Topic; Subtopic : Judicial Power; Requisites of Judicial Inquiry (Necessity of Deciding Constitutional Question) 159.

General v Urro Date: March 29, 2011 Ponente: Brion, J. Facts: PGMA appointed Alejandro S. Urro (Urro) in place of the petitioner, Constancia P. de Guzman in place of Celia Leones, and Escueta as permanent NAPOLCOM Commissioners. Urros appointment paper is dated March 5, 2010; while the appointment papers of De Guzman and Escueta are both dated March 8, 2010. On July 30, 2010, the newly elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, Benigno S. Aquino III, issued Executive Order No. 2 (E.O. No. 2) "Recalling, Withdrawing, and Revoking Appointments Issued by the Previous Administration in Violation of the Constitutional Ban on Midnight Appointments." The petitioner assails the validity of the appointments of respondents, claiming that they were made in violation of the constitutional ban on appointments. Issue: W/N the issue of constitutionality of the respondents appointments falls can be subject to judicial review? Held: No. Ratio: When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) the existence of personal and substantial interest on the part of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) recourse to judicial review is made at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case. In the present case, the constitutionality of the respondents appointments is not the lis mota of the case. The petitioner must first clearly establish his own right to the disputed office as a condition precedent to the consideration of the unconstitutionality of the respondents appointments. The petitioners failure in this regard renders a ruling on the constitutional issues raised completely unnecessary.

Topic; Subtopic: Judicial Department; Consultations of the Court 180. Manotok v Barque Date: February 13, 2009 Ponente: Tinga, J. Facts: Respondents convey therein that the Courts Resolution dated 18 December 2008 did not obtain the requisite number of votes for its adoption, citing in particular the Separate Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Carpio, which was joined by Associate Justice Carpio Morales, and the Separate Opinion filed by Associate Justice Corona. It would be recalled that the Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Tinga, who was joined without qualification by four (4) other Justices.

Issue: W/N the Resolution dated 18 December 2008 was adopted by a majority of the members of the Court en banc? Held: Yes. Ratio: The Court through this Resolution attests that 8 Justices have affirmed their vote in favor of the relief extended in the Resolution dated December 18, 2008. Associate Justice Carpios opinion is labeled "Separate Concurring Opinion." A "concurring opinion" has been defined as "a separate opinion delivered by one or more judges which agrees with the decision of the majority of the court but offering its own reason for reaching that decision." Indeed, the tenor of Associate Justice Carpios opinion, as well as that of Associate Justice Corona, reflects their agreement with the action taken by the Court. In addition, it can be gleaned from the Resolution that Associate Justice Carpio Morales signed the same with the statement: "I also concur with J. Carpios Separate Opinion." It is evident that by the use of "also," Associate Justice Carpio Morales manifested that she had concurred in the Resolution penned by Justice Tinga and joined the other members of the Court who were of the same persuasion as regards the Resolution.

Topic; Subtopic: Rights; Labor 260. The University of the Immaculate Conception v NLRC Date: January 26, 2011 Ponente: Carpio, J.

Facts: Axalan is a regular faculty member in the university and the president of the employees union. On two occasions, Axalan attended seminars on website development and paralegal training. Axalan then received a memo from Dean Celestial asking her to explain in writing why she should not be dismissed for having been absent without official leave. Convinced that she could not be deemed absent since she held online classes during those two instances, Axalan opted not to write the letter of admission and contrition the university president requested. The ad hoc grievance committee found Axalan to have incurred AWOL on both instances and recommended that Axalan be suspended without pay for six months on each AWOL charge. The university president approved the committees recommendation. The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision holding that the suspension of Axalan amounted to constructive dismissal entitling her to reinstatement and payment of backwages, salary differentials, damages, and attorneys fees. Issue: W/N Axalan was constructively dismissed? Held: No.

Ratio: Constructive dismissal occurs when there is cessation of work because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely as when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay or when a clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee leaving the latter with no other option but to quit. In this case however, there was no cessation of employment relations between the parties. It is unrefuted that Axalan promptly resumed teaching at the university right after the expiration of the suspension period. In other words, Axalan never quit. Hence, Axalan cannot claim that she was left with no choice but to quit, a crucial element in a finding of constructive dismissal. Thus, Axalan cannot be deemed to have been constructively dismissed.

Topic; Subtopic: Eminent Domain; Private Property 302. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Livioco Date: September 22, 2010 Ponente: Del Castillo, J.

Facts: Livioco was the owner of 30.6329 hectares of sugarland in Pampanga. Livioco offered his sugarland to DAR for acquisition under the CARP at P30.00 per sqm. The DAR referred Livioco's offer to the LBP for valuation. The LBP set the price at P3.21 per sqm for 26 hectares. Livioco was then promptly informed of the valuation however, Livioco did not act upon the notice given to him by both government agencies, so LBP issued a certification to the Register of Deeds of Pampanga that it has earmarked the amount of P827,943.48 as compensation for Livioco's 26 hectares. The DAR proceeded to take possession of Livioco's property. In 1994, the DAR awarded Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) covering Livioco's property to 26 qualified farmer-beneficiaries. Livioco filed separate complaints to cancel the CLOAs and to recover his property but the same proved futile. Upon the request of DAR, LBP made two amendments to the valuation. They reduced the acquired area to 24.2088 hectares. The remaining 6.4241 hectares of the property was determined as not compensable because this comprised a residential area, a creek, road, and a chapel. The total value for 24.2088 hectares was P770,904.54. Livioco was informed that the payment was already deposited in cash and agrarian reform bonds and may be withdrawn upon submission of the documentary requirements. Unable to recover his property but unwilling to accept what he believes was an outrageously low valuation of his property, Livioco finally filed a petition for judicial determination of just compensation against DAR, LBP, and the CLOA holders. He maintained that between 1990 and 2000, the area where his property is located has become predominantly residential hence he should be paid his property's value as such.

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Livioco with a determination that the just compensation of Livioco's property, consisting of 24.2088 hectares is worth Php700.00 per square meter. CA affirmed. Issue: W/N the compensation for respondent's property determined in accordance with law? Held: No. Ratio: For purposes of just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at the time of taking. In expropriation cases (including cases involving lands for agrarian reform), the property's character refers to its actual use at the time of taking, not its potential uses. Respondent himself admitted that his property was agricultural at the time he offered it for sale to DAR in 1988. Moreover, it has been conclusively decided by final judgment in the earlier cases filed by respondent that his property was validly acquired under RA 6657 and validly distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries. Since the coverage of RA 6657 only extends to agricultural lands, respondent's property should be conclusively treated as an agricultural land and valued as such. The lower courts erred in ruling that the character or use of the property has changed from agricultural to residential, because there is no allegation or proof that the property was approved for conversion to other uses by DAR. It is the DAR that is mandated by law to evaluate and to approve land use conversions so as to prevent fraudulent evasions from agrarian reform coverage. Even reclassification and plans for expropriation by local government units (LGUs) will not ipso facto convert an agricultural property to residential, industrial or commercial. Thus, in the absence of any DAR approval for the conversion of respondent's property or an actual expropriation by an LGU, it cannot be said that the character or use of said property changed from agricultural to residential. Respondent's property remains agricultural and should be valued as such. Hence, the CA and the trial court had no legal basis for considering the subject property's value as residential.