ON T H E T E R M BUDDHIVIPARINAMA A N D T H E PROBLEM OF I L L U S O R Y C H A N G E by DAVID SEYFORT RUEGG

Paris
During recent years the Ved~ntic doctrine of illusory appearance (vivarta) and the problems connected with the idea of illusory change, causation and discontinuity have received a considerable amount of attention. In the course of this work several schools of thought - notably the early Advaitic and the Buddhist - have been taken into account; but the Indian linguists and philosophers of grammar appear to have been somewhat neglected, although, as has been noted, Bhartrhari, the grammarian author of the VdkyapadTya, is perhaps the first to use the term vivartate in an illusionistic context 1 and despite the fact that the importance of Patafijali's Mahdbhd.sya for the history of Indian philosophy was recognised long ago. ~ It will be recalled that the treatises that deal chiefly with the phonological features of words in combination in the Vedic sam.hit,s with regard to their form in isolation thus safeguarding the form and recitation of these texts, the Pfftti~tkhyas, describe the change in sam.dhi of one sound into another, for example i > y before a vowel. This linguistic process is normally expressed by most of the Pr~ti~khyas in a corresponding manner. The .~gvedaprdtiddkhya rules: amum iti tadbhdvam uktam, yathdntaram (1.56), "(One should understand that) the expression 'this to that' means becoming that, with reference to the sound which (in its relation) stands nearest to it". 3 Elsewhere in the RVPr. the term vikdra "modification" is used, e.g. in 2.5 where mention is made of the vikdragdstra, that is of the rule of the modification of sounds, and in 11.44 where euphonic modifications in the tcramapdt.ha are described. The same type of statement is to be found in the Taittir[yaprdti~akhya where we read atl~ vikdrasya (1.28), "am [i.e. the accusative] makes the name of a product Cf. P. Hacker, Vivarta (AAWL [Mainz], Wiesbaden, 1953). 2 Cf. O. Strauss, Festschrift Garbe 0Erlangen, 1927), p. 94. a ~gvedapratigakhya, ed. and transl, by Mangal Deva Shastri (Punjab Or. Series, Lahore).

