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Report for Telenet on the Analysis of BIPT Regarding Markets 4 and 5 in Belgium
Non Confidential Version
Prepared by Telage
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SEC (2007) 962 Case BE/2007/0735: Wholesale unbundled access (including shared access) to local loops and subloops for the purpose of providing broadband and voice services;
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As per the Recommendation on Relevant Markets, see OJ L 344, 28.12.2007, p. 65 See paras 123-128 7 See paras 177-183
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These factors align more or less perfectly with the criteria identified by the Commission in its case practice in Spain, UK, Netherlands and Finland. An examination of each of these factors in turn shows that: 1. The wholesale share of end-user retail prices are low and are universally below [ ]for DSL based competitors. Therefore, any DSL wholesale price increase would be much diluted at the retail layer. 2. Evidence from the Belgian market shows that Belgacom retail products earn a price premium over competitors and that their market share is stable over time, implying that retail price elasticity is low. 3. The best estimates of retail margins available suggest that the retail margin for stand alone broadband is over [ ] but that that share might fall to [ ] for broader products (i.e. voice and broadband based on a Naked input); in any event there is significant scope of retail operators to absorb the (diluted) wholesale price increases at the retail level such that retail customers may never become aware of any wholesale price change. 4. The evidence available suggests that Belgacom group would capture not less than its market share in the event that retail competitors raised prices in response to a wholesale price increase. Based on Article 7 practice in Market 5 regarding these criteria, indirect constraints coming from cable on the wholesale DSL product market are rightly judged to be weak by BIPT. The conclusion therefore is that BIPTs assessment that the indirect constraints are not sufficiently strong to constrain Belgacoms SMP is correct. The Geographic scope of the WBA market is National BIPTs assessment of the geographic scope of the market is correct. There is no evidence that Belgacom adopts different strategies in different parts of Belgium. There is uniform pricing enacted by Belgacom with no regional variation (not even based on local promotions) and the service functionality provided does not vary by region. It is true that historically Telenet had a more developed network than other Belgian cable networks and that Telenet has a consequently higher market share in Flanders (and Belgacom a lower market share than it has nationally). However, this regional difference in market share has not affected Belgacoms behaviour on the market. On
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http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/infso/ecctf/library?l=/belgiquebelgi/registeredsnotifications/b e20070735-0736/be-2007-0735-0736/_EN_1.0_&a=d See CoCom July2010 data for a cross country comparison http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/infso/cocom1/library?l=/public_documents_2010/cocom1029_final/_EN_1.0_&a=d
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50.00%
40.00%
30.00%
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0.00% FR UK DE SE ES IE FI NL DK BE
Why then would BIPT seek to switch the focus of attention onto another, untired and unproven network which BIPT says itself in its Market 5 analysis cannot give comparable access to entrants? The imposition of a broadband resale product as a remedy in Market 18 is inevitably based on a suggestion that opening access to a cable based broadband product might create a competitive dynamic that would drive the retail broadband market in Belgium. This suggestion has principally been championed by Belgacom in the past though recently France Telecoms and KPNs subsidiaries in Belgium have sought to use the possibility of regulation as leverage in their commercial negotiation. That Belgacom was historically the main protagonist seeking to have the Telenet network opened up diminishes the credibility of its argument that access to the Telenet network is likely to satisfy some pent-up demand. If a large number of third party operators were to appear willing to take access from Telenet, then Belgacom would have no interest to see Telenets network opened since that would create competition to Belgacom on the wholesale market. However, Belgacom realise that there is in fact no demand for access to the Telenet network and that a requirement to put such a wholesale access product in place would (a) weaken Telenet by imposing unnecessary direct costs while at the same time diverting as much as [ ] of Telenets internal system developers, thereby undermining Telenets ability to bring new and innovative services to market and (b) grant Belgacom a further reprieve from the effective implementation of LLU access or
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or by requiring the provision of a more capable bitstream product through traditional remedies (e.g. obligation to supply, price control). Such an approach requires detailed supervision and past delays, if repeated, would make this an ineffective option. [emphasis added]
Should broadband resale be imposed? As noted above by the European Commission, the lowest level in the value chain (before the retail market itself) is a broadband resale product. If BIPT believes that Bitstream is not going to be an effective remedy then it ought to then examine the need for, and desirability of a broadband resale product. BIPTs analysis of the existing resale product offering (only in the context of whether its inclusion in the defined market would affect the SMP outcomes) does not lead on to a consideration that bitstream and LLU are unable to constrain Belgacoms SMP and that remedies lower down the value chain need to be included. Resale as a competitive entry mechanism is also a pretty poor vehicle in any event. As noted by BEREC and illustrated clearly in their revised NGA Ladder of Investment13 replicated below, resale remains the lowest point on the ladder of investment and is normally followed by migration to bitstream and so on.
