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A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS VIEW OF THE VIETNAM WAR 1965-1 972 Editor: Thomas C. Thayer
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REPORT DUCUMENtTA'IION PAC,[-:


1. RLPOl1 1.tU.xwL! 2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. 1 3.

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INS.I'1rUC't'1ON.-

f(CIPILNT'S CA'rALOG-NUI3IHI,1

Now4. TITLE (tind .. uhlltI.) 5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERfED

A SYSTEMS ANA.,YSIS V1:W OF 'T11E VIETNAM WAR 1965-1972 V(.UMES 1-12,


7. AUTHOR(e)

Final Report None


8.

1965-1972

PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBR

CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(a)

Thomas C./ Thayer


9. PERFOR ING ORGANIZA.TION NAME AND ADDRESS

None
10. PROGRAM ELEM.IENT. PROJECT, TASK

OASD(SA) RP SOULtheast Asia Intelligence Division

AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS

Pen t a0WashingtotL,
II.

D.C. 20301

N/A N/A
12. REPORT DATE

CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS

OASD(PA&E)RP Asia Division Room 2C310, The Pentagon Washington, D.C. 20301
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADORESS(I dif'refeent from Controlling Office)

February 18,
13.
1S,

1975

NUMOER OF PAGES
SECURITY CLASS. (of this report)

2793

Same as Above
&

Unclassified
16a.

N/A.
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)

DECL ASSI FICATION iDOWNGRADING SCHEDULE

Distribution Unlimited. Suggest nomination to NTIS because material is interest to scholars of the Vietnam War.

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17.

DISTRIBU"TION STATEMENT (o1 the obstract entered In Block 20, It different from Report)

16.

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTESBetA

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19.

'KEY WORDS (Continue on roveo.e side It naceseary and Identify by block numbser)

Southeast Asia Analysis Report OASD(Systems Analysis) SEA Analysis Report VC/NVA Pacification
. 20. ABSTRACT (Continue an reve, a....

RVNAF Hamlet Evaluation System SE Asia Air Operations SE Asia Deployments SE Asin LoJmtits/Constru,

_n

If necessary and Identify by block number)

This twelve volume sot includes every article printed in t,V2 fifty isstue series of the Southeast Asna Analvsis Report. The SEA Analvsis Te~port represented a month-hy-month analysis of VietTlin War activity includiUng iforces and manpower, VC/NV optirat.lons, Allied ground, naval and air operations, R\"NAF, casuialtiesc and lossvn, populatiou secur.lty, war costs and inflation Ard construction and port operatitus in SouLh VietnamT.

Ado 0 eiqej!AV ;se8 8

VV
SYSEMSANALYSIS VIEW OF THE VIETNAM WAR:195

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VOLUME 4

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Thayer

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FIF

A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS VIEW OF THE VIETHIAM lAR: Contents of the 12 Volumes Volume I Volume 2 Volume 3 Volume 4
-

1965-1972

The Situation In Southeast Asia Forces and Manpower Viet Cong--North Vietnamese Operations Allied Ground and Naval Operations The Air War Republic . of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) Casualties and Losses Population Security Pacification and Civil Affairs Economics: War Costs and Inflation

Volume 5 Volume 6 Volume 7 Volume 8 Volume 9 -

Volume 10 Volume 11 Volume 12 -

Construction and Port Operations in South Vietnam

A Systems Analysis Viet Of The Vietnalln War: Volume 4 AI.L I ED GROUND ArID NAVAL OPEPATIONS

1965-1072

Date 1. STRATEGY (Also See Pacification Forces - Volume 10) The Strategy Of Attrition Military Initiative In South Vietnam Army Comments On September 1968 Articles Tactical Initiative In Vietnam -!ilitary Initiative In South Vietnam: A Follow-UP Long Range Patrols Versus Search-And-Destroy Long Range Patrols Versus Search-And-Destroy: A Rebuttal Long Range Patrols Versus Search-And-Destroy: A Rebuttal 1968 Military Strategy IN SVN: Allied Campaign Plan 1968 Military Strategy IN SVN: General Giap Versus Army Staff Comments Dec 67 Jan 68 Jan 70 Feb 70 Mar 70 Aug/Oct 71
-

Page

May S("J Oct May Jan

67 68 68 69 70

1 4 18 23 33 36 40 43 46 50 56 71 90 121 Vol. 130 132 139 143 146 149 151 154 156 162 169 175 188 197 2,

Jun 67 Jul 67 Aug 67

Application Of The Area Security Concept Application Of The Area Security Concept: Interim Report No. 2. Illustrative RVNAF Force Structure To Implement The Area Security Concept In SVN A GVN People's Army 2.

GROUND OPERATIONS (Also See RVNAF - Vols. 6 & 7, US Redeployments and The Situation - Vol. 1.) Small Unit Actions Feb 67 Operation Cedar Falls Apr 67 Force Requirements In I Corps Aor 67 Force Effectiveness In II Corps May 67 Large US Army Ground Operations IN II Corps May 67 Efficiency In Inflicting Losses: Enemy Vs. Friendly Jul 67 Allocation Of Ground Forces In SVN Sep 67 VC/NVA ,illed By Army Helicopters And CIDG Forces Jan 68 Results Of Friendly Large Unit Operations flay 68 Combat Performance Of IS & ARVN Divisions Feb 69 Combat Performance of US & ARVN Divisions: An Update Apr F9 Impact of U.S. Maneuver Battalions In South Vietnam Jun 69 Withdrawal Of The U.S. 9th Division From IV Corps Jul 69 Battle Prospects In The MR-2 Highlands Jan 72

Date. 3.
FIRE SUPPORT (Also Soe .RV,AF
-

Vol

7 & Air Operationq

Vol,

5)

,,
4.

Air And Artillery Strikes .ther Than Close Support Air Arid Artillery Strikes Other Than Close Support: A Rebuttal Air And Artillery Strikes: A Rebuttal Unobserved Air And Artillery Strikes Artillery Fire In Vietnam NAVAL OPERATIONS Korea And Southeast Asia Naval Gunfire Support Sea Dragon Costs Compared To Tactical Air Costs Sea Dragon Costs Compared To Tactical Air Costs: A Rebuttal Market Time Effectiveness

Jul 67 u tuq 67 Sep 67 Nov 67 Aug 70

207 21 216 217 223

Mar 67 Dec 67 Feb 68 Jun/Jul 71

240 243 246 - 250

,,

;.

Analysis Viecw Of The Vietnam War:

2.965-.972

INTRODUCTION
This vol=ume,
plus

the other eleven volumes in

the series,

contains

every aricle ever printed in the Southeast Asia Analysis Report (a few Saddiio.n pers not printed in the report are occasionally included, too.). Fifty iscues of the Southeast Asia Analysis Report were published from January -967 through january 1972 by the Soutneast Asia office under the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis). The Report had two purposes. Ffrst, it served as a vehicle to distribute the analyses produced by Systems Analysis on Southeast Asia. It thus provided other agencies an opportunity to tell us if we were wrrong and to help prevent

research duolications.

We solicited and received frequent rebuttals or Second, it was a useful management tool for

comments on our analyses which' sharpened our studies and stimulated better

analysis by other agencies. Branch.

'getting more good work from our staff -- they knew they must regularly produce studies which would be read critically throughout the Executive The first page of the Report stated that it "is not an official publication of the Deoartment of Defense, and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Secretary of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis), or comparable officials." The intent was solely to improve the quality of analysis on Southeast Asia problems -- and to stimulate further thought and discussion. The report was successful in doing precisely this.

We distributed about 350 copies of the Report each month to OSD (Office
of the Secretary of Defense), the Military Departments, CIfTCPAC, and Saigon, and to other interested agencies such as the Paris Delegation, AID, State

Department, CIA and the W-rhite House Staff. Most copies circulated outside OSD were in response to specific requests from the individual person or

agency. Our readership included many of the key commanders, staff officers, and analysts in Washington and in the field. Their comments were almost always generous and complimentary, even when they disagreed with our conclusions. Some excerpts appear below:

SI

"I believe the 'SEA Analysis Report' serves a useful purpose, and would like to see its present distribution continued." (Deputy Secretary
of Defense, 31 May 1968) "We used a highly interesting item in your May Analysis Report as the basis for a note to the Secretary, which I've attached." (State Department, 28 June 1967)

L. _
. -

"We wre al.. r:n,;t 1mnressed with your first monthly Southeast Asia Analysis Report. *Not only do we wish to continue to receive it, but we wonu.ld apprcciate it if we could receive 4 (four) copies from now on." (WThite House, 9 February 1967)

Best Available Copy

R".Ambassador

me tc tell you that he has much apprehas as::em )F this .ublicat.on." analyses ciated and benefited from the studies

(State Department/fhite House,

2L Januar-6

lhe 'Situation in South "Congratulations on your January 4-zue. (State Vietnam' article was especially interes--ng and provoking." Department, 24 January 1969) "I let Ambassador take a s-..ing at the paper. He made several

'any thanks for putting us back coim.ents which may be of interest to you. Also, despite the return volley, I hope on distribution for your report. 17 June 1968) (%LA.CV-CORDS, you will continue sending your productsi." "As an avid reader (and user) of the SEA Analysis Report, I see a field and fewer simplistic need for more rounded analyses in the 6) (MACV-DEPCORDS, 17 April constructs." "The SEA Programs Division is to be ccmmended for its perceptive analysis of topics that hold the continuing concern of this headquarters... The approach was thoughtfully objective throughout and it was particularly pleasing to note a more incisive recognition of factors that defy quantiSfied expression." (Commander, US Army Vietnam--USARV, 29 November 1967) "In general, I think it is becoming the best analytical periodical I've seen yet on Vietnam (though there's not much competition)." (MACV-DEPCORDS, 21 April 1967) "Statistical extrapolations of this type serve an extremely useful purpose in many facets of our daily work." (CIA, 6 February 1967)

STP

"One of the most useful Systems Analysis products we have seen is


the monthly Southeast Asia Progress Report.... Indeed it strikes many of us as perhaps the most searching and stimulating periodic analysis (President of The Rand Corporation, 22 October 1969) put out on Vietnam." In November 1968, 55 addressees answered a questionnaire about the 52 said the report was useful, 2 said it was not, and 1 said, Report: "The reoort does not meet an essential need of this headquarters;" From nonetheless, it desired "to remain on distribution" for 7 copies. 48 questionnaires with complete responses, we found that an average 4.8 people read each copy -- a projected readership of 500-950, depending on whether we assumed I or 2.4 readers of copies for w.;hich no questionnaire was returned. Readers responding to the questionnaire reported using the Report for the following purposes: Information Analysis Policy Meakfnz Briefings Other L2: 3 lyj 76 9

it)

10"),

3
, In addition, readers reported about equal interest in each of the seven subject areas normally covered in the Report.

VC/NTVA Air Operations RVINAF


Pacification Friendly Forces Deployments Logis bics/Construction

18% 20% 17%


130 12% 12%

8%
Concern was expressed

about "the distorted impressions" the Report left with the reader and its

There was some negative reaction to the Report.

wide dissemination w.-hich "implies its acceptance by the Secretary of Defense, giving the document increased credibility." Given the way in which the Southeast Asia Analysis Report waz used, the important responsibilities of many of its readers, and the controversial pspects of the report, I decided to include in these twelve volumes every article ever published in a Southeast Asia Analysis Report. This will allow the users of these volumes to arrive at their own conclusions.

Thomas C. Thayer February 18, 1975

CONFIDENTIAL
THE STRATEGY OF ATTRITION attriting MACV's briefings and public stateme.-.s emphasize the goal of replacements. enemy forces faster than the enemy can recruit and infiltrate noted tat the have Is this emphasis practical or wise? 1,an senior officers superior with faced when enemy fades into the jungle and refuses to fight fights at a forces. Some make the stronger statement that the enemy only largely true, are statements these If time and pl.acd of his own choosing. outlast us, he is and if the enemy's objective in fighting is to harrass and unlikely to fight so hard as to allow us to deplete his forces. action Because the enemy's degree of control over the pace of the the degree analyzed have determines how well he can control his a.ttiticn, we and platoon-sized 56 of the enemy's tactical initiative. We classified is data The developed. they larger fire-fights in 1966 according to hxw S.L.A. by compiled as CTZ, !!I and based on detailed accounts in I, I, sponsorship. Service under West, F.J. and Marshall TABLE 1 TYPE OF ENGAGEWNTS DESCRZB=- IN COZAT NARRATIVES Category Description U.S. troops as they deploy onto the battlefield. 2. Organized enemy attack against a U.S. static defense perimeter. 3. VC/NVA ambush or encircle and surprise a moving U.S. unit, using what is evidently a preconceived battle plan. 4. A moving U.S. unit engages the enemy in a dug-in or fortified position: a. The main engagement comes as a virtual surprise to the American tactical commander because the enemy is well concealed and has been alerted either by observations of our unit or by our engaging apparent stragglers near-by. b. The U.S. tactical commander has reasonably accurate knowledge of enemy positions and strength before committing his forces. 5. U.S. unit ambushes a moving ene-," unit. Nr. of Engagements Percent of Total Percent Subtotals

1.. Hot Landing Zone,

Enemy attacks
7 17 12.5 30.4.

13

23.3

66.2

12.5 78.7

3 5 8.9

6.

Chance engagement, both sides surprised. TO:AL

3T100.1

47

6
__~~

COFIEfamu

CONFIDENTIAL
Thte.ny willingJ- anA :1 owiniLy stood and

47 (84%) of the 56 battles (Categories 1-4 in Tablv 1).

aou.hL a pit;(,thed battle in The ,llemy 6bhushecI

and assaulted our forces in 37 (66%) of the cases; the enemy had the advantage of surprise in r other cases (12$) in which U.S. forces were moving against him. The 10 cases in which a moving US unit engaged a dug-in enemy (Category 4) warr=.nts furtlier discussion. Typically, during the 7 engagements of Category 4a, Anericean units pressed forward into combat after events made them aware Our company and platoon commanders in these narratives of enemy presence. often strived to ta~e immediate advantage of what seemed to be an inviting situation without fully reconinoltering enemy forces and positions. The enemy appeared to be caught in an unaware or straggling condition that viewed in hindsight my have been a lure. Clearly, the enemy chose these occasionG to fight. Usually he was badly beaten. In the future he may not be so willing, and we may not be able to kill so many. The 3 cases in Category 4b were instances when the American commander engaged enemy positions while possessing accurate knowledge of both the enemy force and its position. Common to 44 of the 56 cases (78.7%) in the first threa categories and 4a is the element of enemy surprise with regard to time, position, or strength; the American tactical commander was put at an initial disadvanitage by enemy initiative. The entire picture is not consistent with the ;uccusful prosecution of a strategy to force attrition upon the enemy against his will. After Action Reports. COMUSMACV requires that an After-Action Report be written by the responsible commander after every significant operation. These reports constitute the most comprehensive official source of informaReports covering 77 U.S. operations tion available on ground operations. terminating from January through October 1966 were reviewed (of 186 total) to determine what percentage of VC/NVA losses (KIA-body count plus captured) occurred in combat resulting from enemy initiative or active willingness to engage at the tactical level. Enemy mortar attacks, sniping, and attempts to over-run our perimeters are examples of the overt action which indicatod that he sought combat. The pertinent portions of the reports are the narrative accounts, which vary in quality and detail. There was sufficient information to permit classification of only 38% (3600 of 9458) of the enemy casualties; in the other cases the enemy casualties in the "body count" are unexplained by the narratives, or are covered by narratives -too vague to be interpreted in the present context. Table 2 shows that of the classifiable enemy casualties, 62% occurred in actions where the enemy sought the initial contact.

1 1 1

I I

'

.a.

JUNFIDENTIAL
I: 1

I 1 1

CONFIDENTIAL
TABLE 2 DEPENDENCE OF ENEMY LOSSES ON Z:2-.Y 1NITI7TTI%72 AT THE TACTICAL IMVEL JANUARY Ti3OUGH OCTOBER 1966 Enemy KIA & Opt informatively described as to occurrence Category I Those enemy Casualties occurring when enemy sought initial contact. Category II Subtotal Other
-

1,982 (62%) 11233 (38%) 3,215 (100%)

Those enemy CasuaLties occurring when enemy did not seek ihitial contact. Category I plus Category II Those enemy Casualties resulting from air, arty, mines, etc., and not classifiable above.

385
3,600

ARCOV Study Results Independently, the Army Combat Operations - Vietnam study, which analyzed

a different set of battles in late 1965 and early 1966, found that 46% of the fights begin as enemy ambushes and that the enemy starts the fight in 88% of the cases; moreover, it found that 63% of the infantry targets encountered were personnel in trenches or bunkers.

Conclusion:t
During 1966 most of the enemy attrition depended upon his willingness to engage. His aggressive and offensive tactics were obvious in ambushes both at landing zones and as our units moved forward on sweeps. l anticipated our tactics, produced substantial U.S. casualties, and decided the losses he was willing to take. While more effective U.S. techniques probably can increase enemy attrition, we must recognize that U.S. ground units do not have the tactical initiative in most encounters at present. Enemy attrition in 1966 was largely the result of his seeking combat, not the result of combat forced upon him. Continued large-scale enemy attrition remains subject to his willingness to fight. Should the enemy find that his attrition has reached a rate unacceptable to him, he can avoid combat use more mortar and rocket attacks, resort to smaller guerrilla-liie actions, or rely increasingly upon isolated acts of terrorism. Givei such an enemy decision, and without a chsage in the tactics employed by U.S. forces, a strategy of attrition cannot be, prosecuted successfully.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

211n~r. flata on ccw-albat deaths, opc'rations an.d inciUlcn~ts indicate thv` the VC/Fil VA ave a much sr.e influence over bo-'h th-e:r c~ tde.acth ratesj atnd tbosc of US forces than do the alliosd forcon. Thois, in. turn irid**ca,,tes that t~he enemyr holds the milituary, initiativc. in South V~ta': In this analysis ve assume that ,the abl5 Pity to control casualty rates is a good measlare of military initiative in South Vietmnam; whoever holel.s the initiative in STVN should be able to influence both his casualty rate and the other side' s casualty rate by changing t'ie tempo of his offensive actions. Thus if the US/M'Llied forces hold the initiative, they can increase VC/lVA loss-es (all~ied losses willI increase too) by increasing 'their operations; conversely, a significant reduction in allied operations shouLld reducc c-as.uaities for bot-h sides. If the enemy ho:lds the initiative, both VC/11'111 and allied combat deaths shlould fluctuiate nore with VC/NvA activity rates, -than with allied ground operation rates. We found: 1. Ljittle or no relationship between the tempo of all-ied operations and fluctuations in ei,ther VC/NVA or US co-mbat deaths. 'A significant increase in friendly operatLions is not accompanied by a significant increase in allied or enemy combat deaths, nor does a reduction in allied operations reduce deaths. -nd VC/NVA cas2. A very strong relatinhpbtenCV ataks ualties and an -even stron.ger relationship between VC/NVA attacks and US ccoiibat deaths. The chances are 9:99 out of a 1000 that the VC/NVA1 a&tanck rate _an be used to account for about 85, of the'total variation In both US. and 1VC/NVA combat death rates. (The graph shows the-movementa) The statistlical f'indings fit our hypothesis-A -a the enemy hold the military initiative in South Vietnein, as measured by his ability to influence casualty rates. Taken alone, the statistical. findings rnust be considered tentative, but they accord well with past experience, which indicates the enemy can control his casualty rate, to a great extent, by choosing, "w~hre; when, and how often he will fight. (A previous study ii~dicat~es that Vc/TTVA units initiate up to 85i of all the fire fights in SV)NL.' .), He tries to a'oid contact with allied troops under unfavorable conditions by blendingr into the population or vanishing in-to Jungle base areas during large callied opcrations. Senior officers have often coinmented -that: "We just can't find hin (vIC/nlW) when he 'doesn't want to fight." In jui.y o:r thi-s Y~eetr for. example, vC/iKMA: KIA decreaned sharply dcspito va very hi.gh level of allied oporations. ~~~ ~ ~ F Attrit ion" KT'hA Aimly F'eh-I/0y 19'57) p. 6. Alro ths.iyC, ~ citc-d on pagi 8 of that tice ppA.ujcs pocin iIn~

Ai'

t~~

cy

*~~.

CONFIDENTIAL
U

"4"

P flOFIDENTIAL

,..'

110000

;.500

36000

US MIA (Pdght Scale)

)"
32006-1

,. -

EIT,, 14 .Y K T A ( Lef t 'S cal e )

..

"v'
S20000 24ooo

ENE!4Y ATTACKS (Right, Scale)

7o

.2

200001,._5
1.6oo

IK
US
.

A
r0
CONFIDENTIAL

j\~000i.
,l0
'V

0 oj.

2750

8001

I
--

VI
-

CON
oI o o
,

7 I d F\IDE1NTIAL00

...

..

...

..

. .

..

CONFIDENTIAL
rTji;' VCJ/' i\A o

t.tcT4 ' '

to

aCI

.iij .(L

& ...

P~tL%

In a br!iei:). i'

Llate Ju ly, ',;'ACV

been i.ntcl," iron].L-v reduci:ng hic casult:i.eC

nc;y in, :ruceo.! ,t .... t".,cJ J *Lby t:r'yin!, to ..

L ': ........ k ru U;"...It...

key targets, expanding attac-1ts 1by fire, and withdrui.:inft i-roops f_:rom ury.tor.t. able battle areas,. Mlorcover, VC:/NVA. forces often fight fro!;i .p.,!'ac1. po0litions whenever possible in an attempt to furthcr increase 'th::,.:L cor,1,at
advant-nge.

Control of casualties also bears upon the s'trategy, chosen by allied cor .1M..eS. If the VC/TVA forces retain the initiative in controll.ing their own losses, then any strategy based upon the attrition of VC/NVA forces is untenable. Recent studies have shown tliat the v/INVA mnrapo1.er pool is f:uflcient 1o sustain the current rate of casual-ties for an extended period of
time.?)/ Unless allied forces can drastically increase the rate of VC/frVA

losses, they can continue operations for at least tbcce more years (at first half 1968 loss rates).
Details of the Analysis As associated with battlefield situations the. term "initiative" indicates the degree of control over the combat situation that each participant possesses. "A combatant is usually credited with having the initiative if he can freely Over the course of the conflict, choose the time and place of the encounter. "tactical initiative reflects the larger strategic military initiative, for the battlefield data indicate the degree of control. and the success with which each participant has implemented his strategy. In the writings of Mao Tse Tung and other protagonists of guerrilla wax.faxe on protracted conflicts, the strategic initiative plays a central part in the success of the insurgency. To study strategic initiative, we need manageable and meaningful indicators of the degree of control that each combatant has over important areas "bf0-the Casualties are a central factor in combat success and control over conflict. The ,vehicle for control combat deaths is an important indicator of initiative. Holding the initiative, a of casualties is, of course, combat operations. successful co-batant can, within limits, tailor his own operations to control enemy casualties and ).ikewise to control his own. Hothe~sis for Friendly Forces on the Initiative In Vietna.m, friendly military forces operate largely on the theory that large operations designed to search ott and dcstroy the enemy will yield a I The folloving correlations high l.evel of control over the field of combat. between opcrations and IaA should hold if friendly, forces have the initiative:

-P *"

Z7

SeeJ.inO,

AvailoMJ.1ity in N-ortWh VietM,," F4EA A1.yr,:I.s

'

Ih.v

100%O p. 1t "lot~nh Ai'runt 195P., p. 1.

Sl~d~outh

icmre

ip?7

CONFIDENTIAL
8

CONFIDENTIAL

,:.s the,.

nv',, c:r o::. " .,.,,

y, .
""-". .

.
''

..
.2.S "

to .rl A

V':/I'VA..

'.i'hxi as "Uhc-

":" ,"
'"

....

"C/'IV

KUA can be expeetcd to inrcas.-.,

.... -v z..

2. VC/NVA KIA Will2 not Correl!'."t' 17-ith V:/Q.!A oper!,tions, such as enemy large and small scale attacks, since -f-,-.-endly . foh'ces hold.ing the initiative would be killing most of the VC/i'VA i *:.,_cn.- ini'iated operations. friendly ri.h operations, because 3. Friendly I}A will correlate hi-hly friend1y forces will seldom be caught off a.i..rd by the ene"y and vill incur most of their MCA during their own operations. They will have the ability to control the tempo of those operations anl therefore their level of McA. 4. Friendly KIA will not cor'elate vwith Y/IVA operations, because few frieneLly ]JA will result from VC!IWI. initiated actions. The bypothesis for friendly forces ho).ding the initiative is displayed below as a matrix. MATRIX FOR FRIEiDLY FORCE INITIATIVE

KipA Friendly High Correl. Expected VC/IV. High Correl. Ex-pected

Friendly Operations VC/NVA

Low Correl. Expected

Corral. E,:pccted

""'F IDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

l L, ").11 t~i;: c i.. rn to minLl 0u1o~mm enmWn c, -xi Ve of' thco opo"~11c.JonC~. to P'11.iicoawrol. an rara o:,r invvni~rcbi:Uty and iyu in ' shall.1'so th~.-t the onemyir.c.s try~ini, to foJ.3ovi slch 't rtlrutecZyrV) This ntrat~.cgy iinplie.- a set o~f Corrcl~ations 1.7h11chl ea~o exactly the opvicis~itr, The matr'ix for thi~s s.3.tu~dtior ppcll,(S of t~i-o~e f~or fr.tenI~oly initiatilve. be low,

MTIX FOR VWIN VA FOC)31 111TIITI ATI \,'


KIA
..

Fr . endly

VC/m%.V

Friendly Operations

Low correl. Expected

LOW Correl.. -Expected

High VC/lVA

High

Correl.
Expected

Correl..
Expected

What the Data Show.-,We have performned correlation and rression analys~.s of the KITA and activities cited in the two hypothesis. Ii Table 1 shows a higfh correlatlion ~/In the following tabl.es: R~, the correlation coefficient,. indicatenrN-whether a rolationship exist!s between the variabl~es. 0 indicates no relation and .1 inldicates a perfect v&I Ati~on. The F Bienificflnce test indicates the cortainty of the 'clatioll. .999 i,.eans% the chnnecc arei St least 999 out of' 1000 thnt a roTht olSip, pcx-i .hmrans 'lossI th~an .95' mnans the chancos are Jlers th,'ji .1.9 out; of' PO.

i-li

corrarthtion coefficients~~~c
C~i~ip~t~1'

obttinm.- by voinc the o


in

iik~cvrt;
C1hp. `0 tyh(c 'Tl

by~~*.~crt~ the, Bccoronlcs3. cpse ]TLm(-,lit or' `(.Il l ~Yh ra 'CONFIDENTIAL"i"ta 1111"'~

1.0

CONFIDENTIAL
'/i vA
\c /i
,~:

bctz~c.n
a i' c

):.:.,A an

.tt~U'/

c.L th, f l:-,a'L"

e b , v.'.; r:;Q:a u.ed

th .
th

that thc: c .rxncesf '. the, ',' aaccouvnt for oer 80%. o in flcti.uate in the sv.xe Patte:rns

e g...c,,.cr

....... ) . t;, i \?O,!;VA K"A. k. fluc,.t . \'C./i';"VA at...ck. .:-i*';

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: ; . , , . bat -h ,W`;,

.,h:f to .L TC..
I.nt5

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TABTE 1

By

AN'LYS IS XYIATXGA.TN-ST VC/N1VA ATTACKS~F JA\N 66 THROUGH- JU 68 --fIO',

R Correlation Coefficient I CTZ II CTZ III CTZ IV CTZ Countrywideb/


"

2 R

Significance Test (F) .999 .990 .999 .999 .999

.84 .54 .84 .72 .91

.702 .291 .701 .521 .839

one studies runwith total VC/hvA attacks by CTZ as RCTZ independent variable. size and b/ Cduntrywide study run with VC/NVA battalion as two attacks larger attacks and VC/INVA small scale independent variables. the Tabie 2 shows that VC/UVA KE!A have virtually no relationship to There contact. 17Tith operations friendly to number of friendly operations or friendly of nwnbe~r the and KIA VC/NVA is a moderate relationship between are battalion days of operations, except in II CTZ. All of the correlations operations friendly of tempo well below those observed in Table 1. The appears to have little effect on the tempo of vC/iNVA casualties.

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T~AByLE 2

'

'i mo nt'n:

Ja

(thy o'aih JUY 6


R2Significance
:

Correl. Coeff. Vlp. ersus VCo/jIVp Friendly Large Opns


-

Test (F)

.I.07

4
.ic390 .478
.010
.213

Friendly La~rge Opns -with Contact

.25

9 esta less than .95 l


.999
less than .95
.95

Friendly Bn. Pays 01' Opn

cou.t6 I CTZ
IT CTZ
III

.69
.09
.47

.999
.99

CTZ

IV CTZ Note:

.51

All stities run with one independent variable.

between friendly KTA and VC/INVA Table 3 shows the strong relationship US KIA and enemy attacks is the strongest attacks. The relationship between the relationship does not appear in one encoi~ntered in the study. Again, that the chances are better than..999 II CTZ. The tsble seems to indicate rate accounts for over 85% of the variain a thousand that the VC/tNVA attack tempo of VC/NVA attacks seems to have tions in US 1CA. In other mords, the US KIA than the te-Po of friendly operaviuch more influence on the level of tions.

4,.J

S ....

! ICIt4F1BENTI~kL .
-~

:
4

in

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,RI

TDLy KIAA.; ... ,'v.:f.,

ATTACKS q'eas

aI-c--,

Significance

Corhel Coeff.
Total Friendly Forces KIA

R2

Test (F)

Versus VC/PIVA Attacks a/ RVNAF Forces KJA Versus


VC/PVA Attacks a/

.82
.82

.689
.683

.999
.999

US Forces KIA Versus VC/NVA Attacks Countrywide-a I CTZ b/

.93
.85

.873
.735

.999 .999

"II CTZ-/
iII a! b/ CTZb/

.16
.84

.0:4
.717

less than .95


.999

VC/NVA Bn size and Time period by month: Jan, 66 through June, 68. independent variables. as two attacks scale small VC/NVA larger attacks and Time pcriod by month: Jan, 67 through June, 68 because US YJA by-CTZ is only available for that period. Total VC/NVA attacks (large plus small) treated as one independent variable. IV CTZ not studied because of

low US involvement.

Table 1; completes the statistical an-alysis and shows the correlation There is no correlation between between friendly KIA and friendly operations. friendly K1IA and the number of large operations or large operations with I contact. Battalion days of operation -Xhibits a moderate degree of correla "' tion except in III CTZ.

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COIIFIRENTIAL

1:.11

EvNL e i i -

JOI ly Kr.

Coff

~e

I:rX

] IU

C~1~ pr-m

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I I ca Z,%/
111t CT'fZ b27

I cuvz b/

.68 .61.

.hyo

.65
on4

.371 .~~t
.077 -550)

.999 .990
less than .95

.990
.999

?.'I C! 71 E!7ac

pc~rlr,` by monn-h: J'an, 67 throurgh Juno, 68. available Picr -',o Jwi), 67. All stulieci run i-ith one i~ndo-pcindent var~iable,

7b,,' ,7), th

Jan, 66 throug~h Junv, 685.

Friecndl~y K)IA b)y C'Z not

Using s E resu tE, froi .hfou' en.li, 'Ve Can con1stru~ct, Eoz1tho by~~~,c two ?'ArxtWilth ttiocn on a co-untrywide baist.
RESMYPEN 1ATRTX

*wv

K:[A

Fri cn.~ly

IOcarc. Low

,J.C.1
-

VC/Y1VA.
1. L1

cvc.

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best
. :V111/1".1:' in."~ . bcic'te*V)hf:C.~C"L:. Vic: i itf3.1-s
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fro;: the c.ou.. rY: (I.( ic.t.y . :-.. ": The situation in II C,'' di for I1 CTZ is shotm b'loz... A r-:.: pattcrrnr in several respects.
II APPROXI1.A'3i .,,T. -: :,UL.. 1.:4YIX

.KIA Friendly VC/1'IVA .. .

Moderate

L.,ow

Friondly
Operations

Corral,
Observed

Corrol.
Observed

Low
VC/NVA Correl. Observed

Moderate

Correl. Observed.

The II CTZ situation fits neither of the hyothesis matrices developed earlier. The pattern shown may indicate that neither side has the initiative aginst the other and that both have assurd a primarily defensive posture. Such a .situatioh could be associated wi-th a stalemate or an area in which neither combatant has a strong interest. Evaluation I

from these studies must be treated With The correlation factors obta tentative. But it is possible to say considerei conclusions the and care some operations does not determine friendly of teimpo the that confidence with some do not possess the initiative forces frierldy Thus, VC/NVA KIA or friendly KIA. in South Vietnan, as measured by their ability to control casualties.

;is needs elaboration to fully On the other hand, the foregoing -l ,0nl..z con,:A o:trol oassualti..e and have the . -h.,:. supp'ort arn asse;rtion thnt the
initi,',i.ve. The regrcssion from the a tysIS of VC/:-VA

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!43

13

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.t.: s., ariJy,' " :. .5 .L l 'ga opc'n)al o

6J.',L o:f ta] Y,'A.'.>,. ;y a!.i.1

-:bat bw.. C1 %C/uvf c',.: j.'... n.. - i .n \(,2/i, :f'o :CE ...n

oc,':

.'

' :&leo 1...arge r.ink is that erneoy (and frie,(..y) KCA on The mvissing fight. and st.,.x1 to wilLin,.ess VI ' s VC/N the ti.ons is pri:::ar.1y detcr..ri n c by In turn, this occurs at the sar:., tirY.(c that he also inc,'eascs his ow,;n at`-ack Further, encily initiativc at the tactical -level n.y b r;,askc. to a rate. high degree, because the present reporting system reports all actions occuxrinug in the area of a fricndly large operation as friendly initioated, no n-.Atter who started the fi.ht. The findings of the analysis are in accordance w..ith past experience, vhich indicates the ene-,- can control his casualty rat.v, to a great extent, by choosing where, when, and how often he will fight. A preyious study in) dicats that VC/I1VA units initiate up to 851 of al.l. the fire fi&hts 1A $VNWh lie tries to avoid contact with allied troops undcle uX!:vorab.e cond:Wtionz by blending into the population or vanishing intro jungle base areas during large "We just can't Senior officers have often cotmmented that: allied operations. find him (VC/NVA) when he doesn't want to fight." In July of this year, for example, VC/NVA KJA decreased sharply d.er pite a very high level of alliedl.

operations,
The VC/.T,7VA also attelnpt to fight on favorable terms as much as possible. As we have seen, they pick the time and place in most of the fights. In a

\briefing in late July, MACV stated that the enerny in recent months has been
* intentionally reducing his casualties by trying to stagger attacks on key targ.ets, expanding attacks by fire, and withdrawing troops from,unprofit.ble battle areas. Moreover, the VC/NVA often fights from prepared positions whenever possible in an attempt to further increase his eonubat advantage. Control of-casualties also bears upon the strategy chosen by allied commanders. If the VC/NVA retain the initiative in controlling 'his losses, then any strategy based upon the attrition of VC/NVA forces is untenable. Recent

"Results of Friendly Lq.rge Unit ,erations," SEA Analys.s Re port, May 1.958
Dur regression equation gives the followving estimate: p. 21. Monthly VC/tNTVA KIA = ili% + 206 x (large attacks) +30 x (nmall' attacks) This nearns that every large VC/NVA attack must result in an ave, rage of 20r VC/WTVA KIA and every sitaJ.1 attack mnust result in 30 VC/jIVA 1<IA, if those attaclrs are to account for the bulk of the VC/H'iVA KIA. See "Th! StraLcgy of Attrition" SPA Anal.ysi.s RP, enrt ,C-,ci.&1 SuilecmnI, Fcb-'t.-hy 1967, p, 6. Also the A y .. . -. article, citced on pa~ge 8 of th't,

6/

CONFIDENTIAgest Available Cci-.v


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sr.) th.t.l the V/~. be studitoEr .'c .: the curvcnt ral-c ofC casua).ticz, i"c, -: they ca thc- rmw1e of' vc/iY*% anLlcd f'orces, can drasticallyic~ Jos.O3 half102 ~I'rct (a~t yccvrr r-ore c~oati1nuc operatimis f~or a.t ler.st t.rc
rates).

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32 -119

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1~

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16t.-~12 1 6 10 12 14~ 12 1.S 28 0


60c7 1122

17 11 29 20
0

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24

1.7 14, 20 17

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26 z0

26 13 29 i8

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71
980 '779 1484,

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44

73
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63
5

85
1276

6'n6.
1301 13.67,. 1520 1571

~
9 .1759 20149

3,
15?0. 1797

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44

ITT CTZ
IV

625

OTrZ

28B.3 3?1

627

986 912

965

559

976 608

956 923

1053

790

t06 C-46

570

h,89

4,85

1,62

687 370

33-3

33?

1,53

3-6 1

b/ Ci

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53. J-1z168: 8S-ESA StatkL*cal Summarwy, Ta~ble

f~ 0$D Statistical

,le 53. 72ery

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CONFIDENTIAL'

Best Available Copy


17

CU NiF IDE "I T IA L

WA rec~ived the folwartiolez frc= -.he Army~ Staff:

comm~enta Oil3 September Analysis Report

"The Settember issue of' your Southpast Asia An~alysis4 Rer.'ort zzntains a na"-:er of interesting and useful articles. 7he value of' these articles lies in the presentation of potentisal2y useful data and the fresh look given, to mrany old peolble~ms . I find, howiever, that three of' the articles appear to warrant conment in order to prevent misuderstarling on the part Of %Iterested readers. "M.ilitary initiative in South Vie'lnam (page

This article r~norts to show that it is the VC/NVA who have the military initiative in South Vietnam and bases this

over th-e combpat sitation.


-ts 'military ini--i-tt-.'

Said another way, a side which uses principally -to avoicl combat is not trying 11. _4ominzate the battleficld but only to zmaintain a presence there; this is nost military initiative. I do not believe that thie Vz'/r*VA dzznlnate the battlefield in Vietnam nor do I 4 asree that thei.r w'11ingess to stand and fight, or even their iecisions to ata~are entirely volu~ntary. Perhaps a better zeasure of military- initiative could be obtnined by examining thre relative abilioy to successfully enugge an opponent in This right be done by comparing the rate of' 2.etisl ve combat. ca1a.13,1ty fluctuations to fluctuations in opposing initiatives.
"E%*enL aasum.-ins that ability to eron-1ril casulIties isa goo! =e~s.=ue Of =1i~tary initiative, the finding of the article

is errone)us i.n tl-.at the analysis is fallacious. The analysis attempts to d~eterrmin military initiative by ccm-.Iprine fluctuations
ot opposing military actions with fluctuations in casualties. Howover, the measure of military activity used is friendly large unit operations (number, nunfber with contact, and battalipn day:. oa operations) for f1rienaly f'ories, and attacks for enemrj foroc s. These represenftations of ailitary activity are not comparab1-z divisi-.- -. riendly operation. L-',en friendly 'o-perations with cantact' is not a con:tareable neasurc of frierbd~ly military

CONFIDENTIAL
.... ..............

CONFIDENTIAL
activity because an o-'"-..
'.-

if it has one or more ccntac:.: .dozen and be enumerated. as on.:

c- (it could have had a


,eticn .h contact). Even

comparing battalion days on c-_r~:ions "ith enemy attacks is not valid, although, as re...n..ez -r. article, its corrolation with casualties is be-7o-. -o h ccparablQ an enemy attack, which i1 an enemy int-iti- n---t, =u3t be commared to a friendly initiated cont-;.
"In summary, the _pre-ise :-at abii4ty to control casualties
I

is a good rr.easure of mili-eary iniiate is q,.-stonable, and the teats aD-lied to measure .4l_ degrees ."_ of 'military ~initiative' are invalid due t: .a:k of co.marability in measurement of the tempo of military oerations of opposing forces. "Artillery Support for ?.".: -;age !9)

This article is pre-_ature. 7_ i.r that the distribution of artillery support IS i.-=-roner, but almitted-ly contains no examination of the bci filstr'ibution. As pointed out in the article, a great deal nre infor.=ation is needed in order to arrive at any .'znusion. It might, therezeaninnfu_ fore, have been beater to si=!3.- _sate the facts available, drawing no conclusions, or......... .. article until sufficient information ta evaluate the si:uation .as available. In addition to examination of raw arnu.i tion e:.en`itures data, a look at missions, organization for ccc-at, .iri'g restrictions, targets, -and other fire support means a=.ailable -oli add much to a study of the adequacy of artillery t

While it is encouraging to roe the improved effectiveness of RPt, caution must be exert'sol to i-"sure that it is not over-rated. This is parti:ulur.1y true -when considering the current high level emphasis cn de--=-31 ing the RVIAF to take over more of the war from LS Fcrces. "The evaluation of RV:LkTF .... t'aned in this article bases its primary conclusions on the nuozer cf enemr killed; it overlooks friendly losses. The arziz~e als: points out that the missions assigned to various f'rzr: have not been considered, yet this fact has been omitte4 frc the Sur-ary and conclusions. Additionally, other indicators sc:!h as leadership, morale, training, and aggressiveness which be in.zluded in a full evaluation have not been considered. -la-ei on the facts presented, this

Best Available Copm


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thrat R1W.'1F h~s kil.lod more enemy artic!2 can only-on-lu.e recently; this zuggests an imqroved capability to perform the missions assigned during this period. An exanination of its demonstrated effectiveness in performing various missions might prove useful as we look to the assumption by RVNA.F of greater military respoasibility in Vietnam.

*..(based * i

on enemy killed), in terms of US force equivalents, is invalid, and tends to be misleading. As emphasized earlier, to omit consideration of assigned missions and other influencing factors, and without evaluating the capability to perform missions currently assigned to US units, it is inappropriate
to rate %V7L_ in terms of US equivalency. Equating this im-

"Expressing increased RV1AF strength and effectiveness

proved RVWTA

effectiveness to US units suggests that the

RV'RAF is now able to assume tasks assigned to the stated number of USrunits -- this is not proven in this article, and is undoubtedly not true at this time.

"H

"In the final analysis, the greater number of enemy killed by the IVTRAF, while encouraging, is not a true measure of its Other tests must be applied to deteroverall effectiveness. mine its current and projected capability to perform the complete spectrum of -i.sions which it must assume if US and 1Free World forces are to be phased down."

M],iteary Iaitiative The treatment of military initietive suggested in the comments fits a conventional limited war such as the one in Korea. There the "relative ability to successfully engage an opponent in decisive combat" did constitute military initiative for either side. But Ne wonier if the same holds true
the Vietnam war where many of the principles of guerrilla warfare and pro-

Sin

tracted conflict seem to explain enemgy strategy-best. We suspect that the ability to control casualties is an integral part of the overall enemy strategy in Vietnam. His attacks and other activities are designed t have the. maximum psychological impact by inflicting 'heavy Sallied casualties, projecting an aura of countryide strenzgth and continual presence,' and gradually reducing the US will to continue. This in turn implies that the enemy must expend his resources at a rate low enough for him to hold out longer than the allies. It must be clear to him after his spring offensive that he cannot win by engaging us in short, decisive combat and that he must frame his strategy within the rules of protracted conflict. In such a conflict, control of the casualty rates is critical.

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55

20

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Th co

ments also suze

cn

coaa

esreo

ain

as ~ vstast am "ountat of rinl areiewtiuld wahbut they vlarlyae

no the

n..efort -r thIPAat prouesnol d cortcts Yoarisofnh. ieofredyo

tions (acttg or tte i /=N11) canet l=**nearl al'o y fi-ndeus and the resualtiy con-t tactsper oeratihewants us tow.: t-0int-hlierhnd, isw excptionally goodns aont Dre hear ofniltary. inThaie ic~zrn Vgetnm inthe imlcimets assumptioneri . thek t-et iast tamut both sredes ar.-o-rationa ueffrt identicalobucesnctctivs strategys anud tatish ast ine valu cof ntcn ar. Unde. hs odto cotat eropraio ats niht* -wciaeys eqndusvalnand usalabilty the toenae inc decisive Vcmbat ca=l neal cica! obthsds at h ertiller miliotafry initati; nVet. .Teipiitasmto n

Oux article contained data which!b show that- the volume and weight, of
artillery support for R17ILkF is munless than that for US forces. We ac.=owledge that we lack the infor=mation ne-essary for a thorough evaluation of the adequacy of R~r;.!F artill1ery. s-.--ort., and of the distribution of fire s=.nort between USb and "_RvT~Te~rheless, available data strongly suggest that ~ ~ upo ~ orRAF ~ atley ' =ay not be adequate. Further ex:,Lination of t.he problem is re-t.Lred. More d~ata on tohe artillery support for RVI'IF wo "be most useful. 1RVNrL.1F Effectiveness The article does not overloc*- losses; Table 3 (page 411) indicates that *the APRVNf enemy kill r'atio in large vooerationms improved. We have addressed the RlVKA.F leadership problems in the Jne a-nd August reports. We agree that an examination of RVTNAF's dez=mstrat-ed eff--e-ct-ive-n-e-s-s, in performing various missions would prove usefml: in evalu-at~ing RV1NAF's ability to assume greater military responsibility LaT ;J"etnam. Data for this is sparce at the moment,, but should become available as we get information from IvACV's new reporting system for RVNPIF forces. We compared the performarce of RVPAF ground forces in killing VC/NVA with the US perform~ance in two ways. First, we compared the effectiveness of Vietnamese ground force battaLio-'s to US battalions. We found that in 1968 the' Vietnamese performance in :- 11 ing VC/YVA increased more than the US performance,, and that it would ha-:me taken 106 additional US maneuver battalions to ki~l the additional ~/Vif the RVI'AF kill rate had not improved. Second, a comparison of:tlenemy killed by all RT~nLkY forces to those killed by all US for-ces ~dct that: the improved Vietnamese performance was equivalent to an 0_itio o1 9L'~,000 US troopos.

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56

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in ~&tothe ar'ticle. potn.ned out that RIP4ZU battalions on avarzgq hAvi bean consistva~tLy %il.ingVC/NMI at a 4oisnfcantly higher rate than the MACV A~r-4 capability model would. load us to expect. Aside from being
unable to unertaica long field operations, many Vietna.~e3e battalions prosently 1pariftrm mu.ch the sa~o missiozs that US forces do, The low level of support and fire poweor provided Vietnamese forc03 may help account for tha greater tits their battalions spend. on static security, and training

missions a~nd for their reported lackc of aggressiveness. ~

If true, providing

better support and fire power to RV:U forces may enable them to perfform

~We

missions now entrusted to US forces socner than we might otherwise expect, think -that attempting to state RVTAF improvement in terms of US force e~Taivalemts is a. usef'ul way -to gain perspective on the rate of improveaent
as the RVTAY' modernization and improvement programs proceed.

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fin..s o: *his t.:--.7 -are: Firs-t, the encz.y7 haz the 'ih,: pr'ci:: in Vi"tnam. c ,- . ', d ...... tf.. ,:L iui':.i"..'Ve in over 6L';'

ta

a, d 77%! of 120 cOmbat losscC .... . ... e .i,. IJ.at de-.r . c., T Second, US loss z'...s (KIA per cumpany per .engagelosses. eh emy l Of higher a:.: .... l1 ratios (cnemy to US KIA) three "i:.:i me:;) aZ'c On:t 1

L.,i Iow:o;r :i.n encity-initiated en.- .es..' W%-

And finrJ.ly, .hi.L

te

C.-.y "..it'.u.., contacts -w.hen his reJati'e strength is highest, he rarely ha., ,' %treng'lh t, antagc over the US nIt of' over 1.5 to 1.

Tho princi'pal US mi].itary CtrateC$' in Vietnam has either explicitly ,Or irrn.03icitly been based on a "strateE,- of attrition," in which the US milita-'y forces .ttcImOt to attrite "h'' ene,:y beyond his capability or will
to replace his losses. This approach is frequently described as maintaining t;,,ficient pressitre on the enemy to force him to negotiate or to abandon his political goals. To successfu.lly apply a strategy of attrition, thl-3 must a control the rate of enen-y losses or at the least retain the

option to engage the enemy or not. We believe this is the essence of tactical. i;ilitary initititive in Vietnam.
The' enemy can withdraw to his Ca-ooaian and Laotian sanctuaries, thereby avoiding all attrition. But he canaot continue this alternative indefinitely because his strategic goals in SVi' include protection of his infra-

structure, harassment and disrupztion of the GV7, and rai'ntainirg a high

level of US and RVHF'casualties. To be successful in these strategic objectives, the enem, must control .the pace of combat and the rate of casualties in South Vietnam. Thus, fcr both antagonists; tactical control over combat intensity and levels of casualties is essential to their strategic objectives. Control of casualties and combat intensity are undoubtedly not the only measures of initiative, particularly in a conflict similar to the i,'ar in Vietnam. For example, it is important to deny the enemy undisputed access to base camps and logistical sanctuaries. Military pressure and harassment shoLld also force the enemy to operate in small units and keep' him a;iay

from pacified areas. We do not consider these other measures to be unimport-at. However, both area denial and harassment of large VC/iN'VA units
require some degree of ability to engage the enemy at our will not his. If we can force the enemy to fight ,hen an-a where we choose, we would also

become far more effective increasing enemy battle deaths, harassing the VC/

NVA main fCorce units, and el.iminating sanctuary base cemps.

The converse is

also true; failure wrill follow in each of these measures of initiative if the Pacification will be the enemy. US units cannot control en gera Ints ;h

disrurybed by an occasional Tet-type off.e.sive as large VC/iNVA units move ndec-tected into populated areas; enem. -ase areas will be immediately reoccupied and repaired. after the US unict 2eaves after making no contact.

if

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,n L, u,'icr rceor~t. l As \ck4round to this analysis, two er-i:ter May 1 z-' an .nalysis of 56 platoon-size or l.avger fire fights i iat.,d 8'el '0 fiShts. encnxy had the tactical izi,.Ltiative in r. of tht f,',r, the limited data available at trhat tre, it appeared thut :n 7V'l of the C-',7 &r the c'cx.y retsined the option to engage or ndt. enFare US troolps. A s.i

stud. sof. 165 enjagements conducted in Decaeber 1967 showed the- eneny ir-i.ted We could not obtain suffiuiont detailed infonr-.tion in either of these studies to relatq conmbat deaths to initiative or to the ty-pe engagement. In September 1968,-S/ a regression analysis relatinE KIA to activity levels again suggested that the US did riot control "he tactical initiative. We found that variations in the level of enemyinitiated attacks explained most of the variations in US and VC/N-VA casualties, but that variations in US-initiateq aoctivities erplained very little of the casualty variations.

73I of the fire fights.

In this study we analyzed a sample of 68 platoon-k;J.ze or l.,ger engagements. extracted from detailed reports nrepaared by US Army M.ilitary istor"ans. Although the sample was small, we felt it was representative teca.use the engagements covered a long time period (Oct 66-,!ay 68), all. trAjor US Army divisions, and all parts of SVN. In oddition, we tested somne of the parameters in the sample. We found that: (1) kill ratios in the sanple were reasonably close to those experienced by all US units during the same period of tine (8.5 to I in the sample vs. 6.2 to 1 for all US units); (2) the ratio of small unit contacts (loss than battalion size) to total conteacts in the sample was ve:ry similar to .the US Arry expr:rinnce in Iii Corps durina the sample Period (75'S of sample were, small unit- engagements vs. 83 in III Corps); and (3) the averag6 }WA per contact wha considerebhly larger in the Eample than the total experience for III Corps (7,1 in scnnple vs. 2.2 in III Corps). We concluded the sample wms relatively representative of the fire fights in Vietnam, except possibly that the battles in the s.:.ole tended to be larger(in terms of US KTA per engagement) than the overall average, as a result of the larger proportion of battalion size eiage-ments in the sample. The Analysis We classified the sa.ple engagements into seven categories to show the degree of tv.ctical ihitiative held by US units. Cotegories 1 aad 2, The enenr- heli enemy attacks and ambushes, were obviously enery-initia-ted.
the initiative in Category 3, a "hot" landing zone, because he knev" the strength and exact location of US forces, and was thereby free to eZage cr

withdraw.

Category 4i, the US engagement of the enemy in fixed positions,

occurred on US search and destroy-type missions deep i-r en,7.r typically territory: The element of surprise in CateGory 4a indicatecl the c.:nemy had

I :2

Report, January 1%8, p66, "The Stratcegy of Attrition." SAnalysis A Not published.
SEA Analysis Repot't, September 1968, P6, ",Jtilitary Initiat3've in S'v1;."

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the initiative becauce he chose

C
-

tran

L.,o

t'hd a--i'Ja'

co~ziaivder -,new the elxmthe LI-1


decided to engag;e or avoid conta L rn.

Y P-Lr ( <"c,CA:ory

thd airtiutive. :. h b; L _ iS ,c.. perfect, ..... distinction between Categories z-:.on is the crucial deterrii.:iant knowledge of the enemy strength n, of initiative and of surprise. 7n Category 5, the US unit obviously hhd

the initiative when it laid a successful


included surprise encounters in Summary Findings .;hich

",

tU...... c

side had the initiative.

Table 1 shows the 68 engagements rby cateory of initiative. following primary conclusions er-erge: 1. The enemy initiated 68; of the rilite.ry engagemQents.

The

.2. The enemy controlled his combat losses in the sense that he selected Ile the time and place for engagements that accont~ed for 775b of his K. fought anid lost men only wheh he wanted to.' The enemy initiated cozbat situations that accounted for 84% of 3. the US combat deaths.

42'

4. US loss rates (KIA per cornpany per engagement) were a4most three times higher (5.9 vs. 2.2) when the enemy initiated the engagement than Enemy loss rates were not nearly so sensitive when the US unit initiated. to tactical initiative.

ratios (enemy/US: KIA) were the least fa'orable when the 5. US kill US unit was ambushed on the move or lending during an air assault. Rarely did the enemy achieve more than a 1.5 to 1 strength advan6. tage over the US unit, but the relative engaging strength ratio of VC/NVA to US was twice as high w-hen the enemy initiated the fire fight (1.2:1 vs.

o.6:1).

7.

Artillery support was used by US units in more than 80% of

their engagements.

The exceptions -were enemy initiated ambushes, less than

W"0% of which received artillery fire.

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S...
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3A T ;L'.H_'I..

:" :" nmv-lzitit,d._}?na(;cn.ontsq 1 2.


