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20330. 1 Jun 1967.
28 FEB 1979, DoDD 5200.10; PER OAG D/A ltr 29
Apr 1980
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28 feb 1970, DoDD 5200.10
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THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF
THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS. TITLE 1 8 ,
U.S.C., SECTIONS 7 9 3 AND 7 9 4 . THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF
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SECRET
OFFICE OF
(li'/?Fe{
r
(o 7
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON. D. C. 20310
INWLYWmTO
A G A M -P (M ) (23 M iy 67) FOR OT
flprraffn
1
"rrtTt -Lessons Learned, j^U Field Force
Vietnam Artillery if L\^
T
) ,
V
r*m-1 9 67
SEE DISTRIBUTION
OJL
0
3 / ^rui 6 . 7 ,
1 . Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned,
Headquarters, II Field?force Vietnam Artillery for quarterly period
ending 31 January 1 96 ?/ Information contained in this report should be
reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6 c and d of
\AR 1 - 1 9 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6 c and d of AR 1 - 1 9.
Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT
within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2 . Information contained in this report is provided to the Com-
mandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the
future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted
S, . for use in developing training material.
LlJ
BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:
1
I
1 Incl
as
^^// 6. JtadJi-
~* KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General
o -
DISTRIBUTION:
Commanding General V_><.
US Army Combat Development Command
US Continental Army Command
Commandants
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US Army Air Defense School
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US Army Ordnance School y
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Copies furnished:
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Deputy Chief of Staff
national Aeronautic! * Space Administration, Office of Defense Affaire
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jBFFORCEV
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS II FELD FORCE VIETNAM ARTILLERY
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96266
14 FEB1967
OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED
QUARTERLY FOR PERIOD ENDING 3 1 JANUARY 1 3 6?
(RCS CSFOR-65MU)
V
PI.
~ - ' ' I '
v
~ i. .
*31U
POROTRO
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te o tlo n Z - Sigaifio ant Or ganisatio n A o tlTltle s
(IOO0) idndLiastr ntio n/Pe r e ctine l,
1.
9|
V
^
He adquar te r s and He adquar te r s Batte r y, II Ho ld lo r e
Tie tnan A r tille r y it o r ganise d undo 101 6-501B with a auth o r ise d and
assigne d str e ngth m o f 31 Januar y o o fo llo ws*
A U THORIZ ED A SSU M ED
sn a s as a a
54 2 159 58 2 174*
* Th e indicate d o r e r e tr e ngth io duo to tr ansie nt pe r so nne l
dur ing a r o tatio nal pe r io d
28
G A DS
OFF W O BM OFT W D
7 0 27 5 0
5 Casualtie s dur ing th o po r io d ino lndo t
K ille d in no tio n 0
Dio d o f battle wo und 0
W o unde d in no tio n 0
M issing in no tio n 0
Io n-battle de ath 0
Io n-battle casualti 0
4* Pe r so nne l M anago nant
HQ , II JfOBCB? A r tille r y 81 Se ctio n co ntinue d to pe r fo m
e dninie tr atlTo functio ns fbr th o h e adquar te r and to no nito r pe r so nne l
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
81*313
'
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
action for the headquarter battery. The 5th Battalion (AV)(SP), 2d
Artillery was placed under the operational command of thie headquarter.
Thi aotion lightly increeaed the administrative dutie of the eotlon.
Initial orientation and aasiytance a given to the battalion in the
area of publication, BbR, award and decoration, peoial services
at a activities. Caaualty report and efficiency rating
fron Mt .^. alion are now ohcnneled through this eotlon*
5 Het and Hecuperatlon Program.
Iho following out of country BfcR trip were taken by mem-
ber of thi headquarter t
LOCATIQB MOT BBC JAB
Bangkok 2 4
1 0
Hong Kong 1 2 2
Tokyo 1 2 0
Taipei 1 0 0
Penang 0 2 0
Hawaii 1 2
5
Thi ieadquarter' BAR program operate within the allo-
cation given to II FFQRCE7 .
6. Morale.
The morale of the organization continue to be outstanding.
7 Award and Decoration.
the period.
The following award and decorations were presented dut? w;\
Bronx Star Medal
Air Medal
Army Commendation Medal
Good Conduct Medal
3
1
4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
FOR OMCIAt USE ONIY
i
8 . Discipline. Law sad Order
the following judicial and non-judicial actions ware eon-
duotod during this reporting period:
Article 1 $ 2
Sway (to ur t-Har tial 0
So cial Ontr t-lie r tlal 2
G e ne r al Co ur t-M ar tie l 0
9 Safe ty.
The battery sustained three vehicle accidents during this
period, all of which were minor
10. Civil A ffair e .
Dur ing th is r e po r ting pe r io d th e Staff Ch e mical Office r
co ntinue d to pe r fo r m additio nal dutie s an th e 35. fh e unit civic ac-
tio n pr o gr am co ntinue d, with additio nal fo o d and clo th ing diatr ibute d
U > th e pmo o l and o r ph anage at th e ne ar by h amle t o f HOsTA I Til G DI.
ftr to o ntly, th e h e adquar te r s, in co njunctio n with attach e d unite be gan
e po ne o r ing o la*ae e in apo ke n ftigiM sh la th e h amle t* A ll unite fur *
<i*h ? 4 lnjtr n. * ; * v'jr t ng o ne fc" '*r classe s in th e h amle t daily
so ir ty o f U i*4i.i e lsae e e * *;io h h ave at with o o iie e r able e nth usie aa
fr o m th e citlse ns e r f Butt A I VA R C0I
f
h ave be e n give n th us fax and ar e
atte nde d daily ly ^pi.r o jr inate ly 230 Vie tname se , fh e M e dical Clvlo
A ctio n Pr o gr am (K tiU U A lOf initiate d by th is h e adquar tar a la Se pte mbe r
Vj6d
9
co ntinue d dur ing th ie r e po r ting pe r io d Th e pr o gr am co nsistJ
o f twice -we e kly visits to ifiSA I VA I 001 by me dically qualifie d pe r *
fiittihki to pi7ido e ce &ssr y me dical car e to Vie tname se civilians A
to tal o f e igh te e n vie lte h ave be e n co nducte d and an ave r age o f 150
patie nte ar e tr e ate d at e ach vie lt Bo th gr o upe unde r o pe r atio nal
co mmand o f th is h e adquar tar a h ave e stablish e d and suppo r t sa e me r ge tlo
pr o gr am basically in th e ar e a o f K BDCA P, fur nish ing mate r ial fo r se lf~
h e lp pr o gr ams co mmunity r e latio ns K nglish -Vie tname se and Vie tname se -
anglish language classe s and suppo r ting sch o o ls and o r ph anage s in th e ir
ar e as. In additio n th e 23d A r tille r y G r o up h as aa active pr o gr am in
th e co nstr uctio n o f a r e fuge e village
11. Public Info r matio n Pr o gr am
Publio information activities continue under the direc-
tion of the SI Section During this period several articles submitted
by this headquarters appeared la various civilisn and military periodicals
3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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published in Vietnam Additionally, the Cannoneer a newspaper pub-
liehed at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, published several article concerning
the activities of II FfORCOT Artillery.
1 2* Change of QmgmgAm
Brigadier General V 0 Grlttenbsrger, Jr., ho had been
transferred to the American embassy in SAIGOI for a special assignment,
returned to II BORGE? Artillery and assuaed ooaasnd on 1 0 Januar/
Oolonel George R. Allin, Jr., ho ooaaanded since 7 Septeaber 1 9 66,
beoaae the Deputy Goosander*
B. (S) Opormttons/lhtelligonoe
1 . (C) General.
Operations and intelligence activities of the headquar-
ters during this period included nony of the aaae projscts reported in
the previous Operational Report as ell as initiation of several new
projects. She plea for stationing of II IfGRGaY Artillery units aa
revised in light of changes la the troop program and the taotloal situa-
tion Refinements ere aade In the headquarters' aerial visual reoon-
naisanoe program Assistance to AR7 X in artillery employment continued
to ooamend much of the headquarters attention
2 (S) Han for Stationing of Artillery Unite
a During this reporting period the 1 9 9 th Light Infantry
Brigade (Separate) beoaae operational, with its base camp located at
LOW BUH. The 9 th Infantry Division established bass oaaps at BEAR CAT,
and at D0 G TAM in the I? Corps Taotloal Zone A majer W maneuver unit
was stationed at DAU TIE for the first time when th* 3 d Brigade, 4 th
Infantry Division displaced to that location from BEAR GAT. As addi-
tional maneuver units arrived, end new artillery units came to II IfQRGEV
Artillery, the stationing plan of II fPOBCET Artillery wa& revised. The
current plan is at Inolosure 1 Range capabilities of 1 7 5mm $m units
disposed In aooordanoe with the stationing plan are shown at Inclosurs
2 Unit locations referred to are depicted on the asp at Inoios :e 2
b During this reporting period four additional artil-
lery Battalions beeeme operational under II flCRCEY artillery
(1 ) After completing staging at PH LOI, the 7 th
Battalion, 9 th Artillery (7 /9 th Arty) (tOJnn T) moved to a base camp
at BEAR CAT, closing sad becoming operational on 1 3 lovenber One or
more of its firing batteries have been on operational missions out of
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7
baa* oaap ever einoe that date* The battalion ma aaeiajaed to the 3 4 th
Artillery Group.
