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AT: AT: AT: AT: AT: AT: AT: AT: AT: AT: AT: AT: AT: AT: AT: AT: AT: AT: AT: AT: AT: AT: AT: AT: AT: AT: AT: AT: AT: AT: AT: AT: AT: AT: AT: AT: AT: AT: AT: AT: AT: AT: AT: AT: AT: AT: Accidental Launch...............................................................................................................................................1 Africa...................................................................................................................................................................1 AIDS....................................................................................................................................................................1 Air Power............................................................................................................................................................1 Balkans................................................................................................................................................................1 Biodiversity.........................................................................................................................................................1 Bioweapons.........................................................................................................................................................1 Bird Flu...............................................................................................................................................................1 Brazilian Economy..............................................................................................................................................1 China-Taiwan......................................................................................................................................................1 Chinese Economy...............................................................................................................................................1 Culture.................................................................................................................................................................1 Disease................................................................................................................................................................1 Economy.............................................................................................................................................................1 Egypt...................................................................................................................................................................1 Endocrine Disruption..........................................................................................................................................1 Europe.................................................................................................................................................................1 Hegemony...........................................................................................................................................................1 India-Pakistan......................................................................................................................................................1 Indian Economy..................................................................................................................................................1 Indonesian Collapse............................................................................................................................................1 Iraq......................................................................................................................................................................1 Japan Rearm........................................................................................................................................................1 NATO..................................................................................................................................................................1 North Korea.........................................................................................................................................................1 Nuclear Meltdowns.............................................................................................................................................1 Nuclear War.........................................................................................................................................................1 Oil Peak...............................................................................................................................................................1 Overpopulation....................................................................................................................................................1 Ozone..................................................................................................................................................................1 Pakistani Coup....................................................................................................................................................1 Prolif Bad............................................................................................................................................................1 Readiness............................................................................................................................................................1 Russia-China Alliance.........................................................................................................................................1 Russia-China War................................................................................................................................................1 Russian Collapse.................................................................................................................................................1 Russian Economy................................................................................................................................................1 Secession.............................................................................................................................................................1 Soft Power...........................................................................................................................................................1 South China Seas/Spratly....................................................................................................................................1 Terrorism.............................................................................................................................................................1 Trade....................................................................................................................................................................1 UN Credibility.....................................................................................................................................................1 US-China.............................................................................................................................................................1 US-Iran................................................................................................................................................................1 US-Russia............................................................................................................................................................1
AT: Warming..............................................................................................................................................................2 AT: Water Wars..........................................................................................................................................................2 AT: WTO Credibility.................................................................................................................................................2
AT: Accidental Launch
Nuclear accidents wouldn’t escalate Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, 1995, p. 93-94
“Love is like war,” the chaplain says in Bertolt Brecht’s Mother Courage, “it always finds a way.” For half a century, nuclear war has not found a way. The old saying, “accidents will happen,” is translated as Murphy’s Law holding that anything that can go wrong will go wrong. Enough has gone wrong, and Scott Sagan has recorded many of the nuclear accidents that have, or have nearly, taken place. Yet none of them has caused anybody to blow anybody else up. In a speech given to American scientists in 1960, C. P. Snow said this: “We know, with the certainty of statistical truth, that if enough of these weapons are made— by enough different states—some of them are going to blow up. Through accident, or folly, or madness—but the motives don’t matter. What does matter is the nature of the statistical fact.” In 1960, statistical fact told Snow that within “at the most, ten years some of these bombs are going off.” Statistical fact now tells us that we are twenty-five years overdue. But the novelist and scientist overlooked the fact that there are no “statistical facts.”’ Half a century of nuclear peace has to be explained since divergence from historical experience is dramatic. Never in modern history, conventionally dated from 1648, have the great and major powers of the world enjoyed such a long period of peace. Scott Sagan emphasizes the problems and the conditions that conduce to pessimism. I emphasize the likely solutions and the conditions that conduce to optimism, bearing in mind that nothing in this world is ever certain.
Risk of backlash prevents accidental war Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, 1995, p. 111
Deterrence is also a considerable guarantee against accidents, since it causes countries to take good care of their weapons, and against anonymous use, since those firing the weapons can neither know that they will be undetected nor what form of punishment detection might bring. In life, uncertainties abound. In a conventional world, they more easily lead to war because less is at stake. Even so, it is difficult to think of wars that have started by accident even before nuclear weapons were invented. It is hard to believe that nuclear war may begin accidentally, when less frightening conventional wars have rarely done so.
Fear of accidents prevents them Kenneth Waltz, Professor of Political Science (Emeritus) at UC Berkeley, "Peace, Stability, and Nuclear Weapons,"Columbia International Affairs Online, August, 1995, http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/wak01/, accessed
8/4/02 Fear of accidents works against their occurring. This is illustrated by the Cuban Missile Crisis. Accidents happened during the crisis, and unplanned events took place. An American U-2 strayed over Siberia, and one flew over Cuba. The American Navy continued to play games at sea, such games as trying to force Soviet submarines to surface. In crises, political leaders want to control all relevant actions, while knowing that they cannot do so. Fear of losing control propelled Kennedy and Khrushchev to end the crisis quickly. In a conventional world, uncertainty may tempt a country to join battle. In a nuclear world, uncertainty has the opposite effect. What is not surely controllable is too dangerous to bear.
No great power involvement in African wars Robert Barrett, PhD student Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary, June 1, 2005,
Westerners eager to promote democracy must be wary of African politicians who promise democratic reform without sincere commitment to the process. Offering money to corrupt leaders in exchange for their taking small steps away from autocracy may in fact be a way of pushing countries into anocracy. As such, world financial lenders and interventionists who wield leverage and influence must take responsibility in considering the ramifications of African nations who adopt democracy in order to maintain elite political privileges. The obvious reason for this, aside from the potential costs in human life should conflict arise from hastily constructed democratic reforms, is the fact that Western donors, in the face of intrastate war would then be faced with channeling funds and resources away from democratization efforts and toward conflict intervention based on issues of human security. This is a problem, as Western nations may be increasingly wary of intervening in Africa hotspots after experiencing firsthand the unpredictable and unforgiving nature of societal warfare in both Somalia and Rwanda. On a costbenefit basis, the West continues to be somewhat reluctant to get to get involved in Africa’s dirty wars, evidenced by its political hesitation when discussing ongoing sanguinary grassroots conflicts in Africa. Even as the world apologizes for bearing witness to the Rwandan genocide without having intervened, the United States, recently using the label ‘genocide’ in the context of the Sudanese conflict (in September of 2004), has only proclaimed sanctions against Sudan, while dismissing any suggestions at actual intervention (Giry, 2005). Part of the problem is that traditional military and diplomatic approaches at separating combatants and enforcing ceasefires have yielded little in Africa. No powerful nations want to get embroiled in conflicts they cannot win – especially those conflicts in which the intervening nation has very little interest.
Multiple ongoing African wars empirically deny your impact Ramesh Thakur, Japan Times, 2-16-2006, “At least no new wars,” p ln
In Africa, the Ethiopia-Eritrea peace frayed dangerously with neither side showing willingness to compromise in the ongoing border dispute. The security and humanitarian situation in Darfur remained dire. The small and belatedly deployed African Union peace force could not adequately protect displaced civilians, new fighting erupted, the rebel movement remained divided and Khartoum was less than cooperative. The political settlement sought by the A.U. looks far off. The Democratic Republic of Congo's shaky transition inched forward amid widespread insecurity. Up to 1,000 still die every day from disease, malnutrition and violence. Almost 4 million have perished in eight years of war.
Sudan empirically denies your impact AFP, 3-9-2006, “UN forced to slash,” p ln
A three-year offensive by government-backed militias against rebels in Darfur has left 300,000 people dead, with 1.7 million internally displaced and a further 200,000 in UN refugee camps in neighbouring Chad. UNHCR said the conflict "continues unabated" despite ongoing peace talks in Nigeria and the presence of African Union troops in the region. "Armed clashes, banditry and attacks targeting civilians, including internally displaced people, continue to occur with increasing frequency" in Darfur, the statement said. "Humanitarian convoys are also targeted."
( ) AIDS can’t cause extinction Andrew Sullivan, editor of The New Republic, Love Undetectable, 1998, p.8
You could see it in the papers. Almost overnight, toward the end of 1996, the obituary pages in the gay press began to dwindle. Soon after, the official statistics followed. Within a year, AIDS deaths had plummeted 60 percent in California, 44 percent across the country as a whole. In time, it was shown that triple combination therapy in patients who had never taken drugs before kept close to 90 percent of them at undetectable levels of virus for two full years. Optimism about actually ridding the body completely of virus dissipated; what had at one point been conceivable after two years stretched to three and then longer. But even for those who had developed resistance to one or more drugs, the future seemed tangibly brighter. New, more powerful treatments were fast coming on- stream, month after month. What had once been a handful of treatment options grew to over twenty. In trials, the next generation of AZT packed a punch ten times as powerful as its original; and new, more focused forms of protease inhibitor carried with them even greater promise. It was still taboo, of course, to mention this hope—for fear it might encourage a return to unsafe sex and a new outburst of promiscuity. But, after a
while, the numbers began to speak for themselves.
( ) Can’t solve AIDS – Stigma and Condoms Peggy B. Sherman and Ellwood F. Oakley, Professors of Legal Studies at Georgia State University.
“Pandemics and Panaceas: The World Trade Organization's Efforts to Balance Pharmaceutical Patents and Access to AIDS Drugs,” American Business Law Journal Winter/Spring, 2004 Social and traditional practices create great hurdles to making medicines accessible to all. The availability of low-cost antiretrovirals will not impact social customs. In many developing nations, there is an incredible social stigma attached to the AIDS disease, which causes those infected to keep it hidden and not seek testing or treatment, for fear of losing jobs, families, and friends. 226 Even prevention programs suffer because of the stigma associated with the disease. 227 Many religious groups oppose the use of condoms and believe in abstinence as the only acceptable form of prevention. For this reason and issues related to
cost, condom usage in many African nations is extremely low. Although the average South African has their initial sexual encounter at approximately fourteen or fifteen years old, if
Lack of education about the disease is also a contributing factor to people not seeking treatment. Many women in rural African villages do not know the names or symptoms of many sexually transmitted diseases. 229 This is particularly disturbing when compounded with the fact that in many cultures, women are not educated and are illiterate. Finally, armed conflict and political unrest in parts of Africa also undermine the ability to provide access to anti-AIDS medicines. 230 [*404] Clearly, reducing the price of drugs alone is not the sole solution to the problem of access to
such a teenager were to ask for condoms in an average clinic, let alone anti-AIDS drugs, he or she would be chastised and told to practice abstention. 228 medicines in developing countries. A holistic approach that addresses all the relevant hurdles is required. Without such efforts, the recent concessions by the United States and the
pharmaceutical companies are not liable to impact the AIDS pandemic significantly.
Claims About AIDS Epidemic Are Wildly Overstated Wandera Ojanji, Staff Writer, The Nation (Nairobi), , Africa News, November 16, 2000, p. np.
Statistics quoted by most development agencies suggest millions of Kenyans are sick and dying. Expert opinion is questioning the authenticity of these figures. About thirty per cent of all Kenyans (8.4 million) are infected with tuberculosis, with
about 16,700 dying every year. Seventy per cent or 20 million are exposed to malaria every year with 26,000 children below five years dying every year (or 72 children a day).
More than 2.2 million Kenyans are infected with HIV, with 240,000 dying every year from Aids
Between 20 and 30 per cent of Kenyans are either suffering from typhoid or are carriers of the disease, of which a third (over 1.9million) eventually die even after seeking medical treatment.