Ii.

um3 :r oVt

Percc~it. o

As~ilt: Organizi ~enemy attack against a US atatic de.ofense perimeter. Ambush: VC/DIVA ambush or encircle and surprise a ,ovirng '.r3 unit, uing what is evidently a preconceived bhttle plan.

22

32

12

3.

Hot Laiind

Zone:

Enemy attack US troops


.23.

as a hey deploy onto the battlefield from heliccpbers.

4.
Ia

A moving US unit engage& the enemy in a dug-in or fortified position: Sweep eact.on: The main engagement comes as a virtual surprise to the Arnerican tactical commr.aner because the enemy is well concealed and has been alerted either by observations of our unit or by our engaging aqparent stragglers near by. Total Enemy-Initiated

1}

21

46

68

~~US-Xnitiatcd En,r.e,:'e nt s
b. 5w,-n: The US tactical commander has reasonably accurate knowledge of enemy position3 and strength before commiitting his forces.

15

22

5.

Ambush: unit.

US unit amhbushPs a moving enemy 20 2 P9

Total' US*-Initiated

Neither Side 1fas the initjative

Tot al Engagents

68

100

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Who Has the Tvhc:tical intti't"-'-

,;of tih f.ire f.g,% in Table 1 indicates that the enr.-.-_e . SIR S and exercises somne degree of ccntrol- i-.n 22' c-f the other crx,:ra frecucty., 3 of total Enemy attacks against static US peri-. ... "rr.. ainst fire sUpoZrt bases or =These attacks were us engagcments.

ar a,:ay frow. population calters. temporary night defense perimeters us--.i Category. 1,,. a moving US unit engaging "he enemy in prepared positions, "usually occurred on search and destroy-tzye .zssions. These sweeps .led to over 413?, of' the engagements"" ..... -- oout h.lf of the res-ultin& fire fi6hts were initiated by the U$. The disV- iut"on between t-yPs of engagements did not differ substantially frcm our two earlier studies of
tactical initiative. Table 2 below distributes the KZ- by tye ergagement. VC/I\M forces in sVn haid the "actlcal iitiativ6 in engage=ents accounting for 77% of their combat losses. The enemy apparently chose to engage US units in each of theie situations and ki-6wingly a .ccepted the casualties as the price for.

achieving his objectives.

The enemy co"ld have reduced his losses 63%.

by not attacking US perimeters and landing zones or adbushing moving US

units. By avoiding contact with US units on sweeps in situations. where he had adeduate advance warning. the "C/;V.!L might have been able to reduce
losses another 14, although this is highly denendent on his ability to withdrawr undetected. Enemy-initiate=' attacks on US fixed perimeters, moving US units, and helicopter landing zones accouted for 8h% of the total KIA. Six-y-five percent of US KIA oco--red -. hen the US unit ...as moving,

away from prepared positions, and 35f when in prepared positions.


enemy usually initiated fire fights egainzt the m!,ovi~ng US unit. TABLE 2 US AND ENEMY BATTLE DEA-L BoY TYE ENGGEMEIT
LS KIA

The

'

Number j of Total Enemy-Initiated Engagements 1. 2. 3. 4a. Assault Anibush "Hot Landing Zone Sweep Reaction Total

Enemy KMA NA.tzber of Total

168
162 21

35
3'

53
0

11

1922 532 137 572

47 13 14 77

US-Initiated Engagements

4b. Sweep
5.
Ambush

72
-

15
-

891
932 1i

22
1

Total Nieithdr Side Has The Initiative Total Fngavenents

72

15

4 4.80
100

4105

1OD

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Casualty

J,,FIfENTIAL
-Rtes an,. Kill }1Ratio g
US conualty ratec (1.L1 per co.rbpany p-.r "" :.g,,..) y with the type of engagement. Table 3 shows that lu los,; rrntes ov-orz-.,,e 2.2 KQA pr eo::,pany per engap,;ment in US-initSated fire f,*i ; vLr.5.9 wh.cn the enemy had the initiative. Enemy amIbushes an-' "hot' lh., zone! were especially costly; losses were 10-20,L;of the friendly for-ce (uS companies in the field in our samzpxe averaged 90-120 men). !Ofbushcs usually occuiu'ed Swhen US units were moving along a road in convoy or .'",,.edi... 1-y aftfer leaving a night defense perimeter. The enemy was vwell.locater)., causing friendly fire support to be ineffective in the first few mo.:n.s of coinrbat, when most US casualties occurred. The enemy frequently was able to inflict high casualties in hot helicopter landi.ngs because the shortage of good landing zones in the jungled areas of SVN: allowed the enemy to prepare positions around the few suitable air arszult locations. Artil lery.and air preparation did not neuarali'ze the enemy. in, hio.v well pre.pared positions, thus he was able to ambush exposed US troops.

TABLT? 3 CASUALTINS
-

......

KIA Per Com.pany Per Enrgageen'


Us._ EnemUy

Per Engagement
s Enemy

Enemy-Initiated Engagements
I.

1. Assault Am. Abush 3. Hot Landing Zone


1 4a&.

410 21.9 10.5

19.x

7.6
20.2 10.5

28.6 27.4

87. 4 66.5 68.5

Sweep Reaction
Total

3.3 5.9

26.0
21.8

3.7

40.9

US-Initiated Engagements

.4b Sweep 5. Ambush


Total Neither Side Has the Initiative Total Engagements ..

2.4
-

27.2
25.0

4.8
-

59.4
8.0 1. 5.5 60.41

2.2 2.0 1.8

27.1 8.5 22.7

3. 2.0 7.1

This is a measure of the casualty rate, i.e., was 20% of the engaging unit KTIA or 2.. (There were approximately 105 men per US Co. and and 60 men per VC/NVA. Co.) Tablh 3 shows the enemy's casualty' rates were very high even when he had the initiative. The enemy lost one-third to one-half of his unit each time he engaged or was engaged by a US force. ( average VC/17VA comp any in the field i:ncluded 50-75 men.) Most of the enrmy's losses did not oc"ur in the first moments of the fire fight, but artill.:ziy and ail strikes ware devastating if the US, unit was able to break, contact so that fire support could be used effectively.

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zzdent o~.n

hiL~hJly (11Ciepathe typ'e t t a,-uiJ. Z., .; J,, -1-,,,C '~ ic~tero, wrc typi ct:l~y laiflc br~tttleS for' .c '- y 111s:;ed i'n battulion zize or larg~er, jnd. both enemy aii'2 UP,~ da-r-much hi~ghcr th1an :in any other typ, of enCr,(11r~nt lbiv: ahc1-i ~o."".tod, f 1 7,1 OP total. onry hc.tn * an average of 87 KIA per en~ag one: uc.-es of a moving enemy force typically invol.ved less than cornpan;:- size u:'iits, which meant that total

TJotal:

frierirvlly arid onI,!.y ca.U:

A~nT~

~.F:~.n-(_;e we

KIA per engagement were msuch lolere.. Table 4 indicates that even t7hkill ratios vere higher 0dith US initiative (12.4:1 vs. 7.8 to 1), ta-_ticai initiative did not play an ovrl ipotatpart in determninin;- "llJ ratios. Tw-,o eneny -initiated combat situations,. assaults and s7we_-m reactions produced kill ratios very favorable to the US. The kill ratioZ -,ere high (11.5 to 1) for enemy assaults because' 6ven though the US unit" was SUZ~pr!.sed, it w-.as not unprepared because of good cover and .pre-piarined artillery support. .Sweep reactions had high kill ra~tios when tL.!--- US uit-'l broke contact quickly allow,'ing air and artillery support. to bec-ome effectie. Kill ratios were most favorable to the enemy when he unbush-ed, mnoving T.13units (3.3 VC/1,,, killed for edch US) becausie these usually occz.:red when'US'artill1iry ancla -ir support were less-effective and when t!%e USj forces were in positions exposed to enemy fire.

TAE~LE 4 14 KILL PATIO

Enemy-Initiated Engagements 1. AssaultsU. 2. Ambushes 3. Landing Zone 4a. Sweep Reaction Total Enemy-Initiated. US-Initiated Engagemrents 4b. Sweep 5. Ambush Total US-Initiated Neither Side Has Initiativ e Total Engagements85 Inf'J.r!-tq~y high because no W2 XIA in theacltions.

31.3 6.5
1.

12.4

2.7

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1Tiable 5 s,,'"h
higher 'e:hen the e:e

L: t..-to .-.

of

.. '., ;trcrgth to

size o. larger only when assaulting a U" unit in a fixed combat category in which the enemy exorcis..d his highest Cal initiatiNve. Conversely, the smalle3t average vC/,, encountered wihen the US unit iambushed thcm, the category
initiative. degree of US

-V, initicAd combaL t.han when the U, i.itti. (1.2 to 1 compar-ed to C.6 tcl), b'z that the eni.y :r"arcly htc.c- a ntr..eric-2 2.arge t h'T .. a,VC/1"VA force size . re-atec3 to the extent of his iVIitiative; %,;/.k. forces ms:c3, to an MI.. "at..lon

- ,trcn,..h was

per:i.rater, forces were

the

degree of tactiwith the m:imnu

RELATIVE ETN.GAGING r0ORcErS


Average En-ag'ing 'Force"

us
Enemy-Initiated Engagements 1. 2.
4 a.

Enermy/iLS

'Assaults Ambush

270 138

199

99

1.4 1.5

3.

Hoe' Landing Zone on Sweep Reaction "Total

135 10

105 105
155 19

1.4 0.1.
1.2

US-Initiated Engagements

4b. Sweep 5. Ambush Total


NTeither Side Has the initiative Total Engagements

132 18

210 52
5203
105 157

0.6 0.3

10
42 156

0.4 1.0

SSince only the troop units (not actual strength' w:ere typically reported,
we convertcd those to prsonnel strengths by asstuing 105 men/US coznany and
60 men/VC/;VA company. Wombat Tnitiative and Fire Support

The US unit was rarely without fire support from artillery, helicopter Punhhips, AC-47 gunships or tactical aircraft. Most encemy MIA ie.rc caused by this fire su3.Yort rather thahi by sinall arms fire. The enemy realized the effectiveness of US fire support and attoipted to engage the US unit closely so that tactical air and artillery could not be used. Ambushes

of moving 5ts allowed hin to engage at vejry cloe range and therefoare ,,,remai, fargel" "d.eq,.jt to US artillery. Atta-ks at ni;!ht and in other Peerodos of lo4 visibility also reduced the, cffectiveness of tactical air.
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Jiuigle areas far fro7 fr'iend'y fir: engageneunt. The US units thaL ser;e tactics t~ically s-.vzorts. tc:,:zv were favored areaL for to suVccC-1 O in theF suffered high loss ra-.zs.

Table 6 indicates that US units -recziveJ artillery support in 8-

artillery less than However, abush their engagements. %>._" u-' receivedarilylestn 37" of the time, instead, helicopter g.... " s hai to be used. In an L'rhUash the enemy got in close to the US unit nreventi' effective fire su...ortUS-laid ambushes did not receive artillery because they involved snall enemy forces which typically were handled by the US uznit's organic firepower. support was available to US units in 7C5 of -their engagements. nightAir assaults on US perimeters received air support 61i.% of the time, but Even. poor visibility often made accurate tactical ,air support difficult. Therefore, helicopter gunships and AC-47s were nor.-_ally used for most night engagements .close to US positions; le.ss t.han 2(0 of hight air support involved tactical aircraft.

SFrimE

TABI3 6 SUPPORT

Engagements
Wil 4.h

Engagements

Atillery j~pport

ithAr

lypt

Enemy-Initiated Engagements 1. 2. 3. 4a. Assaults Ambush Hot Landing Zone Sweep Reaction 95 37 100 100 64 87 100 100

Total
US-initiated Engagements 4b. Sweep

70

5. Ambush
Total
*

93

87

4o
79

Neither Side Has the Initiative

STotal

Pngagements

81

70

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The findTh-:c. of rhinK stdy haeNj-Ltat

imp;Jicutions~for US

'J

rdltur statc-yand tactics in Vietnam, First, a "War of~ Attrition,'t o 071 or thc '', ztrategy uhnch requires the US to control the :,bat, will prnba,y fai-). because the encray can cele ct the intensity of tiL-. and1 place for 6 of' all engagem~ents;. (77% of totol Iie~ losses occurred. in the-se engtagements.) S,!ccna~, re~aucing US casualties will be diifficult vrS~thout major cha~nges iii US ncethads of oteration P-s long as the enemy (who has the tactica.l

i~niti t tiv e desires, t,,, inflict US casualties.

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MILITARY INITIATIVE IN SOUTH VIE-TNAIV: A FOLLOW-UP
u . U4p to and through his 2968 offensives the enemy maintained a fair degree of control over fZuctuatiors in his combat deaths and those of the aZZiel. By increasing his attacks he couZd increase aZlied casualties or by decreasing his attacks he could l;i-mit his own combat deaths. The alZies, on the other hand, appeared to ?-ve littZe control over changes in their own )ZA or those of the enemy. This is interpreted to mean that the enemy heZd the military initiative, iat least in terms of casualties, in South Vietnam. However, since the ery 'sa Winter-Spring campaign in 2968 "(Tet and May offensives) the initiative has shifted. The VS now has moderate control over both their own combat dee.hs and those of the coamunists; the enemy's ability to control fluctuations in his own deaths remains highs but his ability to increase US deaths appears to have nearly vanished.
backgro.und

An analysis in the September 1963 SEA Analysis Report entitled "Military Initiative in South Vietnam" indicated -hat the VC/NVA had a much stronger influence over fluctuations in both their combat deaths and US combat deaths than did the allied forces. The article concluded that the enemy held the military initiative in Soath Vietnam since he could alter the levels of enemy and US combat deaths by changing the frequency and nature of his attacka whereas changing the tempo of allied operaticns had little effect. The extremely high correlation between VC/NVA attacks and -S KIA was interpreted to mean that if the enemy desires to increase US casualties, at the cost of an increase in his own, then he can step up his offensive operations. The lack of a correspondingly high correlation between any of the indicators of allied activity was interpreted as a lack of casualty control on the part of the US as longasit persisted in an aggressive policy of maximum pressure on enemy main force units at all times. Current Results The present study used the same statistical regression technique as before to see whether the earlier relationship still holds after the enemy's Winter-Spring 1968 offensive (Tet and .aY 1968). When we compare the "postTet" bffensive period (July 1968 thro, November 1969) with the previous period, the relationships between VC/.:JA attacks and friendly KIA decline substantially and the correlations bez-ween allied battalion and larger operations with contact and VC/NVA and US KIA increase as dramatically. This may indicate the military initiative in terms of control over our combat deaths has been shifting to the US since June 1968, as the US shifted away from an aggressive, maximum pressure strategy. Table 1 shows the relationships bet.ween combat deaths in South Vietnam and enemy attacks. The correlations be.ween VC/NVA attacks and communist combat deaths have not changed much and are essentailly the same as they were before. This means that there has been little change in the enemy's ability to change his level of comba- deaths by changing ?his level of attacks. Before, he could presumably control azz- 84% of the fluctuations; now he presumably can control about 77 of -.he change. Attacks include all enemy attacks (arge, small, and by fire) and are used here as an indicator of the le*'el of the enemy's willingness to fight and to take casualties.

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Table I also shows the correlation between enemy attacks and allied combat deaths. In this case however, the relationship between VC//VA attacks and allied combat deaths has changed significantly in the allies' favor. Through the 1968 offensives the enemy presumably could control 87% ;,1f the fluctuations in US combat deaths by changing his level of attacks; since June 1968 he can control only 22% of the variation in US combat deaths. 4Moreover, the pre-Tet figure of 63% indicates that the relationship has not simply dropped back to pre-Tet days; a real change appears to have taken place. The enemy ale., can no longer inflict significantly more casualties on tte US by simply increasing his attacks. Similarly, the RVNAF figure has dropped after June 1968, but it is still higher than before Tet 1968 (.28 vs .10), This figure bears watching as an indication of the enemy's ability to control future RVTW Wlosses F as Vietnamization proceeds. In short, the enemy no longer exerts the that he did before, though he still maintains iombat deaths. Stated another way, the enemy willing to, but no longer is able to increase "easily when he wantz j . TABLE I control over US combat deaths sore control over his own still loses men when he is US and allied cimbat deaths

"REGRFSSION ANALYSIS VC/NVA ATTACKS AGAINST COMBAT DEATHS IN SVN


(All Figures are the RW)

VC/NVA Attacks Oi.Lensives, Pre-lQ68 Through 1968 cffensive


Post-1968 Offensives C!

VCNVA KIA

US

./55
.77

.63 .87

MIA

.223

RVNAF KIA .10 ..68 .28

a/- July 1965 through December 1967


S/ January 1966 through June 1968 /July )968 through November 1969

Table 2 shows there was no relationship between our best indicator of friendly attacks (friendly battalion and larger operations with contact) and combat deaths in Szuth Vietnam, prior to and during the 1968 offensives. That

is, before mid-19b8 the allies appeared to have little control over either their own combat deaths or those of the enemy. Stated another way, increases in allied opeations with contact would not yield corresponding increases in enemy or allied deaths. There have been significant improvements 1968 offensives. The correlations indicate a allied forces to inflict casualties when they attacks and enemy XIA) and to limit US deaths friendly attacks and US KIA). Increases from in these relatiunship since the greatly increased ability or wsnt to (.66 between friendly if they denire (.63 between the 1965-67 figures of .U5 ani

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... .. i .1....i....

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.OP t,) the new figures o. .66 and .3, allied control over combat deaths. zth i:-Aicate a real increase in

REGPMSS I A ALYSIS FRIENDLY BATTALIO1 ONATZO, WITH CONTACT AGAINST( CC.,2AT D-.A 11 SVN (F~gues are R4 c/:C,,,A Pre-1968 Offensivesi/ Through-1968 Offensiv sW Post-1968 Ofesnives-/ .a July 965 through December 1967 January 1966 through June 1968 .05 .07 .66 MUS .02 .10 .63 RV MA NA .19 YIA

a/

Jlly 1968 through November 1969

j:

Tn summary, the data show that the comnunists retain a large amount of control over their own combat deaths but art less able to increase allied losses by stepping up their attacks. On the other hand, the US now (qince Tot 1968) has a moderate amount of contro.l over both their own and VC/NVA
combat deaths. This could indicate a shift in the nilitary initiative in South Vietnam from the communists to the Allies, and may hel-2 explain why the US has been able to reduce its combah deaths so much in recent months. Additional information supports the idea of a shift in initiative since the 1968 offensives. The US has changed its tactics and it is likely these now tactics reflect knowledge acquired from 1965 through the 1968 offensives and the decline in enemy capabilities. Data shows the kill ratio of enemy to friendly forces has increased since the third quarter of 1968. The ratio of total enemy kills to US combat deaths likewise shows marked and steady increases since late Bummer of 1965. This data, crude though it is., together with reports from the field, indicate that US troops may be operating more efficiently now than during, and before the 1968 oifensives. A second reason why the initiative raay be shifting to the Allies in that attrition of ',rained VC/iYVA over the past five years, particularly during the 1968 offe'i-T--s, may have lowered the fight 4.ng effectiveness and aggressiveness of the communist forces in South Vietnam. The accelerated pacification campaign in the second half of 1968 and the gains made without stiff opposition mince then testify to the serious beating the VO infrastructure and cotmnunist main force units tooX during Tet.

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_'/ ona.iue to emphasize large sweeps nd i .. U.- S. Asearch-and destroy-types zf )oerations, although some Army units and r.ost other units increa_.inr!v e.hss e_,smal l, clandestine Long Rangc Pn.c.zl_ in enezy-infes-e areas. !he use of such patrols in the last half of CY 1966 varied from about 5: of the total force available tz Arm,,y units, which is 10; of zheir force not tied, up in TAOR and base defense, to abo,:t 5045 of the Austral!an force, which is to..e 83% of their force not tied u0 Available data suggests that at least a 4-' in TAOR and base defense. could be achieved with no increase in -: increase in ene-.y KL4...er friendly losses if we increased our use of small unit ocerations.
*

Coba.-ta

Force Allcations

by" re of Activit: in Vietnam (In %)


Search & Destroy
Lcng Range Large TAOR Patrols,

'Patrols 15
8

Units

Base Defense, 50

etc.

Total

III MAF, USMC


US Army, Vietnam
-

35
81

100
100 100

11
40

Australian
*\ /

50

10

On large sweens and search-and-destroy missions,

where company-sized and

larger units are the tpypica_ fights that develop,

maneuver units operating semi-independently inJ

the field, stealth is impossible.

Consequently, in over 84% of the fire

the enemy knowingly and willingly seeks or accepts the

M'oreover, large s-v;eeps are reletively sur rise of our forces by the enemy. enemy killed and captured per friendly of terms in either viewed unproductive,

fight; and in over 78% there is a clear indication of a planned, premeditated

lost or in terms of enemy killed snd captured per friendly battalion ner mont-1. And pen~utting the VC/:,WA to initiate xmost battles must be far better for their morale than is hitting them out of the blue i-with observed, well-aimed artillery and air strikes, with .aobushes, and with i.,ell-timed reaction forces. The daton, tacticol'. initiative -,as discussed in the May SEA Analysis Report. Experimentation-with clandestine patrols in the past several months has gone far enough to provide a good idea of what they can accomplish. The most comprehensive data nor.. available relates to STINGRAY and other operations by the Reconnaissance units :f the III M.AF, snd to the operations of the Australians. to infiltrate and extract the patrols by The STI:,?AY orozeir helicopter, usuas1y at da-.n or dusk, in as covert a maneuver as possible. They move frezuen-.y *:.ftler chanz.anr: o-Zitic~n every day both at dawn and at
-

.)

eds and ridge lines whererer posib_. dusk, avoiding .ai. s. s-ram ... -.-.... tically 14 men, frcm on: :f the Re :mPatrols consist z-f L z Fhese men receive somea additional -- ainin.g t*-he 77 :.AF. naissance units -:iv principally ro take the. forward o.bsrvers, anle to call for suLportina fire.

SPatrol durati-r.. are. 3:

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ta-eo ha.or more of the patrols The information available inLi In those cases where they call that sight enemy troops remain ":nde-ene-:. in artillery and air strikes, h..ever. one:,- cannot usually remain undetected it has almost always been " 7fizhts for long. When they, have gotten in-: generally they are possible to extract or reinforce them extracted. There can be no doubt thao ze ca!ance of initiative is completely different with these patrols frcm what! iL is on large sweeps. Small-Unit Actizns

En Loss/ En Loss/ .n Fr No. of Avg. Patrols Patrol Size ;cA & Caot. KIA & MIA Patrol Fr Loss USMC-' (Feb 1966-Jan 1967)
Aussies_/ (Jul 1966-Jan 1967) a/ b
*

836

i4

900

25

1.1

36

500*

235

'

20

.6*

14

Includes Stingray opns, & recon. *cttalion patrols on named operations. Includes reaction force results. Estimate

The Marine Reconnaissance oneraticne have achieved excellent results by going with extreme stealth, _-d calling in artillery and air strikes on The enemy/friend.y loss ratio is 36, and enemy losses interesting targets. Continuation of such results on a large scale might have run 1.1 per patrol. devastating effects on the enemky. The Australians are of particular interest because they operate largely in Phuoc Tuy Province as an independent force, providing their own artillery support, communications, and reaction for2es. About half their force operates in small patrols, often ranging far out of reach of artillery support, while the other half stays around their bane to prctect it and to provide reaction forces. Their overall results look good in terms of the two criteria: about l4 enemy killed and captured zer friendly lost,- and about .6 enemy killed and captured per patrol (_ncl!.d..ng reaction force results). Also of interest are the ocerations zf the 1st Brigade of the 101st Abn. Division, which has emphasized =-vern patrzls in the early stages of As with other units, a certain proportion of its force is its operations. Of the remainder, it typically tied up in TAOR patrols and base defense. puts out half its force on covert par:ols and retains the rest as a a large enemy force, the other reaction force. When a patrol turns patrols become part of the reaction f:r.e an, the entire force cf one or At this point it fights two battalions is concentrated arournd -n.*eeeneny. : -: f-he-blue bombardment used by conventionally, making no use of the i-e. haz :.re thnn its share of big The Brigade the STINGRAY patrols. killed and captured to A.ne:y fights this way, and achieved a rati: :f

friendly losses of more than 1C

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All these res'2.~lts u;,.....,

:overt p)atxrol: are sig;nificantly sujrri- r

V t

to those achi-eved in conventional operations with battalion-sized and larger forces, These latter have had a ratio of enemy killed and captLured to friendly losses of 6.7 and have killed awl captured the enemy a. the rate of only 36 par battalion per month. It is reasonable to project, with some degradation, the results of a heavy emphasis on covert patrols by -using the results of these past experiments, In the projected posture, Comarison of Conventional Search and Destroy "And Covert Small-Unit Operations

(Calendar 1966)

Typical Comat Group Size


STINGRAY 14

Per Battalion Per Month Us/fl " tio of Enemy Losse, Enemy Losses Losses to US/FW Losses
100 2.8 36.0

FConventional
Possible

lst o

de. 101st 30/600 COns. 140


8

yO 36
100

7. 5.4
5

10.1

6.7
20

bombardnent would be used often', as it is on STINGRAY oat-of-the-blue u" operations, but reaction forces would also be used from time to time to exploit an opportunity to mop up a large enemy force. Up to about half the troops in each maneuver battalion can be committed to patrols of about eight nen* each lasting four days, with about one-fourth of each battalion out on patrol at any one time (twelve to fifteen patrols This would imply 100 such patrols per battalion per month out at a time). (12 X 30 days 4 4), requiring about the same number of helicopter sorties for

p.

.*

Although the Marines use patrols as small as four men, they prefer a minimum size of about 15 because of its ability to hold out against a large force. However, Marine data show that larger patrols get poorer overall results, probably because they are more easily detected. Moreover, the larger- unit has that many more men to become casualties when they are discovered. The Special Forces Delta teams are almost always eight men, the minimum group size that can continue to function ",'hen one of them is wounded or injured. Cutting the patrol size from 1,5 to 8 at least doubles the number of lucrative sightinzjz because it permits having, twice ai many patrols. We -1o not yet have nonprehensiv. 'ata on the Delta teams, but the smrall sample of data nowo available indicates that the concept works; the secret i:uick extracltion w1hen things get hot. for the srall group i
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both patrols and reaction forces s -. e :.;;., Because of their shift to battalions are assuried to a.4Z: -- n RD, their scarcity of airlift, put out only 26 patrols per month .ni -z =et h*.1f the results per patrol. The assumed results are one enerj-y _er patrol for the US/E.T units and .5 enemy losses per patrol for the -ts. This would imply 100 enemy losses per U.S. battalion per south 'i--hluinz reaction force results), or -about triple the present results -or o-erations. This exoectation is supported by the USMC results which h-ave been 1.1 ene.y per patrol without the reaction force results.

Possible Results frco Patrols Per Month Per Bn. 100 26 53

Exnansi=n of Smaml-Unit Actions Total Enemy Losses Per Month 9,000 2,000 11,000

Mvr. Bns. US/IW ARVN Total 90 1554 244

Total Patrols 9,000 4,CO0 13,000

En Losses ?er Patrol 1.0 .5 .3

The patrols alone imply a 40% increase over the current total monthly rate (Jan-Mav 1967) of about 7800 enemy losses. Ln addition PF/RF forces, aircraft, further. lsc-ses enemy and other sou'ces should raise (
,Inasmuch

as US/FW small-u-nit operations have produced enemy losses ranging from ten to almost forty ti_-res the friendly losses, compared to a ratio of less than seven for battalizn-sized operations, it can.be expected that a shift to major emphasis on s-ail-unit operations would bring about a decline, or at worst no increase, in friendly losses.

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SConnents have been a2ezeived from

.he Arraiy Staf:f' (GDCSOVS) in

rebuttal to the June 1967' Scutheast Asia Analysis repoa.'t item

(page ti~), which stated that increased small unit operations could increase the ratic of enemy KIA/friondly Klh, C-Cements received are as follows.
"The referenced report contains an analysis (pages 14-17) of Iarge ui. t operations versus long range (clandestine) patrols. The analysis concludes, "Avai.able daIIa suggests that at least a 40% increase in

enemy KZA per month could be achieved with no increase in friendly losses
if we increased our use of small unit operations." Small unit operations in this case refer to small, clandestine, long range patrols in enemy infer'ted areas. While this analy.is may be valid within the parameters established, I believe that a review of large unit operations, to include their purposes and relation to our objectives in RVN, would provide backgroundL for a more complete appreciation of the subject. "rArge unit operations in RVN .aredesigned. to support the accomplishmerit of the objective, to defeat the VC and NVA forces in SVN and force the witbdrawal of NVA forces. By conducting large-scale, sustained, offensiv,: . operations (one or more battalions) against enemy main forces and b.Lse 'ireas, US forces seize the initiative from the enemy, inflict heavy casualties on enemy nrits, and disrupt his organization and plans for strategic and local %ctivities. In this role, US forces indirectly support another objective, to extend GVN dominion, direction and control over SVN, be relieving pi'essure exerted by enemy main force units. Invasion of the enemy base areas causeo the enemy to face serious "logistical problems. These operations yield surprisingly large amounts of food stuff and equipage, lower his morale, and develop intelligence of great importance to the allied effort. Generally, the longer or more often US troops operate, in force, in a particular area, the greater difficulty in reorganizing his forces and regaining control of "the enemy's that area. Captured enerr.,r dociiments reve .l plans for tying down US forces in local security roles to prevent large-scale offensive operations which are evidently greatly feared. The present ehemy activity and threat demands that friendly forces devote a large effort to the 4efeat or, at least containment, of th- enemy's main ,forces and the neutralization of his base areas. The enemy rftain fo'oces are capable of massirng to disrupt RD efforl-s Just as they si-c be.,!inning to show vomc progress. The enemy has base areas in which he ca:n train hMr furcns, rest and refurbish his units, rohea-'c his pl.ano, and bu..d up his store tend his wounded, develop 'i

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of supplies. As long as these -it is most i...t.t that sustained, large scale, offensive zpra:;:n.. aimed at the dest-uction of the enemy main forces and their base araS. e conducted. "1As an integral part of these large "z.; operations, long range

patrols are in fact used extensively bzth prior to and during the large unit operations. The importance and ne:esity of these patrols is recognized, not as a replacement for, but in conjunction with the large unit operations. Current activities in ?.. pertaining to the long range patrol projects include the following: 1. The RECONDO School operat.i by US Army Special Forces personnel at Nha Trang trains approximately 120 US :erso.nnel each month. These *perconnel return to their units and are ;-:'--nized to conduct long range patrols. The patrols consist of five t: t-w-elve men and are normally out from three to five days, patrolling to -he limits of the parent unit's designated area of operation.

2.

and each one is directed by a USASF "A" detachment. There are two of these units assigned to each Corps Tactical Zone. They conduct missions of 30 to 60 days duration in VC/7IVA conr:lled areas and are resupplied by air drop from fixed wing aircraft. .hecompanies rely on friendly air for support. 3. Project Delta has authorized assets which include sixteen reconnaissance teams, eig'-t "Road Runner" teams and one Vietnamese airborne ranger battalion. .here are 93 USF personnel authorized for Project Delta. These assets provide a long range reconnaissance and interdiction capability to I and IV CTZs.

The Mobile Guerrilla Companies are composed of 150 Vietnamese

4. Project Omega and Project Siea provide the same support in II and III CTZs, respectively, as Project Delta does id I and IV CTZs. Each project has eight reconnaissance tea_-ms, four "Road Runner" teams, three Mike Force (reaction force) comun`ies, and one camp security company. 78 USASF personnel -re authorized for each project. 5. Action has been initiated z: add 834 spaces to the US Army ceiling to accommodate the recognized divisional and separate brigade long range patrol requirements. 6. Tactics and technicues very sim1ilar to those outlined on page 16 of the referenced report are being usei in I! and III CTZs when and where the situation and terrain call for such tactics. Examples of this are the operations habitually conductei the 4th Infantry Division in the Kontum-Pleiku western border area and th* 25th Infantry Division in Hau Nghia Province.

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In order to make fttumre analyseL; on this subject more comprehensive and complete, I suggest you consider the foregoing rnearkl and the additional factors. IV.fol1owing 1. Since it is often impossible for a long range patrol to determine the exact size of a located enemy force, it is not only difX1cult to accurately assess casualties incurred by "out-of-the-blue bombardment", but no determination can be made as to the "real" effects of the bombardment on the eremy in terms of lasting damage to his base and supply areas and, of prime importance, the effect of these efforts towards providing security, for the GVN RD program. 2. In attempting to execute a concept of small-unit patrols, such &s suggested, there is a point beyond which sufficient artillery and air is not available for support. This becomes critica)l since the conceopt depends upon timely artillery and air support in order for them to accomplish their mission or for suvvival.

3. A primary difference between the "out-of-the-blue bombardment" used by the STINGRAY patrols and normal preparatory fires used by US Axmy forces is that the preparatory fires are immediately followed by the introduction of sizeable forces into the area. Although these forces are exposed to enemy fires and the kill ratio may change, the significant "advantages accrued from the large unit operations must be considered.
it one meens of meacuring forces activity, it is not conclusive in determining status of progreso. The enemy considers the human life as the heapest commodity in Southeast Asia. The total impact of our operations on the enemy, security of the population, and conttol o0 surface lines of communications are more valid yirdsticks." i not. While attrition is

P NT IIAL "Cq"FI

.'

.
In the July issue of SZA A.....
' "'-:

.,OONFIDENTIAL
:.~e_-^t

?edcySA

i.,'e pu'blished co-,mients byUS

at.rol vers-u, Searc-and-Des-roy. . ODCSOPS on a June article, "Lcn-g ?nr. these co:nients, and DCSOPS presents its to a re-ly we present this issue In
rebuttal to the reply. ODCSOPS made 3 points in its re&:uttal: first, that "it is most important that sustained, large scale, cffensi'.'e operations, aimed at the destruction

of the enemy main forces and -heir case -reas be conducted;"


must be considered,

second, that

"long range patrols are in fact used4 extensiely both prior to and during large unit operations;" and third, zha; other factors than enemy killed

such as securit" -orthe GVD RD program, and the

availability of artillery and air. Several of the ODCSOPS assertions are well-documented and unquestionably For example, it is true that cur forces already use long range correct. However, neither the M:arines of the III YAF nor the U.S. Army in patrols. Vietnam use more than an average cf 1i of their"maneuver battalion strength The issue is not whether to conduct such in the field for such patrols. The th-._ust of the PATROLS article was that the patrols, but how many. proportion should be increased to szmething like 50% of the maneuver battalion strength. We agree further with ODOSOPS tht'. security in the populated areas, protection of LOC's, and so on are the i-_ortant objectives, not merely killing Analysis of the mcAe cf operations that contributes most to VC/NVA troop.

/
4

theme objaectveo ~M 'not come to wir attetign. Flgwmrevr th analyai of


tactical initiative suggests that patrols would do at least as well as sweeps in serving these other objectives. Would the patrols run short of air or artillery support? We think not. The helicopter support required for the present pace of la.ge-scale-nerations would also support a strategy of increased patrolling combined with use of large reserves against identified enemy units. Last month's paper, "Air. and Artillery Strikes Other Than Close Support" showed that less than 15% .. -9t resent--t-o--tupport-ttroops r and artillery are- -re-ired "ofour tactical--1

in contact, One of the main aLdvati6Coa of' c~axymdd mae of covert long range pabro3.n wo2d be an iperfalod ei'foativefteng ror artilltry and, air

Some changes in the aeployment and strikes how Used in unobserved sttri-es. operating patterns of artillery might -a needed to provide mcre coverage, but no increase in artillery should be needed. Advocates of large operations assert that they "seize the initiative "from the enemy, inflict heavy casal.-*-:i-es on enemy units, and disrupt his invasi:n of the enemy base' areas causes the organization and plans ..... enemy to face serious logistical pr-c-ems." The contention of the PATROLS article is that increased patrolling ca=n achieve these objectives better. It estimated that the use of patr:ls :zuld increase enemy casualties from all causes by 4(0%; those due tc U.S. resources now used in major operations-

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I. TERMS;

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*

.I

, - -- - - ...

