Professional Documents
Culture Documents
No impact – anything virulent enough to be a threat would destroy its host too quickly
Joshua Lederberg, professor of genetics at Stanford University School of Medicine, 1999, Epidemic The World
of Infectious Disease, p. 13
The toll of the fourteenth-century plague, the "Black Death," was closer to one third. If the bugs' potential to
develop adaptations that could kill us off were the whole story, we would not be here. However, with very
rare exceptions, our microbial adversaries have a shared interest in our survival. Almost any pathogen
comes to a dead end when we die; it first has to communicate itself to another host in order to survive.
So historically, the really severe host- pathogen interactions have resulted in a wipeout of both host and
pathogen. We humans are still here because, so far, the pathogens that have attacked us have willy-nilly had
an interest in our survival. This is a very delicate balance, and it is easily disturbed, often in the wake of
large-scale ecological upsets.
AT: Economy
( ) US Econ is resilient-9/11, Katrina, oil prices, and tech balloon prove
Christian Science Monitor “US economy chugs ahead despite auto and housing slumps” 12/11/2006
The economy's resilience has been a theme of several years' standing - one that predates the 9/11
attacks. The US output of goods and services has survived the damage of hurricanes Katrina and Rita,
a run-up in oil prices, and the bursting of the high-tech balloon in early 2001. One reason for its
capacity to take hits is its growing diversity. Indeed, last month's new jobs came in health and financial
services, travel, government hiring, and professional services - all helping to offset a struggling
manufacturing sector. Even in manufacturing, the picture is not as bleak as it could be, in part because
vigorous economies abroad are buying American-made goods. "It takes a lot to get the economy down,"
says Ethan Harris, chief economist at Lehman Brothers in New York. "It does have some natural resilience
in the face of shocks."
( ) More evidence
GreenFacts.org, 12-8-2005, http://www.greenfacts.org/endocrine-disruptors/l-2/endocrine-disruptors-4.htm#0
At the moment there is no firm evidence that environmental EDCs cause health problems at low levels of
exposure. However, the fact that high levels of chemicals can impair human health through interferences with the endocrine system, raises concerns
about the possible harmful effects of EDCs. Increases in the occurrence of certain diseases affecting the reproductive system in men and women have also
raised the question of whether this could be due to exposure to EDCs. The
difficulty in finding conclusive evidence on what is
happening globally is compounded when researchers try to compare and integrate data about trends in
human health from different sources collected at different times, and often using different methods under varying conditions.
AT: Europe
European war won’t escalate—the Cold War is over
Robert A. Manning, senior fellow and director of Asian studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, 3/10/2000
We don't want to go any lower because we need these weapons for nuclear deterrence, according to State
Department spokesman James Rubin. But how many nukes do we need for deterrence to be credible? China,
which President Clinton has talked of as a "strategic partner," has a grand total of 20 - count them - strategic
warheads that could hit the United States. Nuclear wannabes like North Korea, Iran, and Iraq would have
only a handful if they did manage to succeed in joining the nuclear club. Russia, which has 6,000 strategic
warheads, is no longer an adversary. During the Cold War, it was not hard to envision a conventional war
in Europe escalating into nuclear conflict. But today it is difficult to spin a plausible scenario in which
the United States and Russia escalate hostilities into a nuclear exchange. Russia has no Warsaw Pact, and
not much of a conventional force to speak of. Yet U.S. nuclear planners still base their targeting plans on
prospective Russian targets, though no one will say so.
No risk of escalation
Michael Quinlan. 05. “India-Pakistan Deterrrence Revisited.” Survival. London. Vol. 47, Iss. 3; pg 103.
ProQuest.
Since the 1999 Kargil conflict and the 2002 confrontation political
relations between India and Pakistan have eased
considerably, with leaders on both sides spearheading a drive to improve the climate and to do
practical business together, including on Kashmir. Nuclear-weapon concepts and doctrines seem to
have evolved prudently, though information is limited. The buildup of armouries, slower than some observers
foresaw, does not at present threaten deterrent balance, though worries about ballistic missile defence may lie ahead.
Further cooperation on confidence-building measures, and dialogue on entrenching stability, remain important. Both countries, but
especially Pakistan after the A.Q. Khan scandal, have global responsibilities in the non-proliferation context. Overall, the scene is more
reassuring than five years ago, though improvement is not irreversible.