(2) ill pereonnel of tat 1 ft Battalion, 63 * Artillery
(l/8 5d Arty) (8 " SP) arrived la oountry IQT 1 Boveaber; however, the bat-
talion^ equipment did not arrive until 1 Beoeaber* Burin November the
peraonnal ere located In a etagiag area at LOW BIIB, although a por-
tion of the battalion moved to BUI BAT. near BA RIA, on 22 Bovanber to
prepare a baaa camp. Shortly after the equipment vaa unloaded, half of
the 8 " hovltie*s were oonverted to 1 7 5 put forming a ooapoalte 8 "/
1 7 5 battalion, ma battalion, vhloh vaa aneigne* to the 54 th Artil-
lery Group, beoaae operational on 1 2-1 6 December at three looatlone,
with the headquarters end one xIring battery at BOX BAT, one firing
attery at SAR CA9 and one firing battery at X DAB LOC.
(5) The advance party of the 2d Battalion, 1 1 th Ar-
tillery (2/l1 th Arty) (1 55 *) arrived by air on 3 0 Hovember, vhlle
the aaln body arrived at VUHG TAB by ahlp on 1 5 Beccaber. The batta-
lion vaa etaged at PHU LOI, beooalng operational on 27 Beoeaber under
the 23 d Artillery Group* One firing battery relocated on that date to
GO BAU HA. O 2 January one firing battery aoved to a baae oaap at
BAB TiatG.
(4 ) The 5th Battalion (Automatic Weapons) (Self-
propelled), 2d Artillery (Reinforced) (5/2d Arty), originally programmed
for deployment in II CTZ, van diverted to II FFORCB? by COHUSHACV in
SEGRKT message MACJ)22
f
DTG 1 8 1 4 252 Hov 66, subject: 5th AV Bn (SP),
2d Arty (iteinf) (U). The unit
1
a advance party, having arrived at QU1
HHON in the II Corpa Zone on 1 6 Roveaber, flev to BISH HOA on 22
November, unit equipment and peraonnal were diverted at aea to III
CTZ and the aaln body arrived by ship at YUNG TAU on 27 Roveaber*
The 54 th Artillery Group eponaored the 5/2d Arty The battalion be-
oaae operational on 27 Beoeaber under the operational command of II
FWttCEV Artillery. Paragraph 5 belov contalna a dlaouaalon of the
employment of the primary veapone of the 5/2d Arty
o. Concerning tks plan for future etationlng of II
JTORCEV Artillery unite, Iacloeure 1 , the folloving polnta ehould be
notedr
(1 ) A plan for atatloning heavy artillery at BKei
IUC vaa dlaeuaaed in Section I, paragraph B2h of the previous Opera*
tlonal Report* Work on a position at BEB LUC nan been delayed because
of other ooamltments of engineer reaouroea In III CTZ. It la hoped
that the position at BEB LUC vlll be prepared for occupation in April.
If ao, It vlll be oocupled temporarily by a battery from another loca-
tion until more heavy artillery arrives
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1
(2) Duo to continuing operations of the 1 st Infantry
Division near QUA LOI
f
in the extreme northern portion of III CTZ, a
deolelon van made to station a heavy battery at that looation to extend
artillery coverage. Btry A, 6/27 th Arty (8 "/l7 5um SP) will displace to
QUA! LOI in February.
(3 ) In order to extend artillery coverage into War
Zone C, Btry B, 3 /3 2d Arty (8 "/t7 5o* SP) will aove fron LAI HE in Feb-
ruary to SOI DA Special forces Camp, 1 6 kiloaeters northeast of TAT
BTBH. 'Hie coverage from SUOI DA ill still include the important
MJCHBLH Plantation area.
(4 ) The planned arrival of the 7 th Battalion, 8 th
ety) (8 " Artillery (7 /8 th Arty) (8 " SP) in June 1 9 67 will permit extension of
heavy artillery coverage in several directions* It is planned to con-
vert the firing batteries of this battalion to three composite 8
rt
/l7 5mn
batteries* In conjunction with restationlng of current heavy batteries
new ooverage will be provided at Half TAB in the eastern portion of III
CTZ, at MIO TAN, a brigade base camp of the 9 th Infantry Division near
MT WO in IV CTZ, and at BW LUC*
3 * (C) Air Defense Weapons in a Ground Support Bole*
During this reporting period the 5th Battalion (Automatic
Weapons) (Self-propelled), 2d Artillery (Reinforced) ($/2d Arty) began
operations in III CTZ. The battalion is organised imder TQB 4 4 -8 5? *
Upon activation at Port Biles, Texas, the battalion as reinforced by
the attachment of Battery D, 7 let Artillery, an M55 caliber 50 machine
gun battery organised under TOB 4 4 -8 5T. After arriving in BVV the 24
machine gun squads of the machine gun battery were attached to the four
firing batteries of the 5/2d Artyy two sections each to Batteries A and
3 and one section each to Batteries C and D. Upon becoming operationalt
operational control of one firing battery was passed to the 1 st Divi-
sion sad one to the 25th Division later all four batteries participated
in Operation CBDAB FALLS* Thus far the H4 2 twin 4 0 am and K55 caliber
50 machine gun aeotlons have been employed both as maneuver elements
and as firs support element e* Both weapons have been used extensively
for convoy esoort and security. The quad *50 has proved to be parti-
cularly effective in providing close-in defense of installations auch
as field CPU, artillery fire support bases and forward supply com-
plexes* In numerous oases the quad 50 machine gun has\been dismounted
from its 2 ton truck mount and hellllftsd into forward areas to pro-
vide additional support to front line infantry units* The mobility of
the twim 4 0 sm has been exploited by employing the weapon in missions
such as road clearing and securing and using It to support mobile men-
ewer elements euch as mechanised infantry and armored cavalry. Some
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h ave ne e d the we apo n la the indir e ct fix sol by iate gr e tlag
it lato unsattiamlai pmgr saa end laaaaaalag and inte r dicting fin in
amjlo jae at tao aalansa U X so do ubt stabilise afte r W M ve r to ne te ch -
nique s h ave be an itr iiil ft analyse d* Se ve r al M b IW IM ir t no *
be ing co ndno to d. Th e wmtimlmm sh o uld be o o ne available la U M ve r y
ne ar future. A t bis po int, lamlo ntio ns ar e th at th e j/aft A r ty am
be st be utilise d la th e gr o und suppo r t sola by aalate Jnlag tat fir ing
batte r ie s aaftar o par atio aal co ntr o l o f o r attao baft to tbo
o f tbo anjo r ao ao ur o r e l<
4* (8) Aircraft for Artillery U nite .
a A a po iato d o at la Se ctio n I
9
par agr aph B3 aat So o tio a
II, Port 2, par agr aph B o f tbo Ope r atio nal Be po r t for tbo poriod e nding
31 October 1966, tbo ao o d for air cr aft tc aappo r t artillery oporatiooo
la urgent. During thia period, there wo o little relief la thio problea
area; aa a natter of fact the r e quir e me nt bo o aat e ve n gr e ate r dae to
the arrival of additional artillery unite.
b. The 54th Artillery Group now baa three operational
btrotte (l/X Arty, 2/35th Arty and 7/9th Arty), fiKperlence in
Vie nan has shown that three 0-1 typo aircraft per group h e adquar te r s
arid :-no 0-1 per artillery battalion ar e required to provide adequate
a*;;**! ue^c 11-. . tula -roup and ita battalion bar e no organic air-
craft* The only observation aircraft support available ia aircraft fur-
nh*i rrt-r- II ?S"(lCW Fixed Wing Conpaniea on a aisalo n baala. Thia
gr o an in ?* .?*. the lev, i . f tbrce 0-1 aircraft pe r d^
f
i'u. Lii&Lt wi '..-. . v *i ^..rafi re^.-xd lo r a group with three
hatbiUona /ic^ou'
o, *ba ?*A frtillary Grsnp h aa nine 0-1 aircraft, but
reu>ij&*ftiia tor those aseets becane greater when th e group's lo.utb
tail-A5 on '-/na Arty) becwae operational without organic aircraft.
a. In addition to th e two groups, two other unite
(HHB, 8th CAJ0/2$tb Arty and 5/2d Arty) are operational without aircrew
These unita do net require observation aircraft, but cannot perform
their ni salons properly in Viet nan without helicopter aupport
e. Th e 2)d Artillery Group h aa five OH-13 helicopter a
with an average availability of three per day* Th is group is required
by tnls headquarters to furnish One OH-13 daily, on a mission baala,
to the 34th Artillery Group, leaving only two helicopters to perform
the myriad coaraid, control, reoonnalaaance, courier and logistical
support functions of a group headquarters and four battalions.
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1
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f. II FF0 RC8 V normally furnishes two TH-1 helloopters
ouch day OB a mleeion basis to II FIORCBV Artillery, ft two heli-
copters ut be used to support ft group headquarters 1 th thro* artil-
lery battalions, an automatic vaapona battalion and tho headquarters
of n target acqulaitlon battalion Thla support la obviously inade-
quate, and results in ft serious deterioration of ton oosmmnders* abi-
lity to influence the notion of the vldeapread unite for union they
re reeponaible an veil en inadequate reconnaissance, delay In sur-
vey operntiona and unevoidable odmlnietrative and logistical pcoblene.
g. This problem of adequate aviation support hen been
cited In ell previous Operational Reports submitted by this hendquar-
terni until adequate aircraft are provided fully effective artillery
operations cannot be achieved As stated previously, these require-
dt re as follows:
/*
(1 ) force Artillery Headquarters (also supports
separate battalions and batteries)s Four UH-1 's, three 0 -1 's.