D S!"71 ?TE D."R_... DOVD c'WJ

12 YEAES.
~~~~~~
____0._

if or frrcesra:redup tr

shokedrernarnts hit "out of the blue"

less capturel mAteriell but the tonnages we clalra to caplrure are loss than 25"S of his estimated lo-Fstic requirement, and field etimnates say that thoe enemy can reconstitute many base areas in a month or less. Furtherrn.re, our large operations mayseem to seize the strategic irdti'eative but do not seize the tactical initiative fromt the enemy. Our paper, "The 8,rategy of Attrition," in the May' issue of this publication, showed that the onemy fights at timas and places of' his own choosing in 8 of the battles. The airlift milling around our *landing zones, the ponderous and noisy movement of our infantry, and the lavish expenditure of artillery a~ll around them make their whoreabouts obvious for a. thousand yards or more in every direcn;ion. Moreover, the 1mine and booby trap threat forces them to move slowly and prevents ground pursuit of the fleeing enemy who k~nows where his mines and traps are. The enemy nearly always knows the whereabouts of our units in the field, and can move in front of, behind, and through our lines while watching for the right tacticalJ moment to attack*. J, Neverthelesss the strateg'ia offects of using more small, covert patrols are not obvious. The effects woul.d depend on how such patrols were deployed, used, and intejrated. with the operation of reserve/reaction forces. Hlow to do it right can be determined only by analysis and experimants~tion in the fields by people close to the action and responsible for its result,. But the evidence makes it clear that this ii the right way to go. ODCSOPS REBUJTTAL TO ABOVE COR.41NT$

There are no doubt many instances In South Vietnam where increased is being reviewed continuously by each commander on the ground, in light of the situation confronting him. In so doing, he must consider the ta~ks that are to be accomplished *by hise unit; the enemy's activities, aims, and capabilities; tho battleground on which his unit will be employed; and the forces and tools hie has available. Sifice the situation varies from one CTZ to another, aad from c,.ie province to another, it is not militarily prudent or desirable to increase patrolint3 arbitrarily across the board without considaritig these factors.

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the UKz in 3' Corps where the enamy For example, in the vicinli', is placing pNaIi st effort, 7orJnt he is effort, he hi. greatest fo::h be putting to appearA presently imore emphasis on conventional. type cperatiorns by NVA forces than on guerrilla

relatively to locate nacessary paLr-,ls range the long warfare. Here concentrated enemy forces in the spa.rsely populated jungle the covered mountains are fewer than those required in ot':ir areas. ,he enemy attempts to reaction forces in this area, just as he contact where in SVN. HeIwever, 'the ruqui-ement for long range patrols is not
as great stnce contact can be marintainod more readily by more conventional Further, if 50% of the ground combat force were committel to patrolling. patrolling, the reaction force ;any not be large enough to handin all enemy forces located, which could result in an excessive number of casualtios. On the other hand, in the western border provinces in 11 Corps and ir Tay Ninh and Hau Nglia Pr'ovinces in III Corps, enemy forces are fewer The emphasis is on guerrilla rather than and relatively disperied. Therefore, a greater percentage of or conventional type operations. ,maneuver battalion strength can bi employed in long range patrols to In this case, a smaller reaut.on force would locate the enemy forces. be large enough to complete the deatrurtion of all enemy fornes our 'patrqls may locate,. Another problem to be considered is that of providing .lose and continuous air And artillery support to approximately 3,700 ten man patrolA (50% of U.S. maneuver battalion streng3th) operating at any given ?U, ther the support elements would be fragmented to the extent that time. they would not be able to provide tho volume of fire or air support requirqd when lucritive targets are located, or some p.trols would be denied this Fragmetntation of these support units would result in support altogether. the requirement for additional control personnel, equipment, and hecurity measures. In su=mary, long range patrols are presently being used extensively in conjunction wiLh large unit operations, particularly in the II and III Emphasis is being placed on the increased use of such patrols when Corps. However, there and where the, tactical situation calls for such tactics, Is no requirement that the number of patrols consist of a specific In the final analysia, only the strength. percentage of 9 unit's cunumander on' the ground, considering the varying environmental factors mentioned above, can make the final decision regarding the amount and degree of patrolling Lo be aceomplished in a given situation.

iY "still

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"

~ ~~~J.,:)(8 'L. ....


S,
[L'o ,.aiu 2

,"T;L'i A,,,

. :.;:

-l.,,,1A!" (;Ti VS .. LL i-'i)

.. 7Ai '.
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,forc: .in Iut~ v,'i,:n,_m, ,., have. br:iefly compared the VC/:A"A sa;rb.tgy, 11g Task," expresswd in General C2.ap s Scptemher 196' irticle "idi:g V ;-cty,

Vwith

alliolr LttPLc~:atey, prc:7.n ~td rinthe 1JS/RVNAF cumb~rierI c~ampail:i Plans.


We r'ealizc the perils of -1..rX'.rring enemy st'.ategy frou a. 2nA.11le ducumorint which incorpo-'ates plan, ehortubion and propaganda. However, the insight gained from such a :oinparison may help us understand the meaning of ma.4r nmilita'y engagements in SV'., during the next few months. VC/lVA Strategy 'Jeneral Giap presents three North Vietnamese objeotives: "to protect the North, liberate the South, and proceed toward reuniting the country." He bases his strategy on an analysis of the U.S. global. position and North Vietnam's international n1osi-tion. Within this context, he considers the ways to achivive his objectives. We j.gnore all but the "liberati.od' of the South. To liberate the South, Glap propones to defet. E.led military forces. Americais are seen ae his mo.st important enemy. He states that the VC/NVA have already defeated the American counterinsurgeacy strategy (since us forces had to be coamitted on a limited war scale), and have repeatedly defeated uS troops in South Vietnam. He concludes that the tactical and

,'Zrategia

initiative belong with the Viet Cong.

!:

To maintain VC/NVA momentum, Giap seeks to lure US fo-'cci to the periphery of Vietnam in order to disperse them and draw them away from populated areas. He believes that the vacuum left by US forces moving outward to fight VC/NVA main force units (in battles such as -those & b L,. Ninh, Dak To, and the DMZ) presents significant tactical opportun.ties to local and regional forces operating in the populated areas of SVN. Glap would reinforce these local forces with small elite strike units who would operate against milita-y bases and disrupt GVN attemrp to establish

:],

s ecurity.

Giap does not develop a strategy aimed specifically against RVNAF' forces. He simply dismisses them and the GVN as ineffective. He notes tbat the RVNAF's principal role is to provide security for pacification,and asserts that the GVN only serves as a political buttress for the Americans. All the same, his Ptrateg, -' concentrating the main thrust of his effort in the populated areas implicitly calls for the destruction or neutralization of RVNAF fo:.ces. Giup considers his strategy sound because he thinks that global commitments prevent the US from deploying significant nurbers of additional US trooee to South Vietnam. He states that a "people's war" which m..bilizcs all possible forces will triumph over the US limited war strategy. Gisp f'lithe,' conns.,rs the strate6y doomed because the Americans have been denikd the b]itzkricg vict:.y essential to that strategy and now find themselves engaged it. .a pr.JtrracteJ. war.

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Allied Strategy The N=CV staff and the ARV 1,rJoin-a! a' develop an annual Combined Campaign Plan which lays out -'. s-rr ategy against the VC/-VA in South Vietnam. The 1968 plzr.: ._ 3. states that the general objectives of military operations are t- iefee -,he VC/iVA forces and extend GVN control throughout South Ze-n n. The p)an defines military tasks, establishes goals to be achieved,: _zsigrns responsibility for the tasks to specific forces, and establishes priority for operations in specific locations.

Military tasks fall into three categries.


anti-invasion forces prevent major

First, containment or

incursions into SVN; US forces have

this responsibility in I, II and iII Ccrz.

Se:.-nd, offensive forces

pressure VC/NVA main forces and base areas; USiFW.MAF forces, assisted by ARVN units, carry out this mission in I, Ii and III Corps. Third, security forces protect the people, selected territ!ry, and critical installations behind the shield formed by US operations; this is the principal mission

of the RVWAF in I, II and III Corps. all three missions.

in 17 Ccrps, RVNAF forces carry out

The primary assignment of US forces to defend Vietnam against the external threat and to fight VC/11VA main force units within South Vietnam

continues the roles and missions assignsi in the 1967 plan (AB 142). The 1967 assignments gave rise to US opertions generally on the periphery of the area given priority for military operations (Map 1). The 1968 plan enlarges the priority military operations areas to include sparsely
; populated areas adjacent to the SVN borier in This implicitly commits US forces to operate, populated areas then they did in 1967. Opposing Strategies Giap identifies areas along the border of South Vietnam as the places where the VC/NVN can expect to fight on favorable terms; these areas correspond well with the border areas er-phasized in the MACV/JCS plan. Both US/RVNAF and VC/NVA have bases near the borders which they probably would defend. Both sides are likely to attack each other's bases. These factors all indicate that the biggest battles in 1968 will take place in the border provinces of South Vietnam. The unanswered question is: W:hat are the costs of engagement there, for each side, in terms of casualties, materiel, and foregone opportunities? Choosing this particular battleground for the contest between battalion size units offers advantages to both sides. On the one hand, US/RVeAF keeps VC/NVA main forces at a safe dista-nce from population centers, affording them additional security. On -,he other hand, Giap expects such battles to further disperse US forces, -,hereby reducing forces available to protect populated areas and preventing concerted large campaigns. The question is who can turn the "disoersa- of US combat troops to advantage. It seems to us that the answer will ha.-e to be found in the populated areas where Giap plans to challenge oces -ith intensive guerrilla warfare. I, !I and III Corps (Map 2). as a:rule, further from

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FIDE NTI AL CO N

19b7 CAYYAIGIN PlAiN

SThUO Th!

74Nationala

Priority Areas

OaoNi,,

Arafor Priority of 1MiltaryaU

;-

*#'Quong

-Long: Long

YA57e
P1L

:1

X~ fO

N, SONj

Mp

SOURCE:

A.B 1~42'-8

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:.6AMtPAIAN PTA f
*N

1-

S. Nal

jTP4
ARZ'1101 or *.inr

O.

C.., *l.
,vt 01

VO v NO

..... . . .N.S. .

00

O~P1~1YO

MAP 2 F3oUvti.E

Ab13J 43

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1968 r!ILT.TAWJ
:AFvI7?~ Ara-Y STAFF cO11v1FgNTS

V71. S Our of December article on "1968 Military Strategy in SVN" indicated areas both US/CVIN and VC/NV% strategies call for most big battles of 1968 to
)

that be in

"forces to give the VC new guerrilla warfare opportunities in the, populated

the border provinces; and that (iap expects the resulting "dispersal" of US

In the following comments ODOSOPS stresses some advantages accruing to friendly forces in combating the VC/PrVA near the SVN frontiers. However, 9, new Marine Corps study on I Corps finds that the enemy also reaps some benefits by fighting at the borders. We compare Marine experience with tha DCSOPS expectation of US gains and conclude that a harder loo) is needed fication while friendly forcers fight on the frontiers. y !iThe ODCSOPS coments are as follows:

fast.

Some means mus+t be found to prevent the VC/NVA from disrupting' paici-

"The referenced report contains a study which briefly -ompared

strategy, expressed in General Oiap'z 1967 an interesting is Ekuptembea This ' 'Big Victory, Big Tusk' , plans. with allied stratngy, presented ctipaign combined in the US/RWnAF study, yet I suspect that its frame of .,eference tends to lure th, Sanalyst and thei &oader to over-simplify the strategic equation. A common pitfall in using a document, such as General CLap's article, is that is is purposely misleading. It is extremely difficult to separate meaningful concepts and strategy from propaganda. Obviously, the Giap article was released for worldwide distribution in an effort ") influence the thinking and actions of a variety of people. in 1968 will Your study concludes that 'the biggest battles

"article,

'the VC/UV

take olace in tne border provinces of South Vietnams.

The ur'nswerod

que:;Lion is:

what, ere the costs of engagement there, for each side,

in terms of casual.icss, materiel, and foregone opportunities?' Thus, one is led to the view that the Giap 'border strategy' disperses the US uonLata troops and if vu are to turn this 'dispersal' to advantage we w;ill have to find the ansver 'in the populated Lreas w;here Giap plans to challenge RVNAF forces ,,.Lth intensive guerrilla wrarefare.' -,I sug;et that there is ianother side of thi coin and I coranend to yor analyst. There are a number of advantages in cnmbating thi en-zry fo!,,a near the bordcrs which deserve consideration 1ith :-t,,pect to Lh, above quuctlon.

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a. It is preferab-e engage the enemy in unpopulated

terrain where friendly firepower.

o-a-.ly

more freely their superior

b. By fighting the enez-near the border, our forces prevent him from getting at _otentisl sources of food 'in country' and also limit his maneuver room. It takes much longer and costs more casualties (partic. the enemy forces once they casualties) to civilian cularly As an example, the have become entrenched in the momulated areas. destroying enemy and out searching in Division, 25th US Infantry forces in Hau Nghia and nearby proinces during the period 11 May to 7 December 1967, suffered 3 2T '--. while killing 1,686 enemy. These figures are very close to the comparative casualties in the However, -h.e fighting around Hau Nghia recent Dak To fighting. do-n for seven months while Dak To tied division kept an entire weeks. took three There are no local 7C forces and guerrillas near the d. borders on which the NVA forces can rely for sorely needed assistance. e. When our forces engage the enemy near the border, they often frustrate his plans and force him to fight before he is fully organized and can inflict dar-mage. There is no need to m.aintain large friendly forces conf. stantly in the border area a:!4 dis3ersal is not primarily the result 1,1hen a large battle takes shape, friendly as has been suggested. forces may be diverted quickly to the area and rapidly returned to missions supporting pacificaticn m-ore directly following the battle. This is the plus of air mobility. g. By engaging the ene:r at the borders, our forces expose the fact that he is making ta-:ical use of sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia in flagrant violation of these countries' neutrality."

SEAPRO Comment But it provides a The Giap article is, indeed, a prcppaganda document. reasonable point of departure since the cc-unists tend to integrate strategy tends to conand propaganda. Moreover, a recent U. S. .arine Corps study., It states that :he enemy considers the survival of his firm Giap's position. `":Z .ost critical concern, overshadowing guerrilla infrastructure in SVI to U. S. Marine Forces in Vietnam - v .... " '>65-S-eptember 1967, Historical an" -- 31. Summary, FMF-PAC, undated, pp

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tNe volu~ne OZ` is casualties. Ho thcrefore wirAhos to drav US forcr .,. from populated ar:..as into the rough terrain near his border sanctuairieg (Es he did in the DV fighting). Soz:me of the Marine comments are: "The enemy exhibited that he recognized that ongag,:nents in the mountains,
I"

such as those near the DMZ,

provided him a double

bonus.

They drew free world forces away from operations nupport-

ing the pacification effort, while they offered the enemy combat under conditions more favorable than those in the lowlands. Corabat in the highlands gave the enemy shorter supply lines from his caches in the rugged mountain regions of North and. South Vietnam and Laici, and thus helped ease the strain generated by our air interdiction campaign. And combat near the DMZ and Laoe offered the enemy nearby havens, safe from ground attack, to which he could retire when pressed. In those sanctuaries he could also set up long range artillery and rocket positions to harass and attrit forces inside RVN. The thick jungle cover and rugged terrain of the mountains tended to degrade the effectiveness of Free World forces' supporting weapons and, at the same time, favored the enemy's ability to ambush, djfend briefly and withdraw. Finally, his defeats, suffered in the unpopulated hinterland, resulted in no direct losses in control of the population many miles "way. The enemy's major military operations aimed at the more populous areas brought his troops out of the remote highlands and into relatively open terrain. The enemy's supply lines were stretched, he was forced to expose his movements to the growing number of peasants who were willing to report them to the free world side, and his large attacks near the coast moved him far away from his hiding places in the highlands. At the samb time, Free World forces were ablP to bring their supporting arms to bear most effectively. The most significant aspect of operations in the coastal plain, however, was the absence of a privileged sanctuary, such as North Vietnam, to which he could retire when he felt the need. The result was that enemy attacks in the lowlands were invariably failures, and these failures weere evident to the Vietnamese population among whom he had fabricated his mystique of invincibility." The contrast between USMC and the Army staff comments indicates the need for a better answer as to who benefits most from border lights. Only the cummander in the field can make the final docision. We hope to cast more light on the subject in the future. At present, some of the factors which seem relevant are discussed below, using the Army staff eonments as a guide.

""

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:-r~e The Army staff states that .. ble .. --a "t--oengage the enemy in "t

apply more freely their superior eca unpopulated terrain where friendly Conversely, the !.arines :.dicate that "the thick jungle cover and firepower." .... 0 rugged terrain of the mountains te:e-e to -:bile Thutvreapons." supporting forces' World without fear of undue civilian casualies, low P-z-_ther, may more than offset this advantage. tars and artillery, as he did at Con Ciiien. de the effectiveness of Free we can use our massive firepower visibility and protective cover the enemy can use his own mor-

* For border operations to cut cff enemy access to food sources in SVN and limit his maneuver room assumes that virtually all enemy movements across This appears to the border will be stopped by allied -_ilitary operations. require more massive forward deployment of allied forces than called for in Further, it is not clear that the 7C/I'IVA forces in the border areas AB-143. need access to SVN food supplies: they are being supplied from both Cambodia Enemy food shortages ap-ea_ to be particularly serious in the and the DMZ. coastal areas rather than the border areas. As for limiting maneuver room, the Marines indicate that fighting in enemy base areas "favored the enemy's ability to ambush, defend briefly and withdraw." Moreover, extending areas of allied operations, while allied forces remain the same size, affords insurgents additional maneuver room. * The Army statement that combat a-. Dak To was more productive than S&D operations in Hau Nghia assumes that productivity should be judged by the number of VC killed per battalion day of enagement. This criterion overlooks some important points, as the Ar-my staff has tellingly remarked about some of First, the Dak -o type of battle is infrequent; the our previous articles. results should be judged in terms cf all the allied battalion days expended in the Dak To area over a reasonable period of time, not just those expended in the course of one brief battle. E-,ven massive deployments of US forces in the border areas could not be expected to produce big battles every week. More likely, Giap would allow his "sanctuary" forces to be engaged just enough to keep the US forces tied down on the frontiers.

Second, the forces operating in Hau 1igh'ia, in addition to killing VC/NVA, probably had assignments to destroy or deny selected base camps to the enemy and to increase LOC security. Such missions seem a proper use of US forces Third, US search and destroy when more productive employments are unavaila'ble. operations in Hau Nghia were close eno'az_ to highly populated areas to provide some indirect support for the GVN revolutionary development effort. t*is true that the VC/i.CA have fewer local forces to assist them in t the border areas, that we sometimes hit an uprepared enemy there, and that the VC/NVA's flagrant violation of neig-boring countries' neutrality is exposed. But the enemy has less need -sr lccal forces when he has border sanctuaries, shorter lines of supply, mtezared defensive positions, easy

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conc'alincr:nt c supply cachs, and honvy c.wvr in which to move. * ODCSOrS points our that friendly forces fighting in border s.rear will avoid being dispersed because they have air mobility, which a.llowu ther. to get there "firstest with the mostest" for the big battles, and thnn rapidly rnturn to other missions, such as paciflcation. Neverthkoles., sorne large US forces have been deployed near the borders for considerablL lengths of time in responso to enemy threats. The deployment of the 4th Inf Div to the. highlands of II CTZ, and of the Marines and, ARVN to the DMZ comen to mind. M4ore important, even temporary dispersal of allied forces allors the VCJ/NVA, with their improved command and control capabilities, to exploit quickly and effectively the absenca of US forces; they can erode in a few hours the security progreis3 that may have ta.,n mrontha to achieve, For example, an ARVN unit's absence of about h8 hours enabled the VC/NVA to regaiJcontrol of' Duc Lap village in IhAu Nghia, undoing mont..s of p,.%cification work.=. conclusion, Giap states that fighting US forces nuar the border disperses them and will have a high payoff in the populated areas of SVO for the VC/NVA. The thrust of the advantages cited by ODCSOPS iu that ciap's strategy provides a better opportunity for llied attrition of VC/NVA main forces. But the Marine Corps' experience iduntifies some disaivantages to allied strategy, especially If the VC/NVA's prime objective is to keep its infrastructume intact, even at the cost of substantial main force unit losses. We conclude that the VC/flVA must be prevented from seriously disrupting pacification and that the question of who benefits most from combat at the frontier urgently requiv.es more study.

'tn

27R. Micheial Per.,

"Zince Icvomber

!,ivolution or a Vh..tnwm,:s,-! VLl1air.

ind ti Snu Cr-nrionto on RJ4 %06,Dece.:mber :965, p. V. 22

Pa-rt ITI: D11u0 Lap 1U) , ratL

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ODCSOPS Coinnent on this Article

SThey

We of'fered CDCOPS the opportun.i-.. - o responded as follows:

the final coiraent thin. morith.

IBy

"Let me ,just summarize thi -ai point~s of my earlier view. It seems as plausible as the e'.gent advanced in your original thesis just that the enemy is resorting to a "border strategy" because continuing us/Fw/RVNAIP successep ha":T- forced this strateGy on him. publicizing this "new" stratetg',, the enemy is making a remarkably clever attempt to conceal his true pr'edicament. his main force units are being isolated ~rmthe populated and food producing areas; he no longer has the freedom tn move his large forces into these signif'icant areas; his objeictive, as well as ourm, is to to achieve this objective. The important question is not so much who benef~its most from combat at the frontier. Rather, it is w;hether tho th~reefold strategy of' containment at the borders, of-1'ensive pressures on enemy main freand support of the GVX pa.izfiaRtion program, which is being

TIP

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APPLXCATION OF '"S APRA SSCURIU'Y CONCEPT' Fo the first time, RACV wid the GVJ Joint Cenerat Staff (JOS5) yprm~~e an Area Security Concept (ASO) as the primary militar'y strateg'y for a~ied efforts in South Vietnam,- the ASO is the basis for Comnbined Co~aign Ptan for 1970 (AB 145). Operations in the 11th D2'A Simay

have oM I

~thei

ri .and Tht4a Thien provinoes) during the year September 2968-'Sept amber WQo 79R9 seem to oZosety pearaltt those Zater codified in the A50. Thin artinIt) reviewsI the hi story of a? lied operation. and paoifioa~ion rosudt. in thab area

ij.

using the framew~ork of the ASO criteria. Fle found that alied forcee w'ere sutooaeef~l in bringring relatit'e secur~ity (C-or-better Homn lt NvaZui~tfon Syst em, NB'B, ratina) to almoet Wl (96%) of the I million popukion in the 117th DTA, and in doubing (35% 'to 73%) the peroentaqe of popu~ation rated A-B. In this article w~e ateo describe the RI'?AF florce present during the period, and showi

2an

conceptual. framework for allied operations in the plan is the Axes Security the populoted &reams and to consolidate existing security through the use of intensive police-type operations in tones surrounding the secure areas (A-B hamlets). This strategy develop# no radi~ally new methods of operations, but focuses already tooted concepts on the new goal of population security. Because all but 7,t of svNVs population is now rated A-B-C, the ASOC concintrates on consolidating (upgrading) already existing levels of security (to A-B levels), rather than expanding~ security to all remaining 1), E, and VC population. Table I shows how the ABC will be implemented in four types, of areas, each of whion is described by it. Hamlet E~valuation System (HES) security rating and goegraphic location: Secure Areas (A-B hamlets), Consolidation Zones ( and come D, E, and VC hamlets) c~urroundirig the Secure Areas#,,Ceairig and Border Surveillance Zones zones (VC controlled and unpopulated areas (along the DMZ# Laos, and Cambodian borderaS rienl foLce t entirely differently from zone to zone; therefore, each zone has a unified coniand structure, and a unique mix of forces.

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AR:A S"C.URITY CONCBPT

Tage Of Aresa
V s Rlying

Secure Area
A,B (some 0)

Con3olidatipn Zone
C (some D,E,0V)

Clear'ing Zone
VC (some DDE)

Zone
Unpopulatedi

.and unpopu-

aommnriad SCommandei
i GVN Porce,

Pr;;in,7e Chief

Provinta Chief

ARVN DT%/SZ
ARVN

ARtVN DTA/SZ Oo,nda r


CI/R

National Police,1,P Field Forces

CIRO lime

(Tp

,Fus

Popular Vrare.
People's Self -Defense Foroes

PF
provincial Reconuaissance

FW

(PaDF)

Units (PRU)
required
(AVN, US, V.14as

Mission

Maintain & improve existIng security without attempting expansion of area NP-maintain law & order, ne'ttralize VOll PP, PSDF-reside and operate in secure areas only.

Provide outer belt of protection for secure area, and raise level of security within zone Continuous patrols & enbushes with mobile reaction forces, Police tlpe c;erations to raise 'evel of secarty.

Keep VC/NVA away from consolidation mone.

Detect,

enOgagze and
deter enemy to infiltrate into RIVN

attempting

Methods of Mir raio

Rejg4lar forces CO opera. engage or tions drive enemy out, and iso. late/neutralime enemy base areas.

Source:

MAN/aGS Combined Cempaign Plan 1970 (AB 1+4).

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tit

The ASC has already been in use in principle in selected areas, even before its official endorsement, To see how it has worked, we attempted to select a "model" area where the principles of the ASC have been used. Although "mW.ny areas in SVN improved significantly in security in the last year., we chose

the 11th DTA in I Corps for the following reasons: (1)the ARVWT let Division there has historically been committed to combat operations as opposed to pactfication dutieslthus conforming to the ASC, (2) the let Division has received consistently high performance ratings in accomplishing its assigned tasks, and (3) a great deal of information about operations there was readily available. Measuring Area Securit . To see how the ASC works, we devised a method of using HES scores and hamlet locations to approximate the geographic.- areas for each ASC Zone on a 1500,000 scale map of the 11th DTA. The results are In Map 1 (September 1968) and Map 2 (October 1969). To show the Secure Areas) we colored black every 1-kilometer square which nontained one or more A-f hamlets. To show the Consolidation Zones, we shaded all the 1-kilometer squares containing C hamlets, plus those squares immediately adjacent to squares containing A B and C hamlets. Finally, we pri.nted a "D," "E," or "VY' at the location of the remaining hamlets. Note that many of the D-E-VC hamlets fell within the boundaries of the Consolidation Zone, and were treated "together with the C hamlets in the upgrading prouiess. During the one-year period, wo found that the Secure Areas nearly tripled in size and the overall Secure plus Consolidation Zone area increased 78% (Table 2). At the same time, A-B population doubled from 35% in September

V.!,. S.shown

1968 to 73% in September 1969.

one million people were rated A-B-C. More importantly, pacification scores continued to improve even during the second quarter of 1969 %hen enemy attacks Jumped to 44 per month, compared to 10-20 per month during the preceding three quarters. VC aasuasuinationn of Vietnamese civilians and officials continued at 20 per month, however, suggesting that while the GVN has extended military protection, the OVWI' has not eliminated the last hard-core vestiges of the VO political apparatus.

By September 1969, 96% of the n1th DTA's

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I
sou,
QUANG TRI

LEEND
SECURE ZONE (A.0) CONSOLIDATION ZOPNE (CO-ADJACENT I K(M) CLEARING ZONE

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ViSOUTH VIETNAM
11th DTA SEPTEMBER 1968

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W.P 2

501
X.

THUA THIEN

LIEiiI'J

J ~

SECURE ZONE

(A*e)

CONSOLIDATION ZONE
(Cl-ADJACENT I K(M)

C ~CLEARING

ZONE

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wt
SOUTH VIETNAM
11th DTA OCTOBER 1969

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"

~TAZ L.SECURITY 11;, 1TH DTA

i 1969

3rd Qtr P.
to 3rd4

-'7nd of Quarter) Secure Area 116 Consolidation Zone Sub-Total ,.71 Total Aixe& in 1lth DTA 9987 Pouato (%of Total) EdofQarter) A-B
A-B-C
Em, A}tivit

-.ot

Available --.--

302 12 1154 9987

+156% + 67%
+7

"
34.9
62.4

64.o 86.4

64.4 86.7

70.3
93.7

72,6
96.3

+ioo% + 54%

(MnhyAverage) Atcsby Fire


Total Attacks

11

10
1020

l1.

33
T

10

-9%
+

5%

Haragsment/S~botage

Incidents

48
23

35
25

92
10

175
17

76
20

+ 58%
-

Assausinations

13%

We conclude that frenday operations had a significant impact in the 1lth DTA on population security, particularly in creating a shield for the population against enemy attanks, but not necessarily against terrorism within the boundaries of the Consolidation Zone.

was achieved. Table 3 shows that about 30,000 men in 19-23 US and. 19 ARVN battalions operated in the Clearing Zone, 6,000=8,000 VF operated in the Consolidation Zone; 8,600-9,700 PF operated in, both the Secure and Consolida.
tion Zones; nnd 3,000 National Police and 30,000 armed People's Self Defense Forces operated in the Secure Zone.

"in the three zones of the llth DT'uxing the one-year period when progress

Friendly Forces in the 11th DTA.

We examined the forces which operated

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S~~TABIX

3
FRIENDLY FORCES IN 2E llth D-A 1968

CLWAING ZONE: (Monathly Averages) US !?%ttalions U.vN Battalions Total US bn est. strensth 23 23 20 20 19

2
3 18,4o00 8,400 1 2,300 TO"0 16,000 16,000 15,200

AlIVIN bn est. strangth


TutalT57 CONSOLDATION ZONE: (End of quarter) RV co. asgnd strength PV pat. aagnd strength (.) _/

.12,0

12.30
2,0

1%600
1g

11 400
1go

5,917 4,319
1073

5,887 4,321

6,410 4,491 61

7,213 4,561

8,543 4,830
14012

~''Total "SECURE AREA:


(Endl of quarter)

VF pit. asgnd strength ()a/ NP (exc1. NPFF) P3DF (armed)


Total

4,491 4,321 4,319 2,87P 2,94i 3,006 ----------- Not Available

4,561 NA

4,830 3,010 29,730

Source: a/

Battai on data - SFAFA Computer File. Bn. atrengths: US average of 800 per bn. assumed; ARVX data from SEER Computer File. RF/PF - ITEG Computer File. NP/NPF?/PoDF - from Province Senior AdVisor Reports. PF assumed to operate in both Consolidation Zone aid Secure Area. Since exact breakout not aliailable, we assumed b of time spent in each area.

Methods of Operation - ARVN Main Force Units. We studied operations of main force units in the 11th DTA, part.cularly those of the ARVN let Division, to determine what methods related to the ASC seem to be ruccessful. Sources used in this ianlysis were: (I) SLER/AMnES computer file, (2) monthly "Operations of US Marine Forces - Vietnam" reports from FNFPAC, (3) "Operational Report - Lessons Learned" (ORLL) from pertinent US units, and (4) the NSCsponsored Vietnein Special Studies Group (VSSG) paper, "The Situation in the

Countryside," Thua Thien Province Study.

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During the September 1968-September 1969 period -we studied, US and ARVN regular forces were primarily engaged in reconnaissance in force operations of4 varying duration and size. The typical large unit clearing zone operations involvin~g ARV1N units focused on enemy lines of communication (LOC), and staging and assembly areas. It should be noted that according to a detailed study of relevant SWER reports, local ARVN co=.&nders reported that their operations were unilateral in the limited tactical sense) even though their units were part of .Joint task organization with US units. By having a joint task organization, ARVN? commanders probably enjoyed greater US combat support than they could obtain operating independently. For the most part, US forces played the dominant role in main force operations. Short descriptions of four operations ".nvolving ARVN units during MayJul 1969 are given below. (1) lot AavxReciment--Between 20~244 July, elements conducted reconnaissance in force operalo-n near former base axria 101 in quang Tri. (2) Operation Massaachusetts Striker (1 March-B May 1969) -- designed to locate and destroy enemy force caches and lines of cormmunications. The Joinit task organization included the 3rd ARVWi Regiment and part of the 5J+th.

(3) Operation Apache Snow (10 Nay-7 June)--The mission given the 3rd Brigade 101st and lsit AREN Reginent, was to conduct airmobile assaults into the Northern A Shau valley in conjunction with the 9th (US) Marines and 3rAV Reimnt to destroy NTVA/VC forces, obstru~ct enemy routes of egress into ioao, interdic~t enemy LOC so and to locate and destroy enemy caches.
(i 4) Operations Montgomery RendezVous*(8 June-August 1969) and Campbell Streamer (13 Jluly-August 1969) - Joint task organizations included the 3r and 5~4th ARVN Regiments. Same general missions but in difrorent operatlniial areas of Thua. Thien. Methods of 0 eration - Territorial Security Forces. We studied, operations of RF, PT, and other territorial seurity forcesi the 11th DTA to see their effect Ln the ABC. The primary source used in this analysis, and for the Results sections following, was the Thua Thien Province Study mentioned above. In co~ntrast to previous emphasis on "search and destroy" sweeps by US and ARVNf maneuver elements, increasing emphasis was placed in late 1968 on "cordon, search, and hold" operations, using combined US, ARVN, and territorial security forces. These tactics continued through late 1968 and 1969, and, according to Province Senior Advisors (PSA) reportssthey had a major effect on. pacification. In October 1965, for exv-ple, the month of the most rapid pacification progress, in four major conbined c'ordori/search/hold operations in Thua Thien alone, the enemy lost 328 1,MA, 664 POW,, and 98 Chieu Hoi, at a cost of 6 friendly KIA and 39 WIA. A native population of 16,000 was resettled in the newly secured areas. The Thua Thien FSA report for October noted that RF/PF forcos had been operating more and mrore energetically; beginning in January 1969,

1:

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iRF/1F were equipped with M1:16 rifles, giving them firepower parity with enlemy time in several years. regulars for the first

Results - Clearing Zone In 1967 and early 1968, the bulk of the enemy main forces were operating in or near the populated coastal lowlands (see large number of D, 2, VC hamlets serving as base areas in the populated areas 4s of September 1968--Map 1). In late 1968 and 1969' on the other hand, they operated for the most part only in the unpopulated western mountains. This shift is well documented by captured documents, ?$A reportz, and the location reports of friendly KUA. Apparently the enemy's heavy casualties in early 1968 and his likely desire to avoid repeating them, together with repeated allied disruption of the vital A Shau" Valley supply system, aand the successes of pacification, increasingly denied the enemy supplies, manpower, intelligence, and any safe resting areas in the lowlands. By isolating the enemy's main forces and by rapid, mobile reactions in response to hard intelligence information, friendly Clearing Zone operations appear to have been very auccessful in'the 1lth DTA In providing an effective shield for operations in the Consolidation Zone. Results - Consolidation Zone As enemy main force influence was largely eliminated from populated areas, the great relative increase in the strength and effectiveness of RF/PF and other local security forces over weakened lockl enemy forces produced the spectacular improvements in population security noted in Map 2 and Table 2: tripling of the Secure Area, and doubling of the -A-B population. It should be noted, however, that from mid-1968 to about March 1969, the enemy was attempting to consolidete and rebuild his main forces and guerrillas, and from March 1969 to the present, he has apparently returned to a protracted war strategy. These strategies in themselves grant the GVN more freedom of action in the Consolidation Zone, at least temporarily, and account for part of the improved GVN security. On the enemy side, there appears to have been serious regression in local force effectiveness. After early 1968, captured documents, prisoners, and ralliers indicated that guerrilla forces and the infrastructure began to e;cpe* rience many serious problems, including low morale, inability to recruit and replace losses, popular unwillingness or fear to give support, and loss of rest and supply areas previously secure from US/GVN incursious. In suzmary, the enemy could probably reverse the recent trends fairly quickly if he became willing to adopt a general offensive strategy (as in 1967 early 1968), i.e., to commit hii main forces to intense activity in the lowlands, and to accept the heavy casualties this would ontail. However, he now lacks support for his main forces in the populated areas, making such U strategy much more difficult to use successfully.

'

CONFIDENTIAL
.,.

30

CONFIDENTIAL
ARVN Fore Structure. Because the ARVM lot Division was apparently sue. celsful in its "Clearing Zone" operations on enemy main forces and base areas, we have compiled a detailed description of the Divison and its supporting alemento as an example of a "model" Clearing Zone force. Table 4 shows that the Division plus Its support totaled 27,056 men, of which 6,495 were provided by ARVN Corps-level forces and 3,613 "ARVN equivalents" of US support personnel.

TABLrE 4

AlVXINST DIVISION~ "SLICE" ARVN Division Force (let Division - 17 infantry battalions plus division foroea)
ARVN Corps Support Combat Service U.S. Suppo- 06/

16,948
2 M, 4,0i

Combat
Service

3,lo4 27,O56

Division Slice (through Corps, including us support)


a
4

Expressed as the number of personnel in ARVN units required to replace US support unias. See text.

Table 4 was derived using the following methodology: (1) We applied the assigned strengths from the post-midway Unit Authorization List (UAL) to the lit Division's organization chart. (2) We then did the same for I Corps forces and the ist Division, since it had hilf 1i.7 of 33) of the In one exception, we allocated both of the Corps' two to lot Division, incboth operated primarily in 5. in -Table (2) are shoown (1) and Of the allocated j of them to Corp's infantry battalions# Armored Cavalry Equadrons the l1th'DTA. The results

"CONFIDENTIAL
31

67

I.;,
CONFIDENTIAL
I',

TALE 5 MAVX !ST DIVISION No. 40fDivision


I

Strength

Total 11,305 161 208 44

Units Infantry Bn Recon Co Hq Inf Div


Regt Reoon Co

17 1 1 4

665
161 208
1,11

i~..Div
N Rlr I

Arty
Scout fog Plt Div/ Augment A/ ist Bn

1
.

10577
2

177i
2Z 15 666

'DS

666
1 1
1 1 1

Sij;.Bn O/ Eng Ba
Mod Bn Lt Truck Co Mil Band Total Division Forces

378 437.
488 152 29

378 437
488 152 2 Division lit Allocation

,
Corga Units Armored Civ. Sqdn 155 Bn 105 Bn Ranger Hq Ranger Bn Corps Combat Support Allocation Subtotal ALO Engr Spt Grp (Combat) Engr Spt Grp (Const) Sig Spt Bn Med. Grp Corps Service Suppo)t Allocation Subtotal Total Corps Support Allocation

N.o. 1 "
2 3 2 1 3 1 1 1 1 Ig

S~trength 573
729 54o 501 124 655 279 1,127 3,030 360 90

N.~Alcto

287 1,458
760 501 62 " 81 14o 564 1,515 180

6,495

p/

Inclueos Radar Section (16), DS Bn (98) nd Sig Bn (40). 1st Div Org Chart shows DS Co. vice Bn, assumed to be an error. ist Div Org Chart shows Sig Co. vice Bn; since all Sig 0o. phased out in FY 69 Sig Bn used here.

CONFIDENTIAL 68

CONFIDENTIAL
(3) We then studied SZR and other data to isolate the support provided the ARVN lot by U.S. units. While our drta was probably quite accurate for artillery support to X CTZ and we even knew how many helicopter sorties were flown exclusively for the AZVN Ist in various mission categories, ,,e could only estimate other support provided, bassi. on such things as after action reports, comunications improvements program targets, total logistics tonnages handled tor ARV etc. We also tried to tak.e into account the support, such as heli.
I

M".copter

)}ioperations.

lift and resupply, provided ARM~ in the normal course of coo~bined mobile
(4) We attempted to translate this support into individual U.S. units ckpable of providing that level of support, and converted those U.S. units into equivalent ARVN units. Based primarily on the I CTZ battalion split, we allocated a portion of such units to the model clearing zone force. Table 6 showa the allocation of U.S. support.

'

Q'i:
SAsalt

_quivalent

st Division

TeAir Cam SnCo Spt Assl.nHelo Co Su'veill. co


Recon Co

1 2 4 2
2

80 536

425100 268

!. !
!.

661 1,12
1,o80
246

331 576
123

i. '175/8"

S811

Bn

Bn

54o
122 b/

540o

2 70
61 1 :

C eombat Support Total Bi;:!Sg Spt Co

,Truck " "DS !' :"Service

Co (Main) Co Support Total


U.S. Opt Equivalent Total

1 1

168 302

84 15 r09 3,613

; : '

ARVN will have no 8" weapons therefore 155 Bn substituted here.


bjU.S. now providing equival1ent of about two Co. of s~g support prii I: c./

marily during helo assault; .st Div self sufficient U.S. now providing some surf ale-transport, primarily otherwise. port service
and truck; exact amount unkncwn at present.

CONFIDENTIAl.
..................................

CO NFIDENTIAL
the ARMN ist Division nor to X CTZ but which would be used by a divisLon
(5) We excluded other ARVN support assets not assigned specifically to

force. These forces include militmry police, military security, intelligence, political warfares, area signal, hospitalp depot repair, base depots, tranWe also excluded ARVN overhead figures, including headquartes, port, etc. admninistration, and pipeline.

V!.

:ii~ii

! I,

TI

CO N F IDENTIAL
34

CONFIDENTIAL
APPLICATION OF THE AREA SECURITY CON=CE._
A,

INTERIM ANAUYSIS #2

. An interim report from o:,r study of RVNAF force structure S, based on the Area Security Concept (ASC) indicates that, in the absence of US combat troops, there will be a requirement for more SVN regular forces., The present countrywide nw.ber of RF rifle companies and PF "platoons will be more than adequate if `eployed in accordance with the SASC. th. nber o j platoons is only marginally s ,omezer, InIy.o,

adequat~

-a an Ins

of RF rifle companies

cernt GV? plan for employing PSDF assigned to security missions. The during 1970 appears to be a major mo ification of the Area Security Concept in terms of its effect on the ,WV.4F force structure, force mix and strategy. Background. The Area Security C:n.e. ,nt

4,,,i. V

the 1970 Combined Campaign Plan and the _170 GV.N Plan for Pacification and Development, provides a framework within which to examine RVNAF missions and force structure.' The ASC divides the countryside of South Vietnam i0o four zones according to the relative security offered to the population.J/ The SECURE AREA and the CONSOLIDATION ZO.'7 encompass the population in all hamlets whose security ratings are A, B, or C, according to the MACV Hamlet Evaluation System. Regional Forces, ?opular Forces, Peoples' Self Defense Force, and National Police all operate in these two areas under the control of the Province Chief. When requested by :he Province Chief, regular ARVN units might also operate in these areas unler his control. Emphasis is placed on pacification and on population and resources control operations. The CLEARING ZONE and BORDER SURVEILLA.C_'7C3 ZONE encompass all the countryside "outside of the CONSOLIDATION ZONE. These zones are sparsely populated, contain VC-controlled areas and are broken into areas of operation under the control of the ARVN division commanders. Operations therein are conduqted by highly mobile ARVN or US battalions to A.estroy or break up enemy fbrces and isolate them from the population i-the CONSOLIDATION ZONE. In last month's issue we discussed the application of the Area Security Concept (ASC) to the lst ARVN Division's area of operations (llth DTA). We used this application to develop an R,.7'.2 force in I and III Corps based on 1st Division and US forces in the DT.A. de area. While our study is not yet completed, this article discusses the kAlS" application to model areas in II Corps and IV Corps, together with some tenzative findi-ngs on the resulting RVNAF force structure in each Corps Area. This interim analysis deals only with maneuver battalions, Regional Force rifle companie s and Popular Force platoons. The completed study will inolude combat and combat service support units and should be published about mid-M..arch.

_/

See January 1970 issue of the SEA..n-.y.is Report, "Application of the Area Security Concept," for a detqa'Ie explanation.

Best Available Cop.,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
preliminary Zi rid irS There is a requirement for additional RVNAF forces in each Corps The precise number of maneuver battalion required, however, Clearing Zone, in effecdifferences based adjustments qualitative incorporate &ihould battalions. VC/NVA and,on ARVN, between US/FmAF, tiveness and mobility

1.

!i~i

2. If Territorial Forces (RF/PF) operate as the ASC requires, there are sufficient RP rifle companies countrywide to bring all D, 9, and VC hamlets to a C rating (expanded security) when the main force security situation permits accecs to these hamlets. At least 62 more MF platoons, however, will be needed in IV Corps under conditions of expanded security.

.,,be
Ilk, I.

3. There has been no attempt to evaluate the Peoples Self Defense Force (PSDF) as an effective force in the secure area primarily because However, it is expected that the we have very sketchy information about them. effect of at least the armed ?SDF would release some PF platoons now on This in turn generates additional PF security or other type missions. units for expansion/consolidation of security which were not included in The apparent GVN change in strategy with regard to PSDF our calculations. it, 1970 will also imp4t on the regular forces, since more RF units will made available for employment in the clearing zone.

"least every 4-6 months, particularly where PSDF employment changes the ASC
strategy. The Approach. The existing RVMAF force structure has evolved over the years and does not necessarily optimize the mix of forces. We therefore examined three model areas to develop force requirements in each Corps The model Tactical Zone during both low and high levels of enemy activity. areas chosen were the l1th and 41st Division Tactical Areas and the 24th These areas were examined thoroughly between the Special Tactical Zone. period September 1968 to October 1969 in the same manner ar the 11th PTA We found. that the forces model area discussion in last month's erticle. (including US)in these areas during thisperiod noL only operated successfully but also operated in general agreement with the principles of the area security concept. Concurrently we plotted the MACV Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) scores on a map of South Vietnam to determine the size and nhape of the Secure, (The Border SurveilConsolidation, and Clearing Zones in the model arqas. Maps 1-6 and Tables 3-5 lance Zone was included with the Clearing Zo.ne.)._/ (appended) show the resulting "snapshots and statistics for September 1,968 and October 1969 in each model area. However, The H.S ratingu may only be accurate to within one other grade. the trend of hMS ratings over time is generally considered reliable.

Recalculation of threat and requirement indices should be made at

CONFIDENTIAL

cCONFIDENTIAL
The nodef'zr:es in the llth DTA, combat and service support. 24th STZ, and

Regular Army Forces.

41st DTA were the 1st ARVN Divisio'n,-~dAR1Y2'i Regiment, and 9th ARrTh Division, respectively, with U.S.

The size of the model force requ~.red in each Division Tactical Area

and Special Tactical Zone depends up-on =any factors, some of which are
However, three quantitative factors seem most imporpurely qualitative. tant: (1) the number and strength of VC/NVA units, (2) the intensity of

enemy ground assaults and engagementfs, Pand (3) the size of the CLEARING
ZONE in which the force must operat.: As a base period for our models we chose the 2nd Qtr, 1969 since during

that period the combined forces successfully countered relatively intense


enemy activity without degradation of population security. We collected data for the three factors above in all three model areas during that period

and used that data as the denominator (model) for computing a relative threat
index in each Corps area. The relative threat index equation has the form: AOCorp AOZ Coros EME#EASLT ECorps

1"' E Model

#EAS TIT Cor'5 Model

ACZ Model

Where: RTI = relative threat.," ndex. EMBE = enemy maneuver battalion strength equivalents (relative to a US battalion). EASLT = enemy ground assaults/engagements. ACZ = area of clearing zone. We then collected data on each of the three factors for both a high and a low threat in each Corps zone and computed the indices. The indices were multiplied by the force in the model area to yield a range of required maneuver battalions needed in each Corps Zone. No qualitative refinements were made for differences in mobility, firepower or leadership and each term in the threat index equation was weighted uniformly. Table I sunmarizes the number of ARVN maneuver battalions required for each Corps Zone and coqtrywide.

On a countrywide basis, an additional 54 ARVN battalions appear necessary


to counter the low (Oct 69 level) threat, while 110 battalions might be needed needed for a simultaneous increase of the threat in each Corps to sustained levels at or above the 2nd quarter 1969 enemy activity. In terms of US/FWMAY btta-

lion strengths, this would equate to a range of 42-86 maneuver battalions. Realistically, a simultaneous threat increase is not likely and the ability to shift battalibns to the threatened Corps -would decrease the countrywide total required. Moreover, variations in combat effectiveness among US, FWMAF, ARVN, and VC/NVA battalions compared to each other (and over time) might also change the range of battalions required.
-

An ARVN Satta.Uon is .78 x US batte.l.... in strength.

CONFIDENTIAL

73

CONFIDENTIAL
TABLE 1 MANEUVER BATTALION ARVN FORCE REQUIIMENTS Battalions AR.I ARVA1 Bns Re cireur

uS I Corns

Total

Present Strergth a/ Period of Low Threat

43
-

4o
-

83
-

58

/ Period of Kigh Threat j/

69
-

II Cores
Present Strength 35

34

Period of Low Threat


Period of ,igh Threat

51 1

69 -

68
80

III Corps
Present Strength Period of Low Threat b Period of High Threat 63 114 68 85 49
-

6
-_/

I Corps
Present Strength b/0

Period of Low Threatb/ Period of High Threat e/ RVN Present Strength

49 186
-

46

62
315

129
-

Period of Low Threat

240

Period of High Threat

296

S/ January 15, 1970. 1969 activity levels. SOctober 2dQtr 69 tyie activity levels
e

d/ 2nd Qtr 69 type activity levels in 24th STZ

in llth DTA.

2nd Qtr 69 type activity levels in 41st DTA.

Slation

Regional and Popular Forces. We also chose .2nd Qtr 69 as the base time the rural least 90% of timeat t'elatively forces RF and period for Ilth Tho popusecure. considered was that area by model since DTA llth PF in the h used for all four Corps areas in determining RF/sF requirements. model was -The RF andsPF in that area operated successfully in general agreement wethqthe Teprinciples of the area security concept, and while population distribution prdiffers between the Corps, the index we used accounts for differences in poprAti

Oin

ulation and area. A relative requirement index for RF units was determined a manner similar to that for the relative threat index, using the factors

CONFIDENTIAL
17., .

CONFIDENTIAL
-:1i aZtoon strength, (2) size of the

of (1) guerrilla and separate VC Cc

rural "C" population, and (3) size of zon-outed CONSOLIDATION ZONE less SECURE AREAS. i This index was then. =,ti--ied by the number of RF units which Smaintained.security in the model ar;ea _._s assigned to security missions in the TYES Report). RRIF / TR Corps. Model RUPeo oCC" Corps ACNZ Corps ACh-Z Model

RU-? "C' PoD Model

Where

RRI = Relative RP uire=ent Index ESTR = Enemy guerrilla and separate unit strength RUR "C" Pop Rural -ooulation J ith "C" HES rating ACNZ = Area of consolidation zone less secure zone

The number of RF units was calculated for each Corps to determine those needed to maintain present security conditions (Oct 69) or expanded security (if all D, E, and VC hamlets were brought up to "C" rating). Similar PF requirement indices were determined which generated the number of PF platoons needed in each Corps Zone during periods of present security or expanded security. The PF relative requirement index is based on two factors: (1) rural population with C or better HES ratlng and (2) size of the entire consolidation zone, including the secure zone. /
1/2

ABC Poo Cor-os


UR ABC Pop Model
=

TACNZ Corps]
TACNZ Model

Where

TACNZ

total area of cons-l zone including secure zone

Table 2 shows the number of RF cc--__aaies and PF platoons needed by Corps Zone and countrywide. Even with some 40.O PP companies not directly assigned to security missions, there are a sufficient number of companies countrywide to meet expanded security requirements. Since Territorial Forces cannot be shifted from one corps area to another, special attention should be given to the RF now assigned to security missions in I Corps and IV Corps. In these two corps present levels appear to be tco low (IV Corps) or marginally adequate (I Corps) to maintain present security. Similarly, present levels of PF in IV Corpsare Just above the minimum required to maintain present security, and for expanded security 62 more platoons wculd be needed. We note that IV Corps traditionally keeps a larger percentage of PR companies on offensive operations than the other three Corps, and is now facing a major enemy threat. While the number of RF companies a'ailable countrywide is some 400 more than required for expanded security, scn-- of these companies would be engaged in training and rehabilitation, while oth-r units act as a "swing force" to assist regular forces during periods c- high enemy threat (such as the IV Corps

situation); still others are requirei f,. border surveillance missions on a

more or less permanent basis.

5 CONFIDENTIAL Best Available CoprS

CONFIDENTIAL
Reconrt GVi directivcs and comrnents by Pre,.ldent Thieu indicate an apparent modification to the Area Security Concept Rs presently written, speciflical2.Jy in the formation of an elite PFF force to replace PF platoons in A, B ana'C This program envisions 35 man :nter-teams (platoons) hamlets during 1970. from the 530,000 arms-bearing PSDF and training four men per team (60,000 in If this program is successful the end result would all) in one week courses. ,provide substantial augmentation for the regular forces from RF units. We have not included the effect or released by the "upgraded" PF platoons. this plan in our calculations.

TABLE 2
,., ,

~~REGIONAL

.FORCE/POMUAR, FORCE REQUIREMENTS

,, PF Plat ':

~RF

Co a

Number on Security .lisci ns Present Security Lvels Expanded ec.t_,,y Levels


1I1 Corts ., Number on Security ,Lisaioas Present Security Levels Expanded Security Levels III Corps

171 169 183

9635 743

863

1,266 291 237 261 1,121, 1,268

Pdresent Present No. of of Units Number on Security Missions


Present Security ,Levels

353031 373 310


167

1,028 965
803

Expanded Security Levels

153
530 307
380 465

835
41i3 2,154
2,rtr 2-475

IV Co~rps
Present No. of Units
+/OtNumber on Security rtisions PreAent Security Levels Expanded Security Levels

'i
,,Number

Pesent N~o.of Units


on Securi-.y Missioas Present Security Le.vels Exp~ande. Security Levels

1,473
1,07Cy 1,o62.

5,248 4,67 5,441'

5,672

October 1969 !t,-S ratings. All D, E, VC harlets are brC)u~jht to a "C" rating.

. Dec

i V~ ior P: tol,toons, Wwe(mber ~. A9 9

(1('0 1'r) r RV rifle roIroonles.

SCONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY. ,,ATISTTCq -I CORPS,

ON TACT'CiCL ARELA DI., .1. SOUTH VIET;AM

Area
Socure Area

fPpulation (000)

Sep8
327.0

69 :_Oct

Preceat of Total a/ SQ 1,_ Population 8 Sep 68 Oct 69 Oct 69 6_ S


35 70 116 297

684.2

(A, B)
Consolidation Zone (Secure Area, C) Clearing Zone: Populated (D, E, VC) Unpopulated 585.7 929.2 62 96 871 1,556

352.5 na

42.0 na

38 na

4 na

868 8,248

52 8,379

ja Total Population, 11th Division Tactical Areat

971,200.

.1+

+;+

+
U

.t

I
V IIIA
. +.

I;Uf'UL

CONFIDENTIAL

I:

~V4 v

(C~A~JACEA

KM)

FI~JCLEAR ING

I~(lhIACflT

ZONE

Xmt I

MAP I

SOUTH VIETNAM
I

SEPTEMBER 1968

Irv
MEN,~*

*0

**

CONFIDENTIAL

(R

MAN

THUA THIEN

LEGEND
SICURE ZONE (A.a)
* .*.* .'*CMOU~LDATION

ZONE

(C+ADJACENY I K(M) CLEMHWO ZONI

CONFIDENTIA

MA.P 2

SOUTH VIETNAM
11th DTA OCTOBER 1969

)A THIEN

81

SECURITY STATISTICS

--

247" a

rTCL TAICAL ZONE

PrecerIt of Total a/ Population (000)


_FPoulation

Area.
Secure Area

.so_6
48.9

Oct 69
185.4

SE2 68
19

c.
61

69

68
49

Oct 69
125

(A, B) Consolidation Zone


(Secure Area, C)

153.9

274.8

60

90

909

1,403

Clearing Zone: Populated (D, E, VC) Unpopulatod

101,0 na

31.U na

40 na

10 na

1,453 16,629

486 17,102

:&7

Total population, 24th Special Tactical Zone:

305,800.

i:4

'Coll

'"
Lr

1 CO EIDE.itT

CONFIDENTIAL

SOUTH VI!TNAM
24th STZ SEPTIMBUR 1968

KONTUM
0000 E*

Iall

55v 4 AL 5v V

PLEIU~ a.

vi VV vN
VUN vAlAO CUv)IAIN~l4

vEL~

COFIENIA

CONIFIDENlTIAL

SOUTH VIETNAM
4>

74th STZ + OCTOBER 1969

KONTUM

PLEIKU

CONFIDENTIAL

._

STATtIS' -S 41T DIv.sCirN TACTICAl, AREA SECURITYSTATSIV CO'1S SM- T VtIETNAMti o


_SECURITY

Parc'.nt oE Tntnl a/
Populatian_(000)

6Area !:,1 :.(A, Secure B) Area Consolidation Zone

Population___

Km__

Sep 68

Oct 69 1,197.4 1,573.2

Se 43 69

Oct 69 68 89

Sep 68 297 2,582

Oct 69 545 3,701

719,8 1,158.5

(Secure Area, C)
Clearing Zone: Populated (D, F, VC) Unpopulated 522.8 na 197.0 na 31 na 11 na 2,133 1,946 815 2,145

?ITMalppultion, 4&iot Division Tactical Area:

1,770,200.

.i

,!

:
LCjBL JA

COAFIDENTIAL

VV

I
I

LEGEND
SECUR~E ZONE WEI~)

*..**

CONSOLIDAT ION ZONE ~(Cf-ADIACENT I KM) CLEARING ZONE

__

CON.R.DE.NTIAL

MAP5

SOUTH VIETNAM
41st DTA
~DEC

SEPTEMBER 1968

vv

,s.

vva
v vww 0 VI~t#

vI

COM FIDENTIAL

AN GIANG

LEGEND
SECURE ZONE (AB) CONSOLIDATION ZONE (C+ADJACENT 1 KM) CLEARING ZONE

CONMDENTIAL

1'

~imi'

SOUTH VIETNAM
41st DTA
SA DEC

OCTOBER 1969

VINH LONG

*%.,**

:::..*:

**~*

ILLUSTRATIVE RWVAY 1W SOUTH VIET!i"M

FORCE SThUCTURE '20

.jTHE

ARM SECURITY CONCEITGi

Background
The Area Security Concept (ASC) is novw an integral part of the 1970 Combined Campaign Plan and the 1970 GM71 -Plan for Pacification and Development. This strategy develops no radically new methods of operations, but focuses already tested concepts on the gcal of population security. Allied operations are designed to separate the nain force war from the populated areas, atd to consolidate existing security through the use of intensive police-type operations in zones surrounding the secure areas. Since each segment of the RVNAF has a distinct mission and area of operation, the Area Security strategy provides a fre.ewcrk within which to examine RVNAF missions anM force structure. This study is an attempt to develop the RVNAF force structure required to implement the ASC. However, it does not attempt to integrate the many quolitative factors which influence force effectiveness.

Brief Explanation of the ASC The ASC divides the countryside of South Vietnam into four zones according to the relative security offered to the population (see Enclosure 1). The Secure Area and the Consolidated Zone encompass the population in all hamlets whose security ratings are A, B, or C, according to the MACV Hamlet Evaluation System. Regional Forces, Popular Forces, Peoples' Self Defense Force, and National Police all o-erate in these tv.o areas under the control of the Province Chief. When requested by the Province Chief, his control. regular ARVN units might also operate in these areas under control ~The concept emphasizes pacification and .yopulation .aad resources operations. The Clearing Zone and Border Surveillance Zone encompass all the countryside outside of the Consolidation Zone. These zones are sparsely populated and contain VC-controlled areas. They are broken into areas of operation under the control of the ARVN division ccomanders. Operations therein are conducted by highly mobile regular combat forces to destroy or break up enemy forces and isolate them from the population in the Consolidation Zone. Table I summarizes the ASC showing the four types of areas and their related command structures, forces, missions and operations.

'i

.2

CONFIDENTIAL 28f

4,(1

IAL ET !NFIU
TAPLE 1 ARIEA SF'CURITY CONCEPT S UNAUIjY T e of Area
Secure trea Consolidation Zone Cleexriap, Zone Zone

S41$

mmEs

Ain .,B I (some C)

C (some D,E,VC)

Vc (some f,E) and unpopuUlted areas ,AR.I,1) DT/SZ Commander ARVN

Unpopulatea

Coma.nd GrN Forces

,rovince Chief National Police

Province Chief NP Field Forces

ARVU DTW./SZ Commander CIDO/RF

Reo70 nible

Oup)
Popular Forces People's Self Defense Forces

(Nm)
PF Provincial Reconnaissance

use

FW

(PsDF)

units (PRrJ) PSDF'


(ARVN, US, FW as required>

Mission

Maintain & improve existing security vithout attempting expansion of area NP-maintain law 3 order, neutralize VCI; PF, PSDF-reside and operate in WecuLre areas =nly.

Provide outer belt of protection for secure area, and raise level of securit:; within zone Continuous patro-s & ambushes with mobile reaction forces. Police type operations to raise level of security,

Keep VC/bVA away from consolidation zones

Detect, engage, ani deter "epemy attem;ting to rtffiatrate into RVN CnDG operations

Methods of peration

Regufar forces engage or drive enemy out, and isolate/neutralize enemy base areas.

Source:

XACV/JGS combined Campaign Plan 1970 (AB

L'.5).

ASC-type operations have been employed in certain areas for some time
even before the concept's official endorsement. To see what kind of forces are required to make it work we selected "model" areas where the RVNIF successfully applied the principles of the ASC and we examined, in detail, the friendly forces in those areas. We chose the 11th Division Tactical Area(DTA)in I Corps, the 24th Special Tactical Zone (STZ) in II Corps and the 4 1st DTA in IV Corps because: (i) the inits operating in these areas

CONFIDENTIAL 29[ q1
Y

.....

.......... .. ,..,....-.:" '.......'""

*:"

- '+

'

'

::: . . :

'::J!I

C 0N FIED T IAL
.,
'~and

oppo.ed tro pac.,fic'at:on dut ies, --'.in,

to the ASCX

(2)

the unLt.,

"

receiveA high performance ratirxz tn --t:! ing their assigned tasks, (3) a great daal of infonomationc ab"'".t operations in these areas was

readily available.
Measuring Area Security - 4-o dezrib oixr ncdel areas irn the terms of the concept, we devised a mezhod of uring HES scores and hamlet locations to approximate the geographic areas for each ASC zone and plotted these on maps of the thLree model areas. To bhow the Secure Areas, we blacked out every 1-kilometer square which conte.ined one or more A-B hamlets. To show the Consolidation Zones, we shaded all the 1-kilometer squarer containing C hamlets, plus those squares i,.-edately adjacent to squares containing A, B and 0 hamlets, Finally, we printedl a "D"t, 111, or "V", at the location of the remaining hamlets. The results shown in Enclosures 2-4 (Sep 68) and in Enclosures 5-7 (Oct 69) give dramatic evidence of the relative increase in security in these model areas. Note that some of the D-E-VC hamlets fall withia the boundaries of a Consolidation Zone; this is consistent with the Area Security Concept.

.:

Table 2 summarizes pertinent findings from the maps. It reflects that from September 1968 to October 1969 the Secure Areas of the three model areas nearly tripled in size and the overall Secure plus Consolidation Zone areas increased about 75%. At the same time, the total population under A-B security increased dramatically. By September 1968, 89 or more of the population in the model areas -,erre rated A-B-C. More importantly, pacification scores continued to inmrove even during the second quarter of 1969 when enemy attacks increasel ccm;ared to the preceding three quarters.

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30

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MIR'1J 2

4'

"ECURITY STATXISTICS MODEL AREAS Percent of Total Population (000) 8 Sp 6 Oct 69 327.0 684.2 Population bep 68 Oct 69 35 70 SOJ(? Sep68 'Oc 116

1lth tTAA

I CORPS

69 297

Secure Area

(A, B)
Consoiidation Zone (Secure Area, C) Clearing Zone: 585.7 929.2 62 96 871 1,556

Populated (D, E, VC) Un 'opulated


24th STIZ, T'[ CORPS
Secure Area

352.5 na
48.9

42.0 na
185.4

38 na
19

4 na
61

868 8.248
49

52 8,379
125

(A, B) Consolidation Zone


(Secure Area, C) 31.0 na 40 na 10 na 1,453 16,629 486 17,102 Clearing Zone.: Populated (D, E, unpopulated 43.t DTA. IV CORPS

153.9

274.8

60

90

909

1,403

VC)

101.0 na

Secure Area
(A, B)

/19.8 1,158.5

1,197.4 1,573.2

43 69

68 89

297 2,582

545 3,701

Consolidation Zone
(Secure Area, Clearing Zone: C)

Populated (D, E, VC)


i_

522.8
na

197.0
nu

31
na

11
na

2,133
1,946

815
2,145

Unpopulated Total Populsation, llth Division Tactical area 971,200; Zone 305,800; 41st Division Tactical Area 1,770,200.

24th Special Tactical

We concluded that friendly operations in the model areas had a significant impact on population security, particularly in creating a shield for the population against enemy attacks. Clearing Zone Foi'.es - The forces in the l1th DIA were the lst ARVW Division, 42nd ARVN Regiment respectively, with U.S. combat and service support. successfully executed Clearing Zone type functions responsibility, we used them as models on which to structure. DTA, 24th STZ, and 41st and 9th ARVN division, Since these forces in their areas of base our total AR4V

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31

S3

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The size of the force required Su-_cessfully implement the ASC in each Division Tactical Area and Snecial :-ctical Zone would depend upon many factors, some of which are purel- cua.litative. However, three quantitative factors seem most ipo"rt'n-.: (1) the number and strength of VC/NVA units, (2) the intensity of enezy ground assaults and engagements, and (3) the size of the Clearing Zone in which the force must operate. As a base period for our study we chose the 2nd Qtr, 1969, since during that period the combined forces successfully countered relatively intense enemy activity without degraation of population security. We collected data for the three factors abov.e in all three model areas during that period and used that data in the dencminators (models) for computing a relative threat index in each Corps area. The relative threat index equation has the form:

RTI -- 1/

EIME Corps

#WASLT

ACZ Corps Coros

Model

IAS LT Model

ACZ Model

Where: RTI = relative threat index. EMBE= enemy maneuver battalion strength equivalents (relative to a US battalion). EASLT - enemy ground assauls/engagements. ACZ = area cf clearing zone.

We then collected data on each of the three factors for both a high and a low threat in each Corps Zone and computed the indices. The indices were multiplied by the number of maneuvzer battalions in the model force to yield a range of required maneuver battalions in each Corps Zone.l/ Table 3 summarizes these requirements for each Corps Zone and countryside.

_/

~No qualitative refinements were ,a4e for differences in mobility,


firepower or leadership; and each term in the threat index equation was weighted uniformly even though it was recognized that further study might show one term to be more 4.=ortant than another in assessing a throat. For instance, enemy assaults might be more significant than the size of a Clearing Zone.

"CONFIDENT

R st Available Co-

CONFIDENTIAL
TABIE 3 ARVN /VNMC
%

UkTpTVTE BRA:ATT !bQTrn1-MWRTS

Present

Bnsb-/

RVJ Bns

SUS/F

VN Total RF

Low Threat

High Threat 80-d

I Corps 11

35

34

69

68

SIII
=..IV

Corps
Corps

51
129

63
49

114
49

68
46

8
62e-

SOT
c
d"

L86
leve'ls i

315
lhDA

240

296;

Sondbtr 169 15 tyeactivity 1970.

2cdobtr 969 tp activity levels.

inlthD

2nd Qtr 69 type activity levels in 24th STZ. 2nd Qtr 69 type activity levels in 41st DTA.

On a countrywide basis, 54 ARVN/VNMC maneuver oattallaos more than the present authorization appear necessary to counter the low (Oct 69 level) threat after US/FWMAF withdraw, while 110 battalions might be needed to counter a simultaneous increase of the threat in each Corps to sustained levels at or above the 2nd quarter 1969 enemy activity. In terms of US/ FW1AF battalion streneths to make up the shortfall, this would equate to a range of 42-86 maneuver battalions. _/ Realistically, a simultaneous threat inctease in all Corps is not likely'and the ability to shift battalions to the threatened Corps would decrease the coiutrywide total required. Moreover, variations in ccmbat effectiveness among US,. FWMAF, ARVN and VC/NVA battalions compared to each other (and over time) might also change the range of battalions required. We then combined the maneuver battalion calculations with model Clearing Zoni forces to generate ARVN strength requirements by Corps and countrywide. I Corps Model Force We examined the structure of the ARVN let Division and supporting units during their successful combat operations in the llth Division Tactical Area (11th DTA) between September 1968 and September 1969; and we sought to describe the force in detail and to identify the Corps and U.S. support it 1 received during that pericd. An ATVN battalion is To dpscribe the force we applied the assigned battalion in strength.

.78 X U.S.

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ai... .zation l K'?'1-) (st to the ict Division's organization chart. ._ 8 shows the type units which made- up the 1st Division in the --er-'d exz:nined and the authorized strength for each.

