LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN, versus MARJORIE NAVIDAD, Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD

& PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY FACTS: Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token (representing payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached him. A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who, between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously. The widow of Nicanor, Marjorie Navidad, along with her children, filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of her husband. Trial court ruled in favor Navidads wife and against the defendants Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin . LRTA and Rodolfo Roman were dismissed for lack of merit. CA held LRTA and Roman liable, hence the petition. ISSUE: Whether or not common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or wilful acts of the formers employees? HELD: Contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the latter, entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation. The appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise. The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances. Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage. The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or b) on account of wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common carriers employees through the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and by simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure. In the absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred, which petitioners, according to the appellate court, have failed to show, the presumption would be that it has been at fault, an exception from the general rule that negligence must be proved. The foundation of LRTAs liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage.

A. MAGSAYSAY INC., plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANASTACIO AGAN, defendant-appellant. Facts: The SS "San Antonio", vessel owned unintentionally stranded inside a port and at and operated by plaintiff, left Manila on the mouth of a river during a fine weather. October 6, 1949, bound for Basco, Batanes, vis Aparri, Cagayan, with general cargo For the purposes of this assignment of error belonging to different shippers, among we may well accept the finding below that them the defendant. The vessel reached the stranding of plaintiff's vessel was due to Aparri on the 10th of that month, and after the sudden shifting of the sandbars at the a day's stopover in that port, weighed mouth of the river which the port pilot did anchor to proceed to Basco. But while still in not anticipate. The standing may, therefore, port, it ran aground at the mouth of the be regarded as accidental, and the Cagayan river, and, attempts to refloat it question is whether the expenses incurred in under its own power having failed, plaintiff floating a vessel so stranded should be have it refloated by the Luzon Stevedoring considered general average and shared by Co. at an agreed compensation. Once the cargo owners. afloat the vessel returned to Manila to refuel and then proceeded to Basco, the port of The law on averages is contained in the destination. There the cargoes were Code of Commerce. Under that law, delivered to their respective owners or averages are classified into simple or consignees, who, with the exception of particular and general or gross. Generally defendant, made a deposit or signed a speaking, simple or particular averages bond to answer for their contribution to the include all expenses and damages caused average. to the vessel or cargo which have not inured to the common benefit (Art. 809), On the theory that the expenses incurred in and are, therefore, to be borne only by the floating the vessel constitute general owner of the property gave rise to same average to which both ship and cargo (Art. 810); while general or gross averages should contribute, plaintiff brought the include "all the damages and expenses present action in the CFI of Manila to make which are deliberately caused in order to defendant pay his contribution, which, as save the vessel, its cargo, or both at the determined by the average adjuster. same time, from a real and known risk" (Art. Defendant, in his answer, denies liability to 811). Being for the common benefit, gross his amount, alleging, among other things, averages are to be borne by the owners of that the stranding of the vessel was due to the articles saved (Art. 812). the fault, negligence and lack of skill of its master, that the expenses incurred in putting In classifying averages into simple o it afloat did not constitute general average, particular and general or gross and defining and that the liquidation of the average was each class, the Code (Art. 809 and 811) at not made in accordance with law. After the same time enumerates certain specific trial, the lower court found for plaintiff and cases as coming specially under one or the rendered judgment against the defendant other denomination. Going over the specific for the amount of the claim, with legal cases enumerated we find that, while the interests. From this judgment defendant had expenses incurred in putting plaintiff's vessel appealed directly to SC. afloat may well come under number 2 of article 809-which refers to expenses suffered ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT EXPENSES INCURRED by the vessel "by reason of an accident of IN AFLOATING THE VESSEL CONSIDERED the sea of the force majuere" and should GENERAL AVERAGE THAT SHOULD BE SHARED therefore be classified as particular BY THE CARGO OWNERES . average, the said expenses do not fit into any of the specific cases of general HELD: The trial court erred in allowing the average enumerated in article 811. No. 6 of general average for floating a vessel this article does mention "expenses caused

in order to float a vessel," but it specifically refers to "a vessel intentionally stranded for the purpose of saving it" and would have no application where, as in the present case, the stranding was not intentional. Let us now see whether the expenses here in question could come within the legal concept of the general average. Tolentino, in his commentaries on the Code of Commerce, gives the following requisites for general average: First, there must be a common danger. This means, that both the ship and the cargo, after has been loaded, are subject to the same danger, whether during the voyage, or in the port of loading or unloading; that the danger arises from the accidents of the sea, dispositions of the authority, or faults of men, provided that the circumstances producing the peril should be ascertained and imminent or may rationally be said to be certain and imminent. This last requirement exclude measures undertaken against a distant peril. Second, that for the common safety part of the vessel or of the cargo or both is sacrificed deliberately. Third, that from the expenses or damages caused follows the successful saving of the vessel and cargo. Fourth, that the expenses or damages should have been incurred or inflicted after taking proper legal steps and authority. (Vol. 1, 7th ed., p. 155.) With respect to the first requisite, the evidence does not disclose that the expenses sought to be recovered from defendant were incurred to save vessel and cargo from a common danger. The vessel ran aground in fine weather inside the port at the mouth of a river, a place described as "very shallow". It would thus appear that vessel and cargo were at the time in no imminent danger or a danger which might "rationally be sought to be certain and imminent." It is, of course, conceivable that,