(2) Croup Headquarters: Three 0 -1 'e, two OH-IJ'a
and one U-6.
(5) Artillery Battalion: Two 0 -1 8 and one OH-1 3
for each battalion.
5* (c) Visual Aerial Reoonnalssanoe (VR).
a. Visual aerial reconnaissance continued to be tho
best method of gathering intelligence and locating targets of oppor-
tunity in Vietnam* Although the potential effectiveness of Vfi was not
fully realised due to a critical shortage of aircraft, the II FPORCEV
Artillery VR Program did obtain highly important results.
b. Under the II FfORGEV Visual Reconnaissance Program,
II RDRCnV Artillery is assigned VR responsibility of areas within range
of heavy artillery but outside the Tactical Areas of Responsibility
(TAOR) of US units* Shis assignment of VR missions gives II HQRGEV
Artillery responsibility for some 1 3 , 0 0 0 square kilometers in III CTZ,
oonpared to en vesmge of 1 , 60 0 square kilometers for a division*
o* In executing the VR program, artillery groups are
assigned VR responsibility for speoifio sseas based on the bass camp
positions of their artillery and their aircraft assets* Groups fur-
ther sub-divide their areas down to battalions.
8
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dU To th e e xtant po ssible , th a M M IT o bse r ve r flie s
tli sams r ft day aftar day. to la h aa th e o bvio us sdvsntage o f allo wim*
th a o bse r ve r to be co me co mple te ly fM illar with a spe cifio ar e a, aai la
e r aae e e h ia ability to do to o t ch ange s la mo vsmsmt patte r ae . Oh tacr ar t
are br ie fad aad de br ie fad fo e e ach nle e lo m. ir aaa ane w o th e r Inte lli-
ge nce e o ur o ce ladio ata po taatlaX ano ny activity r a daaljaatad far
tie nlar atte ntio n. Spat r e po r te o n lapo r taat sigh tings ar m and*
Inte llige nce o h ajme le aad a co mple te fl apar t o f all *a**^g far a
24-hour par io d it fo r war de d th r o ugh inte lligsno e o h aanals to r e ach XI
IK ftC&T 02 A ir dally.
a. In fito aaaar , wh ich ana tba f Ir at mo nth 1 vmle h II
ffORCBT A r tille r y h ad two gr o use and e avan ar tillar jr battalio n* o pe r a-
tio nal, a to tal o f 616 inte llige nce sigh ting* ar e r apo r tad by ar tlllar y
o bse r ve r s and 192 o f th aaa aar a attao fcad with ar tlllar y aa tar ge ts o f
o ppo r tunity
6. (s) Re o ulr sacnts fo r A dditio nal Co untar ao r tar Radar Satt.
a. In Section I, par agr aph B4 o f th a pr ar lo aa Ope r atio nal
Report, th a effective use o f ao r tar a ay th e VC and th e limitatio n o n ef-
fectiveness of the AN /M PQ -4A due to ita nar r o w aao to r o f scan war e cite d.
Information was alec fur nish e d o n a plan to pr o vide ade quate o o unte xmo r -
tar radar co ve r age by utilising th r e e ae ta at e ach o r itio al lo catio n auch
t'.n airfield, h at''. 1vipe and lo gistical co mple xe s. Th ir ty-se ve n co unte r -
aoriar radar detachcunta war e r e quir e d to imple me nt th is pr o gr am and
this r e quir e me nt waa include d In th a 3A BY tr o o p Pr o gr am
... ii N o ve mbe r \Jic
9
dua to an actio n impo sing a
iixiop oeili.4 io .leu**, th a De par tmsnt o f the A r my dale tad th aaa
det&uhmenta from tht* Troop Pr o gr am Th e y can be r e instate d In th a pro
gram only if space* can ba o btaine d by de le ting o th e r r e quir e me nts
c. A recent study h as be an mada o f mo r tar attacks o n
base cawps where tfci Ali/toPQ -4A waa o pe r atio nal. In a to tal o f 15 euch
attacks the uiiu
A
ditions war e lo cate d aad e ffe ctive suppr e ae ive
fire delivered in b instances, la th a o th e r 5 attacks e ith e r th a at-
tack e nde d before the set waa properly ve cto r e d, o r a de cisio n waa made
to fire a preplanned artillery co unte r mo r tar pr o gr am wh ich co mple te ly
saturated the radar onope, pr e ve nting fur th e r se ar ch .
d. Tha need fo r th e co unte r mo r tar r adar de tach me nts which
ve r e formerly in the ?x< oop Pr o gr am still e xists. It do ss no t appe ar pro-
per to recommend the trade-off of e sse ntial ar tille r y battalio ns to pr o
vide th e space s for th e se de tach me nts. If th a cur r e nt r e vie w o f th e o ve t*
all force structure should de ve lo p additio nal space s, a h igh priority
should be given to reinstating th e required ft co unte r mo r tar r adar de-
tachments into the tr o o p Program. A to tal o f 333 pe r so nne l ar e r e quir e d
for these detachneulu
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
7. (c) Ag g jg tg s g isJSEL*
Siace boooming operational la Hfl almost a yesr ago, this
]
headquarters has maintained a continuing program designed to aaaiat tha
Army of Viatnaa la Improving tha enployment of it artillery. Durlag j
thla raporting pariod several project hare bean completed la furtner-
aaoe of tale program:
(
a. One of tha ore success*ul projects has been coordi-
nating the use of artillery fixe to support isolated outposts normally
aaaned by Rofioaal Jbrce/Popular Force (HF/PF) personnel Assistance
ma proTlded by this headquarters at a number of outposts during this
reporting period:
(1 ) Officere from this headquarters conducted classes ,
oa observed fix procedures for 4 2 HF/iF personnel repre^aitlag various
outpoeta in LOOT KHAIH during the pariod 4 -6 December
(2) Pro 8 -1 2 January representatives of this head
quarters provided instruction to HF/PF personnel naming outposts la
three separate sab-sectors of LOK AB Province*
(3 ) Bventually this instruction will be offered
throughout the sub-sectors la each of the provinces la III CffZ sad will
aeaaurably increase the effectiveness of these outposts*
b. Section I, paragraph 5b(3 ) of the last Operational
Report discussed II FPORCE? Artillery's assistance prograa la relation i
to the Capital Military Diatrict (CUD). The following additional assist-
ance as provided the GMD during this period: i
(1 ) Position area survey for most permanent AHHf
artillery positions within the CM) was completed by US survey teams from
the 23 d Artillery Group* Survey control was also established at an al-
ternate position for the oountermortsr radar located at fAl SOU HOT.'
(2) At the request of the Senior Advisor, CMD
f
sad
the Provost Marshal. TAI 3 0 1 MOT Air Bass, instruction was girm la
observed firs procedures to Air Polios manning the watch towers at the
Air Base*
(3 ) On six separate occasions units of II HORCHT
Artillery ware deployed la the CMD to support ground operations sad
the defense of key installations.
o* This headquarters has consistently urged ACT! units
to avail themselves of US artillery support* One of ths most sffsctive
1 0
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
)1wstsmo so o f ach suppo r t o ccur r e d h e n a ligh t A ao dlua batte r y
de plo ye d dur ing th e pe r io d 3 Pao aato r - 12 Januar y to - -
A ll 1A M 81 la fe e m o f ID flat d TO XU
f
pr o viding o e e ar ity fo r a
r le e h ar v+e ting o pe r atio n
do Par agr aph 3o (3)(d) o f th e last r e po r t de e o r lbe d th e
WI assignme nt o f i o ffio r to CM D to me t e e m A r tille r y idvio o r til
such time o o a psr mmnsat po sitio n co uld bo auth o r ise d, Dur ing th is im-
po r ting pe r io d, th lo h e adquar te r s co ntinue d to pr o vide aa o ffice r la tale
e mpe city until 10 De ce mbe r h e n a pe r mane nt po o itlo a aa e th e r ise d mad
fille d by to ur .
o . Ih la h e sdo uar te r s o o atlaao o to lao o r po r o U A Hi
que st into Ito Hkl pr o gr am. Am e n e xample , dur ing th in pe r io d f Ir e
wo o de llTe r e d o n th e numbe r o f tar ge ts sh o wn at th e r e que st o f CM ) aid
Rung So t apo dal Z o ne (BSSZ )t
DECW IEB JA HTttBT
CM D 14 6? 83
R3SZ 198 109 161
f. t jn le v vial to to A RVH Divisio n and Co r ps h o adquar to r a
war * p.ii \. cj.^iri.Tti and staff o ffice r s o f th lo h o adquar to r a to ke e p
tttafce ni. 'if ? -., its> L: e -if. o f A RVH ar tille r y, pr o ble ms e nco unte r e d and to
' *
4
-
:
- - : L
x
'A 2i 2J nte r dictio n (Hfcl) Pr o gr am
i i uiudy o f VC activity In th e ar e as h e r e h e avy ar t 11-
..U tiuno l co nfir me d th e e ffe ctive ne ss o f th e U fcl
ti'U tr y as statio ne d In a ne w ar e a, an analysis was
, j U iculavly tr o ll use , ne w fo r tificatio ns
9
r adio
ti at- is" visual r e co nnaissance sigh tings
'<d be in po sitio n fo r a co mpar ative ly sh o r t
., , .tic Har assme nt and Inte r dictio n Pr o gr am, YC
, t* r ,w- capability o f th e we apo ns de e r e &o e d, and in-
: : *ci just o utside o f mar t sum r ange .
i ai.titio n to pr o viding e vide nce o f th e e ffe e tive -
i i ..JW J ii*T pr o gr am, th e se studie s o r e use d fo r o th e r
i.i i- fcibr c-to sly use ful In planning fo r th e de plo yme nt
in-r y units. Fo r Imme diate tactical uss, h e n suffi-
^ available to indicate co nsidsr able VC activity in a ne v
ar e a, aitille r .-; as te mpo r ar ily displace d to po sitio ns h e r e th e se ne w
ar e as co u'a i.e attacke d with Hfcl fir e s
11
1;;; J, .
r r ..^., , f 1 : .