The figures are far much above the official figures given by the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). Take for instance Aids. According to the estimates, it is said to be killing 182,500 people annually. The total reported deaths, from all causes, by CBS were 185,576 in 1997 and 221,543 in 1998. Consequently this would mean only about 3000 people died from other causes than Aids in 1997. The head of Health Information Systems at the Ministry of Health Mr. Godfrey M Baltazar says of the quoted HIV/Aids cases: "These estimates are subject to wide margins of error. They are based on blood samples taken from pregnant women attending antenatal clinics in a few sentinel sites, all of which are in urban areas and assumed to be representative of the entire Kenyan population, which they are not. Their extrapolation to non-pregnant women, males and the rural population are based on assumptions which have little empirical foundation." Until mid this year, Mr. Baltazar was an epidemiological officer at National Aids and STI Control Council ( NASCOP) . He argued that in the absence of a population or community survey, these figures cannot be accepted as credible. Kenya has not done any. "Such surveys are very critical as this is the only way to validate the data." Health statistics estimated are mainly done by the WHO. It is said that after the ministry forwards the figures to WHO. The latter will then subject the data to farther mathematical processes, apparently to take care of the 'low under- reporting rates' of government agencies. This has in the past created glaring discrepancies between government figures and those floated by private or non-
AT: Air Power
Air power will decline inevitably Michael W. Wynne Secretary of the Air Force, March 2, 2006, “FISCAL 2007 BUDGET: DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE”, Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony The threats Airmen will encounter in the coming years are changing dramatically. Adversaries are developing and fielding new ground-based air defenses, improved sensor capabilities and advanced fighter aircraft. These capabilities will increasingly challenge our legacy aircraft, sensors and weapons systems. Advances in integrated air defense systems, to include advanced sensors, data processing and SAMs continue trends noted in the 1990s. SAM systems are incorporating faster, more accurate missiles, with multi-target capability, greater mobility and increased immunity to electronic jamming. Currently possessing ranges of over 100 nautical miles (NM), these anti-access weapons will likely achieve ranges of over 200 NM by the end of the decade. These advanced SAMs can and will compel non-stealthy platforms to standoff beyond useful sensor and weapons ranges. Proliferation of these long-range SAMs is on the rise, with projections for 2004-2007 indicating a twofold increase over the number of advanced SAM system exports during the mid to late 1990s. Another trend is the development and proliferation of upgrades to older, 1960/70's-era SAMs. At a fraction of the cost of a new advanced, long-range SAM, many African, Asian and Mid-East nations are looking to upgrade older SAMs to revitalize their aging air defense forces. By bringing in modern technologies, improved missile propellants and increased mobility, older SAM systems are becoming more reliable and more credible threats. Finally, the threat from Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) continues to grow. Large, poorly secured stockpiles of these weapons increase the chances of highly capable MANPADS ending up in the hands of an insurgent or terrorist group. The threats from advanced fighter aircraft also continue to grow. Currently there exist 31 nations already fielding 2,500 or more airframes. Increased use of stateof- the-art radar jammers, avionics, weapons and reduced signature airframes/engines are becoming the norm in fighter design. Additionally, countries like India and China are now able to produce their own advanced fighters, thereby increasing the quantity and quality of adversary aircraft the Air Force may face in the future. By 2012, China will more than double its advanced fighter inventory to over 500 airframes, most with advanced precisionguided munitions and air-to-air weapons. Similarly, self-protection jamming suites are growing in complexity and proliferation, potentially eroding our ability to target adversary aircraft. The threat from the development, fielding and proliferation of standoff weapons such as long-range cruise missiles will also provide potential adversaries with offensive capabilities of ever- increasing accuracy and range which, when combined with their relatively small size, presents an increasing challenge to detection and tracking. Many nations are enhancing the utility of advanced fighters by pursuing, procuring and integrating support aircraft as force multipliers. They acquire aerial refueling tankers to extend the range of strike operations and increase on-station time for fighters. Furthermore, airborne early warning aircraft are extending the reach of many nations through datalink capabilities that provide control of fighter operations well beyond the reach of land-based radars. Several nations are also purchasing standoff jamming assets in both manned and unmanned platforms to attempt to deny our traditional sensor advantages. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) of all varieties are in high demand and are becoming increasingly available on today's market, providing low-cost, but highly effective reconnaissance capabilities. This situation represents a new and increasingly prolific and complex challenge on the battlefield. Additionally, the combination of improved C4ISR with improved ballistic and cruise missile capabilities will increasingly threaten regional and expeditionary Air Force basing. China, in particular, has a growing over-the-horizon intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capability from a combination of ground, air and spacebased systems. Coupled with its large and growing inventory of conventionally armed theater ballistic missiles, China's increasing capabilities and reach collectively present a serious potential to adversely impact allied and Joint air and space operations across the Asian theater. Worldwide advancements in the development, deployment and employment of foreign space and counterspace systems are challenges to U.S. Space Superiority. Adversaries, including terrorists, are more and more easily obtaining a number of increasingly sophisticated space services. Furthermore, they are developing the means to degrade U.S. space capabilities, freedom of action and access. The intent of U.S. adversaries combined with the capabilities of foreign space and counterspace systems will increasingly threaten U.S. military forces and interests worldwide.
No risk of Balkan escalation Ivan Eland, director of defense policy studies at the Cato Institute, 5/3/99, http://www.cato.org/cgibin/scripts/printtech.cgi/dailys/05-03-99.html In reality, the ostensible humanitarian justification for the war is secondary at best. It's the underlying perception that European security is threatened that's really driving this military intervention. The United States rarely intervenes militarily when there is no perception that its interests are at stake. So the military operation advertised as a NATO mission to relieve human suffering is actually a ham-handed U.S. attempt to defend perceived American security interests. Those perceived interests flow from the Clinton administration's domino theory of instability and concerns about preserving NATO's credibility. Instead of a fear of communism spreading from country to country, the administration's refurbished domino theory sees "instability" -- unless checked -- spreading and engulfing large parts of Europe. Instability has always existed in the volatile and remote Balkan nations, but it hasn't spread outside the region since 1914. The administration constantly alludes to the specter of World War I. But in the events leading up to that war, two powerful and hostile alliances exploited instability in the region -- a situation much different from the one that exists today. At present, instability in the Balkans has no relationship to American vital interests.
Species loss is inevitable New Straits Times (Malaysia), February 4, 2001
Yule rates the loss of biodiversity as the number one environmental crisis. "The extinction of species that
we know and don't not know of is happening at an alarming rate, caused by pollution and the destruction of habitats. Other crises include global warming, river and air pollution, destruction of rainforests and even over population."
Redundancy prevents ecosystem collapse-keystone theory is wrong Chris Maser, internationally recognized expert in forest ecology and governmental consultant, 1992, Global
Imperative: Harmonizing Culture and Nature, p. 40 Redundancy means that more than one species can perform similar functions. It’s a type of ecological insurance policy, which strengthens the ability of the system to retain the integrity of its basic relationships. The insurance of redundancy means that the loss of a species or two is not likely to result in such severe functional disruptions of the ecosystem so as to cause its collapse because other species can make up for the functional loss.
Extinct species are replaced Thomas Palmer, The Atlantic, January, 1992, p. 83
Students of evolution have shown that species death, or extinction, is going on all the time, and that it is an essential feature of life history. Species are adapted to their environments; as environments change, some species find themselves in the position of islanders whose islands are washing away, and they go under. Similarly, new islands (or environments) are appearing all the time, and they almost invariably produce new species.
Respeciation will rapidly fill in the vacuum Michael L. McKinney, 1998, Biodiversity Dynamics : Niche Preemption and Saturation in Diversity Equilibria,
Biodiversity Dynamics: Turnover of Populations, Taxa, and Communities, Chapter 1, Michael L. McKinney and James A. Drake, eds. http://www.earthscape.org/r3/mckinney/mckinney01.html A key prediction of the niche preemption model is that, as incumbent occupants of niches are not dislodged by competition, then extinction of the incumbents by disturbances provides the main opportunity for replacement. As Roy (1996) discusses (and shows evidence for), speciation-rate disparities tend to drive changes in diversity composition during both background and mass extinctions. Mass extinctions provide widespread opportunities to occupy many ecological niches and so accelerate incumbent replacement (Patzkowsky 1995; Roy 1996).
Bioweapons can’t be used – too unreliable Walter Laqueur, Cochairman, International Research Council, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, The New Terrorism, 1999, pg. 69
The attractions of biological weapons are obvious: easy access, low cost, toxicity, and the panic they can cause. But there are drawbacks of various kinds that explain why almost no successful attacks have occurred. While explosive or nuclear devices or even chemical agents, however horrific, affect a definite
biological agents are unpredictable: they can easily get out of control, backfire, or have no effect at all. They constitute a high risk to the attackers, although the same, of course, is true of chemical weapons. This consideration may not dissuade people willing to sacrifice their own lives, but the possibility that the attacker may kill himself before being able to launch an attack may make him hesitate to carry it out. Biological agents, with some notable exceptions, are affected by changes in heat or cold, and, like chemical agents, by changes in the direction of the wind. They have a limited life span, and their means of delivery are usually complicated. The process of contaminating water reservoirs or foodstuffs involves serious technical problems. Even if an agent survives the various purification systems in water reservoirs, boiling the water
space, would destroy most germs. Dispersing the agent as a vapor or via an aerosol system within a closed space-for instance, through the air conditioning system of a big building or in a subway-would ear to offer better chances of success, but it is by no mens foolproof.
Technical barriers prevent bioweapons Jonathan Tucker, director of the CBW Nonproliferation Project at Center for Nonprolif Studies at Monterey Instit, Amy Sands, assoc director, July/August 1999, http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1999/ja99/ja99tucker.html
One reason there have been so few successful examples of chemical or biological terrorism is that carrying out an
attack requires overcoming a series of major technical hurdles: gaining access to specialized chemical-weapon ingredients or virulent microbial strains; acquiring equipment and know-how for agent production and dispersal; and creating an organizational structure capable of resisting infiltration or early detection by law enforcement. Many of the microorganisms best suited to catastrophic terrorism-virulent strains of anthrax or deadly viruses such as smallpox and Ebolaare difficult to acquire. Further, nearly all viral and rickettsial agents are hard to produce, and bacteria such as plague are difficult to "weaponize" so that they will survive the process of delivery. As former Soviet bioweapons scientist Ken Alibek wrote in his recent
memoir, Biohazard, "The most virulent culture in a test tube is useless as an offensive weapon until it has been put through a process that gives it stability and predictability. The manufacturing technique is, in a sense, the real weapon, and it is harder to develop than individual agents." The capability
to disperse microbes and toxins over a wide area as an inhalable aerosol-the form best suited for inflicting mass casualtiesrequires a delivery system whose development would outstrip the technical capabilities of all but the most sophisticated terrorists. Not only is the dissemination process for biological agents inherently complex, requiring specialized equipment and expertise, but effective dispersal is easily disrupted by environmental and meteorological conditions. A large-scale attack with anthrax spores against a city,
for example, would require the use of a crop duster with custom-built spray nozzles that could generate a high-concentration aerosol cloud containing particles of agent between one and five microns in size. Particles smaller than one micron would not lodge in the victims' lungs, while particles much larger than five microns would not remain suspended for long in the atmosphere. To generate mass casualties, the anthrax would have to be dried and milled into a fine powder. Yet this type of processing requires complex and costly equipment, as well as systems for high biological containment. Anthrax is simpler to handle in a wet form called a "slurry," but the efficiency of aerosolization is greatly reduced.
AT: Bird Flu
( ) Bird flu can’t mutate to human-to-human transmission John G Bartlett, and Frederick G Hayden are medical doctors Sep 20, 2005 Annals of Internal Medice
Influenza A (H5N1): Will It Be the Next Pandemic Influenza? Are We Ready? . Annals of Internal Medicine. Philadelphia:.Vol.143, Iss. 6; pg. 460, 3 pgs How concerned should we be? As noted, a flu pandemic requires human-to-human transmission. This currently seems to be the Achilles' heel of H5N1. There is one apparently confirmed case (19), but to date, no human genes indicating reassortment have been detected in the analyses of H5N1 strains and sustained human-tohuman transmission has not occurred. Indeed, some would speculate that, with this much disease in poultry over 9 years, if a pandemic were to happen it would have happened already (8). Also, some have reported serologic evidence of avian influenza antibodies (H5, H7, H10, and H11 strains) in 2% to 38% of humans, suggesting that bird flu infections involving multiple strains have gone on for years but have only recently been reported (3, 20, 21).
( ) If they win it can mutate, then it’s totally inevitable Boston Herald Sunday, 25 September 2005 Attack of the Bird Flu: Experts Say Pandemic Inevitable
http://www.rednova.com/news/health/250822/attack_of_the_bird_flu_experts_say_pandemic_inevitable/ While the deadly Avian flu spreads through Asia, Bay State health officials - who have been "vigorously" planning for a flu pandemic for six years - doubt the state could ever be completely prepared for a full-blown attack. "At some point, the pandemic is going to happen. We're prepared better today than we were last week. We can only prepare so far," said
Dr. Alfred DeMaria, head of communicable disease control for the state Department of Public Health. Two million people in Massachusetts alone could become ill in six to eight weeks if a flu pandemic hit, according to the state DPH. One million Bay Staters could need outpatient care; 16,800 could be hospitalized and nearly 5,000 could die. Last century
. National and local flu experts say it's inevitable that a sweeping flu pandemic - a worldwide outbreak - occurs every 20 to 50 years. The H5N1 strain has killed 64 people in Southeast Asia in two years. People have contracted the virus from birds. Health officials fear the virus eventually will spread from person to person, creating a worldwide outbreak that could kill millions. "It's not a matter of if, but when we might see another pandemic," said Tom Skinner of the federal Centers for Disease Control.
saw three flu pandemics - in 1918, 1957 and 1968. The flu killed half-a-million Americans in 1918
( ) New studies prove the Avian flu is not drug resistant
Helen Branswell Canadian Press Thursday, October 06, 2005 Reports of Tamiflu resistance to avian flu based on old data, not new proof TORONTO (CP) - It appears a misunderstanding, not a mutation, is behind recent reports suggesting the H5N1 avian flu strain is developing resistance to the drug Tamiflu. The professor of pharmacology from Hong Kong University quoted as warning of an emerging resistant strain of the virus says he was citing old data, not new evidence, when he gave an interview last week.
AT: Brazilian Economy
( ) Brazilian economy is resilient – and IMF will bail them out if there’s a crisis EIU Executive Briefing, 9-28-2005, “Latin America,” p ln
Brazil has experienced a marked improvement in its macroeconomic and financial situation over the past few years, and as a result the government decided not to renew its IMF loan facility in March. The current administration is maintaining very positive relations with the IMF and would be able to turn to the Fund again if the need arose. The orthodox policies and fiscal controls adopted by the government of Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva have worked to consolidate macroeconomic stability. This, combined with healthier external accounts and robust economic growth, has reduced Brazil's susceptibility to financial crises and improved its creditworthiness.
( ) Brazils economy is resilient, despite past shocks Journal of Commerce, 7-5-2004, “Brazil,” p ln
Economic overview: Possessing large and well-developed agricultural, mining, manufacturing and service sectors, Brazil's economy outweighs that of all other South American countries and is expanding its presence in world markets. From 2001-03 real wages fell and Brazil's economy grew, on average, only 1.1 percent per year, as the country absorbed a series of domestic and international economic shocks. That Brazil absorbed these shocks without financial collapse is a tribute to the resiliency of the Brazilian economy and the economic program put in place by former President Fernando Henrique
Cardoso and strengthened by President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva. The three pillars of the economic program are a floating exchange rate, an inflationtargeting regime and tight fiscal policy, which have been reinforced by a series of IMF programs. The currency depreciated sharply in 2001 and 2002, which contributed to a dramatic current account adjustment: In 2003, Brazil ran a record trade surplus and recorded the first current account surplus since 1992. While economic management has been good, important economic vulnerabilities remain. The most significant are debt-related: The government's largely domestic debt increased steadily from 1994 to 2003, straining government finances, while Brazil's foreign debt (a mix of private and public debt) is large in relation to its modest (but growing) export base. Another challenge is maintaining economic growth over a period of time to generate employment and make the government debt burden more manageable.