12 13
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The Commission also recently noted that these Resale lines are not significant anymore at EU level with the unbundlers climbing the ladder of investment to the benefit of more investment intensive forms of competition. . As an access product, resale was important at a certain point in the markets evolution but as access products (and delivery processes) improved it went into steep decline. In terms of metrics, resale lines represented 44.21%14 of all access lines in 2004 but by mid-2010, resale lines represented 3.1 %15 of all broadband lines. The evidence therefore suggests that the remedy is not likely to make a material impact on the market and that BIPT may be correct not to waste time and resources implementing it in Market 5. However, it is against that backdrop that one must consider the decision to impose a broadband resale obligation on Telenet in the Market 18 analysis. The cost of implementing this regulation is clearly high for Telenet, hence our opposition. However, the cost of intervening in this way also implies an important opportunity cost for BIPT in terms of the market 5 remedies proposed. Since a disproportionate effort by BIPTs will inevitably be focussed on implementing an ineffective remedy (as decided by BIPT in its market 5 analysis) on Telenet in Market 18, this materially reduces BIPTs resources to implement and police effective obligations on Belgacom (where SMP has properly been identified) and which could actually facilitate more competitive entry. The very real concern which arises therefore is that BIPT will expend enormous resources imposing a dead-end remedy in Market 18 which BIPT has already decided
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http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/infso/cocom1/library?l=/publicsdocuments2004/cocom0420_broadband/_EN_1.0_&a=d http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/infso/cocom1/library?l=/public_documents_2010/cocom1029_final/_EN_1.0_&a=d
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Commission Recommendation on relevant product and service markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation - C(2007) 5406 and Explanatory memorandum of the Recommendation - SEC(2007) 1483
17 18
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E.g. report by Excentris: Technical evaluation of wholesale broadband network, 23.01.09, CableEurope 21 Case BE/2007/0736: Wholesale broadband access
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Upstream
DSL NETWORK
CABLE
Downstream
WBA 1
WBA 2
WBA 3
Retail layer In figure 1 we can see a situation where there is a supplier DSL Network of an intermediate wholesale input, that is supplied to its own vertically integrated downstream retail arm WBA1 and to independent retailers WBA2. Cable is a supplier of an input serving its own vertically integrated downstream retail arm WBA3. The firm operating at the upstream level may be constrained directly at that level by other firms operating at that level if its product at the intermediate layer is directly
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The demand for a wholesale input is derived from the demand for the wholesale based retail product. The price elasticity of demand for the wholesale input is related to that for the retail product. If there is a high substitutability between the retail products based on DSL and cable, it is primarily the cost share that determines the level of the price elasticity of demand for the wholesale input. For example, where the share of the wholesale cost in the retail price of a product is lower than 10 %, the impact of a wholesale price increase on wholesale demand would be largely diluted because end users would see less than 10% of that price increase. The elasticity of demand for the wholesale dsl product would be less than 10 % of the elasticity of demand for the retail product. Hence, a hypothetical monopolist provider of dsl is unlikely to be constrained by retail demand substitution. Only when the share of the wholesale input in the retail price is over 50 %, does the indirect pricing constraint appears to have the potential to become large enough. Another factor that needs to be taken into account is the margin that is enjoyed at the retail level by parties selling into the retail market. In the first instance, retail suppliers using DSL inputs bought at the wholesale level face a decision regarding how much of the wholesale price increase to pass on to end users. In circumstances where such suppliers enjoy high margins they have considerable flexibility regarding how much of the price increase to pass on to end users. At the limit, if competition at the retail level between cable and DSL based bitstream products was intense and the retail operators using DSL wholesale inputs had a high margin, they could choose to absorb the full price increase themselves such that end-users would be unaffected and no indirect constraint considerations would apply. Finally, the retail prices charged and/or the retail margin enjoyed by the incumbent operator using its own DSL inputs may not be the same as third parties using inputs based on the DSL network. In this way the incumbent may or may not choose to pass
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49%
51% 51%
53%
48% 48%
28%
35%
33% 34% 34% 33% 33% 33% 32% 31% 31% 31% 33% 32% 33%
13% 14% 14% 15% 14% 14% 13% 13% 11% 12% 8% 8% 6% 6% 6% 7% 7% 7% 6% 8%
Q4 1999
Q2 2001
Q2 2002 Belgacom
Q2 2003
Q2 2004 OLO
Q2 2005
Q22006
Q22007
Q22008
Q22009
Q22010
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60%
50%
20%
10%
0% Q4 Q4 Q2 Q4 Q2 Q4 Q2 Q4 Q2 Q4 Q2 Q4 Q2- Q4- Q2- Q4- Q2 Q4- Q2- Q4- Q21999 2000 2001 2001 2002 2002 2003 2003 2004 2004 2005 2005 2006 2006 2007 2007 2008 2008 2009 2009 2010
70%
60%
50%
40%
Telenet
30%
20%
10%
0% Q4 Q4 Q2 Q4 Q2 Q4 Q2 Q4 Q2 Q4 Q2 Q4 Q2- Q4- Q2- Q4- Q2 Q4- Q2- Q4- Q21999 2000 2001 2001 2002 2002 2003 2003 2004 2004 2005 2005 2006 2006 2007 2007 2008 2008 2009 2009 2010
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Taken together these time trend graphs which show differences and movements in terms of prices and market shares suggest that end users do not switch even in the presence of marked price differences. This evidence is further supported by the findings of BIPTs consumer survey which found that on 13% of respondents chose their package on the basis of price. The conclusion based on the evidence is that therefore must be that retail price elasticity of demand is relatively low.
