PROPERTY Recent Jurisprudence September 12-13, 2012 Laurel v Abrogar (2009) Movable Property Article 414 provides that

all things, which are may be the object of appropriation, are considered either real property or personal property. Business is likewise not enumerated as personal property under the Civil Code. Just like interest in business, however, it may be appropriated. Following the ruling in Stochecker v Ramirez, business should also be classified as personal property. Since it is not included in the exclusive enumeration of real properties under Art. 415, it is therefore personal property. Secretary of DENR v Yap Property of Public Domain The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony, a doctrine consistently adopted under the 1936, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain. Republic v Serrano The certification by the DENR Regional Technical Director as annotated on the subdivision plan is considered as in compliance with the legal requirement that the land be declared alienable and disposable. Hence may be acquired by private persons. PEZA v Carantes (2010)by Villarama Ancestral Lands Respondents being holders of a mere CALC (Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim), their right to possess the subject land is limited to occupation in relation to cultivation. Unlike No. 1, 26 Par. 1, Sec. 1, Art. VII of the same DENR DAO, which expressly allows ancestral domain claimants to reside (occupy and cultivate) peacefully within the domain, nothing in Sec. 2 grants ancestral land claimants a similar right, much less the right to build permanent structures on ancestral landsan act of ownership that pertains to one who has a recognized right by virtue of a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title. CALT does not even vest ownership over the land, but a recognition that the land covered is part of the ancestral land. Mactan-Cebu Intl Airport Authority v Heirs of Sero Ownership of Expropriated Property When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former 1

owner. The government has to declare it unnecessary for public service and convert it to patrimonial property. But this does not automatically convert the land to private ownership. Madrid v Mapoy Accion Publiciana Accion publiciana, also known as plenaria de posesion, is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independent of titleit refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the property. New Regent Sources Inc v Tanjuatco Jr (2009) Accession But it must be stressed that accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the NCC requires the concurrence of the following requisites: 1. That the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; 2. That it be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and 3. That the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of rivers Thus, it is not enough to be a riparian owner in order to enjoy the benefits of accretion. One who claims the right of accretion must show by preponderant evidence that he has met all the conditions provided by law. Petitioner has notably failed in this regard as it did not offer any evidence to prove that it has satisfied the foregoing requisites. Sulo sa Nayon Inc v Nayong Filipino Foundation Builder in Good Faith Introduction of valuable improvements on the leased premises does NOT give the lessee the right of retention and reimbursement which rightfully belongs to a builder in good faiththe doctrine is that a lessee is neither a builder in good faith nor in bad faith that would call for the application of Articles 448 and 546 of the NCC since his rights are governed by Article 1678 (law on lease). Briones v Macabagdal (2010) Builder in Good Faith The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle of accession, i.e. that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way around. However, even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. He must choose one. Esmaquel v Coprada (2010) Builder in Good Faith Respondents argument does not hold water. Since respondents occupation of the subject property was by mere tolerance, she has no right to retain its possession under Art. 448 of the NCC. She is aware that her tolerated possession may be terminated any time and she cannot be considered as builder in good faith. It is well settled that both Art. 448 and Art. 546 of the NCC, which allow full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of 2