Economic ties deter war between China and Taiwan Eric Ting-Lun Huang, LL.B. Soo-chow University School of Law, Taiwan, ROC; LL.M., and currently S.J.D. candidate, Golden Gate Law, Spring 2003, 9 Ann. Surv. Int'l & Comp. L. 55
After twelve years of negotiations, Taiwan was admitted as a full member of the World Trade Organization on January 1, 2002. The WTO admission of both sides of the Taiwan Strait has created a new opportunity for the further development of crossstrait relations. This is because not only will there be closer cross-strait trade and economic relations, but both sides will also be able to use the WTO spirit of consultation to handle other issues resulting from promoting cross-strait trade normalization. Although the WTO is not a place to discuss political affairs, the two sides of the Strait can reduce political tensions and gradually increase economic cooperation through their repeated contacts at WTO meetings.
U.S. deterrence prevents Chinese aggression toward Taiwan Robert S. Ross, Professor of Political Science, Boston College, Fall 2002, International Security,
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v027/27.2ross.html Chinese leaders acknowledge that U.S. capabilities would be particularly effective against Chinese forces operating in the Taiwan theater. A senior Chinese military officer has lectured his troops that China's likely adversary in a local war would possess high-technology equipment that could neutralize China's ability to rely on manpower to defeat the enemy. A civilian analyst has noted that, in a war in China's coastal region, it would be difficult for the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to take advantage of its superior numbers -- as it did during the Korean War -- and that the adversary could "make full use of its superiority in air and naval long-range, large-scale, high-accuracy weaponry." n53 A military analyst was more direct, explaining that not only would such superior capabilities seriously restrict China's ability to seize and maintain sea control around a "large island," but they would also pose a major threat to China's coastal political, economic, and military targets. n54 Experts at China's Air Force Command College have concluded that an "air-attack revolution" has occurred and that a "generation gap" exists between the high-technology air-attack capabilities of the United States and the "stagnant" air defense capabilities of less advanced countries, causing a "crisis" in air defense. Thus China assumes that if the United States intervened in a mainland-Taiwan war, the PLA could not protect its war-fighting capabilities, nor could it prevent U.S. penetration of Chinese airspace. It must also assume that the prospect of victory would be close to nil and that the costs of war and defeat would be massive. Once war began, the United States could target China's large but backward navy. Even China's advanced Russian destroyers equipped with highly capable missiles would not contribute to its war-fighting capability, because they lack sufficient stand-off range to challenge U.S. offensive forces. Indeed U.S. capabilities would be even more effective in targeting Chinese surface assets at sea than they have been in targeting enemy assets in deserts, as in the Gulf War and the war in Afghanistan. n56 Moreover, China's air force would likely remain grounded, because neither its pilots nor its aircraft could challenge U.S. air superiority.
AT: Chinese Economy
( ) China’s economy is resilient – Asian financial crisis proves Steven F. Jackson, Assoc. Prof and Chair Poly Sci @ Indiana U Penn, 2000, Is China Unstable? Ed. Shambuagh
These problems, however, do not necessarily mean that China is on the verge of economic collapse—far from it. As Pieter Bottelier demonstrates, China possesses some substantial economic advantages. First and foremost, China is not directly vulnerable to the Asian financial crisis in the ways that other countries in the region have been. China’s massive foreign exchange reserves of $144 billion, minimal short-term debt exposure, and its current account surplus provides the ability to ride out short-term trade deficits.
China also does not have a freely convertible currency for capital account transfers or a large amount of short- term debt as did South Korea, and thus the Renminbi (RMB) is not vulnerable to monetary speculation in the ways that the rupiah, won, baht, yen, and other currencies have been in the last year. In fact, the RMB has appreciated against the U.S. dollar, the only Asian currency to do so. In short, Bottelier concludes, “...the
probability of instability in China due to external economic pressures or macroeconomic imbalances remains low.”
Second, China continues to have a high rate of GDP growth, though it has slowed in recent years. The key question is whether the government can maintain a rate of growth around 8 percent. Third, rural discontentment notwithstanding (see below), harvests in China have been good for the past three years and grain stocks are at an all-time high, a relief for any nation which must feed 1.3 billion people. Externally, China has great strengths, but internally it must solve its financial problem before it becomes a crisis.
( ) Chinese economy is resilient – strong growth and macoeconomic measures Business Daily Update, 1-26-2006, “China must rely,” p ln
For the third consecutive year, the Chinese economy has grown at a rate of about 10 per cent, laying very solid foundations for pressing ahead with the 11th Five-Year Program, from this year. Preliminary estimates indicate China's gross domestic
product (GDP) soared to 18.2 trillion yuan (US$2.2 trillion) last year, up 9.9 per cent over the previous year. Though it was marginally lower than the 10.1 per cent growth in 2004, the rate remains impressive given
the measures taken to rein in excessive investment in overheated sectors since late 2004. The robust growth demonstrates not only the immense resilience of the Chinese economy as it has survived tough macroeconomic controls, but also its great potential to grow in a more efficient and balanced way. For instance, the country managed to cut consumption of crude and refined oil by 0.5 per
cent last year. To fuel similar growth a year ago, the country had to increase oil consumption by 15.3 per cent. The year 2005 marked a successful end to the first five-year period of the 21st century. That the country's per capita GDP reached US$1,700 last year, doubling that in 2000, implies the national economy has fared better than expected in delivering the nation's ambition of quadrupling GDP in the year 2000 by 2020. But while applauding these big strides that China has made in achieving its quantitative economic goals, we should also focus on other challenges that must be overcome if a comprehensively well-off society is to be created.
Cultural survival is impossible and irrelevant Michael Blake, Professor of political philosophy and philosophy at Harvard University, August/September 2000,
Civilization, p. 51-53 One frequently hears that endangered cultural groups have a right to preservation, and indeed to outside aid and legal sanctions toward that end. Anthropologists and activists have made such claims on the grounds that the survival of these groups has inherent value. Some advocacy groups have even gone so far as to equate the absence of such special rights with genocide. There is no great moral distinction, such rhetoric seems to suggest, between allowing a culture to assimilate into the wider surrounding society and actually going out and killing its members en masse. This vague moral equation has turned up of late in the discussion of issues as varied as affirmative action, Southern regionalism, Quebecois nationalism, and the moral status of such culturally overwhelming institutions as Wal-Mart and McDonald’s. If we take these arguments at face value, cultural survival is something very close to a moral absolute; to refuse to endorse it is to sign up on the side of cultural atrocity and numbing global conformity This is a shame, because it is surprisingly difficult to figure out exactly what is morally relevant about cultural survival in itself. The first challenge is pinning down just what the term might mean. It cannot simply mean the continued existence of the individuals comprising the endangered culture, since their survival is entirely compatible with their complete assimilation and hence with the destruction of their culture. Nor however, can it mean the preservation of all existing aspects of a culture, for some degree of cultural change and adaptation is normal, indeed inevitable. Cultural stasis is not a plausible ideal, let alone a worthy guide to policy. The messy reality of cultural survival, then,
lies somewhere between disintegration and the deep freeze. The most plausible meaning of the slogan as a political goal might be simply the preservation of difference: the desire that whatever cultures now exist not lose their distinctiveness and blend into surrounding society; and that they continue to serve as means by which some people make sense of their place in the world, however much the content of their cultures may change over time. The key idea here is that the number of cultures now present not be reduced, however much the lifeways and customs comprising each individual culture might change over time. But what reason have we, then, to think that cultural survival is valuable in itself? One argument draws an analogy between cultures and other threatened aspects of the social and natural world: We ought to preserve cultures because to do otherwise is to allow something unique and irreplaceable to leave the world. Refusing to act against assimilation might thus be thought roughly akin to, say; shooting the last of a particularly beautiful species of condor. This argument, though, claims too much, for we feel an equivalent sense of loss when we face not the destruction of a culture but merely its reworking from the inside—and, thereby the destruction of specific elements within it. For example, during Quebec’s Quiet Revolution— the tumultuous postwar period during which French Canada cast off clerical authority and conservatism and fashioned itself into a modem secular society—much of the culture was completely remade and many traditional norms and practices abandoned. We might easily sympathize with the feeling that there was a loss to the world in what was thereby abandoned. We
do have reason to regret the fact that current ways by which the world is understood— our own ways included—will eventually disappear. But our justifiable sadness does not give us good reason to declare that what is now endangered ought to be preserved forever, or to forbid ourselves from altering inherited cultural norms—abandoning some, amending others, and embracing foreign ways and customs as our own. One could even say that this sadness is the inevitable price we pay for freedom: If we had no choice about what norms to adopt, and knew that our children would live as our ancestors lived before us, the world would lose one source of woe but gain many more. This approach to defending cultural survival,
then, has some serious defects. Another line of argument harnesses the value of cultural survival to the more kindred value of cultural diversity gaining support from the undoubted attractiveness of the latter. On reflection, however, the ideal of cultural diversity seems scarcely less mysterious and ambiguous than the notion of cultural survival itself. The ambiguity in valuing diversity lies, on one level, in whether it means valuing people of distinct backgrounds or valuing the diversity of backgrounds itself. The first notion—that people ought to be respected as equals regardless of their ethnicity race, gender, and other distinguishing traits—is today a part of any plausible political philosophy But it hardly follows that we must value and preserve diversity itself, in the abstract; we have, I think, no reason to regret that the world does not contain twice as many cultures as it does. We might try to defend cultural diversity in the abstract by pointing out how much we benefit by its concrete existence. But this raises in turn another deep ambiguity—that between diversity of cultures and diversity within cultures. Exposure to a wide variety of lifeways is clearly of great moral value; it enables people to flourish in ways that conformity and sameness instead suppress. But there is no necessary link between the desirability of diversity within cultures and the demand that there be a wide variety of cultures themselves. More to the point, the latter demand can actually work against diversity.
Political measures designed to foster a culture’s survival must perforce ascribe a negative value to assimilation; they therefore end up penalizing those individuals within it who seek, for example, to borrow or adapt from other cultures. In so doing, advocates of cultural survival often provoke a stilling insistence on cultural purity and conformity; one need only think of the recurrent French crusades for linguistic purity to realize how quickly a drive for cultural preservation can begin to resemble a paternalistic—and, if imposed from outside, patronizing—intolerance. It is one of the sharpest ironies of the cultural survival movement that defending a diversity of cultures tends to repress the possibilities for diversity within cultures.
Humanity does not face extinction from disease Malcolm Gladwell, The New Republic, July 17 and 24, 1995, excerpted in Epidemics: Opposing Viewpoints, 1999, p. 31-32
Every infectious agent that has ever plagued humanity has had to adapt a specific strategy but every strategy carries a corresponding cost and this makes human counterattack possible. Malaria is vicious and deadly but it relies on mosquitoes to spread from one human to the next, which means that draining swamps and putting up mosquito netting can all hut halt endemic malaria. Smallpox is extraordinarily durable remaining infectious in the environment for years, but its very durability its essential rigidity is what makes it one of the easiest microbes to create a vaccine against. AIDS is almost invariably lethal because it attacks the body at its point of great vulnerability, that is, the immune system, but the fact that it targets blood cells is what makes it so relatively uninfectious. Viruses are not superhuman. I could go on, but the point is obvious. Any microbe capable of wiping us all out would have to be everything at once: as contagious as flue, as durable as the cold, as lethal as Ebola, as stealthy as HIV and so doggedly resistant to mutation that it would stay deadly over the course of a long epidemic. But viruses are not, well, superhuman. They cannot do everything at once. It is one of the ironies of the analysis of alarmists such as Preston that they are all too willing to point out the limitations of human beings, but they neglect to point out the limitations of microscopic life forms.
No impact – anything virulent enough to be a threat would destroy its host too quickly Joshua Lederberg, professor of genetics at Stanford University School of Medicine, 1999, Epidemic The World
of Infectious Disease, p. 13 The toll of the fourteenth-century plague, the "Black Death," was closer to one third. If the bugs' potential to develop adaptations that could kill us off were the whole story, we would not be here. However, with very rare exceptions, our microbial adversaries have a shared interest in our survival. Almost any pathogen comes to a dead end when we die; it first has to communicate itself to another host in order to survive. So historically, the really severe host- pathogen interactions have resulted in a wipeout of both host and pathogen. We humans are still here because, so far, the pathogens that have attacked us have willy-nilly had an interest in our survival. This is a very delicate balance, and it is easily disturbed, often in the wake of large-scale ecological upsets.
( ) US Econ is resilient-9/11, Katrina, oil prices, and tech balloon prove Christian Science Monitor “US economy chugs ahead despite auto and housing slumps” 12/11/2006
The economy's resilience has been a theme of several years' standing - one that predates the 9/11 attacks. The US output of goods and services has survived the damage of hurricanes Katrina and Rita, a run-up in oil prices, and the bursting of the high-tech balloon in early 2001. One reason for its capacity to take hits is its growing diversity. Indeed, last month's new jobs came in health and financial services, travel, government hiring, and professional services - all helping to offset a struggling manufacturing sector. Even in manufacturing, the picture is not as bleak as it could be, in part because vigorous economies abroad are buying American-made goods. "It takes a lot to get the economy down," says Ethan Harris, chief economist at Lehman Brothers in New York. "It does have some natural resilience in the face of shocks."
