The Danger of Idolatry: First Corinthians 8:7-13

GREGORY W. DAWES
Faculty of Theology University of Otago Dunedin New Zealand

FOR MANY YEARS chaps. 8 and 10 of 1 Corinthians have posed difficulties for interpreters. The principal difficulty has been that of finding a consistent teaching on the issue of "food offered to idols" (8:1). At first sight, 1 Cor 8:713 would seem to imply that the eating of food offered to idols is itself morally neutral act which should be avoided only because of the effect it may have on others. This position seems to be repeated in 10:23-11:1. Yet chap. 10 also contains a passionate denunciation of idolatry, and 10:14-22 suggests that eating food offered to idols is quite simply unacceptable.

I. The State of the Question Some have adopted the extreme position of suggesting that there is no consistency in the positions adopted in these chapters. In doing so they have called into question the integrity of the letter.1 However, this is a counsel of despair: one should not assume that 1 Corinthians is a composite work simply because its argumentation appears inconsistent. Furthermore, such a theory does not resolve the difficulty, since all admit that the same author wrote all three passages. By partitioning the letter, one is forced to assume a
1 See, for instance, Walter Schmithals, Gnosticism in Corinth An Investigation of the Letters to the Corinthians (2d ed , Nashville Abingdon, 1971) 92-93, who assigns 81-13 (all of chap. 8), 9.1-23, and 10 23-11 1 to one letter and 9 24-27 and 10 1-22 to another Schmithals remarks that the connection of 10 23 with 10 14-22 is "simply impossible "

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1 CORINTHIANS 8:7-13 83 significant inconsistency in the apostle's thinking on this issue. Therefore, other commentators have attempted to interpret the chapters as they stand. In surveying the work of those authors who have tried to read 1 Corinthians 8 and 10 as a piece of consistent ethical exhortation, one may distinguish two interpretations of these chapters. According to the first interpretation, only one issue is addressed in these chapters, namely, in C. K. Barrett's words, "whether or not it is proper for a Christian to eat food that has at some stage in its history passed through a pagan rite and been offered in sacrifice to an idol."2 The difficulty with considering that these chapters deal with only one issue is the apparent inconsistency between what is said in 8:1-13 and 10:23-11:1 (where eating such meat seems to be, in itself, acceptable) and what is said in 10:14-22 (where all involvement with such food seems to be condemned). According to the second interpretation, put forward and vigorously defended most recently by Gordon Fee, we need to recognize that within chaps. 8-10 two quite different matters are being addressed.3 The first is the question of taking part in sacrificial banquets within pagan temples, which is discussed in 8:7-13 and 10:14-22. The second is the question of eating meat bought in the marketplace which may have been sacrificed previously to an idol,4 which is discussed in 10:23-11:1. While Paul condemns participation in sacrificial banquets (on two grounds, as we shall see), he has no difficulty in principle with eating meat from the market which may have been involved in sacrifice. But he does warn that even this action needs to be undertaken with concern for the other person's conscience. Fee's presentation of this position has been criticized by Bruce Fisk, who offers an alternative interpretation.5 Fisk takes exception to the way in which Fee narrows the semantic range of the term , "food offered to an
2 C. K. Barrett, "Things Sacrificed to Idols," NTS 11 (1964-65) 138. Barrett does, how ever, distinguish the eating of such food in general from "the situation implied by viii.10 (cf. x.20f.), where the meal takes place in a religious establishment" (p. 146). He writes that for Paul to take part in such temple banquets "would be . . . wantonly to bruise consciences," but that the apostle "does not say that it is in itself idolatry" (p. 144). 3 Gordon D. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987) 357-63. This view may already be found in Archibald Robertson and Alfred Plum mer, Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the First Epistle of St Paul to the Corinthians (ICC; 2d ed.; Edinburgh: T. & Clark, 1914) 219. 4 For the suggestion that not all the meat sold in the marketplace would have been involved in sacrifice, see W. L. Willis, Idol Meat in Corinth: The Pauline Argument in I Corin thians 8 and 10 (SBLDS 68; Chico, CA: Scholars, 1985) 230, and Barrett, "Things Sacrificed," 145-46. 5 Bruce N. Fisk, "Eating Meat Offered to Idols: Corinthian Behaviour and Pauline Re sponse in 1 Corinthians 8-10 (A Response to Gordon Fee)," Trinity Journal ns 10 (1989) 49-70.