the premises until reimbursement is made, apply only to a possessor in good faith, i.e one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. Verily, persons whose occupation of a realty is by sheer tolerance of its owners are not possessors in good faith. At the time respondent built the improvements on the premises in 1945, she knew that her possession was by mere permission and tolerance of the petitioners; hence, she cannot be said to be a person who builds on land with the belief that she is the owner thereof. Mores v Yu-Go (2010) Builder in Good Faith The good faith referred to by Alida Mores was about the building of the improvement on the leased subject property. However, tenants like the spouses cannot be said they be builder in GF as they have no pretension to be owners of the property. Indeed, full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made applies only to a possessor in GFone who builds land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. It does not apply where ones only interest is that of a lessee under a rental contract; otherwise, it would always be in the power of the tenant to "improve" his landlord out of his property. The appellate court is correct in ruling that Article 1678 of the Civil Code should apply in the present case. Article 1678 reads: If the lessee makes, in good faith, useful improvements which are suitable to the use for which the lease is intended, without altering the form or substance of the property leased, the lessor upon the termination of the lease shall pay the lessee one-half of the value of the improvements at that time. Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, the lessee may remove the improvements, even though the principal thing may suffer damage thereby. He shall not, however, cause any more impairment upon the property leased than is necessary. With regard to the ornamental expenses, the lessee shall not be entitled to any reimbursement, but he may remove the ornamental objects, provided no damage is caused to the principal thing, and the lessor does not choose to retain them by paying their value at the time the lease is extinguished. City Mayor of Paranaque v Ebio (2010) Accretion It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the alluvial deposits that have gradually settled along the banks of Cut-cut creek. This being the case, the law that governs ownership over the accreted portion is Art. 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, which remains in effect in relation to Art. 457 of the Civil Code. Art. 84 of the Spanish Law of Water of 1866 specifically covers ownership over alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek. It reads: Art. 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks, st reams, river and lakes by accessions or sediments from the water thereof, belong to the owners of such lands.

Interestingly, Art. 457 of the Civil Code states: Art. 457. To the owners of the lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters. It is therefore explicit from these provisions that alluvial deposit is along the banks of a creek do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been added. The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens System; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons. In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by prescription. No matter how long the possession of the properties has been, there can be no prescription against the State regarding property of public domain. Even a city or municipality cannot acquire them by prescription as against the State. Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion, the land which is formed by the gradual and imperceptible accumulation of sediments along its banks does not form part of the public domain by clear provision of law. Cruz v Catapang Co-Ownership A co-owner cannot give valid consent to another to build a house on the co-owned property, which is an act tantamount to devoting the property to his/her exclusive use. Monteroso v CA Co-Ownership The right to seek partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches. The only exception to the imprescriptibility of an action for partition against a co-owner is when a co-owner repudiates the ownership. Heirs of Jose Reyes, Jr. v Reyes (2010) Co-Ownership In order that a co-owners possession may be deemed adverse to that of the cestui que trust or the other co-owners, the following elements must concur: 1. The co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation of the co-ownership amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or the other co-owners; 2. Such positive acts of repudiation must have been made known to the cestui que trust or the other co-owners; 3. The evidence on the repudiation is clear and conclusive; and 4. His possession is open, continuous, exclusive and notorious.

Jarantilla v. Jarantilla (2010) Co-Ownership There is co-ownership when an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. It is a partnership when two or more persons bind themselves to contribute money, property or industry to a common fund, with the intention of dividing the profits among themselves. From the above, it appears that the fact that those who agree to form a co-ownership share or do not share any profits made by the use of the property held in common does not convert their venture into a partnership. Or the sharing of the gross returns does not of itself establish a partnership whether or not the persons sharing therein have a joint or common right or interest in the property. This only means that, aside from the circumstance of profit, the presence of other elements constituting partnership is necessary, such as the clear intent to form a partnership, the existence of a juridical personality different from that of the individual partners, and the freedom the transfer or assign any interest in the property by one with the consent of the others. Lacbayan v Samoy (2011) Co-Ownership The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a coownership does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. x x x The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the partition" directed by the court. In that event[,] partition shall be done for the parties by the [c]ourt with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the [c]ourt after the parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question. x x x Cardinal Building Owners Association v Asset Recovery and Management Corp. Condominium In order to have a notice of assessment to be considered a lien on a condominium unit, the same must be registered in the Registry of Deeds.

