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Specified Contractors & Development v.

Pobocan
Syllabus Topic: Incapable/Capable of Pecuniary Estimation
G.R. No. Ponente Date
212472 Tijam, J. January 11, 2018

Petitioners Respondents
Specified Contractors & Development, Inc. Jose Pobocan
Spouses Architect Enrique O. Olonan
Cecilia Olonan

DOCTRINE: While the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of an action,
nevertheless, the party raising such question may be estopped if he has actively taken part in the
very proceedings which he questions and he only objects to the court's jurisdiction because the
judgment or the order subsequently rendered is adverse to him.

I. Facts

Jose Pobocan’s last position was president of Specified Contractors and subsidiary, Starland
Properties, as well as executive assistant in its other subsidiaries and affiliates. Architect Olonan
allegedly agreed to give Pobocan one (1) unit for every building Specified Contractors were able
to construct as part of respondent's compensation package to entice him to stay with the
company. Two (2) of these projects that Specified Contractors and respondent were able to build
were the Xavierville Square Condominium in Quezon City and the Sunrise Holiday Mansion Bldg.
I in Alfonso, Cavite. Pursuant to the alleged oral agreement, Specified Contractors supposedly
ceded, assigned and transferred Unit 708 of Xavierville Square Condominium and Unit 208 of
Sunrise Holiday Mansion Bldg. I (subject units) in favor of respondent.

In a March 14, 2011 letter addressed to petitioner Architect Enrique Olonan as chairman of
Specified Contractors, Pobocan requested the execution of Deeds of Assignment or Deeds of
Sale over the subject units in his favor, along with various other benefits, in view of his impending
retirement on March 19, 2011. When respondent's demand was unheeded, he filed a Complaint
before the RTC of Quezon City praying that petitioners be ordered to execute and deliver the
appropriate deeds of conveyance and to pay moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's
fees. Petitioners interposed a Motion to Dismiss denying the existence of the alleged oral
agreement. They argued that, even assuming arguendo that there was such an oral agreement,
the alleged contract is unenforceable for being in violation of the statute of frauds, nor was there
any written document, note or memorandum showing that the subject units have in fact been
ceded, assigned or transferred to respondent.

The RTC dismissed the respondent's complaint but disagreed with petitioners that the action had
already prescribed under Articles 1144 and 1145 of the New Civil Code, by reasoning that the
complaint is in the nature of a real action which prescribes after 30 years conformably with Article
1141, it nonetheless agreed that the alleged agreement should have been put into writing, and
that such written note, memorandum or agreement should have been attached as actionable

Digest Maker: Michael Angelo L. Memoracion


documents to respondent's complaint. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC's Order, reasoning
that the dismissal of respondent's complaint, anchored on the violation of the statute of frauds, is
unwarranted since the rule applies only to executory and not to completed or partially
consummated contracts.

II. Issue

Whether or not the Valenzuela-RTC erred in ruling that venue was improperly laid.

III. Ratio/Legal Basis

No. The petition has no merit. Rule 4
VENUE OF ACTIONS Section 1. Venue of real actions. -
Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be commenced
and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property
involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.

Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and tried in the municipal trial court of
the municipality or city wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. Section
2. Venue of personal actions. -All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff
or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants
resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the
plaintiff. Section 3. Venue of actions against nonresidents.

If any of the defendants does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the action affects
the personal status of the plaintiff, or any property of said defendant located in the Philippines,
the action may be commenced and tried in the court of the place where the plaintiff resides, or
where the property or any portion thereof is situated or found. Section 4. When Rule not
applicable. - This Rule shall not apply (a) In those cases where a specific rule or law provides
otherwise; or (b) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the action on
the exclusive venue thereof. (Emphases supplied) Based on these provisions, the venue for
personal actions shall - as a general rule - lie with the court which has jurisdiction where the
plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff.

As an exception, parties may, through a written instrument, restrict the filing of said actions in a
certain exclusive venue. In Briones v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained: Written stipulations
as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only in the place agreed
upon, or merely permissive in that the parties may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon
but also in the places fixed by law. As in any other agreement, what is essential is the
ascertainment of the intention of the parties respecting the matter. As regards restrictive
stipulations on venue, jurisprudence instructs that it must be shown that such stipulation is
exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, such as "exclusively," "waiving for this
purpose any other venue," "shall only" preceding the designation of venue, "to the exclusion of
the other courts," or words of similar import, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an
agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.

Digest Maker: Michael Angelo L. Memoracion


It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is
determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective
of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. We therefore find
that respondent correctly designated his . complaint as one for specific performance consistent
with his allegations and prayer therein. Accordingly, respondent's suit is one that is incapable of
pecuniary estimation and indeed cognizable by the RTC of Quezon City where both parties reside.
As stated in Surviving Heirs of Alfredo R. Bautista v. Lindo:

Settled jurisprudence considers some civil actions as incapable of pecuniary estimation, viz:

Actions for specific performance;

While the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of an action, nevertheless, the
party raising such question may be estopped if he has actively taken part in the very proceedings
which he questions and he only objects to the court's jurisdiction because the judgment or the
order subsequently rendered is adverse to him. In this case, petitioners' Motion to Dismiss, Reply
to the opposition on the motion, and Sur-rejoinder only invoked the defenses of statute of frauds
and prescription before the RTC. It was only after the CA reversed the RTC's grant of the motion
to dismiss that petitioners raised for the first time the issue of jurisdiction in their Motion for
Reconsideration. Clearly, petitioners are estopped from raising this issue after actively taking part
in the proceedings before the RTC, obtaining a favorable ruling, and then making an issue of it
only after the CA reversed the RTC's order.

IV. Disposition

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals' November 27,
2013 Decision and April 28, 2014 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 99994 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. We sustain the dismissal of Civil Case No. Q-11-70338, but on the ground that the
action for specific performance had already prescribed.

SO ORDERED.

Digest Maker: Michael Angelo L. Memoracion

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