1^.'*. 1 . \J 4 i ,'..'
X* ! . .
if.r .-
tifc,, ' * *
activilw /i.uh i.i
cr e aa^ S
. * ' "
ne s cf a a-
pur pvu.fce . Ikjf
o f incww? A j ai't
cie nt d*
;
''<
A |
SECRET
SECRET
o Boring this reporting period, UM system of planing
the major portion of tho daily I Program on too areas of greateet VC if
activity MM continued. While tbio method dooo not place fin OB oll
areas of possible fC activity, it dooo exploit tho fall velum of avail-
oolo intelligence by placing sore firoo on areas in which it io ooot
probablo tho VC will bo operating*
d. While it io ofton difficult to accurately aooooo tho
total casualtiee inflicted by I firing, thora io little doubt of ito
overall effectiveness. Prisoners of War and personnel voluntarily re-
turning to gOYernnent control (Chieu Hoi'a) frequently cite unexpected
artillery fire and air otrikoa ao what they fear ooot The following
two instance! of eaaualtleo inflicted by Hal firoo indicate how devas-
tating euch fires nay bos
(1 ) On 7 January 1 9 67 , Capital Military District
(CMD) requested that II FPORCEV Arty include a part of tho PIMBAPFLB
Plantation, vicinity X S 63 69 , in our Harassing sad Interdiction Pro-
gran for that night. Mine suspect areas (bunkers, base camp, tunnel
entrances) were selected and eighteen rounds of 1 7 5* were fired by
Btry A, 2d En, 3 2* Arty. A VC who was captured 250 9 0 0 H Jan 67 vici-
nity X S 7 20 0 4 6 revealed that 60 nonbsrs of his oonpany (4 th Co, 6th
Bn, 1 63 legt) were Jcillsd on 7 Jon 67 vicinity X S 63 0 9 0 8 by artillsry
fire.
(2) On 26 January 1 9 67 , tho 3 d Bn, 3 4 th Arty con-
ducted an AI progran vicinity X S 3 4 4 7 * On 3 February 1 9 67 , an AHVa*
element at MilG TUOHG reported that a wounded VC PW led AHVI elenente
to the bodies of 3 0 VC vicinity X S 3 4 3 4 7 6. The PW stated that the VC
were at a nesting in a hut on 26 January 1 9 67 when artillery fell on
then.
9 . (C) Programs to Increase the Accuracy of Artillery.
II FPORCEV Artillsry programs to increase tho accuracy
of artillery discussed in Section I, paragraph B7 of tho previous
Operational Report continued during this period. These prograna con-
tinued to be concerned primarily with meteorology, survey and cali-
bration.
m. frtllfrory ymJUstio ffotoorolog (Mgfro).
A comparative metro analysis among the bass camps mt
CtJ CHI, TAT KUH, 0 0 BAU HA and BAU TIBTG was conducted during this per-
iod to determine the need for metro stations at all these locations.
Data provided by the stations at CO CHI and TAY NHH proved to be in-
conpstiblsf however, data provided at GO BAU HA and BAU TIKVG were
compatible. Therefore, it was decided to maintain stations at TAT
1 2
i
i
SECRET
CONFOBiflAl
im
9
mil turn snd G ce i.
b.. Calibration of Artillery Hg.
During this reporting parted 1 9 6 of 4 26 OB and 24 of
1 3 6 ARVI artillery pieces no calibrated. The inoreased toss* of oon-
bat operations has created A need for ore frequent onllbratlon of artil-
lery places,
o.
Dur ing th is r e po r ting pe r io d co nside r able far th e r pr o -
gr e ss h as bo o n aido in th e pr o gr am o f e xte nding ar tille r y o o ntr o l 1A th e
Co r ps ar e a. Sh e sap at Ino lo snr o 3 illustr ate s th e sur ve y o o ntr o l no w
e stablish e d in XXI CfZ . ftir *-o r dcr o o ntr o l be e bo w e stablish e d at BBA B
CA T, XDA I U K " , sad LOW J (HA D by th e 66th Eagr Oo (to po ) (Do r ps), th ir d
sad fo ur th nact co ntr o l h as be e n e stablish e d la FH OC TOT Se cto r by 1
A ustr alian U nli Far o e (1 A TT) at VW W , BA HA , TO A D sad 99C A BE
sad e dditi sur ve y co ntr o l po ints (SCP) h ar e bo o n e str lsh sd at in-
te me diat* .U ? b*tv~an th e se lo catio ns in th e co ar se o f th e tr ave r se s
lbur th -o r d<~ r ^tr al h .13 ba<s e o tablish e d by 8th TA B/? 5th A r ty at FHTOC
HE, BBfli -* m m.bilOf TA B A I, Q U A I LOI
9
BO JA B, BA M ? A l
f
00 BA U HA .
DA D TIBW J, ? -3i K M ), V0 DA T, TA HH LHH
9
PuTO LA M , M BB Q Q A B, ftJC TOW O.
G U RA Y TA " IT, THA I 31, SU OI DA , BA O A I
t
BA D DQ i
t
U M BOB and
TRIW G LA P. A dditio nal fo ur th -o r de r o o ntr o l h as bo o n e stablish e d at OX
A l by th e lr <- Tnf^tr y Divisio n A r tille r y and at TRU BG U P by th e 2$th
Infantr y Biv talo n r tlU o r y^ Sur ve y o o ntr o l is no w available at all
bass o asps; iU us, th e fir st o bje ctive o f .placing all h e avy ar tille r y
batte r ie s e n n co mmo n gr id h as be e n aco o nplish e d. U S/TW Itt* ne dlue e nd
ligh t sr tillar y pt*sllluind at say o f th e lo catio ns to wh ich sur ve y o o n-
tr o l h as b<~~" av*. p** may fir e o n th e sane gr id* Sur ve y o o ntr o l h as
be e n e xte nd** to th e ne ar vicinity o f 14 ne diua and 54 lie ** A JCTi ar til-
le r y plato o n*. A plan h as be e n de ve lo pe d and co o r dinate d wh e r e by th e
A HTO ar tille r y battalio ns will r e vitalise th e ir fifth -o r de r sur ve y capa-
bility snd ti th e ir plato o ns into th e gr id* Sr te nsio n o f o o ntr o l to
th e ne ar vicinity o f fo ur ne diun snd 26 ligh t A SH sr tille r y plato o ns
Sh o uld be ao co spllsbad by .Tuns 1967 A co ntinuing go al is to satur ate
th e co r ps so ne with sur ve y co ntr o l po ints wh ich wo uld be r e adily avail-
able to units o n o pe r atio n.
1 0 . (c) Application of Pfaotograsnstry to Survey
a Mm stated in Section I, paragraph 9 o above there has
been considerable progress in establishing artillery survey oontrol to
1 5
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CONFIDENTIAL
earn position ama. The major surrey problem areas remain a lack
of ot ntrol points both for position areas on operations snd target srsn
control. Obstacle to satisfying these requlremsnts ere the inadequacy
of food storting control, look of good ground observation, frequent die-
plsoensnts, snd the necessity of utilising lazge forces to provide se-
curity for survey operations*
b. Ins USARV engineer has propossd a tost be node of the
feasibility of using the photogrnanstrio proosss to provide the necee-
ssry basic control. In essence, this proosss involves using recent re-
oonnaisssnes photography, oonparing it to the very accurate asp photo-
graphy of the sane area, and selecting points union ars identifiable
both on the reconnaissance photos snd on the ground for which coordi-
nates can be furnished The engineers belisvs they can furnish the
coordinates to these points to approxinatsly fourth-order accuracy,
and not less than fifth-order accuracy It is evident that if a large
density of such points can be made available in a planned area of opera-
tions that th artillery survey problen can be greatly reduced. Using
selected points near position areas, the position area survey can be oom-
pleted by a abort traverse Other identifiable points can bs used for
registration points.
o The test of this concept will be nade in February
1 9 67 * Reconnaissance photography of a planned area of operation has
been obtained, control points selected, and the engineers have furnished
photograanstrioally computed coordinates of these points. Prior to the
actual operation, fie ^curacy of sons oi toese points will be verified
by conventional survey methods, snd registrations snd transfers ill be
fired* If Misse preliminary tests prove successful, the entire concept
ill be fully tested on a major operation
1 1 . (C) Safeguarding aircraft from Friandly Artillery firms.