if left indefinitely at the mercy of the elements, they would run the risk of being destroyed. But as stated at the above quotation, "this last requirement excludes measures undertaken against a distant peril." It is the deliverance from an immediate, impending peril, by a common sacrifice, that constitutes the essence of general average. (The Columbian Insurance Company of Alexandria vs. Ashby & Stribling et al., 13 Peters 331; 10 L. Ed., 186). In the present case there is no proof that the vessel had to be put afloat to save it from imminent danger. What does appear from the testimony of plaintiff's manager is that the vessel had to be salvaged in order to enable it "to proceed to its port of destination." But as was said in the case just cited it is the safety of the property, and not of the voyage, which constitutes the true foundation of the general average. As to the second requisite, we need only repeat that the expenses in question were not incurred for the common safety of vessel and cargo, since they, or at least the cargo, were not in imminent peril. The cargo could, without need of expensive salvage operation, have been unloaded by the owners if they had been required to do so. With respect to the third requisite, the salvage operation, it is true, was a success. But as the sacrifice was for the benefit of the vessel to enable it to proceed to destination and not for the purpose of saving the cargo, the cargo owners are not in law bound to contribute to the expenses. The final requisite has not been proved, for it does not appear that the expenses here in question were incurred after following the procedure laid down in article 813 et seq. In conclusion we found that plaintiff not made out a case for general average, with the result that its claim for contribution against the defendant cannot be granted. Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed and plaintiff's complaint ordered dismissed with costs.

ZAMBOANGA TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., and ZAMBOANGA RAPIDS COMPANY, INC. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE MARIO DAGAMANUEL, represented by PASCUALA JULIAN DE PUNZALAN FACTS: In the evening of 13 August 1955, the spouses Ramon and Josefina Dagamanuel boarded a bus at Manicahan, Zamboanga City, to attend a benefit dance at the Bunguiao Elementary School, also in Zamboanga City, where Josefina was a public school teacher. After the dance, the couple boarded the same bus to return to Manicahan. At around 1 a.m. of 14 August 1955, the bus (1955 TPU-1137), and driven by Valeriano Marcos, fell off the road and pinned to death the said spouses and several other passengers. Jose Mario Dagamanuel, the only child of the deceased spouses, through his maternal grandmother as guardian ad-litem, Pascuala Julian de Punzalan, instituted an action against Zamboanga Transportation Co., Inc. (Zamtanco) and the Zamboanga Rapids Co., Inc. (Zambraco) for breach of contract of carriage, alleging that the accident was due to the fault and negligence of the driver in operating the bus and due to the negligence of the companies in their supervision of their driver. the trial court rendered judgment sentencing the three, jointly and severally, to indemnify the private respondents. The CA affirmed the decision of the court a quo. ISSUE: WHETHER BOTH SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE. HELD: While it is true that according to previous decisions of the Supreme Court, transfer of a certificate of public convenience to operate a transportation service is not effective and binding insofar as the responsibility of the grantee under the franchise in its relation to the public is concerned, without the approval of the transfer by the Public Service Commission required by the Public Service Act, and that in contemplation of law, the transferor of such certificate continues to be the operator of the service as long as the transfer is not yet approved, and as such operator, he is the one responsible jointly and severally with his driver for damages incurred by passengers or third persons in consequence of injuries or deaths resulting from the operation of such service, the Court does not find any need for applying these rulings to the present case for the simple reason that in their respective third-party complaints, the companies both admitted separately that they are the owners of the bus involved in the incident in question and that Valeriano Marcos, the driver of said bus at the time of said incident, was in their employ. There is no application of the ruling in the previous cases to the present case. There, the registered owners invariably sought to pass on liability to the actual operators on the pretext that they had already sold or transferred their units to the latter, whereas in the present case, the registered owner, the Zambraco, admits whatever liability it has and vigorously objects to any finding that the actual operator, the Zamtranco, is also liable with it, claiming that as registered owner, it alone should be adjudged liable. We would not inquire into the motive of the Zambraco why instead of sharing whatever liability it has with the Zamtranco, it prefers to shoulder it alone. But the fact stands out in bold relief that although still the registered owner at the time of the accident, it had already sold the vehicle to Zamtranco and the latter was actually operating it. For the better protection of the public that both the owner of record and the actual operator, as held by the Court in the past, should be adjudged jointly and severally liable with the driver.