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of a l t e r a t i o n " : Here the element that undergoes a modification is called the vikdrin (1.23) and appears in the nominative c a s e : The Vdjasaneyiprdtigdkhya, probably an earlier work of the varttikakdra Kgty~yana, also lays down that by the accusative a modification is indicated (1.133: tam iti vikdra.h; cf. 1.142: vilcdrf yathdsannam). The uniformity of description in the VPr. is however broken by the rule 1.136 .sa.st.hf sthdneyogd ( = P~.nini 1.1.49); but this exception can be explained as an interpolation: The ~aunakfyd-Caturadhydyika (which was published by W. D. Whitney under the title AtharvavedaprdttYdkhya) 7 also differs from the normal type of Prgtig~khya description with its rule dntaryeoa vrtti.h (1.95), "conversion is according to proximity", s It is furthermore noteworthy that this Pr. also makes use of the P~n.inean type of formulation by using the nominative case to indicate the element substituted and the genetive to represent the element being changed (as in 3.39 quoted below). However, its conception of the process of sam. dhi change is in the last analysis apparently identical with that of the other Pr., for with reference to forms in the pada and krama texts like pari-eti : paryeti, abhi-aimi : abhyaimi, etc. it says paddntavikrtdndm (4.81), "restoration is made [before a pause (virame): 4.79] of alterations taking place at the end of a word". This rule is to be read together with 3.39 svare ndmhlo 'nta.hsthd, "before a vowel, an alterant vowel becomes a semivowel". This is the only passage in the Caturadhydyikdin which a derivative of vi-k.r- is used in this sense, while im 1.63 and in 2.84 the term ddega is used. ~ The correspondence on this matter between this Pr. and the usage of P~ .niniis probably to be explained by the fact that, while the Prfitig~khyas are all presumably post-Pg.ninean in their present form, x9 the Caturadhydyik~ appears to follow the A.s!ddhydy~ especially closely. 1~ 4 Taittiriyapratigakhya, ed. and transl, by W. D. Whitney, JAOS, 9 (1871). 5 ahkara agamavikarilopinam, "aO [i.e. the nominative] makes the name of an increment, or of an element suffering alteration or elision". 6 So P. Thieme, ZDIVIG, 89 (1935), p. *22* n. 3. 7 On this text and another Atharvavedapratigakhya v. Sfu'ya K~nta, Atharvapratigakhya (Lahore, 1939), Introd. p. 31 ft. and p. 61 if. a Ed. and transl. W. D. Whitney, JAOS, 7 (1862). - The use of this derivative from vl't- here is noteworthy. In 1.8 and 1.40, however, Whitney translates the term vl"tti by "authorized usage" and "treatment" respectively. 1.63: ~a.tpurasor ukaro 'ntyasya dagadagayor ade~ag ca m~rdhanya.h, "the final of $a$ and puras becomes u before data and data respectively, with substitution of a retroflex for the following initial"; 2.84: yur taistvamadivarjam, "[s becomes a : 2.81] also before forms of the second personal pronouns, excepting in tais tram etc.". Cf. AtharvapratiL ed. Sfirya kftnta 2.17, while vikl'ta appears in 3.26. - Elsewhere in the Pr~ti~khyas ddega means "indication". lo V.P. Thieme, P&nini and the Veda (Allahabad, 1935), p. 95; L. Renou, JA, 1938, p. 171-176; Sfa'ya K~nta, op. cit., Introd. p. 61-66.
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The formulation by means of the accusative thus appears as the counterpart in the linguistic field of the Sfi.mkhya doctrine of vikdra/pari.nama or real transformation of a cause into its product (satkdryavdda). 12 N o w this type of formulation characteristic of the Pr~tigftkhyas differs in theory from the parallel one found in the A.st.ddhyd)q where Pfm.ini regulates the process of ddeda or grammatical substitution by the sf~tra which reads .sa.st.histhdneyogd (1.1.49). In other words, in order to express the process of substitution, the Prfttiggkhyas use the second case which is said to connote a transformation of one sound into another, while P~n.ini uses the sixth case (which is not a kdraka) to express the element replaced. In the A.s{ddhydy~ the process of substitution is further defined by the satra 1.1.50 sthdne 'ntaratama.h, "(le substitut non sp6cifi6 qui est mettre) ~tla place (de tel d'entre plusieurs 614ments 6nonc4s est celui qui) est le plus proche (dudit element)" (Renou). While the As.t.ddhydyi thus treats of substitution in the full sense, the Prfttigftkhyas for their part describe principally one aspect of substitution - the sam. dhi changes -, since they "deal with the qualities of nouns, verbs, prepositions and particles in euphonic modification and in disconnection" (Caturadhydyikd 1.1 : catur1.~dn.~padajdtdndt.n ndmdkhydtopasarganipdtdndm, sa.mdhyapadyau gun. au prdtijfiam). The considerations, theoretical or otherwise, that may have led P~.nini to prefer such a formulation have to the writer's knowledge never been made clear, lz but this formulation appears to be of potential theoretical significance and was of importance to the later philosophers of grammar. Already the Mahdbhd.sya of Patafijali has some interesting observations to make on this subject in its commentary on Kfitygyana's vdrttikas on the sfttra 1.1.56 sthdnivad ddedo 'nalvidhau. This satra prescribes that the substitute (ddeda-) is to be treated like the original (sthanin) except in certain cases of particular grammatical processes in the A.st.ddhydyL In this connexion, however, arises the question of the perennity or permanence(nityatva)ofwords. I f we speak of substitution, how is it possible to maintain that a word is nitya, as has been done for example at the be~ Cf. Thieme, ibid., p. 94-95; Sfarya Kfmta, ibid., p. 62-63. i~ The theory of the permanence of var.nas is however known to the RVPr. 13.14: eke var.nafz chadvatikan na karyan; but the S~r0khya also speaks of a pari.nftmanityata beside the kat.asthanityatd. - In the gktantra (64) vikara is opposed to prakfti. V. also VMbh., vartt. 16 on 1.1.66. xa See nevertheless Thieme, ZDkIG, 89 (1935), p. *22*-*23*. - In the older grammatical terminology, as is seen from the VMbh., vikara occasionally = adega, e.g. vartt. 16 ad 1.1.66 (with prakrti) and vdrtt. 17 ad gS 5. On the terms derived from vi-kf- amongst the P~iniyas v. L. Renou, Terminologie grammatieale du sanskrit, p. 275-276.

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ginning of the Mahdbhd.sya? As K~ty~yana puts it in an dk.sepavdrttika, the system of original and substitute is inadmissible in view of the doctrine of the permanence of words (anupapannam. sthdnydde~atvam, nityatvdt). Katy~yana first proposes to justify this usage by comparing it with the everyday usage according to which we say, for example, that a pupil is in the place of the teacher or that p~t~ka-grass is pressed in a sacrifice instead of soma, although we do not wish to imply that the teacher or the soma have ceased to exist. The following vdrttika TM however abandons this empirically founded justification and seeks to explain the theory of substitution. The Mahdbhd.sya accordingly speaks here of a kdryavipar#.Tdma. The question is, what is this kdrya which, when changed, still permits us to speak of substitution while at the same time maintaining the well established doctrine of the permanence of the word accepted by the Vaiyakara.nas as well as by the Mim~.msakas. Patafijali answers this question only rather briefly by stating that it is buddhi, knowledge that changes. Unfortunately he does not enlarge on this matter as much as we might wish him to, but only equates the terms buddhi and sampratyaya "concept" and then compares the process to the situation where a speaker talks to a listener first about some mango trees and then about some fig trees. In the listener's mind, Patafijali explains, the notion of the mango tree is removed and that of the fig tree is substituted, although in fact both continue to exist. Thus, just as the buddhis change when different words connected with their respective referents are uttered, so in grammar the buddhi of asti is substituted by the buddhi of bhavati in certain conditions defined by Pa.nini's sf~tra 2.4.52 without it being necessary to consider these words impermanent (sa.h 'aster bhft.h' [2.4.52] ityanendstibuddhyd bhavatibuddhim, prati-