( ) No impact – micro-recessions check econ collapse David Leonhardt, 10-8-2005, New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/08/business/08fedex.html?ex=1136696400&en=f1fd879411772cc6&ei=5070 The recent birth of that small fleet, at a multimillion-dollar price tag, explains a lot about how the nation's economy has become so much more resilient. Think of it as the FedEx economy, a system that constantly recalibrates itself to cope with surprises. The United States has endured an almost biblical series of calamities in recent years - wars, hurricanes, financial scandals, soaring oil prices and rising interest rates - but the economy keeps chugging along at an annual growth rate of roughly 3 percent. It has been able to do so with the help of technology that allows businesses to react ever more quickly to changes. But with little notice, those reactions have also created a new feature of the business cycle: the microrecession. When one of them strikes, activity slows for a few weeks, sometimes in just certain sectors or regions, as companies adjust to a dip in demand. It has happened
much more often in the last few years than in earlier expansions, but growth has picked up each time, thanks in part to the adjustments that businesses have made. No company embodies this change, for better and worse, quite like FedEx. When Alan Greenspan, the Federal Reserve chairman, sees Frederick W. Smith, FedEx's chief executive, during halftime of Washington Redskins games, Mr. Greenspan uses the company's vast reach to check in on the economy. "He always asks, 'We still O.K.?' " said Mr. Smith, a part-owner of the team whose stadium suite abuts the one Mr. Greenspan uses. More formally, Federal Reserve staff members rely on FedEx and the nearly six million packages it delivers every day for realtime data that helps set interest rate policy. The company's around-the-world flights - fuller coming from Asia than going to it - are the shipping lanes of the global economy, bringing goods from Chinese factories to American shelves in just days. FedEx technology helps Procter & Gamble managers send more Crest to Wal-Mart whenever somebody buys a tube, and the managers can then watch the replacement move through the supply chain from their computer screens. All this - combined with financial innovations that allow companies to hedge their bets and, some say, the deregulation of pivotal transportation industries - has helped mute the economy's swings. The business cycle has certainly not been eliminated, as some dreamers suggested during the 1990's boom, but recessions really do seem to happen less often. There have been only two recessions in the last two decades. From the late
The more flexible an economy, the greater its ability to self-correct after inevitable, often unanticipated disturbances," Mr. Greenspan argued in a recent speech. "The impressive performance of the U.S. economy over the past couple of decades, despite shocks that in the past would have surely produced marked economic contraction, offers the clearest evidence of the benefits of increased market flexibility."
1960's through the early 80's, the economy endured four of them, including two of the deepest in decades, which left millions of people out of work. "
( ) Egypt is totally stable, there’s no risk of a coup – instability is empirically denied
Tore Kjeilen, Masters Religion @ Bergen, LexicOrient, 3-14-2006, “Egypt: Political Situation,” http://lexicorient.com/e.o/egypt_1.htm, accessed 3-14-2006 Egypt is politically stable, but there have been many examples of unrest during the last years. Egypt has no democracy, and there is no form of independent opposition. Still the country has good freedom of speech, and civil rights are in most cases well secured. At the present, the militant Islamists represent no threat to the Egyptian governments, as their violent acts have made them unpopular in all regions of Egypt.
( ) They don’t even have nuclear weapons FAS, “The Nuclear Potential of Individual Countries,” 4-6-1995, Fe. Of Am. Scientists,
http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/svr_nuke.htm#egypt There are no reports of the existence of nuclear weapons in Egypt. Egypt's possessing nuclear weapons is not expected in the foreseeable future. Egypt has subscribed to the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
AT: Endocrine Disruption
( ) No scientific proof endocrine disruptors affect human health – and there’s tons of altcauses GreenFacts.org, 12-8-2005, http://www.greenfacts.org/endocrine-disruptors/l-2/endocrine-disruptors-5.htm#1
Lack of scientifically sound data about the frequency, length and levels of exposure to endocrine disrupting chemicals (EDCs) is the weak link in the argument that they have harmful effects on human and animal health. Most of the information on EDC exposure has focused on the presence of persistent organic pollutants, such as PCBs, dioxins, DDT and other chlorine-containing pesticides, in Europe and North America. Exposures to other non-persistent EDCs have not been investigated in any depth. Another
shortcoming is the lack of information on exposure during critical periods of human or animal development. Moreover, the available information relates mostly to EDCs present in the environment – such as in the air, food and water – rather than to levels in blood and tissues in the body. Limited exceptions are human breast milk and fat tissue samples, which have been screened for potential EDCs, such as organochlorines. Generally, exposure
to potential EDCs occurs through contaminated food and groundwater, gas emissions from industrial sources and the burning of waste, and contaminants in consumer products. Despite a heavy investment of money, time and effort worldwide, information comparing human and wildlife EDC exposures in different countries is still sorely needed. Such information, obtained through field studies on wildlife and studies in human populations - epidemiological studies - on diseases or other observations like sperm quality or outcomes of pregnancy, is essential to establish causal relationships between exposure and response. Exposure information is also essential to produce a credible risk assessment of this problem.
( ) No studies show ED’s hurt human health GreenFacts.org, 12-8-2005, http://www.greenfacts.org/endocrine-disruptors/l-2/endocrine-disruptors-99.htm#1
Although it is known from laboratory and wildlife studies that certain environmental chemicals can disrupt normal endocrine function, evidence suggesting that human health has been affected remains weak. There are some signs that humans are vulnerable to endocrine disrupting chemicals (EDCs) at high levels of exposure, but effects from long-term and low-level EDC exposure have yet to be proven. This statement is not meant to downplay the potential effects of EDCs; rather, it highlights the need for more rigorous studies, especially those examining the possible effects from exposure to EDCs at sensitive stages in early life.
( ) More evidence GreenFacts.org, 12-8-2005, http://www.greenfacts.org/endocrine-disruptors/l-2/endocrine-disruptors-4.htm#0
At the moment there is no firm evidence that environmental EDCs cause health problems at low levels of exposure. However, the fact that high levels of chemicals can impair human health through interferences with the endocrine system, raises concerns
about the possible harmful effects of EDCs. Increases in the occurrence of certain diseases affecting the reproductive system in men and women have also raised the question of whether this could be due to exposure to EDCs. The
difficulty in finding conclusive evidence on what is happening globally is compounded when researchers try to compare and integrate data about trends in human health from different sources collected at different times, and often using different methods under varying conditions.
European war won’t escalate—the Cold War is over Robert A. Manning, senior fellow and director of Asian studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, 3/10/2000
We don't want to go any lower because we need these weapons for nuclear deterrence, according to State Department spokesman James Rubin. But how many nukes do we need for deterrence to be credible? China, which President Clinton has talked of as a "strategic partner," has a grand total of 20 - count them - strategic warheads that could hit the United States. Nuclear wannabes like North Korea, Iran, and Iraq would have only a handful if they did manage to succeed in joining the nuclear club. Russia, which has 6,000 strategic warheads, is no longer an adversary. During the Cold War, it was not hard to envision a conventional war in Europe escalating into nuclear conflict. But today it is difficult to spin a plausible scenario in which the United States and Russia escalate hostilities into a nuclear exchange. Russia has no Warsaw Pact, and not much of a conventional force to speak of. Yet U.S. nuclear planners still base their targeting plans on prospective Russian targets, though no one will say so.
War between European nations is impossible Charles W. Smitherman III, Doctoral studies on European Union-United States trade law and regulation, Faculty of Law, University of Oxford, Minnesota Journal of Global Trade , Summer, 2003
No person, no entity, no relationship remains exempt from time's paradigm, and nowhere could this model be more applicable on a global scale than in the relations of the United States and Europe. The Allied victory in World War II and the end of a near half-century of continent-wide war in Europe led to the initiation of arrangements aimed at averting the reoccurrence of the past through commonality and economic integration, erecting supportive pillars that would form the foundation of what would later become known as the European Union (EU). 3 The conquering of fascism spurred the rise of an equally threatening ideology on Europe's eastern borders, a communist agenda standing in stark contrast to the democratic, capitalistic ideals of post-war Europe and its friend and ally, the United States. 4 Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, in recognition of its common ideological commitment and shared foe, the United States provided incentives and encouragement to the nation-states of Europe to integrate their economies and foreign policies, binding themselves so tightly that war between the European nationstates would be all but impossible. At the same time, this integration provided the United States with an economic and political partner in the Cold War. 5
Heg is dominant—there are no challengers G. John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. America Abroad. Weary Titan or Poorly Led Superpower? 9/5/05.
http://houseoflabor.tpmcafe.com/story/2005/9/5/135627/8001. accessed 9/11/05 If America is overstretched, it is not because of declining material capabilities. Some argue that American power is likely to actually increase during the coming century, not decline. John Mearsheimer made this provocative argument at the recent American Political Science Association, arguing that China’s ascent will be cut short because of a declining and aging population. My point doesn’t rely on this argument. I simply maintain that the U.S. is not threatened by rising powers in 2005 as Britain was in 1905 – the U.S. is utterly more powerful in relative terms and its rivals further behind.
US heg is not going anywhere—expect it for at least another century Financial Times, 2/17, 2006 The American century shows no sign of ending MICHAEL LIND P.L
The rise and fall of great powers makes exciting history - all the more exciting if, as in the case of the Soviet Union, we can watch the spectacle unfold before our eyes. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that much of the discussion of the role of the US in the world is warped by the natural human desire for drama. The US is a declining power headed for collapse, says one side. No, says the other, America is the greatest empire since Rome at its peak. The truth is less dramatic but nonetheless fascinating: America's share of global economic power, and its potential share of global military power, have been roughly the same for a century and may remain so for another century or more.
India-Pakistan nuclear war doesn’t escalate The Hamilton Spectator, 5/24/2002
For those who do not live in the subcontinent, the most important fact is that the damage would be largely confined to region. The Cold War is over, the strategic understandings that once tied India and Pakistan to the
rival alliance systems have all been cancelled, and no outside powers would be drawn into the fighting. The detonation of a hundred or so relatively small nuclear weapons over India and Pakistan would not cause grave harm to the wider world from fallout. People over 40 have already lived through a period when the great
powers conducted hundreds of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, and they are mostly still here.
No risk of escalation Michael Quinlan. 05. “India-Pakistan Deterrrence Revisited.” Survival. London. Vol. 47, Iss. 3; pg 103.
Since the 1999 Kargil conflict and the 2002 confrontation political
relations between India and Pakistan have eased considerably, with leaders on both sides spearheading a drive to improve the climate and to do practical business together, including on Kashmir. Nuclear-weapon concepts and doctrines seem to have evolved prudently, though information is limited. The buildup of armouries, slower than some observers foresaw, does not at present threaten deterrent balance, though worries about ballistic missile defence may lie ahead.
Further cooperation on confidence-building measures, and dialogue on entrenching stability, remain important. Both countries, but especially Pakistan after the A.Q. Khan scandal, have global responsibilities in the non-proliferation context. Overall, the scene is more reassuring than five years ago, though improvement is not irreversible.
India and Pakistan will prevent accidental nuclear launches Pyotr Goncharov. 01/25/08. “Is Nuclear Pakistan Really Dangerous?” Russian News and Information Agency.
A Muslim state with nuclear weapons and extremists is also testing missiles? But this criticism is hardly justified. What should Pakistan do if it has nuclear warheads? It couldn't possibly carry them by aircraft. Needless to say, there are some risks for the world in the Pakistani nuclear potential, but they are not much more serious than those involved in the nuclear potentials of India or Israel, the United States or Russia. Everything depends on which capital looks at these risks. Islamabad has never concealed that its
nuclear weapons are meant exclusively for India, or, to be more precise, for deterring its aggression. India is fully aware of this and, judging by all, is not too worried. Moreover, since 2005, the sides have been developing their missile potentials without creating problems for each other. Early last year, Pakistan and India resumed the discussion of problems in their relations. Last February, they signed an agreement on preventing the risk of accidents with nuclear weapons. It is aimed at removing the threat of nuclear confrontation and the development of reliable nuclear arms control systems.
AT: Indian Economy
The Indian economy isn’t key to the global economy Andrew Walker, BBC economics correspondent. “India's economy packs more punch,” BBC News World Edition 9/21/2005 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4269858.stm
The IMF's economists think that India is punching below its weight and that the spill-over from a decade of strength is more modest than it could be. The IMF's assessment of the world economy asks - is India becoming an engine for global growth? The answer seems to be probably yes, but it is not quite there yet. The arithmetic tells us India is having an increasing impact on global growth numbers. It accounts for 5.8% of global production now, compared to 4.3% in 1990. A thriving techology industry is helping drive Indian development But its influence on the performance of other economies is limited because, the IMF says, it is still an economy that is relatively closed to the outside world. India has attracted a lot of attention for attracting foreign investment such as call centres. However, its international trade links are weak and it accounts for only 2.5% of global trade in goods and services. For China the figure is 10.5% and for Hong-Kong, Taiwan,
Singapore and South Korea - the so-called newly industrialised Asian economies - it is 9.3%. Hidden costs One reason is India's trade policy. Tariffs - which are taxes applied only to imported goods - protect Indian business from foreign competition. The average size of tariff for India is 22%, more than double the average in Asia's developing countries. The IMF also says that bureaucracy has hindered the development of the manufacturing industry, which could be a much bigger exporter. Foreign investment has also been hampered by restrictions. And investment - foreign and home grown - is often discouraged by inadequate transport and telecommunications networks.
( ) Indian economy is resilient – won’t collapse Hindustan Times, 2-27-2006, “Rising credit,” p ln
Reflecting the resilience in the economy, India comfortably absorbed the shock of a surge in global oil prices and appreciation of rupee vis-a-vis dollar even as it redeemed billions of dollars to NRIs with a marginal decline in foreign exchange reserves now placed at 140 billion dollars, the survey said. There was a sharp rise in current account deficit of balance of payments, which stood at $13 billion in April-September 2005-06, the survey said. Even with such a deficit, on BoP basis there was a net addition of worth $6.5 billion in April-September 2005-06, the survey said, adding this accretion was, however, offset to a large extent by valuation losses.
AT: Indonesian Collapse
( ) Indonesian instability and economic collapse is empirically denied Economy Watch, 3-14-2006, ‘Economy of Indonesia,’
http://www.economywatch.com/world_economy/indonesia/index.html, accessed 3-14-2006 There has been a massive mayhem faced by Indonesia in past few years. It faced the Asian financial crisis during 1997, then the fall of President Suharto after 32 years in office, the first free elections since the 1960s, the loss of East Timor, independence demands from restive provinces, bloody inter-ethnic and religious conflict and a devastating tsunami disaster. While globalization reaped the tremendous rewards of the opportunities into
Indonesia, it also made Indonesian economy a victim of its enormous risks. For almost two decades prior to the crisis of mid 1997, Indonesian economy had bounded ahead at unprecedented rates, reducing country's poverty levels from over 60% to less than 15% of the population by 1997. Then, in that year, as the Asian
financial crisis struck with crippling speed and impact, economy came cascading down and resulted in enormous social and political upheaval. Poverty and unemployment soared, children
left school in droves and the national debt reached new and staggering heights.