84 THE CATHOLIC BIBLICAL QUARTERLY I 58, 1996 idol," from food offered to an idol in general to food eaten in the idol's 6 temple. He rightly insists on the need to distinguish between the meaning of 7 the word and its referent in a particular context. He notes that "the term simply means 'meat offered to an idol"' and that "only a search of the context of each occurrence will reveal precisely where this meat was to 8 be found and under what circumstances it was eaten." These observations do not in themselves undermine Fee's position. Fee's distinction of the two issues requires only that the context of the word's use in chap. 8 suggest that the reference is to eating such food in a temple. However, Fisk raises another objection to Fee's idea, suggesting that, like earlier explanations, it is unable "to explain Paul's toleration in chap. 8 of an activity declared idolatrous in chap. 10."9 Fee himself notes that this tension causes a difficulty for interpre ters. 10 We will return to this difficulty. Fisk's alternative interpretation of chaps. 8 and 10 rests on his claim that attendance at pagan temple feasts could serve a number of purposes, ranging from "harmless fun and social convention" to "raw idolatry."11 What Paul is concerned about, he suggests, is not the meat as such (as in earlier readings), nor even where one eats it (as in Fee's interpretation), but rather the character of the meal. As he writes: "when temple feasts had a distinctly religious focus, when participants were consciously acknowledging pagan gods, the Christian could not participate (10:14) without risk of provoking God to jealousy (10:22)."12 The apparent conflict between the two chapters comes from the fact that "1 Cor 8:10 describes permissible temple attendance, while 10:19-22 clearly portrays what is off limits." 13 Whichever reading is chosen, however, all commentators seem to agree on the nature of the problem being faced by the "weak in conscience" in chap. 8. Whether one considers that 8:1-13 is directed against eating in the temples in particular or against food offered to idols in general, it is assumed that the so-called weak in conscience are scrupulous Christians. Such people have, as it were, an overactive conscience. They cannot bring themselves to act in good faith when it comes to eating in this way. Believing that such eating was prohibited by their new faith, they are acting contrary to conscience if they do so. In these verses at least, those to whom the instruction is addressed are asked to refrain on the grounds that such behavior may lead fellow Christians into acting contrary to conscience, and therefore to their ruin.
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

Ibid , 55 Ibid , 55-56 Ibid , 56 Ibid , 59 Fee, First Epistle to the Corinthians, 363 23 Fisk, "Eating Meat," 63 Ibid , 64 Ibid , 62

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Jerome Murphy-O'Connor, for instance, describes the alleged problem as follows: It is easy to perceive the dilemma that one of the Weak would face if he received . . . an invitation to celebrate the marriage of his pagan brother. He could not decline on the grounds that his new faith did not permit it, because the Strong were known to participate in such banquets. No matter how deeply rooted his conviction that Christians could not share in such meals, there was no way he could make it either comprehensible or palatable to his family. To refuse could only appear as a gratuitous insult to a family he still loved. If he ceded to the legitimate desires of his family, he would be going against his conscience, and all because the Strong participated in such occasions.14 Robertson and Plummer write similarly of the one who is "weak in conscience": It is just because he is feeble in insight and character that this following of a questionable example "builds up" his conscience in a disastrous way. His conscience is not sufficiently instructed to tell him that he may eat without scruple, and yet he eats. Doing violence to scruples is no true edification.15 Wendell Lee Willis writes in the same way: Most interpreters say the injury to the weak man's "conscience" arises when in retrospect he evaluates his actions to have been wrong. It is possible, of course, that the pangs accompanied his eating, but he was simply unable to resist pressure (implicit or explicit) to eat. Either way his "weak conscience" is the opposite of the current meaning: someone without scruples. Rather, the man is overscrupulous.16 What this means, as Willis notes, is that the weak person does not act because his conscience is weak, but in spite of his weak conscience. C. K. Barrett adopts the same line, in the process showing little sympathy for the problems the "weak" are alleged to be experiencing. There are in Corinth men who have eaten sacrificed food all their lives, and have always thought of it as sacrificed to an idol having real existence, and thus bearing real spiritual significance and force. In becoming Christians they have not ceased to believe in the reality of the spiritual beings behind idols, and have accordingly not ceased to think of the food itself as having religious meaning.
Jerome Murphy-O'Connor, St Paul's Corinth: Texts and Archaeology(GNS 6; Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, 1983) 164. 15 Robertson and Plummer, Critical and Exegetical Commentary on First Corinthians, 112-73. 16 Willis, Idol Meat, 105.
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They are weak . . . , weak in conscience, for they are scrupulous where scrupu losity rests on pure error; to eat food sacrificed to idols is contrary to their conscience, and if they do eat, their conscience is defiled. All this is foolish, and Paul will not defend it. 17

What all the commentators have in common is that they consider the problem of the "weak" in 1 Corinthians 8 to be essentially the same as that of the "weak" in Romans 14-15. It is my contention that the similarities between the two passages have led scholars to assimilate one to the other. I will suggest that 1 Corinthians 8 and 10 make a great deal more sense if the danger facing the weak in Corinth is not that of acting contrary to their own beliefs but rather that of idolatry, simpliciter. We will begin with a brief look at Romans 14-15. II. Romans 14-15 and 1 Corinthians 8 The number of points of contact between Romans 14-15 and 1 Corin thians 8 and 10, particularly on the level of vocabulary, is impressive.18 Nonetheless, it is clear that the issues which are dividing the two churches are very different. The community in Rome can be divided, it seems, into at least two groups, described in Romans 14-15 as the "weak in faith" and the "strong."19 What issue is dividing them? Although not every practice men tioned here is in conformity with Jewish dietary laws,20 the question of the observance of the Old Testament's regulations about food does seem to be the issue which is dividing the community.21 Even if we have to reckon with the
C. K. Barrett, A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians (HNTC; New York: Harper & Row, 1968) 194-95. 18 The points of contact are conveniently listed by C. E. B. Cranfield, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans (ICC; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1979) 2. 691-92. 19 For the expression "weak in faith," see Rom 14:1, and for the expression "the strong," compare the phrase oi in 15:1. Paul S. Minear (The Obedience of Faith: The Purposes of Paul in the Epistle to the Romans [SBT 2/19; London: SCM, 1971] 18) discerns "at least five distinct factions, or, if faction be too strong a word, five different positions" within the church at Rome, but even if one accepts this more detailed classification, the fundamental problem remains a conflict between the "weak in faith" and the "strong." 20 The vegetarianism of 2, for instance, and the abstention from wine of 21 are not required by Old Testament laws. 21 As James D. G. Dunn notes (Romans 9-16 [WBC 38b; Dallas, TX: Word, 1988] 799-803), one is led to this conclusion (a) by the context of the chapter, (b) by the terminology used (particularly the references to what is "unclean" [] in Rom 14:14 and to the things that are "clean" [] in 14:20), and (c) by the contemporary significance of the dietary laws within Judaism.
17