( ) Indonesia is stable
George Wehrfritz and Joe Cochrane, 3-6-2006, “The Biggest Sleeper,” Newsweek, p ln
The same might be said for Yudhoyono's presidency. Inaugurated 17 months ago, he is Indonesia's first
directly elected leader, and the first to show a firm hand after a series of sleepy bumblers since the fall of
Indonesia's dictator Suharto, in 1998. Yudhoyono led a highly competent response to the devastating tsunami
in December 2004, and then exhibited a statesman's touch in signing a visionary peace pact to end the long-
running rebellion in the province of Aceh. For the first time in years the ethnically and politically
fractured archipelago is relatively stable; the Asia Foundation's Indonesia representative, Douglas
Ramage, calls Indonesia "the sleeper democratization success story" in Asia. All this, however, has only brought the
country to the starting gate--positioned for a run to reclaim its rightful place as the third giant growth story in Asia.
AT: Iraq
Empirically Denied
Steven A. Cook Ray Takeyh. and Suzanne Maloney fellows at the Council on Foreign Relations senior
fellow at Saban Center, Brookings Institution. 6/28/2007
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/06/28/opinion/edtakeyh.php
Finally, there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not
directly involved. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either
ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling
interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the
Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone
else's fight. Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman
and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight.
Even without the alliance Japan would not rearm- the culture is too anti-militaristic.
Anthony DiFilippo, Prof. Sociology at Lincoln University, 2002, The Challenges of the U.S.-Japan Military
Arrangement: Competing Security Transitions in a Changing International Environment, pg. 103
The problem here is not with the conclusion, but rather that it is drawn from faulty assumptions. To assume that the dissolution
of the existing U.S.-Japan security alliance can lead only to Japanese rearmament is faulty, for there is clearly another
viable alternative. Since the end of the Pacific War Japan has maintained a culture of antimilitarism. Specifically, in
addition to renouncing war, Japan has repeatedly stressed the need for the realization of global disarmament, the
total elimination of all nuclear weapons, and the strengthening of the United Nations. Because the revisionist
perspective completely ignores the emergence of multilateral security systems, both global and regional, its focus is entirely on shifting military
responsibility to Japan to replace the end of the security alliance with the United States.
AT: NATO
NATO is resilient
Beth Jones, Assistant Sec. of State, 3-13-2003, “US Official says ties to Europe,”
http://www.useu.be/TransAtlantic/Mar1303JonesUSEU.html
For over fifty years, the United States and its European Allies have been joined in a common cause
through NATO. We have been working hard since the September 11th attacks to transform the
Alliance to address these new security threats. The Summit meeting of heads of state and government in Prague last November
represented an historic milestone in this process. Mr. Chairman, I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate you on your chairmanship of the NATO
Parliamentary Assembly and to thank you for your advocacy of U.S. interests in that organization. I also want to applaud your deep engagement at Prague
and your continuing support for NATO's transformation. At the Prague Summit, NATO members agreed on an ambitious program proposed by the U.S. to
develop "New Capabilities, New Members and New Relationships" to transform the Alliance. Our European Allies agreed to improve their military
capabilities, through resource pooling and specialization, helping NATO to undertake collective action against the new threats that we face around the globe.
The Allies also endorsed a U.S. proposal to establish a NATO Response Force, which will give the Alliance a cutting-edge land, air and sea capability. We
agreed to streamline the NATO command structure to make it more lean, efficient and responsive to today's threats. Work on implementing our new
capabilities initiative is well underway. Our decision to invite seven new members to join the Alliance will extend the zone of NATO security and stability
from the Baltic to the Black Sea, helping to further secure a Europe that is whole, free and at peace. We are pleased that each of the seven invitees has
already made significant military contributions to the war on terrorism and we will look to them to provide specialized niche capabilities to the Alliance in
the future. Prague also celebrated the establishment of a new relationship between NATO and Russia. NATO states and Russia are working together in the
NATO-Russia Council as equal partners on selected projects aimed at expanding and deepening our mutual cooperation. Current projects are focused on
peacekeeping, civil emergency planning, non-proliferation and missile defense. I am pleased to report that so far the NATO-Russia Council has been
relatively successful. Russian participation has been constructive and cooperative. As this process continues, we will seek ways to broaden and deepen the
NATO-Russia relationship. The NATO-Ukraine Action Plan agreed at Prague provides a roadmap which, if implemented by Ukraine, will draw Ukraine
closer to the Alliance and bolster internal reforms. It is a source of some regret that last month some Allies chose, at least initially, to confuse the obligation
of the Alliance to provide purely defensive assistance to Turkey with the broader debate over the question of what we should be doing about Iraq in the UN
and elsewhere.
This is not the first time NATO has experienced disagreement on a difficult and important
issue. One only has to think back to the debate over the INF deployment in the 1980s. The fact is that
NATO remains the fundamental means by which the Allies guarantee their common security and the
indispensable defense link that binds North America to Europe.