padyate; sa tata.h pa@ati buddhydstim, cdpakLsyamd.na.m bhavat#.n c6padhiyamdna.m nitya eva ca svasmin vi.saye 'stir nityo bhavatig ca; buddhis tv asya vipari.namyate). Patafijali does not make this theory of viparigdma the basis of any
philosophical doctrine but introduces it merely to explain a particular difficulty raised by the Varttikakara. The theory is therefore purely linguistic or rather "psycho-linguistic" in import and does not lay claim, in the somewhat rudimentary form in which it appears in the Mahdbhdcya, to any general epistemological or ontological validity. The theoretical significance of this notion did not however escape the attention of the commentators on the Mahdbhdr especially Kaiya~a and N~tge~abha.t~a.
t~ According to the Nir~aya S~gara Press ed. of 1951, this vartt, is a bha~ya-vdrttika.

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Kaiyat.a in his commentary on this passage of the Bhd.sya says that, in such a situation, knowledge-qualities are superimposed on the objects by the listener; and he adds that the objective world is not conditioned in itself by virtue of this process, thus not involving himself here in a discussion on the objective reality of artha (buddhidharm~.h kevalam arthe~u

pratipattgvagdd dropyante, na tu tadva~dd arthdndm, tathdvasthdnarn). Kaiya~a's viewpoint thus appears to be far removed from extreme illusionism or a dLstisf.st.ivdda,is N5gega amplifies this statement by saying that the withdrawal (apakar.sa) and the production (upadhdna = utpatti) of the buddhi is superimposed on the mango and fig trees and that similarly there is a superimposition on words of the system of original and substitute involving a mental origination and destruction (buddhigatotpddavindga). This superimposition of buddhidharmas which is thus deduced is said to be due to knowledge and usage; therefore, in view of the fact that the notion of a previous existence is thereby only superimposed (dropitabhf~tapf~rvatvawavah~ra), the permanence of words is not annulled. Furthermore, it is to be noted that Kaiyat.a in his Pradfpa on another section of the Mah~bh6~ya (under v6rttika 5 on the sfm'a 1.1.20) substantivises Patafijali's expression quoted above and speaks of a buddhiviparin, tima - a term which in its form at least recalls the vij~naparin, t~ma of Vasubandhu and the Vijfifmav~tdins. It will be of interest to see how Kaiyat.a, Annambhat..ta and Nftgega understand this expression and the process denoted by it. In his commentary under v~rttika 5 on the sfttra 1.1.20 Patafijali has also treated of the problem of the permanence of words with regard to the theory of grammatical substitution and recapitulates by quoting a verse that is referred to as anutantra by Harivr.sabha, the commentator on the Vdkyapadtya (1.23) who is presumably identical with Bhartrhari himself. This anutantra stanza states that all substitutes are in reality of a whole word 16 and not of a part; that is, substitution relates to a meaningful
x~ This realistic standpoint may be due to the fact that the Mimgm. saka influence which was strong during the earliest period of Indian grammatical thought continued to be felt even at this late date, long after Bhartrhari and Man..danamigra (see below). S. N. Dasgupta suggests that the latter may have been the originator of the d.ratisrst.i school, Hist. of Indian Philosophy, II (Cambridge, 1932), p. 52 and p. 84. Elsewhere Kaiyata states that the meaning of a word refers to a mental image which assumes the form of the object (buddhipratibh~sa.h ~abd~rthab; yada yada ~abda

uccaritas taddrthakgtra buddhir upaHtyate). 16 According to the commentators pada means here not only a complete word (suptiOanta) but includes also the parts making up a word, e.g. the stem and suffix. Furthermore, according to Nftge~a on paribhas.a 13 (yatr~nekavidham antarya.m