1 CORINTHIANS 8:7-13 87 possibility that the concerns of the "weak in faith" had other origins as well,22 it is clear that the dispute is about the acceptability of certain foods. A detailed treatment of the apostle's response is beyond the scope of this essay,23 but for our purposes it should be noted that Paul describes the problem of the weak in this chapter as a weakness in faith, not a weakness in conscience as in 1 Corinthians 8.24 Indeed in Romans 14-15 the word "conscience" nowhere appears. Moreover, the two groups mentioned in Romans 14-15 are "the weak [in faith]" and the "strong." Again, this stands in contrast to 1 Corinthians 8, where those opposed to the "weak in conscience" (as we shall see) are those who "have knowledge."25 A sign that the two passages are often assimilated (1 Corinthians 8 being read in the light of Romans 14-15) is the fact that in discussing 1 Corinthians 8 many commentators adopt the terminology of Romans 14-15 and speak of the "strong" and the "weak."26 Jerome Murphy-O'Connor, for instance, writing of the group opposed to the weak in conscience, chooses, "for convenience," to call them "the strong," because it is "the most natural antithesis."27 It may be "the most natural antithesis," but it is not the termi nology the apostle himself uses. The use of the terms "strong" and "weak" in discussions of 1 Corinthians 8 acts as a further encouragement to the reader to identify the situation addressed in Corinth with that addressed in Rome. The problem is made all the more difficult by the fact that the modern reader is inclined to think of the problem addressed in Rome as a "problem of conscience."28
22 C. H. Dodd, The Epistle of Paul to the Romans (MNTC; London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1932) 212. 23 For a useful summary of scholarly views regarding Romans 14-15, see Cranfield, Criti cal and Exegetical Commentary on Romans, 690-98. 24 Several authors simply assume that the two terms are identical. Hans Conzelmann (7 Corinthians: A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians [Hermeneia; Philadel phia: Fortress, 1975] 147), for instance, writes that "for , 'conscience,'[Paul] says in Rom 14f , 'faith'." Similarly, Rudolf Bultmann ( Theology of the New Testament [London: SCM, 1952] 1. 220) writes that "since Paul takes for granted that the transcendent authority, whose demand and verdict conscience knows, is known by Christians as God, he can substitute 'faith' for 'conscience'." 25 Compare Fee, First Epistle to the Corinthians, 382 n. 32 26 Compare Murphy-O'Connor, St Paul's Corinth, 164, and Willis, Idol Meat, 89, al though the latter notes, quite correctly, that "the 'strong' are never so designated." 27 Jerome Murphy-O'Connor, "Freedom and the Ghetto (1 Cor., vm, 1-13; x, 23-xi, 1)," RB 85 (1978) 544. 28 The mistaken identification of the two problems is particularly clear in Conzelmann (7 Corinthians, 137), where we read with regard to Romans 14 that "what was formulated in 1 Corinthians in the course of a topical discussion is here . . . couched in more general terms."