( ) Indonesia is stable George Wehrfritz and Joe Cochrane, 3-6-2006, “The Biggest Sleeper,” Newsweek, p ln
The same might be said for Yudhoyono's presidency. Inaugurated 17 months ago, he is Indonesia's first directly elected leader, and the first to show a firm hand after a series of sleepy bumblers since the fall of Indonesia's dictator Suharto, in 1998. Yudhoyono led a highly competent response to the devastating tsunami in December 2004, and then exhibited a statesman's touch in signing a visionary peace pact to end the longrunning rebellion in the province of Aceh. For the first time in years the ethnically and politically fractured archipelago is relatively stable; the Asia Foundation's Indonesia representative, Douglas Ramage, calls Indonesia "the sleeper democratization success story" in Asia. All this, however, has only brought the
country to the starting gate--positioned for a run to reclaim its rightful place as the third giant growth story in Asia.
Empirically Denied Steven A. Cook Ray Takeyh. and Suzanne Maloney fellows at the Council on Foreign Relations senior fellow at Saban Center, Brookings Institution. 6/28/2007
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/06/28/opinion/edtakeyh.php Finally, there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight. Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight.
Escalation is impossible—weak armies Matthew Yglesias The Atlantic “Containing Iraq” 9/12/2007
Kevin Drum tries to throw some water on the "Middle East in Flames" theory holding that American withdrawal from Iraq will lead not only to a short-term intensification of fighting in Iraq, but also to some kind of broader regional conflagration. Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, as usual sensible but several clicks to my right, also make this point briefly in Democracy: "Talk that Iraq’s troubles
will trigger a regional war is overblown; none of the half-dozen civil wars the Middle East has witnessed over the past half-century led to a regional conflagration." Also worth mentioning in this context is the basic point that the Iranian and Syrian militaries just aren't able to conduct meaningful offensive military operations. The Saudi, Kuwait, and Jordanian militaries are even worse. The IDF has plenty of Arabs to fight closer to home. What you're looking at, realistically, is that our allies in Kurdistan might provide safe harbor to PKK guerillas, thus prompting our allies in Turkey to mount some cross-border military strikes against the PKK or possibly retaliatory ones against other Kurdish targets. This is a real problem, but it's obviously
not a problem that's mitigated by having the US Army try to act as the Baghdad Police Department or sending US Marines to wander around the desert hunting a possibly mythical terrorist organization.
No regional escalation—empirically denied Kevin Drum Washington Monthly “The Chaos Hawks” 9/9/2007
Having admitted, however, that the odds of a military success in Iraq are almost impossibly long, Chaos
Hawks nonetheless insist that the U.S. military needs to stay in Iraq for the foreseeable future. Why? Because if we leave the entire Middle East will become a bloodbath. Sunni and Shiite will engage in mutual genocide, oil fields will go up in flames, fundamentalist parties will take over, and al-Qaeda will have a safe haven bigger than the entire continent of Europe. Needless to say, this is nonsense. Israel has fought war after war in the Middle East. Result: no regional conflagration. Iran and Iraq fought one of the bloodiest wars of the second half the 20th century. Result: no regional conflagration. The Soviets fought in Afghanistan and then withdrew. No regional conflagration. The U.S. fought the Gulf War and then left. No regional conflagration. Algeria fought an internal civil war for a decade. No regional conflagration.
AT: Japan Rearm
Even without the alliance Japan would not rearm. Anthony DiFilippo, Prof. Sociology at Lincoln University, 2002, The Challenges of the U.S.-Japan Military
Arrangement: Competing Security Transitions in a Changing International Environment, pg. 174-175 Some analysts speculate that without the security alliance with the United States, Japan may very well be inclined to abandon its nuclear allergy and develop nuclear weapons 47 What analysts minimize is the manifestly strong antinuclear sentiment that pervades Japan. In addition to the fact that antimilitary norms are easily ascertainable in Japan, the Japanese people overwhelmingly believe that their country should not possess nuclear weapons. While
it is true that the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki show an especially heightened disdain for the existence of nuclear weapons and nuclear testing, including the subcritical nuclear testing still performed by the United States and Russia,48 strong
antinuclear sentiment continues to suffuse the Japanese culture.49 As we have seen, this strong antinuclear sentiment quickly became evident when the public overwhelmingly rejected the
suggestion made by Shingo Nishimura, parliamentary vice minister for defense, when he declared in October 1999 that Japan should consider developing nuclear weapons. Japanese outrage at Nishimura's comment was so intense that he had little choice but to resign from the Obuchi government.50 Despite
substantial economic development over the years and even the realist prediction that this growth would persuade it to become a military power that possesses nuclear weapons,51 Japan has thus far largely retained its aversion to excessive militarism, its strong antinuclear sentiment, and its support for the United Nations. The Japanese public wants to see the United Nations become a strong
and viable force in international security. Both the Japanese public and Tokyo have also demonstrated a continuing interest in Japan's becoming a permanent member of the UN security council. There is increasing frustration in Japan relating to the disparity between Japan's financial support of the United Nations and the amount of influence that it has within this institution.
Even without the alliance Japan would not rearm- the culture is too anti-militaristic. Anthony DiFilippo, Prof. Sociology at Lincoln University, 2002, The Challenges of the U.S.-Japan Military
Arrangement: Competing Security Transitions in a Changing International Environment, pg. 103 The problem here is not with the conclusion, but rather that it is drawn from faulty assumptions. To assume that the dissolution of the existing U.S.-Japan security alliance can lead only to Japanese rearmament is faulty, for there is clearly another viable alternative. Since the end of the Pacific War Japan has maintained a culture of antimilitarism. Specifically, in addition to renouncing war, Japan has repeatedly stressed the need for the realization of global disarmament, the total elimination of all nuclear weapons, and the strengthening of the United Nations. Because the revisionist
perspective completely ignores the emergence of multilateral security systems, both global and regional, its focus is entirely on shifting military responsibility to Japan to replace the end of the security alliance with the United States.
NATO is resilient Beth Jones, Assistant Sec. of State, 3-13-2003, “US Official says ties to Europe,”
http://www.useu.be/TransAtlantic/Mar1303JonesUSEU.html For over fifty years, the United States and its European Allies have been joined in a common cause through NATO. We have been working hard since the September 11th attacks to transform the Alliance to address these new security threats. The Summit meeting of heads of state and government in Prague last November
represented an historic milestone in this process. Mr. Chairman, I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate you on your chairmanship of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and to thank you for your advocacy of U.S. interests in that organization. I also want to applaud your deep engagement at Prague and your continuing support for NATO's transformation. At the Prague Summit, NATO members agreed on an ambitious program proposed by the U.S. to develop "New Capabilities, New Members and New Relationships" to transform the Alliance. Our European Allies agreed to improve their military capabilities, through resource pooling and specialization, helping NATO to undertake collective action against the new threats that we face around the globe. The Allies also endorsed a U.S. proposal to establish a NATO Response Force, which will give the Alliance a cutting-edge land, air and sea capability. We agreed to streamline the NATO command structure to make it more lean, efficient and responsive to today's threats. Work on implementing our new capabilities initiative is well underway. Our decision to invite seven new members to join the Alliance will extend the zone of NATO security and stability from the Baltic to the Black Sea, helping to further secure a Europe that is whole, free and at peace. We are pleased that each of the seven invitees has already made significant military contributions to the war on terrorism and we will look to them to provide specialized niche capabilities to the Alliance in the future. Prague also celebrated the establishment of a new relationship between NATO and Russia. NATO states and Russia are working together in the NATO-Russia Council as equal partners on selected projects aimed at expanding and deepening our mutual cooperation. Current projects are focused on peacekeeping, civil emergency planning, non-proliferation and missile defense. I am pleased to report that so far the NATO-Russia Council has been relatively successful. Russian participation has been constructive and cooperative. As this process continues, we will seek ways to broaden and deepen the NATO-Russia relationship. The NATO-Ukraine Action Plan agreed at Prague provides a roadmap which, if implemented by Ukraine, will draw Ukraine closer to the Alliance and bolster internal reforms. It is a source of some regret that last month some Allies chose, at least initially, to confuse the obligation of the Alliance to provide purely defensive assistance to Turkey with the broader debate over the question of what we should be doing about Iraq in the UN and elsewhere.
This is not the first time NATO has experienced disagreement on a difficult and important issue. One only has to think back to the debate over the INF deployment in the 1980s. The fact is that NATO remains the fundamental means by which the Allies guarantee their common security and the indispensable defense link that binds North America to Europe.
NATO is politically and strategically useless and will soon be replaced Jonathan Strong, editor of the Family Security Foundation Inc., 7-30-2007, EXCLUSIVE: BEYOND NATO: A
NEW ALLIANCE FOR A NEW THREAT A new alliance may not need a formal command structure, but it would not hurt to have one to proclaim a body of collective defense for freedom and democracy to the world. It would also put other “fair weather” allies, who are less than cooperative, on notice that their voice will not be heard, or can at least be ignored, if obstruction is chosen over cooperation. Think Germany and France at the moment. Beyond this, Europe seems to be dying demographically and culturally as Islamic immigration and falling birth rates continue to change the face of Europe. The time to act is now. It is always better to act sooner than later in the face of terrorism because of its invisible nature, which does not heed national boundaries, treaties, or conventions. A new threat has resulted in the need for a new security structure. The threat of terrorists with WMDs forces us to ignore fair-weather friends and allies of convenience. We require allies who are willing to act preemptively and swiftly to confront this threat. While NATO had its place in the past and can continue to be a useful structure in Europe, it is not an adequate organization for dealing with the threat of terrorism and the states that sponsor it.
AT: North Korea
There won’t be a war over North Korea and even if there is it won’t escalate Korea Times, 1/3/2003
The probability of war is very low. Nobody wants war. It's about muscle flexing.''Umbarger said North Korea has done the same thing before. ''It's really not new news. This is not terribly different from how they have negotiated with the U.S. and U.N. in the past.''The
Arjun Divecha, who manages the $1 billion GMO Emerging Markets fund said, ''I don't think it's that serious, actually. threat today is similar to the situation faced in 1994, said John Chambers, chairman of the Sovereign Rating Committee at Standard & Poor's. ''We don't think there will be war and we don't think North Korea will collapse,'' Chambers said. ''North Korea will be a nuclear power and its neighbors will have to live with it. Just as it is with Pakistan.''Umbarger compared the current situation to political tensions before the Brazilian elections in October last year, but said T. Rowe Price will wait for the situation to subside before considering more investments. Meanwhile, foreign brokerage houses in Seoul also believed
the nuclear situation will not escalate to an all-out war with North Korea.
The US would instantly win a war with North Korea – no escalation The Moscow Times, R. James Woolsey, former CIA director and Thomas McInerney retired Air Force Lieutenant General. 10/5/03
U.S. and South Korean forces have spent nearly half a century preparing to fight and win such a war. We should not be intimidated by North Korea's much-discussed artillery. Around half of North Korea's 11,000-plus artillery pieces, some of them in caves, are in position to fire on Seoul. But all are vulnerable to stealth and precision weapons -- e.g., caves can be sealed by accurate munitions. Massive air power is the key to being able both to destroy
Yongbyon and to protect South Korea from attack by missile or artillery. There is a significant number of hardened air bases available in South Korea and the South Koreans have an excellent air force of approximately 550 modern tactical aircraft. The United States should begin planning immediately to deploy the Patriot tactical ballistic missile defense system plus Aegis ships to South Korea and Japan, and also to reinforce our tactical air forces by moving in several air wings and aircraft carrier battle groups, together with the all-important surveillance aircraft and drones. The goal of the planning should be to be prepared on short notice both to destroy the nuclear capabilities at Yongbyon and other key North Korean facilities and to protect South Korea against attack by destroying North Korean artillery and missile sites. Our stealth aircraft, equipped with precision bombs, and cruise missiles will be crucial -- these weapons can be tailored to incinerate the WMD and minimize radiation leakage. The key point is that the base infrastructure available in the region and the accessibility of North Korea from the sea should make it possible to generate around 4,000 sorties a day compared to the 800 a day that were so effective in Iraq. When one contemplates that the vast majority of these sorties would use precision munitions, and that surveillance aircraft
the use of air power would be swifter and more devastating than it was in Iraq. North Korea's geriatric air defenses, both fighter aircraft and missiles, would not last long. As the Iraqis understood when facing U.S. air power, if you fly, you die. Marine forces deployed off both
would permit immediate targeting of artillery pieces and ballistic missile launch sites, we believe coasts of North Korea could put both Pyongyang and Wonson at risk of rapid seizure, particularly given the fact that most of North Korea's armed forces are situated along the DMZ. With more than 20 of the Army's 33 combat brigades now committed it would be necessary to call up additional Reserve and National Guard units. However, the U.S. forces that would have the greatest immediate effect are Expeditionary Air Forces and Carrier Battle Groups, most of which have now been removed from Iraq. The South Korean Army is well equipped to handle a counteroffensive into North Korea with help from perhaps two additional U.S. Army divisions, together with the above-mentioned Marine Expeditionary Force and dominant air power.
We judge that the United States and South Korea could defeat North Korea decisively in 30 to 60 days with such a strategy. Importantly, there is "no doubt on the outcome" as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Meyers, said to the Senate at his reconfirmation hearing on July 26.
AT: Nuclear Meltdowns
Three Mile Island proves Impacts are minimal David R. Francis Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor, 2004 (DS) “After nuclear's meltdown, a
cautious revival” http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0329/p12s02-usec.html It was the near-disaster that scared a nation. A quarter century ago this week, a nuclear reactor at Three Mile Island underwent a partial meltdown. No one was killed and only a small amount of radioactivity escaped. But since that time, no American utility has dared to build a brand new nuclear power plant. But the accident near Middletown, Pa., has faded from public memory. And power blackouts, rising naturalgas prices, and concerns about greenhouse gases have changed public attitudes. Here and there, the nuclear industry is beginning to stir.