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linguistic whole a n d n o t to a n isolated element (sarve sarvapaddde~d

ddk.sfputrasya pdn. ine.h/ ekade~avikdre hi nityatvan.~ n6papadyate)3 ~

It is at this p o i n t that Kaiyat.a observes that Patafijali's i n t e n t i o n is to reject the theory of the modification (vikdra) o f a part a n d that it is the

buddhi that is changed; the n o t i o n of ddeia was resorted to i n order to uphold the theory of the p e r m a n e n c e of words ( . . . vikdrdbhdvapratipddanaparam etat; buddhivipari.ndmamdtram, sthdnyddegdgamdgamibhdvadvdrena kriyate). Kaiyat.a accordingly concludes that the term sthdna
(in 1.1.49) is to be interpreted as indicating n o t a replacement by destruction (nivrtti) b u t rather by eventual application or c o n t i n g e n c y (prasahga). Following Kaiya.ta, Annambha.t.ta observes i n his Pradipoddyo-

tana that in reality p e r m a n e n t words are touched by the i m p o s i t i o n of

i m p e r m a n e n c e only in g r a m m a r in the process of word f o r m a t i o n (prakri-

ydkdla). I n his s u b c o m m e n t a r y o n the Pradfpa, Nage~a equates the ddedapak~a, the doctrine of grammatical substitution, with the psycholinguistic buddhiviparin, dmapak.sa. A n d he also remarks that, from the tatra sthdnata antaryazn balfyab, Paribhas.endugekhara, ed. F. Kielhorn, p. 13.13), a
substitute is essentially that which is capable of expressing the meaning of the original

(sthanyarthabhidhanasamarthasyaiv6degat6ti siddhantat. . . ). ~7 Contrast TaittirfyapratiL 1.56 var~asya vikaralopau, "alteration and omission are
of a single sound". This discussion in the VMbh arose in connexion with the question why we are to write pranidarayati when we write pra.nidapayatL The sCttra 1.1.20 dadha ghv adap teaches that roots having the form dd- and dha- have the technical name ghu, except for

the roots da- "cut" and da(i)- "clean". By virtue of this ghusa~jaa the na of the upasarga ni preceded bypra becomes cerebralised (.natva: 8.4.17 with 8.4.1). This being the case, it would seem that we should write *pra.nidarayati because the root dr- "pierce" takes in the causative by v.rddhi the form d~t (1.1.1) + r (1.1.51) = dhr; the varttika samanagabdaprati~edhaO therefore observes that similar gabdas O.e. sounds [~ruti]
according to Kaiya~a) are to be expressly excepted from this rule. The following varttika however remarks that this express mention is after all unnecessary since meaning is to be taken into account when applying the rules in question (samanaJabdaprati~edho 'rthavadgraha.nat). Patafijali explains that, whereas da- or dha- referred to in 1.1.20 are meaningful, the element d~ ofdarayati is meaningless. - Again, this express exclusion is not necessary because pra is to be considered an upasarga only when linked to a verbal action (kriya: 1.4.59) which is not the case here (anupasargad va); for in pranidarayati pra is an upasarga not of d~ but of dar-. Now the objection is made that this will also be true of the element dfi in pra.nidapayati and that, since it is therefore not ghu, .natva will also not take place in this word. The next vartt, shows that this does not in fact happen because an increment is applied to a meaningful unit and becomes subordinate to it (na v~rthavato hy Ogamas, tadgun,fbh~tas... ). It is shown that the substitute, here dapayati, has the meaning of the original and that the ghusarojga therefore applies equally to it: a vocable with agama is substituted for one without; it is a different vocable, but it has the same meaning

(gabdantarair iha bhavitavya.m; tatra ~abd~ntare gabdantarasya pratipattir yuktCt, gtdegas tarhfme bhavi~yanti anagamakanartt sagamaka.h). Here Patafijali quotes in his siddhantopasa.mh~rabhasya the anutantra stanza given above.