Dazon v Yap (2010) Condominium Not having been specifically conferred with the power to hear and decide cases, which are criminal in nature, as well as to impose penalties therefor, we find that the HLURB has no jurisdiction over criminal actions arising from violations of PD957. Limson v Wack Wack Condominium Corp (2011) Condominium As earlier stated, both the law and the Master Deed refer to utility installations as forming part of the common areas, which reference is justified by practical considerations. Repairs to correct and defects in the electrical wiring should be under the control and supervision of respondent to ensure safety and compliance with the Philippine Electrical Code, not to mention security and peace of mind of the unit owners. Chateau de Banie Condominium Corp v Moreno (2011) Condominium The case before the RTC involved an intra-corporate dispute the Moreno spouses were asking for an accounting of the association dues and were questioning the manner the petitioner calculated the dues assessed against them. These issues are alien to the first case that was initiated by Salvacion a third party to the petitioner-Moreno relationship to stop the extrajudicial sale on the basis of the lack of the requirements for a valid foreclosure sale. Although the extrajudicial sale of the Moreno properties to the petitioner has been fully effected and the Salvacion petition has been dismissed with finality, the completion of the sale does not bar the Moreno spouses from questioning the amount of the unpaid dues that gave rise to the foreclosure and to the subsequent sale of their properties. The propriety and legality of the sale of the condominium unit and the parking spaces questioned by Salvacion are different from the propriety and legality of the unpaid assessment dues that the Moreno spouses are questioning in the present case. Fedman Development Corporation v Agcaoili (2011) Condominium Among the obligations of the FDC and FSCC to the unit owners of purchasers of FSBs units was the duty to provide a centralized air-conditioning unit, lighting, electricity, and water; and to maintain adequate fire exit, elevators, and cleanliness in each floor of the common areas of FSB. But FDC and FSCC failed to repair the centralized AC unit of the 4/F of FSB despite repeated demands from Agcaoili. To alleviate the physical discomfort and adverse effects on his work as a practicing attorney brought about by the breakdown of the AC unit, he installed 2 window-type AC units at his own expense. Also, FDC and FSCC failed to provide water supply to the comfort room and the clean the corridors. The fire exit and elevator were also defective. These defects, among other circumstances, rightly compelled Agcaoili to suspend the payment of his monthly amortizations and condominium dues. Instead of addressing his valid complaints, FDC disconnected the electric supply of his Unit 411 and unilaterally increased the interest rate without justification.

Clearly, FDC was liable for damages. Article 1171 of the Civil Code provides that those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof are liable for damages. Alino v. Heirs of Lorenzo Action to Quiet Title If the person claiming to be the owner of the property is in actual possession thereof, the right to seek reconveyance which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe, the reason being that one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right. Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corp v Bonifacio (2011) Action to Quiet Title In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, two requisites must concur: 1. The plaintiff or complainant has a legal right or equitable title or interest in the real property subject of the action; and 2. The deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. Ong v Republic Possession Possession alone is not sufficient to acquire title to alienable lands of the public domain because the law requires possession and occupation. Republic v Enriquez Possession The law speaks of possession and occupation. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. Unless, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Mistica v Republic (2009) Possession Possession alone is not sufficient to acquire title to alienable lands of the public domain because the law requires possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the conjunction "and," the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the allencompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.

Acaylar v Haraya Possession The rule is that possession by tolerance is lawful but such possession becomes unlawful upon demand to vacate made by the owner and the possessor by tolerance refuses to comply with such demand. The absence of demand to vacate precludes the Court from treating this case, originally instituted as one for forcible entry, as one of the unlawful detainer, since demand to vacate is jurisdictional in an action for unlawful detainer. DBP v Prime Neighborhood Association Possession The purchasers right of possession is recognized only as against the judgment debtor and his successor-in-interest but not against persons whose right of possession is adverse to the latter. Where a party in possession was not a party to the foreclosure, and did not acquire his possession from a person who was bound by the decree, but who is a mere stranger and who entered into possession before the suit was begun, the court has no power to deprive him of possession by enforcing the decree. NPC v Tiangco Easement If the easement is intended to perpetually or indefinitely deprive the owner of his proprietary rights through the imposition of conditions that affect the ordinary use, free enjoyment and disposal of the property or through restrictions and limitations that are inconsistent with the exercise of the attributes of ownership or when the introduction of structures or objects which, by their nature, create or increase the probability of injury, death upon or destruction of life and property found on the land is necessary, then the owner should be compensated for the monetary equivalent of the land. NPC v Purefoods (2008) Easement Because of the nature of the easement of right of way of NPCs transmission lines, which will deprive the normal use of the land for an indefinite period, just compensation must be based on the full market value of the affected properties. Granting arguendo that what petitioner acquired over respondent's property was purely an easement of a right of way, still, we cannot sustain its view that it should pay only an easement fee, and not the full value of the property. The acquisition of such an easement falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain. True, an easement of a right of way transmits no rights except the easement itself, and respondent retains full ownership of the property. The acquisition of such easement is, nevertheless, not gratis. As correctly observed by the CA, considering the nature and the effect of the installation power lines, the limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite period would deprive respondent of normal use of the property. For this reason, the latter is entitled to payment of a just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land. 8

