PHL471 Philosophy of Mind Sofia Ormazabal Pachamama as an expression of Panpsychism in Andean thought I.

. Introduction In this paper I seek to draw an analogy between the Western notion of Panpsychism and the Andean concept of Pachamama. Furthermore, I intend to answer if Pachamama is an expression of Panpsychism within the framework of Andean cosmology. By Panpsychism I mean the philosophical view that argues that all matter has a mind, at least in some degree. By Pachamama, I make use of the Aymara-Quechua concept, which stands for both time and space. However, within that time and space framework, Pachamama includes all physical things and phenomena, together with their spirits, minds, or vital force. I intend to provide an account of how Andean thought has sought to answer the mind-body problem, and has arrived to a solution that has a strong resemblance to the Western philosophy doctrine of Panpsychism. By pointing out common features between the two points of view, I will show that Pachamama is perfectly consistent with at least one form of Panpsychism.

II.

Western Panpsychism: Panpsychism is normally defined as the view that all things have a mind or mind-like quality

(Skrbina 2007). However, as noted by Skrbina, Panpsychism does not define precisely what a mind is, rather, it is the choice of the Philosopher endorsing or criticizing Panpsychism to propose a particular concept of mind that accommodates to his or her version of Panpsychism. As a result, there can be dualist, functionalist, or reductionist flavors of Panpsychism. Despite this lack of consensus, Panpsychists define mind as something that can exist in very diverse kinds of organisms, a concept that is broad enough to be applied to humans, animals, plants and other beings.

There is no agreement among Panpsychists about the characteristics and abilities that a mind should possess. However, some selected features seem to be present in most Panpsychism views. For the sake of this paper, Mind (or mental qualities) is to be understood as an internal process, or a united collection of processes, of an entity, that allow that entity to have subjective experiences (Panexperentialism), qualia, will (Schopenhauer 1819, p. 37), feelings, and sentience (Pansensism) (Diderot 1769, p.49). Another issue that divides Panpsychists is the scope to which all things (Skrbina 2007) applies. Some Panpsychists argue that all things applies to the whole cosmos, others, to closed systems, such as the Earth, or to a particular biosphere. Other philosophers, such as Leibniz(Leibniz , ) endorse the view that even our constituent elements, such as atoms, or even electrons, have some degree of mind. Some others impose more restrictive qualities and claim that mind only applies to all things that are alive. David Chalmers goes one step further and proposes to draw a line between Panpsychism and one of its particular variations, which he calls Panprotopsychism. Panprotopsychism is a refined kind of Panpsychism in which all fundamental elements of matter have certain properties that are prerequisites for something to have a mind. In his own words, Panprotopsychism is the view that fundamental entities are proto-conscious, that is, that they have certain special properties that are precursors to consciousness and that can collectively constitute consciousness in larger systems (Chalmers 2012, p.2). For the purpose of this paper, I will focus on a particular kind of Panpsychism named Spinozist psycho-physical parallelism(Skrbina 2007). Spinoza's psycho-physical parallelism, or just Spinozist parallelism, is the view by which all kinds of matter, inert or alive, have some degree of mind, or some ongoing process that can be defined as mental (Spinoza, Ethics, II Prop 3). This definition of

Panpsychism is applicable to a macro scope: closed systems, conformed by entities that interact with each other, and to a micro or monadic scope: the basic elements of matter, or monads in Leibniz'

theory of the Science of monads (Leibniz 1989, p139). By accepting the proposition that the basic elements of matter have some degree of mind, and that these basic elements can be added up and conform a united system, which also would qualify as having a mind, we arrive at two powerful conclusions. First, we can conclude that mind is not an emergent property, since mind is present in all level of matter. And second, we could say that mind exhibits compositionality, that is, less complex elements can be combined and structured producing a new and more complex element. It is important to know that the basic elements do not lose their own degree of mind, they continue to exhibit mind-like qualities. In addition, when the system is dismembered, the constituent parts do not lose their own mental qualities, it is only the system that loses both its status of system and its mental attributes. Panpsychism is theory about the presence and distribution of mind, mental states, or mental capabilities in all matter, human and non-human organisms. Although Panpsychism is compatible with both materialistic and dualistic theories of mind, it is in conflict with Emergentism. Mind is seen as a fundamental property of all matter, thus, Panpsychism is in conflict with theories that conceive the mind as a emergent property.