otrengtLh; from the accel2,_rated Pha-se "

We then applied L1kL strengths to the Corps organization chart and allocated one-half of I Corps APRVN support, assets to our 11th DTA model, since the ARVN 1st Division had one-ha1' -- e maneuver battalions assigned to I Corps. / In one exception to this a"ocation we assigned a total of two armored cavalry squadrons bec-Use we tanew tha two squadrons had been operating full time with the ARVI last Division. The Corps force and the portion allocated to the model are also shown in Enclosure 8.
7

4
'

We then studied the Systems i'or the Evaluation of the Effectiveness of RVNAF (SEER) and other data to isclate the support provided the ARVN 1st Division by U.S. units. While cur data was piobably quite exact for artillery, and helicopter suppor: to I Corps and the 1st Division, we could only estimate other support provided, based on such things as after-action reports, communications improvement program targets, total logistics tonnages handled for ARVN, etc. We also tried to take into account the support, such as helicopter lift and resupply, provided ARVN in the normal course of combined mobile operations. (Such support does not show in the SEER data.) Next we attempted to translate this support into individual U.S. units capable of pro ngdin that level of support and we converted those U.S. units into'equivalent ARVIN or VNAF units. Finally, based primarily on the I Corps battalion split, we allocated a portion of ARVN equivalent units to the model Clearing Zone force, and we used the VInk_. equivalents in determining total VAF requirements. These RVNAF equivalents of U.S. support are shown in Enclosure 8. Then, we combined the ARVN 1st Division and its Corps support and U.S. non-aviation support to form a model AR77N/V,1M4C Clearing Zone force for the l1th DTA. The total force and the size of a battalion "slice" of the force are shown in Table 4. Because of the similarity of terrain, enemy, and intensity of operations in I Corps and IIi Corps, we decided to use the same model battalion slice in both I and III Corps.

_/Tventy

of 40, included armored cavalry squadrons.

Best Available Cc,


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-r

9S

*1

CO NFIDENTIAL
TAiILE~~
?d!i.:AREA

r:r. C'.C.fPt' 11th PTA FORrC

MO.!T). L

A1RVO" Di'vJson Force


ARVIT Corpsi Support Comb t Serv ce1
r

17,591

3,372

U.S. Suptprt Equivalent

Combat
Servce . Totl& Division Slice (through Corps)

1. 381
24,561

Battaion Slice a/
3a

1,198

20 battalions in model force including Armd Ca. Sqdns


and Ranger Bn allocations.

In a manner similar to that employed in structuring the I Corps model we, constructed models for II Corps and IV Corps Clearing Zone operations. II Corps Model Force

ARVN Task Force Lien, which was composed principally of the ARVN +42d and 47th Regiments and the ARVNT 2d Ranger Group, conducted the Ben HetDak To campaign in the 24th STZ of II Corpb. We chose Task Force Lien as our model ARVN force for Clearing Zone operations in II Corps because this task force with U.S. combat support operated successfully against strong enemy main force units in II Corps over an extended period, without direct involvement of U.S. combat units. Further, because of a very complete "Lessons Learned" study prepared after the campaign we have a&great deal of information about the size and structure of both the ARVN force and its U.S. combat support. Enclosure 8 details the ARVN force and the U.S. combat support it utilized. It also shows an allocation of ARVN I Corps forces and U.S. service support. The total force and the size of a battalion 'vlice" of the force are shown in Table 5.

"CONFIDENTIAL
35

CONFIDENTIAL
24+th STZ YO:',:~
AI'AVN Rogimental Forces

G,796

AiV'N Cor'ps Support SCombat Service .,U.S. Support Equivalenb Combat


Service
8 89 2,

1,662 365

2,027

"TotalModel Slice (through Corps)


Battalion Slice (11-2/3 Bn) IV Corps Model Force

12,884
1,l04

In IV Corps we chose the ARVI! 9t-h Division because during the period
of the study it started to conduct mobile, Clearing Zone type operations throughout the Delta. AF.VN 9th was also relatively successful, compared with the other IV Corps ARVW divisions, in executing these Clearing Zone The breakdown in Enclosure 8 shows the ARVN 9th Division and functions. The total force and the size of a battalion its Corps and U.S. support. "Itslice" of the force are shown in Table 6. TABLE 6 41ist DTA FORCE MODEL

ARVN Division Force


ARVN Corps Support Combat

13,801

2,128

Service
U.S. Support Equivalent

1 o9

Combat
Service ToLal Model Slice (thro"gh Corps) Battalion Slice (15 Bn) l7(,4Ol ii.60

'1 "FIDENTIAL
36
....... . .+. .. .

CONF'IENTIAL
xmned. all otter ARV[f support assjets assign,'i neither Lo WyealJQ z 3'.pecifftc OWNRruLneuver divisionis nor to the CTZ'a but which would indir"ecotly or directly support division forces. Wnile wre did not allocate these asseb.oto our model forces we identified and cou-nted them and computed a support "slice" which can be addeed to each model division force generated in our study. We computed the support "slice" by apportioning 1/15 of thei unallocated portion of these units to each of the 15 division force Table 7 lays out these division level combat equivalents in the RVWAF.%/ and service support "slices.`.'

TABLE 7
Type Unit Special Zones Staffs Artillery Command Separate Infantry Units Ranger Command Special Forced Military Police Military Security Military Intelligence Political War and Civil Affairu Total Strength

677 49
12,877

.73
3o598 8,094 2,816 2,981 2,950

Signal
Engineer Medical
Quartermaster Transportation

10,216
17,862

10,449
3,875 12,979

Training Base Pipeline


Unallocated Division Combat and Service Support Slice (15 DFE's)

15,138

11,150

Finally, we lumped the GVTI mil 4 .tary offices, the RVNAF headquarters and General Staff, the special staffs, the Central Logistics Comm=and and various other headquarters and administrative units which would not vary greatly with the size of the total fcrce into a Headquarters and Administration figure shown below.

The 15 DFE's include 10 ARVN divisions, lABN division, 3 Letarate regiments, and all Ranger and Marine units.

CONFIDENTIAL
37

COMMF IDE VTIAL


TABLE ,

fRVNAF HQA

ADtMMi

Tne Unit
OGVN Military Officers

trengtb,
1s481

RVwA' Hq/JGS Special Staffs Central Logistics, Command POLVAR Central Dept Eq Units RVMAF Admin Units Total

1,321 is575 4 118 2,116 i,562 7,3.2 19,325

Collectively, the model battalion slices, the unallocated DFE support "slice" and the Headquarters and Administration figure developed above provide the necessary building blocks for estimating the overall size and the disposition by CTZ of ARVN forces required to execute the Area Security strategy. Table 9 summarizes these figures. TABLE 9 'MODEL ARVTT FORCLP. TXrpe Unit Battallon Slice thru Corps I 8&Ill Corps I1 Corps IV Corps Other Support, DFE "slice" Headquarters and Admin Strengt 1,198 1, 04 1,160 11,150 19,325

ARVN Force Requirements In the Clearing Zone Forces section above we developed a range of AmVN/VNmC maneuver battalions required to execute Clearing Zone type operations in each Ccrps (See Table 3). Applying our model battalion "slices" to each CTZ requirement, we generated the following ARVN/VNMC Corps force requxirements.

CONFIDENTIAL
S3

iun
. . ..... ..... '''

8.

Sr
161

iFt D.ENTIAL
TABLE 10

ARVN/VZI,C CORPS REQUIPM-1EWFS

Area

Maneuver Bris High Threat Threat

"L ow*

Strength Low HighThreat Tireat

I Corps II Corps

58 68

69 80

jV
k":,

69,489 74,256

82,662 87,370

III Corps
I'V Corps

68 46

85 62

81,464 0

101,830 19

Tota -- l+-29-627d569

343,72

Considering the end FY 70 AmVN/VNMC force of 186 battalions as 15 division force equivalents (DFE) and assuming that each 1.2 maneuver battalions or major fractions thereof added to the ARVI force will constitute an additional DFf we have a total of 20 divisions for the low threat and 24 for the high threat. Applying our unallocated support slices to these DF''s we have: LOw Threat
I.Unallocat'ed

High Threat

Combat and Service Spt

223,000

267,600

Finally, we added the Headquarters and Administration figure and subtracted Phase II authorized VNMC forces to derive the total ARVN force requirement. TABLE 11 ARVN FORCE

Type Forces Maneuver (Corps) Forces Other Support Forces Headquarters & Admin Forces Less: VUIC (present authorization) Total

Low Threat 278,569 233,000 19,325 (13.070) 5.1-7,824.

High Threat 343,782 267,600 19,325 (13,O70) 617,637

The ARVN force figures developed here are those required to maintain present security after all U.S. and FWMAF forces withdraw. Assuming that the enemy threat range envisioned in this study (1969 levels) remains constant, the AmViT force required to maintain present security levels

CONFIDENTIAL
39 .,, . . ..

CONFIDENTIAL
"5
along; with the plres-nt U.S. and F.'W"AF -",rces (.),rr maneuver battalion3 by N Anril 1.5) i ',, only 2b- 675 for 1lo;.* t, r --!-' for high thv#.at. If we asscxcie that the U.3. and FiM'F forze drcps to about 50 maneuver battalions, the ARWP would need about %-75 for Jow threat and 197,975 for high threat. Consolidation and Secure Zone Forces = We used the 11th DTA model
-675

Vi

for all four Corps areas in determining Regional and Popular Force requirements because the BF and PF in the l1th DTA operated successfully in general agreement with the principles of the ASC. We also chose 2rd Qtr 1969 as the base time period for RF and PF forces since by that time at leasb W1,of the rural population in the llth DTA model area was con-

sidered relatively secure.

Use of the I1th DTA territorial force as a

countrywide model is valid because the index we developed accounts for differences in population distribution and area size, the two most important determinants of PF/PF requirements. The relative requirement index for the Consolidation Zone is similax to the relative threat index for the Clearing Zone but includes the factors of (1) guerrilla and separate VC company and platoon strength, (2) size of the rural "C" population, and (3) size of the computed Consolidation Zone less Secure Areas. "RRIRF IWhere =1/3

Ea
ERUR

Corp a+ RUR "C" Pop Cor. 'C" Pop Model

+A

ACNZ Corp; MMo-d-

RRI w Relative Requirement Index ,STR w Enemy guerrilla and sepszrate unit strength RUR "C" Pop Rural population with "C" 1EB rating = Area of consolidation zone lese secure zone ACNZ

We then multiplied the number cf RF units which maintained security in the model area I/ by this index to calculate the number of RF units needed in each Corps. We calculated the numbers required both to maintain present security conditions (security levels of Oct 69) and to expand security (bringing all D, E, and VC hamlets up to "C" rating). Similarly, we computed the number of PF platoons needed in each Corps Zone both to maintain present security and to expand security. The PF relative requirement index is based on two factors: (1) rural population with C or better HES rating and (2) size of the entire COnsolidation Zone, including the Secure Zone.

RRIFF

RUR ABC Pop Cor_s TACNZ CorpsI TACNZ Model + 1/2 LEUR ABC Pop Model
=

Where TACNZ

total area of Ccnsolidation Zone

ncluding Secure Zone.

1/_/Units assigned to security missions according to the Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES).

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.

10?

Sq,'

CONIFIDENTIAL

Tablo 12 below shows the riuzoer of 1RF companJ.es Ean- PF platoi.Ls ne,'Jerl by Corps Zone and country-wide. It appears that presently there are m:ore than ernoUgh companies countrywide to meet expanded security requirements. Since Territorial Forces cannot be shifted from one Corps area to another, however, special attention should be given to the RF now assigned. to In these two Corps, present security missions in I Corps and IV Corps. levels appear to be too low (IV Corps) or marginally adequate (I Corps) to iAiuitain present security. Similarly, present levels of PF in IV Corps are just above the minimum required to maintain present security, and for expanded security, 62 more platoons would be needed. We note that IV Corps traditionally keeps a larger percentage of RF companies on offensive operations than the other three Corps. TABLE 12 ,

REGI0DAL FORCE COMPANy/POPULAR FC1CE PLATOON REQ;UIREMNTS Present No.-/ of Units No. On No to Retainb/ Security Livels No. to AchieveC/ Expanded BecurityA

Security Mission

=F
I Corps 212 920 171

PFP~ R~P
863 169

F
743

R1
183

PP
863

II Corps

359 372 530

1311 1028 2413

291 310 307

1266

237

1121 803

261 153

1268
835 2475 5441

(.

IlI Corps
IV Corps

965
2154 5248

148
380 934

20o4 4671

465
1062

SVN

1473

5672 1079

SDecember
bJ

19'69 for PF platoons, November 1969 for RF rifle companies. October 1969 BES ratings. All Ds, E, VC hamlets are brought to a "c" rating.

While the number of RF companies available countrywide is some 400 more than required for expanded security, some of these companies would b- engaged in training ad rehabilitation, whtle other units woutld act as a "swing force" to assist regular forces during periods of high enemy threat (such as the IV Corps situation); still others are required for border surveillance missions on a more or less permanent basis.. Recent GVN directives and comments by President Thieu indicate an apparent modification to the Area Security Concept as presently written, specifically in the formation of an elite PSDF force to replace PF platoons in A, B, ancl C henalets during 1970. This program envisions formation of 35-man inter-teana (platoons) from the 500,000 arms-bearing PBDF and training four men per team (60,000 in all) in one week courses. If this program is successful the end result could provide substantial

"

CONFIDENTIAL 41

I"
ror ren-la ti-

CONFIDENTI AL
tz relcladLCd by tile

;17pltoonr,.
Total WA

have not inci&:e.

u-;acd of' thsplan in cm, IRF/Pl-

v0uxr

foxce. strucoture devel.opment has concentrated on MIVN) 1R' and RF. In determining a total RWIAF Force St~ructuxre, wre assume tha a VNTN and. VN~MC of about 37,900 and 13,400 respectively, by end FY 73-is appropriate. To determine the strength for the WAIF -we took the Phase 11 authorized strength of 35,800 and added the Corps wide projection of the strengths of the Army helicopter and fixed-wing u~nlts which supported the model AENforces (see Enclosure 8). This resu~e.i J~. faot5,0 to support the maneuver battalions in &. low intensity threat and 57,100 to support them for a. high threat. Zhi.a large T.F would be able to provide the expand~ed ARVNI/VN4C combat farces with the same level of he).icopter and fixed-wing support that the model forces received from the U.S. SVN =%npower and U.S. fisoal constraints, however, would probably obviate building a VMIF of this oie The requirement for ARVN forces generated in Thable 11 would of' course vayy wi.th changes In enemy threat and activity and would decrease if the .?~ began to assume some of the Clearing Zone tn.e. xxissions which are envisioned as AIRVN responsibilities in the Area Security Concept. Ignoring tlhese possible variations for the moment, the tota. Regula~ir Force. requirement would be as showni below.

VIET.WESE flEGitAR FORCE REUREET Personxel - 00 Authorized Phase II Low Threat High Threat

ARV1N
VNN VNCIvI

395.8
3.37 13.1

507.8

617.6 37.9
i14.4~

13.4+

VAF
Total

35.8
477.8 6u1.4

57727.0

2J'These ftirce levels. oxav,. been requested both by MACV and JGS in recent doeumenti;.

CONFIDENTIAL ............... ............

104,

CONFIDENTIAL
In the section on territorial forces we determined the nwaber of RF compannies and PF platoons rneeded by Corps Zone to maintain present levels of security and to achieve expanded levels of security. Using an RF company strength of 123 personnel and a PF platoon strength of 35 personne.l and using existing RF and PF overhead strength percentages of 3V3% and 11i, respectively, we computed total RF/PF requirements countrywlde ._/

TABLE 14 RF/P FR EjuIP~ I;t-ersoxnel-OO)


Authorized Phase II. Regiontl Force 275.7 Present Becurity 253.7 Expanded Security 288.6

Popular Force ~rt1515.1

23.4-2. 453.4 521.2

In order to determine a total RVNAF, we added the regular forces required under period of low threat to the RF/1PF needed for expanded security, since hopefully security will continue to expand during periods On This yields an RVNAF of 1,132,600 personnel. of low enemy activity. the other hand, during periods of high enemy threat, F/FF would more than likely be attempting to maintain present security. This yields an The present end FY 73 authorization for the total RVNAF of 1,18o,.Oo. Subsequent force structure requests have RVNAA (Phase II) is 992,900. indicated a desire for up to 1,100,000 personnel.

TAh3M 15 TOTAL RVNA' (Pirsonnel 000) Phase 11 Regular Forces


Territorial Forces

Low Threat 611,4


541.2

ghThreat 727.0

477 .8
555.1

Total

992.9

1132.6

1180.4

-/

In addition we added 27% of the RF total and 7% of the PF total to account for units not on security missions.

*'.5 ~

CONFIDENTIAL
I

L 14 TI A E ON FID C
"4').
Corilu~io,i,

I.

Our study has generated a req'ire.eA.t for a 1.13 to 1.18 million

RVTAF to implement the Area Security Cor.:;eyt successfully under threat levels existing throughout 1969 and with no U.S. or FWMAF combat'forces
This compares to an approve:! end FY 73 RVMAF of 0.99 million in-country. (Phase 11) and subsequent requests for up to 1.10 million from the JCS. Current manpower surveys indicate that the 1.10 million level is attainable. 2.

"operate in

1969 levels, (2) all U.S. and F;-r,,!kF units are redeployed and (3) that
The present no provisional RF battalions operate in the Clearing Zone. RF contains about. 400 companies that are not used on security missions. Some of these can be employed to assist the ARVN in the Clearing Zone. By utilizing 40 RF battalions (160 companies) the total ARVN required This would in (without US/FWMAF) would be 200 to 256 battalions. turn :educe the total ARVN required from 517.8-617.6 thousand down to 427.8-547.9 thousand. These strengths compare with authorized and requested strengths as shown below.

The requirement for from 240 to 296 ARU/VN/ C battalions to the Clearing Zone considers that (1) the threat remains at

ARVN STRENGTH (Personnel-COO) Authorized Phase 11 Low Intensity Threat iHigh Intensity Threat
Sa

QkSD(SA) O.SD(SA)&/ Projected Modified 517.8 617.6 427.8

MACV Requests-' 517.3 517.3

395.8

395.8

547.9

Forty RF battalions utilized in the Clearing Zone to assist ARVN. W/is strength has not been approved.

3. Additional RVNAW forces will be needed in each Corps Clearing The precise Zone after U.S. units withdraw unless the threat diminishes. number of maneuver battalions required, hcwever, should incorporate qualitative adjustments based on differences in effectiveness and mobility Further, since the size ARVN, and VC/NVA battalions. between US/FWMAP, of the ARVN is a function of the three criteria iti the Relative Threat Index any modifications of the index (for instance, to reflect differences in relative importance (weighting) of the factors) w'ill change the requirement.

4I. Our required RF/PF forces, from 453.4 to 521.2 thousand compare
favorably with the 515.1 thousand (approved for end FY 73 Phase I1) and If Territorial subsequent requests for up to 544.2 thousand from the JCS. Forces (RF/PF) operate as the ASC requires, there are sufficient RF rifle

companies countrywid3 to bring all D, F, and',VC hamlets to a C rating

(expanded security) when the main force security situation permits access !t least 62 more PF platoons, however, will be needed to these hamlets.

CONFIDENTIAL
m-........v
fi .... ... 4.> .>> .4 4vM2NL Lf
' .......

It

CONFIDENTIAL
in .IV Corps under conditions of' expande". security. It wor.td be reasonable to employ any excess RF units in portions of the Clearing Zone near their homes rather than to create more regular units.
,. We made no attempt to evaluate the Peoples' Self Defense Force (PSDF) as an effective force in the Secure Area primarily because we have very sketchy information about them. However, it is expected that the effect of at least the armed PoDF woUdl release some PF platoons now on security or other type missions. This in turn would generate additional PF units for security expansion or consolidation; these were not included in our calculations . The apparent GVN change in strateyr with regard to ?SDF in 1970 will also impact on the regular forces, since more Ra Ltnits will be made available for employment in the Clearing Zone. This in turn will reduce the requirements for ARVN units.

41

6. Re-calculation of threat and requirement indices should be made at least every 4-6 months, particularly where PSDF employment changes the ABCstro. y

i,.

CONFIDENTIAL

TFRAN-01OSY

FOR ARE~A

SECURITY
.. . . .. * .~

....

...

...

..

...........
.. .. ... .. . .. .. .....

............ c(SOM SOLI o~cvc~...CO ATIO~~,~,PPU


P............'

ZONE IlCeAIN

S...

.W .. .......

YE

ZONE AREAS HZON

RFBR~iLA

TERM REPNIS RATING~~

VV 4v
QUANG TRI

THUA THIEN

LEGEND
SECURE ZONE 1A+5)
CONSOLIDATION ZONE (C+AWJACEN I 1K1M)

L~CLEARING

ZONE

Enclosure 2

CONFIDENTIAL

AIL

SOUTH VIETNAM
11th DTA SEPTEMBER 1968

Iv

THUA THIEN

u*aO

I ..........

L"vW'1lj

COHFIDENiTIAL

ntI

fl4UA THIEN

LEGEND
SECURE ZONE CA+B) CON6OLIDAYION ZONE (CeADJACENT I KM)

~JCLEARING ZONE

CONFIDENTIAL
Enclosure 34811

SOUTH VIETNAM
11th DTA OCTOBER 1969

~15

ilk. .

k-

LUa

CONFININT1AL

SOUTH VIETNA,"A
24th

SrZ

SEPTEMBER 1968

KONTUM

V v
v Vo v v

.Z

CNOIrO IVV

N0 LO

U CONIDNTAL1
Enc~osLEGEND

dq

CONFIDENTIAL

SOUTH VIETNAM
24Ah

srz

OCTOPIR 1969

KONTUM

PLEIKU

CONFIDENTIAL
. . .

CONFIDENIlAL

AN

IAN

SADE

LEGEND
SECURE ZONE CA+B)

CONSOLIDATION ZONE
(C+ADJACENr I KM) CLEARING, ZONE

-~~

CONFIDENTIAL

,..

SOUTH VIETNAM
41 st DTA
'1SADCEC

SEPTEMBER 1968
v 0 04

VINH

LON

*.a

vv
Wvv v,

I'

V.

1.

CONFiDENTIAL

(CIDJCN I*~KM)

SLECUREN ZONE(A)

7
I.

SOUTH VIETNAM
~

41st DTA

SA DEC

OCTOBER 1969

EjI

VINH L1N
~

jI.v

LW

-2

j....

CONFIDENTIAL
NMODEL CLEARING ZONE FORCES, ARVN

Type Unit I CTZ


Division Forces

Number II CTZ 7 1
-

IV CTZ 12 1 1
1 1

Unit Strength I CTZ II CTZ IV CTZ

Strength Allocation a/ I CTZ II CTZ IV CTZ Type Unit 11,305

Infantry Bn Arm'd Ca- Sqdn


Div Recon Co. Hq Inf Div Hq Co. Hq Inf Rgmt STZ HHC

17 1
1 1 1

665 693
1 1i
208 124 200
-

665 693
-

665 693
ill 208 124 200
-

693

4,655 693
400 187

7,980

1ll 208
124 800
-

693 Ii
208
124 600
-

U.S. Supn Arty 175 Arty 8"1 Arty 155


Arty 105 Air Def
Arty Cmd

4
-

2 1

3
-

Rgmt Recon Co. Div Arty Arty Bty (2 pit)


Scout Co.

1
-

1
-

3 1
-

ill 1,577
-

187 123 142


-

ill 1,577
-

444 1,577
-

ill 123

333 1,577
-

Combat R Equi
Sig Spt.

I 3

426
-

Eng Bn Eng Co.

I 1

437 -

1.03
-

437 -

437 -

437
-

103
-

Sig Co. Truck Co

DO Bn
Sig Dn
Med Bn

1
-

1
1
1 -

666
378
488

666
378
488
-

666
378
488

666
378
488 -

Port Ter Dir pt


Med Det.

Me4 Co Lfght Trk Co. Mil Band


Scout Dog Pit

1 .

1 I Div Augment_/ Division Forces Total Corps Forces Arm'd Cay Sqdn Corps Hq Arty 155 Bn Arty 105 Bn 2 1 3 2

1 1 1 -

152 29
25

98
-

152 29
25

152 29
25

98
-

Equi GRAN Mode U.S. Sum Air Cav AssIt HE Asslt S1 Aerial l Recon C4

152 29
25
-

154

154 17,591 C/ 7292-/ 287 810 501

6,796

13,801 233 182 517 320 40 '2,129

2 1 1 -

1 1 3 2

729 573 540 501

729 573 54o -

729 573 540 501

4620J 196 142e-/ 124 96 863 151 62 1,172

Ranger Bn

4
1 1 1 1

655
124 280 2,517 440 180

655
124 280 2,517 44o 180

655
'124 300 2,517 440 180

983
62 3,372 140 1,258 220

fn 836 1,9651/

Avn
Surv. Cc VNA1

1 1 Ranger Gp Hq Corps Combat Support Total 1 1 Area Log Cmd 1 1 Engr Gp (Combat) 1 1 Corps Sig Bn I Med Grp Corps Service Support Total

140 7 1,096

803

96 e One All Sinc

h U.S.

allocated to model forces Except where noted otherwise Corps and U.S. support forces on basis of model force battalions/total Corps battalions split. I CTZ-20/40; II CTZ12/35; III CTZ-15/47. b Includes Radar Section (16), Direct Support (98) and Signal (40) augmentations. Two ACS 4 s operated with ARVN ist, we assume one was organic and the other assigned full time from I Corps. / 3rd ACS and 14th ACS (-) operated with TF Lien; 1 squadvon organic, 2/3 squadron

_________________there

!_

/ U.S. helo Incil U.S. est (curi Mode

,/

_/ i/

allocated here.

CONFIDENTIAL
53

15 bi

Enclosure 8

Best Available Cop1is

i'
ST~pe Unit Number ARVN Lcviiv. Streth Strength Allocation

I CTZ U.S. Support Arty 175 Bn 2

It CTZ

IV CTZ

I CTZ

I1 C-Z

V,CTV
-

I CTZ

II QTZ
-

IV CTZ
-

Arty 8" Bn
Arty 155 Bn Air Def Bn

1
-

540

5401/
2
--

54o

138

270
226

270 j h/
27

Arty 105 Bn Arty Cmd Post Combat Engr Bn


Sig apt Lp.

1
1

4+
-

1 1
2- / 1 1 1
1

501 690 122

123
-

126 500
122 122

3h5
-34

532E/ 126in/

5!0-/
1,381 -1-,r-

Equiv. U.S. Combat Support Total (ARVN)

Z.,
'

Sig Co. -' Truck Co. -/ S ort Term/Boat Co/ Dir,Spt Co.

1
I-

MeaDet.

1 1 1 1

Equiv. U.S. Service Support Total GRAND TOTAL Model ARVN Force Model ARVN Battalion SliceI/
SSuwrt

226 168 200 302


-

226 168 200 302 -

226 168 200 302 30

113 84 100 151


-

61

280 58

42

69

64

39 85 54 96 3

104 553 12,884 1,.4 177h/ 300n4 lOO)EI


-

509 24,561 1,198

17,401 1,160 271 551 85 80 79 96 2


84

.ifr Cav Sqdn Asalt Helo Co. Asalt Spt Co. Aerial Wpn Co. Recon Co. Avn Bn EW Bury. Co, VNAF Equivalent

1 4 2
-1

11+ 11

1 6 1

2 1 3 2 11 of U.S. Helo Support

VX850 Equiv. Stro 177 288 300 268 100 123 123 100 331 150

th 85o 288 268

250

123

100
331

425 576 268 123 501,773


86

46 7
58

"VNAW Helo
pj

Support per Battalion

./ v h
I

One 155 bty plus 2 platoons of another. All 3 Ranger Battalions in I1 Corps operated with TF Lien. Since ARVX will have no 8" howitzers, 155 Bn substituted here. U.S. combat support for 1I CTZ model derived from actual unite in support of TF Lien, therefore entire strength allocated to model.
U.S. now providing about 2 Co. equivalents of signal support to each Corps during

4.

helo assaults, otherwise most divisions self sufficient. Incluies 3 signal detachments with TF Lien. k/ U.S. now providing some surface transport, primarily port service and truck; strength
estimates based on number of U.S. units required to handle 20S of RVNAF tonnage

SModel force contained 20-1/2 batWalions in I CTZ, 11-2/3 oattalions in I1 CTZ, and
15 battablions in IV CTZ.

(current figure in I CCE).

12U
. .

rC (
CONIDEN.flMTIA'JIUII~L

It+

A Gr, I PE~OPLE 'SAIMVY

A recent RAND study explored a people's arm concept for South Vietnam as
a way to reduce the burden of their large militaryj structure. Noting that the Vietnamese have historioaZly used this concept to cope with protracted war,

the stud 1 oonoZude: that:

- Aa US support declines, reorganinationof the GVN force structure is ~inevitable. A systematic demobitixation concept now may prevent disruption

'

later, after manpower and economic stresses have mounted to intolerable ZetuZs. ij The'erritoriaZForces (RP/PF/PSDF) could be used as a nucleus for ephasing into a people's army over the next five or six years, with Zarge

regular force reductions only in the later stages.


Our exanination of the pertinent data shows:

I.

- RAP can find the manpower to sustain the current foroo, but muot dip into their manpower reaerves and incur large costs to the economy.

( "burden
}:Leas

:- OW force inoreasee since 1068 have trended toward a peopZe's armny in fact, if not in name; the proposed nucZeus now aicounts for over M0r of a4Z ground forces in RW?? and has grad-oZZl assumed the bulk of the defensive since mid-1969.
than 20% of the f3otal RMeAF budget goes to the Rr//DF, even

though has been a major factor in providing security, contain.this 50, joroe of the miZitaroy manpower, oustains half ofpopulation all ,VN combat deatho and contributes nearly 40% of the enemy XrA. Moreover, only $2.5 biltion (about 20%) of the total var cost it aalocated to territorialsecurity.
i,

"The moat compelling arumont for the peopIeos ary is that the Vietnamese arehis alreadU moving in four thatyear direction. President has announced ~to C, Ltnob a new plan which he willThieu send reportedly to the NationaZ Assembly
shortly after his inaupuration. to a peoporm ,s mnyd noted above.

His plan strongly resembles the phaoed approach

Gradual mothment toward a streamlined regular force which can deploy its unite u o any threatened area, coupled with devaopment of the PF/PP/PSDFinto a defenri. force should be acceptable to the US and Gt/:
- It offers the US a chance to reduce the apparent 02-3 billion dollar floor on war costs with a etsser risk 'to US interests in SIN. -

Pfoffers the &WN an opportunity to rovitalixe its economy and become

leso dependt on outside support without grave risks to their security.

S-s-aeema

The military eituation, combined with economic and manpower realities, favors a shift in sriorities. The abhft need not be abrvpt-the three phaie plan to provide a reasonable transition in the time fr~ane envisaged by T'rcnident Thieu. We believe Vietnamece initiative in this direction should be encoturaged and oupported. But the initiative Mhould remain with them.

121 ' i---r--i-~... .. .. ............... 'V ' '...


...
I...*I.'* .,-i "I ''"..~.. '"'' I

CONFIDENTIAL
A GVN_ PEOPrL

Among the serious problems whizh '., hibit improvement in RVNAF quality
productive role in Vietnamese society--a state of mind conducive to desertion but whigh a term of serviize -igh-t alleviate,

is their continued high desertion rates. The average RVNAF soldier nowstof faces endless military service with little hope of resuming an active and

, . ,]

The RAND Corporation has explored in detail the concept of a people's army for South Vietn,..!/ The concept not only includes a term of service but also discusses the politic&., economic, and social costs of the QVN's large military structure. We felt it would be useful to summarize"

the RAND work and then explore the problem further, The People's Army..

S....

Research into Vietnam's cultural and military history shows much historical precedent for their current problem of maintaining an adequate military force without stifling the country's economy. Historically, Viet-

namese wars have:

-- Been prolonged conflicts Involving the general populace, with no clearly defined end. -- Ebbed

and flowed in the military, political, and economic arenas.

The struct-fre of thd ptesent MVkAF regular forces is better suited to fight a conventional western style war than to cope with a protracted struggle. When US aid is inevitably reduced or withdrawn, the GVN will have to adjust its force structure. Their reorganization alternatives seem bounded by the following grim choices:
-- Demobilization to a force size their manpower and economy can Ssuo . This alternative risks a reduction below the level needed to meet ithe threat, and the influx of unemployed veterans on an already burdened economy could create additional social unrest leading to renewed insurgency. -- Retention of the present f:rce structure. This alternative carries the 6ager that the country will crack under the weight of its own military investment rather than fro- enemy pressure At best it may survive only as an economically and socially stunted garrison state.

Within these bounds, there is an alternative which draws on Vietnamese traditions--an elite and mobile regalar force backed up by a people's army-an army which bears most of the defensive burden and also functions as a productive social unit.
"
r

A Penple's Army for South Vietr.s=: A Vietnamese Solution. November 1971 (Preliminary draf-i, Brian Jenkins.

R-897-ARPA,

SCONFIDENTIAL
2

122

CO N FIDENrIAL
.11
!i.deetroling

The r EtuC`y :ontenrs th,,t the GVN cannot postpone demobitlization, economic stabilization and growth, and political stability to some postwar er& that -or:bably won't come, or if it did, wouldn't be recognized.
RVIN.A-, then, the GVN's most and a efficient institution, The problem is how to iohasive move toward people's national army without

The 6tudy concedes that... "The argument that a people's army is less burd~nsome on the economy has little merit if it cannot also defend the country." Three phases of development are suggested over the next six years, with large reductions in the regular ground units only in the later stages:
%:" -- Initial Phase L1972-73). During this period the program for

!developed,

-a people's arv wouldbe established. Using the territorial forces (RF/FP/ PSDF) as a but nucleus, the command structure tactical doctrine be only minor reduction of the and regular, ground forces would (about 10,000)would be involved. Additionally, a rotational reserve system (term of service) and military fartaing coloniesJ/ are instituted.
-Second Phase (1973-75). Additional measures can be taken to expand and increase the effectivness of the people's army based on evalu-

ations of the initial phase.

Limited demobilization (20-25%) of the

regular ground forces begins, and regular units not involved in combat uhdertake some reconstruction and development tasks.
-Third Phase (beyond 1975). The people's army gradually assumes a greater defensive role as the regular army is reduced to around 200,000. This force would be organized as mobile brigades, capable of deploying to any part of the country.

Th3 gist of the argument is that:


-Reorganization of the GVN force structure is inevitable. A systematic demobilization concept now may prevent a highly disruptive process later, after manpower and economic stresses have mounted to intoler-

able levels. 7 -- The organizational impant of moving toward a people's aray could bp minimized by using the Territorial Forces (RF/PF/PSDF) as a nucleus. Based on data available in Washington, we have examined these points.

Our major findings follow.


_2 Military farming colonies (Don Dien) are created by giving demobilized soldiers land in less secure areas which they would farm, defend, and eventvally own. These colonies would provide a btffer between populated areas and enemy units which have been forced into uninhabited regions.

CONFIDENTIAL
,,i3 i

CONFIDENTIAL
"and Economic Tmm],icatizr.
estimates SConsidering from sev.Je-. sourceso we conclude that 115-150,000 18 year olds are prcba.Uy available for military service physically fit These sources also indicate: each year in South Vietnam, residual SA of about 200,C00 men who are physically fit, have not been drafted for various reasons.
--

but

About one million men aged 31-45 not up to RVNAF fitness Sstandards, but who could serve in noncombat tasks.

)~

lDuring FY 71, a year of relatively high losses from croassborder operations, RVXAF assi ned strength increased by nearly 42,000. The total potential losses combat deaths, seriously wounded, missing, and uet

desertions) sufferAd. by RV1NAF during this period was about 227,000, while
personnel gains (recruiting and oonscription) amounted to more than 225,O00. This indicates that RVNAF was able to replace its net losses and incrqase assigned strength during FY 71 by some combination of the foll owing:v/
--

Extracting up to 100,000 from the residual manpower pools


(Assuming they obtained about 125,000 incoming 1 year olds.)

mentioned above.

-Recovering an unknown, but probably substantial, number of regular force deserters who later join territorial forces near their homes. .Net desertions account for 137,000 oP the 227,000 potential losses. -Returning some of the seriously wounded and missing (about 68,000 during FY 71)to duty, or alternatively, not dropping them from the

assigned strength figures.


-- Recruiting some of the Hoi Chanh(there were 27,000 Hoi Chanh during FY 71, and a yearly average of 20,000 since 1963). Although the data seems to show that RVTTAF will be increasingly hard pressed to find replacements, experience of the past four years warns against making a firm conclusion that a manpower shortage exists.
-RVNAF has expanded over 701 since 1967 in the face of such pessimistic assessments.

The GVN can regulate zenpo'wer flows by manipulating policy (lowering standards, cracking down on draft dodgers and deserters, refusing deferments, etc.).
--

g ains from CMl'G conversicn: M/ RVNAF about equal during FY 71.

en losses to the Ilatlonal Police were

CONFIDENTIAL
li !

12

ibi
:. '

-,.ENTIAL
does stuggest thd- RVNAF ex-panslou t,.n replarcement of'' S.... the da.tst :Sti.ll, fit 18 year olds and_. virtually all of the physically lozbe2 has absorbed substantial numbers of skilled civilians already in the production base2/f/

'

We therefore conclude that there is no demonstrable manpower shortage per so, but that the GVN has to resort to deficit manpower spending to RAF--thereby adversely affecting social aid economic productivity, maintaiRVn an effect more likely to mount than to decline. A In economic terms, the OVN shoulders a mounumental defense burden. 1968 international study of 26 cointries revealed that South Vietnam's relative defense expenditures (percent of GNP) were exceeded only by Israel. The US, USSR, and China ranked well below South Vietnam, and 19 In the of the 26 countries had percentages less .than half that for RVN. last five years: The GVN has devoted 15-17%of its -total budget to defense. ONp and over

60%o of its

-- Revenues and foreign aid have more than doubled, but have not kept pace with inflation and expenditures.

Yet the GVX has borrn" only 3-7% of the total war cost in the.past In FY 71 the US,.picked up $14 billion (93%) of the $15.1 three years. billion total cost, spending :2! .. of which air and general support billion). ($7.5 two-thirds forces accounted for
--

$11.3 billion on US forces,

$2.7 billion on RVNAF, including US advisors and their the GVN support, MASF, and $115 million joint support funding through
--

budget.

Particularly-since we have not allowed for any VC recruitment from the manpower pool, .2/ Although no estimates are currently available concerning the maximum size of RVNAF which could be sustained and stAlU assure economic growth, DA Pamphlet 55o-40, Area Handbopk for Vietnam-1962, estimated that manpower in RVNAF should not exdeed 550,000 if mid-1962 economic levels A linear extrapolation based on current populawere to be maintained. tion-would impose a comparable limit for RVNAF of about 700,000. 6_/ Vietnam Program Budget data, which records the amount actually spent in 17Y 71, even though the item might have been budgeted in FY 69 or 70. This is particularly applicable for equipment deliveries to RVNIAF, some "of which have long lead times. Tnese are total costs, not incremental S/

costs,

CONFIDENTIAL

125

UI

CONFIDENTIAL
In the short run (through FY 73) it appears that the GVN'W economic health depends on the US spending some $2.0-2.5 billion yearly on RVIMAY
plus another $0.5 billion in economic aid--a total Vietnam cost floor

of $2.5-3,0 billion,
M1'j' 'I. UP.-- The GVN funds only about $1.1 billion (301,/) of the current URV1AF cost. They would have to allocate nearly 65% of their GNP to absorb the entire load.
-- The total cost to the US will depend on the level of air and general support forces required for continued military security.

Beyond FY 73 the US cost floor should decrease, since relatively few equipment deliveries to RVNAF are scheduled for that period. This cost floor is also dependent on the level of conflict and GVN's ability to maintain their current contribution. ; 'It appears that without a US spending floor of some $3 billion in South Vietnam, their economic outlook is indeed dismal. Yet even this level may not be enough to provide adquate military security. Moreover, their GNP growth rate from 1967-1969 was about equal to the annual rate inflation. This failure to achieve a real increase in economic well being may be traceable to the manpower situation discussed earlier. The Nucleus
-

"d

,of

Present Size and Capability

We examined the point that the RF/PF and PSDF already embody many characteristics of a people's army and could be the nucleus for such an organization. Although it could be argued that strength distributions in the GVN Military Regions primarily reflect.the nature of the threat and population density for that region, overall GVN force increases since early 1968 have nonetheless

trended toward a PeoPle's ar'

in fact, if not in name:

-- P increases have been twice as large as those for ARVN/VNMC (both entered--1- 8 with about 300,000), while paramilitary strength is about the same. -- _The PSDF, non-existent prior to Tet 1968, now number 4.4 million, ilicluding some 490,00 Key Interteam (KIT) personnel who are nearly equivalent to the PF in organizational cohesiveness. Our subsequent discussion therefore "includes only the KIT PSDF.

Except in ME I, RF/P1F strength is clearly dominant among the ground forces and they comprise more than half the total RVNAF strength in the country. Moreover, the combined RF/PF/KET PSDF nucleus accounts for over 70" of all ground forces, At the Military Region level their proportion of total ground forces

varies as follows!

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

I.

--

MR 1II: 73%
MR M~IV83% 35%

--

Saigon Area:

Thus, the proposed nucleus already has the most ground force strength in all areas except Saigon. We next examined operational data to assees its cap-

ability.
Our investigation supports the contention that the nature of the war has changed considerably since 1968. Characteristics of this chaage are:
--

enemy comb

First half 71 data shows both friendly and A decline in intensi. have decreased 50-60%from comparable Vietnam South in aths

1968 data.
The net effect of the enemy strategy -- Enemy Activity Patterns. change in mid-1959 (COSVN 9) was a greater enemy emphasis on selective targeting and economy of force tactics.

"dents shows:

defensive burden on the rZ/PF. Comparing the same periods A -i igreater from enemy ground attacks and total incifor 1969, 1970, and 19i71, friendly MKA
- Increasing RF/PF KIA and either unchanged or dec-lining paramilitary/ civilian deaths.

- Declining US/FW KIA and dither unchanged or declining GVN regular KIA. Since the people's army would eventually take over much of the country's defense we looked at the PF/PF during the period they were gradually assuming greater defensive responsibilities (since mid-1969). We founa no evidence of deterioration in their overall performance.
-. Nearly 40% of the toal enemy KIA in South Vietnam were attributed to the RF/PF in 1971, up from 20% in 1970 and 10% in 1969 (comparable periods).
-- The enemy to friendly KIA ratio showed an initial sag in GVN effectiveness against enemy ground attacks in 1970, followed by a partial recovery

in 1971.
--

The country's 1S A-B security rating rose more than 35 percentage

points (from 50% in mid-1969 to 85% in mid 1971), together with a 15% reduction in paramilitary/civilian deatths since 1970.

CONFIDENTIAL
7
.I

1 1

CONFIDENTIAL
Th'e extent to which continued gcci ;erforr-nce is dependent on the regular force shield behind which nF/PF and PSDF onerate is not easy to determine. Events of the past two years in 2,s IIII e.ni IV, however, indicate that this shield does not have to be nearby in order to be effective. Nowhere else has the war changed more dramatically; main force conflict by battalion size units has virtually disappeared in MR's III a.nd III except near remote base areas or in Cambodia. Yet in the two MRs combined:
-RF/PF and paramilitary units accounted for about 60% of the enemy KIA and 70% of the friendly KIA during 1971. -HES A-B security ratings ha;'e continued to progress and are now the highest in the country.

On the other hand, RF/PF in southern mR I and northern M II have demonstrated some sensitivity to the presence or absence of regular forces. The turbulence caused by the departure of US Marines and later shifts of US Army units appears to have contributed to declines in RF/PF performance this year, while, in MR II, the RF/PF have not yet attained performance levels which would allow regular forces to free themselves from the populated areas. Overall Evaluation and Observations We find the major thrust of the People's Army concept to be persuasive. The data suggest that it warrants serious zcnsid.eration by both the Vietnamese and the US as a means to reduce defense costs wthout excessive security risks.
-Without such a change, of about $3 billion for years.

the UzS =ay be faced with an expenditure floor

-The Vietnamese are at present hard pressed to accommodate the war cost even with such a US support level end have had to borrow against their future manpower productivity.

It would appear that current spending is out of balance with the chan ed nature of the war. Less than 20p of the total RVNAF budget goes to the RF/PF -a force which has been a major factor in providing population security, contains 50% of the military manpower, sustains LO_,.O,% of all GVN combat deaths (including civilians) and is contributing nearly 405 of enemy KIA in the country. Moreover, only $1.5 billion (about 10%) of the total war cost is allocated to territorial

security.

The suggested movement toward a people's army does not call for large regular force reductions in the initial st-ages. Our own analysis recognizes two factors which support a measured and selective reduction of regular forces.
-Events of the past year show that there are limitations on where ARVN troops can be deployed which render it less a national army than a federation of four semi-autonomous corps. ?.egular units operating out of their normal MRs for long periods begin to suffer se-:'ere morale problems leading to increased desertion rates.

CONFIDENTIAL

128

CONFIDENTIAL
GVI N1P -- The change in the nature of the war has differed ivnong thk. and until thz: regulur force becomes truly national, it is the MR, not the couritrywide, threat which should dictate the appropriate force distribution betw,en regulars and non-regulars. The. most comelling argument for the reople's army is that the Vietnese

are 9.ready moving in that direction.

President Thieu reportedly hes

oa.unv'ed

a new four year plan recently to his Cabinet, which he will send to the National Assembly shortly after his inauguration. The key elements of the pla, which strong!y resemble the three phased approach to a peoplets army, a~ret intensity of the war will continue to decline and the policy of -The GVN is to develop and reconstruct the nation while the fighting is dlminichingo
-Defense policy must be based on the people's self defense. country cannot continue with over one million men in the armed forces.

Sthe
P

The Even

after peace, the OVX must have the concept of the people with a gun in one hand anda alow in the other.
--

The armed forces cannot be reduced suddenly because of economic

)N'.

beginning 300,000 reduced will forces regular but the disruptions, per yearin 50,000 byto about be be reduced will strength Force 974. The P~opular 3.,!

over a three year period beginning in 1972, while the Regional Force and National Police will remain at their current strength.
Some Vietnamese apparently feel that the liklihooca of US resistance to We would the people's army will be a strong impediment to its implamentation. relucta4nce "agree Ghat in the field and in Washington there is an tunderetandable at the to undertake major organizational changes, which can breed inactivity

operational level while the power elite jockey for positions in the new hierarchy. One GI`N minister has reportedly suggested that some aspects could begin now in MR III and IV. We think the suggestion has merit:
--

Enemy main forces in both MRs have fragmented into company and

platoon size since 1970.


-- By the end of the forthcoming 71-72 dry season we Ooild be better able to evaluate the residual capability of enemy units in the MR IV base areas and those adJAcent to MR III in Cambodia.

We conclude that the military situation, combined with economi.- and manpower favors a shift in priorities. The slift need not be abrupt -- the three phase plan seems to provide a reasonable transition in the time frame envisaged by President Thieu. We believe Vietnamese Initiative in this direction should be encouraged and supported. But the initiative should remain with them.

Salities,

A Cradual movement toward a streamlined regular force which can effectively aeploy its units to any threatened area, coupled with an expansion of the RF/PF/ PSDF into a cohesive force for defense shovuld be acceptable to the US and th. GVN.*
--

It

offers the US a chance to reduce the apparent $2-3 billion dollar

floor on war costs with a lvsser risk to US interests in the area.


* offers the CVN an opportunity to revitalize its economy and become -- It less dependent on outside support without sacrificing their security. it will 3ilely provide a force tailored specifically to cope with the I-needs of the protracted struggle ahead

S'

N CONFIDENTIAL

12',]

CONFIDENTIAL

'

A !Z".l.l .. it, action involOv'e. st.. c._:55n"".:S, but at ". , or.e .- fir, teem, ena,.-,e in o' .' ..... (ratrols or s ,.e S ht be theA i.n .ere f ... effectiveness of ... r :.~',: 01"' . with the- er.c:: r " . . "r actions. ,7h Itvof the US small unit acticr, dz ~,t ::z; below 13 felt t 1bI fairly gooll ai the reporting system!. is " .. -.. RIV, data, on th-2 oth.r hand,, i.-' a less use-Ifl mcasu. e c- :.-o',,::. am bush activity, since the Rqh fcrces re-ccrt routine sa:and :e-fenive patrols axdguird] p.ost &civity as sma.1l unit aItic..S.

UNIT -LL A"7r0:"^ LD


(Wee',:Ly Avera;es a'r. C

"0"cC..

te')'

cy).(,66
4 ,tr 1 tr 2 `tr

,,cYi967
3 Qtrr Jan

"Q3tr us

Con..,s ,,
aS.a1l. Unit Actions
Conta cts/lOGO Sell"

3L 629
70 1,953

93
3,242 29

121
3,364

159
3,066 52

135 3,668 37

136
5,140

Unit Adtions RVN Contacts Small Unit Actions Small Contacts/lO00 Unit Actions
3d Nsti.'

69
90 19,821 4.5 Un,: UriI

3a
52 22,3,56 2.3 3 577
5.2

26
85 3. 4 13 760 '
17.1

19,712

99
5.0

52 18,600 2.8 Unk U.k

85 96 24,289 26,3 3.5 4 670


6.0

3.6 10 648
15.l4

Contacts Small Unit Actions Contactj/1O00 Small.


Unit Actions

Unk Unk
-

TOTIJA Contacts SmUl1 Unit Actions


Contacts/lO00 Small Unit Actions
US

2245 2i3
20,341 7.0
21,77'

176
1 ,842 26,29-(

248
28,025

241 30,69!

234 30,7314

10,3 '.

6.6

6.7

8.8

7.79

7.6

Tb.e 1 sho-,s a secu].r do-:.r and 1MW forces since th., lt ",:;o

- in cc:in-:_ct rates for both. the of " 1965. R\T c;::ta't

ratc.;

ropp.d. off ve.ry ,"h'.)ly in, -,'-

two ::-h',: .Y66. of

an".

"t h ,: Us'; c n ', ha).f c: CY65.

rt'

in
SBest

..

ccnt' L:.P

i.n th

Available Copy

CO NFIDE N]TIAL

C 1- 65 3 Qtr 41 US COUiT:ACTS Day Ilight


Total1

__CY

10966
3 Qtr 121(7M) 35(24)
159 tr

CY 1967
Jan

.rQ~ Qtr

2 -tr

29(66)* 15(34)
.44

56(42) 134.

78(58)

54(58) 90(74) 39(112) 31(26) 93 z121 27(52) 25(48) 52 Unk Unk


-

1`3(86) 22(16)
135

120(88) 1 )
137

RVI4 CC'iTACTS
Da.y

59(60)
40(o0) 9990 Unk Unk
-

57(57)

Vi ht Total Day Night Total TOTAL (CONTACTS


D.y

39(4-3)

n9(56) 23(44) 52 2(67) 1(33)

55(65) 30(05)

58(60) 3'(4+0)

65
3(75) 1(25). 9(90) 1(10)

53(59) 37(41) g 909 12(92) ( 8) 13


185(77)

3d NATI0N CONTACTS!-/

U -1 Unk
-

3"10

88(62)

135(59)

81(44)

Night Total

55(38) 143

9r(11) 230

64(56) 145

121(69) 179(72) 55(301) 69(28)

180(75)

176

246

61(25) 241

55(23) 240

Table 2 surmarizes the contacts by day and night. Day contacts seem to be playing a larger role in the total contact picture for US and Third Nation forces than for R%11 forces. RVN forces have Provided 51 per cent of total night contacts since June 1965 and 65 per cent in the last 4 months. The percentage of day contacts (of total contacts) increased from 66 per cent in the third quarter of CY65 to 88 per cent in January 1967. Unfortunately, the day/night data do not permit a ccmparison of day versus night effectiveness, because data on the number of small unit actions do not provide a day-night breakdown.

Best Available Copy


(i
/ Not reported until mid-1-'rch 1966.

CONFIDENTIAL

.131

CONFIDENTIAL
Operation CEDAR FALLS

Operation CEDAR FALLS (7-26 Je ,'ezy) engaged an average of 17 U.S.

maneuver battalions per week for two ,..e7eks This paper will compare the U.S. effort in CEDAR FALLS with other battalion or larger size search and destroy operations and with the results of efforts in all of III Corps. The results indioate CEDAR FALLS was a&,ut as effective as other III Corps operations in terms of numbers of VC/71A killed; based on virtuallir all other measures it appears to have been considerably more effective. It may also have had a significant disruptive effect on VO organization and. coomunications. It is still too early to assess this latter effect with any assurance. The operation took place in an asea encompassing the major portion of three long-identified VC base areas 25 km NW of Saigon. These were strongly fortified, contained numerous medlcal, storage, training and base flailities, and the headquarters of VC Military Region Four (NR 4), as well as those of the Binh Duong VC Provincial Committee and the Ben Cat VC District Committee. From the area the VC controlled and supported guerrilla and terrorist operations in an= around Saigon. Some .0 VC .mainforce battalions and 3 local force companies were known to frequent the area but only about 1500 enemy were thought to be present in the ares. (with an additional 700 within a six mile radius) just before the operation. 4 ri Objectives of Operation CEDAR FALLS 1I FFORCEV had considered the area as a target for a major ground operation since October of 1965 when the 173rd Airborne Bde had penetrated the area with herd fighting as a result. By the latter half of 1966 troop strength uad increased sufficiently to undertake such a major "operation without loss of security in other areas. The objectives of the attack were to destroy the base areas and neutralize the VO control structure, rather than to inflict a large number of personnel losses on the enemy. iConduct of the Operation. The I1 FFORCEV planned to attack with two U.S. infantry divisions (reinforced), with ARVN units in support, in 4..maneuver designed to seal the area, trap enemy force, destroy the base area, and evacuate the civilians in the "Iron Triangle" section. As planned, during the first phase (5-7 Jan) elements of the lt and 25th Infantry Divisions (reinforced) deployed along the flanks of the "Iron Triangle" into blocking positi-ns under the cover of small scale search and destroy operations. During the second phase (8 Jan) a surprise air assault was launched to seal and search Ben Suc while
blocking positions were further impr.ved. In the third phase (9 Jan) an armored attack was launched from Ben Cat to the Saigon River to cut the triangle in half while an air assault was made around the Thanh
Dien Forest to complete the northern encirclement.

maneuver battalions per week for three wueeks plus an average of 5 ARV,

I'd 10

E'

SCONIDENTIAL

All attacking forces

IJ?

0.,

CONFIDENTIAL
then began search, destroy, and evacuation operations south to the confluence of the Saigon said Thi Tinh Rivers while the blocking forces conducted search and destroy operations in their areas of operatiou.
*
4

Friendly forces met no organized defense or counter attacks except

for the resistance 'met by the 2nd Bde/25th Infantry Division on 8 January from what was later identified as the 2nd Bn/165A VO Regiment. Contact

was almost exclusively with platoon or smaller sized units trying to


escape the area. When the operation ended approxiiately 6,000 refugees were removed from the "Iron Triangle" to Phu Cuong p cover had been removed along the main arteries of transportation, and landing zones were prepared to facilitate quick reentry. In all, some 9 of the 100 square kilometers of the "Iron Triangle" had been cleared. The area was declared a specified strike zone (aeai may be hit by air or artillery without prior clearance from the province chief). Achievements of the operation were credited to the surprise of the attack, the mass of troops employed, the use of Psyops (approximately 5,600,000 leaflets were dropped), and the cooperation between U.S. and AMV civil and military officials. _suls. This operation may be evaluated in terms of its own objectives, comparative results with other large operations, its relationship to other act'ivities in the III Corps region where it took place, and its contribution to the war as a whole.
41

i"'
,

1. Objectives: The objectives mentioned earlier were destruction of the base areas and neutralization of the infrastructure. Inn regard to the base areas, I FFORCEV estimates that the major Lortion of the enemy's bases (in the form of tunnels, bunkers, storage :,aid med1cal.facilities) .,ere destroyed to the best of its ability. However), unnel systems (the heart of the base) cannot be literally obliterated, only interrupted by explosives and saturated with relatively short duration chemicals. Each major unit headquarters was provided with the latest maps and machine of the location of VC installations and fortifications. "printouts" These proved to be accurate. For example, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, which located 77 separate facilities in its sector, found that 156 or 88% were within 500 meters of their reported locations, the average distance being 200 meters. Whether the enemy can resume operations in this base area, remains to be seen. It takes a minimum of three months following the operation to determine whether there is a resumption of enemy activity indicative of a base. 1_ However, the refugees were not required to remain there until resettled. There have been reports that half of them have disappeared afid perhaps returned to their old homes.

CONFIDENTIAL
.... . ....

WNW

P-11,

CONFIDENTIAL
In regard to infrastr .:9.re, a review of the interrogation reports of the 731 ralliers, prisoner-u a-nd detainees showed that about 70% were from the VC infrastructure in area (guerrillas and combat support personnel). Only a few to-.e'=e. cadre ;.ere identified: an executive officer of Tay Ninh Milita-ry Schcol, a captain from the 14R 4 Political Staff Section, a lieutenant from a small guard unit, and two NVA political cadre. In addition, more th_-,%L,0,000 pages of documents were captured. These will take considerable time to evaluate; no doubt many are of negligible value to us and many have meaning only in the context of all other captured documents. A -few, however, were considered of outstanding value, such as the Le Du.-a Zetter of March 1966. 2. Comparisor. with Other Large Operations: Table 1 compares CEDAR FALLS with all other U.S. Army sea-rch and destroy operations of 100 battalion days or more since 1 August 1966 in terms of'battalion days of operation, friendly losses, enemy losses, and ratios between these quantities. The statistics are :3.y those of the U.S. effort,

since the statistics of the ARVN effort Lre scattered and incomplete.
It also shows total figures for all U.S. battalion-sized or larger search and destroy operations from August 1966 to February 1967.

Compared with other le.rge operations, CEDAR FALLS inflicted more enemy losses (KIA and captured) -er battalion day than 8 of the 9 compared operations and was 72% better than the average of all U.S. operations from August to February. 7. had a higher enemy KIA/fricndly KIA rate than 7 of the 9 compared operations. In-terms of weapons captured per battalion day CEDAR Fil :as 63% better its nearest competitor, Geronimo I, among the c^-red_ operations, than and was more than four times better than the averse of all U.S. battalion or larger operations from August to January. 3. Relation to III Corps: Table 2 presents a comparison between the efforts expended, personnse attrited, arms (to include ammunition, grenades, etc.) and focd za~ztured or destroyed in CEDAR FALLS and in the whole III Corps for he month of January. As in the last section, the figures for CEDAR -::ZS represent only the U.S.; the III Corps figures for efforts expended represent only the U.S., while those for personnel, arms, and food remresent everything taken by all friendly forces. CEDAR FALLS representes :zJly 43% of the battalion days in III Corps, and received 43% of the =-:2 sorties and only 24% of the tactical fighter sources in III CTZ .n .January1967. It produced 42% of the VC KIA, only slightly less t the effort in battalion days, but 72% of the captured arms and. 91 f the rice taken in III Corps. CEDAR FALLS appears to have more -h-. _u-led its weight in the categories considered.

1C

Best Available Copy


'lr %T.. I, A I

~~CON~FIDE NT IAL

~j ,~icontext

~Pr

4. Contribution -to thicW&lai: Unfortunately) the impact of operation CEDAR FALIU on the war as a whol~e (either as a type or as an individ~ual operation) ca~nnot be measured at this time. This type of evaluation requires an'historical perspective on information about the enemy not yet available. It is clear, however, that attrition of enemy personnel is not a completely adequate criterion of effeotiveness of ground operations even when linked to the eabi2 4 t;, and will of the enemy to replace them. We must also consider arms and w~munitionp food. (chiefly rice), and base areas (for resupply, regrouping, R&R, aet.) linked) of course) to the enemy ability and will to replace them. Operation CEDAR YALIU was aimed precisely at a base area and took large caches of arms, a~unition, and food. Until we can adequately evaluate the impact of these other variables it cannot be finally said, in the of the whole wer, whether the month's effort of some 25p00O30,000 personnel (including all types of siapport) to destroy the base area (if it has been destroyed)) kill 720 VO, capture enough rice to feed 5 regiments for a year, and capture large quantities of arms and. ammunition was the most profitable one possible. At this point Judgment, not statistical analysis, says yes.

-22
Ni

COIDWENTIAL
.ABIZ, 2.

PBIENDlLY AWENM'f ILQS'S IN 84'kAC"?

LITY0ATXO. 9

Ba Days EnCpt2L~6 Opn En~ KtA (Bc) Cr pt . V,' .n Fr. 'K:


pr

CBE0AA FALLS / 8 -/26

PAUL PZi.12X 11
7/-

JO0t-. PAUL JON~ES TOLEDO


712- -

PAUL MOEVRE

.ri

3314
720 72

a6B 620.58 9
IN,

66

10 125
2.2

13 279

6o
2.2

46
3 2.7 .o6
.21"

WIA

337
2.16

-248
2.36

2. -1k

68
:95

9 143 .09
.-. 7

En KIA/BDO

En KIA & Oapt/B

2.79

2.73

1.32.

ilp!n
FT ABDO rr:..'., K. WTA/BDO Er KTA/Fr. KTA En KM & Cap/Fr. KrA E('

.49.7 o
1,O1
10.00 12.96 8.9

.o5
.x6 15,33
2.9.67

,.4o
13.1?

34
1.22 2.33

lo.C L2

18;17

Sourest

Guava File,

MS

,.,

.CLr,, ~.:.':, ,, "---"-".

*d,"";iiAJ~k,_s.-

CONFIDENTIAL

............................

...... I

CONFIDENTIAL
,L R~EVERE III ,A ATTLEBORO L.5-:LI. 93&11/25 PAUL REVERE IV PICKETT 0nO~illMo I lo/ 0 ~- 12 4 19

All

..

Sra
0

afd cc trg THYM11 -c u 4198139 /0111 Ati 1

462'(9 41.
134o 1/537 14q 1 315+5~ 2.(2

6
3.12 295

62
1.25

2.66,325
3.96 826
P..25

125 1.5' 74 26 1. .49 1.75


1.0

58

331 2.0

193+8m

16,
NA A

136 399
1.36 .116
1.,D2

70

.3.6 .05
. 21

.48
.26

1,44
126.32

.2.0
2.62

.74
.98 .16 .55

9.~2
.61 .2? 1.3 8.29 9.27

.~

.5.38
OL
-'a~9.93

.42 9 .. .42

.41. .19 WIL

.2..1 .O 1.31 9.38.8533RO79

.63

7A'

3.10
4.75

45 7.
8137

P,

oASD/6A/8EA Proerrurnh DI.. April 3.5, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
M E R0~T Bn Days Qpn. B-52 Sorties CE-MDAf FALZ Unit S ~1C!tjk0Z OF 111 COZ?5 roR jAUMA I96

9P-AA As 33~4
104i

CFM/Cor Cor~s 782 4~2.7%


42.9%

OIL
a&

238

PBE0NML ATTRI

v.c. ]MA(DO) V. C. Co~t.C


Ealliers

006
IA

720
213

53.8

1,736 N/A 7137Q%

45

~,Crew

Ind. Weapons.a55 Weapono o rds S.A. A~mmo Lqxge Caliber Ammo rds Bombs Gre~nades Mieea Va elk

4
33 60,896 238
1,979 883

74+,826 463514 382 1227:


2t33384%

2
8i.I4%

ag

302

79 .1%

Rice
44 Self

tons lbs

3,636 9,000

4+,0.3
1.5,778

90.6% 57:0%

Sources:

Guava File, 1N11SI CEDAR FALLS After-Action Report; MACV Monthl.y Buumsryr for January 19671 DIA Intell2igence Bulletins. Cnapital Military Riegioni, Gia Dinho end. 1(ung Sat Special Zone.

-17

j/Theme are select items only, Oth~er ite.A (e.e. medical supplies, clothes, documents.) etc.) are either non-quo~tiftablc or recorded in incompatible cluux&itties.

~/Represents onlyr Close and. Direct Air Support effort in the III Corps..

11A'NCRA'M AT 3
I.I

DECLAS8Ti'v:*.! AIVTY

Tx"\1ITNVAI. 2 logI- YE.IA 1

OAkd'/SA/6I1A Programns Div.

Dil5201

CONFIDENTIAL1

April 15, 1.967

I......................IL,

CONFIDEN TIAL
PON r, REkpUR=-, Tr IN I CORPS
In an atte~mt to determine possible future requiroments foi, US forces

in X-Corpa, the impact of past increases in friendly combat strength on the


enemy KIA and population control was analyzed. Population control in I Corps has been almost at a standstill since last fall due to a diversion of forces to fight infiltration from across the DMZ. A total force of about 3-S7,Marine battalion equivalents (including the prosent 20 UItMC & 3 ROl!C battalions) would be required to simultaneously defend the DM71 patrol the mouiitainous areas of OTZ and to bring the remainder of the coastal population nf I Corps into the Marine Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR). Theae battalions would virtually eliminate VC domination of 90% of

'the population of I CTZ, but probably would not fully socure tem froni VC
harassment. The weekly enemy KIA rate in I Corps has taMed to be steady at 250280 per week since September 1965 in spite of a 50% increase in friendly

forces. Exceptions to this occurred in certaiiu periods (July-August 1966, January-March 1967) in which the enemy chose to initiate large battles. In
those period@ the enemy loss rates increased 2 to 3 times. Allied operations responding to enemy activity, particularly infiltration acrosm the DMZ, appear to be the rimary influence on enemy KIA weekly average. Thus no prediction of enemy losses is possible. Population Control In our privious analysis of USMC pacification efforts in'I Corps we stated that after September the USMC TAOR was not expanded and the pacification effort leveled off' despite a continued build-up in troop strength. The primary reason was the need for forces at the DMZ in response to stepped up infiltration from the north. Since the Marines have reached their limit of authorized troop strength and they are now carrying two burdens, additional US forces have been tenmprarily moved from I and III CTZ to preserve gains made to date while coping with the added NVA forces. Even more forces would be needed to continue the desired expansion of the TAORs to form a continuous strip along the coast and to raise the level of security of the civilians within the TAOR. Matine reports indicate some 90% of the I Corps population is concentrated along the coast. In September, when expansion leveled off, 1,087,000 people or 41.3% of the I Corps population were in the Marine TAOR. The remaining coastal population was approximately 1,283,000 persons. An analysis was made to determine how many more Marines would. be needed to bring the remainder of the coastal population vithin the TAOR and at the time to maintain an adequate force at the DMZ.A/ Projections were based on the 15-month period July 1965 through September 1966, when the TAOR was expanding. We compared monthly increases in the number of civilians in the TAOR against the monthly increase in the maneuver battalion strength including the ROK MC. o 60 + secured (roughly eauivalent tD..being secured & securedl. goal is the ultimate Marine objective The 90%

Ssame

!25-

CON FIDENTIAL
,I~s~~a~ r~ Ju-y
No of UE14C/ROK Qtr Qtr ... Qtr

3r Qtr

4~th~ 1 Stv Tan Feb

Pro.
Jected

MC Bnu in AOR
No 4 of, Civilians

10

13,3 13.3

16,7

l 9A/

lt&

15 Jc

15-0/

29J2

V'

198.8 350.1 4 36,1 577,. 797,9 1086.6 li9,5 1112.8 1170.7 9370 in TAOR :& Plus 4 on DZ. 1/ Plue 9 ori flIA. c/ P2,ua 3 on DM,.Z. Airter Beptember (the point at which he TAD? e:,,,pansion leveled off) if the
expansion hod continued at the previous rat-P, each additional battalion would At this rate it would take an bring 89,000 more civilianz vithin the TAOR. additional 14 battalions to cornpte the pa,:ification of the coastal area providid the Marinvo wiahed to maintain the ssz.e ratio of troopm to civiliana that From October on, tbe Marines have mftintained between 13 they had in Septenmber, and 15 battaliona (including Koreens) in su;port of' the TAOR and mountain

patrols diverting 8-10 battalions to the north.


niecesaery to maintain thb TAOR at the point it

Taking this as the minimum


leveled off, we can project that

""noomnaas
;,, .H
A

a oa

906% of the I Corps population and at the same time keep l.aJ battalions on the DMZ (as estimated by MACV for Practl^.e 9).

C3-37 tJSMC battalion equivalents isn eeded to-expand the TA

to

(U8MO Required 13-15 . .. Bn Equiv.) old, 'TOR


Increase TAOR DMZ .14 8

Availble USMc "' BA qiv) 0 UWBIO '


3 nOLO -vN 1

,M

35-3

USAR (Praotice 9)
33/USAR (Temp)

In view of the recent introduction of 13 ARVN battalions (7.7 weighted battalions) to formerly Marine tasks within the TAOR the additional battalion equivalents required would be only 4-6. The 6 temporary Army battaliona (14 Marine equivalent battalions) alretdy sent to reinforce I Corps, would be awff'ilbatcient to meet the requirement if maintained in I CTZ along with the 3 Army talions (2 equivalent) recently added to Program #4 for Practice 9. Expanding the TAOR does not, however, complete the pacification of I Corps. When a VC area is first under Marine control it is considered to be 20% secure in the Marine system or undergoing clearing in the GVN system; from there on proined by nu2,er of troops only but by a number of gress in securing is not determc other criteria such as revolutionary develc;ment, permanent defense measures established. The Marine Corps is very successful in the initial clearing and securing stages. It is the topmost category, socurel, which has shown no progress in the last year; as the table below indicates, !t actually declined by 8,800,

&/ Two USNC battalionr

equivalent to -26-

".

Army buttallons in strength.

/CONFIDENTIAL
,' " , . . .. ' ' , . ,, ..i - ,. . . . . . . . ,... .. . .. .. ., , . , . . . .. ,

: ,

..

A".

CONFIDENTIAL
CIVT,,M, POP-TIODT CONTROL IN I COliS
SF", kill:-

%Tho~

nands)
Is

3r -4th tr . 883.7 938.0 134.1 153.0 713.31 593.:o


4+9.2 809.7

QQr %tr

n qtr

3d

Qtr 934.3

It

Qtr

End 1965En 1966 . 8.8

Secured
Undergoing Secured

Undergoing Clearing Uncontested VC Control


Toal

+2.6.3. 268.9 283.7 395.2 370.0 - 22.2 568.8 661.3. 483.I+ 4+99.3 98.2 34!/ I + -21,7, 36.9 63.3 36.9 606,0 36.9 886.0 66-2 - 8879.7 840.7 +2 7.721.7

950,2.916.,4

929.2

iIncrease due to tedefiniition-of category.


,i.
i!'Although

~~nemw

:.

tendof Althughthe

weklyeney ICA i te eneal

~ipove

th ,:

the general trend of the weekly enemy XTA is up over the

"past kO month,,1, peaks in the graph below are generally the result of
large unit operations by the USMC.

"VC/NVA KU v,

GVC/NVA ,,OOP STNOTH

K]A vs TROOP ACTIVIT!

(Weekly Average)

6o 50

Vo/NVA KMA

600

2000

so
Maneuver Brie

~oo

$ 00

1500

Bn Days
mill Unit Action withUConntact va/NvA Y'.A
______________

4+0 ,(Left Scale 30


2

4+00 300

1000. 500.

03

200

65 65

66 66

V t--,T3q 24 676 66 -67-

4i4 14 65 6566

2q 3Q i4qT

66 66 66 67

CONFIDENTIAL

Co NFIDENTI AL

x
1965
3rd C Qt, Maneuver Bota].ionsVC/NVA C'MKMA/Man. Battalion Small Unit Action 4th Qtr 1st Qtr, 2:ud qtr.

1966
3rd tr 4th Qtr

1,967
lst Qtr 51, n 616 11.7 noa. n.a.

35.3 35.3 41,.9 , 45.1 52.8 52.8 205 263 262 253 471 288 5.8 7.5 6.4 5.6 8.9 5.5 666 1026 1002 1497 2088 1809 1337 157,
=1.5,

Bn 'Drays of Operation 1056 :a,


1

with contact
We-i hted

1397 RO1KO

2013 1.5, RVN

22139
-. 59

,/ ,
I/

Weekly average by quarter. January and February only.

(uM

A--MY

1): USMC

For exanple, in December 1965, Operation HARVEST MOON accounted for 4 07 enemy KIA. In July and August of 1966, Operation HASTINGS wan conducted in the vicinity of the DMZ and Operation PRAIRME was begun in the same axes. These two Operations plus the activity of the first quarter of 1967, which caused thK KIA rate to skyrocket, wero the results of large-scale enemiy infiltration and activity, particularly "by the 324B IMA DiviLaon and parts of the 341st. Operatton PRAIRIE It in February arAd M!ach 1967 reported a total of 693 enemy KIA.

up from 288 in fourth quarter 1966.

The weekly average of enemy KIA in I Cor;s was 412 in January 1967

In February it leaped to 820 and

it is not yet poassilble to determine if thib is a trend or if the rate will return +) p. .viuus iIs later in the year. Couriously, there is little direct correlation between KIA and maneuver battaliois, battalion days of operation or small unit actions. It is a willingness for the enemy to initiate large battles which causes the enemy KIA to go up. At the same time he diverts us from the pacification role. Statistics on enemy killed cannot be predicted on the basis of increases in friendly force strength. Similarly, predictions based on friendly activity cannot be made accurately since much of our activity is based on enemy initiativea. Should the enemy continue to engage in large-scale attacks his losses will continue to rise accordingly. -28-

I
1.)

CONFIDENTIAL
. . .....