NPC v BongBong (2007) Easement Just compensation is the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell, fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. This rule holds true when the property is taken before the filing of an expropriation suit, and even if it is the property owner who brings the action for compensation. The nature and character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion for determining how much just compensation should be given to the landowner. In determining just compensation, all the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, should be considered. Granting arguendo that what petitioner acquired over respondents property was purely an easement of a right of way, still, we cannot sustain its view that it should pay only an easement fee, and not the full value of the property. The acquisition of such an easement falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain. NPC v Tuazon (2011) Easement As earlier mentioned, Section 3A of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, substantially provides that properties which will be traversed by transmission lines will only be considered as easements and just compensation for such right of way easement shall not exceed 10 percent of the market value. However, this Court has repeatedly ruled that when petitioner takes private property to construct transmission lines, it is liable to pay the full market value upon proper determination by the courts. NPC v Heirs Macabangkit Sangkay (2011) Easement We agree with both the RTC and the CA that there was a full taking on the part of the NPC, notwithstanding that the owners where not completely and actually dispossessed. It is settled that the taking of property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual physical taking or appropriation. Indeed, the expropriators action may be short of acquisition of title, physical possess or occupancy but may still amount to a taking. Compensable taking includes destruction, restriction, diminution or interruption of the rights of ownership or f the common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner, lessening of its value. It is neither necessary that the owner be wholly deprived of the use of his property, nor material whether he property is removed from the possession of the owner or in any respect changes hands. Castro v Monsod (2011) Easement We sustain the CA in declaring that a permanent injunction of the part of the petitioner from making injurious excavations is necessary in order to protect the interest of respondent. However, an annotation of the existence of the subjacent and lateral support is no longer necessary. It exists whether or not it is annotated or registered in the registry of property. A judicial recognition of the same binds the property and the owner of the same, including her successors in interest. Otherwise, every adjoining landowner should come to 9

court or have the easement of subjacent and lateral support registered in order for it to be recognized and respected. Unisourse Development and Marketing Corp v Chung et al (2009) Easement Having made such an admission, petitioner cannot now claim that what exists is a legal easement and that the same should be cancelled since the dominant estate is not an enclosed estate as it has an adequate access to a public road which is Callejon Matienza Street. As we have said, the opening of an adequate outlet to a highway can extinguish only legal or compulsory easements, not voluntary easements like in the case at bar. The fact that an easement by grant may have also qualified as an easement of necessity does not detract from its permanency as a property right, which survives the termination of the necessity. A voluntary easement of right of way, like any other contract, could be extinguished only by mutual agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate. Goldcrest Realty Corp v Cypress Gardens Condominium Corp (2009) Easement The owner of the dominant estate cannot violate any of the following prescribed restrictions on its rights on the servient estate, to wit: (1) It can only exercise rights necessary for the use of the easement; (2) It cannot use the easement except for the benefit of the immovable originally contemplated; (3) It cannot exercise the easement in any other manner than that previously established; (4) It cannot construct anything on it which is not necessary for the use and preservation of the easement; (5) It cannot alter or make the easement more burdensome; (6) It must notify the servient estate owner of its intention to make necessary works on the servient estate; and (7) It should choose the most convenient time and manner to build said works so as to cause the least convenience to the owner of the servient estate. Any violation of the above constitutes impairment of the easement. Dichoso Jr v Marcos (2011) Easement However, petitioners claim that the outlet is longer and circuitous, and they have to pass through other lot owners by different owners before they could get to the highway. We find petitioners concept of what is adequate outlet a complete disregard of the wellentrenched doctrine that in order to justify the imposition of an easement of right of way, there must be real, not fictitious or artificial, necessity for it. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis of setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing the easement, the same should not be imposed.