a Section X , paragraph 9 d of t*e previous Operational
Report presentsd a discussion of a propossd II IfQBGE? regulation eon-
esrnlng the protection of aircraft from friendly artillery fires s
proposed regulation van published on 1 8 lovsmber 1 9 66 aa II J1 0 BCET
Regulation 3 8 9 -2, subjscti ^sfsguerding Aircraft from Artillery Piree",
a oopy of which is attached at Inolosurs 4 Basically, the regulation
serves to replace the old air oorridor system with a network of Artil-
lery Waning Control Centers (AVCC) which broadcast advisories on ar-
tillery fires to aircraft upon request Chsngs 1 to this regulation
was published in Decsnber snd clarifies certain rssponsibilitiss of the
AVCC
9
o A oopy of ths change is also at Inolosurs 4 *
CON HDEh mA l
CONFIDENTIAL
h. Following an announoonsnt by the Federal Aviation
Agency In early January that there would be a large volume of aircraft
flying daily In an air corridor between a control toner located in X AH
LOG and the BIEH HOA and TAN SON HHUT Air Bases, thia headquartere con-
ducted a etudy to determine whether additional neaauree were neeeeaary
to protect theae aircraft fron friendly artillery* Aa a reeult of the
study, 'the following propoaala were published on 3 0 January aa Change 2
to II ySWCHt Regulation 3 8 5-2, (Inoloeure 4 >
(1 ) The BIBtf HOA air corridor will be extended east-
ward to u distant of ten nautical alle a* Artillery unite firing into
thia corridor will clear with BOW? IAI Sensitive Area AVCG which in turn
will coordinate with Air Traffic Control at BX HOA Air Base.
(2) Additional air oorridora with a width of four
nautical ailee will be established between X L7 AN IOC and the end of the
BIER HOA air on idor and between the end of the BIEH HOA air corridor
and the boundary of *he Capital Military District. All artillery firea
in theae oorridora which reach an altitude of 7 ? 0 0 0 feet or higher muet
be reported to Taris Control at ? AV SON NHUT. Paria Control la charged
with further oooidi, *; t.on to iiisur* t\ proper notification ia broadcast.
1 2. (c) i'g'Klline of Artillery Weapons*
Tha following chart depiota the average daily deadline
rates for the various artillery weapons of II FFORCEV Artillery during
thia reporting period:
W EA PON N OVEM BER DEcao ai JA N U A RY
M 107 (175BU SP)
#
lo ji
7*
M 10? O^am SP) 18^
% *
M 110 (8 SP) 195*
# #
H114A 1 055* T)
.-
%
10*
a. Th* deadline tte for the 1 1 1 0 7 ia considered to be
within tolerable limits During December several weapons were dead-
lined for short periods due to numerous traversing and elevating final
drive fairjKea*
b. Th* nigh uriadliKe rate for the M1 0 9 howitser in the
month of Hovev^r is attributed to one battery which returned to OPC'QN
II 1 9 BCBY Artillery dtesr a A day attachment to a major maneuver unit.
if
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
During those 51 da;ys the battery tired over 12,000 rounda, .wed over
;oo milea and displaced 16 times ill the last 17 daya or ita attaehllent.
e. The daily deadline rate tor the M110 duri.Dg thia re-
porting period remained at about 1 .1 weapons per dq. DuriDg BoYeaber
n l"FFRCEV Artillery had eight weapons vhile in Deoeaber and January 6ix-
teen veapona were eansidered. The higher rate in Novellber ia therefore
attributable to a lover density.
d. The II FFORCEV Artillery's first 155ma towed batta-
lion became operational on 27 Deceaber. Therefore the deadline rate
the M114A1. for that JaOnth represents only a tour period. The
deadline rate far January vas caused by spindle and spindle plug
failures, recoil seals 8.IId firing jaeka. These veapooa were issued to
this directly trom depot atter an extended period ot storage.
It is possible that this storage led to the high deadline rate. Repair
parts the M114A 1 ware rapidly obtained, boveve:t:, and the deadline
problem an the weapon proved to be only a temporai'y one.
i3. (c) Communieationa.
,,
e.. The II HURCEV Artillery CoiiiiDUDioationa Section con-
tinued ita mission of supplying units with required VHP, :!M aDd lM co
JRUDioationa. VHF coutinues to be the moat important oollllUJlioaticma liwt
between this and subordinate units aa well aa to ARVH headquarters located
in III CTZ. This ooarie of c:>mmunication baa proven to be the 110st depend-
&.ble Hhtll ccmmnal:::;il. ion 1:; required. All C(ilDYillini.:lition ie utilized
for the of IDOst clasr:Jitied inforaation betveen this headquar-
ters and the 23d and 54th Artillery Groups. PM communication is pri-
aa back-up since VHF haa proven to be highly reliable.
b. Communications security and eoonom;y of oola'Uil!eations
resouroea were stressed during this period. To economize on oouniea-
tions resources, electrical transmieaiona were held to the il!SWWI dur-
ing the period and brevity ot uaeftgea wae stressed.
o. Direct maintenanoe support for the AB/GRC-46 radio
equiJDtWlt i.mproTed conaidel.'ably during reporting period. The dead-
line rate had been averagiDg betveen 305' end vaekl7. Reomtly thia
deadline rate haa Bhovn a gradual iaprovelleDt. .A.s this reportinc period
closes, the deadline rate is approxia&tely the lowest
deadline rate achieved at this head.qu&rtera 1n the past eight .ontha.
d. During this report!.DB period, approxiMtely thr&e
thoumand doO\liHnts (SECRE'l', CONJ'IDEBTIAL, JOR OPPICIAL USE ORY and
16
CONFIDENTIAL
CQNFttNTIAl
uOASSIFIH>) were processed by this hnadquartare
1
Message Center. This
repreeentc an increase of 2% over the number of meeeagee processed dur-
ing the preceding three month period. The increase is attributed prima-
rily to the addition of ecveral now mit to H F1 DRCKV Artillery and to
tho increased tonpo of combat operation
Section X I, Part 1 - Obeervation/Lceeons Learned.
Meteorological Supplies
Itemi Supply of apare parti and expendables for meteorological sections,
Discuoaloni the apply situation in the area of artillery meteorologl-
oal equipment ia now very good in the ZU Corps area However it hae
required the eupply ayaten fron 60 to 9 0 days to catch up to the need
of the Inoreaaing number of neteorological aeotiona deployed in the
Corpa Zone In tho interim period a alight ahortage of both electronic
repair pert and expendables waa experienced Items such aa drive no-
tore, ecaaner part, aolayna and drive belts were noat difficult to ob-
tain.
Obeorvatlont Meteorological sections deploying to RVH should Insure that
the section
1
e authorised stockage of apare parts ia complete before de-
parting OOVUS. The authoriiad atockage ia normally sufficient to carry
the section through the 60 -9 0 day period required by the supply system
to oat oh up to the section's needs.
FM Frequenciee
Itemi Availability of FM ftequenciee within Hie III Corpa Tactical Zone.
Discussion; Almost all Hi frequencies are Issued on a shared basis within
the III Corpa Tactical Zone. This is due to the shortsge of FM frequencies
available to the US in this zone. As many aa seven or eight units' some-
times share the same frequency resulting in a great deal of interference.
By thorough coordination it ia often possible to reduce the problem by
trading assigned frequencies with units operating outside transmitting
range. Oocaaionally unite can reduce interference by using alternate
frequencies. In oaaea where sharing of frequencies cannot be avoided,
atriot radio discipline is essential.
Leeaon Learnedt By trading assigned frequencies and using assigned alter-
nate frequenoieo, the snarl
w
g of FM-frequencies by several unite can be
minimised. In oaaea where anaring of frequencies cannot be avoided, in- .
terferenoe can be held within acceptable limits by practicing strict
radio discipline.
1 7
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Se ctio n n
9
Paar t 2 - Re o cmmaniU tlo ne
A (A ) fcT-8 Installatio n K ita
Installatio n kits fo r th e K Y8 cr abbie r de vio e de signe d fo r
use with th e A N A RC-12 r adio h ar e no t be e n issusd to th is o r subo r dinate
ar tille r y unite Re quisitio n h ave be e n e ubnitte d and validate d but
th e r e ar e no installatio n kite in-co untr y Th e uae o f th e K M wo uld
gr e atly incr e ase th e ape e d with wh ich tar ge ting data o o uld be pr o ce aae d
since info r matio n up to and including SBCRBF co uld be tr ansmitte d uti-
lising IM o o mmunlce tio na
> o
That the installation kite for the Cf-8 scraabler device be aade avail-
able to unite in Vietnam aa a natter of priority
B (S) Countemortar Radar Seta
In Section I, paragraph 6, the need for 3 7 countemortar radar
detaohaenta was explained These detachments were previously approved
and included in the U8 ABRT Troop Program but have recently been deleted
because of the troop ceiling imposed on military personnel in SVI A
total of 3 3 3 personnel are required for these detaehaenta
RBCOmEgDATIOHi
That if the current review of the overall force structure should develop
additional specss, a high priority should be given to reinstating the
required 3 7 oountermortar radar detachments into the troop program
C (S) Aircraft for Artllliuy Units*
In Section I paragraph 4 the critical need for additional
aircraft for II IfCRCaT Artillery was cited. The full potential of the
artillery in III CTZ will not be realised until adequate aircraft support
is provided
That, aa a matter of high priority, all reasonable efforts be made to
provide II nRCSY Artillery with aircraft on the following basis:
(1 ) force Artillery Headquarteras Jour UH-1
1
a, three
0 -1 'e.