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http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/infso/ecctf/library?l=/espaa/registeredsnotifications/es 20080804-0805/es-2008-0804-0805/_EN_1.0_&a=d
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3. Retail margins
A best estimate calculated by Telenet indicates that the retail margin on a broadband only product is in excess of [ ]%. It also follows from the section above that third parties enjoyed a gross margin that ranged between [ ] and [ ]. That data itself suggests that net retail margins are likely to be not only positive but probably quite high. Telenets best estimate is that the net margins are likely to be in a [ ] range depending on the level and nature of the customer acquisition. The margin on a broadband product sold as part of a bundle (together with VoIP) is estimated to be less than on the stand alone product (reflecting the relative weighting of costs on the traditional PSTN line) but is again estimated to be not less than [ ]. In such circumstances, taken together with the evidence provided in the previous section regarding the share of WBA products in end-users prices, ISPs enjoy significant opportunities to absorb some or all of any price increase imposed at the wholesale level. BIPT arrive at the same conclusion regarding the wholesale share of the retail price and the retail margins as is demonstrated in figure 5.12 of their analysis. This finding looks robust on the basis of their analysis.
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Conclusion
Of the four elements identified as being important to determining the strength of indirect constraints, all evidence available suggests that those indirect constraints are likely to be very weak in the Belgian market. The available evidence suggests that the retail price elasticity of demand is relatively low given the fact that operators market shares are stable and that pricing is not homogeneous (some operators pricing is clearly higher than other operators for comparable products). Survey results also show that pricing has not been a driver of consumer choices in Belgium. The wholesale inputs share of the retail market is typically less than 50% (and very close to 50% where it is above) meaning that any price increases at the wholesale level will be greatly diluted at the retail level. This factor, taken together with the fact that retail margins are significantly positive indicates that ISPs may choose to absorb any wholesale price increase at the retail level, implying no observable retail price effect. Finally, in the event that a price increase did filter through to the retail level, the available evidence suggests that most retail consumers are likely to opt for Belgacoms own retail arm or other DSL based operators rather than migrate en-mass to a cable operator. In terms of the European Commissions own standards25 for assessing the strength of indirect constraints it is clear that indirect competitive effects coming from cable based broadband products on DSL based broadband products are very weak. BIPTs analysis of indirect constraints comes to the correct conclusion despite certain omissions.
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26
Ibid
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100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
19 99
20 00
20 01
20 01
20 02
20 02
20 03
20 03
20 04
20 04
20 05 Q
The fact of a potential constraint coming from cable is dependent in the first instance on the strength of that indirect constraint. If the indirect constraint is strong and potentially effective in constraining the behaviour of the DSL product then its inclusion in the defined market may be appropriate. The indirect constraint is not strong in the instant case and so its immediate effect is to dilute the potential SMP observable on the DSL market. Finally, as observed by the European Commission in Case NL/2008/082727 an NRA must consider in the event of a wholesale price rise finding its way through to end users that: the customers of the ISPs would not switch to a significant extent to the retail arm of the integrated hypothetical monopolist, in particular if the latter does not raise its own retail prices.19 [Footnote 19 states: For example, the hypothetical monopolist could increase its
wholesale price while sustaining lower retail prices than the ISPs which purchase its wholesale product without exercising a margin squeeze and could thus gain retail customers from the ISPs while not losing customers to alternative platforms. This could make the price rise profitable.]
