SEC. 48. Certificate Not subject to collateral attack. A Certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack.

. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. 1. Certificate of title cannot be the subject of collateral attack. A certificate of tile, once registered, cannot be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged or diminished except in a direct proceeding permitted by law. The validity of the certificate of tile can be threshed out only in a direct proceeding filed for the purpose. A Torrens title cannot be attacked collaterally. The efficacy and integrity of the Torrens system must be protected.
Moreover, it is a well-known doctrine that the issue as to whether title was procured by falsification or fraud as advanced by petitioner can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for the purpose. Torrens title can be attacked only for fraud, within one year after the date of the issuance of the decree of registration. Such attack must be direct, and not by a collateral proceeding. The title represented by the certificate cannot be changed, altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding. (Lagrosa v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 115981, August 12 1999)

The certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. After the expiration of the one (1) year period from the issuance of the decree of registration upon which it is based, it becomes incontrovertible. A decree of registration and the certificate of tile issued pursuant thereto may be attacked only on the ground of actual fraud within one (1) year from the date of its entry and such attack must be direct and not by a collateral proceeding. The validity of the certificate of title can be threshed out only in an action expressly filed for the purpose. In Catores v. Afidchao (GR No. 151240, March 31, 2009), an action for recovery of property filed by respondent, petitioner alleged that the area which she occupied is not within the titled property of respondent and that respondents title is replete with errors in the technical description of the property. These allegations, according to the Court, constitute a collateral attack against respondents title because petitioner ascribes errors in respondents title that would require a review of the decree of registration which cannot be allowed in an accion puliciana. In Caraan v. Court of Appeals (GR No. 140752, Nov. 11, 2005), petitioners claim that subject property could not have been titled in favor of private respondents because the same had not yet been classified as alienable and disposable was not given consideration because, [t]he issue of the validity of the title of respondents can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. In Salandanan v. Mendez (GR. 160280, March 13, 2009), the Court reiterated that when property is registered under the Torrens system, the registered owners title to the property is

presumed legal and cannot be collaterally attacked, especially in a mere action for unlawful detainer. In Manotok v. Barque (GR No. 162335, Dec. 18, 2008), the Barques wanted the LRA to cancel the Manotok title and forthwith cause the administrative reconstitution of their own title. The LRA refused to do so, although it ruled that the Manotok title was spurious and thus subject to cancellation but through the proper judicial proceeding. Upon review, the Court of Appeals initially upheld LRAs position, by ultimately, upon motion for reconsideration, it directed the cancellation of the Manotok title and the reconstitution of the Barque title. However, the Supreme Court en banc reversed the appellate court, citing Section 48 of PD No. 1529 that [a] certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack [. . . and] cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law, and ruled that the cancellation of the Manotok title cannot arise incidentally from the administrative proceeding for reconstitution of the Barque title even if the evidence from that proceeding revealed the Manotok title as fake. Nor could it have emerged incidentally in the appellate review of the LRAs administrative proceeding. Neither the Court of Appeals nor the LRA had jurisdiction to cancel the Manotok title. The Court further said that such title can only be cancelled by the proper regional trial court in direct proceeding assailing its validity. 2. Distinction between a direct and collateral attack on the title. An action is deemed an attack on a title when the object of the action or proceeding is to nullify the title, and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct when the object of the action is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof. 3. A direct attack on the title may be made in a counter-claim or third-party complaint. Rarely will the court allow another person to attack the validity and indefeasibility of a Torrens certificate, unless there is compelling reason to do so and only upon a direct action filed in court proceeded in accordance with law. In Leyson v. Bontuyan (GR No. 156357, Feb. 18, 2005), plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendant for quieting of title and damages. They alleged that upon their return from the United States, they found that the property was occupied and cultivated by the tenants of defendant who could not produce any document evidencing defendants ownership. In his answer, defendant averred, by way of affirmative defense, that the lots in question were portions of a parcel of land owned by Calixto Gabud which were eventually sold to him through a series of intermediary transfers. He interposed a counterclaim that Gregorio Bontuyan, plaintiffs predecessor, obtained his title to the property through fraud. Defendant prayed that the complaint be dismissed, that he be declared the owner of the property, and that the title of Bontuyan be cancelled. Plaintiffs countered that defendants counterclaim constituted a collateral attack on the title of Bontuyan and the titles emanating therefrom. However, the