~~~~~..... a

SCONFIDENTIAL
FMaCF.EEFFEcTI-,V-E?7j-S iII.- 11:i
Pacification progress

.
II Corps was great.r NLn than in I Corps au:tini

SitY.

CY 1966. r/scL1nnt As in Crps 0 (see April inTIZCo be predicted or SEA the Analysis bsis of Rcport) inrs-ne[h ene_ K A rldl _,L in 11s otb rd .4-in ncrare eit er friendIV

Population Contr,l*
,Talle I hows an increasle of 342,000 people in th'.3 II categoivy in contrmst to T Co.-pa' decrease of 8,800. Corps eecurrd

C171=0 tjZTION COMTOL IN 11 CCIUPS ..iousands)


V

rd

Ut Sicured t ndfergoing Securing


Undergoing Clearing

_qtr Qtr 1133 72


&)O W9

th

2nd iid'+h Qtr 2,tr Q~tr 1079 1079 1'7. 15,5


786 825

And 1965

End t.96 6~

937 1020 Iiii L16


778

L362 136
789

+ 342 + 20
,0
'

Unconbested VC Control
STotal

7 6
P.,3

10 6
t33

9
.

53 582
2673

26
26R"

32 2
42 ...

2 253
11

In comparing I Corps and 11 Corps in the VC control category, II Corps again was ahead--a decrease of 2'53,000 persona under VC cL)tW-rcl versus 2.17,000 pern)na for I Corps. Since II Corps had a ,1.ightly, faster rite of increase in friendly maneuver battalion strength, the average r'eduction in tae VC con'trolled populution Vir butte,lion per month were essentially Kuqul: 11,000 in 11 Corps versus 10,700 in I Corps.

Ei.3rnyr KIA
II Corps aivtr in Table 2 and Gr&rph A shov' r o correlation between e.emy KIA and increases in friendly battalion strength. Table 2 and graph B also indicate that we crnot predict ftuture enemy KIA rates from previoun trends in battalion days of operations and mnall unit actions with contact.

' Pacification progresis An 11 Corp,, connol. Oce ineasur-3d in terms Of increases In the Tactical Ar,'as of Pes;>insibiAity (TAOR). An Army TAOR i_ a bas- area; the ee.xV riair. forcos are outs]dc the TAOIS. The USMC TAC:R is an area in which thy !harin!., wpera'e; hhey raise Oecurl.ty inside grad-lly expanding TAORs.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
L
'st two large operations in each The two p~eaks in enemy KIA &x~e of the two quArbers. Inltqire '~Opera~tiu.ns VAN~ BURW~ and WHER1/ 1wel WMT10 WING acooouited for 1701 one.-y :K:A c r 133. p~ eekorh average fov that quarter. Operat~ions :.FA'YER 11 anO~. SAM'HOUSTON killed If thie 2400O enemy in lst quarter 1967, or 1-.5 oe the L~ 4 3,weekly a~verage. 6nomy had chosen to fight in those q.a;rters as he fought in the others, his losutoa would have been~ 270 and 216 per week, respectively. Th' &var. age for the, seven quarters would have ttean 300 per week, with a ra~nge of only-,-50 per week.

it1965 1,...3

1966 4tZ . 0 2q 3q

4Q

1967 IQ

Enemy XIA per week


smal A0onW/oftac ni

"9 31
38 13

0
01

3
24 20

9 4)
2nit0

CONFIDENTIAL1

+*

',,

Graph A
Enemy ;iw Fr.enmly lA StrengthActivity

Graph B
rnemy IaA vs Friendly

60Bat aioiv (left scale) t,. S5000, OBn. Dys/

~1/ o/,
'I

I GI

1
.'oo
'ooo

/
/

/i/
/ ''

'<-"

,rt

30

Ir

/KA/Mrt scae)l
poo

3000 .

scal ) -.300

0-1 12
:0 10

-. 20000

MOW
,'
w/con3 Actions SmallUnit,

.20

100

2100020

'

, .I 104

_.i

10

-3o'10

R 4Q.It -T-1 65656666666667

65 65 66 66 66 66 67

4Q& Ji

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL Co
LARGE U. S. ARMY GRCUID OPEPATIOI:- i :--

The U. S. Army conducted 60 sear:' sn- 4es-rzy operations in II Corps from August 1965 to March 1907, ver 75% of the ove 5 -7 . battalion days of operation (the rest were -'s. for security operations). The search and destroy o'peratisn.zkled (body count) 140526 VC/NVA in 7,055 battalion days of s:-ra-ion - 2.1 KIA per battalion day. However, while the averag=e -zu:oer of battalion days per operation and the average number of2 "bat-alions committed per / operation has increased steadily, the ille per battalion has decreased equally as sharply since the !st quarter of 1966. (See Table 1) The lowest point occurr%'. in t+he 3rl quarter of 1966, the same quarter in which there was th- h st average of battalions committed per operation. (See graphs) The last two quarters of 1965 seem -o represent a period of learning for both the enemy and the U. S. in the subsequent period between January 1, 1966 and April 5, 1967 V:e U.S. Army started and completed 32 search and destroy operations/in II Corps. Table 2 groups these operations according to size, in terms of battalions committed and battalion days of operation. Zhz.t operations produced between two and three times as may enemy killed per battalion day as long operations.

a/ This number does not equal the one fzun.d on Table 1 because (I) "I

long

operations were not divided; (2) two cierations included on Table r were not completed by April 5th; (3) four small operations totalling 24 battalion days with only one or tw.o cc-=mittled battalions were eliminated.

(7)

NFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
TABLE 1 U.S. ARf SMEACH A2D DESTROY OPERATIONS Tn 1.1 CORPS

i%196
No. Operations l/ P Avg T.ns/Opn. Avg Bn Days/Opn. 7

5
4q
2Q.

1,966

3q .... 6 6.5 207.7 263.5

1267 8
4..T) 245.1 377.3 1.5I 6.33

2. 2.3 2e.6 152,9 6,76

9
3.5 71.9 199,0 2,77 5,83

.2 3.3 86.1 236a1


2.742I.7

7
4,.7 263.9 1470.6 1.78

1.6 10.3

Avg VC/NVA xxA/Opn 46.7 VC/1LVA KIA/Bn Dyf VC/NVA KZA/US KIA 4,.54 13.63

5.53

684

10.-13

9,89

ji Oerations are grouped by the quarter in which most of the operation toolt place. However, 4 operations took place in two quarters, e.g., Adans. Thene were divided into two operations and the results divided between quarters in proportion to the days in each quarter, -ouroet NMC8 Computer File, After Action Reports, and VEPAC Siummary, Every effort was made to obtain all operations, but a few may have been misernd due to missing records early in the war.

280

--Avg. Bn Days/Opn.

i.:

9~~~00 20-

"

Avg. Bn; Opn. n

..

12a -

39-7/

:"

14

VC/NVA KIA/Bn bJay

:1965

19,

971965

1%6

CONFIDENTIAL
&20

CONFIDENTIAL
AP SEARCH .A:TD 66 JAFJARY :L, -S2 O3?: PEATIONS 1h 11 CORPS ARIL 9, 1-966

over 100 over 100 25-100


25-100

4or more less than [44or more


less than 4+

11

3900 1260

7123 1511. 9~46

1.83 1.20 37 35

4252 10 44

11199

VV

COFDETA
. ... ...

q~

CONF~IDENTIAL

During the first halPJ of' 1967 the oen'my loss rate increaed. mo.re thin the ra riienc y in killin~r iQed, ~e frindly l.oss rate. Bu~t enemy do.nt com;-%rabla to friemldly force efficiency In Itili.ng VC/illm, ror every 1000o VC/NVA forces 1.5 friendly forces por weak were k~illed; for every 1000 friendly forces, 1.5..2.0 VOAVA p~fr w;eel were Icilled. GRA.PH 3 VC/IVA Killed GRAPH 2

Fri~endly Killed

232.5-I
2. 0 2.0.

'

I
10Weekly .

ocs

/rA Ire' I.-.

,.ekr i.
51.5

Avg,

..

For 1000 F'riendly

Stren1gth

Per- 1000 VC . .A

Weekly AVe

lq

2Q

1966

3Q

4.Q

14

1967

2q
TAL I

IQ,

24

3~ 3.966

4,

IQ 2q 1967

~ (WasCOFDETA ly Xvarag
lat Qt~r V/.NVA Killed Died of Wounds R9I/j35 Total. Killed Avg. Friendly Strengbh (000) VC/NVA Klled Per 1000 Friandly Body Count Totia Killed
/M4CV Factor of .35 t1mna; budy ccunlr-, Body Count

~
3rd Qtr
1200

2nd
Qtr

4th '16 &r Avg


1150

o Qtr 1750
6l5 235

qtr1800

1005 135

2516
982

915 320

1067
7 4

4o
20

0_
1555

630
40

930
1.1 1.5

lot43

3.144 10o5 1188 11


1.0
1.4

.9 1.3

1.2

1.0
1.:4

1.6

1.5 2.0

1,5 2.0

E/April-may average.

CNIETA

CONFIDENTIAL
I that, h-.. "r__ o ,. .'.ndCV -he

TIlb!Je 1 and Cra~zh I 1 2~ -~ VC/iV th-ei-1e' y 1.5 in 1967; additions of

increazed v -11 y f or r . 19s6fto. stre,.. ' -ca.L-o= th:orats fron.a 1.4 in f

].966 to 2.0 in 1967.

Thtts, friendly.r:
for-ee

" .... ed '-l". incr""

at

50;

Tabole 2 and Graph 2 show; tiat vci-P,

increased their weekly kills

of friendly troop from 1.0 .per 1000 VC/rA stren;ths in 1966 to about 1.5 in 1957. Thus, VC/17.rA forces also increased their- efficiency by 5&f.
TABTE' -2

FR -

LY KCLL-

PER 1000 VC!ITIA S-TRIGTH

(Weekly k;erage) it61


1st Qtr Friendly Killed Avg. VC/NVA Strength (000) Friendly Killed Per 1000 VC/1IVA Strength 315 265 1.2 2nd qtr 265 282 .9 3rd Qtr Qtr

1967
1st 56th l Avg qtr 290 284 1.0 395 289 1.4 2nd Qtr 440 289 1.5

270 .305 297 .9 291 1.0

Table .3 shows that the straight Ene~r/Friendly Kill ratio for 1967 is higher than the 1966 ratio. But -hen the two ratios are adjusted to reflect opposing force strengths, the 1966 ani 1967 ratios remain the sar.. TABME 3

KIL

RAT.ICS

S1966
lst Qtr Enemy/Friendly Body Coun.t Only Body Count & Died of Wounds Enemy IEA Per 1000 FR/Friendly KIA Per 1000 Enemy Body Count Only 2nd Qtr 3rd Qtr 4th 1966 r Qtr

1967
1st Qtr 2nd Qtr

3.2 4.3

3.5 4.7

4.4 6.0

3.8 5.1

3.7 5.0

4. 4 6.0

4.1 5.5

.9

1.0

1.3

1.0

1.0

1.1

1.0

Body Count & Died of Wounds

1.2

1.3

1.7

1.3

1.4

1.5

1.3

Best Available Copy


CONFIDENTIAL 150

CONFIDENTIAL
7?.2 G7o:sT ,iIOI 0r ~LOAT"
U.S. for-'c-s ze :'=orted2!y 'accz-,tcJ .pe. They repor..D_, effort in SV,. 7C: of the sarch and destroy fr ,,,; of their time on such operations.

About half of their total effort is age.inst regional main. force units. In August 1067, ',MACV began to account for all battalion days available to US, RV and F',W, maneuver battalions in accordance with the categories and definitions set. forth below. The mrneuver battalion days are reported without any adjustment for the varying number of companies per battalion-? or any weighting for the significant var~iation in numbers of personnel assigned to battalions (ARVN battalions are much smaller than US-FW battalicns). Moreover, it appears that the data is not flowing smoothly yet and th~e figures used in this report represent only a two wek sample** from August. The categories and functions are as follows: Operations to destroy or SEAIRCH..2D DESTROY (REGIONAL): areas and supply points. base neutralize VC/NVA main forces, Operations conducted continguous SEARCH A-D DESTROY (PROVINCIAL): to popullated areas under GVN control or to areas in which RD is in progress which assist in providing a secure6 environment by destroying or neutralizing VC/NVA forces which pose a potential or iediate threat to those areas.
SEARCH 5D DESROT (LOCAL): Operations which are conducted

in or adjacent to RD areas for the purpose of destroying VC guerrilla and infrastructure. SECURITY OPERATTiONS: Operations whose purpose is to protect

"political, economic and military resources and installations,


such as district capitals or populated areas, to include previously pacified areas; lines of co=unications; food stores and production areas; and depots and base areas. RESERVE: Units in reserve.

All of the foregoing categories except reserve imply that forces are active. Table 1 below therefore indicates that all forces are active more than 951 of the time, since less than 5% of the total battalion days are reported as reserve. But units train, refit, rest, and weather probably interferes with operations. An explanation of how the system reports units in these categories is being sought.

Best Available Co-

The number of companies in a battalion can vary as follows: USA-3, USA-augmented 4, USmC-4., FW-3 or 4, ARVN 3, VimC 4. Figures for both weeks (aug 6-12 and 20-26) were identical.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

is

RVN

ALL :::CES

Searcah
S&D~~aais Securisetrit

L9eiDsrro

PpPovicilri2.ci5-4i7. 19issi651. .8.

Npertio. ipntldn o pofrmop

nsac 04 ftertm pn UStr lothlnftertieoeaigaant iaeofU orteioneddmsty n h

toperaion n ethey einlmi oc frevarot waith .

ofth trota

spendt01 on ftertm search and destroyopato. timefoce

attaindast proviciate hafof theiof thme toprtnl 1.ertiosirceudingouved an oc ui r ma aNd dieist sperat ionrserve. to Bea~frcs. 2. 'R'V half of thei m'r ore than forces speontd and* locaJ. bieatecrtyliissdon$

againstth provincial u't ofte~ operations

forces unitsThe alfeo

the ons ccutdor8Sof totaltimespen Talbof th whichv timeh,

ndsrity se f cuh operations. rsetv fre'shr fechmsin

lo~

CONdicatesALh1t:

COgFIDE, TIAL
V, S

I
f
Security !6.3 2.5 81.2
Reserve

Stcnrch and~ >__stroy Regional Pro-;incia! Local US 70.4 19.8 37.8

7V,RV; Total

11.3
18.3 100

2.6

2L.2.6
55.6 100

4.7
57.5

"
97.4

100 indicates that:

100

100

Table 3 shows the allocation of total forces within each'Corps

Tactical Zone in South Vietnam.

It

1. In I Corps, -3-of the total effort is allocated to search and


destroy operations and half of that is against regional main forces. 2. In IT Corps 85% of the total effort is reportedly allocated to search and destroy" operations with most of this effort split between operations against regional and provincial forces. II corps has the lowest proportion of effort devoted to security. In III Corps less than half of the effor-t is devoted to search anI destroy operations, mostly against local forces with very little effort against regional main forces. III Corps has the highest proportion of effort devoted to reserve, probably because it is the home of the RVNAF

3.

general reserve units.


-4. In IV Corps, 705 of the effort is devoted to security with the re--atnder evely split among search and destroy operations against regional, 'incial and local VC units. The low proportion of search and destroy act;-1ity undoubtedly reflects the absence of US units.

USE OF FORCES BY CORPS


(% Of Time Employed)

COUNTRYWIDE
Search & Destroy Regional 33.2

Provincial Local Subtotal Security

13.0 18.8

65.0

35.0

36.7 36.9 l0.4 84. o 13.4

5.1

8.2

21.0

14.8
25.7
7.

27.5 2

9.3 10.0

19.2 17.6

57.8
38.0

44.9

70.0

Reserve Total

100.0

2.6 100.0

9.L 100.0

2.5 100.0

4. 100.0

VBest
and ac the c.ta

Available Cop':f
ch.%,eno ,lown, we will po'&lish -ore

Th.! nnw reporring formaot shows .:ro..ise

of '-,.n,

extensive studies of it.

exceptionally useful

CONFIDENTIAL

VCJD/A KcILLED BY ARVM HELICOPTERS P2 =;1i

:'5

Civilian Irregular Defense (CoD-1) fcraes Knd US Army helicopters accounted for 23% of all VC/NVP. forces killed in 2,'uth Viitnm during January - November 1967, according to th, VC/WVA combat dtath figares in the USARPAC Monthly Highlights and the 5th Special Forces Group's Monthly Operational Summarim.e. The table indicates that Army helicopttrs at.ounted for 15% of the total, and C0DO forces for 8No with both forces claiming a l.rger proportion of the VC/NVA KIA as the year progressed.

VC/11VA KIA A'TtE.IB'X1-7


' , Us ARMY H ooTE~S JiSt . (Monthly Average)

TO

G FORCES

1967 lit QOr SVDN TOTAL VCINVA KIA


Total VC/NVA KIZA./ KIA Attributed to: U Army HwlicopteR/ %Helicopter CDDO & Helicopter 7566

2nd

3rd Otr

Oct Nov

Avg jan-Kcm

7797

6696

6967

7288

~58 V;*
703 9 17

(1IG/ 58
12.32, 16 24

1466
1203
18 25

723
1334 19 3u

598
1098 15 23

Total VC/NVA KIA-/ KIA Attributed to:

3895

3056

2P60

316

31.48

CIDGk/
US ArM

325
Helicopterd/ 49o0 13 21

.21
260 28

326

I492
935 -9 45

382
770 2P4 37

SHPlicoptpr

S4o
34 42 47

% CIDG & Helicopter

0M
a

tatistical Suninary, Table 1.


Group.

Monthly Reports - CIDG, 5th Spei ia1 USARiPAC Monthly Hiplhights.

701o o2 US Arnv heiicopter kill., OSD Statistical Sumuary,, Tnble :.

ss'.

tc have occur-d in II and III CTZ.

1.tI
S.. ,.,, . .,, . .,.,=,,
. ... . ,,,....... . ,,,'" '.,,.,. ' 1. ,,.,,:,., ,.i . . -

Co CONFIDE NTIAL

W
About 44W1, of all Vu'/i',vA kil.led in 11 ad III UTV7 duriag thc! AprilNovember 1967 period may be attributable to Army helicopLrrs rind CCIDG forcei*, ,with the helicopters accounting for about 30o of the total. This finding is based on the assumption that I1 and III CTZ account for 70(/, of all VC/NVA killed by helicopter, since most of the US Army armed helicopters are reportedly located there, (CDG figures are available by CTU.) Thus, the figures in the table would indicate that Army helicopters and CTDG forces are playing a major and increasing role in carryin. out the allied strategy of attrition, pirticularly in II and III CTZ. We are not certain, how.ever, that all of the CIDG and Army helir.aopter Iills are counted in the MACV total estimate of IC/'4VA killed, although the Special Forces and USARPAC report their figures aa confirmd. We asniae that the MACV report ., enemy KIA include "confirme.d" kills inflicted by: US Army, USMC, CoDG and ]W ground forcen; USN, VMT, and FW TNaval forcer; USAF, USMC, USN and VDIAF tactical air sortLes; B-50 sorties; AMNV, VNTMC, IRF, and PF. If the 0ID(G W1n Army helicopter kills are fully counted in the MACV total, these two forces are extrumely efficient in killing the enemy compared to most of the other forces, For exmple, the C=D3, with about 3% of the total allied forces in South Vietnaim,, accounted for about 8% of the enemy killed; they dccounted for 12/ in II and III CTZ, with only L% of the allied strength there.

COFDNTA
j'

CONFIDENTIAL
g(I
NDV"~LAMgE rF,SffRMLTr OP' rLTF, . n72~ T'"F gU'.

lost c.&nut 605 Of O o:.Stentlzv Since Aunust 1966, US forie. . A.nut G4,% of nll tl-e-. :ntj 'ne-.eior. their KI1 in -1are7e ,unit frerationq. Thp energy/US. kill enom,) KTA were k7ilPd in allied l'r7 and remained lo?'er than 1966 a? crutr ati.to dronrned 20,V durlutag rcond fen",. lZvelZ3 until the 1968 Tet ers since August 1966 about 40% Table 1 shows that in most of the .'.; of all allied KIA were killed in large c.-eration. we initiated. US forces consistently lost about 60%/ of their 7T! in large unit operations; RVNAF Third nation KLIN averaged 2D-1, but the portion of their lost about 25%. total KIA killed in large operations declined steadily during the period. This resulted primarily from a sharp i7 C-Z decline in the number of ROK I CTZ had the most US KIA in large operaforces killed in large operations. tions. KIA -were killed by friendly nTable 2 shows that about 64,, of ail large unit operations in the 20 month periid from August 1966 through March 1968; throughout most of the period the s-rcentage was a steady 71-75%. After falling to 44.7% in Jan-Feb 1968 aZ a result of the Tet offensive, I CTZ had the percentage resumed its former-level in MNarch 1968 (71.7%). The I CTZ enemy of the total). the most enemy KIA in large operations KIA rate jumped sharply at the beginning of 1967 and has remained higher than the other CTZ's ever since. Table 3 shows an average kill ratio cf 7.5 enemy KIA for each allied KIA Third nation forces had the highest ratio, averaging in large operations. 13.3; US forces averaged 7.9, followed by ?,A at 6.3. ROK forces reportedly killed 22.2 enemy for every ROK KIA in Ii CTZ, but averaged only 7.4 in I CTZ.

A large operation is defined as an ozeration conducted by a battalion However, the o.-terations reported in this category size or larger force. may actually contain many small unit "-_ctions. II CTZ, for example, reports large US operations only; nc U-S small unit actions at all are reported. The source for most of the data in thi- article is the JCS GUAVA computer file. The KIA data in the file are _'-.:n from operational reports and are not updated to include died of wounds fix-res. We also know that operations are occasionally reported in the -.--ong , and that other errors exist. Despite

the

.rrors, a we believe that the

-,..... .e useful for general trend analysis.

Best Available Copy


CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
tZ

FRIENDLY KIA IN

-G

7ZI -OTAL FRIIMDLY KIA

1-,6 --196S A'v .. h 1..


.-.,"

3r1
1_.r

)4t.h

1st

20-Month
Total

t 842 3564
23.6
1672

"--A in Large Ops a/


Total KIA _/ KIA in Large Ops

3814 1717
22.4 467 814
57.4

63 2732
22.3 765 12L3
61.5

77, 3:9E
_-.2
137

:75

322
7.C
17 3

743 2834
26.2
1192

1270 23.4
2730

5536

5516 22601
24.1,

.us "KIA in
Large Ops a_/

9881

Total KIA 1 % KIA in Large Ops

2113
62.

s7762.7 67

2091
57.0

2384
70.1

4847
56.3

16262 60.8 487 1704

3rd Nation KIA in Large Ops a/ Total KIA b/


KIA in Large Ops Total Friendly :IA in !arge Ops a/ Total KIA

48 74
64.9

84 173
h,6.9

10 s.6 22

95
3441 27.9 27

30 296 10.1

60 346 1.32.
17.3

"-7 77

!,2. in Large Ops KIP

899 2605

34.5

1472 Ll:)4

-'

--

35.4

:,6-

-:..C

2030 0_,6

38.5

2544 6244

40.7

4060 106240567

15884

38.2

39.2

b/

Source: Source:

JCS GUAVA Table 2, OSD SEA Statisti~al

'iS-.=

Best Available Copy


-UNFIDENTIAL

II

CONFIDENTIAL
TABLE 2

E .V

i.

W3: ,IU.NiT OPI-ATIONS VS TOTAL

E'*- K.A

V.'-7

':gI CTZ Enemy KIA in ,_-rze C-):-: Total KIA b/

4th 2Otr 2568 3747

lzt '.tr 4843 8207

2nd 0 tr 7666 11504

3rd Qtr 763210318

4th Qtr 5495 8129 -

1st ^tr 21-13 113A7T.

20-: ont, Total

2/1 .

76266

KIA in Large Ops

7,....

68.5
4601 4541 101.3 2344 34284 67.3 1663 3204 51.9 11176 14976

59.0
44830 54'46 38.7 5528 6238 88.6 1652 2865 57.7 16853 22756 74.1

66.6
3612 4236 85.3 3506 4932 71.1 1866 2717 68.7 16650 23389 71.2

74.0
3196 4175 76.6 2028 3206 ,63.3 1798 2388 75.3 14654 20087 73.0

67.6
4574 5105 89.6 3015 4853 62.1 2643 3785 69.8 15727 21872 71.9

-9.6
5343 12312 L3.4 12-70 2C5h0 62.7 4034 9133 h4.25 37360 72455 51.6

'o. 4
2E-294 3 L60 73.6 30203 44366 67.3 14519 26262 55.3 119059 185854 64.1

II CTZ `=ne-y KIA in Large COps a! 2!1 Total K!A 6 % KIA in Large Cps 8. III CTZ Enemy KIA in Large Ops &/ 912 Total KIA b/ 1613 KA in Large Ops K% 56.5 IV CTZ Enemy KIA in large Ops a_/ 863 Total KIA 1/ 2170 SKIA in Large Ops 39.8 Countrywide Enemy KIA in Large Cps a/ 6639 Total IA _/ o101 %KIA in Large 'ps 6,.3

74.6

a/

Source: JCS GUAVA. Source: Aug-D- 1966 data source is JCS GUAVA. is Table 53, OSD(C) SEA Statistical Summary.

Jan 1967-Mar 1968 data source

Best Available Copy


CONFIDENTIAL 1.58,8

CONFIDENTIAL
,/i'i[ KILL ZATIOI IN TARCIE UNIT OIHAIO.N'.

' I

,,6 Aug-

4th

a967:6 Ist
&b

2nd

Qr 2! t
6 ,83 5.24

3rd
Ot

1 ,h 4

lit
L Lr

()t r

20 Month
Aver age

R ,A, t,

.1 9.28a

4 . 80 6-74

5, 84 8.60

6 .9 :i 6.$F8

7.03 6.63

8 .59 9.61

6 .53 7.62

W2 ,.
'L:4R

CMU OA

30, . T TA TI o,,
UATO '-4 N TOTAL

7.7-73 7 7. 8 0 8.87 21 8.98 1 4. 0'? P6 2..5V4IA 0.; 2o6 .6,60 4 ep 2 81 .. .


9.42
2.'3

50 .07

6.68 3.8 2. 4

b.o9 370 59 24 . .7
7 .

6.5

I.9U1h J0.68 .

7.P79

T.17 IP.13 ,94 6.61 P


206 68

.8,.2

8.27 5.16

9,94 8.07 .72 _7 .1_ C 118 .43


-

11.22

b, 7 7.79 6.33 6.6 .6 9 -

Ill CORPS

!i !.T

TA L 3RD O IIATIODT
UVCRS

7,71 6.4RVNA0 4 .,38 7 4. ,'2 6 . ,1 0 14j . . 12, 4,2 2

6.92 6.2.3 5- .6; _.OO

8 6. 3.6Z
1. 0, 5"

7.1 3.31

4.98

L.93 6.87 . .. . . 2b 4
7. co

1.0.68 6.68 6.z7 9 ! ,3b . .. . 9.31

RVVA
TOTAL

.',0
9.70
7.34 6.4o
7.358

10.66 11.16
W0,66 11i.16
8.u3 6. 1w Z ...... O
7.66

8.97
b.97
59.92 6 28 . 3 .o
6.21

.97

7.24
7.20

L4.36

2. 1 6.60
1o.25 6 .7 .73: .
9.20

7.._ 96./ .
6.09
7 6 . 33
7.50

.94

SRVITJAl

LIS ,',, 3

A ZO
TOTAL

8.11 5.97 !!.


7.59

7.31 6 .1 Z.Z31
7.22

6.28 .9 5.93
6.C1

_/ Source:

JCS-GUAVA.

"CONFIDENTIAL
I E

.5
111e kill rat-io for US forY C , quarter 1967 and did n. ontit early 1953. Prior to Anril 17--:

CONFIDENTIAL
.

threugh December it ave~raged . Arxericans per enemy KIA during averagi- k:ill ratio remained th

..

ri the sc(' thr T-:t ofesiein i_-7.i; -. ron l_ -k.1 more the ' eney killEd In contrast, the R'.AF -th o neriods.
-.

...... Table 4 shows that in CTZ .:hhay.' lzs favorable kill ratios: force. ratios. Conversely, RVINAP they kill a lot of VC.

}:ill more ene.y they rat!_s generated low 1ill - ct 7e-ter kill ratios in CTZ where
:-ations

!'!"i':,

ENE.EMY 'KIA VS A~~Iugust . - . . ?. "._ .

?ATIOS/ R -"
En/Fr

.IA
u

Kill Ratio

Rank

I CTZ III CTZ II CTZ IV CTZ

3-177,
24503 !92'9 2_ 5 2

7.62

7.79
8.27

3
2

""

2
4

8.94 6.53 7.96


.

RVINAF I CTZ IV CTZ


III CTZ

13036
12'7"

1
4

II 'TZ a/

53 05.16

Source:

JCS GUAVA

an average of 3 KIA for every Table 5 shows that enemy fore weapon lost as a result of large alliei zerations. The ratio has remained relatively stable. Third nation forces _:zured twice as many weapons per enemy KIA as the US forces; RVN1AF zat:- 204 more than the U.S. forces.

Best Available Copy


CO;.,FIDENTIAL ISO

CONFIDENTIAL
TABLJ 5

".';;-,LKIA Yl',i "I'MY WM:PO'N LOST


1967 Aug4th 1st

N LARGEt- UNIT OPERATIO.'S ;/

2nd

3rd

4th

Ist

Se vo

Qr

qtr

Otr

20 Nonth

q~tr

at,7

Ztr

Total

Us. -Ea'ory KLIA


Etnr
I

34'30)
Docst L: l
ss e

62o4
2040 3,-01 3719
1133 3.28

10571
.2920 3.62 5005
1749 2.86

10283
2.27

8718
439 3.57 4689
1565 3.00

10501
3425 3.07 4990 2074
2.41

27,1S
7102

77696,
23168 3.35 34904
12407 2.81

"' ; l;oo '" W

6.2 5.51 245k


1204 2.04

o 4530

3.89
8546
.1 6

Emy "M,
P Enemy Weapons Losses KIA per Weapon Lost 39rd Nation:

5496
1202 4.57

1480

Enemy KIA Enemy Weapons Losses KIA per W1epon Lost TOTAL: Enemy KIA

750 488
1.54

1253 711
1.76 11176 3884 2.88

1.277 935
1.37 16853

871 711
1.23 16650

12147 550

P36 210

825 2.09
37360

395

6459 4OOO
1.61
119059

2.27
14654

1.3.2
15727 P.75

Efnety ';Napons Lcases K.A per Wea;on Lost

6639 2314
2.M7

5604

3.01

64)L3

2.58

40'4

3.22

57.09

11067
3.38

39575

3.01

a/ Source:

JOS GUAVA.

CONFIDENTIAL
--

D V IAL
CO."BAT PERFORMANICE OF US AND S: 5ummary. in 1968, .,.j:., thecombat b."de

ARV5 Divisions assu7me:-r.ore of; -the combat burden

but their performance " ine. well below that of the Wide disparities exis; among the US Divisions and among the ARVN divisions, in terns rf enemy and friendly combat deaths and kill ratios. US divisions which inflicted and took "high combat deaths in 1968 tenaeiz to htave low kill ratios and vice versa. The ARVM pattern wag os;osite, with the high combat loss divisions having the highest kSiiZ ra-tios. There seems to be no consistent relationship be:ween the level of friendly combat deaths in an ARVN division an: its desertion rate.

"US Divisions.

Method each US and ARVIN division in large oerations!_: kill ratios, percentage of total enemy killed, and percentage of fr-"ndly killed. friendly killed by operation, not by unit, in the weekly OPREP-5 messages. The total enemy and friendly killed in eazh operation during a week were divided among the individual battalions listed as participating in the operation that week. The individual battalions were then hand matched to the proper divisions and the totals for eszh division and kill ratios were computed. Thus, the data is only approxizate, but all we have. Since two full years are covered, the numbers are probably good enough for trend analysis and to give us a reasonably accurate cicture of each division's performance in killing VC/NVA. Of course, a unit's lccation, the enemy it faces, its mission, and a host of other variables affect the three measures we are using, and the results of our analysis must be Judged -,with these factors in mind.

Three measures are used in this analysis to compare the performance of

The data came from a computer file u-sed on reports of total enemy and

. ..

,'

US Divisons
* Table 1 shows that the enemy killed by US divisions in large operations rose 90% at a cost of only 32% more US' ccnbat deaths in 1968; the average enemy/US kill ratio went from 7:1 in 1967 to 10:1 in 1968. The disparities among the nine US ii-.-isions in terms of combat deaths and kill ratios are quite large. In 196$ the kill ratios varied from 4:1 for the 4th Infantry Division tc 16:2 for the kmerical Division. The 1st Infantry Division inflicted 23% of the enz. KIA inflicted by the US divisions and took 22% of the US KIA; the -th Division figures were 1% and 3%. _/ Three companies or more.

Best Available Cop,


CONFIDENTIAL
22.

..

CONFIDENTIAL
ZNE~f/,-,NDL K IA IU IAO V T Ot' ATIOR,

January Enemy
Killed

,runa

% of
Eemy

Friendly
Killed-

%of
Friendly

Hn/Fr
Kill Raito

Fnemy

of
RMl

lot InfnntrY 14th tf' nhry 9th Infanary 25th Infantrty

23M8 2757

1762

2971
32.91

12 14

27't 310

10 11.

6ti 8:1
70:1 8el
'21

1053

12 352
723 19

11
17:161

063
14136
21;7 14730

1841

11

10
L 214
12

lst Air Cavalr Diviion 3rd Marine Division

11st,Air Cavalry Division let Iarins Division

738 2169

16

100

1,4 14
15 20

l746 17

12

71

11

7 19

i,

i~lst.A87 Total Ai4 0a170

3718 5686

1iiso 7Il1 41vlt 00 1 LU6

1
IM

1 1000

'.lot

Division AiMavaryn

is

613

14

7l:1

S,'

/ Source: GUAVA 0P3P-.

in a weekldy OPREW- given operation in ratios participating listed as by A to battalions ensun/trieudlj were compted. division and then hand rynDatohed report. Battalions

Data is not preolse.

Used to showe trends only.

Computed by apportioning

S~CONFIDENTIAL
A a
lo

12

82

Ma

~ -%,

3r

Main

Diiso

7567.. 17

24

....................

360....,.

owl'
4','

July - Deoembtor

Enm

Ki led

% of~
Enemy 103

P rioniy
Killed

FrtendlY

%of

En/ft
Kill Ratio

r,0 .
ei XL2U

of'

F'Iandly
Killed

Friendly

%of

En/Fr
Kill Ito

1841 1868 1671 4136 21J7


11

658624
9
36 2
NO 0 A

11 11 10 2 12 7

618 371 258 38 ~' 4~633 33 212 2 11 '243

68t3. 14 10 15 13 8 9

2B15 5:,.9 7:1] 4: 1 3~.7327 1311 101112 5 -39 -"53 2Z7 . ,5oo

7
1 13 12. 20 8 12

415 681 570 804 716 312 666 ______01 1222

8
13 10 15 1 12

8:1 6:3. 1011 9:1 71, i11 1i _"

3368
9691

170 1053 .151


T A A 129

691
39 1
V A I

10
21:

11:1

~
L A S

:1

116

23

1579

~'

560
1259

?11E
L Z 10:1

1- 462
f 695 8125

i~5 12679

4,~2t
10

1 10
12

192 508
7142

92 3
8
10

0 4:1
13:1
1111

7?:112 3
l11: 16, i00
81 10:1

Ito)I0:1
11-176 7C442

72 7
4 16 100 1361 6721 7120

1
100
21

14:1 1:
: 1;

v0

~ 4730 3 602 S2190


i vor% Ang

17 10

1;

4'76 4+29 2677

99

CONFIDENTIAL

. ..

CONFIDE NTIAL CD
"OIn L:O, divisions which took amn inflicted, high combo t death8 tsndtcd

to have low kill ratius; divisions with low enemy and friendly KIA tended to have high kill ratios. Tht 4th Division, with th,>. lowest KIA and lowest kill ratio, was a notable exception. During 1967 the pattern was not clear. The two Marine divisions in I CTZ consistently carried a heavy share of the combat. In 1967-68 they accounted for 29-30% of the enemy KIA by US divisions, and for 35-38% of the US KIM. In 1968 the ist Infantry Division for 23% of the because action to more much sawUS apparently (Army) n16.Teoes 71 n it accounted KZA, compared and 220,1 of' enemy KIA probably stems from the heavy III CTZ fighting during the Tet and May offen-

K
',j i,
/1'

sives.
Vietnzaese Divisions (ARVN) Interpretation of the ARVN figures requirws even more caution than interpretatiou of the US figures, because they are based on preliminary casualty data, which ,W represent only 67% of the final, refined casualty totals. This, in turn, may mean that the ARVN kill ratios are significantly less favorable than shown in Table 2 and that AWVT losses are closer to US losses than we indicate. (It is also probable that the US loss figures are too low, but we have no basis for estimating how low.) In comparing ARVN and US division death rates, the reader should also remember that the Vietnamese Regioual and Popular forces, which are not covered here, account for a significant portion of total RVAF combat deaths. Thus, we are comparing combat deaths for almost all US forces with combat deaths for about half of the RVNAF forces# As expected, the data show that enemy KIA, friendly KIA and average enemy/ friendly kill ratios of the Vietnamese divisions were lower thani those for the US divisions. But the Vietnamese divisions showed significant improvement during 1968. In 1967 US divisions killed 4.6 times as many enemy and sustained 3.6 times a. many friendly KIA as the ARVN. In :L968 the US divisions killed 3.4 times as many enemy and sustained 2.3 times as many KIA. This indicates that ARVN took on more of the combat burden in 1968. Table 2 shows that the enemy killed by ARVN divisions in large operations rose 160% at a cost of 108% more ARVN combat deaths in 1968: the average enemy/A.RVN kill ratios went from 5:1 in 1967 to 7:1 in 1968. The disparities among the 10 ARVN divisions in terms of combat deaths and kill ratios are also quite large. In 1968 the kill ratios varied from 2:1 for the 18th Division to 9:1 for the let Division. The 1st Division inflicted 23% of' the enemy KIA by ARVN divisions and took 17% of the ARVN KIA; the 18th Division figures were 1% and 3%. The two lowest performers, the 18th and 5th Divisions, are both in III CTZ, which is also the location of the US 1st Infantry Division, which inflicted and took the highest losses amongi th UiS divisions in 1968. I,

CONFIDENTIAL
. . ......................... .