88 THE CATHOLIC BIBLICAL QUARTERLY I 58, 1996 We should also note that Paul's response to the situation in Rome is very different from his response to the situation in Corinth. In Romans 14-15 the apostle sidesin principlewith the position adopted by the "strong" (cf. 14:20: "for everything is indeed clean"). As Cranfield notes, "there is no indication in this section [of Romans] that Paul saw any harm at all in the 29 practice of the strong in itself, apart from its effect on the weak." The apostle qualifies this agreement in principle (a) with a warning against passing judg ment on one another (14:l-13a) and (b) with a warning that the behavior of the strong could lead some of the weak to act in a state of doubt and thereby sin (14:13b-23). This is in contrast (as we shall see) with 1 Cor 10:14-22; there, Paul does not find himself in agreement with those "having knowledge," for he suggests that confident behavior in the matter of sharing idol food is in itself dangerous, since it risks communion with demons. 30 Who, then, are the weak in conscience in 1 Corinthians 8?31 And what is the danger into which they are being led by the behavior of those who "have knowledge"? First, a more precise description of the group. Those to whom the chap ter is addressed (those "having knowledge," 8:10) are warned of the existence of another group, one whose members lack knowledge (v 7). Of these people it is said either that their conscience is "weak" (vv 7 and 12) or that they themselves are "weak" (vv 9-11). Who are these people? Verse 7 has already made this clear: in this verse Paul qualifies his agreement with the principle that pagan gods have no existence (vv 4-6) by saying "but not all have this knowledge." Therefore, the text itself tells us that, in Willis's words, "the real definition of the 'weak' in Corinth is 'those not having knowledge.'" 32 The "knowledge" they do not have has been referred to in the preceding verses. They do not share the conviction of those "having knowledge" that idols
It is also clear m Richard Horsley ("Consciousness and Freedom among the Corinthians 1 Corinthians 8-10," CBQ 40 [1978] 581), he refers to "the parallel discussion of the same issue m Romans 14," although later in the same article (p 588) he qualifies this and writes of "Paul's subsequent treatment of virtually the same issue in Romans 14 " 29 Cranfield, Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Romans, 692 30 If one distinguishes the two issues identified by Gordon Fee, then one may take 1 Cor 10 14-22 as a passage directed particularly against sharing the meals in the temples, the activity m which those "having knowledge" were engaging (cf 8 10) In any case, it is difficult to accept without further qualification Jerome Murphy-O'Connor's claim ("Freedom," 557) that in 1 Corinthians 10 Paul "adopts the conclusions of the Strong " 31 I have used the phrase "weak m conscience" because of its convenience, although I am aware that this expression, too, comes from a partial assimilation of this text to Rom 14 1, which speaks of the "weak in faith" ( ) A precise parallel is not to be found in 1 Corinthians 8 32 Willis, Idol Meat, 94

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have no real existence. On the face of it, this may seem surprising. In Horsley's words, "in the mission context of early Christianity, . . . the con fession that there is no god but the One would have been central, . . . the 34 essence of one's conversion to the true faith." Moreover, as Murphy-O'Connor notes, "the opposition between the one true God and idols was a key element 35 in Paul's own preaching." But it is precisely this knowledge which the apostle claims some people lack. It may be, therefore, that "the Weak were Gentile Christians whose intellectual conviction that there was only one God had not yet been fully assimilated emotionally."36 They could not bring them selves to believe that these gods, who formerly seemed so real, were in fact nothing. What then is the danger? The danger is outlined in two places, first in 7, and then in vv 9-10.37 In 7 we are told that these people are so accus tomed to the idol that they eat the food "as food offered to an idol" ( ). The expression is an interesting one: it is not simply that they eat the idol food, but that they eat it as idol food. As Fisk notes, this indicates the attitude of mind with which they eat: "they recognize that what they eat has been offered to an idol, and for them, this knowledge is highly signifi cant."38 Yet the question remains: why does it matter that the weak eat this food with awareness of its religious significance? What effect does this have? The immediate answer is that it results in their "conscience" being "defiled," but the meaning of this phrase is far from clear (as we shall see). The danger is described more precisely in vv 9-10, where those "having knowledge" are warned to ensure that their freedom in principle with regard to idol food does not become a "stumbling-block to the weak." Again there are verbal parallels
33 See E.-B. Alio, Saint Paul, Premire pitre aux Corinthiens (EBib; Paris: Gabalda, 1934) 203: "Cette 'science' qui n'est pas le lot de tous, c'est la conviction que 'l'idole n'est rien dans le monde.'" 34 Richard Horsley, "Gnosis in Corinth: 1 Corinthians 8.1-6," NTS 27 (1980) 36. 35 Murphy-O'Connor, "Freedom," 545. 36 Ibid., 554. Fee (First Corinthians, 381) suggests that the difficulty is a "dissonance between their heads and their hearts . . . which would ultimately lead them back into idolatry and thus destroy them." Such an explanation helps to resolve the apparent contradiction between "we all have knowledge" in 8:1 and "but not all have this knowledge" in 8:7 (even leaving aside the possibility that the first is a Corinthian slogan). In the words of Christophe Senft (La premire ptre de saint Paul aux Corinthiens [CNT 2/7; Neuchtel: Delachaux & Niestl, 1979] 112), the contradiction is "plus apparente que relle." 37 The exegesis of the extremely difficult 8 need not detain us. It seems to be an affir mation of the principle of the indifference of idol food in itself, a principle leading to a freedom which those "having knowledge" are immediately warned not to abuse (in 9: ). 38 Fisk, "Eating Meat," 60, with which we may compare the NRSV's paraphrastic but accurate translation, "they still think of the food they eat as food offered to an idol."