1 8
SECRET
SECRET
uS -6.
(2) 6x0 1 9 Headquarters! Three 0 -1 a, two OB-1 3 's id
(3 ) Artillery Bettalioni TMO 0 -1 'a and one CH-1 }.
D. (U) Schooling of lowly - Commissioned Offloors.
In Section II, Faxt 2
f
Paragraph A of the last Operation!
Report it was reooanended that all newly-commissioned officer, with
the exception of OCS graduates, attend a basic field artillery course
prior to assignment to field artillery units* This recommendation la
reiterated and la considered sore Important in view of new field artil-
lery techniquee being devised in Vietnam. In addition to aehooling in
artillery procedure coamon to conventional warfare, it la important
that techniquee peculiar to counterguerrilla warfare be taught.
That procedures unique to or habitually practiced in Vietnam be stressed
in the Artillery Officers Basic Course, la particular the method of
employment of the 64 OO mil firi** chert and all attendant FDC/'*3 pn-
ceduree should be preeented aa the usual situation in gunnery courses.
K. (U) 1 55cm Howitzer firing Pdftatalg.
In Vietnam a 64 OO mil capability must be maintained by the
artillery at all times. Due to the weight of the 1 53 mm towed howitzer,
problems hare sometimes been experienced in meeting timely support re-
quirements Moat 1 3 5am towed unite have devised a firing pedestal which
pernits sapid shifting of the piece in any direction and hence maken
sanier the task of dellYexiirf? tisWK- fire. A firing rudestpi dewlw
was depicted in the January 1 9 67 issue of Artillery Trends. The use
of the firing pedestal has increased the overall effectiveness of the
1 55mm towed units significantly.
HEOOMWaPATIOI:
That a type firing pedestal for the 1 55mm howitzer be devised and issued
to all 1 55mm howitzer battalions before deployment from C0 MS to RVN.
unit* should be permitted sufficient time to train adequately on using
the device.
? (U) Maintenance of Distance Measuring Equipment MC-8 .
The electronic distance Measuring Equipment (DME) R:-8 is
authorised for issue en the ba9 is of six instruments per headquarters
1 9
SECRET
U N CLA SSIFIED
and headquarters battery of the division artillerice and UM target
acquisition battalion (TAB). Only alnlaua operator maintenance is
authorised fox thm lnstruauats. Instruments with serious deflclen-
oles must be taanM 1 B for repair to direct support maintenance facui-
ties. It hu boon found that In-country dlxoet support and dopot sain-
tonanoo faoUitloa do not have tho capability to repair tho mora aorioua
falluroa that aay occur la thin equipment. Tho alternative 1 B tho paat
haa boon evacuation out of country to Okinawa or CORDS, but tho loot
tlae iBtolTad haa ariod from three to eleven nontha until tho equip-
aent is returned. It haa also been found that the telluroBster, a
aiailar typo of electronic DMB issued to a TAB unit 1 B lieu of four MC-8 's,
appears to bo aore rugged and less prone to serious failures
In order to solve this problem the following steps should be taken:
1 The direct support and depot aalntenance facilities in country
should be expanded to include the capability for repair of electronic
2MB in terse of trained personnel, adequate repair parts tad test equip-
Bent*
2. float should be established that would permit iSBsdiate ex-
change of defective instruments* In the interim, a rapid method of
evaouatiun should bo established directly to the factory or maintenance
facility in OQMUS that haa the capability to repair those instruaenta
in a timely Banner
3 Consideration should bo given to replacement of tho MC-8 with
the telluroBeter am a temporary solution.
G. (V) leed for Heliotrope.
The heliotrope is a airror device used by topographic engineer
companies with a third-order accuracy capability to observe angular Mea-
surements over long distances by reflecting brilliant flashes of sun-
light from a distant station. The common experience of artillery fourth-
order survey units in III CTZ to date has been to Bake observations in
excess of fifteen kiloaetera, the limit of the optical power of their
organic angle-measuring T2 Theodolites when sighting na a distant sta-
tion aarked by a tripod-supported colored panel. Artillery survey units
are not authorised the heliotrope In their TOB. However, field expe-
dient heliotropes have been fabricated from 9 *7 inch shaving airrors
with great effectiveness. Anglo Bssaureaenta have been aade over dis-
tances up to seventy kUoasters by this Beans.
20
U N CLA SSIFIED
*3 CON HOEN TlA l
Tho heliotrop! should bo an it of issue to artillery survey units la
Vietnam on tho bull of thro* instruments per survey section.
H. (u) SurvsorinsT Towers*
In a groat portion of III CTZ tho terrain la flat and linos of
sight ere interrupted by dense tropical vegetation. Neither fourth-
order artillery survey units nor tho third-order topographic rtf~t
company are authorised tho Tower Erection Set, Topographic, a survey-
ing tower one hundred three foot high which would oonsidorsbly enhance
their capability to extend survey control in delta and plain terrain.
Tho Tower rection Sot
9
Topographic should bo issued to artillery survey
sections of division artillery and target acquisition battalion head-
quarter batteries and to tho topographic engineer company on the basis
of throe towers per section.
I. (C) Limitations of the K4 2 rwin 4 0
Tho terrain in III GTZ and the techniques of maneuver employed
in Vietnam create a uniquely limiting environment for the utilization of
the M4 2. Because of tho heavy jungle canopy and undergrowth in many parts
of in CTZ
9
not only tho movement but the firing capability of the H4 2
is seriously impaired. Since tho round employed 1 -. ptJr.l dctsiwtlifc it
cannot bo fired through foliage doss to tho gun without extreme czew
safety hazard, and cannot have substantial effect on any target screened
by foliage. When clear fields of fire are available, supported tactical
commanders are sometimes reluctant to allow the M4 2 to fire because th*
convergent schemes of maneuver habitually practiced in Vietnam, couple!
with the flat trajectory and long range of tho M4 2, will often place
friendly troops in tho field of fire.
HBCOtMEBDiTIOgi
That a 4 0 am round be developed for tu a 4 4 2 'hi oh is capable of penetrating
dense foliage* In tho absence of development of such a round, serious
consideration must bo given to the limitations of the M4 2 prior to fur-
ther deployment of the weapon in Vietnam*
n
CONFIDENTIAL
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11 FFORCEV K e g JtfS-Z
DEPA RTM EN T OF THE A RM Y
He adquar te r s, II Fie ld Fo r ce Vie tnam
A PO San Fr ancisco 96266
CHA N G E 2 > 0 Januar y VJ&f
REG U LA TION
N U M BER 385-2
SA FETY
SA FEG U A RDIN G A IRCRA FT FROM A R U LLK R Y FlftES
Re gulatio n N umbe r 385-2. th is h e adquar te r , date d 18 N o ve mbe r 19o ,
is ch ange d as fo llo ws:
* * * *
5. PROCEDU RES:
a. A r tille r y.
(5) (A dde d) To fur th e r pr o te ct air cr aft in th e B1EN
HOA and TA N SON N HU T ar e as fr o m fr ie ndly ar tille r y fir e , th e fo llo wing
air co r r ido r is h e r e by e stablish e d:
Le g 1:
(a) Co o r dinate s: Th e ar e a bo unde d by XT880150.
XT880110, YT100150, YT100110, YT200167, and YT200093.
(b) Re str ictio n: DON G N A I Se nsitive A r e a A W CC will
co o r dinate all ar tille r y fir e with in le g 1 o f th e air co r r ido r with A ir
Tr affic Co ntr o l, BIEN HOA A ir Base . A r tille r y units de sir ing to fir e into ,
th r o ugh , o r o ut o f le g 1 at any maximum o r dinate will fir st o btain cle ar -
ance to fir e fr o m th e DON G N A I Se nsitive A r e a A W CC.
Le g 2:
(a) Co o r dinate s: Th e ar e a bo unde d by YT200167,
YT200093, YT460167, and YT460093.
(b) Re str ictio n: A r tille r y fir e is no t r e str icte d
in le g 2 o f th e air co r r ido r wh e n th e maximum o r dinate o f th e tr aje cto r y
2
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#
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N HU 'I A ir Bast* by th e laste st me ans available pr io r *o ! ir ;ne j.sing f.*.e
pr e scr ibe d fo r ma? , ir par a 6k, be lo w.
3f
Le g *:
(a) Co o r dinate s: TV re* , bo unde d o n '.h e no ufh we ini
by th e CM D bo undar y and o n th e no r th we st, no r '.h i'a! . avJ -o vlh e as' ' y
a line jo ining XTr
f
7C4S, YT108109, YT27? 09 ar I YT'V
?
: 'C'2
' l.
Re str ict io n: Same as le g '
FOR THE COM M A N DER:
OFFICIA L. JA M ES H DYSON
Co lo ne l, CS
Ch ie f o f Sr aif
Co lo ne l, A G C
A djutant G e ne r al
DISTRIBU TION :
6 - COM U SM A CV
15 - CG , 7th A ir Fo r ce
10 - CG , U SA RV
15 - CG , I FFORCEV
25 - CG , 1st Inf Div
25 - CG , 9th Inf Div
25 - CG , 25th Inf Div
35 - CG , 1st A vn Bde
15 - CG , 173d A bn Bde
6 - Cr h dr , 1 A TF
25 - CO, 3r d Bde , 4th Inf Div
25 - CO, 12th A vn G p
15 - CO, 23d A r ty G p
1
s
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|H CO Shh Ativ Gj>
I* CO, Ulli ACH
.! IIKA. Ill (nips
> .SA, IV Corps
/ CO, M<| Si
K
lin
CO, tlSlh Air Conimandn Wing
CO, USlh Air Trailic Company
1 0 CO. M
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U FFORCEV Reg 385-2
C-l
4*1 DEPARTM EN T OF THE ARM Y i&& /cPTCt* * p
' Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam
APO San Francisco 96266
CHAN GE 1
REGULATION
N UM BER 385-2 19 December 1966
SAFETY
SAFEGUARDIN G AIRCRAFT FROM ARTILLERY FIRES
Regulation N umber 385-2, this headquarters, dated 18 N ovember 1966,
is changed as follows:
5. PROCEDURES
a. Artillery.