Art 1755 PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES vs. IAC Facts:Catalina Pascua with several others boarded the jeep owned by spouses Isidro Mangune and Guillerma Carreon and driven by Tranquilino Manalo bound for Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan. Upon reaching Tarlac the right rear wheel of the jeepney was detached, so it was running in an unbalanced position. Manalo stepped on the brake, as a result of which, the jeepney which was then running on the eastern lane (its right of way) made a U-turn, invading and eventually stopping on the western lane and was hit by the petitioner companys bus causing the death of Catalina Pascua and two other passengers. Issue:Wether or not the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance applies in the case at bar? Held:No, The principle about "the last clear" chance, would call for application in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence." It is the rule under the substantial factor test that if the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable. The bus driver's conduct is not a substantial factor in bringing about harm to the passengers of the jeepney. It cannot be said that the bus was travelling at a fast speed when the accident occurred because the speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hour, assuming such calculation to be correct, is yet within the speed limit allowed in highways. The driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier in case of breach of the contract of carriage. The rationale behind this is readily discernible. Firstly, the contract of carriage is between the carrier and the passenger, and in the event of contractual liability, the carrier is exclusively responsible therefore to the passenger, even if such breach be due to the negligence of his driver. In other words, the carrier can neither shift his liability on the contract to his driver nor share it with him, for his driver's negligence is his. Secondly, if We make the driver jointly and severally liable with the carrier, that would make the carrier's liability personal instead of merely vicarious and consequently, entitled to recover only the share which corresponds to the driver, contradictory to the explicit provision of Article 2181 of the New Civil Code.

CASE DIGEST (Transportation Law): Sabena vs. Court of Appeals Sabena Belgian World Airlines vs. CA (GR 104685, 14 March 1996) FACTS: Private respondent MA. PAULA SAN AGUSTIN was a passenger on board Flight SN 284 of defendant airline originating from Casablanca to Brussels, Belgium on her way back to Manila. She checked in her luggage which contained her valuables all amounting to $4,265.00, for which she was issued Tag No. 71423. She stayed overnight in Brussels and her luggage was left on board Flight SN 284. Upon Arrival in Manila, she learned that her luggage was missing and was advised to accomplish and submit a property Irregularity Report which she submitted and filed on the same day. Upon follow up, it remained missing; thus, she filed her formal complaint with the office of Ferge Massed, petitioners Local Manager, demanding immediate attention. Two weeks later she was notified that her luggage was found. But unfortunately plaintiff was informed that the luggage was lost for the second time. She demanded payment but the airline refused to settle the claim. The trial court ruled in favor of Ma. Paula San Agustin. The appellate court affirmed in toto the trial courts judgment. Petitioner airline company, in contending that the alleged negligence of private respondent should be considered the primary cause for the loss of her luggage, avers that, despite her awareness that the flight ticket had been confirmed only for Casablanca and Brussels, and that her flight from Brussels to Manila had yet to be confirmed, she did not retrieve the luggage upon arrival in Brussels. Petitioner insists that private respondent, being a seasoned international traveler, must have likewise been familiar with the standard provisions contained in her flight ticket that items of value are required to be hand-carried by the passenger and that the liability of the airline or loss, delay or damage to baggage would be limited, in any event, to only US$20.00 per kilo unless a higher value is declared in advance and corresponding additional charges are paid thereon. At the Casablanca International Airport, private respondent, in checking in her luggage, evidently did not declare its contents or value. Petitioner cites Section 5(c), Article IX, of the General Conditions of Carriage, signed at Warsaw, Poland, on 02 October 1929, as amended by the Hague Protocol of 1955, generally observed by International carriers, stating, among other things, that: Passengers shall not include in his checked baggage, and the carrier may refuse to carry as checked baggage, fragile or perishable articles, money, jewelry, precious metals, negotiable papers, securities or other valuables. ISSUE: Whether or not the airline is negligent? Whether respondents negligence is the sole and proximate of the loss? HELD: Yes.