90 THE CATHOLIC BIBLICAL QUARTERLY I 58, 1996 to Romans 14 (vv 13 and 20), but we should not allow these to mislead us. Verbal parallels do not mean that the issues being addressed are the same: there are more ways than one in which one's behavior may cause others to 39 stumble. What does this mean in 1 Corinthians 8? If one of the weak sees one of those "having knowledge" reclining at table in the temple of the idol, his conscience, being weak, will be encouraged to eat the idol food (v 10). It is in this way that the behavior of those "having knowledge" may "wound the weak conscience" (v 12), with the result that the person will be "destroyed" (vll). My suggestion is that the danger into which the "weak" are being led is that of idolatry. The apostle's concern is that the confidence with which those who "have knowledge" take part in temple meals (8:10) may lead those who lack this knowledge to do likewise.40 The danger is that those who lack knowledge regarding the nonexistence of pagan gods will eat these meals precisely as , that is, as food offered to a pagan god. In other words, while both groups may take part in the meals, for each, the food has a different significance. For those "having knowledge" the meal in the temple may merely be a social occasion, but the "weak" regard it also as a religious one. The apostle's concern, I suggest, is not that the weak would thereby be acting contrary to their own deeply held convictions but that the weak may be led to take part in such sacrificial meals as a religious act. Such behavior can be described only as idolatry, pure and simple. A number of commentators have approached this solution, but at the last moment most confuse the issue by assimilating this text to Romans 14-15. Hans Conzelmann, for example, writes that in the eyes of the weak man "the gods are still powers and by his compliance he honors them as such," being thereby guilty of "idol worship." 41 This claim corresponds to my suggestion here: idolatry pure and simple is the sin into which the weak man is being led, but in a footnote Conzelmann writes that, to express the issue in terms of Romans 14-15, the weak man "does not act from faith, and therefore he sins." 42 However, one should not "express it in terms of Romans 14," for the
Still less should one read 1 Cor 8 13, "if food should cause my brother to stumble" (), m the light of the later (and narrower) connotations of the word "scandal " 40 We know that it was the custom in contemporary society to take part in the cult (and particularly the cultic meals) of more than one divinity Ramsay MacMullen (Paganism in the Roman Empire [New Haven Yale University Press, 1981] 36) speaks of the fact that there existed, in at least one area of the Roman empire, "sanctuaries equipped with kitchens for an equal number of different gods " Therefore it may well have been that the behavior of the Corinthian "knowledgeable ones" was leading the weak to believe that they could engage in the same kind of free and easy syncretism 41 Conzelmann, / Corinthians, 149 42 Ibid , 149 35
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1 CORINTHIANS 8:7-13 91 issue being addressed in Romans 14 is a different one. Gordon Fee comes closer to the solution proposed here when he writes that "it is not the food which destroys them, but the idolatry that is inherent in the eating in the temples," noting that "what for the others is 'food' only, is for them 'food sacrificed to the idol.'"43 He adds that "what is in view is a former idolater falling back into the grips of idolatry."44 This is what has been suggested here. Yet in another place Fee fails to make a clear distinction between this problem and that facing the "weak in faith" in Romans 14-15.45 We may say, therefore, that Bruce Fisk is right in insisting that "the ability of to contaminate is determined solely by the belief system of the one eating,"46 but that does not mean that the defilement springs from "a bad conscience"; it comes rather from the fact that to eat without a clear understanding that these gods have no existence is to fall into idolatry. Those who "have knowledge" may feel that there is no difficulty for them: Paul will later suggest (10:14-22) that even for them there is a danger. But his concern in chap. 8 is to indicate that their behavior may lead others who do not share their confidence into that sin of idolatry which he will condemn so forcefully in chap. 10. III. The Apostle's Rhetorical Strategy If the behavior of those "having knowledge" is leading the "weak in conscience" into the sin of idolatry, how can we understand the difference between the tone of chap. 8 and that of 10:14-22? Rather than followingFisk's line and suggesting that "1 Cor 8:10 describes permissible temple at tendance, while 10:19-22 clearly portrays what is off limits,"471 would sug gest that the difference in tone may be explained by the apostle's rhetorical strategy. The first thing to note is that 10:14-22 continues the argumentation of chap. 8. The rhetorical question found in 10:19 ("What then am I saying? That food offered to idols is anything, or that an idol is anything?") picks up
Fee, First Epistle to the Corinthians, 387. Ibid. 45 Of 1 Cor 8:11 Fee (ibid.) writes that the "destruction" of the weak spoken of here refers to the person's "eternal loss, not merely some internal 'falling apart' because one is behaving contrary to the 'dictates of conscience,' " an idea which he rejects as "altogether too modern." Regarding the reference to eternal loss, one cannot help but agree, but I would go further and suggest that what is at stake here has nothing to do with behaving "contrary to the dictates of conscience." 46 Fisk, "Eating Meat," 60, although he too follows the view that the contamination comes from the fact that the weak cannot eat without feeling defiled: their "objective defilement" comes from this "subjective difficulty" (ibid.). 47 Ibid., 62.
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92 THE CATHOLIC BIBLICAL QUARTERLY I 58, 1996 the argumentation of 8:4 ("we know that no idol is in the world and that there is no god but one"). Verse 20 of chap. 10 then introduces a new considera tion: what is offered to idols is in fact offered to demons. In other words, in 10:14-22 the apostle takes up the point made in chap. 8 (where he agrees with those "having knowledge" that pagan gods are nothing), but here he carries the argument further by introducing another fact which they have failed to take into account, that of the danger of fellowship with demons. It is my suggestion, therefore, that the tone of chap. 8 may be explained by the fact that Paul is replying here to those "having knowledge" on their own grounds. 48 He accepts the correctness of the knowledge they claim to have (vv 4-6) but then qualifies this acceptance by pointing out that acting on the basis of this knowledge may lead others into sin (vv 7-13). His funda mental principle here is the one outlined in the opening verses of the chapter: it is not enough to have correct knowledge; one must also act out of love. In 10:14-22, however, the apostle takes issue with their behavior on another ground: by eating in the temple of the god they risk communion with de mons. 49 As Cranfield, contrasting 1 Corinthians 8 and 10 with Romans 14-15 remarks, in 1 Cor 10:20-22 "there is a warning against a danger to which the Corinthian were exposed, the reality of which was quite indepen dent of the presence of the weak brethren." 50 At this point it is interesting to note Richard Horsley's suggestion that the two chapters reflect the two different attitudes to pagan religion which are found in contemporary Jewish writings. The first, he maintains, "derided the heathen gods as nothings and their worship as foolishness" and is represented by "Hellenistic Jewish literature . . . as well as Wisdom and Philo." 51 This attitude he attributes to the Corinthian Christians to whom Paul is writing in chap. 8. On the other hand, the apostle's criticism of pagan worship in 10:14-22 draws on a second tradition, that represented by the apocalyptic writings. Within this second tradition, "although it is agreed that idols are 'nothings' and lifeless human products," nonetheless their worship represents "the service or the influence of demons." 52
It seems clear that chap 8 is directed primarily to those among the Corinthians who are claiming, on the basis of their knowledge, the liberty to eat in the temples (cf 10) 49 In this I follow that line of interpretation in which the two issueseating idol food in general (10 23-11 1), and eating such food as part of an act of worship (8 7-13 and 10 1422)are distinguished 50 Cranfield, Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Romans, 692 The same author, nonetheless, follows the usual view of 1 Corinthians 8 in regarding the basic problem to be that of the "scruples" of the weak 51 Horsley, "Gnosis," 40-41 52 Ibid , 39 In support of this thesis Horsley (p 50) notes the association of turning from idols with apocalyptic ideas found in 1 Thess 1 9-10
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1 CORINTHIANS 8:7-13 93 In any case, the contrast between 1 Corinthians 8 and 10 and Romans 14-15 becomes particularly clear at this point. In Romans 14-15 (as we have seen) Paul sided in principle with "the strong." In 1 Corinthians 8 and 10 he does not side, even in principle, with those "having knowledge." He is not sug gesting that the "weak in conscience" have unnecessary scruples. He agrees that they "lack knowledge" (as we shall see) and may, therefore, be led into sin, but in chap. 10 he makes it clear that eating in the temple of the god is quite simply unacceptable, even apart from the effect it may have on others. IV. What Happens to the Conscience of the "Weak"? The apostle uses several different terms to describe what happens to the conscience of the "weak" when they are misled by the behavior of those who "have knowledge." In 7, we are told that the conscience of the "weak in conscience" is "defiled" () by eating food offered to an idol. In 10 we are told that when such a person sees one who "has knowledge" eating in the temple of an idol, his conscience will be "encouraged" () to the point of eating food offered to the idol. In 12 we are told that by eating in the temple those "having knowledge" are thereby sinning against their brothers and "wounding () their weak conscience." We should examine these expressions, as well as the term "conscience" itself, to see if they support my contention that the sin into which the weak are being lead is that of idolatry. We may begin with the term , "conscience." Much has been written about the use of this term within the New Testament and in contem porary literature.53 A useful starting point, for our purposes, is the article by Paul Gooch,54 with its threefold classification of the uses of the term .55 The first way in which the word is used, Gooch suggests, may be regarded as its most fundamental sense: to indicate "self-awareness, a con scious knowledge of the self under some description or other."56 He describes
See, for example, the survey in Robert Jewett, Paul's Anthropological Terms: A Study of Their Use in Conflict Settings (AGJU 10; Leiden: Brill, 1971) 402-21. 54 Paul W. Gooch, "'Conscience' in 1 Corinthians 8 and 10," NTS 33 (1987) 244-54. 55 A more complex classification is possible. C. A. Pierce (Conscience in the New Testa ment: A Study ofSyneidesis in the New Testament [SBT 15; London: SCM, 1955] 21-28) divides conscience into "philosophical-technical-indifferent (ethically)" conscience (PTI) and "moral" conscience (M), the latter being subdivided into "moral-positively good" conscience (MPG) and "moral bad" conscience (MB). This last category may be further divided into three uses: MBNorm ("moral bad normal"), MBA ("moral bad absolute") and MBNeg ("moral bad negative"). Pierce suggests (p. 35) that MBNorm is the most frequent M usage of and that MBNeg and MPG are uncommon and "chronologically of doubtful significance for NT usage." 56 Gooch, "Conscience," 244.
53