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point of view of fictitious word formation, there is no rejection of the artificial system of increments etc. (kalpitaprakriyddaddyd.m tu na kalpitdgamatvddivyavahdratydgah . . .).18 The importance of this doctrine to the philosophers of grammar is thus clear: the doctrine of the buddhivipari.ndma possessed considerable theoretical value and was resorted to in order to obviate the necessity of admitting any transformation of the permanent iabda - an eventuality that would undermine the whole foundation of the grammatical gdstra. These considerations appear to indicate that the well known philosophical opposition between the vivartavdda of the Advaita and the continuous vikdra/parin, dma of the S~tm. khya satkdryavdda had a counterpart in grammatical thought. This divergence seems to be already reflected in the different ways the Pr~tigakhyas and Pa.nini follow when formulating parallel cases of linguistic substitution: for the former it is a question of modification (vikdra, VPr. 1.133), while for the latter, and above all for the philosophers of grammar, it is a question of substitution affecting a totality (VMbh on 1.1.20) and based on the change of the buddhi (VMbh on 1.1.56). It is even possible that the latter theory, though still removed from the classical doctrines of illusory change and causation, served as a stepping stone leading to them? 9 For the shift from a consideration of external things and the transformations they undergo to a consideration of a meaningful mental totality is clearly of great philosophical importance. On the other hand, the type of formulation involving the notion of a vikdra adequately served the purpose of treatises like the Pffttig~khyas which, though very detailed and precise in their phonetic observations, concerned themselves hardly at all with linguistic theory and had as their principal object the description and preservation of the texts of their respective ~dkh~s in their sa.mhitd, pada and krama forms. 18 Kaiya~aremarks that just as Devadatta does not change his name even if he should perchance lose a limb, so a meaningful word remains what it is despite the grammatical operations it may undergo. x9 In this connexion it may be noted that an interesting example of a link between a consideration of causation and grammatico-philosophicalthought is to be found in the 4th chapter of the Gau.dapadiyakarikas which deals with the alataganti and the doctrine of non-origination. There it is said that verbal denomination (prajftapti) does not really have an exterior objective cause (nimitta, 4.25), for the mind never really comes in contact with such a cause (4.26-27); hence, since mind does not originate in relation with an external world (4.28, cf. 46) in the process of denomination, the doctrine of origination is inadmissible (4.29), and the ajativ5da set forth in the third chapter is to be accepted. It might be added that the alatacakra or Catherine-wheel image appears in the Lank~vataras~tra (ed. Nanjio, Kyoto 1923) p. 96 beside references to v~iftapti and namamatra. The context is also similar in VP 1.130; for a parallel passage from Ma.nqlanamigra'sBrahmasiddhi see below.

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In this context it will perhaps not be without interest to compare the grammatico-philosophical buddhiviparivdma theory with the vij~dnapari.ndma of the Vijfianav~dins. As has been seen above, the buddhivipari.ndma theory was accepted in order to preclude all possibility of a transformation of the gabda. This gabda is changeless, while linguistic usage employs alternatively for example forms derived from the roots as- and bhft- in certain conditions defined by the A.sfddhydy~, thus affecting the verbal knowledge of the listener. This process is compared with the change in a listener's knowledge according to what is being said - a circumstance which is not however necessarily to be understood as affecting the object itself. Thus while Kaiya.ta explains that the buddhidharmas are superimposed on these objects, there is no hint of the theory that the object exists only by virtue of its being perceived or known. Kaiyat.a appears then to speak here as if external objects were denoted by words and were real; he thereby keeps his interpretation in harmony with the realistic outlook on the gabddrthasambandha prevalent amongst the Vaiy~kara.nas as well as the Mim~ .msakas at the time of the composition of the Mahdbhd.sya. This point of view is however not the normal one of the philosophers of grammar, and it would be interesting to know how Bhartrhari in his commentary on the Mahdbhd.sya dealt with those passages to be found especially in the Paspagdhnika which stand close to the Mim~ .msaka view. ~0 The position of the Vij~dnavddin is different. While his vijgdna is in some respects comparable to the buddhi of the philosopher grammarian, there is in the former's system nothing to correspond to the permanent gabda and its correlate the artha, be it external (bdhya) or mental (bauddha). Though Vasubandhu in his Trim.gikd conceives of the vijhdnapari~dma as real, there is there no direct parallel to the grammarian's gabda which undergoes only a prasahga-change by virtue of the buddhiviparin.dma. Whereas Kaiya.ta merely holds that the buddhi-qualities are superimposed on the artha, Vasubandhu and his commentator Sthiramati speak of an imaginary attribution of an ego or of elements on the consciousnessnature: dtmadharmopacdro hi vividho ya.h pravartate, vij~dnapari.ndme

20 Kaiya|a's interpretation could not however remain altogether untouched by the grammatico-philosophical doctrine prevalent after Bhartrhari, and he speaks of a superimposition of mental elements. - On this somewhat obscure and difficult point, see above note 15 and the writer's Contributions~ l'histoire de laphilosophie linguistique indienne (to appear in the Publications de l'Institut de Civilisation Indienne, Sorbonne, Paris), p. 6-9 (on N~ge~a's view), p. 65-67 (on Bhartrhari), p. 84 (on Puoyar~ja's interpretation of Bhartrhari).