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Gancayco v City Government of QC (2011) Nuisance Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, business, condition or property or anything else that (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others; (2) annoys or defends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; (4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders or impairs the use of property. A nuisance may be per se or per accidens. A nuisance per se is that which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may summarily be abated under the undefined law of necessity. (Only a nuisance per semay be abated by governmental action without judicial proceedings.) Clearly, when Justice Gancayco was given a permit to construct the building, the city council or the city engineer did not consider the building, or its demolished portion, to be a threat to the safety of persons and property. This fact alone should have warned the MMDA against summarily demolishing the structure. Neither does the MMDA have the power to declare a thing a nuisance. Only courts of law have the power to determine whether a thing is a nuisance. Secretary of Education v Heirs of Dulay Sr. Donation It must be stressed that the donation is onerous because the DECS, as donee, was burdened with the obligation to utilize the land donated for school purposes. Under Article 733 of the New Civil Code, a donation with an onerous cause is essentially a contract and is thus governed by the rules on contract. It has been 16 years since the execution of the deed of donation. Petitioner DECS failed to use the property for the purpose specified in the deed of donation. In fine, petitioner DECS has no use for the property, hence, the same shall be reverted to the respondents. Villanueva v Branoco (2011) Donation Post-mortem disposition (mortis causa donations), typically: (1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor, or what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive (2) That before the donors death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed (3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee

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(4) The specification in a deed of the causes whereby the act may be revoked by the donor indicates that the donation is inter vivos, rather than a disposition mortis causa (5) That the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a provision in the deed to the effect that the donation is to take effect at the death of the donor are not controlling criteria; such statements are to be construed together with the rest of the instrument, in order to give effect to the real intent of the transferor (6) That in case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the deed It is immediately apparent that Rodrigo passed naked title to Rodriguez under a perfected donation inter vivos. First. Rodrigo stipulated that "if the herein Donee predeceases me, the [Property] will not be reverted to the Donor, but will be inherited by the heirs of x x x Rodriguez," signaling the irrevocability of the passage of title to Rodriguez's estate, waiving Rodrigo's right to reclaim title. This transfer of title was perfected the moment Rodrigo learned of Rodriguez's acceptance of the disposition which, being reflected in the Deed, took place on the day of its execution on 3 May 1965. Rodrigo's acceptance of the transfer underscores its essence as a gift in presenti, not in futuro, as only donations inter vivos need acceptance by the recipient. Indeed, had Rodrigo wished to retain full title over the Property, she could have easily stipulated, as the testator did in another case, that "the donor, may transfer, sell, or encumber to any person or entity the properties here donated x x x" or used words to that effect. Instead, Rodrigo expressly waived title over the Property in case Rodriguez predeceases her. It will not do, therefore for petitioner to cherry-pick stipulations from the Deed tending to serve his cause (e.g. "the ownership shall be vested on [Rodriguez] upon my demise" and "devise"). Dispositions bearing contradictory stipulations are interpreted wholistically, to give effect to the donor's intent. In no less than seven cases featuring deeds of donations styled as "mortis causa" dispositions, the Court, after going over the deeds, eventually considered the transfers inter vivos, consistent with the principle that "the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a provision in the deed to the effect that the donation is `to take effect at the death of the donor' are not controlling criteria [but] x x x are to be construed together with the rest of the instrument, in order to give effect to the real intent of the transferor." Indeed, doubts on the nature of dispositions are resolved to favor inter vivos transfers to avoid uncertainty as the ownership of the property subject of the deed.

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Republic v. Serrano (2010) A certification by a regional technical director of DENR annotated on a title of a parcel of land that it is verified to be alienable and disposable is sufficient compliance with the requirement that the land must be alienable and disposable before it can be acquired by private persons. Garcia v CA (2010) Maceda Law The Maceda Law applies to contracts of sale of real estate on installment payments, including residential condominium apartments but excluding industrial lots, commercial buildings and sales to tenants.