94 THE CATHOLIC BIBLICAL QUARTERLY I 58, 1996 this as "the minimal sense of the word," 57 noting Maurer's conclusion that it seems to be one of the earliest uses of both the Greek term and the Latin term conscientia.5* Drawing upon the work of C. S. Lewis, Gooch then distinguishes two further meanings of : that of "internal witness" (conscience bearing witness against us, passing judgment upon our past actions and finding them lacking), and that of "internal lawgiver" (con science as "the repository of moral beliefs and principles," setting down rules, prosecuting violations, and passing judgment). 59 Gooch goes on to suggest that while we may read in 1 Cor 10:23-11:1 in the Sense of "an awareness of bad feelings" (the second of the three senses identified),60 in 1 Corinthians 8 the word "can . . . bear only its minimal sense, consciousness of the self" (the first sense identified).61 Gooch arrives at this meaning of in 1 Corinthians 8 on the basis of the usual interpretation of what is happening to the "weak" as a result of the actions of those "having knowledge," for he assumes that the problem is their eating despite their scruples, resulting in a sense of guilt: "their former customs still haunt them so that they experience themselves as tainted by the idol associated with the meat." 6 2 Since one cannot speak of conscience in the sense of moral lawgiver as "polluted" (v 7), or "wounded" (v 12), or "built up" (v 10), another sense of the word must be chosen. He opts for the minimal sense, noting that as a result of his interpretation "we have been unable to formulate a single meaning for which will make intelligible all of Paul's uses in both chapters." 63 However, the interpretation of the danger facing the "weak" which I have offered has the advantage of allowing us to posit a single sense for the word in 1 Corinthians 8 and 10, for if the danger facing the weak is not that of eating despite their scruples (as in Romans 14-15) but rather that of believing that participation in temple meals is acceptable, then in both places one may understand in its developed sense of moral arbiter. Gooch has already shown that this is a possible sense of in chap. 10,64 rejecting such an interpretation only after his discussion of the meaning of in chap. 8.65
ibid. Christian Maurer, ", ..." TDNT, 7. 904, 907. 59 Gooch, "Conscience," 245. 60 Ibid., 251. 61 Ibid., 249. The same conclusion is arrived at by Horsley ("Consciousness," 581-82), who suggests the sense "consciousness" for all but two of the apostle's uses of . 62 Gooch, "Conscience," 249. 63 Ibid., 252. 64 Ibid., 248. 65 Ibid., 249.
58 57