China and Russia will not militarily balance the US and have no intention to
Richard Weitz, UN Naval War college Review Autumn 2003 www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2003/Autumn/
Despite their common rhetoric, the two governments have taken no substantive, joint steps to counter
American power or influence. For example, they have not pooled their military resources or expertise to
overcome U.S. ballistic-missile defense programs. One Chinese official threatened such anti-BMD cooperation shortly after Yeltsin’s
December 1999 visit to Beijing. The Director General for Arms Control of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Sha Zukang, repeated the
warning in May 2000. But such threats ended after Putin, on his July 2000 visit to Italy, proposed that Russia and NATO cooperate
to defend Europe against missile strikes—despite prior acknowledgment that Chinese officials were “suspicious about Russian initiatives
to create a non-strategic missile defence system in Europe.” When asked about the prospects of a joint Chinese-
Russian response after the December 2001 U.S. decision to withdraw formally from the ABM Treaty,
President Putin told journalists, “Russia is strong enough to respond on its own to any changes in the
sphere of strategic stability.”
Even if economic crisis causes political crisis, it won’t escalate—the 1998 crisis proves
David Kotz, teaches economics at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst, Nov/Dec 1998,
http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Economics/CapitalistCollapse_Russia.html
Despite the unprecedented economic depression, until recently Russian bankers kept getting richer and the stock market soared, buoyed by the lucrative
trade in Russia's valuable oil, gas, and metals. Western banks helped to finance the speculative binge that drove up Russian stock prices, making it one of the
world's best-performing stock markets in 1997. Then in the late spring of this year, Russia's stock market began to fall and
investors started to pull their money out of the country. The Clinton administration, fearing that Yeltsin's government would not
survive a looming financial crisis, pressed a reluctant IMF to approve a $22.6 billion emergency loan on July 13. This bailout proved
unsuccessful. Four weeks later the financial crisis resumed as investors fled and Russia's government had
to pay as much as 300% interest to attract buyers for its bonds. After Washington rejected Yeltsin's
desperate plea for still more money, Russia did the unthinkable: it was forced to suspend payment on its
foreign debt for 90 days, restructure its entire debt, and devalue the ruble. Panic followed, as Russia's
high-flying banks teetered on the edge of collapse, depositors were unable to withdraw their money,
and store shelves were rapidly emptied of goods. The financial collapse produced a political crisis, as
President Yeltsin, his domestic support evaporating, had to contend with an emboldened opposition in the parliament.
AT: Secession
The slippery slope is a sham: Recognizing autonomy doesn’t lead to secession
Ted Gurr; Distinguished University Professor at the University of Maryland, May/June 2000, Foreign Affairs
For several reasons, however, creating autonomy within the state for minorities is harder than simply banning
discrimination. Most governing elites want to hold on to central authority. Many also fear that autonomy will
lead to outright secession. Finally, negotiating arrangements that satisfy all parties and address each
situation's unique quirks is not easy. The second fear -- autonomy as a slippery slope -- is not supported
by the facts on the ground. In very few contemporary instances did negotiated autonomy lead to
independence. Sometimes an autonomous regional government pushes hard for greater authority, as the
Basques have done in Spain. But the ethnic statelets that won de facto independence in the 1990s --
Somaliland, Abkhazia, the Trans-Dniester Republic, and Iraqi Kurdistan -- did so in the absence of
negotiations, not because of them. Those truly looking to reduce ethnic bloodshed should embrace
autonomy, not fear it.
( ) They don’t solve soft power – major alt-causes like Kyoto, the ICC, and Iraq
Sankar Sen, Frmr. Dir. Indian Nat. Police Academy, Statesman, 4-5-2005, “American Power,” p ln
Indeed anti-American sentiment is sweeping the world after the Iraq war. It has, of course, been
aggravated by the aggressive style of the present American President. Under George Bush, anti-
Americanism is widely thought to have reached new heights. In the coming years the USA will lose more
of its ability to lead others if it decides to act unilaterally. If other states step aside and question the USA's
policies and objectives and seek to de-legitimise them, the problems of the USA will increase manifold.
American success will lie in melding power and cooperation and generating a belief in other countries that
their interests will be served by working with instead of opposing the United States. It is aptly said that use of
power without cooperation becomes dictatorial and breeds resistance and resentment. But cooperation
without power produces posturing and no concrete progress. There is also another disquieting development.
It seems American soft power is waning and it is losing its allure as a model society. Much of the rest of the
world is no longer looking up to the USA as a beacon. Rising religiosity, rank hostility to the UN, Bush's
doctrine of preventive war, Guantanamo Bay etc are creating disquiet in the minds of many and
turning them off America. This diminution of America's soft power will also create disenchantment and
may gradually affect American pre-eminence.