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' s a u . . . (Trim.~ikd, v. 1). ~ I n d e e d it is j u s t this vijgdnaparin, dma t h a t r e n d e r s

p o s s i b l e the (as it w e r e m e t a p h o r i c a l ) a p p l i c a t i o n (upacdra) o f t h e dtman a n d the dharmas, f o r it is t h e i r s u b s t r a t u m . ~ T h u s , w h i l e a c c o r d i n g to t h e Vijfi~nav~tdins the vij~dna is the s o u r c e (dlayavijhdna) o f all, i n c l u d i n g t h e s e v e n f u n c t i o n a l c o n s e i o u s n e s s e s (pravl"ttivij~dna) o u t s i d e o f w h i c h ~1 In Triro~ika v. 1 v~i~anapari.nameis the reading adopted by S. IAvi; it was emended to opari.n~mo by "Dignaga" in the IHQ, 4/1 (1928); but this correction was later rejected by L6vi, who refers to Sthiramati's commentary and translates 'La M6taphore des termes "Sol" et "Essence" qui fonctionne en tant de fagons - c'est sur la Transformation de la Notation qu'elle (se produit)'; v. Matdriauxpottr l'dtude du systdme Vij~aptimata (Paris, 1932) p. 63 and n. 1. - However, such does not appear to be exactly the meaning as understood by at least part of the Tibetan tradition; Mi-pham for example, in his Sum-{u-pai chig-leur byas-pai m~han-'grel (fol. 1b-2a, vol. ga of the Ajitagastra.m), quotes and explains the first verse of the Tri~?tAika as follows: bdag-tu gdags-pa daft 6hos-su fier-'dogs-pa/ sna-chogs-pa ste bdag da~ srog dan skye-ba-po sogs bdag dat~ phu~i khams skye-m ~hedsogs ~hos-su 'dogs-pa dag ni gaff byufi-ba/de thams-{ad ni marepar ~es-par gyur-pa ~id-do de-las g~an-du reed-doll . . . All these metaphors (viz. atman, skandha etc.) are nothing but the transformations (gyur-pa) which are produced in the vijgdna; apart from the latter nothing exists. If this interpretation (which zpparently confirms the one proposed by "Dign~ga") were to be followed, the translation could read "La m 6 t a p h o r e . . , c'est la transformation darts la Notation'. That is, instead of the upacdra being produced on the basis of a pari.nama of vijgana, upacara consists in the pari.nama of vU~ana. This point, though of importance, cannot be gone into in detail here, the important thing being for the present to note that for the Vijfi~nav~din all naming (which is according to this doctrine basically metaphorical) is linked with the vijganapari.nama. (Moreover, the fact that gyur-pa is here used to translate pari~.~ama shows how vague the Tibetan translations can be when translating the Sanskrit technical terms belonging to the group paritjama- vivarta; similarly vivartate in Vakyapadiya i. 1 was rendered by the expression yo~s-su 'gyur-ba, which is normally the equivalent ofpari-.nam-. This would appear to indicate that some Buddhists at least, even as late as the period of the Tibetan translations, were still unaware of (or perhaps rather unimpressed by?) the subtle distinctions implied by the terms vivarta and pari.n~ma.) In view of this it is no doubt possible to compare the doctrine of the transformation (parOr6ma = anyathatva: Sthiramati) of the real vij~ana in the form of an unreal upacara with Bhartrhari's doctrine of illusory manifestation (vi-v~t-) proceeding from the real Aabdatattva- brahman, as has been done for instance by P. Hacker, Vivarta, p. 200-201; but the historical link between these two theories nevertheless remains somewhat unclear in view of the different backgrounds and premisses of the two systems. When the philosophers of grammar transcended the buddhiviparit.Tamatheory (see below), they were not necessarily under the influence of Vasubandhu; for their doctrine can be explained in great part as a development, against the background of contemporary Indian philosophical thought, of ideas contained in germ in the earlier grammatical texts. Compare v. 17 where the vijganaparit.lama is said to be vikalpa; Lafikavat~ras~tra p. 46 where the real transformation of the alayavijgana is denied; cf. La Vall6e Poussin, Vij~aptimatratasiddhi (Paris, 1928-29), p. 38; G. Tucci, Notes on the Lafk~vat~ra, IHQ, 1928, p. 550-551. 2~ Sthiramati on Tri.rngika v. 1 (p. 16, ed. S. L6vi) upacarasya niradharasyasambhavad

avagya~.n v~i~anapari~.tamo vastuto 'sty upagantavyo yatrdtmadharmopac~ra.h pravartate.