1 CORINTHIANS 8:7-13 95 The question of the meaning of in 1 Corinthians 8 may now be revisited. The word is used first in 7, where we read that those who do not have knowledge eat this food "as food offered to an idol" and therefore, that "their conscience is defiled." The apostle uses the verb , "defile," nowhere else, but its figurative usage is illustrated by Rev 14:4, where "to be defiled" seems to have the sense "to have sinned." We have seen that in the usual interpretation of 1 Cor 8:7 the expression "their conscience is defiled" is taken as equivalent to "they are led into acting contrary to what they themselves believe to be correct." On this basis, conscience can only be understood as "awareness of oneself (morally)"; having one's conscience "defiled" in this sense can only mean being led into a situation where one is made to feel uneasy, in the wrong. But we know from Romans 14-15 that to indicate this problem Paul uses another phrase, "not (acting) out of faith" ( , Rom 14:23). The interpretation I am offering suggests that "their conscience is defiled" means "they are led astray in their moral judge ment."66 Conscience in this sense is the internal judge of one's actions: it is this which is being led astray. In 10, we read that when those who "have knowledge" recline at table in the temple of an idol, the conscience of the weak person is encouraged (literally, "built up") to the point that "he eats food offered to an idol." On the usual interpretation, this would mean that such a person is encouraged to eat, even though in his heart he believes it to be wrong; but if this inter pretation is followed, in what sense would his "weak conscience" be "built up"? As many commentators note, in 10 may well be ironic: the "edification" which those having knowledge are providing by eating in the temples is no true edification at all.67 This does not solve the problem, for what can a weak person's conscience's being "built up" mean, even in an ironic sense? Gooch, retaining the minimal sense of as "self-consciousness," is forced to paraphrase, "he will come to regard himself as truly edified when he is not."68 Does it not make better sense to understand in 10 as "moral arbiter"? Paul would then be saying in 10 that the weak person is encouraged by the behavior of those "having
66 Fee (First Epistle to the Corinthians, 381), who comes closest to recognizing that the sin into which the "weak" are being led is that of idolatry, offers another interpretation of the phrase "their conscience is defiled": the "past association [of the weak] with idols means that a return to the worship of the god by eating in his/her honor causes them to defile their new relationship with Christ." It is difficult to square this reading of 7 with Fee's understanding of conscience here as "moral consciousness." In what way does this act of idolatry defile their "moral consciousness"? 67 Gooch ("Conscience," 249) relates this use of the verb to the use of the same verb in 1. 68 Ibid.