AT: South China Seas/Spratly
Spratly tensions won’t escalate
South China Morning Post, 11-15-2004
The mainland, Taiwan, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam claim either all or some of the islands, whose main inhabitants are turtles and birds. The most violent and
persistent fight for the islands has been between Beijing and Hanoi over the past 30 years. The most serious clash came in 1988 when the mainland navy sank three Vietnamese naval
vessels, killing 76 sailors. Beijing says the islands belong to China because Han dynasty explorers in the 11th century discovered them, with Chinese fishermen and merchants
working in the region ever since. Hanoi argues the islands were claimed in the 17th century by the Nguyen dynasty and that historical maps are proof of Vietnam's sovereignty. But
Chinese maps from this period show no evidence of control. The fight continues today, with Beijing and Hanoi eager to exploit the islands' reputed oil and gas deposits. Last month,
state-owned PetroVietnam said it welcomed international bids to explore the region's waters. The move, attacked by Beijing, came in apparent retaliation for Beijing's announcement
that it would work with the Philippines on a similar exploration project. The two sides have also locked horns over Vietnam's recent authorisation of tourist visits to the islands.
in today's clashes over the Spratlys. While both sides have not retreated from
However, there is one noticeable difference
their positions, Beijing and Hanoi have refrained from taking belligerent action, such as sending troops.
The only countermeasures employed have been foreign ministry statements, as noted by Do Tien Sam, director of the Vietnamese Academy of Social Science's Institute for Chinese Studies. "The disagreements are now
The verbal sparring is the apparent result of an agreement between Beijing and
fought only with words," Professor Sam said.
Hanoi in August not to take military action on the issue and to settle any future disputes through
negotiation. The agreement is holding, so much so that during Premier Wen Jiabao's summit meeting in Hanoi last month with Vietnamese leaders, they
restated their positions and moved on to other issues. Vietnamese and Chinese analysts said simple economics lay behind the gentler approach
to the long-running quarrel, with both sides seeing the other as being critical to growth. China is now Vietnam's
third-largest trading partner, with two-way trade expected to reach a record US$ 5 billion this year and grow to US$ 10 billion by 2010.
Iran has a limited capability to attack Israel – the effects will be minimal anyway
Martin van Creveld, Professor of Military History at Hebrew University, 10-24-2007, “Actually, Iran is not so
tough”, International Herald Tribune, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/10/24/opinion/edcrevald.php
Should the U.S. strike at Iran - we are talking about a strike by cruise missiles and manned aircraft, not about an invasion for
which Washington does not have the troops - then Iran will have no way to hit back. Like Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 1991,
Iran's most important response may well be to attack Israel, which probably explains why Iranian President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his generals keep making threats in that direction. Even so, they have few options. Iran's
ground and naval forces are irrelevant to the mission at hand. Iran may indeed have some Shihab III
missiles with the necessary range, but their number is limited and their reliability uncertain. Should
the missiles carry conventional warheads, then, militarily speaking, the effect will probably be close to zero.
Should they carry unconventional ones, then Iran, to quote former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir speaking not
long before the first Gulf War, will open itself to "awesome and terrible" retaliation.
AT: US-Russia
Peace negotiations check US-Russian escalation
Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, President of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems. July 2007 “WILL
AMERICA FIGHT RUSSIA”. Defense and Security, No 78. LN
Ivashov: Numerous scenarios and options are possible. Everything may begin as a local conflict that will rapidly
deteriorate into a total confrontation. An ultimatum will be sent to Russia: say, change the domestic policy
because human rights are allegedly encroached on, or give Western businesses access to oil and gas fields. Russia will refuse and
its objects (radars, air defense components, command posts, infrastructure) will be wiped out by guided missiles with
conventional warheads and by aviation. Once this phase is over, an even stiffer ultimatum will be presented -
demanding something up to the deployment of NATO "peacekeepers" on the territory of Russia. Refusal to bow to the
demands will be met with a mass aviation and missile strike at Army and Navy assets, infrastructure, and objects of
defense industry. NATO armies will invade Belarus and western Russia. Two turns of events may follow that.
Moscow may accept the ultimatum through the use of some device that will help it save face. The acceptance will be
followed by talks over the estrangement of the Kaliningrad enclave, parts of the Caucasus and Caspian region, international control
over the Russian gas and oil complex, and NATO control over Russian nuclear forces. The second scenario
involves a warning from the Kremlin to the United States that continuation of the aggression will trigger
retaliation with the use of all weapons in nuclear arsenals. It will stop the war and put negotiations into
motion.