New Regulations Prevent potential disasters before the start David R. Francis Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor, 2004 (DS) “After nuclear's meltdown, a
cautious revival” http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0329/p12s02-usec.html Could a Three Mile Island happen again? The NRC blames that accident on "a combination of personnel error, design deficiencies, and component failures." The event, adds an NRC fact sheet, led to "permanent and sweeping changes in how NRC regulates its licensees - which, in turn, has reduced the risk to public health and safety." David Lockbaum, an engineer at the Union of Concerned Scientists, agrees that the NRC has become much tougher, even before 9/11 raised the specter of terrorists flying a jet into a nuclear power plant. Instead of inspecting nuclear plants every two years for four safety categories, the NRC since April 2000 has been looking them over every three months for 26 or so safety factors. "When performance starts to fall, it should show up sooner," says Mr. Lockbaum, a longtime campaigner for reducing the risks of nuclear power.
AT: Nuclear War
Nuclear war is survivable – 5 reasons JR Nyquist, Expert in IR, Specializing in Cold War Studies and Nuclear Survivability, Writer WorldNetDaily, 520-1999, “Is nuclear war survivable,” http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/printerfriendly.asp?ARTICLE_ID=19722
I patiently reply to these correspondents that nuclear war would not be the end of the world. I then point to studies showing that "nuclear winter" has no scientific basis, that fallout from a nuclear war would not kill all life on earth. Surprisingly, few of my correspondents are convinced. They prefer apocalyptic myths created by pop scientists, movie producers and journalists. If Dr. Carl Sagan once said "nuclear winter" would follow a nuclear war, then it must be true. If radiation wipes out mankind in a movie, then that's what we can expect in real life. But Carl Sagan was wrong about nuclear winter. And the movie "On the Beach" misled American filmgoers about the effects of fallout. It is time, once and for all, to lay these myths to rest. Nuclear war would not bring about the end of the world, though it would be horribly destructive. The truth is, many prominent physicists have condemned the nuclear
winter hypothesis. Nobel laureate Freeman Dyson once said of nuclear winter research, "It's an absolutely atrocious piece of science, but I quite despair of setting the public record straight." Professor Michael McElroy, a Harvard physics professor, also criticized the nuclear winter hypothesis. McElroy said that nuclear winter researchers "stacked the deck" in their study, which was titled "Nuclear Winter: Global Consequences of Multiple
Nuclear Explosions" (Science, December 1983). Nuclear winter is the theory that the mass use of nuclear weapons would create enough smoke and dust to blot out the sun, causing a catastrophic drop in global temperatures. According to Carl Sagan, in this situation the earth would freeze. No crops could be grown. Humanity would die of cold and starvation. In truth, natural disasters have frequently produced smoke and dust far greater than those expected from a nuclear war. In 1883 Krakatoa exploded with a blast equivalent to 10,000 one-megaton bombs, a detonation greater than the combined nuclear arsenals of planet earth. The Krakatoa explosion had negligible weather effects. Even more disastrous, going back many thousands of years, a meteor struck Quebec with the force of 17.5 million one-megaton bombs, creating a crater 63 kilometers in diameter. But the world did not freeze. Life on earth was not extinguished. Consider the views of Professor George Rathjens of MIT, a known antinuclear activist, who said, "Nuclear winter is the worst example of misrepresentation of science to the public in my memory." Also consider Professor Russell Seitz, at Harvard University's Center for International Affairs, who says that the nuclear winter hypothesis has been discredited. Two researchers, Starley Thompson and Stephen Schneider, debunked the nuclear winter hypothesis in the summer 1986 issue of Foreign Affairs. Thompson and Schneider stated: "the global
apocalyptic conclusions of the initial nuclear winter hypothesis can now be relegated to a vanishingly low level of probability."
Fallout args are wrong – 6 reasons JR Nyquist, Expert in IR, Specializing in Cold War Studies and Nuclear Survivability, Writer WorldNetDaily, 520-1999, “Is nuclear war survivable,” http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/printerfriendly.asp?ARTICLE_ID=19722 OK, so nuclear winter isn't going to happen. What about nuclear fallout? Wouldn't the radiation from a nuclear war contaminate the whole earth, killing everyone? The short answer is: absolutely not. Nuclear fallout is a problem, but we should not exaggerate its effects. As it happens, there are two types of fallout produced by nuclear detonations. These are: 1) delayed fallout; and 2) short-term fallout. According to researcher Peter V. Pry, "Delayed fallout will not, contrary to popular belief, gradually kill billions of people everywhere in the world." Of course, delayed fallout would increase the number of people dying of lymphatic cancer, leukemia, and cancer of the thyroid. "However," says Pry, "these deaths would probably be far fewer than deaths now resulting from ... smoking, or from automobile accidents." The real hazard in a nuclear war is the short-term fallout. This is a type of fallout created when a nuclear weapon is detonated at ground level. This type of fallout could kill millions of people, depending on the targeting strategy of the attacking country. But short-term fallout rapidly subsides to safe levels in 13 to 18 days. It is not permanent. People who live outside of the affected areas will be fine. Those in affected areas can survive if they have access to underground shelters. In some areas, staying indoors may even suffice. Contrary to popular misconception, there were no documented deaths from short-term or delayed fallout at either Hiroshima or Nagasaki. These blasts were low airbursts, which produced minimal fallout effects. Today's thermonuclear weapons are even "cleaner." If used in airburst mode, these weapons would produce few (if any) fallout casualties.
AT: Oil Peak
Geological claims of oil scarcity have been disproven for 40 years Leonardo Maugeri, ENI SPA's senior vice-president of corporate strategies and international relations, senior fellow at the World
Economic Laboratory at MIT, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Association, and a member of the executive council of the Center for Social Investment Studies, degree in petroleum economics and a PhD in international political economy,, 12/15/2003,
The prophets of "oil exhaustion," however, don't want to deal with these
Oil & Gas Journal realities, which are basically moved by economics and technology, not by geology. Thus it is comprehensible why a school of geological thought -- drawing on the observations made by geologist M. King Hubbert in the 1950s -- periodically "cries wolf." The problem with this school is that for 40 years it's been predicting that oil reserves will be exhausted within a few years and then has to stay the final curtain once its predictions appear to be wrong. But no one remembers past mistakes, so its credibility has not been tarnished.
Unconventional hydrocarbons offer a secure, long-term supply Bunger, Crawford, and Johnson, 8/9/2004, James Bunger, BS in chemistry, a PhD in fuels engineering, and has authored 40 technical papers and 11
patents., principal investigator for value-enhancement processing of US and Estonian kerogen oils, Peter Crawford, consults in energy technology, policy, and strategic communications, senior manager for Intek Inc., and Harry Johnson, former director of the US Department of Energy's Bartlesville Energy Technology Center, member of the Society of Petroleum Engineers, and has authored over 40 technical papers., Oil & Gas Journal
Recent discussions regarding the advent of a peak in global crude oil production generally fail to address the potential of America's rich, massive oil shale resources to augment petroleum supplies. While hope is often expressed for continued
reserves growth and a smooth transition to future sources of energy, a realistic assessment of the full range of alternatives will reveal that only unconventional hydrocarbon
oil shale, tar sand, extra-heavy oil, and possibly coal liquids, are large enough to supplement petroleum supply with meaningful quantities of liquid fuels in the long term. Interestingly, most of the world's known unconventional hydrocarbon resources are found in the Western Hemisphere -- in the US, Canada, and Latin America -- which geopolitically is relatively secure. Increased production from unconventional Western
Hemisphere hydrocarbon resources could substantially shift the center of gravity of America's petroleum supply. Canada and Latin America already supply at least half of current US oil imports. About one quarter, or 2.5 million b/d, is imported from Persian Gulf countries, with the remainder from numerous other sources.
Demographic transitions are slowing population growth worldwide Xinhua General News Service, 7/10/2004
With more and more people preferring a small family, the world fertility is expected to continue declining and the total population will likely see some sort of stability in 40 years, a senior UN population official predicted. In a recent interview with Xinhua, UN Population Division Director Joseph Chamie said that over the last 50 years, the world has made progress in slowing the population growth, raising life expectancy, lowering mortality and improving quality of human life, among other things. "Look back at the past 50 years, there have been successful achievements. I'm cautiously optimistic that things are improving, " he said. He noted that the last century, especially the second half, had seen a "revolutionary, unprecedented" demographic change around the world, with the total population more than triple, from 1.6 billion in 1900 to 6.1 billion in 2000. The world population currently stands at an estimated 6.4 billion and is growing annually at 1.2 percent, much lower than the record high of 2 percent in the late 1960s, Chamie said. The number of children per woman came down from an average of five in the 1950s to less than three currently, and the annual net increase of the population fell to 77 million in 2004 from the peak of 87 million recorded in 1987. The annual population increase has been falling since the late 1980s and is expected to slide to some 29 million by 2050, when the globe will see some kind of population stabilization, he continued. Slower population growth is mainly attributed to lower fertility. "Family size is getting smaller, everybody wants fewer children," he said. According to Chamie, the world is experiencing a major demographic transition, from high birth rate and high death rate to low birth rate and low death rate. When the fertility decreases to the replacement level of 2, the birth rate and the death rate will be in harmony. Currently, there are 60 countries whose fertility is at or below that level, he said, hailing this phenomenon as a major achievement in the past decade.
Population growth rate is declining Jeffrey Kluger and Andrea Dorfman, “The Challenges We Face”, TIME, 8/26, 2002
Efforts to provide greater access to family planning and health care have proved effective. Though women in the poorest countries still have the most children, their collective fertility rate is 50% lower than it was in 1969 and A is expected to decline more by 2050. Other programs targeted at women include basic education and job training. Educated mothers not only have a stepladder out of poverty, but they also choose to have fewer babies. Rapid development will require good health care for • the young since there are more than I billion people ages 15 to 24. Getting programs in place to keep this youth bubble healthy could make it the most productive generation ever conceived. Says Thoraya Obaid, executive director of the U.N. Population Fund: “It’s a window of opportunity to build the economy and prepare for the future.” Solving Poverty is Key to Solving the Environment
Population growth will slow to less than 1% Richard A. Easterlin, Professor of Economics at USC. Growth Triumphant, 1996, p.150
Obstacles A favorite obstacle for many is population growth—if not too much, then too little. As I have shown, however, the population explosion is a transient condition and is even now waning (chaps. 7 and 8). Rates of childbearing in many developing countries are declining, and population growth rates of less than 1 percent per year are projected to prevail only three decades from now. As for the economic impact of the projected low, or even negative, rates of population growth in developed countries and associated population aging, there is little basis in historical experience for supposing that these developments will retard economic growth in the future (chap. 9).
Your Ozone Impacts are empirically denied, it’s all hype founded on flawed evidence recorded in the 80’s and the 90’s Ben Lieberman, a senior policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation, September 19, 2007, Washington Times, p
ln The international treaty to protect the ozone layer turns 20 this year. But is there really much reason to celebrate? Environmentalists have made many apocalyptic predictions over the last several decades. Virtually none has come to pass. Yet each time, the greens and their political allies proclaim victory, arguing their preventive prescriptions averted disaster. Such is the case with the 1987 Montreal Protocol On Substances That Deplete The Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol). The lurid predictions of ozone depletioninduced skin cancer epidemics, ecosystem destruction and others haven't come true, for which Montreal Protocol proponents congratulate themselves. But in retrospect, the evidence shows ozone depletion was an exaggerated threat in the first place. As the treaty parties return to Montreal for their 20th anniversary meeting it should be cause for reflection, not celebration, especially for those who hope to repeat this "success story" in the context of global warming. The treaty came about over legitimate but overstated concerns that chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs, a then-widely used class of refrigerants) and other compounds were rising to the stratosphere and destroying ozone molecules. These molecules, collectively known as the ozone layer, shield the Earth from excessive ultraviolet-B radiation (UVB) from the sun. The Montreal Protocol's provisions were tightened in 1990 and again in 1992, culminating with a CFC ban in most developed nations by 1996. So what do we know now? As far as ozone depletion is concerned, the thinning of the ozone layer that occurred throughout the 1980s apparently stopped in the early 1990s, too soon to credit the Montreal Protocol. A 1998 World Meteorological Organization (WMO) report said: "Since 1991, the linear [downward] trend observed during the 1980s has not continued, but rather total column ozone has been almost constant." However, the same report noted that the stratospheric concentrations of the offending compounds were still increasing through 1998. This lends credence to the skeptical view, widely derided at the time of the Montreal Protocol, that natural variations better explain the fluctuations in the global ozone layer. More importantly, the feared increase in ground level UVB radiation has also failed to materialize. Keep in mind that ozone depletion, in and of itself, doesn't really harm human health or the environment. It was the concern that an eroded ozone layer will allow more of the sun's damaging UVB rays to reach the Earth that led to the Montreal Protocol. But WMO concedes no statistically significant long-term trends have been detected, noting earlier this year that "outside the polar regions, ozone depletion has been relatively small, hence, in many places, increases in UV due to this depletion are difficult to separate from the increases caused by other factors, such as changes in cloud and aerosol." In short, the impact of ozone depletion on UVB over populated regions is so small it's hard to detect. Needless to say, if UVB hasn't gone up, then the fears of increased UVBinduced harm are unfounded. Indeed, the much-hyped acceleration in skin cancer rates hasn't been documented. U.S. National Cancer Institute statistics show malignant melanoma incidence and mortality, which had been undergoing a long-term increase that predates ozone depletion, has actually been leveling off during the putative ozone crisis. Further, no ecosystem or species was ever shown to be seriously harmed by ozone depletion. This is true even in Antarctica, where the largest seasonal ozone losses, the so-called Antarctic ozone hole, occur annually. Also forgotten is a long list of truly ridiculous claims, such as the one from Al Gore's 1992 book "Earth in the Balance" that, thanks to the Antarctic ozone hole, "hunters now report finding blind rabbits; fisherman catch blind salmon." Overall, the Montreal Protocol isn't making these bad consequences go away - they were never occurring in the first place.