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knowledge" to believe that it is acceptable to take part in such sacrificial meals. Those "having knowledge" may be able to argue that for them it is acceptable (although Paul will question this claim in 10:14-22). The problem addressed by Paul here is that by following their example the "weak" are eating this food "as food offered to an idol" (v 7); therefore, for them to take 69 part in these meals is an act of idolatry. In 12 we are told that those having knowledge are "wounding the weak consciences" of others. On the usual interpretation of chap. 8, how does this "wounding" occur? It can only be by causing the "weak" to eat in a state of doubt. Fee suggests that in this context the word "wounding" () means "to be responsible for the wounds that such a person has received."70 "Wounding," then, would have the sense of "causing pain to." 7 1 But in the light of the interpretation proposed here, may be more coherently understood as "doing harm to the other person's moral sense," for if Paul's real concern is idolatry, then their consciences are being wounded by being led into the false belief that participation in the worship of pagan gods is acceptable. We may note finally that the very phrase "weak conscience" in 7 is difficult to understand if "conscience" is understood in its minimal sense of "self-awareness," as Gooch and Fee wish to understand it. In this context, what can it mean for a person's awareness of self to be "weak"? We know from 7 that the weakness of conscience is a lack of appropriate knowledge regarding the nonexistence of idols; therefore, "weakness of conscience" is most clearly understood in reference to the inability of these people to make appropriate moral judgements. The apostle agrees with those "having knowl edge" that these people lack due enlightenment, but he points out that it is precisely for this reason that they can be led into what is for them an act of idolatry. We may conclude that the term can be understood in the same sense in both 1 Corinthians 8 and 1 Corinthians 10, namely, as the internal judge of what is right and what is wrong.72 In coming to this conclusion I am parting company with the results of C. A. Pierce's influential study. Pierce summarizes his research by saying that "conscience in the New Testament. . .
69 Jewett (Anthropological Terms, 422) draws attention to the subtle shift between 7 and 10 The earlier verse speaks of the "weak conscience", the later verse speaks of the weakness of the person ( ) See also Murphy-O'Connor, "Freedom," 567 70 Fee, First Epistle to the Corinthians, 388 n 64 71 Cf Robert W Wall, "Conscience," A A 1 1129 So also Pierce, Conscience, 81 72 Gooch ("Conscience," 246) draws attention to C S Lewis's claim (Studies in Words [Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1960] 192-93) that it was Paul's use of the word which contributed to "the great semantic shift" from "internal witness" to "internal lawgiver," although Lewis leaves open the question whether "the word is already taking on [this] new meaning m the New Testament "

1 CORINTHIANS 8:7-13 97 is the painful reaction of man's nature, as morally responsible, against in fringements of its created limits."73 In another place he defines conscience as "the painful consciousness that a man has of his own sins, past or, if present, begun in the past."74 In particular, Pierce insists that the word always has reference to past acts,75 and to acts committed by the subject himself, which are normally viewed as bad.76 Paul's use of the word, Pierce claims, is in conformity with its use elsewhere, and here, too, therefore, has no reference to future actions.77 These conclusions might seem to be fatal to the interpretation of the word offered here, but more recent authors have taken issue with the narrowness of Pierce's definition and leave room for a more flexible approach to the meaning of . Robert Jewett, for instance, suggests that "the word . . . shifts in its connotation as the occasion demands,"78 and that these variations indicate "how little Paul was concerned to work out a truly syste matic anthropology."79 Jewett parts company with Pierce in suggesting that there are occasions when conscience is "the agent of rational discernment, not of one's own deeds, but rather of external matters."80 Margaret Thrall, antici pating Jewett's conclusion, also takes issue with Pierce's claim that conscience never makes reference to future actions.81 She concludes that "it remains probable that Paul did think of conscience both as giving guidance for future conduct and also as judging the actions of others," admitting that in these ways Paul takes the word beyond the ordinary meaning, documented by Pierce, which it had in the Hellenistic world.82 The apostle may have done so, she suggests, because he "had come to regard conscience as performing in the Gentile world roughly the same function as was performed by the Law among the Jews. . . . The Law gave guidance beforehand. It did not merely condemn afterwards."83 V. Conclusion It has been my aim in this essay to cast doubt upon a widespread assumption regarding the problem facing the "weak in conscience" in
Pierce, Conscience, 108. Ibid., 111. 75 Ibid., 43, 109. 76 Ibid., 45. 77 Ibid., 81-82. 78 Jewett, Anthropological Terms, 439. 79 Ibid., 459. 80 Ibid., with 2 Cor 4:2 and 2 Cor 5:11 cited as examples. Cf. also 432-34. 81 Margaret Thrall, "The Pauline Use of ," NTS 14 (1967-68) 119-21. She notes (p. 120) that in Rom 13:5 in particular the word seems to "suggest a course of action which lies in the future," Pierce's arguments to the contrary notwithstanding. 82 Ibid., 123. 83 Ibid., 124.
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98 THE CATHOLIC BIBLICAL QUARTERLY I 58, 1996 1 Cor 8:7-13. Most, if not all, writers on this passage assume that the sin into which the "weak" are being led is that of acting contrary to their own beliefs. I have argued that this reading comes from an assimilation of this passage to Romans 14-15 and that it makes little sense in this context. My suggestion is that it is better to understand the sin into which the "weak" are being led as that sin of idolatry which is so forcefully condemned in chap. 10. In particular, the behavior of those "having knowledge" is leading the "weak" into the mistaken judgment that they may take part in cultic meals in pagan temples. Because the "weak" lack a clear conviction regarding the nonexistence of pagan gods, this action is for them an act of idolatry. The difference in tone between this passage and chap. 10 may be accounted for in terms of Paul's rhetorical strategy: in 8:7-13 the apostle responds to those "having knowledge" on their own grounds, while in 10:14-22 he introduces a new consideration in opposition to their behavior.

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