Court, through Justice Callejo, rejected plaintiffs contention, and declared that an action is a direct attack on a title if its object is to nullify the same, and thus challenge the proceeding pursuant to which the title was issued. A direct attack on a title may be in an original action or in a counterclaim assailing it as void. A counterclaim is considered a new suit and is to be tested by the same rules as if it were an independent action. In a case for recovery of possession based on ownership (accion reivindicatoria), the Court, through Justice Chico-Nazario, reiterated that if the object of the third-party complaint is to nullify the title of the third-party defendant, the third-party complaint constitutes a direct attack on the title because the same is in the nature of an original complaint for cancellation of title. The situation can be likened to a case for recovery of possession wherein the defendant files a counterclaim against the plaintiff attacking the validity of the latters title. Like a thirdparty complaint, a counterclaim is considered an original complaint, and as such, the attack on the title cannot be considered as a collateral attack. 4. Where to file action. Any direct attack on the validity of a Torrens certificate of title must be instituted with the proper regional trial court. First level courts do not have jurisdiction over the cancellation of a Torrens title. 5. Other illustrative cases of collateral and direct attack on the title. 1. In Magay v. Estiandan (GR. No. L-28975, Feb. 27, 1976), plaintiff bought from her mother-in-law a piece of land on which defendant had constructed two houses. After acquiring the property, plaintiff wrote defendant asking him to vacate the premises, but he refused. Plaintiff sued defendant. Defendant questioned the validity of the title of plaintiffs predecessor for having been allegedly acquired under anomalous circumstances. The lower court found for the plaintiff. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment based on the principle that a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. 2. In Samonte v. Sambilon (GR. No. L-12964, Feb. 29, 1960), it was held that a homestead patent issued under the Public Land Act and registered in conformity with the provisions of Section 122 of Act No. 496 (Sec. 103, PD No. 1529) becomes irrevocable and enjoys the same privileges as a Torrens title under Act No. 496. The decree cannot be collaterally attacked by any person claiming title to, or interest in, the land prior to the registration proceedings. 3. In Castillo v. Escutin (GR No. 171056, March 13, 2009), it was held that petitioners allegations of defects or irregularities in the sale of Lot 1-B to Summit Realty are beyond the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to consider. Summit Realty had already acquired a certificate of title in its name over Lot 1-B, which constitutes a conclusive and indefeasible evidence of its ownership of the said property and, thus, cannot be collaterally attacked in

the administrative and preliminary investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman. 4. In CArvajal v. Court of Appeals (GR No. 98328, Oct. 9, 1997), it was held that an application for registration of an already titled land constitutes a collateral attack on the existing title. The title may be challenged only in a proceeding for that purpose, not in an application for registration of a land already registered in the name of another person. IN view of the nature of a Torrens title, a land registration court has the duty to determine whether the issuance of a new certificate alters a valid and existing certificate of title. 5. In De Guzman v. Agbagala (GR No. 163566, Feb. 19, 2008), petitioners obtained a certificate of title based on a free patent over land that was the subject of a donation to them. Respondent filed suit to nullify the donation as well as the subsequent transfers to other parties on the ground that the deed of donation is spurious. On the argument of petitioners that the action amounts to a collateral attack on their title, the Court held that while the action was principally for the declaration of nullity of the deed of donation and the other deeds of conveyance which followed, an action to declare the nullity of a void title does not prescribe and is susceptible to direct, as well as to collateral attack. 6. In Oo v. Lim (GR No. 154270, March 9, 2010), it was held that there is no collateral attack where respondent asserted that the existing title registered in the name of the petitioners predecessors had become inoperative due to the conveyance in favor of respondents mother, and resultantly should be cancelled.