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nothing really exists, for the grammarian the fundamental reality is constituted by the permanent Aabda the modifications of which in grammar are explained by the ade~a/buddhiviparin.ama theory. Nevertheless, these differences between the two theories, together with the difficulties caused by Patafijali's terseness of expression, should not make us overlook the significance of this concept in the history of ideas leading to the later doctrines of change and causation. 2a To illustrate this, a passage from the Brahmasiddhi where Man..danami~ra states his doctrine of the word-nature may be adduced. 24 Though a full quotation and a detailed study of this passage must be reserved for another occasion, it should at least be mentioned since it speaks of the theory of viparin, dma in connexion with the verbal nature of brahman and the world. In the first verse of the Brahmasiddhi the expression ak.sara is used, and Ma.n.dana proceeds to explain the significance of this epithet under two heads: it may refer either to the verbal nature (gabddtmatd) or to the immutability of brahman. In conformity with the first explanation it is shown that just as vikdras are inherently connected with their original (prakrtirftpdnvitd vikdrd.h), so the world is inherently connected with the word-form (vdgrapa) inasmuch as the things of the world are perceived by the mind (vij~dna) which is coloured by it. It is therefore to be concluded that the world is an evolute (viparin.rima) or an appearance (vivarta) of vdc. For word is not a mere means to knowledge like sight since, in the absence of gabda, there can be no conscious perception of artha at all; 2~ nor is word to be compared to smoke which indicates fire by means of an inference because the nature of the relation in the two cases is quite different. In addition, intentional action (prav rtti) can only relate to a determinate 'this', and this determination is shown to be linked with verbal coloration including the subtle verbal impressions received in a previous life and located in the "heart". In this way the world, perceived as it is through the agency of

Moreover, for the Sautrfintika-Yoggtcgtralogicians, all verbal designation takes place by upacara or transfer since a name, implying as it does determinate thought (namakalpana etc.), cannot refer to the instantaneous thing-in-itself (svalak.sana) which alone is arthakriyakarin. - This conception bears a certain resemblance to the grammarians' distinction between the vastumatra and the abhidheyartha. ,3 Cf. above n. 19. - The passage of the VMbh itself which deals with the karyavipari.nama was noted by O. Strauss, ZDMG, 81 (1927), p. 134--135. 24 Brahmasiddhi, ed. S. Kuppuswami Sastri (Madras, 1937), p. 16-19. t5 The comm. by ~aflkhap~oi says na ca ~abdanullekhe ghat.adyarthollekho "stL

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word, is said to be a vivarta of vdc. ~8 Moreover, Man.d. ana observes that there are purely conventional (vydvahdrika) referents which exist only as gabdavivartas. Taking them as the basis of a generalisation, we may conclude that the same is true of all arthas. The conventional are divided into four classes: injunction and prohibition (vidhini.sedhau, e.g. kurydt, na kury~t), syntagmatic meaning (vdkydrtha), aggregates (samf~ha, e.g. vana "wood"), and non-entia such as the Catherine-wheel (aldtacakra) or the horns of the hare. Vidhi and nis.edha are considered to be essentially action (pravHti) and cessation (nivrtti), and they cannot be said to refer specificaUy to the past, to the present or to the future. Vidhi and ni.sedha are accordingly only pratibhd conforming to action and cessation and devoid of an external object. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that this pratibhd is altogether without an object (dlambana), for it consists essentially in knowledge; and there can be no knowledge in the absence of the object known. It is therefore proper to say that it is the word-essence (gabdatattva) that manifests (avabhdsate) in such and such a form in conformity with action and cessation from action. - Again, as regards syntagmatic meaning, it can be said that the vdktattva appears (vivartate) in a given form inasmuch as no determinate concept (vikalpapratyaya) can exist without verbal coloration. And the same is shown to apply also to aggregates and to non-entia. The whole discussion implicitly refers back to Bhartrhari's Vdkyapad?ya, especially with reference to the definite knowledge that emerges after a word has been applied to the abstract musical notes called .sa.dja etc. and to things like cows etc. In fact it is in order to obtain d e a r and definite knowledge that cowherds, shepherds and others apply names. Accordingly, the quality of thinking belonging to the intellect is said to depend on word-form (vdgrftpddh~nam eva citag cititvam). - According to another view mentioned by Ma.ndana, thought (citi) is a power of vdc; hence all objects of knowledge are inherently connected with the vt~grapa, and all is either an evolute (vikdra) or an appearance (vivarta) of vdc, just as on the one hand pots are the evolutes of clay and on the other the moons to be seen reflected in the ripples of water are appearances of the moon. According to the other interpretation, the epithet ak.sara means "immutable". Because the use of the simile of the clay might lead to the conclusion that brahman is subject to change, it is explicitly stated to be ,6 According to Saflkhap~.ni's comm., though both vipari.narnaand vivarta are considered here, the vivarta interpretation is Man.~tanami~ra's own. For other juxtapositions of vipari.nama and vivartana see p. 7.24 and p. 8.8-9; cf. JAOS, 78 (1958), p. 140.