Andean thought's Pachamama: Pachamama is an Aymara and Quechua word which usually refers to the Earth in a divine sense, as in Mother Earth. However, Pachamama is not an anthropomorphic deity, rather, it is the fundamental explanatory principle of in the South American native people's cosmovision (Merlino & Rabey 1933). Pacha can stand for time, space, world, or cosmos. Thus, Pachamama is a time-space material and spiritual dimension that encompasses all the humans, living creatures, material things, and other phenomena in the cosmos. In addition, all of these elements have a spiritual and physical dimension, which is also part of Pachamama. If we analyze the spiritual element of each entity that

belongs to Pachamama, we will find that the properties of this soul or spirit, such as sentience or subjective experience, are also qualities that we would regard as mental. Thus, we can say that all the entities that belong to Pachamama have a mind. Pachamama can be regarded as a system conformed by the individual entities that are a part of it. Each of these entities has a mind, and Pachamama has a mind herself. In Andean thought's cosmology, we observe a case of both Panentheism and Animism. I shall proceed to explain why these two aspects are not incompatible with Panpsychism. First, lets take a look at Panentheism. Panentheism claims that there is only one god whose spirit is present in all things. Every spirit is the god's spirit. In simple words, every entity shares the single spirit of the god. This entails that the god's mind would be shared by all the things as well, hence, there would only be one mind, and the individual elements would not have an independent mind. In contrast, according to Panpsychism every entity has a mind of its own. These minds can constitute a system which conforms a more complex mind. But still, this complex mind is a product of the different simpler minds put together, and serves as a sort of central processing unit, rather than one single mind that is shared by all. On the other hand, Andean cosmology does picture the minds of the simpler constituents of Pachamama in an Animistic way. Therefore, all matter is seen as having a human-like mind. This entails that every object would be equally capable of sensing, feeling, hoping, and creating as a human is. Although this vision is highly unlikely and difficult to defend, it is still perfectly consistent with Panpsychism's basic requirements, although not with Protopanpsychism's. Pachamama is one of the pillar concepts of Andean cosmology. As a product of Quechua and Aymara thinkers, it provides a holistic approach to the mind-body problem, by proposing that there is a god-like being that possesses a soul that is made out of all the individual souls of all material elements, and acts as a intercommunicated system where all these souls interact and act

as a whole. Is Pachamama a kind of Panpsychism? Both Panpsychism and Pachamama propose that all existing things have a mind. However, there are subtle differences between the two doctrines, in respect to the kind of things regarded as minded and to the complexity of the mind attributed. Moreover, not every kind of Panpsychism is compatible with Pachamama, as the later presupposes that the mind attributed to an object is equally complex as a human mind. In addition, both concepts belong to different philosophical frameworks. Panpsychism is an unlikely offspring of the Western tradition, as Western philosophers tend to focus on analyzing phenomena from the divide et impera (divide and conquer) point of view ( Estermann 2004, p.9). Thus, Western though tends to look at systems from a bottom-up perspective, looking at fundamental elements and properties first, and then focusing on the overall behavior or characteristics of a phenomenon or a system. This particular way of thinking makes a view like Panpsychism, which assumes some degree of universality among all matter, seem outrageous. On the other hand, Andean though, like many Eastern philosophies, tends to look at events as a whole, and then peels off the higher levels of complexity of the phenomenon, in order to understand the less complex processes or components of the event. Andean thinkers evaluate systems from a topdown perspective. This mindset fosters ideas such as Panpsychism, where the whole is more important than the part. In addition, Andean thought still preserves many elements from archaic cosmologies and beliefs, which have been blended with Western notions in a process called Syncretism. As a consequence, concepts like Pachamama are inherited by younger generations which are raised in a Western-like environment. And these new generations give the old native cosmological terms modernized definitions and interpretations, that are coherent with a Western-like framework. An example of this situation would be certain kinds of Eco-Philosophy that base their beliefs in statements