AT: Pakistani Coup
No risk of loose nukes in Pakistan The Independent, Colin Brown Deputy Political Editor, Pakistan's nuclear arsenal in safe hands, Brown told, November 9, 2007, lexis
The military is the most functional part of the regime," said one senior government source. "No one is suggesting there is any particular concern." The Foreign Secretary, David Miliband said: "We have had no evidence of any threats or change in the security of the nuclear weapons that Pakistan has." US officials also said there was no new intelligence to suggest Pakistan's tight controls on its nuclear facilities were in any danger of being compromised. Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is under the operational control of the military's Strategic Plans Division, led by Lt-Gen Khalid Kidwai, an officer with close ties to American military officials. Daniel Markey, a former State Department official who focused on US policy in south Asia, told the Los Angeles Times: "If we started to see things deteriorate, there would be an urgent and immediate effort to reach out to him. If there's a safe box within Pakistan's army, this is it."
Pakistani nuclear arsenal is safe AFP, 01/24/08. “Pakistan Army Chief Rejects World Nuclear Fears.” Islamabad.
His statement closely follows the line of Musharraf's comments on Pakistan's nuclear weapons during a week-long tour of European countries. Musharraf said Tuesday that militants could only gain access to Pakistan's nuclear arsenal if AlQaeda or the Taliban "defeated the Pakistani army entirely" or if Islamist groups won the country's general elections next month. "There is a zero percent chance of either one of them," Musharraf said in Paris. "They (the weapons) cannot fall into any wrong hands." Friday's missile test-launch came at the end of an annual training session by the army's strategic force command. The locally developed Shaheen-1 missile, which has a range of 700 kilometres (440 miles) and is capable of carrying nuclear weapons, is routinely fired during training exercises by the troops. Pakistan and its regional rival India make frequent missile test launches. The two countries have fought three wars since 1947 and carried out tit-for-tat nuclear test detonations in 1998. Kiyani said that Pakistan "did not have any aggressive designs against anyone and Pakistan's
nuclear capability was solely for the purpose of deterring all types of aggression."
Coup can’t cause loose nukes – Pakistan’s weapons are disassembled Guarav Kampani, Monterey Institute of International Studies’ CNS research associate, September 28, 2001,
online: http://cns.miis.edu/research/wtc01/spna.htm, accessed 1-23-03 Could a rogue military commander or military unit with sympathies to the Taliban or opposed to the Pakistani government's cooperation with the United States, seize a cache of nuclear warheads? Although a successful seizure is possible in theory, it would be extremely difficult to achieve in practice. The first difficulty has to do with the nature and
configuration of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Although Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in May 1998 and declared itself a nuclear weapon state, it is highly unlikely that Islamabad maintains a nuclear force that is operational or on a hair-trigger alert. Statements made by senior Pakistani civilian and military officials suggest that Islamabad's nuclear force probably remains unconstituted. The term unconstituted essentially means that in times of peace the fissionable cores of the nuclear warheads are maintained separately from their non-nuclear assemblies. As a corollary to the above, nuclear warheads are not mated with their delivery systems. Pakistan probably maintains its arsenal in an unconstituted state for doctrinal and safety reasons. At a doctrinal level, the military has internalized the fundamental lesson of the nuclear revolution that nuclear weapons best serve a political purpose. Nuclear weapons are more useful for their symbolic value in deterring enemies than for achieving any militarily useful objective on the battlefield. Hence Pakistan's nuclear force is designed to deter the threat of a high-intensity conventional war against India. Although no Pakistani government has publicly articulated its nuclear use doctrine, some retired senior Pakistani officials have suggested that nuclear escalation by Islamabad would be most likely in the event Pakistan's national survival were threatened. Since the probability of a highintensity conventional war in South Asia remains low, both India and Pakistan maintain their nuclear arsenals in what analysts commonly characterize as a "recessed" state. The unconstituted nature of the arsenal not only minimizes the risks of nuclear weapons use through inadvertence, accident, or a command and control failure, but it also forecloses the possibility of the seizure of an assembled weapon or cache of weapons by a rogue military commander or unit. Even if a military commander or his unit were to successfully seize all the components of a nuclear warhead, they would require considerable technical assistance from other units within the military and the civilian nuclear establishment to reconstitute them. This would also be the case if an attempt were made to deploy the fissile cores or fissile material from nuclear facilities in the form of radiological weapons.
AT: Prolif Bad
Prolif will be slow Kenneth Waltz, Professor of Political Science at UC Berkeley, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, v1 n1, Winter/Spring 2000, http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/gjia/gjia_winspr00f.html, accessed 8/11/02
It is now estimated that about twenty–five countries are in a position to make nuclear weapons rather quickly. Most countries that could have acquired nuclear military capability have refrained from doing so. Most countries do not need them. Consider Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa. Argentina and Brazil were in the process of moving toward nuclear military capability, and both decided against it–wisely I believe–because neither country needs nuclear weapons. South Africa had about half a dozen warheads and decided to destroy them. You have to have an adversary against whom you think you might have to threaten retaliation, but most countries are not in this position. Germany does not face any security threats–certainly not any in which a nuclear force would be relevant. I would expect the pattern of the past to be the same as the pattern in the future, in which one or two states per decade gradually develop nuclear weapons.
Nuclear proliferation won’t happen—it’s not worth the cost Henning Riecke, Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Assistant Professor International Relations at Schiller International University, 2000, Preventing the Use of Weapons of Mass
Destruction, p. 46 Nuclear weapons proliferation has slowed down. Some possible candidates for proliferation have been either forced to destroy their program, like Iraq, or have dropped the nuclear option. This is a sign, that the non-use of nuclear weapons, the ‘nuclear taboo’ is gaining ground. This finding is in contradiction to the signal sketched out above, that the use of atomic weapons in certain cases has a legitimate character. The high costs in each case, however, might weigh heavier than the idea of appropriateness. Chemical and biological weapons programs are still pursued by a small number of states that remain unimpressed by the NATO campaign. They show no sign of entering the relevant non-proliferation regimes (or, as in the case of Iran, they do with obvious qualification).
( ) Iraq and Afghanistan hurt readiness Robert Burns, AP Military, 1-24-2006, “Army stretched,” http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2006/01/24/national/w133017S88.DTL Stretched by frequent troop rotations to Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army has become a "thin green line" that could snap unless relief comes soon, according to a study for the Pentagon. Andrew Krepinevich, a retired Army officer who wrote the report under a Pentagon contract, concluded that the Army cannot sustain the pace of troop deployments to Iraq long enough to break the back of the insurgency. He also suggested that the Pentagon's
decision, announced in December, to begin reducing the force in Iraq this year was driven in part by a realization that the Army was overextended. As evidence, Krepinevich points
to the Army's 2005 recruiting slump — missing its recruiting goal for the first time since 1999 — and its
decision to offer much bigger enlistment bonuses and other incentives. "You really begin to wonder just how much stress and strain there is on the Army, how much longer it can continue," he said in an interview. He added that the Army is still a highly effective fighting force and is implementing a plan that will expand the number of combat brigades available for rotations to Iraq and Afghanistan. The 136-page report represents a more sobering picture of the Army's condition than military officials offer in public. While not released publicly, a copy of the report was provided in response to an Associated Press inquiry. Illustrating his level of concern about strain on the Army, Krepinevich titled one of his
the Army is "in a race against time" to adjust to the demands of war "or risk `breaking' the force in the form of a catastrophic decline" in recruitment and re-enlistment.
report's chapters, "The Thin Green Line." He wrote that
( ) Base encroachment kills readiness Philip W. Grone, Dep. Under-Sec Defense, 3-2-2006, FDCH, p ln
The sustainability of military installations, particularly testing and training ranges, is critically important to readiness. The often accelerating pace of development in the vicinity of our installations and ranges poses ongoing challenges and leads to secondary effects including loss of habitat for endangered species; more noise complaints from new neighbors; diminished usable airspace due to new structures or increased civil aviation; and a compromised ability to test and train with the frequency resources needed in time of war. Exacerbating the
encroachment challenge, the demands of the military mission are not static in nature and a number of factors are changing the way the Department will need to test and train in the future. Upcoming mission adjustments and relocations associated with the recent BRAC decisions and the return of large numbers of troops and their families to bases in the U.S. as a part of global rebasing will require expanded training opportunities and place a growing demand on receiving installations. And the integration of training opportunities necessary to satisfy joint mission requirements, combined with the increasing testing and training battlespace needs of new weapons systems and evolving tactics associated with force
encroachment remains a powerful challenge to military readiness, and requires a comprehensive and continuing response.
transformation, point to a military need for more, rather than less range space. The confluence of these competing trends makes it clear that
( ) Part shortages hurt readiness Phillip Carter, Former Army officer, 4-23-2004, “Hollow Force,” Slate, http://www.slate.com/id/2099408
Changes in the defense industry also undermine military readiness. Since the start of the war, the military has faced a shortage of critical spare parts—including Bradley fighting vehicle treads, helicopter rotor blades, Humvee tires, and other items without which the Army cannot fight. The Army's demand for these items has skyrocketed since the war began last year, but the defense industry has struggled to keep up after trimming all of its excess manufacturing capacity during the consolidation wave of the last decade. Spare parts for the forces in Iraq have been diverted from units in the States, creating a cascade effect. Now the units on deck for Iraq have problems getting the parts they need to maintain their equipment since those parts have gone to Iraq. Should those units be tapped to deploy, the Army will need to find a way to procure enough spare parts—and critical items like Interceptor body armor—to ensure these units are ready for combat.
AT: Russia-China Alliance
China and Russia would never balance the US Nikolai Sokov September 2001 PONARS Policy Memo 200 Monterey Institute of International Studies
Of course, one should not overestimate the significance of the treaty or the nature of the mutual commitments. The alliance is weak primarily because neither country currently sees the need for a fullscale containment of the United States. Instead, they seek a good relationship with the United States and what both Russia and China would view as a relatively limited modification of U.S. foreign and defense policies.
China and Russia will not militarily balance the US and have no intention to Richard Weitz, UN Naval War college Review Autumn 2003 www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2003/Autumn/
Despite their common rhetoric, the two governments have taken no substantive, joint steps to counter American power or influence. For example, they have not pooled their military resources or expertise to
overcome U.S. ballistic-missile defense programs. One Chinese official threatened such anti-BMD cooperation shortly after Yeltsin’s December 1999 visit to Beijing. The Director General for Arms Control of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Sha Zukang, repeated the warning in May 2000. But such threats ended after Putin, on his July 2000 visit to Italy, proposed that Russia and NATO cooperate to defend Europe against missile strikes—despite prior acknowledgment that Chinese officials were “suspicious about Russian initiatives to create a non-strategic missile defence system in Europe.” When asked about the prospects of a joint Chinese-
Russian response after the December 2001 U.S. decision to withdraw formally from the ABM Treaty, President Putin told journalists, “Russia is strong enough to respond on its own to any changes in the sphere of strategic stability.”
China and Russia won’t balance the US. Joseph S. Nye, 2004, “China’s Re-emergence and the future of the Asia-Pacific”, in Chinese Foreign Policy in Transition, ed. Guoli Liu, pg. 349
Some analysts fear that this approach will drive China and Russia to reconstruct their anti-U.S. alliance of the l950s—a prospect hinted at by the Sino-Russian summit after the reaffirmation of the U.S.—Japan Security Treaty. This is unlikely for two reasons. First, as Mikhail Nosov points out, China and Russia have “problems connected with the demographic situation in the Far East, where the population on the Russian side of the border is 6 to 8 million, and on the China side is up to 120 million.”59 Second, as Zbigniew Brzezinski points out, “Greater China’s geopolitical influence is not necessarily incompatible with America’s strategic interest in a stable pluralistic Eurasia . . . America and China need each other in Eurasia.”60 Only clumsy U.S. diplomacy can undermine Washington’s favorable position in East Asia.
AT: Russia-China War
No risk of Sino-Russian escalation Chicago Tribune, 10/15/04
China and Russia settled the last of their decades-old border disputes Thursday during a visit to Beijing by President Vladimir Putin, signing an agreement fixing their 2,700-mile-long border for the first time. The struggle over border areas resulted in violent clashes in the 1960s and 1970s, when strained SinoSoviet relations were at their most acrimonious, feeding fears abroad that the conflict could erupt into nuclear war. Beijing and Moscow had reached agreements on individual border sections as relations warmed in the past decade. But a stretch of river and islands along China's northeastern border with Russia's Far East had remained in dispute.
Fear of escalation deters Russia-China conflict Tom Moriarty, military intelligence analyst for the U.S. Air Force. 9/22/04, World Affairs
However, the Soviet Union ultimately chose to forgo a preemptive attack and attempted to defuse tensions through diplomatic channels. Numerous reasons led Soviet leaders to decide against preemptive attack. The main reason was the Soviet Union's fear that even if they could destroy all of China's nuclear weapons capability (which, in itself, was a big assumption), they feared a conventional attack by China. Like the United States during the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet Union understood that they would lose the ability to prevent the crisis from escalating into a full-blown war. Soviet leaders grew concerned that China would respond with a prolonged people's war against the Soviet Union. Knowing that a prolonged war against a country with more than one billion people and a proven resiliency would exhaust the Soviet Union and would require forces to be withdrawn from Eastern Europe, Soviet leaders chose to ignore the Chinese provocations and let the confrontation defuse naturally. (12)
AT: Russian Collapse
Empirics prove no doomsday risk from Russian instability or economic decline World Policy Journal, 12/22/03
Using extensive interviews with participants in all three administrations, and memoirs by former officials, they paint a compelling picture of officials often over-whelmed by the challenge of an entirely new reality. The unexpected collapse of communism and of the Soviet Union, coming just after the GulfWar, left them with no road map to understand how Russia and other post-Soviet states might develop.