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immutable. Now it is suggested in reply that permanence is not really untenable even in this case because the essence has not been destroyed, as has been explained in the maxim yasmin vikriyamd.ne 'pi tattva.m na vihanyate tad api nityam 'that thing is permanent the essence of which is not destroyed when it is modified'. Though Ma.n.dana admits the truth of this principle when applied to its proper sphere, he nevertheless considers that there is impermanence if there is transformation as a whole because of the absence in such a case of that dtmarapa which is unaffected (vi~uddha); and he adds that permanence is a f o r t i o r i destroyed should we assume the change of a single part (ekadeAaparin. ati) because we thereby imply the existence of parts. Accordingly purity, permanence and oneness apply to brahman as they do to the dkd~a which, despite fictitious deterruination, is really free of it and is unparticularised. It is rather correct to say that the fictitious transformation of a single part is imaginary (kalpanaya). It will immediately be seen from this brief summary of Ma .n.danami~ra's discussion that the considerations set forth in this two-fold interpretation of the term ak.sara belong to the gabdddvaita position and are different from those prevailing in the passages quoted earlier from the Mahdbhd.sya with their frequent Mim~m. s~t and Sa.mkhya echoes. Nevertheless this passage taken from the Brahmasiddhi is of interest in the present context because there is to be found in it a clear link with the problems treated in the Mahdbhd.sya: the mention of the principle that a thing, though modified, may yet be permanent provided its essence is not destroyed is apparently a free quotation from the Bhd.sya, ~7 and the expression vipari.ndma, which appears here together with the term vivarta, refers also in part to the psycho-linguistic process. The gabdddvaita however has here transcended the idea of a buddhiviparin.dma and examines the concept of a vipari~dma and of a vivarta of vdc, that is to say of the subtle word. The texts brought together here furnish then one more example of the close connexion existing between the early Ved~ntic philosophy and grammatical thought to those already known, for example the close link existing in the Rgveda between the concept of mdyd and speculation on 27 VMbh on the vdrtt, siddhe gabddrthasambandhe(ed NSP p. 63-64): athavd n~dam eva nityalak.sa.nam: dhruva~ kM.asthamavicdly anapdyopajanavikdry anutpatty avrddhy avyayayogi yat tan nityam iti. tad api nitya.m yasmi.ms tattva.m na vihanyate. - The same expressions recur in the VMbh under the satras 1.1.20 (ed. NSP p. 289) and 1.1.56(ed. NSP p.451). These passages discuss the kM.astha- and the parieama-nityatd, as does the Sh.mkhya. The VMbh also treats of ekade~avlklti in its comm. under 1.1.56 (ed. NSP p. 451) and else where (e.g. under ~S 2).

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speech (e.g. RV 5.40.6 and 10.71.5) and the use by the grammarian Bhart~hari of the term vivartate in the first verse of the Vdkyapadiya. Though much more research will be required to trace in detail all the developments and variations of these theories in the philosophers of grammar and elsewhere, it does not seem too far fetched at present to suppose, in view of the above mentioned links, that the grammatical schools were occupied to a certain extent with the problem of change and causation in the period of about half a millenium that separates the Vdkyapad~ya from the Mahdbhds.ya. 28 Furthermore, it may thus appear unnecessary to explain the vivarta concept of Bhartrhari, Ma.n.danami~ra and the Advaita as a historical development in great part from the vijgdnaparin,dma of Vasubandhu and the Vijfianav~dins. For the problem, as well as the question of interconnexion in this matter between Br~thmanical and Buddhist thought, is thus put back to the time of the Mahdbhd.sya, that is probably to the 2nd-lst centuries B.C. if the current chronology is to be accepted. And, as has been seen, the P~t.ninean method of formulating the process of substitution as opposed to the normal Pr~ti~khya method is also of potential significance in this respect. 29 In short, it can be said that this theory of a transformation of the consciousness (buddhivipar#.zdma) was developed from a realistic position assuming the reality and permanence of 'the word (gabda), the object (artha, i.e. as dkrti) and their connexion (sambandha). It would seem that this theory was then bypassed by the philosophers of grammar beginning with Bhartt:hari, since it was no longer required in the light of the gabdabrahma- and sphot.a-vdda. However, though the theory itself was thus rendered unnessary, the tendency it represents of studying mental processes rather than external objects was to remain characteristic of the later philosophers of grammar who, in their doctrine of sphot.a, emphasise the subtle word and its correlate, the mental object.

28 Cf. also VP 3.7 karma. 45ff.; P. Ch. Chakravarti, Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar (Calcutta, 1930), p. 262ff. (and my Contributions t~l'histoire . . . . p. 62-64). 29 Th. Stcherbatsky thought it possible to trace in the A~;t.adhydyi a distinction between pratiyatna (= sato gutzdntaradhanam) and sa.mskfta (= sata utkar.sadhdnam) corresponding to the difference established by the Buddhists between upakdra and sa~skara; v. Central Conception of Buddhism (London, 1923), p. 22 n. 1 and p. 69 n. 2.