(4) (Added) Fires originating in an AWCC area of respon-
sibility which pass through or impact in another AWCC area of responsi-
bility will'be broadcast by all Artillery Warning Control Centers concerned.
It is the responsibility of the AWCC in whose area the fires originate to
provide advisories to those Artillery Warning Control Centers affected so
that they may include the information in their advisories to aircraft. Artil-
lery information will be passed in accordance with the format shown in
para 5a(1), above.
6. RESPON SIBILITIES:
j. (Deleted)
Inclosure 1, II FFORCEV Reg 385-2 (Change): Extend the western
boundary of the XUAN LOC AWCC area of responsibility further west
to a line between YT3209 and YS3276.
31
3*
Change 1 Reg N o 385-2, HQ , U FFORCEV, A PO San Fr ancisco 96266,
(Cont)
FOR THE COM M AN DER:
OFFICIAL: JAM ES H. DYSON
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General
DISTRIBUTION :
6 - COM USM ACV
15 ~ CG, 7th Air Force
10 - CG, USARV
15 - CG, I FFORCEV
25
N
- CG, lstlnf Div
25 - CG, 25th Inf Div
35 - CG, 1st Avn Bde
15 - CG, 173d Abn Bde
6 - Cmdr, 1 ATF
25 ~ CO, 3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div
25 - CO, 12th Avn Gp
15 - CO, 23d Arty Gp
15 ~ CO, 54th Arty Gp
15 - CO, 11th ACR
25 - DSA, HI Corps
5 - SA, IV Corps
2 - CO, 53d Sig Bn
10 - CO, 315th Air Commando Wing
5 - CO, 125th Air Traffic Company
H FFORCEV
1 - SCk> 2 - Engr
2 - G2 2 -Sig
6 - G3 2 - Surg
2 - G4 4 - Avn Det (Prov)
2 - G5 30 - Arty
3 - A(

^ U FFORCEV Re g N o 385-2
DEPA RTM EN T OF THE A RM Y
He adquar te r s II Fie ld Fo r ce Vie tnam
A PO San Fr ancisco 96266
REG U LA TION
18
N o ve mbe r 1966
N UM BER 385-2
SAFETY
SAFEGUARDIN G AIRCRAFT FROM ARTILLERY FIRES
1. REFEREN CE:
a. Secret message, HQ USM ACV, 03604, 040859Z Feb 66,
subject: Safeguarding Aircraft from Heavy Artillery Fires (U).
b. Unclassified message, HQ USM ACV, 43921, 020638Z Oct 66,
subject: Safeguarding Aircraft from Artillery Fire.
2. PURPOSE: This directive establishes procedures to be followed
by elements of this command to minimize the hazard to aircraft from
friendly artillery in III Corps Tactical Zone.
3. GEN ERAL:
a. The objective of the procedures prescribed herein is to
provide aviators with immediate, accurate information concerning all
artillery firing which might endanger aircraft.
b. For purposes of this directive, the term "Artillery" includes
mortars.
c. The procedures, frequencies and call signs prescribed by
this directive are unclassified.
* This regulation supersedes II FFORCEV Reg 385-2, 23 July 66.
3J
yu
Re g N o 385-2, HQ II FFORCEV A PO San Fr ancisco 96266, IS N o r 66 (Co nt)
4. CON CEPT; Th is dir e ctive e stablish e s A r tille r y W ar ning Co ntr o l
Ce nte r s (A W CC) wh ich air cr aft may co ntact fo r cur r e nt info r matio n r e gar d-
ing ar tille r y fir e s. Th e A W CC ar e lo cate d at fr e que ntly visite d place s
in th e III Co r ps Tactical Z o ne (in CTZ ) and maintain dato o n ar tle .
fir ing o f U S, A RVN , and FW M A F units. A r tille r y units will no tify th e
appr o pr iate A W CC o f any fir e s affe cting mat age ncy's ar e a o f r e spo nsi-
bility using pr o ce dur e s pr e scr ibe d by th is dir e ctive .
5. PROCEDU RES:
a. A r tille r y.
(1) A r tille r y info r matio n will be r e po r te d to th e appr o -
pr iate A W CC as so o n as pr acticable . A r tille r y W ar ning Co ntr o l Ce nte r s
e stablish e d by majo r subo r dinate units will s erve as so ur ce s o f U S, A RVN ,
and FW M A F ar tille r y info r matio n fo r spe cific ar e as o f r e spo nsibility
(Inclo sur e 1) and/o r ar e as o f o pe r atio ns (A O). A r tille r y units will r e po r t
all ar tille r y fir ings to th e appr o pr iate A W CC in th e fo llo wing fo r mat:
" CORSA IR CON TROL A r tille r y fir ing fr o m
vicinity (ne ar e st to wn) o n azimuth (azimuth
o f fir e in de gr e e s) maximum o r dinate
fe e t. Range (to ne ar e st mile ).
,f
Th e abo ve info r matio n will no t be passe d in th e cle ar to th e A W CC in
e xce ss o f fifte e n minute s pr io r to actual fir ing.
(2) Th is pr o ce dur e will pe r mit th e age ncie s to r o ute air -
cr aft, wh e n ne ce ssar y, ar o und ar tille r y fir e s o ccur r ing inside th e age ncy's
ar e a o f r e spo nsibility. W h e n a pilo t de clar e s an e me r ge ncy fligh t co ndi-
tio n (i. e . " M e d Evac" , " M ay Day" , e tc.) and r e que sts suspe nsio n o f fir e s,
th e A W CC will dir e ct suspe nsio n o f th o se fir e s inte r fe r ing with th e fligh t.
(3) To be tte r pr o vide pr o mpt ar tille r y fir ing adviso r ie s
and r e lie ve r adio tr affic co nge stio n at th e pr imar y A W CC, co mmande r s,
if th e y de sir e , may e stablish A W CC subce nte r s with in th e ar e a o f r e spo n-
sibility o f th e pr imar y A W CC. Th e subce nte r s will br o adcast adviso r ie s
utilizing th e call sign and fr e que ncy use d by th e pr imar y A W CC. Sub-
ce nte r s will be fur th e r ide ntifie d by th e lo catio n in wh ich th e y ar e e stablish e d,
(?)Sva> . & * * * * .
L
H
Re g N o 385-2, HQ II FFORCEV A PO San Fr ancisco 96266, 18 N o v 66 (Co nt)
(i. e . Squar e Lo bste r , G O DA U HA ),
b. A viatio n.
(1) Th e A r tille r y W ar ning Co ntr o l Ce nte r s (A W CC) ar e
e stablish e d fo r use by air cr aft to o btain info r matio n o f ar tille r y fir ings
in th e III CTZ affe cting th e ir fligh t plans. A ir cr aft o pe r ating in th e
vicinity o f any o ne o f th e A W CC will co ntact it o n th e de signate d unclass-
ifie d fr e que ncy fo r cur r e nt ar tille r y info r matio n in acco r dance with
th e fo r mat sh o wn in par agr aph 5a(l), abo ve .
(2) Th e aviato r e nte r ing an A W CC ar e a o f r e spo nsibility
will r e que st info r matio n o f ar tille r y fir ing and make kno wn h is inte n-
tio n to o pe r ate in th e vicinity o f a spe cific A W CC. U po n r e ce iving th e
pilo t's r e que st, th e A W CC will, if ne ce ssar y, r o ute th e pilo t ar o und
any ar tille r y fir e s affe cting h is fligh t. Sh o uld th e pilo t de clar e an e me r -
ge ncy fligh t co nditio n, th e gr o und statio n will, o n r e que st, take actio n
to suspe nd th o se fir e s inte r fe r ing with th e fligh t.
(3) Capital Ce nte r will be pr o vide d with A W CC call signs
and fr e que ncie s, and aviato r s may co ntact th at age ncy fo r such info r ma-
tio n, if ne ce ssar y.
6. RESPON SIBILITIES:
a. Th e 1st U S Infantr y Divisio n will e stablish A r tille r y W ar n-
ing Co ntr o l Ce nte r s at FHU LOI, PHU OC VIN H, and LA I K HE. Th e
A W CC will e stablish co mmunicatio ns with U S and FW M A F ar tille r y and
will co o r dinate with A RVN ar tille r y in o r de r to pr o vide as much ar til-
le r y fir ing info r matio n as po ssible with in th e ir ar e as o f r e spo nsibility.