Cases dictated by Justice Hofilena

Republic v Mendoza Sr. (2007) The prerogative of classifying public lands pertains to administrative agencies which have been specially tasked by statutes to do so, namely: the DANR, now the DENR, and two (2) of its bureaus, the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forestry. Hence, consistent with the oftrepeated pronouncements that courts will not interfere on matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government and/or quasi-judicial agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training, and that issues involving basically technical matters deserve to be disentangled from undue interference by the courts, it behooves this Court to refrain from looking into the underlying reasons or grounds which impelled the classification and declaration of Silot Bay as timberland or from questioning the wisdom such classification or declaration. Feliciano v Canoza (2010)by J Villarama A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious. Hence, an action to set it aside on the ground of fraud could be instituted. Such action for the annulment of the said partition, however, must be brought within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud. Palali v Awisan (2010) Accion Publiciana A claim for ownership of a piece of land based solely on tax declaration is not conclusive evidence of ownership. Respondent having failed to prove possession, her claim rests solely on her tax declaration. But tax declarations, by themselves, are not conclusive evidence of ownership of real property. In the absence of actual, public, and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership. 37cralaw Respondent's tax declaration, therefore, cannot serve as basis to oust petitioner who has been in possession (by himself and his predecessors) of the subject property since before the war. So v Food Fest Land, Inc. (2010) Possession Two elements are paramount in possession there must be occupancy, apprehension or taking, and there must be intent to possess. 13

Del Rosario v Ferrer (2010) Donation That the document in question in this case was captioned Donation Mortis Causa is not controlling. This Court has held that, if a donation by its terms is inter vivos, this character is not altered by the fact that the donor styles it mortis causa. Here, the donors plainly said that it is our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be respected by the surviving spouse. The intent to make the donation irrevocable becomes even clearer by the proviso that a surviving donor shall respect the irrevocability of the donation. Consequently, the donation was in reality a donation inter vivos. The donors in this case of course reserved the right, ownership, possession, and administration of the property and made the donation operative upon their death. But this Court has consistently held that such reservation (reddendum) in the context of an irrevocable donation simply means that the donors parted with their naked title, maintaining only beneficial ownership of the donated property while they lived. Notably, the three donees signed their acceptance of the donation, which acceptance the deed required. This Court has held that an acceptance clause indicates that the donation is inter vivos, since acceptance is a requirement only for such kind of donations. Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, need not be accepted by the donee during the donors lifetime. Finally, as Justice J. B. L. Reyes said in Puig v. Peaflorida, in case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed a donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the deed. Since the donation in this case was one made inter vivos, it was immediately operative and final. The reason is that such kind of donation is deemed perfected from the moment the donor learned of the donees acceptance of the donation. The acceptance makes the donee the absolute owner of the property donated. Tiatingco v Gasis (?!?) Possession Possession may be acquired by actual occupation or by constructive means or by the execution of a public instrument, following the rule on sales (the execution of public instrument is equivalent to delivery). The execution of a public instrument gives rise only to a prima facie presumption of delivery. It is deemed negated by the failure of the party to take actual possession of the land sold. Lacbayan v Samoy (2011) Ownership is different from a certificate of title, the latter only serving as the best proof of ownership over a piece of land. The certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership. In fact, mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership 14

with persons not named in the certificate, or that the registrant may only be a trustee, or that other parties may have acquired interest over the property subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. Needless to say, registration does not vest ownership over a property, but may be the best evidence thereof. Basbas v Sayon 656 SCRA Co-Ownership Any co-owner may bring an action for ejectment, because it is presumed that he is bringing the action on behalf of the other co-owners as trustee. Fernando v Acuna 657 SCRA Ownership There was no evidence presented that it was alluvial because it could be a dried up river bed, which belongs to the State. Assuming that Sapangbayan was a dried up creek bed, it belongs to the State. Angeles v Pascual 653 SCRASorry, I cant find the case online Builder in Good Faith Each one constructed his own house in good faith. Applied Article 448 of the Civil CodeBSP in GF on the land of another

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