sought to be prevented must be made by the court while interpreting the portion introduced by amendment. The mischief rule need not always be expansive and in an appropriate case it can also be restrictive. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes . "Consideration of the mischief aimed at may also lead to a restricted interpretation of a statute. Conscious of the mischief, which is sought to be prevented when the amended statute is interpreted, it cannot lead to a ritualistic requirement of the court proceeding further even after it is convinced firmly on the materials available after enquiry under Section 200 Cr.P.C that there is or there is no sufficient ground to proceed with the complaint. An interpretation, unnecessarily expansive and obliging the courts to follow ritualistic continuation of the proceedings should not be accepted.

(c) YashAhuja&Ors.Vs. Medical Council of India &Ors. The Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 was amended by the Indian Medical Council (Amendment) Act, 2001 and new Section 13(4A) was inserted, which requires that a person who is citizen of India and obtains medical qualification granted by any medical institution in any country outside India recognized for enrolment as medical practitioner in that country after such date as may be specified by the Central Government under sub- Section (3) shall not be entitled to enrolled on any medical register maintained by a State Medical Council or to have his name entered in the Indian Medical Register, unless he qualifies the screening test in India prescribed for such purpose and such foreign medical qualification after such person qualifies the said screening test shall be deemed to be the recognized medical qualification for the purpose of this Act for that person. Section 12 of the Act deals with recognition of medical qualifications granted by medical institutions in countries with which there is a scheme of reciprocity. Court held that even if the material words of Section 13(4A) are capable of bearing two constructions, the most firmly established rule for construction of such words is the rule of purposive construction or mischief rule. Applying this principle of construction to subSection (4A) of Section 13 of the Act, Court found that the law before the enactment of the said sub-Section was that medical qualifications granted by medical institutions in countries with which there was a scheme of reciprocity included in the Second Schedule, were recognized qualifications for the purposes of the Act. This law continues to be in force even after the enactment of sub-Section (4A). However, over a period of time, it had come to the notice of the Legislature that a large number of private agencies sponsored students for medical studies in institutions outside India for commercial consideration. It was noticed that such students also included those students, who did not fulfil the minimum eligibility requirements for admission to medical courses in India. Serious aberrations were noticed in the standard of medical education in some of the foreign countries, which were not on par with the standards of medical education available in India. These were the defects and/or mischiefs noticed for which no provision was made either in Section 12 or sub-Sections (3) and (4) of Section 13 of the Act.

In the year 1956, when the Indian Medical Council Act was enacted, it must not have been contemplated by any one that a large number of private agencies would sponsor students for medical studies in institutions outside India for commercial considerations including those students who were not fulfilling the minimum eligibility requirements for admission to medical courses in India, etc. It was, therefore, felt necessary by Parliament to make a provision to enable the Council to conduct a screening test. This is the remedy that sub-Section (4A) has provided. This remedy is prescribed to satisfy the MCI with regard to the adequacy of knowledge and skills acquired by citizens of India, who obtain medical qualifications from Universities or medical institutions outside India and to ensure that those students have secured the standards of medical education in the foreign countries, which are at par with standards of medical education in India. The remedies mentioned in Sections 13(4A) and 13(4B) are prescribed because citizens of India, who have obtained medical qualifications from Universities or medical institutions outside India, would be entitled to practice medicine in India and they cannot be permitted to treat other citizens of India with their half-baked knowledge and jeopardize their precious lives. Thus by adopting rule of purposive construction or mischief rule, it will have to be held that the provisions of subSection (4A) of Section 13 of the Act would also apply to the cases covered by Section 12 of the Act.

(d) VarshaKapoor v. UOI &Ors.(Crim Law Journal P.240 2010)

Since invoking criminal machinery under Section 498A IPC has serious ramifications, need was felt to have civil law on domestic violence inasmuch as there was no law enabling the Court to give protection order to give monetary relief in case women go to Court complaining violence. In order to provide such remedies, Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 was enacted. It is in this backdrop, we should appreciate that married women (i.e. wives) are given rights to agitate their grievances against wide spectrum of respondents under proviso to Section 2(q) of the DV Act, with attempt to put an end to domestic violence and at the same time saving matrimonial home, which was not possible under the remedies provided in criminal law and there was no such provision under the existing Family Laws. When this was the lacuna in law sought to be plugged by passing the DV Act and the purpose was to remove the said mischief. Court held that leaving family relatives of a husband or a male partner out of purview can negate the purpose for which the DV Act is passed. Therefore, even the mischief rule of interpretation, commonly known as Heydons Rule squarely becomes applicable, which persuades us to provide that construction to the provision which shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.

Bibliography Books:
(i) Principles of statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh (ii) Interpretation of Statutes by D.N. Mathur (iii) Introduction to the Interpretation of Statutes by Dr. Avatar Singh (iv) Interpretation of Statutes by Vepa J. Sarathi (v) All India Reporter

Websites:
http://www.itatonline.org/interpretation/interpretation9.php http://www.scribd.com/doc/7118910/Interpretation-of-Statutes