Fault or negligence consists in the omission of that diligence which is demanded by the nature of an obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the person, of the time, and of the place. When the source of an obligation is derived from a contract, the mere breach or nonfulfillment of the prestation gives rise to the presumption of fault on the part of the obligor. This rule is not different in the case of common carriers in the carriage of goods which, indeed, are bound to observe not just the due diligence of a good father of a family but that of extraordinary care in the vigilance over the goods. The appellate court has aptly observed: x x x Art. 1733 of the [Civil] Code provides that from the very nature of their business and by reasons of public policy, common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them. This extraordinary responsibility, according to Art. 1736, lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of and received by the carrier until they are delivered actually or constructively to the consignee or person who has the right to receive them. Art. 1737 states that the common carriers duty to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them remains in full force and effect even when they are temporarily unloaded or stored in transit. And Art. 1735 establishes the presumption that if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they had observed extraordinary diligence as required in Article 1733. The above rules remain basically unchanged even when the contract is breached by tort although noncontradictory principles on quasi-delict may then be assimilated as also forming part of the governing law. Petitioner is not thus entirely off track when it has likewise raised in its defense the tort doctrine of proximate cause. Unfortunately for petitioner, however, the doctrine cannot, in this particular instance, support its case. Proximate cause is that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury and without which the result would not have occurred. The above findings, which certainly cannot be said to be without basis, foreclose whatever rights petitioner might have had to the possible limitation of liabilities enjoyed by international air carriers under the Warsaw Convention . The Warsaw Convention however denies to the carrier availment of the provisions which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his wilful misconduct or by such default on his part as, in accordance with the law of the court seized of the case, is considered to be equivalent to wilful misconduct, or if the damage is (similarly) caused x x x by any agent of the carrier acting within the scope of his employment. The Convention does not thus operate as an exclusive enumeration of the instances of an airlines liability, or as an absolute limit of the extent of that liability. ( Loss of baggage twice shows gross negligence)

Coastwise Lighterage Corporation v. CA Facts: Pag-asa Sales Inc. entered into a contract to transport molasses from the province of Negros to Manila with Coastwise Lighterage Corporation (Coastwise for brevity), using the latter's dumb barges. The barges were towed in tandem by the tugboat MT Marica, which is likewise owned by Coastwise. Upon reaching Manila Bay, one of the barges, "Coastwise 9", struck an unknown sunken object. The forward buoyancy compartment was damaged, and water gushed in through a hole "two inches wide and twenty-two inches long". As a consequence, the molasses at the cargo tanks were contaminated. Pag-asa filed a claim against Philippine General Insurance Company, the insurer of its cargo. Philgen paid P700,000 for the value of the molasses lost. Philgen then filed an action against Coastwise to recover the money it paid, claiming to be subrogated to the claims which the consignee may have against the carrier. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled against Coastwise. Issues: (1) Whether Coastwise was transformed into a private carrier by virtue of the contract it entered into with Pag-asa, and whether it exercised the required degree of diligence (2) Whether Philgen was subrogated into the rights of the consignee against the carrier Held: (1) Pag-asa Sales, Inc. only leased three of petitioner's vessels, in order to carry cargo from one point to another, but the possession, command mid navigation of the vessels remained with petitioner Coastwise Lighterage. Coastwise Lighterage, by the contract of affreightment, was not converted into a private carrier, but remained a common carrier and was still liable as such. The law and jurisprudence on common carriers both hold that the mere proof of delivery of goods in good order to a carrier and the subsequent arrival of the same goods at the place of destination in bad order makes for a prima facie case against the carrier. It follows then that the presumption of negligence that attaches to common carriers, once the goods it is sports are lost, destroyed or deteriorated, applies to the petitioner. This presumption, which is overcome only by proof of the exercise of extraordinary diligence, remained unrebutted in this case. Jesus R. Constantino, the patron of the vessel "Coastwise 9" admitted that he was not licensed. Coastwise Lighterage cannot safely claim to have exercised extraordinary diligence, by placing a person whose navigational skills are questionable, at the helm of the vessel which eventually met the fateful accident. It may also logically, follow that a person without license to navigate, lacks not just the skill to do so, but also the utmost familiarity with the usual and safe routes taken by seasoned and legally authorized ones. Had the patron been licensed he could be presumed to have both the skill and the knowledge that would have prevented the vessel's hitting the sunken derelict ship that lay on their way to Pier 18. As a common carrier, petitioner is liable for breach of the contract of carriage, having failed to overcome the presumption of negligence with the loss and destruction of goods it transported, by proof of its exercise of extraordinary diligence. (2) Article 2207 of the Civil Code is founded on the well-settled principle of subrogation. If the insured property is destroyed or damaged through the fault or negligence of a party other than the assured, then the insurer, upon payment to the assured will be subrogated to the rights of the assured to recover from the wrongdoer to the extent that the insurer has been obligated to pay. Payment by the insurer to the assured operated as an equitable assignment to the former of all remedies which the latter may have against the third party whose negligence or wrongful act caused the loss. The right of subrogation is not dependent upon, nor does it grow out of, any private of contract or upon written assignment of, claim. It accrues simply upon payment of the insurance claim by the insurer.