The next essay is focused on trying to explain what is the Description Theories of Proper Names and what are

the arguments against that theory. Firstly I will explain the Clasical Description Theory of Proper Names to illustrate their problems. For such problems the philopher John Searle offers some solutions inaugurating a new Description Theory of Proper Names called Cluster Theory which fixes the traditional problems of the Clasical theory. Secondly I will highlight the potential objections that Kripke discovered in all descriptive theory. Lastly I will emphasize whether those objections invalidate Searle's theory. First of all I have to say is that all Description theories of Proper Names has something in common. They assert that -against Mill- the proper name has not only reference but also sense, they are not only denotative but also connotative. If the proper name has a sense then the name has content it is not a mere empty tag glued on an object. What is then the sense of the proper name? The sense of a proper name is a definite description. The relation between the proper name and the object to which it is designed is mediated by a sense, that is a definite description. The classical theory1 states that proper names have a sense, a descriptive content which is related to a proper name with a description. In other words, the reference of the proper name is the object which satisfied a single description. The sense of a name allows us to solve some problems: a) Existential statements and b) Identity statements. These problems arise when we guess that the proper name doesnt have a sense. These problems are as follows: a) If the proper name is the meaning of the reference, the existence of an object -e.g. Kafka- is necessary because the proper name needs something to refer to. If Kafka doesnt exist2 the proper name doesnt have anything to refer, the proper name cant be meaningfull without an object to refer. And b) If the meaning of a proper name is the object to which it designs then the identity statements would be trivials e.g. Kafka = Kafka, Kafka = the author of Metamorphosis, Kafka and The author of Metamorphosis referring the same object so a y b The answer of the Clasical theory is: a) There is an object which satisfies the conceptual content asociated with the name. Kafka exists' is true or false according to if there is an object that satisfied the description asociated with the proper name. b) Kafka and The author of Metamorphosis does not have the same meaning but both fullfil an object, both fullfil the description associated with the proper name which designs such object. So Kafka and The author of Metamorphosis can be both informative -connotative. The problem of the clasical theory arises because the referent of a proper name is determinated by a single definite description. The properties of a particular object become necessary. Kafka could not writte the Metamorphosis but if The author of the metamorphosis is the sense of Kafka then to say that Kafka is not The author of the Metamorphosis would be a contradiction. The Cluster Theory proposed by Searle helps to solve theses problems stated above whilst mantaining the solutions of identity statements and existencial statements offered by Classical theory. The Cluster Theory says that the proper name is associated analitically with a descriptive predicate e.g. Coliseum is an amphitheatre The proper name Coliseum and the descriptive predicate ampitheatre are associated. Anything that was not an amphitheatre couldnt be the Coliseum this shows that there is an analitic statement, however the amphitheatre is not a whole description of the Coliseum. The referent of a proper name is not determined by a single description but by some cluster or families descriptions. Such descriptions are considered conjointly and are not
1 Since here Im referring to the Clasical Descriptive Theory of a Proper Names as Clasical theory and Descriptive Theory of a Proper Names of Searle as Cluster theory. 2 In this essay Im going to use the present tense for all the examples.

isolated. Such that if one description is false or unsuccesful it doesnt affect the name as long as there is at least one description that corresponds with that particular object. eg. Kafka is a Czechoslovak, The author of the Metamorphosis, Kafka died yong, Kafka is a representative of existencialism some examples are exclusive of him, others are not, but the set describes him, identifing him. It is a necessary condition that Kafka satifies some descriptions. The fact that the proper name is associated analitically not with a description but with the descriptive disyunction of the descriptions of an object allows that if one of them is false or not applicable to the object for instance if we discoverd that the Metamorphosis was not written by Kafka we would not say that the other properties are not applicables to him. The unique necessary thing is that Kafka satifies sufficient descriptions for being the object. If Kafka had not written the Metamorphosis this would still remain an object to which to refer, namely Kafka, and the statement Kafka died young would still be true, because it fulfills at least one of the descriptions associated to him, but if there arent any characterisctic or all of them are falses then there isnt such an object because nothing is satisfiying any properties. According to Searle there are two thing which support his claim: First, proper nouns are learned and taught by ostention or description, and both methods work by specifiying characterisctics of objects that allows the distinction of a particular object from other objects. Second, anyone who uses a name with the intention to refer, must be able to answer the question of what or who is being spoken. There is a connection between using a name and knowledge of the characteristics that distinguish the referent of the name. The importants of the Cluster Theory is that the proper name has a sense but in a loose way. Searle is not identifying the proper name with the definite description, both have differents functions. The proper name is not the associated description. The proper name is not compromised to establish the properties of a particular object. The set of descriptions associated with a name remains in most cases indefinite, ie we cannot say with certainty what the definite descriptions that would allow determining when an individual is or is not the referent of a proper name. Thus, Searle is not committed to the thesis that the function of proper names is to describe an object. Therefore in Searles words: But the uniqueness and immense pragmatic convenience of proper names in our language lie precisely in the fact that they enable us to, refer publicly to objects without being forced to raise issues and come to agreement on what descriptive characteristics exactly constitute the identity of the object. They function not as descriptions, but as pegs on which to hang descriptions. Thus the looseness of the criteria for proper names is a necessary condition for isolating the referring function from the describing function of language.3 Having suggested the Clasical theory and The Cluster theory I will now consider the objections that Kripke show to the Description Theories of Proper Names in general. Kripke summarizes such theories in six thesis. The thesis roughly say: 1.

3 J.Searle, Proper Names. Mind, New Series, Vol. 67, No. 266 (Apr., 1958), p.172