Th e ar e as o f r e spo nsibility, fr e que ncie s, and call signs fo r th e 1st U S
Infantr y Divisio n
1
s A W CC ar e se t fo r th in Inclo sur e 1.
b. Th e 3d Br igade , 4th U S Infantr y Divisio n, will e stablish an
A r tille r y W ar ning Co ntr o l Ce nte r at BEA R CA T. Th e A W CC will e stab-
lish co mmunicatio ns with U S and FW M A F ar tille r y and will co o r dinate
with A RVN ar tille r y in o r de r to pr o vide as much ar tille r y fir ing info r ma-
tio n as po ssible with in its ar e a o f r e spo nsibility. Th e ar e a o f r e spo nsi-
bility, fr e que ncy, and call sign fo r th e Br igade 's A W CC is se t fo r th in
Inclo sur e 1.
r
Reg N o 385-2, HQ II FFORCEV APO San Francisco 96266. 18 N OT 66 (Cont)
c. The 25th US Infantry Division will establish Artillery Warn-
ing Control Centers at CU CHI and TAY N IN H. The AWCC will establish
communications with US and FWM AF artillery and will coordinate with
ARVN artillery in order to provide as much artillery firing information
as possible within their areas of responsibility. The areas of responsi-
bility, frequencies and call signs for the 25th US Infantry Division's
AWCC are set forth in Inclosure 1.
d. The 1st Australian Task Force will establish an Artillery
Warning Control Center in the vicinity of BA RIA. The AWCC will
establish communications with US and FWM AF artillery and will co-
ordinate with ARVN artillery in order to provide as much artillery
firing information as possible within its area of responsibility, "he
area of responsibility, frequency, and call sign for the 1st Aus ..an
Task Force's AWCC is set forth in Inclosure 1.
e. The Deputy Senior Advisor, in Corps Tactical Zone, will
establish Artillery Warning Control Centers at XUAN LOC, TAN AN ,
and BIEN HOA (DON G N AI Sensitive Area). The AWCC will establish
communications with US, ARVN , and FWM AF artillery and will have
information of artillery fires within their areas of responsibility. The
areas of responsibility, frequencies, and call signs for XUAN LOC,
TAN AN , and the DON G N AI Sensitive Area are set forth in Inclosure 1.
f. Artillery Warning Control Centers will furnish the following
information and assistance to pilots upon request or when deemed neces-
sary:
(1) Information concerning artillery fires in the AWCC's
area of responsibility.
(2) Suspend fires interfering with any flight declared by
the pilot as being flown under an emergency condition.
(3) Inform pilots of the establishment of AWCC sub centers
in TAORs and/or AOs to include frequencies and call signs.
(4) In addition, DON G N AI Sensitive Area AWCC will pro-
vide artillery firing information to Air Traffic Control, BIEN HOA Air
Force Base.
it
#
Re g N o 385-2. HQ II FFORCEV A PO San Fr ancisco 962 S6, 18 N OT 66 (Co nt)
g. Each co mmande r assigne d an A O fo r a spe cific o pe r atio n
will de signate an age ncy o r e le me nt o f h is co mmand to r e ce ive r e po r ts
o f ar tille r y fir ings in th e A O and pr o vide no tificatio n to pilo ts utilizing
th e appr o pr iate fr e que ncy and call sign o f h is pr imar y ar e a o f ar tille r y
war ning r e spo nsibility.
h . Inco ming units assigne d a TA OR o r A O will e stablish an
A W CC as so o n as pr acticable to pr o vide pe r tine nt info r matio n as pr e -
scr ibe d by th is r e gulatio n. N e w A W CC, all ch ange s in call signs and/
o r fr e que ncie s, and any o th e r impo r tant info r matio n pe r tine nt to A W CC
will be fo r war de d to th is h e adquar te r s, A TTN : FSCE, by th e mo st e x-
pe ditio us me ans. FSCE, th is h e adquar te r s, will fo r war d ch ange s to 12th
A vn G p wh ich will publish and fo r war d N OTA M S to all aviatio n units in
III CTZ as we ll as th o se age ncie s wh ich h ave a " ne e d to kno w" as de te r -
mine d by th e A viatio n Office r , II FFORCEV.
i. Subo r dinate co mmande r s will th o r o ugh ly br ie f th e ir pilo ts
o n th e pr o visio ns se t fo r th in th is dir e ctive in o r de r to minimize th e
h azar d to air cr aft fr o m fr ie ndly ar tille r y fir e s.
ji fTnr nir mninr n nline s TAtTtn nr AO iinnliiiiin 1 1i|lg s s nliln
fo r A ir Fo r ce A ir cr aft will be e quippe d will) TIHF r mPo a in additio n
to FM o r will co o r dinate wjfb Ih n 1 h lit il A n Co ntr o l Par ty at such
iiii In Ills j\\ insiiil
1
Ih iil in h lh iy war nings ar e available to U SA F air -
&*
k. A n age ncy o r e le me nt o f e ach majo r unit h e adquar te r s will
r e po r t to th e Co ntr o l and Re po r ting Ce nte r (CRC)(PA RIS CON TROL) all
pr e planne d 8" and 175mm fir e s o f ar tille r y units ph ysically lo cate d in
th e ir TA ORs o r A Os. II FFORCEV A r tille r y will r e po r t th o se h e avy
ar tille r y war nings co nne cte d with H&I pr o gr ams sch e dule d by th is
h e adquar te r s. Th e r e po r t will include th e e ffe ctive time s, lo catio ns
o f fir ing units, tar ge t lo catio ns, and maximum o r dinate s. A ll age ncie s
will use th e 1: 250, 000 U TM gr id as a standar d fo r mat wh e n fo r war ding
h e avy ar tille r y fir e sch e dule s to PA RIS CON TROL. Sample fo r mat fo r
r e po r ting h e avy ar tille r y fir e s fo llo ws:
57
ff
Re g N o 385-2, HQ II FFORCEV A PO San Fr ancisco 96266, 18 N o v 66 (Co nt)
" a. Effe ctive 1600 to 1700 Lo cal
b. Fr o m XT 1700 to XT1800
c. M aximum o r dinate 15,000 Fe e t"
FSCE th is h e adquar te r s, will r e ce ive fr o m subo r dinate units and tr ans-
mit h e avy ar tille r y war ning r e po r ts fo r all tar ge ts o f an imme diate natur e
wh e n dir e ct co mmunicatio ns be twe e n th e unit and PA RIS CON TROL do e s
no t e xist o r ar e te mpo r ar ily ino pe r ative . Imme diate war nings ar e th o se
wh ich r e sult fr o m th e appe ar ance o f une xpe cte d tar ge ts, and, as such ,
canno t be planne d in advance . W ar nings o f th is natur e may no t be tr ans-
mitte d in th e cle ar mo r e th an 15 minute s pr io r to fir ing.
FOR THE COM M A N DER:
j
OFFICIA L: JA M ES H. DYSON j
Co lo ne l, G S
Ch ie f o f Staff !
VERN ON R. RIDER
Co lo ne l, A G C
A djutant G e ne r al
1 Incl
as
DISTRIBU TION :
6 - COM U SM A CV
15 - CG , 7th A ir Fo r ce
10 - CG , U SA RV
15 - CG , I FFORCEV
25 - CG , 1st Inf Div
25 - CG , 25th Inf Div
IS
* *
Re g N o 385-2, HQ U FFORCEV A PO San Fr ancisco 96266, 18 N o v 66 (Co nt)
35 - CG , 1st A vn Bde
15 - CG , 173d A bn Bde
6 - Cmdr , 1 A TF
25 - CO, 3r d Bde , 4th Inf Div
25 - CO, 12th A vn G p
15 - CO, 23d A r ty G p
15 - CO, 54th A r ty G p
15 - CO, llth A CR
25 - DSA , HI Co r ps
5 - SA , IV Co r ps
2 - CO, 53d Sig Bn
10 -CO, 315 A ir Co mmando W ing
5 - CO, 125th A ir Tr affic Co mpany
II FFORCEV
1 - SG S
2 - G 2
6 - G3
2 - G4
2 - G5
3 - A G
2 - Engr
2 -Sig
2 - Sur g
4 - A vn De t (Pr o v)
30 - A r ty
37
+ 7
FHBdW N P4X BU N K - W T FIIM SD.
II ??QRC* V
5-332/1-67
SECm ft)
A TOBC-H (14 Fe b 67) 1st lud
SU BJECTS Ope r atio nal Be po r t fo r Q uar te r ly Pe r io d Ending 31 Januar /
1967t Btpo r ta Co ntr o l Symbo l CSFQ H-65
Si HQ II Fie ld Ibr e e Vie tnam, A R) San Fr ancisco 96266
7

A PR

18
"
TOi A ssistant Ch ie f o f Staff fo r Fo r ce De ve lo pme nt, Se pt o f th e A my,
W ash ingto n, D.C. 20310
1 Th e Ope r atio nal fispo r t-Le sso ns Le ar ne d fo r Be r io d A iding
31 Januar / 1967 submitte d b/ U Fie ld Fo r ce Vie tnam A r tille r y is
co mpr e h e nsive , we ll pr e par e d and co ntains valuable le sso ns; any o f
wh ich ar e applicable th r o ugh o ut th e th e ate r
2, Th is h e adquar te r s h as th o r o ugh ly r e vie we d subje ct r e po r t and
co ncur s with th e co mme nts and r e co mme ndatio ns co ntaine d th e r e in.
FOB THE COM &N DHRs
1 Incl IA M BS A . U LVBB&
A ast. 10
Rcgracled ^CLASSIFIED
Wh.n Separated From Cf^DT
Classified Incloiui W LW llL I
*
i-