CONFIDENTIAL
JA".WRY
Enemiy M
_

JULY-

of

_ -Y 7r .,b-

of _

EnVir

EneMW

Of

P~ rIeft 'd

23dIfnr

21:1

137

10

366

~~~~18th 22nd

Infant*ry36 7th Znrantry 9th Inantry

Infantry

1
233 1176 813 119

3r
14,129 25

3
DA

14
0 0 A A

811N

l Inantd eort.

at01 e 2

2nd Inaneryg

37vi 1n

20d

8i24

7ratiol

1aio

20e

1o66

08

23rd Infantry CONFIDENTIAL33


25hIfnr 38 127 1 1 2

g
0

op

4p A 1. 6 1.19 1, 2 00
A T A

A.16 38 51 62. A 15 40 205

27 % L10A B L )

2pL6
1.:2.

37 0 9.
n.

6 a

7 2.7

411 0:2. 61 O:il 6:2.

22.1. 302 2114 A0 +

8 1.08 12
209

2pbk

33 1 8.. .14 2 14

682 1 3
631

AA AV IAL376 A V A I LA B Li E 7

36 996
43

13 36

0. 1 12. 2
loll1

5
09 IOU 10

8:2

1491

14

250

90

20

7
.

81 311 3:2.1
14a2 6:t2.

~Ik8 ~

20

..

42 3 2. 14
12.

5 87 165:2.

at

J
3:2.

1.
2. 2.0 5

414 14.88
12 F6 2

ACONFIDVENTIALB L 613. 12. U.4


15

.314 7:.

3 16
2.0

2:2. 612. ell

2.372

1.5

2.2

497 32.3

l4.

22',

1.

CONFIDENTIAL

........

CONFIDENTIAL
The relationship between total :cz':t deaths and kill ratios for ARVNI divisions is the opposite of the US _-at.ern. A.R',I units inflicting and baking high losses tend to have more .. av.rab._"iL! ratios than units inflicting and taking low losses. Thus, the a:-.N':e A.VN units seem to fight both more efficiently and harder than the ncsrer ::'.its. AMVN Combat Deaths Versus Deser ?ates _-R

There seems to be little consistent relationshio between an ARVN division's friendly combat death rate and its .- ei desertion rate (Table 3). One might expect that units with high losses would have high desertion rates and vice versa, but this does not occur cften enough to generalize. For example, the 1st and 7th Divisions ranked 1-2 in friendly losses, but had relatively low desertion rates. Conversely, the 21st- and 25th Divisions also had high losses

accompanied by very high desertion rates.

and 18th Divisions, fell into the -id-level desertion rates. Thus, it seems clear that a division's desertion rate is affected strongly by factors other than its level of losses.

The two poorest performerv,

the 5th

ARVN DIVISICN SIZE UNITS DESERTION R.=- S/CEFF7PC TIh SS

(Large Unit 0Ocerations)

1967

%of En % Fr
Killed KIA

Desertion

1968
of En
Killed

Kill
Ratio

ate/l-OO 0
Strength

%Fr
KIA

Desertion

Kill
Ratio

Rate/lOOO
Strength

ist Inf 2nd Inf 7th Inf

37
20

33
19 2

5:1 6:1
10:1

12.5 10.8

23

17 17 16

9:1 8:1 6:1

27.9 28.6 28.5

9th Inf
21st In:
5th Inf

5 5
12
1

14
15

4 6
8

8:1 11:1
1:1

e2.0 =6.7
27.5
2L.8

11 11.
3

10
13 4

8:1
6:1
5:1

50.1 48.4
30.6

18th Inf
22nd Inf 23rd Inf

1
12

3
14

1:1
5:1

31.2
12.2

3
5

2:1
5:1

25th Inf
a/ Source: Tables,

3 4

4 7

4:1
3:1

ll.7

4 4
14

38.6
17.6

-1.6

8
13

3:1 8:1

25.7

45.5

GUAVA OPREP-R. Table 4B.

Deserticn rates from SEAPRO January Statistical

Best Available C.,,


.... I .CONFIDENTIAL

""

188~

CONFIDENTIAL
,i .

COMbtjAT Ph.RFO9MANCE OF US AND ARVNv DXViSZOivS:

AN UYT'ATE

inSummar. ARYN divisions asaweund more of thie ioombat burdoln ~n. 068 have continued thise trend in first quacrter 2969. However, the'ir performaco remained wsZ4 bsZow that of the US divis.ion;. Wt.dec'hparitie. oontinu2 to exist among the US dt.vieione and among the ARVIV .ivisione, in terme of enemy and friana.y combat deaths and 1hit6Z ratios. The ARVN th and 28th Divuieions infqiat and take tow oasuattise despit. the high oaesuate, taken anda inft.i sd by the US let, Infantry and lot Air OatZry Dit.ieions fi t'ping in tne sams area (IW CTZ).
Method N:

"Three measures ard used in this analysis o compare the performance of each US and ARVN division in large operati na /: kill ratios, percentage of total enemy killed) and percentage of friendly killed.
The data came from a computer file based reports of total enemy and friendly killed by operation, not by unit, in on the weekly OPREP-5 messages. The total enemy and friendly killed in each operation during a week were divided among the individual battalions liebad as particigating in the operation that week, The individual battalions were then hand matched to the proper divisions and the totals for each division and kill ratios were com. puted. Thus, the data is only approximate, but all we have. Since more than two full years are covered, the numbers are probably good enough for trend' analysis and to give us a reasonably accurate picture of each division's performance in killing VC/NVA. Many of our findinga are substantiated by data from the "System for 'Evaluating RVNAF" (SEER) published in the MACV "ARIVN Marine and Naval Forces Advisory Report." Of course, a unit's location, the enemy it faces, its mission, and a host of other variables affect the three measures we are using and the results of our analysis must 'be Judged with these factors in mind. US Divisions Table 1 shows that during the first quarter 1969 US divisions killed the enemy in large operations at about the same quarterly rate as in 1968 (17,018 vs, 17,610) but US deaths were 18% lower. The average enemy/US kill ratio went from 10:1 in 1.968 to 12:1 in first quarter 1969. The disparities among the nine US divisions in terms of eneiny killed, combat deaths and kill ratios are quite large. In 1968, the kill ratios varied from 4:1 for the 4th Division to 16:1 for Amertcal Division, The lot Division inflicted 231 of the enemy KIA inflicted by US divicions and took 22% of the US KIA; the 4th Division figures were 1i and 3%. In 1969 Similar !/

,,.+'k

Three companien or incrE.

CONFIDENTIAL ........

TA O

CONFIDENTIAL
disparities exist. The kill ratios varied from 5:1 for the 4th Division to 26:1 for the 9th Division. Thc 9h D;vision inflicted 33% of the enmy KIA inflicted by US divisions and too", 1z, of the US KIA; the 4th Division figures were 6% and 12%. In 1968, US divisions which took and inflicted high combat deaths tended to have low enemy/friendly kill ratios; divisions with low enemy and friendly KIA tended to have high kill ratios. in first quarter 1969 the pattern reverses somewhat; the 3 divisions with high friendly and enemy KIA had the 3 highest kill ratios. In 1967-1968 the two Marine divisions in I CTZ consistently carried a hea;%y share of the combat, accounting for 29-30Yf of enemy KIA by US divisions, and for 35-3851a of the US KIA. In 1969 the figures were substantially reduced to 16% and 25% respectively. Also in 1969, all four US divisions in I CTZ reported the same kill ratios (8:1). Conversely, in III Corps the 1st Air Cavalry Div and 1st Infantry Division together accounted for 37% of the enemy and took 37% of the US KIA. The increase probably reflects the heavy III CTZ fighting in late 1968 and first quarter 1969. Vietnamese Divisions (ARNT) Interpretation of the AR-N figures requires even more caution than interpretation of the US figures, because they are based on preliminary casualty data, which may represent only 67% of the final, refined casualty totals. This, in turn, may mean that the ARN kill ratios are significantly less favorable than shown in Table 2 and that ARVN losses are closer to US losses than we indicate. (It is also probable that the US loss figures are too low, but we have no basis for estimating how low.) In comparing ARVN and US division death rates, the reader should also remember that the Vietnamese Regional and Popular forces, which are not covered here, account for a sigoificant portion of total RVNAF combat deaths. Thus, we are comparing combat deaths for almost all US forces with combat deaths for about half of the RVNAF forces. As expected, the data show that enemy KIA, friendly KIA and average enemy/ friendly kill ratios of the Vietnamese divisions were lower than those for the US divisions. But the Vietnamese divisions showed significant improvement during 1968. This trend is continuing in 1969. In 1967 US divisions killed 4.6 times as many enemy and sustained 3.6 times as many friendly KIA as the ARVm. In 1968 the US divisions killed 3.4 times as many enemy and sustained 2.3 times as many KIA. In first quarter 1969 US divisions killed 2.9 times as many enemy and sustained 1.7 times as many KIA. This steady downward trend indicates that ARVN are progressively assuming more of the combat burden. Table 2 also shows improvement in the ARV kill ratios between 1967 (5:1) and 1968 (7:1) with the 1968 average kill ratio of 7 to I continuing into 1969. The disparities among the 10 A.R,7 divisions in terms of combat deaths and kill ratios are also quite large. In 1968 the kill ratios varied from 2:1 for the 18th Division to 9:1 for the ist Division, in 1969 the range was 3:1 for the 5th Division to 17:1 for the !st Division. The two lowest performances

CBest

Available C~q

4k

M,,+ ENTIAL
TABLE 1. 11.U DIVISIONS EN-E! IY/n '4,-DLY KIA IN LARGE UNIT O-ERATIONS

lip

(96-16b
Enemy

Xilluer,

% of Enm

Friendly

Ki 11641

of Friendtly

tn/Pr Kill Ratio

let Infantry 4th Infantry 9th Infantry

282.' 4199

25th Infantry
I est Air Cavalry Division 101st Air Cavalry Divi.ion ost blarine Division 3rd Marine Division 3 i , Total

4839 4458
7327 2875 4351 6 37015

7 311 13

415" 681.570..

8 13 .0

7:1J 6:. 8:1

12
20 8 12 17 100

804L
716, 312t 666:: 1225 .

15
13 6 12 23

6:1
10:1 9:1 7:1

53b9

1CO

5:1 7:1

1968
Ist Infantry 4th Infantry 9th Infantry "25th Infantry lst Air Cavalry Division 101st Air Cavalry Division Americal lst Marine Division 3rd Marine Division Tital 16146

847
7990 6695 8128 50o0 41422 9998 11176 70442

23 1 11 10 12 7 6 14 16 100

157P ,19vI' 508' 7I42!' 370': 2721i 1236" 1i16'} 7126

22 3 10 1?18+" 8 10

5
4 17 21 100

10:1 4.: 1 11:1 13:1 11:1 14:1 16:1 8:1 7 1 10:1

let Infantry 4th Infantry 9th Infantry 25th Infantry ,st Air Cavalry iOl1t Air Cavalry Axierical 1 M Xarit: 3rH M.trinr!

2501 15 266'0. 18 96,i 6 181.f!/ 12 5582 33 218, 15 DA T A K 0 T A V A I L A B LI 3815 22 '2S3j 39 495 3 65 4 803 5 9), 7 I1L9 6 143 10 17'? 10 1

9.1 5:1 26:1 5.3:1 8:1 8:1 8-1 8:1

.vur ! Nata R
C.'mp',tel by

t1L:patin; tllh IA hivlih. hf .'.L

I.t, I,.. t p ,'c U. (,d t.) .,ho" Erer.i c<,'../, " Y K.A x.? hnHR. iq.t', !r 14 ,+.-4 t.- - , . n m r -/ gtvjit c,.?ratlon In a w,-(,'.]y (PitP0-) ropirt.. g.r. Pattali ns werc In::V+ by i'tv I. aw.l U ' : w' , . pu-t, I,
.A .. .

rtl

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFHOENTIAL
in 1968, the 18th and 5th are b"th '.n 'II CTZ, which is. the location of the 1st US Division which inflicted anr tcoc 'h highest losses among US divisions in

1968. In 1st quarter 1969, the Viotn.:_ese a~th and-5th divitions repoated their
poor performance while the JS. Ist Division and let Air Cavalry Division in the somie CTZ together inflicted and took -.he highest losses among the US divisions in the same period. Our evaluation cf the "-orst" and best ARVN divisions is substantiated by advisor evaluations reported by MACV. The relattonship between total ccrnbat deaths and kill ratios for ARVN divisions wa3 the opposite of the US tatern. In 1968 ARVN units infli.cting and taking high lossos tended to have r.ore favorable kill ratios than units inflictina and taking .ow losses. In '.t quarter 1969, the trend is not clear.

"ARV3 Combat Deaths Versus DesertIon Rates


t There seems to be little coneis-ent relationship between an ARVN division's friendly combat death rate and. its annv.al desertion rate (Table 3). One might expect that unita with high losses would have high desertion rates and vice versa, but this does not oceur often enough to generalize. Lor example, the lit and 7th Divisions ranked 1-2 in friendly losses in 1968, but had relatively low desertion rates. Conversely, the 21st and 25th Divisions had high losses accompanied by very high desertion rates. The two poorest performers, the 5th and 18th Divisions, fell into the mid-level desertion rates. Thus, it seems clear that a division's desertion rate is affected strongly by factors other than ito level of losses. Overall, the divisions' desertion rates declined 23' in lot quarter 1969 from the 1968 average. The 9th and 25th divisions cut desertion by more than the MACV goal of 50 percent. Seven of th6i division lowered their desertion

rates while three divisions increasel theirs (21st, 18th and 2nd).

CONFIDENTIA L

CONFIDENTIAL
TAK'. 2 a/

H-Z'Vr
1967
lst In~antry 2nd Inf'antry 23rd Infa~ntry 25th Infantry 5th Infantry 18th Infantry 22nd Infantry

r/FI9zMNLY XTIA VT' LARGE U."IT OFERATIONS


'TOTAL
_____

Enemy Kill.ed

ofi Enemy

Friendly Kil.led

%of Frienily
33
196:1

Tn7FrKill Ratio

2956j

16o8
221 302 114 36

37 20 3 4
1 153 12

491.
230

6:1 4
41l

58
108 120 209 4

7th Infantry ILI


9bh Irdafntry 21st Infantry

996 376 438


24

7' 8 3
14

311
: 0.7:1 5:1

536
286

2 1910 6

10:1
!

~~~~Total790

00

1l, l

lo nfnry4

38

24

397 265
313

13

9:1 5:1 8:1.

765Inatr 2 4

8
10

5t

2tInaty2937 inanr

55

14

30

12341k-

g Ifnty2602 21st Infantry

20hIfaty14 3 22dIfnr 610 45 169If~nr 314 5 11 2234 11

82

333
471 303 393

1 58 30 14

27:1 81 61:2 9:1 6:1

~th Infantry
23td Infantry 21nt Infantry

234 169 226

3 3 4

134 15 14

161: 10 4

64:1 7;1

J.%/Aii{P5 i~ raa ot pr,-rln. User] to chow tr,.nis only. Coma/ Surce: put~ed by apringen-,nry/rrt.vnm1,v KtA t., battalionu~ listed as paLicipating naw.eelkv OP1REP-5 roort * Batttailon. wk-re theLa h~il znatohnd In P~iven ourtu r 7c.~ omputcd. '.q divisiovi sani ratioa b/Avvrag, k~ill ratio froperon.

UNPU~flNTI Al

Il

CONFIDENTIAL

ARVN DIVISIC'N SIZE LMITS DESERTI0NE:Z ~~S//ECTIVENES ~Large Ur.tt 0~erations) 1968
Desertion
Kill Ratio Ra.e/1000 Strength

-.

Deserlon
Rate/lO00 Strength

% of
1st Inf 2ndl nf

En Killed

%Fr
KIA

%of

En Killed

% Fr KIA

Kill Ratio

23

17

9:1

7th Int

9th Inf 21st Inf 5th Inf

18th

22nd Inf 23rd Inf 25th Inf

mt

:4 15 11 11 3

17 16 10 13

1 4
4 1.

8 13

4 3 5

8:1' 6:1 8:1 6:1 5:1 2:1 5:1 3:1 8:1

27.9 28.6

28.5

50.1 48 3o.6

3 45 9 9 17 2

17:1

17.5

38 16 10 16

38.6
17.6 25.7 .5

4
4 3

4 7
4 1 3

8:1 4:1 6:1 7:1 3:1

23.0 17.8 23.4 59.4 21.9

4a
7:1 14:1 9"1

45-5
18.5 P-0.3 17.0

Sourc'e GUAVA 0PKEP-R. Desertion rates from BEAPR0 March Statistical Tables, Table 4B. _/ Estimate based on Jan-Feb data. xarch data not available at time of publication.

DE

--.

CONFIDE NTIAL
-u-n---...|.-u

I
P

it

CONFIDENTIAL
IMPAO2 OF US MANSUVR BATTALIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Summary. A high~y tentative preZiminary anaiyeis *uggest that, in provinoas where US pressnoe ha. beon high, a signifioant
Sincrease in US batations is associated with az rise in

1RES aecurity

eoores and deoreased ARVN aotivity. ConvereeZj, smaZZ increaase have Zittte or no effeot on security eoorse but are accompanied

by increased ARVN activity. of US battaZtione.

For' provinoes w~her'e US presence is

4ow, no apparent effects are associated with changes in teveZo additionaZ US batta~iona but revoret quicky to countrywide patterns. This analysis is a preliminary survey of historical data in an attempt to determine the impact of US maneuver battalions on Hamlet Evaluation System (Hs) scores, enemy activity, and RVXAF activity in South Vietnam. We examined countrywide, corps and sample province data available in Washington, starting with January 1967. We regard our observations and findings from this initial assessment as promising, but highly tentative. Future papers will refine the approach to achieve greater validity. Y Approach We examined correlation patterns for HES security scores against US battalions employed countrywide and by Corps Tactical Zone. The hypothesis for this investigation was that increases in US battalions shouAld result in increases in relatively secure (A+B+C) KEG scores and a reduction in either the contested (D+4) or VC controlled (V) categories; a reduction in US battalions should have opposite effects. In the HES part of the analysis, we examined correlation results for 11 of the 27 SVN provinces which had a history of US battalion presence. Our first two findings listed below result from this initial investigation. For a more detailed look at the impact of changes in US maneuver battalion deployment, we narrowed the number of sample provinces to five, and looked at the effect of changes on enemr and RVNAF activity. Data for each province was displayed graphically for interpretation and observationL leading to the reminder of the findings below. Tentative Findings 1. When the data is aggregated countrywide or by Corps Tactical Zone, no consistent relationship between the presence of US battalions and HES security scores emerges for either total hamlets or total population. 1/ However, for total population, an increase in US battalions is associated with an inorease in secure population and a decrease in contested or VC controlled populations for countrywide data, I Corps and IV Corps.

Enemy activity seems to react briefly to

V,

17

Total popu~lation does not include thu population of Saigon and the other autonotous cities, but does include the other urban population,

CONFIDENTIAL
I-

zI

COUF IIE N I AL
P. When provinces are grouped %:ording to the numbers of US battalions present (instead of by CTZ), the proirinzes with more than four US battaions present each month since April 1967 show a pattern consistent with our hypothesis, in which addition of battalions seems to raise Mfl8 scores, and withdrawal seems to lower them. However) the time lag for effects to become apparent varies throughout the range available (from 0 to 8 months), depending on the province. Deployment of one US battalion into a new area, or esmll increases levels, seems to have little effect on hamlet security scores at the province level. These relatively small increases, ho'ever, are

"over previous

3.

usually followed by a period of greater.ARVTN activity which, in turn, seems


associated with an increase of secure hamlets.

4. A large influx of US battalions is aocompanied not only by a rise in security scores but also in an almost immediate decrease in ARMT activity.
A 5. If not balanced by increased ARVMT activity, a decrease of more than 50 per cent of the US battalions present seems to be associated with a reduced rate of growth for secure hamlets, 'but not necessarily in a lose.

tothe6.

Enemy activity seems to show Pn initial marked increase subsequent

(.'

Sto

the appearance of additional US battalions or entry of US battalions into a new area. This activity seems to subside quickly, with the enemy apparently reverting to his previously planned campaign. Details of the Analysis To allow for future refinement and to accommodate tenuous data, we chose the three broad areas of possible US force impact already mentioned. Since HES security scores are clearly defined and reflect a very important facet of the war, their relationships to US battalion deployments were used as the initial screening device for* this analysis. We assumed that relationships between US maneuver battalions and HES scores would vary by province to some extent, but that grouping the provinces by reported levels of US presence might yield the most consistent Accordingly, we categorized US battalion employment during 1967-68 pattern. in the following levels of presence for the 24 month January 1967-Deoember 1968 periodi

High
Medium

Low

More than 96 battalion months. Between 24 anl 96 battalion months. Les than 24 battalion months.

We also included a reference pro'rince (Phong Dinh) with no recorded US presence. / A battal=on month represents the reported presence of a US battalion in a province during one month. (Divide by 24 to yield the average battalions present during the Ler..ol.)

S. ......& .. .... " . ........ . ... ..... . .

..

. . .. .

CONFIDENTIALi
. ',.....'i ":

,, :': ' , ' "...

: :': i :......

............

..... : "

41k

CONFIDEi IAL
While IrES security soOren are a tabulated statistic, no general agreement on a single indicator of enemy or RVNAU activity exists. For the purpose (o this article, we define an enemy activity index (VO/NVA AI) as the ratio of VC/NVA total attacks to VC/NVA strength for any given month and pr'ovince. Similarly, the RVNA1, activity index (ARVI At) is defined as the average battalicn days of operation per RVNAM battalion. Correlation of HES Security and US Battalions
-

CourtrywIde an-4-by -Corp

Tactical zone

...

The influence exerted on the RES security scores in any, given area can be both direct and indirect, depending on the local situation. We therefore used a regression technique containing a lag routine in assessing the extent to which the scores correlated with the presence of US bittalions during the period April 1967 to November 1968. in platting lhe number of US3 battalions present against the security score for each of the 20 months, the lagging technique essentially shifts the security score intol curve its fluctuations match, as closely as possible, those of the fixed US battalnon curve. Table I shows the results of o recr gression analysis by CTZ using arhe lag which gave the mos t significant upgorrelation value in etch case. Zero entries indicate either no eorrelation trends for relation wa not s signifacst at the 95% confidence level regardof wlehs In c this eg.paper we are more interested in basic patterns than in the amount of correlation, so we have included only the signs of the tsignificant correlations for comparison with our hyothesis. Since corps and countrywide data aggregation in Table I shows no clear pattern. In the Countrinide, I CTZ and (to some extent) V CTZ columns a the total population sco prese with edected result, showing a general . upgrading thedualthe three score categories. The total hamlet a orrelation trends for the&L coltumns, as well as all other entries, show little agreset with expect.ed r.esults. In raot, It CTZ scores seem relatively indifferent to the presence of US battalions.no ! o

S~~men

~Battalion

M!onth Distribution

Since corps and countrywide results were not encouraging, we decided to investigate the situation by province, As a preliminary step, we tabulated the number of battalions present during each month L'or 1967 and 1968. This served the dual purpose of provi.ding us the total battalion months by province and highlighting rignificant shifts of US battalions Into or out of a particula.v auea.

' .

CONFIDENTIAL
-i .. .. I i .. ... I II I I ]i ' i

CONFIDENTIAL
TABLE I

REGRESSI10t Al1ALYSISI j/ HES SECURITY SCORES AGAIMST US BATTALIONS I CTZ Total. Hamlets:
Relatively Secure (A (D+E.) VC Controlled (V) 0 0 0 ..
+0

II CTZ

III OTZ

IV CTZ

Countrywide

tContested

+
-

+
-

Total Population
Relatively Secure (A+B+C) Contested (D+E) VC Controlled (V)
+
-.

+
-

0 0 0

+
-

+ +

+ +
-

Signifcant positive o~orrelation.

Significant negative correlation. 9 No significant correlation., Table 2 displays the total battalion months for 1967, 1968 and their sum. The table also shows US nresence levels by the high, medium or low categories previously explained. From this display we selected at least one province from each category in all four CTZ (except IV Corps, where the

battalion in Kien Hoa has been deployed only recently).

The 11 circled

selections in the table exhibit US battalion employment level changes of interest such as:

BJ.nh Long, Binh Thuan, Lam Dong and Phuoc Long.

1.

Entry where no US battalions had previously operated - Kontum,

2. Significant increases over previous commitment - Quang Tri and Dinh Tuong. Significant withdrawals - Quhng Due, Binh Dinh, Pleiku, llau Nghia, Lam Dong, and Phuoc Long. 4. Consistent US battalion employ.er.t at a low level - Binh Thuan.

3.

5.
6.

Consistent U3 battalion enrp];',,z:.,t at a meditm Ievel - Binh Long Consitent US battalion emp .gn.ent at a high level
-

aud flinh Tuong.


Quang Tri,

EBinh Dinh, Hau Nghia and Dinh Tuong.

CONFIDENTIAL
L
. ..

CONFIDENTIAL
TABLE 2 MO ThI oTALs 1967-68 0%t m &ommyIV US MvA.M'/E BATMLIONS BY P110VINOE (Battalion Months) 2.967 Quzng Tri Thua Thieri Nam qang Tin Qu~an Ngki 1I CTZ MEI Dinh Pleiku, K~ontuz Phu Yen Bink~ Thuan Knh Thuaxz Darlao Lam Doing *Quang Due Bon. 90 51 1u6 51 196:8 209 16,5 1.48 65 Total 299 216 264+ 1160 110 147 128 US Presence: Low Medium Hih X

PQ1Aang

64

46

UPhu

97 76 10 23 8 14 2 4 0 0

50 52 56 8 12 0 8 6 10 1

66
31 20 1~4 10 10(2 10 1. x X x

x
x

[Kien

Hsu Nha72 Long An Long Khanh Tay Ninh Binh Long GigaDinh Phuoc Long IV UM METtong Hog
__________10

30 31 1.2 3 0 0 30 0

54 43 30

126 73 .61

x x

46
34

58

9 9

37 -

9 9
--

x X
x

53 3.

830 1

x
7 10

Apuce:SJUAF Co~uber File. X% Used in the analysis. Correlation of HES Security Scores and US Batta.liong Selected Provinces

We groupe- thv3 eleven selected provinces according to the level of' US presenze ani a gin looked at the resultm of' the regression anaTlynis with rei'puct, to iMh securnity scores. Tabln 3, while showing variations similar to Table 1, loes indicate a pattern of good agreemzent with expoeted resultiu for the provinz-as with hi~gh US prevencc3. The amount of lag required for the

__

CONFIDENTIAL-

CONFIDENTIAL
best correlati.on varied ;onvidrerbly f-.
score category,

- .. n.

to province irl each

possibly showing the i-'!..:en.e or the l-0O , situation. Except for Dinh Tuong and Kontuin, pro',-In."o secLrlty scores in the Inliifferent to the presence medium and low level categories seem r.eati.ly of US battalions. DlInh Tuong mirrurs the ^.:c=rotide and TV CTZ pirture :'o! population security scorrps, while t-e V,::=um scores show a negative correlation. Since grouping the provinces by level :f US battalion presence provi~ed batter results than a CTZ groupirg, -,' have used this techliiue for the rest of this analysis. For the detaile. snalysis of LS battalions versua enemy activity, ARVN activity an4 ?TS scores all together, we

) t [,(a&

narrowed the ample from 11 down to 5 provin.ess:

quang Tri, Binh D.nh,

Dinh Tuong and Binh Thuan (because they ek-h have at least two of the US presence characteristics dismussefi tarlier' i. the paper) ant PhongfDinh a control province, with the same c.a.ac~ristica as Binh Thuan, but no US battalion presence),

ZkBLZ 3
REGRESSION ANALYSIS HES BEZURITY SCOR A'AINST US BATTALIONS

Y 11OTH,, APR 67 T.ROUGH NOV W 3 High US Presenoe Medium US PresenceV/ Low US PresenceW_/ Quang Binh Hau Q'Ang Drnh Bin Binh Lam Phuoc Tri Ding Pecie i'.ugjhia :in Tuong Kontum long Thuan Loin& Lo2n
Total Hamlets: Relatively Secure

(A+B+o)
C:ntested (D+E) VCControlled (V) Total Poxpulation:

+
.-

+
+

+
+

+
+

+
0

+
0
-

0
0 0

0
0 0

0 0
+

0
0 0

Relatively Secure (A+B+C)


Contested (D+E)

+
. -

+
. -

+
.

+
. . -

+
+ -

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

VC Controlled(V) 97o

8.' 0

more US battalion months.

21-96 US battalion months.


23 or i.esm US buttalton months,

CONFIDENTIAL
: ifi)

I.T1IFIDENTIAL
"'us
US txta',lion 7,nolO.net ,"rius Secure 11amd~t1_Ata -. LC(.,

We present this data for the zulecbed provinces as a .eries of five pairs of' graphso one pair for oach province. Flor each pair, the top graph displays US battalions versus total hamlets rated relatively secure (A+B+C) and ARVfI activity. The bottom graph depicts US battalions vwersu VC/NVA activity. Since in how change in US battalions ~compare with ch we are in noat th Intereated te aibethe g nrase

::nbs ~~~~--thhetcag bs ee.g~ ing technique used r was similar to a pr ce index. For each set of data, the average value for Ist quarter 1967 was used as a base figurep and ,each subsequent entry repreents the per cent change fro,%Lb that base level. The single exception It for US battalions In Binh Thuan province. Shnoe there were no u battalions opresent ast in quarter 1968, the actual number of battalions is plotted for that province. These p raphs are attached in order of descending US battalion presence lovel and elded the highly tentative oblervations which followt 0 respetiveUyS B Fntta orlions gSecure nand Hamlets sle provinces show either a constant secure hamlet score battAll five sa buor a small but steady iTt ovement us to the 1966 Tot ofensive, which caused a dtop of10-50 per cent. The iuTrovement in Quang Tri and Dinh ar ong during the pro-Tot period shows a step increase following a US battalion inwithc r ogress le than p o00 cent. or The associated lags were 6 and monthse treopectilvely. For Phong Dinh (no US battalions) the secure hamlet line shows gradual, steady inoreate prior to the Tot offensive. In Biath Thuan (one battalion new to the rea) and Binh Dinh (50 per cent decrease in US battalions) there was either no effect or the rosultant lag encountered the
blurring effects of' the Tot offensive.

.a

SUS

After the 1968 Tot offensive, quang Tri once again begins a sharp

Ssteadily

in the pest-Tot 1968 period, In Phong Dinh significant recovery began in August 1968 and Continued upward to substantial gains. In Binh Thuan a pattern emerges in the post-Tet period. The US b.ttalion drop is accompanied and followed by a decline in A+B+C hamlets, which then levels off throughout the rest Of 1968 as the'US battalion presence remains level. In BInh Dinh the pattern

rise in ABC hamlets about 6 months after a sharp rise the in US US battalions, leveling off for several months after battalions were substanttalle reduced. In are Dinh Tuong the cptverfor US battalion changes and A+B+C hamlet, changes quite similar
with progress

is

btill

not very clear.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
S ~U5
1. Battalions mild A.RVX Actbivity US Battulion Increanas - Binh :n.t., Quans TH. and Dinh Tuong i!

r i w

In Binh Thuan, one US battalion inLitially entered in August 1967. in Quang Tri and Dinh Tuong a US battalion inarease of around 100 per cent

occurs durine April and May 1967.

Following these changes in US deploy-

ment, ARVN activity showed a marked inczease and then a decrease to the

base level.
4

In all thr'ee provinces this Vw9s followed, at different intervals$,

!by

an erratic but aterdily increasing c2ir0 to activity levels well above the first quarter 1967 base activity level by December 1968. In Quang Tri and Dinh Tuong, increases of US battalie.ns to more than 250 per cent above base level seemed to depress ARVM activity. 2. US Battalion Decreases - Bimh Dinh and Quang Tri

Sby

by :a In Binh Dinh the 50 per cent withdrawal of the US battalions was matched 75% decrease in ARVN activity) which has remained relative:Ly steady at this lower level. In Quang Tri the ef''ect of the 140 per cent decrease has not yet been apparent. Based on obser*ei igs, these effects should material-

ize by June 1969.


3.

Control Province - Phong Dinh

In Phong Dinh, ARVN activity has oscillated generally around the bas(c level throughout. Unlike the other saal provinces, additional ARVN battalions have been deployed there. U3 Battaliorn and VC/NVA Activity

US battalion increases show an s.auoo-anying rise in enemy activity. Otherwise enemy activity f'ollows almost the same pattern for all sample provinces. Activity peaks in Quang Tri, where US presence is highest, are much less pronounced. After the 1968 :tt offensive, there is a definite danping of enemy activity to levels gen.erally below the first quarter 1967 base in 4 of the 5 provinces. The single exception is Binh Dinh where, except for a lower level in June and J.aly 1968, enemy activity has perslated at around 300 percent higher than the bane level since the 1968 Tet offensive.

CONFIDENTIAL

182

CONFIDENT IAL
W4EANG T11I

600

--

loo

TT--..

-800

tz
700
.