such as (Mind) was in nature in the very beginning (Skrbina 2011), and refer to the Earth as Mother Earth, or Pachamama in the communities near the Andes, even though they have no direct contact with the people who regard Pachamama as a cosmological concept. Another important difference is the fact that for Panpsychism to be a feasible theory, and stand against more widely accepted theories of mind, it must let go of the idea that all entities have equally complex minds, as Pachamama says. As Chalmers and Skrbina point out: as the complexity of the organism or system declines, mental faculties should decline and be simplified too. According to these philosophers' view, it would not be possible for an amoeba to have the same mental states that a college student has. In contrast, according to Pachamama, these two beings would be able to have the same kind of mental states. Setting aside these differences, we can clearly see that Pachamama would correspond to an early kind of Panpsychism, as the ones proposed by philosophers such as Leibniz, Spinoza or Bruno. I pointed out the word early as a way to draw attention to the fact that these kinds of Panpsychism refer to souls rather than minds, in contrast with the predominance of mind in the current concept of Panpsychism. For example, Spinoza's parallelism refers explicitly to the presence of souls, and not strictly to the presence of minds, as a contemporary Panpsychist would do so. Furthermore, early Panpsychism shares the animistic characteristics present in Pachamama. For instance, in Leibniz' science of monads, monads can have appetites and perceptions, abilities we would now attribute to a human-like mind. One criticism against the idea that Pachamama is a kind of Panpsychism could be the fact that Andean thought would be normally classified as a religious cosmology, rather than a philosophy, on the grounds that it refers more to the origin of the world and creatures, and proposes a whole theory of how the world was created and how it is currently organized. But if we examine a theory like Leibniz' who claims that the world is made of elemental, and souled, particles we also have an explanation of the origin of the world. Furthermore, if we examine views like those of Empedocles, Anaxagoras or

Heraclitus we can notice the pattern: the formulation of a Panpsychist theory requires to make cosmological statements. Panpsychism is not only a theory about minds, but also a theory about all matter.

Conclusion: The purpose of this paper is to point out common elements in two geographically, culturally, and chronologically distant philosophies. This comparison focused on the topic of Panpsychism, and intended to show that Pachamama can be considered as a specific kind of Panpsychism. First, I gave a broad description of Panpsychism and its most salient features. As well, I provided an account of the two fundamental questions in order to define a Panpsychist view: what is considered a mind, and to which extent does the principle of mind is present in all things apply. Then, I described one variety of Panpsychism, Spinoza's Psycho-physical parallelism, the view by which every object has two modes: a mode of extension and a mode of thought. This idea entails that every object has a mind, or something mind-like, and a physical extension. As well, if we ascribe to Panpsychism, we have to assume that mind is not an emergent property, that mental states and systems can be combined to form more complicated systems, and that the mental cannot be separated from the physical. Following the topic of Panpsychism I focused on identifying the main characteristics of Pachamama. Pachamama is a basic principle in the Andean cultures' explanation of the origin of the world, and its current structure and natural laws. As well, it proposes a view that addresses the mindbody problem, by attributing a soul, hence a mind, to all matter. Like many early cosmologies, Andean though has a strong Animistic view of matter, which leads this philosophy to attribute human complex minds to much simpler elements of matter. Pachamama perceives every kind of matter, living or non living as having a human-like mind. In addition, Pachamama can be erroneously perceived as a kind of Panentheism. While

Pachamama has a religious component, and plays the role of uniting all existing matter, Pachamama is not the only being endowed with a soul. Rather, Pachamama is the name for a system which establishes relations, and serves as an umbrella soul for all the other, less complex souls. According to Andean thought, every element has its own soul, while Panentheism discards this idea, and claims that God is the only being with a soul. Moreover, God's soul is distributed along different levels of matter, so that every material element has God's soul in it. In short, in Pachamama every object has its own soul, while in Panentheism everything shares the same soul. Pachamama can be seen as a subset of Panpsychism, as it complies with the basic requirements of the later: it provides a soul for every living and non living being. In addition, Pachamama is also compatible with Spinozist psycho-physical parallelism and Leibniz' science of monads. With the first theory, because Pachamama does attribute mental qualities or an extension of thought to every element in the cosmos. And with the second theory, because Pachamama conceives even the least complex items as minded, allows compositionality, and the creation of more complicated systems that behave as one when looked according to its macro-features. By comparing Pachamama and Panpsychism, one is able to appreciate the distinct approaches which different cultures give to the mind body problem. As a result of this comparison, I realized that the native thinkers of the Andes were not so distant from their Western counterparts, and that the mindbody problem has been always crucial for our understanding of the cosmos and our own nature. I this paper I described how the topic of the distribution of the mind of different beings has been addressed by different cultures, and that they surprisingly share many aspects of their respective visions. As shown above, Pachamama complies, not with one, but at least with two kinds of Panpsychism. And even more analogies can be found if we compare Pachamama with earlier theories, such as those of the Pre-Socratic thinkers. As a result, I would encourage enthusiasts and critics of Panpsychism to look at all the non commonly studied cultural frameworks that postulate theories about the distribution of mind and matter, so that they can get a further understanding of the problems and

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