This point is not only important in determining the strength of the indirect constraint but also goes to the heart of what the European Commission refers to as a risk of prejudging the SMP assessment and understating the real extent of market power in UK/2007/0733. If cable is included in the defined market then the starting point in relation to this assessment would probably be that Belgacom would capture its market share. However, Belgacoms market share would vary from 47% to 84.5% at the retail level and would vary from 58% to 100% at the wholesale level depending on whether cable is in the market or not. Furthermore, it is appropriate to consider whether Belgacom would capture not only its DSL market share on a broad market (as an
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Commission Guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant market power under the Community regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (the "SMP Guidelines"), OJ C 165 11.7.2002, p. 8. See e.g. Case COMP/M.1650 -ACEA/Telefnica; Case IV/M.1439 - Telia/Telenor, paragraph 124, Case IV/M.1430, - Vodafone/Airtouch, paragraphs 13-17, Case COMP/JV.17 Mannesmann/Bell Atlantic/Omnitel, paragraph 15, and Case IV/M.570 TBT/BT/TeleDanmark/Telenor, paragraph 35. It has to be noted that in regulated markets de-averaging might not be possible due to price control obligations. In such an event conditions of competition would have to be analysed absent regulation according to the Greenfield approach,
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Commission notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law [Official Journal C 372 of 09.12.1997]. See for example NL/2005/0281 and AT/2008/0757 ~ AT/2009/0970 UK/2007/0733: Wholesale Broadband Access in the UK ES/2008/0805: Wholesale Broadband Access in Spain
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Commission Recommendation on relevant product and service markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation - C(2007) 5406 and Explanatory memorandum of the Recommendation - SEC(2007) 1483
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As noted by the commission in SEC (2007) 962 There are three types of wholesale services that a new entrant can build on to offer retail broadband services: (i) a pure resale service, where the new entrant resells the incumbents broadband connection to the end user and does not invest in own infrastructure, (ii) bitstream, where the new entrant builds its own backbone but relies on the incumbents infrastructure for the lower and middle parts of the network, and (iii) local loop unbundling where the new entrant relies on the incumbents infrastructure only for the so-called last mile. The ladder of investment theory implies that new entrants pass gradually from relying on (i), via (ii) to (iii). In order to undertake investments in network development, they first need to be able to develop a sufficiently large retail customer basis relying on the network infrastructure of the incumbent. 37 Ibid 38 http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/infso/cocom1/library?l=/publicsdocuments2004/cocom0420_broadband/_EN_1.0_&a=d 39 http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/infso/cocom1/library?l=/public_documents_2010/cocom1029_final/_EN_1.0_&a=d
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http://www.ectaportal.com/en/upload/Press%20Releases/2010/Europes_Digital_Deficit.pdf
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or by requiring the provision of a more capable bitstream product through traditional remedies (e.g. obligation to supply, price control). Such an approach requires detailed supervision and past delays, if repeated, would make this an ineffective option.
Should broadband resale be imposed? As noted above by the European Commission, the lowest level in the value chain (before the retail market itself) is a broadband resale product. If BIPT believes that Bitstream is not going to be an effective remedy then it ought to then examine the need for, and desirability of a broadband resale product in the context of the relevant market and that is the broadband market. BIPT does not conduct such an analysis and therefore finds that bitstream is sufficient to constrain SMP at the retail level. It may well be that this an analysis is without merit, no other country in Europe has experienced such an abject failure of its retail products, perhaps the decision not to regulate wholesale broadband resale should be reconsidered. However, it is clear that if a wholesale broadband resale obligation is required, it can only be required on the SMP operator, the operator who has other product on the ladder of investment, the operator who can facilitate network access competition deeper in the value chain. That is Belgacom. That is not Telenet. Finally, as noted most recently in Case SE/2010/1061&1062 the Commission considers that a finding of SMP should not have ancillary remedies applied which could pertain to another relevant market where SMP could be identified. Specifically, and as set out above, Wholesale Broadband Resale (WBR) is clearly located downstream from the WBA market and the lines between the two are not always clear. Many NRAs have in the past had to specifically identify its noninclusion while others (notably Germany) have explicitly regulated WBR on foot of a Market 5 SMP finding. In the Swedish broadband case, with respect to backhaul as an ancillary service to the broadband market, the Commission noted that: The Commission recalls that the proposed obligations should in principle pertain to the relevant product market in which SMP has been found. Whilst not contesting the market definitions and SMP findings for the two notified markets, the Commission is not convinced that the proposed backhaul obligation is intended to remedy an SMP finding in the product markets covered by the notifications, but instead may pertain to a potential finding of dominance in another relevant market.
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