_t

"T

6o

.....-

4 4

.
____=7

2_

...

~~~I

..

....

CONFIDEN~TI AL
8cc, *.IH~:h~: ZEL ETE ~~ -1~
.-. . ......

resnce Level:

High

600
W

-:'

II

-~

6 ~B~e Data (10 7 Avg). UBns US. ::zc-z:A-B-C Hamalets - 342/

__ _

i.j2{2.
. ..

ARVI At - 44.8 En Days/Bn E4.nem~y Al -. 4Atas10


Strength

200

-jt

0 Sase
Y:_
_

::-_ _ _ _ __ _ __

_ _ _

96

CONFIDEN

1TIAl I~

COUNFI DENTI AL

DID-

'fl13

6c~z:.z

t4~~

~~3

40

0 F
.:

~77

z-

t
.==E'L
700".

COFDETA
.*

10ENT

7L

2 004
t.-4

# of
100
-'~-~-

US

Bn s

mm-F-4z'

OO-0'--

-~

S~

tL'.3 .1
CO700 N I I1

__

F77

CONFIDENTIAL

L
ro

500
100

__ziz

-4=

niemy4

._0

-100

Ii T
_ _0_

700

iI1

M.

II~~

CONFIDENTIAL

CONIFIDENTIAL

WITHDR/AliIL OF T,V'Z U" 9171 DIVIb'IP,!L FRO.

IV C.TZ

SBrian

SwZiariL. of

of August aZZ US ground combat forces (lot and 2nl theBi' US the 9thend Division) wiZ4 be withdrawn from the XV CTfZ area in

South Vieotncn. These forces moved into IV CTZ earZI *n 196?. RP"AP ande 0mj force deployments apparOnty. did not change sihificar,:6Zy as a result of the introduction of US ground forces. The enemy attack patterno also showed littZe chane from the patterns elsewhere in TV CTZ. However, the entry of US forces seems to have raised RoNmet Evaluation Security scores in the four' provinces Igreeion
where the 9th Division operated most, and there could be some security re-

after the forces withdraw.

In recent weeks, anesmj attacks have not

diminished in IV CTZ as they have elsewhere in Vietnam, but most are attacks by indirect fire. Except for a few rocket attacks, the US Oth Division apparently hae not been made a prime enemy target after the anouncement of its withdrawal, because its combat death rate has folZojwed the countrywide trend for US deaths in the Zull.

There is conside~rble interest in the eftects of the withdrawing of all JS 3' cnr cobalt forooa (9th D.;. iAion) from the IV Corps at-ea. To develop a better perspective for assessment of possible future changes in enemy activityp GVN security Etatus, and RVIi performance in the area, this paper describes the entry of US forces into IV CTZ in early 1967, identifies their primary areas of operation, and attempts to examine the impact of the US forces' entry on RVNAF and enemy force deployments) enemky attacks, and RES security scores. Finally, the enemry and Soitth Vietnamese reactions to the announced withdrawal are discussed.

Deployment of US 9th Division into SVN


The 9th US Infantry Division moved into the upper delta region of III and IV Corps in early 1967. This was the initial deployment of US units into IV CTZ, except for one brief Joint US/Vietnamese amphibious operation conducted earlier. After a short in-country training period in Bien Ilia province, the 9th Division units moved into base camps in Dinh Tuong, Long An (III Corps) and Kien Hoa provinces. The 3rd Brigade moved into DlInh Tuong with one battalion in January 1967 and then toved to Long An as the let and 2nd Brigades deployed into Dinh Tuong. The 2nd Brigade became the Mobile Riverine Force with one battalion ahove and two afloat. As a rivurine force, it operated in conjunction with the US Navy along the major waterway. in the r.rua, prrt:1QularLt.y in the coastal pro',Inu,, u Ki,,u N a, In J".Lnuaty 1959, the 2nd Brigade Headquarters and battalion ashore were shifted to Truc Gianz (Ben Tre) in Kien lon. By late 1968 t}h. lactic.s of all three The lst Brigade roenin,' in Dinh Tuong. brigades had evol';'c- to re2latively small unit; actiHons re,.poncing to intelli.uncr',, J.nstead of' lar.e unit sweepe tI-i.d to np-rc:[Qc terrain.

CONFIDENTIAL 20
"" I A .. ... ... ....

.:

CONFIDENTIAL
fo.rt has been in Table 1 indicates about 9.., c-"- " .. :;erations of three maneuver Dinh Tuong, Long An and Kicn Hoa, pl-,:, battalions in Bien Hoa in 1967. Unit. ":: the :ii'.-sion also made brief forays into the III CTZ provinces of .-. -hia "-an ia Dinh, according to MACV order of battle reports.

TABLE 9TH INFANTRY DIVI'--' ?aES-CE2 (Battalion Months a/ - Jan _s?7 through May

1969)

IV Corps
Dinh Tuong Kir. ing Ho -a

III Corps
Bien Hoa Other-/ Total

1st Brigade
2d Brigade 3rd Brigade

38 75
1

25

0
o03

33 0
17

5 7
7

101 88
88

9th Division Total 114 6 ;8 50 19 277 Source: The SEAFA Computer File, w--hich rorts to ,....re-ot. he location of each maneuver battalion monthly. One bat-aiion nonth is the reported presence of a battalion in a province during ! month. b/ Operations in Gia Dinh, Hau Nghia a.i zredeployzent training. The location of each brigade and its zaneuver battalions in May 1969 is shown in Figure 1, along with the l:cat-ion of the 7th Squadron,. 1st Air Cavalry, which supports US and ARVN operations in the IV Corps area with helicopter gunship and reconnaissance :--rations. While the monthly MACV order of battle reports show US maneuver battalions present only in Dinh Tuong and Kien Hoa, operations by units s-aller than battalion size, short riverine operations, and support by artillery helicopters have undoubtedly transmitted the 9th Division's irfluence to adjacent provinces. Since Go Cong is surrounded by the t`h Div.ision provinces, we are including it within the 9th Division are-a of naxfz=.-, impact. Thus, for this analysis, the 9th Division area incluieZ -he fcur provinces of Dinh Tuong, Kien Hoa, Long An, and Go Cong. The s-.-i~ns below examine the enemy and ARVN deployments, enemy activities, pa-ifi-ati=n status of the area, and events since 1 June 1969. RVNAF and Enemy Deployments The 21 ARVN maneuver battalions i -.. I` '-sion area (i.e., the four provinces) at the end of 1966 consist-:" 13 controlled by the ca-aliens, ARVN 7th Division, in the IV CTZ port":r., .n.. "zattalions in Long An, under thL 25th AJVN Division. Table 2 shc -. in"ea.e in US battalions during the lasut two yca-s and indicates that --. and number oP ARVN

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21

0,N~Ff0 ENT (AL


F

i~FIGU U I,

Headquairters 9th infantrY Division

2/2n9

lRTigade

P(oinc AraoI 4~~~~~24 2/6 anftuonc

hxm

CONIDETIA
2oo ......................................

1*EN*

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. battalions have not changed sir-.i:z Regional and Popular Forces in th'Table 22a.! RVIIF force expansion. change much, but the onemy force and mnay not be very reliable.

....
-n=reased

that time

However

RM!F

az a result cif the that enemy brength did not ;- are from collateral intelligence

/ FORCE LEVELS 7:-. 4:o DIVISION AREA a_ (End of ...._ r Szatzus)

1967 lst
Qtr

2. 8
2nd
r-ttr

1969
2nd 3rd
Qtr

3rd

4th

1st

4th
Qtr

1st
tr

tr r,... 0r

US Battalion:
ARVN Battalions VC/NVA Strength

5
22 7.7

6
23 7.3

6
22 8.6 2. 7.5

6
21 7.3

9
21 7.0

9
19 8.3

10
21 7.6

10
20 N/A

(ooo's)

Source: SEAPRS Computer file (from SZAFA). Includes provinces of Dinh Tuong, Kien Hoa,

Go Cong, and Long An

Enemy Activity
Table 3 indicates that the level of enemy attacks in the 9th Division area has fluctuated independently oc changes in the US maneuver battalion presence there. Enemy attacks in the 9th Division area averaged about 40%

of the IV CTZ total in 1966, 1967 and 1968.

(Quarterly Average) 1Qtr

1966
Total Attacks

:967

1968 265

1969 178
94

IV CTZ
9th Div Area a/

o75 80 31 70

107

39

40

53

A_ Dinh T=ong, Long An, Kien Hoa azn

c Csng provinces.

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23

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Popvulation StcurityI
Table 4 shows that, at the time of the 9th Division's arrival in first quarter 1967, the percentage of the population in its ;'oux provinces rated "C" or "Contested" (D+E) was about the same as the rest of the country. In the other two categories, "A+B" and "VC Controlled'" (V), IV Corps lagged slightly behind the countrywide ratings, but the 9th Division area was far behind, with 44% of its population unider VC control. During the periods in which security scores improved, the 9th Division area improved faster than IV Corps or the country as a whole. Moreover, its A+B ratings did not drop below 1st quarter 1967 levels daring the 1968 Tet offensive. The marked security improvement beginning with the 4th quarter 1968 scores is probably best explained as the effect of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign operating within the security provided by the 7th ARVN Division, 9th US Division, US Air Cavalry and US Niavy. TABLE 4 SECURITY STATS - END OF QUARTEM 1967 1968
4Q

1969

1Q
Total Population a/ Per Cent Rated A&B Countrywide 35

2Q

3Q

2 Q q4Q, -Q -

36

'38

35

23

25

26

38

43

IV Corps
9th Div Areab/ Per Cent Rated C

31
13

30
15

32
19

31
19

23
15

25
18

28
20

36
29

39
31

Countrywide IV Corps
9th Div Areab/ Per Cent Contested (D&E) Countrywide IV Corps 9th Div Ar.ea/ Per Cent VC Control (V) Countrywide IV Corps

26 23
26

25 23
24

25 23
24

28 23
24

30 23
22

31 25
21

34 25
21

35 29
27

36 34
35

i6 17 17

17 19 22

16 18 16

17 19 16

25 24 21

23 22 21

20 20 20

13 13 15

10 9 9

23 29

22 28

21 27

20 27

22 30

2). 28

20 27

14 22

11 18

9th Div Area

14_4 39

Il

41

142

40

39

29

25

Source:
a/ /

HNMA Computer File.

Excu.Iudng autronomous cities in countrywide total. Dinh Tuong, rien H-,a, 'o Cr.ong ani Lon-, An.

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CONFIDENTIAL
Table 5 is a regression ana - . . .. .n using data from April 1967 through November 196. "arliE. use....d in an article to ussess the impact of US, -'. t. ons. If security scores are dependent upon the presenze of: 75 bUs -alions, tnen the increase in US battalions during the periii ho & a--companicd by an increase of population within GVN security (A+3+C) an4.r ae ca-ease of either contested population (DE) or VC controlled oo:"'- ... (V).' A reduction in US battalions should have the opposite Cffe-.
S

Table 5 shows just such a p.itterr. o ' Dinh Tuong, Long An and countrywide data. In Dinh Tuong, the GVIN secze and contested categories increase at the expense of the VC controlled at--zy when US battalions are increased.-I The effect of US presence (or absence) shcws i ediately; there is no time lag. In Long An the C-VN secure category inzfea-ses at the expense of the VC category, with the contested category having no reltion.shi to the input or withdrawal of U-0 battalions, and it takes foir to seven months for the full effect to show. The countrywide pattern is si.ilar to Dinh Tuong's, but the lag is nine to ten months. TABLE 5 REGRESSION A.kMMISfHES SECURITY SCORES AG--..E")T US 2ATTALIO.S BY MONTH, APR 67 7=-ROUJ NOV 68 Dinh Tuonz Lag Corr (Monthas Total Population
Within GVN Security + +
-

Long An Lag Corr (Months)


+ 0 4

Countrywide Lag Corr (Months)


+ +
-

0 0 0

10
0

(A+B+C)
Contested (D+E) VC Controlled (V)

1
7

Source: SFAPRS computer file (HA:.aA data). a/ + significant positive correlation. - significant negative correlation. 0 no significant correlation. Thus, Dinh Taong mzy prove to be a useful case study 'for evaluating the immediate impact of withdrawing US forces because there seems to be some relationship between the Hamlet -valuuation System (HES) security scores and the presence of US maneuver tattalior.z, Moreover, the relationship shows immodiately after a change in US *oesen"e. However, the relationship .JSAAnalysis Rqport, June 19k. v

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23

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of USbaZiin from Dinh Tuongl coul.d adver-sely a:ff-_t HES security there nou)n, ualesE other factors, (which influence tih;e other 75.-00`i o' the changes in:- S scc.'s) overcome the influence of Lhe US withdrawtals. is not can be dr'awal seor..... an
s.. o. axplai::;_ ,"

....-

only 20-25'%of the charr.[,'-: in US battaliors.

th,: IE

,':OY :he Witht.'lnethL:,

Table 6shc: the chansea in n.aneuver battalion earployrent for IV Corps which will have occurred by September 1, 1969, assuming no change in ARVI deployment after 8 July. The 9th Division redeployment will result in a 14% reduction of IV Corps friendly maneuver battalions and a 21% decrease in battalions on combat operations. Of course, the impact on the four 9th Division provinces will be greater. TABLE 6 IV CTZ M.rEUVER BATTALION DEPLOYMvINT 8 June Combat Operaticns 30 June 17 July

us

6
28

SAVN~ Security/Pacification US ARVN

4
27

3
27

0
27

1
12

0
12

1
12

0
12 0

'kus Reserve/Training V
ARVI Total Us ARVWT

0
3 7

3
4 7 43

1
4 5 43

o
4 0 43

43

Source: IMCC Ooerational Surnary 2/ Estimated. b US Battalions standing down for movement. Events Since I June

2.969

SCONFIDENTIAL

Friendly Operations. The 9th Division began its IV CTZ operations in June with one battalion in security and the remaining six battalions of the 1st and 2nd Brigades 2ommitted to combat operations. Following the June 8 Midway conference announcement, these two brigales were publicly designated (on 17 June) for redeployment. On 20 June, the 2nd Brigade moved to the Division Headquarters at Dons Tam in Dinh Tuong province, and by 4 July all three battalions (3/47, 4/i7 and 3/60) were standing dow:n for redeployment. On 8 July the 3/60 departed for the US followed by the 14/47 on 13 July The remaining batalion ani 2ni Brigade Headiquarters will move to the US foi, demobilization by 2-7 Auguzt. On 23 July, the Ist Brigade turned over the fire support base at Cai Lay to the 7th ARIPT Division. The 9th Division lHeadquarters an, the li",t Briga-le will redeploy to S_,hofiela Barr'ack: H.awaii njWb!come a par- , PACO., ,'ecr;ve between 30 July and 30 August.

CN Eest
26 ,1,-*

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-"

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Vietnamese .actio!/ Outs_ ..... :.on onerational area, the Vietnamese appear to be rclativw.ly in the provin-eso- Kien Hoa and Dinh Tuong, there is repcrted ... of relief and apprehension. This arriivalence apparently stem- _rn._: _=..ertainty regarding security
without American support,. couplcteaith a fee1i::- that heavy US firepower

can be as large a personal threat as V2 -;. Officers from the 7th ARVN Division ex-=es s some optimism, stating that ARVN soldiers will go on the sar! nz'zber of maissions as before, and that adequate US air, artillery, and helicpter support has been assured. On the other hand, there are some fears that R7P,/F-oerformance will suffer from ceduced US materiel and fire support. ,h-re are no indications that the Vietnamese accept the VC contention tha. -the withdrawal is a tacit US adznis:ion of defeat. Recent Ene. y Actions The co"lutr.;iie lull in combat started during the week ending 2b June, with *ene:.- ground, &--bush and indir.ct fire attacks, averaging 66 per week through 19 July, cozared with 123 per week during the two weeks before the lull. In IV CTZ, the opposite happened: average attacks increased to 14 per week, versus 10 per week before the lull. On the other hand, IV CTZ closely followl i the co,'_itrywide trend in haracsment, terror, and sabotage incidents, :w"ith a 5.-5-o decline (vs 5.6 decline coLL-itrywide), as shown by Table 7. Thus,. the eniery may have reacted to the withdrawal announcement by deciding to keep his attack level up in
IV CTZ, particularly attacks by indire,t fire.

TABLE 7
RECENT ENEMY ACTIVITY LEVI
-

IV CTZ

(Weekly Totals) June 14 Total Attacks _! Countrywide IV Corps H/T/S Incidents Countrywide
IV Corps

21 119

28

July 5 61

12 67 20 507
75

19 49 14 521
107

127

9
495
95

11
501

l, 4!B

9
4Ll
49 41 10

Source:

DIA _a/ Includes assaults, ambushes and ind!:ect attac.ks by fire. CIA CA ansment. anF AmeriCON IDENn

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CON FIDENTIAL
Aft:',r the redcjloyma't an. .,ncemnnts there '.:ere indication., that the VC had changed tactics in the uppr delta r2gion; elements tZl. 9bh Division had difficulty fin"2in and Iengaging the eemy enemy an- n'thr tr-r an en-figingthc =i .,ere numerous reports of small Viet Cong units hiding out in villages. In the lowaer delta (Va Milita-.'y Region -, the VC are reportedly moving into pa.cified areas, and thcir operations indicate the possibility of strong attacks. Primary VC emphasis in the 9th Division area has been on propagandizing the withdrawal as a defeat for US forces, supported by harassment of US bases during and after the withdrawal. On 10 July a 107mm rocket landed in the Dong Tam base, resulting in 23 US WL, the first such attack since 20 June. Since then there have been other attacks by fire, and captured docuinents indicate continued VC reconnaissance of US bases. Desoite the harassment an' reported targeting of the writhdrawing

week in the 5 weeks befo-e the lull to following the countrywide trend.

units, 9th Division combat deaths declined from an average of 17.6 per

9.3 per week during the lull,

During the 3 week period preceding the Midway conference,

9th Division KIA were due to gunshot wounds or grenade fragments: for the 3 week period which follo'.led the conference, this figure had dropped to 34%. Wounds caused by gunshot and grenade fragments are reasonable indicators of forces in contact, so the decrease tends to support assertions that the VC are relying on attacks by fire and avoiding ground contact.

44% of the

Best Available CopY

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4,

CONFIDENTIAL
Recent assessments indicate the 4-cnS possibility of an enemyi The enemy has historically mounted offensive in MR 2 early in 1972. 2 nrzally eiploying a 3 regiment force. offensives in the highlands of -LLR The major difference in this year's enez.j buil-i-up IAthe deployment of the 320th Division to the B-3 front. This will substantially increase enemy capability. The critical factor in judging enemy intentions is the employment of the 320th NVA Division; its arrival from North Vietnam is imminent but there are two differing views on its likely employment.
- Strong Offensive. This view, strongly hell by COMUS$MACV, sees the 32Oth au@nenting orgarTic B-3 Front units in MR 2. This would lead to a , , to I force ratio in favor of the enemy, the worst in the history of' the Highlands but not as bad as the 2 or 3 +,o I faced by RVNAF during

Lam Son 72.9.


- LOC Protection. Those holding this view believe the 320th will provide a reserve to protect the enemy logistic network in Cambodia and South TAos. This would release all of the organic units of the B-3 Front for action in MR 2 but the force ratio would be about the same as in last year's FSB6 attacks.

Despite the adverse ratio of forces if the 320th is employed, MR 2 units will be on defense in familiar home terrain, in contrast to RVNAF in Lam Son 719. Should it become necessary, the adverse ratios could be improved to about I to 1 by using more units from the ARVN 23rd Division or MR 3.

Sthat
Ii I

Analysis of support furnished during past enemy offensives reveals combat support now available to 1,M 2 should be adequate: -Of 13 ARVN artillery battalions available, the 5 under MR control would more than double the amount used at Ben Het/Dak To. The three VNAF helicopter squadrons now in the Highlands provide about 3 times the support furnished PV2WAF during Ben Het/Dak To.

"-Major engagements in MR 2 have never received more than 8% of the total US/VNAF tactical air sorties, and support equalling the highest level ever flown in MR 2 would require less than 15% of the current US/VNAF capability.
May-June 1969, Ben Het/Dak To rceivei almost 25% of the B-52 flown in SrA. Support equivalent to that provided at .Ben Het/Dak To would require )e, of the current capability.
-

In

"sortiesbeing

Since lant year's battle in 1-M 2 -a arr:,'ed cavalry" squadron has been activated and a VNAF' gunship 3qua:`ron tranzferred from MR 3. More recent FVITAF actions to cointer the ,-:,3i o:-fcnsives include alerting two brigades of tho ,enera). res.rve hor _:.e.t to MR 2 and replacement

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COWfIDENTIAL
3,

of the 23r~i. Di'vision's co~an~der.

P rincipal RVWtAF s $ .rt cO lrn gignoted dluri~ng t he Lm.r Son were battlefijeld. coordination s c i n a rne casualty rep~aemnent. Af'tcr action reports from MR 2 cite the samne and deficien~cies in addition to poor staff planning.

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Introuction. Recent assessments 2r.iate the strong possibility of an enemy offensive in western MR 2 ari mid-February 1972. Despite general agreement on the enemy capai-_ities in the area, there are some understandable differences among a-_. .ts as to his actual intentions. Moreover, RVWIF preparations and a.ti-.Ity wil! influence not only the outcome but also the intended. scose of the enemy's activity. This analysis discusses cur;ent enemy capabilities ar.-. intentions, the historical data on past enemy offensives in the High!:nds, and RVNAF preparations to counter the expected offensives this year. Additional perspective is provided by comparing the scope of -ast and projected enemy offensives with Lam Son 719. Current Enemy Capability and Intentions The OCS/CIA recently updated 1ast spring's assessment of enemy capabilities in RVN and noted that ene:j preparations since then in the B-3 front (increased personnel and unit infiltration) give them an added capability to launch an offensive in the :ighlands early in 1972. In addition, Hanoi's search for a dramatic (albeit temporary) tactical success might focus on this region, where RV_,TAI =i-'E-ts are more dispersed and of poorer quality than those in MR 1. Informal discussions with intelligence analysts from several agencies reveal considerable unanimity not only with regard to the capability assessment but also the enemy's probable scher.e of maneuver -- a main thrust in Kontum province with supporting attacks in Pleiku and northern MR 1 to tie down ARVN forces there. To further restrict the RVNAF reinforcing capability, increased activity is also expected in MR 3 and the coastal provinces of northern MR 2 and southern .-_R 1. According to some analysts, the intelligence signals countrywide are mare reminiscent of 1964 (heavy attacks in the Kontum area and northern MR1, low level activity elsewhere) than 1968. The principal difference in revolves around the intended use in the B-3 front is imminent and enemy offensive in the Highlands anal-ysts' views of the current situation of the 320th DNVA division whose arrival thus the probable intensity of this year's cozared to those in the past.

- Strong Offensive. This vie-,, strongr held by COMTJSMACV, assumes employment of the 320th NVA division in the battle area and thus the largest enemy effort since TET 1968. - ILOC Protection. Those holding this view believe the 320th is to provide a reserve and protect the So'th Laos portion of the supply network, while the three regiments normally orge-nic to the B-3 front conduct an offensive similar to the Ben Het/Dak To campaign in 1969.

In addition to the 320th Divizicn, the B-3 front has apparently been augmented by up to a battalion of field EUns (10-12 tubes). The significance of this added combat ,-r. to an enemy offensive, however,

Best Available Cop,

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:.i

COIF 0EN\T IAL


may Le mo=re p0rchologica% thea
A+

real; the 122mm gtn".s have a ereater range


.

than the ARV:; L:n ho:;t, er (2kni vs 15 km) but the 155 is more accurate

"fJ
'

and its projectile vei-ht is nearly twice as large. Moreovwr, the ).22mm gun is vulnerable to allied air strikes; it is 15% heavier than the 155nm and has only I-en sighted behind tracked vehicle movers,. rIntelligence x'eports from the field shcw no distinct pattern and support either view, depending on the analyst's interpretation. Since there has been no significant change in enemy capabilities over the pazt weeks, COMUSN1ACV's recent request for new authorities may simply reflect his growing conviction in the strong offensive interpretation. The LOC protection view is primarily based onthe imiportance of the expanded Ho Chi Mih Trail to the enemy and declining levels of US sup-

could

port to RVWF:

- Elements of two B-3 regiments have been helping to expand and protect the routes through South Laos and northern Cambodia sincemid-1970. Enemy sensiti'iity to RVNAF ground interdbtion threats may have dictated the dispatch of the 320th to assume this mission.- This would release organic B-3 units for action in the Highlands this year, leaving them the option to employ the additional diviEion in 1973. - Return of all B-3 units for a 1969 style activity upsurge would probably achieve the desired publicity this year, while next year would be more opportune for a major offensive. US combat support to RVNAF, already reduced over previous levels, will be essentially nil by 1973, and the 320th would have gained valuable familiarity with the terrain.

Historical Perspective. The highlands of MR 2 have been the scene of large scale enemy action for the past several years, usually beginning in late March/early April, peaking in May and subsiding in June after which enemy units retire to their sanctuaries across the border. Enemy'attacks in the eastern portion of MR 2 are smaller in scale and generally avoid major confrontation with frtendly main force units. Enemy base areas supporting his coastal units are more vulnerable to friendly penetration, which restricts his ability to nwass without detection in this area. Battle Detail. The enemy opens these setpiece battles in the highlands with scattered attacks by fire which build to a crescendo and arv followed by multi-battalion ground assaults against isolated GVN oubposts. Normally two infantry regiments and the bulk of his, artillery regiment attack* in Kontum, with one or two regiments and the rest of the artille.-ry in Pleiku. Since 1969 this two province area has been on a pur with all. of MIR 3

in number of' enery groun~i attacks during the April-Juno poriod. Moreover, during this samse poriod in 1971 frtirmdly regular KTA there equallM the

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IDE 'N'T IAL SCON F


total for both MRs 3 and 4. A projocted force ratioc for thi, -y-.i, 5o.e;trison of these past battles anl in the are& (Tablo 1) showst

of the 320th sployme.nt mA"-

.. ision is the key issue. Div,'A

If the 320th is used in the enemy attack, friendly to enemy force ratios approach that for Lam Son 79 (.7 zco-a.red to .5),
- If the 320th is not used, force ratios will be about the same as last year (about 1 to 1).

,entrast to Lam Son 719, the MR 2 for.es will be on defense in their home
territory. Moreoverp the ratios alovt assume only the same reinforcement aj last year. As discussed later in the RV.1tF preparations section, it would be possible to provide enough reinforcement to raise the coabat strength ratio to nearly 1 to 1, should that prove necessary.
V TABLE I

Despite the adverse ratio of for.es should the 320th be deployed,

in

BATTLES = -,Oh'M.VPLEIXU _a/ 9


ICombat

1970 eang) 7)

1971

1972 (30t In InVA out

LAO 39 1971

Frt'mly5a Bno

=ombr E7ns
Enemv Fr/En Ratio Combat Str (000) Friendly Enemy Fr/En Ratio Rasults
SEn/Fr

20 (8 US)
19 1.1

A6(3 'iS) 25
18 .9 8.E 5.5 1.5
72 1699 703

25k
38 .7 11.6 13.5 .9

-ir/

20
4o .5 12.5 27.1 .5
N/A

26 1.0 11.6 8.7 1.3 24 4526 577 50


50

26 1.0 11.6 8.7 1.3

15.6 5.8 2.7

Enemy Attka (per month) 72 Snemy KIA Friendly KIA


Ratio GVN Control _

3241 330

9.8

2..7.8-

13642

1532 -

Before B~tte
After Battle
,a_/

34
27

52
48

60(NIov 71)
-

D~ata is for the entire two province are-a luring the course of the battle. KTA results are operational (0PREP) fignxre-, not final verified casualties.

Assumes the 2 airborne brigades an6 a reL,6ent of 23rd Division are moved to the battle area. l though there are some tentativw indictions that the 271st Regiment may also be sketchy the of because assessment, it was rc in.'mded in t our 2r:. B-3 Front, fnr Sdes[ned only consists currently 1 available c the informntion :ntellir' calculathe either affect rtally one bath'alicon, fnd this would n t

tto,,or outcome.

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Since much of' the enemy KIA in thers Artillery and Hslirnopter Support. battles is credited to artillery w'id air we exreinu.d available data to support in the paot and the Impact of US deteinine the scope of sth redleploynents. US forces furnished all of the helicopter support and most of' the artillery and TAC AIR support for the 1969 Ben Het/Dat To Campaign.

Two battalions (36 tubes) of light ancl mcdlum artillery augmented by a composite heavy (1 7 5 /8") battery(5 tubes). All of the heavy artillery
and half of' the light/mediuin tubes were US.
-

utility, 6 heavy) per clay, In sharp oontrast) more than 20 times that number (659) were used on LAM SON 719.
By the tine of the FSB6 attack in 1971, US artillery in ME 2 had been reduced about 2/3 (to 5 bns). A medium (155mm) and heavy (175/8") battalion were in Pleiku but were not employed in the actual battle area. According the commander of the V=F 2d Air Division,* his division furnished all of the air support in the actual area of operations (2 helicopter squadrons, 2 fighter squadrons, and a liaison squadron). Based on the above, RVNAF seems to have adequate combat support available in MR 2 for the predicted enemy offensive even though all US artillery has been withdrawn and US helicopters have been reduced:
-

US Army Aviation units provided 32 helicopters (6 gunships,

20

Sto

Of the 13 ARVN artillery battalions, the 5 under MR control would

more than double those employed in the Ben

Het/Dak To battle.

- Although ARVN does not have heavy (175mm/8") artillery in MR 2, available US heavy artillery was not actually used in the battle area during the rSB6 battle last year, although it was used during Ben Het/Dak To. - VNAY in MR 2 has three of its four U11-1 helicopter squadrons (31 helicopters each) stationed in Pleiku, giving them about 3 times the number provided in support of the Ben Het/Dfak To battle.

*CIA field report dated 27 May i1'(1.

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Tactical Air mid B-52 Support Tactical air sorties have, not benr, used extensively in Kontum and

Pleiku provinces. Even in the months -racterized by major battles, no more than 8% of the total U.S. and I~kF, sorties in Southeast Asia (and
17% of all those flown in South Vietr,..) were flown in support of operations This is in contrazt to the air effort devoted to in the two provinces.

LAM SON 719 which, during February an.1, 'arch 1971, received about 30% of

~If

all tactical air sorties flown in SZA ea.1 over 50% of those flown in South Laos. The level of B-52 effort supporting the significant engagements in Kontum and Pleiku provinces has never exceeded 25% of the total sorties flown during the period of the battles. However, during the time LAM SON 719 was in progress over 80% of all B-52 sorties flown (and 90% of those flown in Laos) were in support of the o.eration. The table below shows the level of tactical air and B-52 effort support-

ing the major engagements in Kontum and P2eiku during 1969-1971, as well as the levels during LAM SON 719. Sorties flown in conjunction with these
operations are compared with the air activity in the remainder of SEA during the times the operations were in progre3s, and with the capability now available.

.....................................

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2-0 3

CONIFIDENTNil AL
Un,1,V OPJI"ATR T0MIjI 3 TN KODITJM AMD }PLEITJ Ben Het/Dak To 11ay- Junfe 1.959

Dek Seanrj lB
uza~a ko -june 71

SON 719
Le__-I__ar-I_

Tatiu Air t.
Sortiec supporting battle (monthly ave..)

Sorties in all OTIT Tobal SSA Sorties


% of SVU total for battle of SEA total for battle %of current monthly

37,L15 4 60,707
5

2,037 (1,019)

2,577 (2,035)

721 (240)

8,512 (5,674)

15,519 3 2, 3 L3
17

12,' 75 46,:146
6 2

16,063./ .9,8214 53 c/
29

8 13 111 1,015 1,778


(90)

capability
.orties supporting operation

6
804 3,019 3,54?
(402)

2 96 791 3,425
12 (302)

35
1,358 1, 84 C/ 1:66L
91cJ (906)

Sorties in all SVWT Total SEA sorties

(monthly avg.)

% of SVN sorties for


battle % of SEA sorties for

27

11

battle

23 4o

6 9

3 3

82 91

of current monthly

capability

/ c/ :/

Sortie data for Ben Hee/Dak To and Dalk Seang from LOAF reports of air support for the operations. Data for FSB6 include all sorties in Kontum and

Pleiku provinces.

LA4 SON 719 data from USAF report of CammANDOM)0

T V.

Includes gunship sorties. Sorties in South Laos for LAM SON 719.

CURRENT tS/VNjAF AIR CIAPABILT1S Tactical Air


US (Air Force)

(sorties/Month)
10,000 (6,7001

(Navy)
VNAF

3,300
6,500 750 o00 1,0C
!I
.

Ounship
US VNAF
1 - 52

IDNI ALHt,.:: ONF ~~~~~~C

,il

CONFIDENT IAL
19j2 ir ThrughJun ore arcrtf-'---Td n -.,-"h Vietnam~ an~d Thai and

Aotc tonel

aarepl

75e at Pishu.squlyo of,-7s(2 air carat)e ii odfn wlevl oflyth T-yarran m:7 2 aorircrft isat'-, 1,00 B-57 =qudro have be e ~ai br of aicaftwol c 3,300 sor tiosAmonsquydrons engthB-5 mok oiran-- .aonide o an prtionl usedto sppot at 6 Ben {e wol req00 aUr~~aey1 arrf;s~p uppogrtarsued ueathi cok entri4.butio wi nd SB 6b, no es thre 2ha B5,200s. i .Tield coodintio 15nd0 tcasualt =:ntl 719, arshortieomind 5.0Inship sorte ings.e ean aditonh sortcombeav s? B t00 r-52a 1 hi aeecnsdrd gunt 25ce
cpreviously ton w!e'ed not

nnr tl o 0035OT2 1972 (ti osnticud MGti juneJr and to advgnsipsor ntied lon his final reot thtTsotoighc e Aste cat De seen (170 wheraoe alsoie renzaemn to lessrnetuen a atimilar
pos when HtheDa operatin i FS and iou1dnoj- l-esunitesinfro sveal porgnztions.o

theVVIF urrnt tctial ir scevel of mane uveor, chain ouin co -5 coordiintio.

ontly acrtion caalther isTo accomathin eanr f-.ret ol support plan. h cr-,, itellihence, DaviSatin, artilleryoul Co2 upordntio oftroaneen.' the zalty reptortse

werelnt.i* l or acurte ad threvioasl litte sudor nof .---ps to4 esaishrft arprortyP Asyseq o aua ltyn repl3324aicment. i a4re-;, u..-rnits wer oflyten rotaed in tacdiout ofr thepobattlew arearithout :.-.wol re quire. thei perfomancepotanialit of il -7otermn nn too the curaron.Tien tbeuetospotan operation mag3nitude of the b-ilu of inume of2 aircrafpportd ofv ol require DakC~T9 o ,5 B-uren

reur-11 Pesnne and! Unsecitey

asus/ed tactiaair Sand, 91 of52 the cB :3-5 lestanbity Since the priodF Sotomigs SON InAN cmie 719 3V, ia i criataiit hasd dcrasedlt lesbatthanc 1969 showevr sicncesteant se7. o defcreasiehs. been orvero3us

postwh capebilitytin

own is farogea and

unitdwn30 from sevearl

1970.atins

Planning.DETAe~ IR2hsnihrac=P oravsasolable

CD.Atopyh

Current RMl'LF Prepuations of iR 2, there are 35 EVIAI maneuver battalions operating generally as f'ol l ors :

In addition to the two POK divisions (18 bns) along the central coaab

- The P2d Division (17 bns) haa two regiments oprating in the thcestenrd northern Highlands (Konttum and Pleiku) and two in thd perennially troublesome Binh Dinh area. - The 23d Division (13 bns) has it8 three reginents operating, over a aida area f'rom Binh ThuLn on the southern coast 5to Darlae in the hichlands south of Pleiku. - MR forces (5 bns) include a 3 battalion ranger grot0p and a 2 squadron armored cavalry brigade now operating arotud Pleiku.

The OJCS RVN assessment (January update) cited measures taken to strengthen 1. 2 since last May-a-,n armored cavalry squadron activated and a VITAF gunship squadron transferred from ME 3. More recent actions include: Two airborne brigades (3 bns each) withdrawn frcm Cambodia and a2lerted for movement to 2R 2, leaving 2 brigades (I Abn, I Marine) as
-

JGS general reserve in MR 3.b"I

Re-peacement of the 23rd Division commander by the deputy MR commander and new province chiefs in Binh Dinh, Darlac, and Quang Due. While it seems strange that the 22nd Division cormander, whom COMTMMACV rates incompetent, was not relieved, it is probable that the IS, commander (MG Dzu) will personally direct operations in the northern highlands as he did in last year's FSB 6 attacks. Thus having his former deputy in command of the other division might facilitate rapid movement of reinforcements

to the battle area from the 23rd Division.

In past years, MR 2 commanders have reinforced the highlands with regiments from either the 23rd Division or the Binh Dinh area. The present MR 2, senior advisor has stated, however, that the two regiments now in Binh Dinh would remain there to preclude the Ussual GVN control losses in Binh Dinh which have accompanied this tur1bulence. In addition to the 6 airborne battalions then, 6-8 battalions could be provided from the 23rd. Division, Depending on the situation in MR 3 and MR 1, one of the two remaining general reserve brigados might also be made available, since the JOS has alerted L reinforced rotiment in MR 4 for possible muvenent to IM 3.

LJ,
'-i

CONFiDENTIAL
AIR AND ARTILLERY STRIKES T-I4AN CLOSE SUPPORT (S) Lass than 35% of the total :cnnage of bombs and artillery rounds are used against targets located by n.-nnecvering troops or patrols. The other 65% is aimed at places %,here the er.emy might be (e.g. free strike zones, suspected routes of VC movenent, reported VC encampments) but usually without reliable information' that he is there. The evidence is too fragmentary to give a reliable estimate of the results of such strikes. What little hard evidence there is consistent with the conclusion that such strikes may have killed as few as 50 to 100 VC/NVA in 1966. (S) However, the 27,000 tons of dud bombs and shells each year from such attacks provide the enemy with more than enough material to use in mines and booby traps. In 1966 about 1100 U.S. soldiers were killed this way of which more than 100 may have been killed by duds from unobserved strikes. Even from a purely military standpoint, the exchange is bad. The effects on civilians in VC and friendly areas are also Such strikes mny create more VC than they eliminate. Such undosirable. strikes coat about $2.2 billion .er year. 1. Calcuiatinq Artillery and Air Strikes Away From Friendly Ground Forces (S) Artillery and air strikes in South Vietnam, besides supporting friendly troops engaged in combat, hit suspected enemy position in the general area of our forces; this is to harrass, discourage, and drive off the enemy if he happens to be around. Fire is also directed at enemy held areas and villages declared hostile by GVN province chiefs. We used Service data to classify strikes as "close support" (strikes in support of engaged ground forces or adjusted by ground forces) and "other" (harrassment and interdiction strikes, LZ preparations, and other strikes unobserved by nearby ground forces). The figures run uniformly below 13% for close support. Changing the definitions somewhat does not change the ba'sic conclusion. CY 66 Artillery and Air Strikes (in % of fire missions or sorties) Close Support Army Artillery a/ Marine Artillery h/ Tactical Air c/ B-52s9/ o a/ 8.8 11.4 12.6 Other 91.2 88.6 87.4 100.0

b/

In Support of Mtajor Operations only. "Close Support" includes all observed Sfire on identified targets; "Other" includes I&I missions and LZ preps. Data from 22 major operations of the 1st Division, the 25th Division, the lst Air Cav, and the 101st. Includes all obscrved strikes, both in close support and on targets spotted by reconnnissance patrols. Data frnm .V,I Pac, A STATTSTICAL ,PORTRAYAL OF 'ARI!NE ACTIVITIES I.; EASIA, Dcc,, 1966.

Best Availab!n Cr

CONFIDENTIAL

207

CONFIDE NTIAL
c/
S./

January.*rovemr o.rlI. Itdcs AUr Force, Navy, X Cnrinc orp and Vietnamct6e Ail FortL. N'.[CS dalt.. Very : of the 5023 B-,52 sortie in SVN in GY u6 weru clo.se aupport.

Adding artillery and tactical air landing-zone-preparatory strikes to "close support" would add only 2.5% to the numbers above. Adding air

strikes that hit identified enemy targets, usually under airborne for-

ward air control, would probably have a bigger impact. However, we have no figures on what fraction of air strikes are airborne controlled, nor have we any idea how many hit well-confirmed hostile targets, We can get a rough measure by using enemy KBA as a basis, by assuming that our aircraft attack personnel only when they fire at us, and that this

4s the main way to be sure that a target is hostile.

'4

strikes fn 1966 killed 3,682 enemy, and all other types of strikes killed 10,261. a/ If the non-close-support strikes on confirmed hostile targets had the same average effectiveness as close support strikes-, such strikes would need 36% of the total sorties to get this result. Close support and these other strikes together would be about 48%; the remaining 52X would be unobserved strikes and strikes on targets not definitely

Close air support

known to be hostile (including unseen targets in the juigle). As to artillery strikes, two major

adjustments are needed. One is to account for the larger number of round's per fire mission in close support
strikes. The other is to adjust for the strikes not included in above data (which is based only on major operations); the other strikes are mostly unobserved. Adjusting for these factors, ilet ad.AX.WjIlery Rounds Fired Close Su ort and OtheL

(196-6 ifn %r)_


Close.Support Army artillery Marine Corps artillery 15 27 Other 85 73

15% of Army rounds are in close support and 27% of Marine Corps.. These figures exclude mortar shells, which we assume are used only in close

support.
2. Qost & Side Effects o UnobservedNon-close-suor)Air and Artiller Strikes

The VC get most of the materials they require for mines and booby traps from dud bombs, dud artillery shulls, and captured ordnance. k/ Total air and tube ordnance delivered within South Vietnam levelled off at about 1.44 million tons per year by June 1967. Of the total tonnage, 42,600 tons (3%) per year or 117 tons per day are duds, using standard rates. This compares with total infiltration of 45 tons per day, including 12-20 tons of ammunition. c/ a/

NCS data.
Local materials also contribute to their supply. US.C Bulletin 3480, Professional nledr_C.in d.---, reports the predominant role played by duds and other captured items. These other items are mainly cattured "grenades and mines. NIE 14.3

ki

cf

20

CONNI

aA-

I.-.

JiI ID) j.f EN TIAL

ORDNANCE EXPENDITURES IN SOITPl

T..

,O.-CLOSE

SUP~OR'_(NC[ Eat Dud

AND DUDS Daily Rates Total NCS Tons Tons

[
Total

Annual Rates

June 1967

Tr Tons Tac Air & B-52's Artillery


,ortars

NCS

Total Cost M($ illion) $1200 a/ 360 h_/ 141.0 b/


no 11b/

roCS Cost.. Rate ($ Million) S 660 al 5% 360 b/ 5% 1220 b/ 1.5%


2%2

Tons

uds

Dud 55 25 29

Duds 27 25 25
-

400,000 180,000 720,000


140Q00

200,000 180,000 610,000 970,000


(67%)

20,000 9,000 10,800


2

TOTAL a/ b/

1,440,000

-$32E0

$ 2240

42,600 117
(100%)

77
(657.)

$3000 per ton $2000 per ton

US KIA from mLnes and booby traps must be estimated, lot Division data for 13 months show at least 22% of KIA antd 29% of WIA due to mines and boobj traps.
The Marines have higher percentages, due to their emphasis on pacification;

if any, Army units would be lower than the 1st Division since it emphasized big operations last year. However, even the lst Division percentages imply that
we lost 1100 KIA to mines and booby traps in all SVM last year, How many of these are due to converted duds is unknown. plus 8720 WIA.

few,

,J.S. CASUALTIES.
KIA

1966
WIA TOTAL

Total
% due to mines & booby traps Number due to mines

4,989
22%

30,060
29%

35,049
28%

& booby traps

1,100

8,720

9,820 We do not

Could we reduce US KIA by stoppinr all unobservie rtrikes?

know. The daily rate of duds would drc from 117 to 41 tons. The enemy can only find and modify a portion of the 41 tons. It is possible that he could still find enough to mine at current rates. However, if the number of mines and booby traps fell by as little as i0%, about 110 American lives would be saved, more thnn the enemy we astimate are killed by unobserved fire. (See next section)

5,

~CONFI

EINTI,

p.,,

CONFIDENTIAL
The logic of curtailing unobserved strikes doe3 not apply to close support, Close support kills many times as many enemy as we lose to mines and booby made cut the duds. For example, if all the ordnance expended in South Vietnam were as effective as that used ii close support, the enemy ki.lls would Thia kind of improverise from the estimated 20,000 to about 90,000 per year. meat would make our losses to mines and booby traps tolerable. It would also justify the $2.2 billion cost of the ordnance for unobserved strikeo. 3. VC KIA oue to Unobserved Strikes

2traps

Unobserved strikes are of two types; those aimed at the approaches to friendly units and bases, and those aimed at enemy camps, facilities, and assembly areas. The first type aims to discourage attacks, and the second aiMes to catch the enemy by chance at the most likoly places. Approach routes to friendly units and bases take a major share of the artillery fire. There are about 50 US/W fixed base areas, cantonments, etc. There are also about 50 battalions in the field co major operations at any one time; each in an average of about three distinct perimeters each night. The enemy attacked about 2 of these 200 targets (12) per day in 1966 a/. If there are ten approach routes to each friendly unit we are firing at 2000 approach routes and if the harassing fire laid on the 2 routes actually used by the enemy has the same effectiveness per pound as have strikes in close support of engaged troops, then the effectiveness of the harassing. fires is .001 times that of close support strikes. Althoigh strikes on enemy camps and assembly areas are more effective titan
[tnobserved

strikes on the approaches to friendly units,

they don't effect the basic conclusion.

There are thousands of identified camps,.ecilities, and assembly areas, fec more than the number of units. Moreover, enemy units often hide in villages we try not to hit; this is particularly tr.ie of the guerrillas, who reportedly assemble for military missions only once every two or three months. Main force battalions each may have fifty different prepared camps and at least that many trails to them. And we are less accurate in hitting whatever target we are shooting at. The 6est guess at the accuracy of unobserved artillery fire is that it pute one-ternth as m~.ny shells on the intended target as does observed fire. h! Air strikes on camps have the some problem, because the pilot can seldnm see his target. In order to have a number, we estimnte that the aver.-.,% strike of this type has to hit 50 locations to find one occupied. This and the lower accutacy of unobserved fire place the effectiveness of this type of strlie at twice that of harassing fire, o- .002 times that of close support.

S~Daily

a /. b/

Total attacks from MACV Weekly Suimmary, INTSMI. Data from World War II.

prorated by target type using MACV

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
In 1966, at most 20,000 VC/;VA were Irilled by air and artillery in close
support of major operations. b/ 0bser':,'e air strikes not in close support

killed another 10,000. c/ These 30,000 KIA were caused by 215,000 tons of air and tube ordnance (including mortars), or .14 enemy KIA per ton. Unobserved strikes used 350,000 tons of ordnance; at an effectiveness .001 to .002 times as great as that of close support, they accounted for 50 to 100 enemy KIA. Observed and Unobserved Strikes
1966

Tons Observed 215,000

Ene-ay KIA 30,000

Enemy KIA per ton .14

Unobserved d/ 350,000 50-100 .00014-.00028 / Data from U.S. Army DCSOPS, rar East & Pacific Division, and from Marine After-Action Reports, Hq. USNC, indicated 22,000 enemy KIA in major
f/ NMCS data.
d/ operations; we assume at least 10% were killed by infantry. See the discussion of these KBA on page 2, above. Inc.uding air strikes aimed at suspected, not confirmed, enemy. Total tons from SEA Stat. Summary Table 211; allocation to "observed" by me'hod of vaec. 2, above.

How good these numbers are depends on which side outguesses the other. U.S. artillerymen and pilots aim at areas they think may contain enemy, using intelligence when available but avoiding friendly populated areas. The enemy trios to avoid being hit, using villages and hamlets along main roads which provide linear sanctuaries if cloos together. The safety zone varies by type of weapon from 400 meters to a kilometer on each side of a hamlet, providing a wide strip in which eneny units can move without

being hit.

To cross the gaps between hamlets, the enemy will do the best he

can after noting the pattern of our harassing fire. In addition, the enemy stays in areas where we can hurt him least: our guns cover only about half the areas of the country. We, In turn, move our guns and use aircraft to strike him by surprise. The enemy exploits predictable patterns in air activity caused by weather, time of day, and other factors. In maneuvering against our infantry, the enemy surprises us about ten times as often as we surprise him. The intelligence and tactical initiative is at least as bad for artillery and air as it is for infantry. Therefore, we will be lucky to do better than the above calculations show.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDE NTIAL

However, suppose we have underrated the results of unobserved strikes. Frequent roves of artillery and occasional bad judgement by enemy units might lead to lorger-than-estimated kills among enemy groups caught in vulnerable postures. A It Field Force Vietnam Artillery report for the three months ending 31 January 1967 tells of two instances of apparently good results. In one case a captured VC said that artillery fire killed 60 of his fellows at the time and aim point of a known II&I fire mission; in another case an ARVM unit, guided by a captured VC, reported finding the bodies of 30 VC at such a location. No U.S. ground forces went in to verify the results in either case. Suppose, however, that both results are true and that in each of the three CTZ with major U.S. forces unobserved strikes, with similar luck, kill 100 enemy per quarter. If so, these strikes would kill 1200 per year, country-wide, or more than ten times the high end of our previous estimate, and over ten times the possible U.S. dead from mines and booby traps made fom the

duds in these strikes.

By present standards,

this good an exchange ratio of

enemy to U.S. dead is satisfactory, although we could do still better by extensive use of small patrols that call in observed strikes. (Such patrols now get an exchange ratio of over 30 to one). If a rationale for unobserved strikes is hard to find in supposed enemy kills, it must be found instead in their effects on enemy operations, ramely "Harassment and Interdiction." If these strikes killed no enemy at all they

might still produce militarily valuable limitations on enemy movement and


enemy attacks. However, there is no evidence that they have done so and no reason to expect that they should do so. When U.S. forces entered South Vietnam in strength in 1965, bringing uith them an immense increase in firepower and in the volume of unobserved strikes, VC initiated incidents, attacks, etc. almost doubled, from a countrywide total of 6,141 in the first quarter of 1965 to 11,073 in the fourth quarter. During 1966 they dropped back part way, and seem to have stabilized in the range of 8,000-10,000 per quarter, well above the levels prevailing before 1965. Analysis of the geography of VC incidents shows no tendency for them to be pushed out of any vital or hotly contested areas.

It is,

indeed,

surprising that anything different was expected from the

S~CONFIDENTIAL

broadcast expenditure of air and tube ordnance. Although enemy combat units make it a practice to camp just outside the range of our artillery, if they wish they can march in one day to the center of the circle covered by our largest guns from their camp at the edge of the circle. When they advance to an attack in the covered area, the losses they take from occasional chance hits by unobserved strikes will be negligible compared to the losses they take in the attack itself;.our previous calculations of losses during the approach to attack show that such losses are trivial in comparison to losses in direct engagements, in spite of assuming that the advancing unit takes no countermeasures like staying near populated areas. And, even if that calculation was low by a factor of ten, the losses involved are still rdnor compared to those in combat. Therefore, the losses durinj the rdvance will fail to deter a unit that is already prepared to take much heavier losses when it reaches its target. It should be no surprise that the incident rate has failed to drop below its level of early 1963 and before. "Haraisment and Interdiction" fire doesn't interdict, and according to our evidence doesn't harass very much. CN DETA

....

et

P.

As an offset to these points, wetf houi n:.te l'it the effects of unobserved strikes on VC defentions could he larger :?.r, tn:tir effects on VC KIA. Losse' to strJkPq out of the blue may he eoe' fri;bhcen!.n. than losses in close combat, and may therefore have a disproportionate effect on defections. However, we get this same benefit if the strikes ate controlled and adjusted by clandestine patrols, which offer a practical alternative to unobserved strikes. 4. Additional Side .Effects in addition to the foregoing, the huge expenditure of ordnance on un-

observed strikes affects our relationship to the civilian population.

To

them it Is a constant, noisy menace, creating an image of indiscriminate, unthinking use of force. Every new visitor to a U.S. base camp is startled by the constant roar of artillery, day and night. It is boun! to be frightening to Vietnamese, many of whom have been hurt by the careless and incompatent use of artillery by their own army. Moreover, uur own unobserved strikes are lass than perfectly aimed. Artillery commanders save up their best, most uniform powder lots for the crucial times when they must work close to U.S. troops; they expend their mixed powder lots on unobserved strikes, They may or may not take care to make continuous adjustments for changes in the weather, which without such adjustment will throw their shells several hundred yards off the mark after a few hours, or even after a few tens of minutes. Inevitably, there are accidents.

No figures exist on total civilian casualtles in SVN, AID reports 34,000 civilian hospitalizations in 1966 due to war injuries, and we do not know how many were killed or injured but not hospitalixed. About one-third
of the hospitalizations ware due to artillery and bombs (friendly induced) and one-third to mortars, mines and booby traps (enamy induced). Even in the enemy induced category, unobserved friendly strikes may cmtribute to civilian casualties via duds. Civilian casulatiea and property damage from both accidental and intentional strikes on populated areas undoubtedly generate some refugees into secure areas. What is not known is how many people become VC recruits and willing VC collaborators, nor how many stop providing intelligence and other forms of cooperation to friendly forces ane to local OVN officials, in villages we strike. We know that the VC exploit our heavy use of artillery and adr in their propaganda, but we do not know how e."ective this propaganda is or how people react to the strikes themselves.

i .

4on't.

sometimes hit villages, such strikes hwe the wrong effect even when they
increases the probability that firefights will develop in -them, unavoidably
Our harassing fire encourages the etrmy to hide in villages and

Although unobserved and poorly aimed tac air and artillery strikes

hitting civilians. The only way to coarect this problem is to improve intelliBence collection, police work, and screening operations to make villages safe for the people and unsafe for the enemy. Then, when the enemy retreats from the villages, it would be better to hsve reconnaissance patrols call in sir and artillery strikes on enemy units they have spotted. This tactic improves the effectiveneis both of our men an, of cur fire uporL while alo z'e.uoIng the chance of accident. 5. Concluding Remarks Although the foregoing evidence is too weak to prove the need for a change in policy, it does suggest that such a change deserves consideration. In the light of the papers in earl-.. editions of this publication on battlefield initiative and on clandestine patrols, the polic, change that might prove best would be to increase sharply the resource, put into such patrols to require that artillery and air strikes he adjusted. by observers who can confirm the existence and location of hostile targets, on-. perhaps to cut back on total ordnance allowances. The most clearly de-on-trated need, however, is lor better data in this area.

CONFIDENTIAL

Air

and Artilleri; Strikes Other Than Close S'o.ort"

A Rebutta1

Ar.,j Staff (ODCSOPS) in rebuttal Comments have been received frort the report item (page 13), w-hich to the JulY 1.-67 Southeast Asia Anal!,sis artillery and air strikes indicate concluded that statistics on unobserved and provide the enemy with that the strikes cause few;.. VCW/',A casualties mines aand booby traps. large amounts of material for making "The purpose of air and artillery strikes, other than close support, -. 'ary as much as the ordnance delivered on the targets. The si1.1kes may be artillery fire used to interdict or deny a wooded area which local villagers claim are used by the VC each night as a bivouac, or they may be B-52 bombers on a disruption mission against the confirmed enemy build-uu in the A Shau Valley of western Thua mhien Province. It is most desirable to have a man on the ground directing all air and artillery strikes but in instances, such as in Z1W, and Laos, political restrictions prohibit this. In ?VN, there simply are not enough forces to maintain influence over all areas or restrict the unimpeded use of all land and water lines of communication. This necessitates the use of other means to acquire lucrative targets and, at the same time, eliminate indiscriminate application of our firezower. "Considerable effort is devoted to the development of targets for 'unobserved' air and artillery strikes. Airborne radio directioft finders, aerial radar and photography, forward air controllers, and aerial observers, coordinated with information from various intelligence sources, assist materially in taking the guess work out of these strikes. POW interrogations, captured enemy documents, and discovery of graves in target areas support the cdontention considerably VC/iVA were killed by ombServed that air and atleystrikes more than in 100 1966. Asanemp, oncaptive reported that 'when the 5th Battalion (24th NVA Re ent) began infiltrating into SVN, its strength was over 500 men.\ By the time the battalion reached its destination, malaria and b mb attacks had caused many casualties, cutting the battalion streng to about 200 men.' Another NVA captive stated that two B-52 ra s on a facility in Birth Dinh Province resulted in 50 men

ii

being kil ed. b,.= Recently, U.S. Marines, es dr 'unobserved.

fresh gra' s containing 30 enemy dead, presumably killed by


artillery or air strikes.?'

on Operation BUFFALO, a

found

"There is no evidence to support a conclusion as to how much material t e VC acquire fr~n duds for use in mines and booby traps. Hov:ever, ;e know that conside.rable quantities of potassium chlorate' are received from (J:;:oodi~a. Additionally, primers and detonator cord arc' roeci'e:! from .", a aela" quantities of stand.e r ines. The tr~cwlcr recently sunk off

Quang ;;gai Province contained 1,960 ariti-pe~rsonnel1 mines, 6,860


lbs. of pla.stic explosive, 3,102 J.bs. of 'I".T, detonators, and. [I el:ctric detonators." -900 non-electric _

S-

.. B stAvailable Copy 213

"Our c .,aders in MU: :i: :.e han anyone, the problems resulting from casuliaties :-;: inflicted on civilians. In or'der to keep non-combat-ant ... t--" about-inmm

~~RVNAF and US/.I1VTW


cedures:

have been die~

-. o a-pply the following pro-

a. In sparsely populated areas, artillery, naval gunfire and air stri":--s =ay be directed against enemy forces in contact Ln accordance with normal procedures. W..hen.not in contact, unobserved fire will be directed only on targets or target areas declaea hostile by GVN, Vietnamese liaison perso.nel, ground observers, or-forward air conttrollers. b. Artillery fire, naval g-,.r.fire and air strikes against kno.n or sus:ected VC targets in hamlets and villages occzpied by non-combatants are governed by the follo-.ing: (1) All attacks xill be controlled by an airborne or ground fon-Tard air controller,. tactical air controller (airborne), ground observer or RVNAF observer ani -ill be executed only after US-GVN-RV.NAF ap-przval, as appropriate. (2) Hamlets and villa--es not associated with ground operations -will not be attacked without prior warning (by leaflet and/or speaker or other appropriate means) even though light fire is received from them.

(3) Hamlets and villages may be attacked without prior warning if the attack is in conjunction with a groand operation involving the movement of ground forces through the area, and if, in the judgment of the ground cozmander, his mission would be 'Jeopa-rdized by such warning. Undeniably, there have been occasions when hamlets and villages -were hit' by air and artillery; hc-.wever, captured enemy documents state that VC guerrillas ani caire have been denied access to villages because "the v;illqgers "-ere afraid this would cause the with guns and planes." ille government forces to ats:

Best Available Cor'


SC, 0NEENT

"Captur_ J' eneTy do!'2unc.ts and iuturrozaion of

inor

the mos conclusive informaLion concerning of ,,,rar have -rovidod the true impact of .nobserved air and artillery strikes on the enemy. B-52 raids alone have proven their effectiveness to the point that the enemy has adopted an intricate warning system. When a~unit recelves warning of a possible B-52 strike, activities are suspended for several hours and individuals disperse or take cover. A member of the signal company, 324 B NVA Division, stated that such measures would coznience seven to eight hours prior to a raid and that his unit was bombed eight times in fifteen days. A cadre of an enemy main force supply transport unit in Tay Ninh Province 'reported, that, because of losses suffered in previous B-52 strikes, his unit and other units in the area cancelled all transport missions during the alert periods. In a survey of prisoners of war conducted in the second half of 1966, interviewees repeatedly maentioned air and artillery as the weapons they feared most, even though most personnel were usually well entrenched. A captured enemy critique of two VO battalions located in Darlac Province noted, "Friendly units (VC) were so afraid of enemy planes and artillery that they withdrew from battle." and "Some units were so afraid of artillery and aircraft that, while on the way to battle, they turned back."

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7th AIR FORCE REDUTTAL:
V,

AIR A5)

'..LY

KNRKF;s

The Tactical Air Analysis Cen-rr, 7th Air Force, has joined the of those who doubt the .- lidity of the conclusions and/or growing list research methodology of the July SEA Analysis Report item (p. 13) on Air For the benefit of our and Artillery Strikes other than Close Support. readers SEAPRO is not convinced either, except as to the following conclusions: (1) the VC are using dud bombs, b-mtlets, shells and granades to make boobytraps, (2) much of our bombing and artillery consumption is of unknown value, and (3) the concept and value of such fire needs to be reexamined. SEAPRO

is preparing a follow-on study of this subject,


The 7th AF rebuttal follows:

"While there may be merit in the theory developed, the validity of conclusions in the article is compromised in a number of ways.
I. Speculation should not be substituted in the absence of'

"I

However, in some instances, such as the fraction of air .reliabledata. strikes airborne controlled, a fairly reliable figure could have been easily developed through research on the rules of engagement.

2. Terms used are not vell defined and are not in agreement Such terms as "unobserved" with standard reporting systems (Oprep, Joprep). identifiable categories. readily not are and vague are support" )se "nonand

3. The same criteria of success (KIA) is applied to strikes It would not be expected that an having different yrimary objectives. interdiction strike on a road or bridge would produce as many enemy dead as a close support strike against troops in contact. 1. Impractical logic is applied specifically in the statement at the bottom of page 15 to the effect that one mine or booby trap kills one friendly troop. In addition a comparison is made to support the argument on the basis of data (50-100 VC/NVA killed by unobserved strikes in 1966) which the author himself says is not supported by sufficient reliable evidence.
In generalp it is suggested that articles of significant consequ-.ees should be strongly supported with accurate and completely identifiable data.

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F13 E'll TI1AL C 0M


UMOBSERVEM! AIR
AVhi
(rJ.:

~Introductiton
teThe unubotervce tir anft eartl~l.ery strikeai artic:le in bile July Issue of teSoutheast As. Analysis Report (pg 13) created cons idterab.IF~ contrcvercy. Consequently, we felt, it useful to stud9y this quentlon in G~reater detail. Our objeotivte is to dtetriu,.no If' we arc getting sufficient return from our' bombing arid artillery fires on unobserved bareetoi to jui~tify the cost in

fr entdl n tiers an ros d prcez.ostruhu hs ae r eie Appedi a. Anbief rev ies aow thiyapendix woulad be aseulefarng pmrsny lesno ~as-the s wih'aripogres cate ori of14 rdsties air/artll5r strikes. 1. using ou Whafet iv or te agniterpoute o v o casdaltessaed i.s the n Du uitonf pe parobleinm? t i

2ita. how mueny

cauedlowie.ndboyrp

teuds? udepesostruhu hsppraedfndL o aulthis appedi cauled by uoservedfo ptreies? not familmany witt Carons caregokiledsbou ar/noberve strikes?

3pedi.Aobran civii-an f

1.WaMi agnitude h of Puiin the Dudd

roblem?

O2r fppow ach in cnsuiderin the dausd prblemihas bend tooeparate 3ond. tows alnd costaintotcategories, obecasevd and unobbserved srks

missions. Observed missions are normally employed in support of troops in contact or against a target being watched by a patrol or a spotter aircraft. F'or observed missions,, conaidarations of dud rates and costs are largely meanin~less since we are concerned with a tactical situation where the enemy has been observed and is hit as fast as possible, with as much firepower as is available. The results (i.e. KIA) destruction of mater~iel) are normally observable.* We assume that these expenditures are justified and necessary and they will be continued despite their cost or the duds they may produce. The second category iv the dropping and fitrin 35,000 toc~n on art viemy whom ,,,e can riclther infl:Lcting sigtni.:V.cant dama-le. unobserved mission. We estimiat~e we are of ordnance a month (wojrbh $40 million) sioe nor gather data Lhat proves we are On the other hand thereu is sufficient

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evidence to conclude the.L -the enemyv iz, S a portion of atbout 6C00
tons of dud explosives we eshintate art ,.x:,'ied each month. The Viet Conc, use these duds to manufacture mines anri,boby-traps, which they use against our troops. Table 1 breaks dovrn the ordnance exza6nded each month (based on data for the first half of 1967) into the two categories observed and unobserved missions. These estimates were made using the following assumptions: 1. Ninety percent of .ll Arc Light sorties (B-52) are considered unobserved. By their very nature, high altitude drops on suspected enenmy -troop and supply concentrations cannot be observed. However, some strikes are conducted in close support of ground troops and we assume 10% to be in this category. Tactical air 2. Tactical air sorties are generally considered observed. sorties can be generally separated into close air support, direct air suppbrt, and air interdiction. Of these we consider the first two to be observed (i.e. Ground observer, FAC, or the pilot himself can assess results). Air interdiction is questionable and we have assumed approxi-

mate3V hWX of these axe unobserved and &bout 10 of total urdnance expended
iis in this category. Because of inadequacy of data reporting thin figure is questionable and perhaps should be nuch higher. 3. Of the total tube ordnance expended between 1 January 1967 and

30 June 1967, we estimate 45% are unobserved.-/i


(a) Based on field reports from artillery commanders, 35% of total artillery rounds expended in SVN are used on harassment and interdiction (H&I) fire missions.

(b) 8% of the missions were neutralization fire.2! These were considered 75% observed and 25% unobserved based on field reports.
(c) Another 16% of artillery fire was for registration, and landing zone preparatory fire missionsi' These two categories were

considered observed. (d) 16% of total rounds fired consisted of illumination, smoke
These are all considered in the observed category. and chemical shells.

(e) The' remaining 25% are considered close support artillery fire and are classed as observed.

.2_ Data collected first

half '67 shows a significant decrease in this category as compared to 1966. Estimates on close support fire missif.s, SFA A-alysis Report, 25

July 1967, pages 2 and 3.

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0J~LDAN t~C~~DFIRE M~sIOSS~i ANID kU STk,1KIU" EXPTor.WD fNSVN ROUi[DS/BOk!NS A0FD '.LONL it:

TONS EX1LEND (OOO) PER MONTH S/


1rItM Observed Mission 1.6 11.9 7.8 5.8 22.1 h9.2 59.0 Unobsexved Mission 14.0 1.2 .8 18.2 3-.2 41.0 Total Ordnance 15.6 13.1 8.6 5.8 40.1 83.4 100.0

1B-52 Al Teo Air Navy & Marine Air Mortar Fires Artillery Fires TOTAL Percent of Total

ITEMS EXPENDED (000) PER MONTH


1T =1M Observed Mission Unobserved Mission

____

Total Ordnance

B-52
AF Tao Air

4.8
6r.O

43.6
6.4

.48.14
71.4

Navy & Marine Air


Mortar Fires

31.2
503.3

3.11 438.7
49. 1

37.6
503.3 1051.0 1711.7 100.0

Artillery Fires
TOTAL Percent of Total

612.3
1219.6 71.2

2P8.8

Baned on data for the period Jan-June 1967. _/ Operation ARC LI{H'P sorties in SVN only.

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Table 2 estimates the costs of the ordnance constuned in ob erved and Unobserved artillery and air strikes. Costa were based on the unit prices of the items expended. Delivery costs are not included. Thus, the eFrotua cost is iinderstated significantly.

TABLE 2 MONTHLY COST OF EXPENDED ROUNDS/BOMS OF OBSERVED AVID UNOBSERVED FIRE MIrSJONS AND STRIYE1 IN SOUTH VIETNAM o.bserv Missions Unobserved Missions Total Coot

ITEM
5-52
AF Tac Air Navy & Marine Air

Cost (4 Millions)
1.7
14.2 11.6

Cost ($ Millions)
Ordnance Expended. 14.8
1.4 1.2

($ Millions)
Ordnance Expended 16.5
15.6 12.8

Ordnance F-pended

Mortar Fires Artillery Fires

11.2 26.5

22.2

1. 2 48.7

TOTAL
Percent of Total

65.2
62.2

39.6
37.8

io0..8
100.0

/
E/

Based on data for Jan-June 1967.

Operation ARC LIGHT

Table 3 computes the volume and cost of recoverable duds resulting from unobserved strikes during the first half of 1967. It was estimated that only 50% of B-52 duds are recoverable. At altitudes of 20,000 feet and above dud bombs will normally bury themselves 20 to 30 feet below the surface. Locating and retrieving this type dud would be extremely difficult and probably not of a dud worth the effort. On the other hand heavy foliage can slow the fall bomb or cause it to tumble, thus impeding Its penetration into the ground. For lack of any substantial data as to what portion woiLd be buried, we simply assumed that 5M of d~js are retrievable. We used a 5% dud rate for the bombs carried by the B-52s.-" The BLU-3 bomblets are considered in a separate a egory because of their light weight and their extremely high dud rate of 20%. Foliage is the single most important factor that contribubes to this rate. The bomblet has a tendency

j/ Menorandum toPyatt (ODDR&E), rbid. -/

W. G. McMillian, Pg. 3.

MAMSA from Paul V. Iandes and Everett

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to when penetrating successive ayers foliage and and not they are li1eey to tumble l.and relatively undamaged on their -:!"e or of tailfin, explode.
The remainder of the unobserved orn.nnce is artillery rounds which have

an estimated 2% dud rate.

Costs were attributed to each of the three cate-

gories on a basis of unit price per item. TABLE 3


DERIVATION OF ESTI.M--D DUD BOMBS

AND SHELLS INCLbDI'-G D;D COS Monthly Average a


Tons Expended

IN SVN

Retrievable

Dud

ITEM Unobserved Strikes B-52 AF, Tac Air, Navy & Marine Air Excluding BLU-3B BLU-3B Artillery TOTALS aI b 13,971 1,957 9 18,236 34,173 Dud Group 6,986 1,957 9 18,236 27,188 Rate 5% 5% 20% 216

Tons

Cost of

of Duds 349 98 2

Duds ($ Mil) .7 .1 .1

365
814

.5
1.4

Based on data for Jan-June 1967. Excludes all small arms type ammunition to include 20mm.

Based on the above calculations, we estimate that we are potentially providing the enemy with about 800 tons of" duds per month which cost us about $1.4 million. CaqUSMACV estimates the VC/NVA forces have a total average monthly munitions requirement of 300 to 450 tons. U.S. CASUALTIES CAUSED BY MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS The table below, covering the period 1 Jan to 30 Jun 67, indicates that 17% of all U.S. casualties are caused by enemy mines and booby traps. During the 6 month period, 539 U.S. lives were lost and 5532 were wounded. The need for a vigorous program to minimize these casualties is apparent.

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TA BLE,.

U.S. CASUTALTIES3 1.Jan - 30 Jun 1967 ARMiY


___KL 1q1 KA

MARINES
WIX

TOTAL CASUALTIE
WIAA PXA

;8
2

Total C,rualties
Caused by

-"

2829

18058

1780

12705

460_ 3

3__63 532 607

Mines & Booby Traps

30[3

32

by M&BT1
Source of Data:

.3% 13.1%
ICS, and HQ Marine

,.1l

24..d

.7 1

8.o1M

17.41

Army 0DCSOPS Meno dated 3 Oct 67,

oubj. Data" Office of 0-1. "Request forporpss

Pa/ Marine cors casualties are grouped in a category "mines, booby traps and explosive devices". In preparing this table, we assumed that 5(# of explosive devices are mines or booby traps. B/ Breakdown of WIA into hospitalized and non-hospitalized not available.
Army casualties resulting from mines and booby traps are likely to increase in the future, approaching those of the Marine Corps. A high percentage of the Marine Corps troops have been engaged in operations in their TAORs. As the Army begins to remain in place more often and actively engage in revolutionary development support activities, susceptibility to mines and booby traps will increase. No data is available to determine ARVN mine and booby trap casualties; however, it is thought to be high. There is ample uvidence that the VC are using U.S. ordnance to make mines and booby traps. It includes a captured VO training film showing the individual The film demonstrates VC soldier how to dismantle duds and use the explosive. how one captured 100 lb. bomb can be used to make four 25 lb. nmdnes; even the containers used were expendable U.S. cans. Intelligence reports also state that the VC place a premium on obtaining duds as a supply of explosives. Rewards and incentives are offered for each dud brought into the mine factory. Some skeptics state it is too difficult or dangerous for the VC to waste time doing this; this is clearly not the case. Reclaiming U.S, duds is not a small size effort nor is it localized to any area of SVN - it is an overall VC objective. Of course, it greatly simplifies VC logistical problems. 4!

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Fh,re arc- uio statistiUH tO indi~l%:e .01; :'aancy contain U.S. explosives; but frcm the t-ornnr~ges of is ecnu h for every mine and booby trap the VC is aL~~nx his mines a~id booby traps contain our
-of

V mines and booby traps ou~r duds available, there willing to make. If we explosives, then yearly

abou 54 peole

illbe killed and 5500 will be wounded as a result.

It s asocontended that many friendly non-combateunt casualties result

dirctl fom urunobserved fire. No statistics are available either to deny or support this allegation. The general consensus of personnel who have served in Vietnam, however, seems to inidicate that wi~th few exceptions, the civilians killed or wounded by the unobserved fire are living in areas known to be under tight VC control. Most of thq areas are very lightly populated and aryone in These areas are probably either VC or are sycnpathetic-to the VC.
If we concede that some unknowr. niumber of non-combatant casualties are caused by our un~observed fires, the next question is what impact does this

have on our efforts in Vietn~am. if purely humanitarian aspects are excluded, there are two possible results: (1)we'alienate the civilians by wa~r indiscriminate Mir6; or (2)the civilians attempt to' disassociate themselves from the VC in order to reduce the likelihood of attack or they may blame the VC gor carrying on the war and thereby causing the attack. Th~re is evidenee to support eitlier thesis and we have no sound basis to determine which is most CONFIDEN4TIAL most frequently. The latter result, however,, probable or which result happens probably occurs more frequently in observed fire circumstances when the villagers see that VC anti-aircraft fire provokes aCU.S. Threac s.itistoini.eho;:n iesanretaliatory ooytr5 air strike. Mhe VC's role in provoking unobserved fire, however, would be less clear, and we can assume our unobserved fire alienates -uhe lo~cal peasants in most caseli, thus harming our efforts to break down' their loyalty to and support for the Viet Cong. the indirect casualties caused by our duds and the A se~parate .4uestion ;'a mines and booby traps made from them, by the VC. Civilian casualties appear to be running at about 75,000 to 100,000 per year. Various official U.S. estimates are -that 40% of these are unquestionably VC caused - and r~dnes and booby traps are the primary factor. Other studies indicate that mines and booby trap casualties are even' higher. In any event, it would seem that 30,000 to LO,000 civilians are killed or wounded by VC mines and booby traps, many of which are made using our' dud munittLons. They also cause considerable damnage Lo roads, bridges and equipment. The magnitude or cost of this damage is unkniown.4
VC KTLTJED BY UNOBSERVED FIRE

There are no data Indicating how manyj VC have been killed by unobserved fires. There are, however, intelligence reports (mainly POW and rallier statements) that indicate many VC cas'ialties can be attributed to air attacks.
Other reports state that VC morale is undermined by frequent tactical and B-52 strikes. But there appears to be no -,ay lo make any valid estimiates of' the

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or to.,L1 the he realt ieiipn,t ofnumber of VC kill-:1 or VC combat effentiveness. However, Until better evidence it available we have no basis to believe the numbere of enemy killed is large.

WHAT IFF WSTOPPED ALL IOBS3ERVED FIRE?


Nwo things are clear: (1) the VC use our duds, many of which came fror unobserved fire, to kill our troops an well as ci'tilians; (2) unobserved fire fails to kill large numbers of enemy troops, But, if we stopped all unobserved fire, would it result in a real drop in US/Civilian casualties? Perhaps, but very possibly not, It would reduce friendly c&sualties only if the VC would be unable to get a sufficient supply of duds from our previous bombing or from "unobserved" strikes which i-culd presumably be continued. However, the fact the VC pay bona3es for duds indicates they do not have an oversupply. At least we might force the price of duds higher. At best we would reduce riendly military and civilian. casualties to some degree. On the other hand, there would be some unmeasurable loss in our effectiveFewer VC would be killed or injured. Some 13-52 strikes are evidently ness. evidencr, is building up that we killed sizeable numbers extremely effective; Interdiction fire has some of NVA troops along the DMZ in Sept. and October. effect fn reducing our casualties by making an attack on our positions more difficult. But we are unable to measure with precision the favorable results of these fires. CONCOIISION Based on available evidence we cannot reconmend that all unobserved fire be stopped. However, we can conclude that it does lead to large numbers of friendly casualties (mainly through VC retrieval of duds) and it should be minimized. Troop commanders at all levels mist realize that unnecessary missions may cause more hars than good. The cost to the taxpayer is only a minor part of this, the noet in friendly lives eMd ?.imbs is the major factor, We are solving a significant part of thia VC .ogistical problem for him, thereby reducing the effectiveness ot our interdiction program. Specifically, some of the following act:ions could ba taken': .I

1. Improve the reliability of our o-rdnance (DDR&E has established a study group to do this.) a/ 2. Use ordnpnue, such as the BIIJ-3B, which has high dud rates only where the tactical situation clearly justifies it. 3. Conduct field studies to determine what other types of ordnance can be used e,:ily by the VC. Then hold down consumption of these items. 4 . Expand efforts to judge the effectiveness of B-52 operations as they provide lEu'e numbers of dud bombs. If warranted by these studies, restrict the mission to ueses where the intelligence makes the pny-.off clearly worth the cost,

:t I/ is interesting to note recient statistic, of enemy E,.rbillery fired


in D"2 area indi-ate eremy artillery dud rate is less than
10i,.

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5. Tnc~rnrs-e our effortsi torc~
include bonusos to civilians whr

e.,r'

This UiIjght
-.-e location of a, dud. This might be done etc.

repoc,;

Rais. eithe cost of the du1.s tc the 7,C. by use of self- destruct devices, "ph:ney".-ads," 7. problem.

Conduct an educational cm;ai. t. apprise our troops of the dud "The life you take may be yc':r :,-w."

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"

DELJINITIOcN O.AT.Zla"',6 Much confusion can be caused by the impropor use of military terms.

The foll.owing is a condensed .:ias used in this paper:

and definition of terms most convv',nly

. Cose Air uport Air action against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integrations of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. wih2. Tactil Air Support - Air operation carried out in coordination ()3-52'0 with surface forces which directly assist the land or naval battles, are normally involved in this type of operation).

3, Observed fires - Fire for which points of impact or burst c&n be Oeen by an observer. The fire can be controlled and adjusted on the basis of observation.

lb rassinE Fire

Fire designed to disturb the rest of the enemy

troops, to curtail movemient and, bythreat of losses, to lower morale.

5. Interdiction Fire - Fire placed on an area or point to prevent the enemy from using the area or point.
6. Destruction Fire - Fire delivered for the sole purpose of destroying material objects. This is observed fire with precise adjustments usually fired by one gun. 7. Close Supporting Fires - Fire placed on enemy troops, weapons, or positions which because of their proximity present the most immediate and serious threat to the supported unit.

8. Neutralization Fire - Fire which is delivered to hamper and interrupt movement of an enemy force,
9. Free Strike (Fire) Zone - A battle area. in which fires may be brought upon without authorization of military and civilian authorities. /Joint Chiefs of Staff', "Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage", JCS Pub. #1, Washington, 1962.

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"CONFIDENTIAL ~~~AP~:--:" -PFron. our experience in Vietnrmxa, it s zlet~r that the VC Euxe teking
ordnance,

extreme risks whun handling and attempt1n

to use our dud air and artillery

Despite the fact that the average 71'. received considerable training in demolitions during his basic training, cr.le methods of handling explosives must cause considerable loosen of life And limb among his ranks. Iki; In early 1966, in the village of'S'en 'at, north of Saigon, a search and destroy operation uncovered a VC anti-vehiiular aine manufacturing operation. The VC had a 100 pound bomb slung from a hoist mounted on a tripod. The bomb was not deactivated but instead, the tail and ind was hhcksawed off, allowing an opening sufficient enouSh to e:xract the explosive by means of a steam jenny. It would take about 4 hours to extract all the explosive and

1111

l'

pour it into 25 pound caeaoity tin cans,

In other instances, the VC have been known to drill through the tops of

dud BLU-3B bomblets in order to place an eativabing mechanism (fuse) within them. Hand drills are most likely used. This officer also noted that while in RVN he read a VC training manual regarding the conversion of the BLU-3B into various booby traps and mines. The manual was very detailed with many diagrams and illustrations, The VO probably have few difficulties using o'ix artillery round as most of them are armed with point detonation f-ses which are extremely easy to deactivate, Only in the case of sore freek malfunction of the firing mechanism, will this type of fuse activate a dud artillery round. We use very few "mechanized time fuses in artillery shells. Duds containing these fuses have been known to be highly dangerous.

a/ Army Officer,

an EOD expert, ),".Is

on o' 27 Sept.

1967

concerning his ifield experience An Fc'-.h Vietnain from Aug 1.965 to Aug 1966.

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AR2'2LERY FIRE r2W VflE,?AM

of 1900 waa onlZy 10% looor than the four month average during the Tot 68

S~j.The avoa'aqe art~ittry consumption for the firet four raonths

oategoriee:

offensive; average oonzumption during the Canbodia operations (May-Jrune 1970) inoroaved 15Z over that for the firot four months and was 59 hig'her than the Tot 68 four month average. rho oombined number of USARV and RAP artillery tubes has increased more the 12% since early 2968, with a 25% decrease for ISARV and a 78% inorease for RVIAP. This is reflected in the RVNAP ehar of artillery 0mnnition expenditures up frcom lea than JO during the Tot xoept for the Tet 68 period, 68 period to more than 30 during ahy-urne 1970. in a situation of fired been have rounde ariZaery some 70% of aZl USARV tight or inactive oombat intenuity, as dudged by the reporting artillery unit. PY 69 ampunition expenditures were directed against two general taryit

(1) Those representing the most direct threat to iendZy ground force& (oonfirmed, outerbattery and preparation tarpet.), and (8) Those representing a probabZe or poseibZe threat (asqutred and interdiation targets). Our analysit ohmse that targets in the fir#* category received 601 rounde fired in 17 69 and absorbed of the US ARYMY Vist'm (USARV) aiery 483 of the total USARV artillery amunition coet; targets in the -second oategory recelved about 58X of the round. but acoounted for more than 471 of the oost. Wit'hin the second category., the bulk of the expendituree was against ienoj rounde and atmoet 40% of the coet, hile interdiotion targets (likely e ooate, of o tbut 16b accounted for groautdono)
by RVN Military The estimated US and RVPIAT artit,'evy distribution

Region in 1969 shows X RR leading with 40%, followed by XII lIR (29%), ZIr MR (19%), and IV MR (12%). HES/?0 datea for 1970 mhow. that, except for an inorease in II 1I, the peroentagee of A, B, and 0 vitZagde subjected to eporadic or repeated arttiAery fires/air etrikes deoined in the eacoond quarter of 1970.
General Artillery am=unition expenditures in Southeast Asia have remained relatively constant for the past three years and in June 1970 were only 6% below bhq highest monthly rate ever recorded (Feb 1968). Variations in the intensity of the main force conflict, (generally, trending downward since 1968), the considerable pacification gains during 1969-1970, and US redeployments have all had little apparent effect on artillery consumption. Some US advisors are unofficially reported to feel that the present level of artillery fires and air strikes is excessive in view of the improved combat situation. Increased consumption by ARVN/VM,1C artillery battalions and a greater use of sensor systeras have been cited as key factors leading to the lev6l trend in artillery expenditures, while operations in Cambodia apparently account for th6 unusually high level in June. This analysis examines these and other factors using data from the Army's Ground Munitions Analysis reports,.Combat loss and

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-Expenditure Data - Vletn&w (COLMJ-V),

of RVNAl' (SEmER), nnd HES/70. was also foutind useful.

the System foc" Evaluating tho Effectiveneas Some preli::sty cost data from the NS$14 77 Study

While these sources provide an insight to artillery distribution by mission, target, and RVN Military Region, we are unable to directly assess the effectivemess of artillery. The best witness for artillery effectiveness is the supported soldier engaged in ground combat, who relies on the artillery's timely, accurate, all-weather delivery of munitiona to a much greater extent than air strikes and who is more likely to complain about inadequate support than excessive use of artillery. We can, however, show the percent of expenditures supporting friendly ground forceson offensive missions versus other missions, as well as the frequency of artillery fire and air strikes directed in or near villages. Artillery Expenditures - Southeast Asia Artillery expenditures in Southeast Asia reflect artillery unit fires of the following organizations, listedin rasnk order of their contributioa1 to the tion: overall consua

(1)

US Army Vietnam (USARV)

!,(2)
(3)
(4) (5)

ARVNlwNC
U.S. Marine Corps
Other Free World Forces (MF) Laotian U.S. Special Forces in Vietnam

(6)

Their recorded monthly expenditures in thousands of short tons since 3,967 are:

In early 1968, USARV and ARVN/V MC artillery units accounted for over 60%of 105mm and 155mm amunition consumptions; 1JSMC and FWF units expended the rest with only about 1% going to Laos and the Special Forces. By 1970 the USAV and ARVN/VNMC proportionate consu--ption had increased to more than 70% due to ARVW/VVMC increases. Of the heavier (8 inch and 175mm) artillery, USARV Table 1, a comparison of artillery and USMC units are the only consumers. expenditures in early 1968 (Tat offensive, Phase I and II) with those for 1970, shown the increased ARVN/VNMC consumption and the effect of the Cambodia operations. Table 1

US/FWF - ARVN/a'C
1966 - -

Atillery Con.smtion
1.970

(1000 tons) Feb Feb-May Avg jan-bAr Avyr May-June Avg June

ARVN/VNMC
UrJ/FWF

-r 109

13
81

23
62

31 66

Total

9
l

299
lMl

Sl

'

CONFIDENTIAL l

V
CONFIDENTIAL

"Consumption for the first four mont,hs of 1970 was about 10% lower tnar the four month Tot period in 1'63, but duing the Cambodia operations was somewhat higher than for the Tet 66 offensive even though the peak expenditure in 1968 (Feb) was higher. The ARV71,/*I7MC share was more than 30% during May-June 1970 compared to less than 14 In 1968. Weapons density data for USARV and ARVN/VZ1C artillery units shov n increase of 205 tubos (all calibers) from
ea'ly 1968 to June 1970. Mv!/Vvma tubes increaced from 599 to 1061; (+78) while USARV tubes decreased from 1052 to 792 (-25%). USARV Artillery Fire by Mission/Target Command Study of Comzbat Opet'ations Loss Lnd Expenditure Data Vietnam (COLE-V) shows the distribution of U,ARV artillery fires by mijsion, target and combat
intensity. For a complete description of the listed categories, see the attached definition& Annex. (The FY 70 report will not be available until Oct-Nov but we hope to receive the reat of the CY 1969 data by the end of August.) Table 2 displays the data by percent aed shows that: The FY 68 and FY 69 year end report of the U.S. Army Combat Developments

(1) Except for the Tot 68 period, about 70% of all artillery rounds exe fired in a light to inactive combat intensity environment as Judged by the ,reporting artillery wait. About 50% of the artillery is fired in support of combat units on .- .(2) offensive mi.siom while some 30% are fired on Harassment and Interdiction or "other"-/ missions. The remaining 20% is divided between security (Mi)
ond base camp defense misions. (3) Confirmed targets comprise about 30% of those engaged; these targets represent an enemy presence determined by actual contact or observed activity and are probably the most effective. This category, together with counterbattery and preparation targets, accounts for most of the direct threat to friendly ground forces and corresponds closely to the offensive mission category. (4) Acquired targets are targets based on detection by special intelligene. sources (SPAR), aerial surveillance systems, radars, and unattended ground sensors, as well as enemy activity patterns, and terrain analysis; together with interdiction targets they account for almost 40% of the artillery expenditures. The upward trends in acquired targets in 1969 may reflect increased use of sensors but we have not yet acquired data which shows artillery fire based only on unattended sensor detection; preliminary FY 70 data seems to reflect USARV efforts to decrease the proportidn of rounds directed against "acquired targets even though the number of ,attehded sensors in use was considerably greater than in FY 69.

The mint categories refer to mission of the supported maneuver unit, therefore the Harassment/Interdiction mission category was discontinued in FY 69 on the basis that this could not be a supported unit's mission. The etfect "of this change shuws in the mission category "other" which increased from 2,

in FY 68 to 32% in FY 69.

-CONFIDENTIAL
, . - ..... .. , .. i , , "... . .. .. . . .. .... . . .i . . . ..... .7 .. . i ....

2
. ., .

Art-i3..y

nU~nitio~

~itxe
1. 6#

US Axniy C Y 196,C61

2
3Q-tr r4. 892 877 975 949 802
825

Fy 68 FY 69
No. o_ Rounds (0oo.)./ 913 1058

-4-t 850 789 1028


1152

877
870

985
1009

W4o
$26

Rda Per Weagon

1045 1025

D,stribution of Rd$
bloderate-livy
Lt. - Inactive

37
63

30
70

29
71 434

34
66

4o
60

45
55

30
70

31
69

32
68

29
71

'

mi ssion
-- eni Security

49

BaseC p4Def, H, as/Int'exrdict a/ Other Target ~


Confred
Counterbattery

9 4 36 2

51 10 7 32
32
5

15 2 37 2

47 9
3 39 2

51 7
4 36 2

53 8
5 31 3

56
12

49
10

534
8 7 31
32
6

45
11 7 37
6
5

7 25
28

8 33 40
14

Vreparation
Subtotal

11
25 22
2210

1 10
22 27 28

A' juired
)nterdletion

Subtotal ARVN Support Spec/other Subtotal


Source Combat Operations Losa

2 10

2.
12 I

2
fl t

and Expenditure Data - Vietnam (COLM-V)

a
"/ }/

Includes only 105mm, 155mm, 8 inch, and 175= round&, Reconnaissance in Force Missions.
Not reported in FY69. Not reported in FY68.

Includes cordon and search, clear and secure, search and destroy, and

,'.

l231 1221

CONFIDENTIAL

AR V!V

p ArtillerX Fltrei

by Target These categories Table 3 shows

In the monthly SEER report, U.S. artillery advisors report the number of
artillery rounds fired in support of RVNAF by target category. to those in COLED-V for USARV. are wimilar but not, identiAl

ii

data or about Wilo. Around 55% of the ARVN/VMC fires are uiracted against the more dire~t threat to friendly ground forces; this is somewhat higher than the comp0arable UrSARV data but not sigulficantly so.

the distribution arranged for comparison to the Table 2 USARV data. A6RVN/VNMC artillery interdiction fires are about 30% of the total, much ereater than the identical USARV category.. The defense concentration catego.'y consists of preplanned fires against likely enemy routes of attack; 'since this differs little from interdiction (fire against suspected enemy locations) these two categories are subtotaled and the result is quite close to the USARV acquirid/interdiotion

TABLE

enditures OY 1969 Artillery Amntion (monthly average)

2Q No. of Rounds (000) No, of Arty


Distribution of Rd

4QYear 349 368 365

303

439

908
opportunity

908
32
9 11

916
31
13
0

93 4
j6
8 12

Sof

47
5

Counterbattery Preparation Defense Concentration

35 6
1_

59
6

511.~

ii

Interdiction Sub total


Spec/Other

37
35

39

a' Includes US artiller;, support, about P."5% of' the tounds shown.
1.05 and 155 artillery tubes, from Army GMAS report.

CONFIDENTIAL
I I I.I.I.l.l...

CO NFIDE1ITIAL
Art illery Fire by, RVX Mili~ttey Region
(MR)

The percent of ARVN/VNlMC art~llery fire in each of the Military Regions for 1969 wee:
-x

I1

XI

Whilfe USARV artillery data for the same period is not available, preliminary "calculations obtained from the NSSM 77 study group shows the following distribu-

tion based on artillery costs in FY 691

Apparentlyt

US artillery uits

supportizn

the two 9th US Division brigades in frame would be:

IV MR during PY 69 were lumped with IIZI 1 uits. By combining the USARV and SARVN/VNM0 distributions rand including USMC and FWPF expenditures, an approximate
distribution by Military Region in the

1969 tizt

il'While

May 1970 a USARV ammutnition officer Indicate& to the NSSM study group that, I
'MR ad consumed 150% of programmed artillery exponditurem, for tba entire country. Artillery/Air Strikes NearP Areas in contrast to

theI7MR estimated share may be slightly hight it is worth noting that in


inO0

A village level question in HES/70 asks: "Where any ftiendly artillery fires or air strikes directed in or near the inhabitO'i area of this villa e during 1o, (2) Yes thu mon 4 hT" The advisor way choose one of slx responses: (1) repyated.Xy, (5) Not al~plicable, and (6) once, (3) Yes, inoradically, (4) Table 4 displays villages rated A or B and C in security in Unable to judge. which the advisor chose response (3) or (4) above.
:

Around 8% of A or B rated villaaes report tporadic occurrences of artillery I1 MR over 1% report repeated occurrences. fire or air strikes, and a little of the C 40, sustaini-d the higheat fraquency with I 1CR recording the lowest. rated villages are subjeoteC to spoadic artillery fire/air strikes and 12% The 2nd quarter 3.97D data is lower in all areaR, report repeated occurrences. except II MR, which shows an increase general!., in all village and freqvincy categories.

CONFIDENTIAL
114

CONiFIDENTIAL

VIL!AGE BECMRTY 8C0R-

lot Str 70
SpraicOccurrence
'

2nd cZtr 70

ge

17

6,o

14

11411
IV22

39 6.0 TI 41.5
ii's4o.5 48 41.2 21

4.6 14.6

UKN 0 Vitllages I32 111

28

32.8

77
4P

39.7
38.0

IV
"I
1

44,o

84

44.o

A, 3Villages 1
11

7III IV
C Villages 18

9
1

3.0

9
2

1.r4
10.9 12,2 11.6 12721

0.4

3.3 0.7

1.0

11
111 IV22
BoratH

23 14i

8 29 10

91

1.
9.0 21.12

Monthlyv response to question VMC02 _a/ Percent by category, e.g.: the 17 villages shownm for I MR under the AB category In lot qtr 70 represent 6% of all villages rated A or B for

that quarter.

CONFIDENTIAL

23L4

CO NFIDENTIAL

Costa. The cost of artillery s8ur=itiorn ihipped to USARV by the Army terTT'oumnd (AMa) ' was $916.5 million, in FY 69 and $923.3 million in Fy 70; the expected cost in FY 71 is $890.1 =illion. At a cost of $1150 per ton the total SEA artillery consumption in ri 7C was approximately $1.2 billion. Table 5 shows the percent distribution o! the FY 69 USARV cost by target and caliber.

TABLE 5
USARV FY 69 Artillery Cost by Caliber and Tnrget

Targt Confirmed, Counter-

1 oM

8-inch

17_5mm

Total

battery & Prepaiation


Acquired and Interdiction

32.7

6.7

2.0

1.1

33.1

9.1

2.9

2.2

47.3

"special/Other

.o.

10.2

The lightor caliber artillery (i0 and l5) account for over 90% of the total cost and the cost of artillery a=unition expended on acquired and interdication targets is greater than that expended against the more direct threat, reversing the distribution based on rounds shown in Table 2. This in primarily due to greater use of the heavier artillery against acquired and interdiction targets although the 105=i as Lniition costs are dominant in all target categories.

CONFIDENTIAL

tI

s: ot .

c.
-

a.

Reconnaissance Iii Force

These operations are designed to

locate enemy installations, destroy or evacuate supplies and equipment, and to deztroy or capture enemy forces. Leas importance is

attached to seizing and holding critical terrain than to finding and, finishing the enemy armed forces and political intrastructure. b. Clear and Secure - These are offensive combat operations

aimed at driving the enemy forces out of a designate4 area and keeping them out.
4

The operations are generally initiated by recon-

naissance in

force actions but differ from pure reconnaissance

in force actions in that they are sustained-and em;hasis is placed on seizing and holding key population and communication centers. c. is first Cordon and Search
-

A military operation in which an area

sealed by a military force and then searched by another It normally implies an

force (or part of the sealing force).

operation in and around a village or hamlet. d. Security


-

These operations include convoy,

route, fire

bases and temporary area security.

Convoy security operations can

be accomplished by temporarily securing the route to be used or by accompanying the convoy with an appropriate mix of combat units;

time involved is limitCd to that required to complete the movement

CONFIDENTIAL

12386

CONFIDET.IiL
of the aonvoy. Security oper.tiorns 2re for the purpose of seizing

and holding routus,


Se. Base COp, n

installations an.! facillites.

Defense - All units combat and oon-combat support

engeged in action defending or su~portng the defense of the permanent base camp when under attasck will report this tactical mission. f. Not Under Attack
-

A period during which a unit may be

firing but not under attack by the ene--. S. Training


-

All ammunition used for tra..ing and demonstra.

tione. 2. IN
a.

SITS OF CONFLICT.
y - A high degree of intensity which may include short resulting in heavy cas-

periods of moderate and/or light, coet, ualties and large expenditures of aunition. b. Moderate -

A degree of intensity vhich may include short

periods of heavy fighting resulting in moderate casualties and moderate expenditures of ammunition. ; Ia. -Sporac~ic th t or no

contact with the enemy wilth little

organized enemy resistance, and resulting in light or no casualties and small expenditures of ammunition. d. Inactive - A period during which a unit is not engaged

against the enemy but may suffer losses of equipment ahd ammunition resulting from erny action, zockets anid Pir raids. su-ch as sabotage, mine, grenades,

"CO

. .FIDE .TIAL

Fi

C03IFID;ENITAL
3.
AW4UMTtTION LOSSEFS. Azunition items destroyed, lost, or
These lcsses may occur abandoned as a result of enemy action.

in transit, within ammunition supply points, or dluring combat missions against the enemy. vehicles will be included.) 4. Ni TARG-M ANALYSIS. a. C !nfirmrd Targets: The enemy iocation is kncvn, and his (Basic loads lost in destroyed

presence has been determined by contact with friendly forces or activity seen by air or ground observers. * This category includes

missions fired against hard targets such as bunker complexes. b. Acquired Targets: Enemy locations based upon SLAR, SPARs,

Red Haze missions, ground surveillance radars, airborne personnel detectors and other detaction devices. Targets in this category

must be based upon timely reaction and additionally must meet all of the following criteria: 1. 2. Detection by one or more of the sensory devices listed. Validation by an evaluation of enemy pattern of operations. Terrain analysis by competent targeting agencies. Known or suspected locations during, or o

3.
c.

Counterbattery Targets:

evnga3ed by friendly artillery immediately before,

-'immediately after enemy rocket/mortar/artillery attacks. d. Preparation Targets: Landing z.ones, fire support bases and

objectives or areas which receive precautionary artillery fire prior to air assault or ground occupation by friendly forces. This

CONFIDENITIAL
19

CONFIDENTIAL
category includes reconnaissance ':y fire missions and blocking

fires.
e. Interdiction .argets: Azras or points which the enemy is Fire is de.ivered for

likely to use at some unpredicted time.

the ;urpose of denying the unrestricted use of an area or point. This category includes targets fired as a result of agent reports that are not timely or lack sufficient reliability to fall in the confirmed category. ft Special Purpose Targets: Those targets fired which assist

artillery and maneuver elements to improve the technical effective. ness of their operations. 7his category includes registrations,

marking miss lons, navigation missions, calibrations, adjustment of defensive concentrations and illumination missions. g. ARViN Support Targets: Missions and rounds fired in support

of ARVN forces are extracted 1rom overall totals and reported in this category. h. Others: Those fired for service practice, training,

demonstrations and other categories not included above.

CONF IUE -TIA L


23

CONFIDENTIAL
NAVAL
ohown bel1ow.

UA

~?:

Sum~ EA
?ulption iN

A compa,.2on of th' av.rage monthly Xaval gun wazunition con Fi0MreF innludve 5"0 6", 8" and 16" tumamition.
,,,o.,th-V Ntval Gunf ire Expenditure A/

Kor,,rmn War
Ave Monthly

SEA Conflict
Ave Monthly

Year!' rt(,r
1950

Rounds Fired (000)

Year/Quarter

Rounds Fired (O00)

3rd

20,5
10.1 Total 15.3

2nd1. 3rd
4th Total.

12.8
__

~4th

10.6

11'a 11 st 2nd 3rd


4 th

1966

25.5 36,8
35.

let

2nd 3rd
4th

16.o ~
Total

2P.9 21.1

40. 8
Total 34.5

31.8
23.0 32.1

1-967 lst
2nd 3rd 4th
Totel

37.9

1st (Jan..Feb)

44.5
25.0

18.7
31.5 Ave

1965

1967

19.,

lst P2nd 3rd (July)


Total Ave 1950
-

17.5

16.7 _17.6
17.1

1953

27.2

/
b

Exc:ludes 5' rocketo Rs data for the Korman War ij priod we:re riot uv-iilable. SEA DRAGO) fring bcgegan on Oct. 25, 1966 (i-orgtt nc.?th of' l(U.).

.:

CONFIDENTIAL
4

24U1
~
............ ...........

CONFIDENTIAL
Unvti.L recent weeks the rate ... in i... Southeast Asia has been

".somewhat lower than during the Kzre: " r. -. It apears, however, that the
expansion of SEA DRAGON operaticn.s wi h ht ne picture rather significantly. The 38,400 5", 6" and 8" roi:.red in November 1966 (the peak month to date) is well below the 5-,C .- vds fired in November 1951. How"ever, during the first 12 days of ".:ar.h .9-7 23,600 rounds were fired (20,700 5" and 2,900 8") indicating the ".'arch e:..e..itures may approximate the Korea peak mnon'h. There are a nuirber ef in-er-s-ing differences between the Korea War experience and in Southeast Azia;: h rinci-al ones are outlined below. 1) Type Rounds Fired Korea Southeast Asia Percent
87-1,3

SNumber
5"

T
-"

Number

Percent

V)

382.5

94. 1

6"

34.3

3.4'

6"

8.0

2.0%

8"
16" Total

81.2
20.4 1007.3

8.1%
2.0% 100.0 f

8"
Total

15.5
406.0

3.8%
100.0,

he obvious difference is that batzleships mounting 16" guns were used in Korea. In addition wider use of 8" s.-zznition was made during the Korean conflict, although 8" expenditurez ha-:e in=reased considerably during the past six months. Two or three 8" gun cruisers were normally on-line during the Korean compared to one 8" gun cruiser in S-A. 2) Principal Missions. In Korea .a-:l gunfire was used primarily for interdiction of supplies moving along the :oasts of the Korean peninsula to the battle front. Except for the a'-rs o-n the coastal flanks of the front line there was limited opportunity to su_pcrt ground troops with Naval gunfire. By contrast the long Vietnamese ccast'i..-e a-id the dispersed nature of the fighting (most of it close to the coa-st) :-rmit extensive use of Naval fire support. A very large proportion of South Vietnam is within range of Naval gunfire. However, in recent months S-A D?-0.G0UT operations north of the 17th parallel have been expanded and 11aval fire is being used much more extensively for interdiction. The SEA DRAGON =issions are very similar to those during the Korean War - firing on roads and brcinges, gun emplacements, coastal traffic and logistic facilities. Radar sites 4o w-'ovide one new target for our ships in Southeast Asia. Effectiveness in Korea In view of the above similaritiacs en= d-ifferences, it is interesting to note the effectiveness of Naval fire urzinx the Korean War. The major impact was as follows:

Best Available Cor"

CONFIDENTIAL

24

CONFIDENTIAL
1) It offectively neutralized the iorth Korean Navy anr permittod the Allies virtual free use of the waters off Korea. 2) The impact on the flow of supplies during the early part of the war was significant as the major roads and railways ran along the coast. The Koreans reacted in part by constructing new roads inland (at considerable cost as the mountains reach the sea in many areas) and by a stenuous effort to repair the roads and rail lines. For this reason it was not possible to stop the North Koreais from using the East Coast rail line although traffic was reduced sharply. The enemy was effectively precluded from using coastal shipping after the initial phase of the ware 3) The shoals, mud flats, and extreme tides limited Naval gunfire interdiction and support to the east coact of Korea. In the west, Naval gunfire was limited to a few areas (primarily the Han River estuary) and it had little effect on enemy LOC's.

Ai

4) In those areas where It could be used, Naval fire support for Bround Fire support considerable effect. forces was employed Marines. as well as U.S. troops EOK with Army and and to U.S. accurately was furnished

4II

2 t 2
CONFIDENTIAL

.............

i....

CONFID ENTIAL

SEA DRAGON COSTS COMPARFD TO TAC AIR Car Operation SEA DRAGON, the U.S. Na' s. .

n :..--l!y,

interdiction opera-

tion against NVN, began October 15, i~6o.

the authorized target's

were waterborne logistic craft between 1 7 c the area adjacent to and slightly north of the DMZ. The area -. :.:rressively extended north to 180 and 190 in November 1966 and January * 3.. n ebruary . 23, 1967, shore targets were authorized and the operational limit I:asse= at 2001. The SEA DRAGON force consists of four destroyers and a gun rser. Carrier based spotter aircraft are used for gunfire adjustments ian-i da.age assessment. Since the operation began, over 2,-O0 -ar.a-have been destroyed or damaged W(/D). The bulk have been moving targets .-lC), largely small craft with a few railway cars included. Table 1 computes the number of attack Sorties required to D/D the same number of targets D/D by SEA DRAGON. We used the 2.CE data base to determine the number of attack sorties required to D/D a -aret each month, by route package. These factors were then multiplied by the targets D/D by SEA DRAGON, providing the number of attack sorties required to .r.-.ide the same damage levels as SEA

DRAGON. On this basis, the SEA DRAGON tarzets _/D in the past year would have required about 9,400 attack sorties, or atcut an average of 130 aircraft, and we would have lost about 12 aircraft. The effort of the last six months, however, only required 2691 sorties, about 18 aircraft equivalents, and about 4 losses. Collateral benefits from naval operations such as pilot search and rescue, intelligence collection and suppression of AAA for strike aircraft were not considered. On balance, we believe this sortie eoui-.-alent comparison is biased in favor of tactical air for the following reasons:

1. The mix of targets (fixed and noving) struck by aircraft and ships differs. The SEA DRAGON target mix is more heavily weighted with moving targets
than the air sortie target mix. The Novemz:er SEA Analysis Report article, "Armed Reconnaissance Efficiency in North Vietnam - A ?.e-appraisal," indicated that more armed reconnaissance sorties are required _-c D/D a moving target than a fixed target. In our calculations we used the a':erage targets D/D by air sorties, not just moving targets D/D. This should work in favor of the air sorties. 2. The estimates of target destructicn on attack reports and undoubtedly overstate target daza.e. SEA is conducted by spotter aircraft which shcld wrovide ment of damage. The reason is that the szctter pilot sorties are based on pilot DRAGON damage assessment a more conservative assessis loitering near the target in

Best Available Copy


CONFIDENTIAL
-A ,

-~2<'2

(A-1) dt"I Vit concentrate on otir-iatinr, rlamaee. Thec a Alow. Prop ttin5 on b ilo, cctratj s i aJet air'craf't andi is cono r attck ordance notsssessing damagec. delierin 3.
(weenvl

ithreg~rdto
ufrAi

ircaftattrition, luss rates etzinEL coantal turgetE4


effective) r~ay be highfr than in othc-.-' pii~rtb ofV the route

pacage A-tiv Ak stesanara.ars are denser itn coaotal acrss than in marny in~an ar--ta.Inc-ic~latngeqUvnlont aircraf't losoes we urr,:d tha average loss

We stiatet'P~ttheSEADRAGON operuition cornts about $65 millilon P-r your, about half'the e ivklont, tactioal wir cost of $130 million. Thiese c.osto exclude the initial capitRl investment, Thi tactical air costa wore computed ao followst Total Cost 9^1 sorties x $11.,000-a/ 103.3 $103-3 30.0 ~ 90 l Josso's X 2.5 millionr1

SEA, DRAGODN annual costs were computed as f'oll~ows: SEA MRAIMN CotsS./ Annual D)ireat Operating and Maintenance 0 Cost per SrTp Total Co-it On Line Backup Total (,jNillion)_ (MilLn
1

Detyr
Crie1

$3.0 7.7

$24.0

1.
Il7

Ahmmunition Total SEA DRAGON Cost

There have been no losses of naval v~ssels in NWN to shore fire. There hptve, howevor, been 21 hits by NVX coastal batteries on SNA DRAGOil ships with 20 WIA arnd '4 }IA. Damage repair coots are unknown. Using the same factors for the April J967 perio4l, however, SEA DRAGON cost $33 million versun -$39 Million for equivalent tactical air capability.
-September

aExclu~des attrition. E'rd pilot ca:,ts~.


a

Source:

1)epar;,..nt of tho

JIqvy

--

1IJAVS0 1P-191YS

.. .. ............ ~~~~~~~~........................

CONFIDENTIAL . ..

..

..

CONFIDENTIAL

SLA DR .A M0. lt

- S ': " 71 -

:u i

z,Attrition/.-/ Expected

4th Targets D/D 1 by NOF Route Pankaga b Tc Air Sortie per Tgt D/D

Ist +t r

ncl Z.r

3rd Ztr

1000 Attack
Total Sorties

A/C Losses

611

4-0

40o . 9,7

u 14l

Sortie Equivalent of NGF


T~rgets by NOF7 Tao Air D/D Sortie per Tgt D/Db/

2456 39M6
3.0
-

,46

325 77 1.5 119

7653 X

1.19

9.11

8,.. 2.5 1.C


171

Sortie Equivalent of NGo R~oute Pa.ckae e3

125 164 2.6 1424

415 X

33

"Targets D/D by NMF Tao Air Sortie per T9t D/D./ 3.0 Sortie Equivalent of NGF -

2.5 112

1A

271 1.6 423


53 1.8 96

959 X

1.81

1.76

Route Packawe 4 TnrgetsuD/, by NUF Tac Air Sortie per Tgt D/Db./ Sortie Equivalent of NGF Total Route Packagles 1.4

2.2
-

1 1 216 2.7 2.0 3 22 3

361

1.57

*57 .

Tgts Destroyed/Daaged NGF NGF Sortie equivalents


Janiary - November 1967.
Source: NMCS
-

611 2456
Source:

550

721 1723

515

'4211

963

9388 X

1.25c-/

11.77

Ot (C) Office of Statistical Services.

/ Computod.

COMBA Data Base.

CONFIDENTIAL
I'-Wig

-. .

2_

CORIFIDENTIAL
82A, DRAUOU COSTS COMPARED TO ,CICAL vy AIR COSTS: A REBUTTAL The Air Staff has provided comments in rebuttal to our December article comparing naval gunfire and tactical air coats of destroying targets in North Vietnam. Our article concluded that: "Since September 1966, naval gunfire has destroyed or damaged moving targets
at roughly half the cost of equivalent tactical air capability. However, during good weather months the costs were roughly corrarable." The air staff comments are set forth below, followed by ours.

Air Staff Comments


Ay

of haThe . guns such as in Sea Dragon is


has, in fact,

use known to be effective. The Air Porce

interdiction targets along the coast as a valuable contribution

encouraged the use of naval gunfire (NOP) against

with tactical air to accomplish the Job being performed by Sea Dragon is basically, as made in the SEA report. an "apples and oranges" comparison. Naval gunfire obviously cannot acoomplish inland the tasks perforrsd by tactical air. (I The target system has a signit'icant bearing on the results Inland target types include many in addition to achieved. those In the coastal target system attacked
by NOF (primarily vehicles and boats).

to the overall interdiction campaign. Hence, the purpose served by the analysis is not clear. Oomparing the capability of ships

high cost advantage portrayed for Sea Dragon results primarily from the difference in target types. (2) The number of sorties required to destroy or damage (D) a target is critical to the analysis. This sortie
requirement is

It

appears that the

marily moving targets (87%), largely small craft with a few railway cars. In addition to thesej targets for Tao Air include weapons, bridges/tunnelsj roads, and buildings. Using all target types and all attack sorties flown against them in R-ute Packages I-IV fora 12-month period, the analysis derives
from data in the SEA Statistical Tables I/ an average number of Tao Air sorties (3.9) to destroy or damage a target. This means that 9388 Tao Air sorties would 'be required'to D/D the same number of targets D/D by NGF (2397). The analysis would be more valid if the comparison were restricted to the target types attacked by NGF. i_/ OASD(SA) "SEA Statistical Nov 3O, 1967. Tables through Oct 1967",

target, terrain, accuracy of delivery, etc. Targets destroyed or damaged by Sea Dragon as stated in the report have been pri-

based on a number of factors Including type of

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d .xureid .inan Air 0,':f Stud1r typas io results were obtained: Tarer; Tpe Boat. Vehicle /rwhich covered all

Average Uunber Airoraft Attacks Required t9 D/D a Target / 1.5

1i.
.

(4) An examination of more recent data taken in October-November 1967 indicates what can be accomplished by a

program aimed specifically at moving target Interdiction. The case examined is the 56th Air Commando Wing night interdiction Data from this program show that 1.4 sorties were program. required to D/D a Imoving vehicle and reflects the increased effectiveness from use of. the Starlight scope for night This fLigure is in close agreement with one interdiction. 3 of 1.5 sorties per truck D/D determined in a recent Air Staff examination of attack sorties flown by propeller airoraft against truck targets in Laos, Sector EB during October and
November 1967.

For example, the Gunship U1 system has demonstrated multiple vehicle targets D/D per sortie, considerably less than .one sortie per veh4ole D-/D./

(5) Future systems rhould bring about a further decrease in the number of sorties needed to D/D moving targets.

I/ HQ USAF (AYGOA) Memo 67-4, "Analysis of Air Operations in August 1966", Package Route 1967. ., North Vietnam, during July 28a 2/ In terms of sorties, the nunmber would be the same or slightly less since occasionally more than one boat or vehiule were attacked per sortie. 3/ Obtained from figures as given in SEA End of Trip Report, Col Harry C. Aderholt, USA.F, Dec 19, 1967.
'V Hq USAF (AFRDD) Interim Report, "Gunship I1 Flight Test and Combat Evaluation," Dec 11, 1967.

S*
.............. !!! I. .. ..

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i.
i.

A
.

'

IA CO 4FIF
-c -rne px' Usir thc f'.U rc~ Vi $ipl,C0 )Q.O by NOF D/D (1297) targeb:s of attrition values and the number as stated in the SEA Analysis Report, the cost for Tac Air would. be as indicated in the following table when the average number of sorties'per target D/D are based primarily on boats It is assumed that the targets .destroyed/damaged and vehicles. , fixed targets by NGY consist of 75% boats, 10,% vehicles, *and (based on the statement made in the SEA Analysis s',port that the bulk have been moving targets (2100), largely oimall craft For the fixed bargets, a* with a few railway oars included). figure of 3.2 sorties per target D/D is used._/ CASE AVERAGE NUMBER SOR T?.E EQUIVALENT ANNUAL TAO A:M OOST

SORTI1S Pmt
-TARGET

D/D-

OF NAVAL OUXRVE 4095 4354

INOWDING A RITION $58M $2

3: 311.8 /

1.7

Hq USAP (AYGOA) Memo 67-4, "Analysis of Air 0perabJiona in


ip Route Package

July 28o 1967.,


craft D/D.

North Vietnam, during August 19p6,"

1.4 sorties per vehicular target D/D; 1.5 sorties per small i /2.3 sorties per vehicular target D/D; 1.5 sorties per small

craft D/D.
_() Based on data for similar target types, it t the Tao Air cost to accomplish the same job that appears Sea Dragon is doing would not be twice the Sea Dragon cost ($65M) but more nearly equal. The sensitivity of the results to a change in (8) An increase in the attrithe aircraft attrition was checked. tion by 50% increases the total cost by only 10%. (9) Additional comments follow:

Some of the figures used in Table I of the (a) Sorties report do not correspond to previous data listings. per target D/D for ist quarter 1967 in Route Package I are SrA Statistical Tables through October 1.967, listed as 9.7. Table '7A, depicts this figure as 7.0. There :Ls a consLderable uncortairiny in (b) For example, ship repair,, spotter aircraft, combat air costs. patrol costs, etc. are not shown.

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us to (io fuxzt,ber srring ptis he irForce corzeatz, We elcme within naval areas on~alYsia to determine the number of sor-ies flojwn in C=n're ranges examination of' the types of targets killed and more slaborate exploration of the weather effent. Our one initial comnment is that the Air Force bases its calcu.latior.8 on data from August 1966 and. oot-Nov 1967, good weather months. V'e are not surprised 'that the Air Force f'inds too air and X'ava2. gunfire nno-:etitive in cost under these oiroumet.Luices--we found the seine thing. However, in bad weather months we stil.J. gingerly believe that NOV' fl~nds moving targets more easily (and. therefore kill, them cheaper) than does tac air. Neverthele~s,u more work is needed.

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' APM1, T14EPFZCTXW!Th36

Co"'Zbined sea-cair-round interdiotion is cruoial to an offeotite allVietnZjoe P.dlarket Nimo operation. Renawed enemy emphaeoi on seaborn.e resupply by traZero and oma~ler, intraooiataZ craft, plus observed ahortoominge in Vietncmese auvy (VNNI forces, prompted a field re-evaluation of Market Time effectiveneen thie Spring. The r'eview diat.osed that 11taokre Timel'e lffcctiveneel could be expected to doocine sh~tpy as the Vionaneee take over bhe operation, if current plan aro not ohchnged Several corrective meaaures have been initiated or reconrmndad,
7L;=surveillance and respon~iv,i a-Lr and grosund reaction forces:

-Reent field assessment& indicate that 8 or 0 t

awlers out of

10 would probably penetrate the Market Time barrier after the US Navy P-3 air patro: ie replaced by the coastal radar system, unlese the VMY ohaVe. ilto current dooctrin and practice&. When the US Navy opernted the barrier, the oomarab~l probability was I or traitors out of 10.
-

This effectiveness decline is primarily caused by to factors:

-- The VN has only 4 craft (destroyer escorts and coast guard cutters) believed sapable of intercepting and sinking an armed tawler'.

"T-he P-3 air patrot provides 2-3 days warning time for reaction, but the radar system replacing the P-3's provides only 2-3 hours
warning.

To increaoe Market Time effectiveness against ,rawZerr, RVNAF must take action to provide additional warning time or to increase the number and effectiveness of its reaction force.. The corrective measures already underway wi:l improve performanoe against intraooas8talZmpans, but will
not help much against trawlers.

The consolidated RYNAF Improvement and Modernization Plan provides for Vietnamese Air Force (YNAF) participation in a Market T'ime identifioation and reaction role "with currently programed assets and within the tao'ai.a
air control system." But periodic Vietnaoi'sation reports do not indicate the status of VNAF plans to assume this role. Without a concintrated US and -GVN effort to streanline corm4and and control procedures, it is unlikaly that a VNAF reaction to a VNN raquet staffed through the tactical air control system would be responsive within the 2-3 hovrs warning time.

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Detai s Background. The Market Time operati-,:n currently consists of an inner barrier (0-12 mi), an outer barrier (=2iLt ri), and air surveillance by US P-3 aircraft over and beyond the outer harrier. The April 1970 Consolidated RVT[AF ircvement and Modernization Plan (CRIMP) rejected the concept of providing ,the Vietnarese Air Force (VTAF) with air assets to assume the US air sur-.-eillance mission and opted for a VW71 operated coastal radar system instead. It was felt that the radar system provided adequate detection probabilities at significantly lower long term costs and with a shorter lead time for implementation. The plan also provided for VW7AF to supplement the coastal radar system by providing identification and reacticn forces with their programmed assets, operating through the tactical air control system. Necessary pilot training for this role was to be acco=1_!Shed during the estimated two years it would take to construct the radar system. At the present time, the VNN mans the inner barrier and the USN is responsible for the jointly manned outer barrier. The land based coastal radar system (ACTOVRAD), intended to replace the P-3 air surveillance and USN ships in the outer barrier, is schedu.led to be operational in early 1972. This radar has an average range of 4C-50 miles, which drops to only 30 miles at some of the low .sites in the Delta. By July 1973, VNAF can reportedly provide a supporting reaction capability for Market Time. There have been seventeen known infiltration attempts by enemy steel hull trawlers since March 1970, primarily concentrated along the coastline of MR IV. Of the seventeen, two were surlk by Market Time forces, while two other attempts were considered successful. The increasing number of intelligence reports concerning seaborne infiltration and coastal transshipment in 1,R IV suggests a greater enemy reliance on this method of resupply to auLment land infiltration down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The mid-1969 closing of Kompong Som (Sihanoukville) and the operations into Cambodia and Laos probably made seaborne resupply more attractive to the enemy; a successful trawler landing in MR IV could provide the enemy there with more than a yeer's supply of large caliber ammunition at his 1971 expenditure tates. Recent Effectiveness Assessments. :ncreased enemy emphasis on seaborne resupply and observed shortcomings in VIIT Market Time units prompted CAfNAVFORV to re-evaluate the February 1970 Market Time II study. Results of the May 1971 review, in terms of detection results, are shown in the following table. Current detection performance of the sutface barrier against trawlers is shown to be no better than the worst esttinate in Market Time II and considerably below its previous high (f'sir weather) estimate and the US performance standard, The review al,- T d th.t effectiveness against

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the intracoastal transshipment threat was very low. This year's degradation was attributed to poor performance in maintenance, leadership, and emplo.yment of aVailable ships.

(No.

ESTI'.ATFD DETECTION PROBABILITY of Trawlers Detected of 10 Infiltration Atte-pts) Current Detection Projected Performance (mid-72) (May"71 study) US Performance (goal)

Market Time II Feb '70) Market Time Component

USN Air Patrol VNNT Radar System


VNN Surface Barrier-!/ a/

6-8
.. 3-8
-,

6-8
2-3

N/A

8-9

N/A

6-8
7-8

b/

b/

Includes combined efforts of inner and outer barrier. The Market Time II and projected estimates are based on an all VWI1 barrier, while the May 71 re-evaluation estimate is based on the current composition (inner barrier 100%VNN, outer barrier 50% VWN). No detection estimate provided.

The May 1971 review also noted that the US Navy P-3 air patrols were a key element in Market Time surveillance capabilities and provided a "warning time of several days. After these aircraft are replaced by the coastal radar system Cearly 1972), overall Market Time capability is projected to be only 1-2 successful-trawler interdictions (versus 8-9 detections) out of 10 infiltration attempts unless the VNN changes its present doctrine and practices. This low estimate is primarily due to a combination of the reduced reaction time (from 2-3 days down to 2-3 hours) provided by the radar system and fewer ships in the outer barrier.

Sdiscussion focuses primarily on detection estimates, with interdiction performance mentioned only im the last paragraph. Unless the knowledge that he has been detected causes the infiltrator to abort the mission (deterrence), successful interdiction requires detection to be followed by interception and destruction of the enemy 'craft before he reaches the coast. This sequence of events is as applicable to the smaller enemy craft ferrying supplies from one point to another along the coast (intracoastal transshipment) as it is to the large steel hull trawlers bringing in 100-400 tons cf supplies from North Vietnam. Ordinarily only the inner surface barrier, augmented by closein coastal air surveillance, is involved in countering the intracoastal transshipment threat. Against trawlers, however, all Market Time components--inner and outer surface barriers as well as the offshore P-3 air patrol or (in 1972) land based radar--may be engaged. The interaction between the detection/interception/destruction capabilities of the various components in the more complex trawler interdiction operation is depicted in Figure I and discussed below.

Detection and Interdiction - How Market Time Works.

The preceding

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Or,

25

CON IDENTIAL
.he nicheractic Market Time Seolving from a single trawler by the P-3 air patrol or radar e,successful intordiction. If scenarios yields success.
di,g'":. 'ifigure -I) sho-os n.1 possible scenarios inf~l-2. 'n atteist. If thi trawler is dvtected (upper c"'.h), two of tho 3 scenarios result in undete.:ei" by the P-3's, only one of the three

Since the purpose of Market Tlre i to prevent enemy resupply by sea, a deterred trawler is considered to rs-revent a successful interdiction. Howevtr: the air patrol or radar can only tra'." the trawler. The trawler commander's decision to abort will be influenced 7i.y Ils estimate of the surface barrier's capability to interc.1pt and destroy hi:z., and the liklihood that he would be detected again if he decides to resuze his infiltration. 'From our previous discussion of %1: iV trawler infiltration attempts (17 in the past year, with 2 interdictions an4 c penetrations) and detection estimates for the air phtrol, the P-3 air patrol or land based radar detection results against 10 infiltration attempts would probably be about as follows:
-- Eight would be detected, b,;t only two would continue their infiltration. The other six would be deterred b," the realization that they had been detected.

1; I

To would be undetected an-. continue their infiltration. Tw--

MARKET TIMEO~

PEF1ATICO AGAINST ENEMY~ TRAWLERS


Inner and O'iter Surface Barriers Successful Interdiction
'

P-3 Air Patrol/Land Based Radar


6

Deterred
8 Detected 2 I Infiltration Continues Intercepted[ Destroyed

Yes
Yes

"

Not
Not

Infiltration.

10

Interce]2ted Intercepted/' Destroyed 2No Not Detected Detecte Infiltration Continues N SNot Detectecd Not Intercepted

No Yes

No No

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Lre\I

Interception ds truction effectiveness is in turn a funcition of tthe amount of warning time provided the reaction force and the n'umber of Lorot elements availble which can sink an armed trawler. Experience gained in sinking an SL-8 trawler oft' MR IV in April of this year indircates that only the larger VIN craft in the outer barrier (destroyer escorts and coast gruard cutters) can cope with a heavily armed trawler. Four such ships are currently programmed for the "NN inventory; two are currently on station and the other two are scheduled to Join them by early 1972. has US Navy augmentation, and the U.S. P-3 air Since the outer bqrrier still patrol continues to provide 2-3 days warning time for the surface craft to intercept and engage the enemy trawler once it enters the 12 mile territorial limit, successful interdiction is vcry nearly assured at the present time. After the US Navy ships are gone and the P-3 air p:trol is replaced by the radar system, successful interdiction of a detected trawler will depend on the ability of one of the four large VXi ships to intercept within the 2-3 hours warning time providee by the radar system - unless %MAr or ground reaction forces provided. This does not mean the detection capability of the inner and outer barrier is unimportant; it is crucial against the intracoastal transshipment threat and could contribute about 20, of the overall Market Time effectiveness against trawlers, even though its current contribution is almost nil._/ Projected Capability and Corrective Measures The inner barrier is currently buttressed by close in coastal air surveillance, primarily by US air units; VNAF Is providing only three flights a week. CINCPAC has stated that since the US can provide only near term augmentation, j1NAF will eventually have to providq full air support and ohould start as soon In addition, the VNN has begun to improve its employment of craft as possible. in the inner barrier; instead of a uniform distribution along the coast, mobile groups are being formed to concentrate in high threat areas with Junks employed in the shallows. Together with other recommended maintenance and leadership improvements, these measures should materially increase effectiveness against the coastal The improved detection capability will also contribute transshipment threat. to performance against trawlers, and concentrations of the smaller craft should provide an intercept force which could at least delay a heavily armed trawler. The greatest improvement in performance against trawlers however, depends upon an RVNAF capability to either increase the warninL tim, or provide additional reaction forces which can effectivcly engage trawlers within 2-3 hours. See Annex A for a somewnhat more rigorous mathematical explanation of the relative importane of detoction versus interception/destruction capabiity against trawlers.

{"are I

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While some enemy trawlers can re:Arte --! when they have been detected by radar, this knowledge will not deter anless the reaction force Dozes a credible threat. Moreover, the radar _sy_=ts= can be defeated by transferring trawler cargo to small wooden junks a-=i -'-pans just out of radar range, or only about 30 miles offshore in some areaz of :.1 IV. It seems imperative then, that tb... be augmented by quickly available VNAF and (if intercept appears ipossibe1 ground reaction forces. It is unlikely that current command and contro! procedures set up for inter-service coordination will be adequately respc-_s-;e, nor is it evident that R.IAF has begun planning to provide such support, In the near term, the question of terminating the US P-3 patrols also nree4s reconsideration.

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AN:=X A

AMRET TID

INTERDICTION PROBABILITY AGAINST TRAWLERS

The overall interdiction probability of Market Time is a function of the detection, interception and destruction probability of the various components. The early warning conponent (P-3 air patrol or coastal radar system) has a detection capability only, whereas the surface reaction forces of the inner and outer barrier have the capability to detect, intercept and destroy an infiltration trawler. Based on discussions with the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), Market Time interdiction probability against a steel, hull trawler; in terms of component probabilities, can be symabolically expressed as follows:

I = DS + d(l-D)S;,nere: Probability Current/Projected Estimate a iunk/.13 - .27 .65-.8/.85 .26/unk 1.o/.14-.30

Sybo I D d S

Definition

Overall Interdiction Detection by P-3s or Radar Detection by surface barriers Interception and Destruction by surface barriers

a_/ From May 1971 Market Time re-evaluatiom Note that the expression does not explicitly account for the deterrence factor, an added benefit which is directly proportional to the interception and destruction capability of the reaction force. Substituting the given estimates into the expression yields the following interdiction estimates:

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(
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WNW

Current Probability.

(using

1,,C_. tde

?-3 detetion)

I = (.8) 1 + (.26)(1-.)
Projected Probability (n: .

1 =
... .

..

- .05 in suface br:'edetection)

Outer barrier with tc-;o :azt

guard cuttel'S on station: .12


4-.01

.85) (.14)

. 2 ')l..

(l

.13

Outer barrier with 2 cutters an.a 2 destroyer ezcorts on statiorn:

I = (.85)(.30) + (.26)(1-.85)(.30) = .26 + .01 = .27


Projected Probability (surface barrier detection improved to U.S.
standard of .75 with 2 cutters and 2 destroyer escort on sta.tion).

I -L(.85)(.30) + (.75)(1-.85)(.30) = .26 + .03

.29

terml/ (DS) provides the It is obvious from the above that the first The current probability major contribution to overall trawler interdiction. calculation shows that the maximum contribution of the second term2/ in the expression is only 15 to 20% of the total interdiction probability, even if detection interception and destruction probabilities are unity.

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and second terms in the interdiction expression are the matheThe first matical equivalents of the upper and lower branches respectively of the schematic in Figure 1 of the basic analysis, less the deterrence branch.

57