Nightmare scenarios suggested themselves: nuclear war between Russia and Ukraine; weapons proliferation on a terrifying scale; Yugoslavtype ethnically based civil war on the territory of the former Soviet Union; mass starvation; economic collapse--the ominous possibilities were endless. That these "dogs did not bark" is testimony to the unwillingness of people in the post-Soviet space to engage in armed conflict and to Western assistance that staved off famine and economic collapse. The failure of catastrophic scenarios to come about is one indicator of success--but if
one were to measure America's contribution to transforming Russia in more positive ways, the evidence is more mixed. If a minimalist definition of success was the absence of catastrophe, the maximalist definition was the creation of a fully functioning democracy in Russia with a transparent market economy and the rule of law. That has not happened yet, and it is unclear when it will. So far, there is no consensus about what would constitute a realistic timetable for Russia's democratic development.
Russian civil war non-unique Moscow Times, 11/25/2000
Cohen takes a distinctly harsh view of Yeltsin, and notes that no Soviet leader was ever able to appoint their successor the way that Yeltsin named Vladimir Putin. (Putin's first official act, prohibiting the prosecution of his predecessor, brings to mind not a Soviet parallel, but an American one - Gerald Ford pardoning Richard Nixon for whatever he might be charged with after Nixon had left the White House to him.) Above all, Cohen would have Americans confront the stark results of the vaunted "shock therapy" that U.S. doctors of economics prescribed for their Russian patients: Total capital flight estimated in the range of $ 150 billion -$ 350 billion; the number living in poverty in the former Soviet Union up from 14 million in 1989 to 147 million nine years later and a male life expectancy that fell below the age of 60. In short, "the literal de -modernization of a 20th-century country." In the hopes of finding something that might strike a more sympathetic chord among U.S. policy-makers than massive human suffering, Cohen continually hammers on the dangers inherent in the fact of the "destabilization of a fully nuclearized society." Already,
in Chechnya, Russia has experienced the first civil war in a country with nuclear weapons. It lacks the funds to pay the security and maintenance personnel responsible for those
weapons adequately and, in some cases, even regularly. A situation in which a nuclear arsenal was under tight control has devolved into a murky one. Yet the attention paid to it in the United States is minor, Cohen argues, compared to "the campaign against Iraq's infinitely lesser weapons of mass destruction." He suggests that American foreign aid payments targeted at helping Russia pay the costs of maintaining an adequate nuclear security system would prove a far better and cheaper investment than building ever more complex and expensive defense and weapons systems. But, unfortunately, the recent American presidential campaign displayed a bipartisan consensus for just such systems.
Their scenario assumes loose nukes, which the US is solving now San Francisco Chronicle, March 7, 2002
The United States maintains a multilayered defense against the terrorists' nuclear threat, said Harry Vantine, a counterterrorism and incident response expert at Lawrence Livermore National Lab. In addition to the radiation detectors and the Geiger counters carried by the Border Patrol, these include a program to assess the credibility of nuclear threats and helping Russia's border patrol look out for illicit nuclear material. Meserve said his commission had stepped up contacts with the thousands of companies and medical centers around the country that use radioactive substances to bring the material under tighter control.
AT: Russian Economy
Demographic shifts make Russian economic decline inevitable Banking and stock exchange. Finance. Economics (Russia), 2/3/2005
However, by the time it is going to happen, it can prove that there is no one in Russia to double GDP. According to Russian Statistics,
beginning with 2007, number of economically active people will start shrinking by 1 million people a year. According to Mr. Sokolin, head of the Russian Statistics, demography "will be a serious economic limitation of our growth." "Then doubling of GDP will be out of the question," agrees Mr. Klepach.
Russian economic decline doesn’t cause lash out or war The New Republic, 2/7/2000
At the time and since, observers of the events of 1989-1990 in Europe have been properly amazed at what happened and at what did not happen. The Soviet empire collapsed in Eastern Europe. Divided Germany was unified. Democratic governments replaced communist dictatorships in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union itself imploded and was reincarnated
Russia, despite a collapse of its economy and the spectacular loss of the Cold War, did not turn in bitterness and frustration to the alliance of nationalists and communists who were seeking to reverse the humiliations of a decade ago
as quasi-democratic, quasi- authoritarian Russia. Yet a unified Germany has not become a menacing Fourth Reich, and
Even if economic crisis causes political crisis, it won’t escalate—the 1998 crisis proves David Kotz, teaches economics at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst, Nov/Dec 1998,
Despite the unprecedented economic depression, until recently Russian bankers kept getting richer and the stock market soared, buoyed by the lucrative trade in Russia's valuable oil, gas, and metals. Western banks helped to finance the speculative binge that drove up Russian stock prices, making it one of the world's best-performing stock markets in 1997. Then in the late spring of this year,
Russia's stock market began to fall and investors started to pull their money out of the country. The Clinton administration, fearing that Yeltsin's government would not survive a looming financial crisis, pressed a reluctant IMF to approve a $22.6 billion emergency loan on July 13. This bailout proved unsuccessful. Four weeks later the financial crisis resumed as investors fled and Russia's government had to pay as much as 300% interest to attract buyers for its bonds. After Washington rejected Yeltsin's desperate plea for still more money, Russia did the unthinkable: it was forced to suspend payment on its foreign debt for 90 days, restructure its entire debt, and devalue the ruble. Panic followed, as Russia's high-flying banks teetered on the edge of collapse, depositors were unable to withdraw their money, and store shelves were rapidly emptied of goods. The financial collapse produced a political crisis, as
President Yeltsin, his domestic support evaporating, had to contend with an emboldened opposition in the parliament.
The slippery slope is a sham: Recognizing autonomy doesn’t lead to secession Ted Gurr; Distinguished University Professor at the University of Maryland, May/June 2000, Foreign Affairs
For several reasons, however, creating autonomy within the state for minorities is harder than simply banning discrimination. Most governing elites want to hold on to central authority. Many also fear that autonomy will lead to outright secession. Finally, negotiating arrangements that satisfy all parties and address each situation's unique quirks is not easy. The second fear -- autonomy as a slippery slope -- is not supported by the facts on the ground. In very few contemporary instances did negotiated autonomy lead to independence. Sometimes an autonomous regional government pushes hard for greater authority, as the Basques have done in Spain. But the ethnic statelets that won de facto independence in the 1990s -Somaliland, Abkhazia, the Trans-Dniester Republic, and Iraqi Kurdistan -- did so in the absence of negotiations, not because of them. Those truly looking to reduce ethnic bloodshed should embrace autonomy, not fear it.
Concessions to self determination don’t snowball Stephen Saideman, assistant professor of political science at Texas Tech University, 1998, The International
Spread of Ethnic Conflict, p. 148-149 Secessionism is probably not as contagious as it is often portrayed, and the mechanisms by which it is though to spread needs to be seriously reconsidered. Diffusion, in the form of demonstration effects does not have the clear consequences analysts often argue. The lessons to be learned from the Yugoslav crisis may or may not encourage potential separatists, depending on whether potential separatists consider themselves to be more like Slovenia or Bosnia, which in turn partly depends on their predispositions. Instead, ethnic conflict and secessionism tend to be generated and reinforced by the internal interacting dynamics of ethnic politics and.ethnic security dilemmas. This offers both good news and bad. Because demonstration effects are clearly not as influential as often perceived, secessionism is not as likely to spread as is commonly thought. Ethnic strife can be managed by states if they ameliorate the insecurities perceived by existing ethnic group and give politicians relatively few incentives to play the ethnic card. Such states will not break apart merely because they contain ethnic groups, who might observe such events occurring elsewhere.
AT: Soft Power
( ) Multilateralism doesn’t prevent backlash. Countries hate US power, regardless of how it’s exercised Charles Krauthammer, The National Interest, Winter, 2002/2003
A third critique comes from what might be called pragmatic realists, who see the new unilateralism I have outlined as hubristic, and whose objections are practical. They are prepared to engage in a pragmatic multilateralism. They value great power concert. They seek Security Council support not because it confers any moral authority, but because it spreads risk. In their view, a single hegemon risks far more violent resentment than would a power that consistently acts as primus inter pares, sharing rule-making functions with others.12 I have my doubts.
The United States made an extraordinary effort in the Gulf War to get un support, share decision-making, assemble a coalition and, as we have seen, deny itself the fruits of victory in order to honor coalition goals. Did that diminish the anti-American feeling in the region? Did it garner support for subsequent Iraq policy dictated by the
original acquiescence to the coalition? The attacks of September 11 were planned during the Clinton Administration, an administration that made a fetish of consultation and did its utmost to subordinate American hegemony and smother unipolarity. The resentments were hardly assuaged. Why? Because the
extremist rage against the United States is engendered by the very structure of the international system, not by the details of our management of it.
( ) They don’t solve soft power – major alt-causes like Kyoto, the ICC, and Iraq Sankar Sen, Frmr. Dir. Indian Nat. Police Academy, Statesman, 4-5-2005, “American Power,” p ln
Indeed anti-American sentiment is sweeping the world after the Iraq war. It has, of course, been aggravated by the aggressive style of the present American President. Under George Bush, antiAmericanism is widely thought to have reached new heights. In the coming years the USA will lose more of its ability to lead others if it decides to act unilaterally. If other states step aside and question the USA's policies and objectives and seek to de-legitimise them, the problems of the USA will increase manifold. American success will lie in melding power and cooperation and generating a belief in other countries that their interests will be served by working with instead of opposing the United States. It is aptly said that use of power without cooperation becomes dictatorial and breeds resistance and resentment. But cooperation without power produces posturing and no concrete progress. There is also another disquieting development. It seems American soft power is waning and it is losing its allure as a model society. Much of the rest of the world is no longer looking up to the USA as a beacon. Rising religiosity, rank hostility to the UN, Bush's doctrine of preventive war, Guantanamo Bay etc are creating disquiet in the minds of many and turning them off America. This diminution of America's soft power will also create disenchantment and may gradually affect American pre-eminence.
AT: South China Seas/Spratly
Spratly tensions won’t escalate South China Morning Post, 11-15-2004
The mainland, Taiwan, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam claim either all or some of the islands, whose main inhabitants are turtles and birds. The most violent and persistent fight for the islands has been between Beijing and Hanoi over the past 30 years. The most serious clash came in 1988 when the mainland navy sank three Vietnamese naval vessels, killing 76 sailors. Beijing says the islands belong to China because Han dynasty explorers in the 11th century discovered them, with Chinese fishermen and merchants working in the region ever since. Hanoi argues the islands were claimed in the 17th century by the Nguyen dynasty and that historical maps are proof of Vietnam's sovereignty. But Chinese maps from this period show no evidence of control. The fight continues today, with Beijing and Hanoi eager to exploit the islands' reputed oil and gas deposits. Last month, state-owned PetroVietnam said it welcomed international bids to explore the region's waters. The move, attacked by Beijing, came in apparent retaliation for Beijing's announcement that it would work with the Philippines on a similar exploration project. The two sides have also locked horns over Vietnam's recent authorisation of tourist visits to the islands.
in today's clashes over the Spratlys. While both sides have not retreated from their positions, Beijing and Hanoi have refrained from taking belligerent action, such as sending troops.
However, there is one noticeable difference
The only countermeasures employed have been foreign ministry statements, as noted by Do Tien Sam, director of the Vietnamese Academy of Social Science's Institute for Chinese Studies. "The disagreements are now
The verbal sparring is the apparent result of an agreement between Beijing and Hanoi in August not to take military action on the issue and to settle any future disputes through negotiation. The agreement is holding, so much so that during Premier Wen Jiabao's summit meeting in Hanoi last month with Vietnamese leaders, they restated their positions and moved on to other issues. Vietnamese and Chinese analysts said simple economics lay behind the gentler approach to the long-running quarrel, with both sides seeing the other as being critical to growth. China is now Vietnam's
fought only with words," Professor Sam said.
third-largest trading partner, with two-way trade expected to reach a record US$ 5 billion this year and grow to US$ 10 billion by 2010.
ASEAN solves Spratly escalation Jason Ray Hutchison, at The School for International Training International Studies, Organizations, and Social Justice, May 5, 2003,
Tying the concept in with multilateralism, China’s involvement with ASEAN has also helped to curb the risk of violence. To quote Professor Lanxin Xiang, Â“The ASEAN Regional Forum was founded to engage China on the Spratly Islands. It serves as a sort of military security mechanism against acts of aggression.Â”11 The view is that as long as China is at the negotiating table, it is not out taking the disputed islands by force. The same applies to Viet Nam, which acceded to ASEAN in 1995. The only party to the South China Sea conflicts that is not a member
of ASEAN or a negotiating partner is Taiwan. Even if ASEAN multilateralism has not entirely succeeded in preventing violent conflict in the region, it is the only game in town. Â“Southeast Asia minus ASEAN,Â” former ASEAN Secretary-General Narciso G. Reyes testifies, Â“equals greater political instability, more widespread economic deterioration and, almost surely, the ascendancy of expansionist forces that thrive on the weakness, isolation and disunity of others.Â”12 To be sure, ASEAN has a role to play in reducing violence in the South China Sea, even if it is only through diplomatic pressure. The thinly veiled reference to China in ReyesÂ’ statement attests to that purpose, and with good reason. A rather telling Chinese proverb highlights this hazard: Â“Â‘he bang xiang zheng, yu weng de li,Â’ which can be translated as: Â‘When the snipe and the clam grapple, itÂ’s the fisherman who profits
No risk from terrorism John Mueller, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, September/October 2006,
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060901facomment85501/john-mueller/is-there-still-a-terroristthreat.html?mode=print THREAT PERCEPTIONS The results of policing activity overseas suggest that the absence of results in the United States has less to do with terrorists' cleverness or with investigative incompetence than with the possibility that few, if any, terrorists exist in the country. It also suggests that al Qaeda's ubiquity and capacity to do damage may have, as with so many perceived threats, been exaggerated. Just because some terrorists may wish to do great harm does not mean that they are able to. Gerges argues that mainstream Islamists -- who make up the vast majority of the Islamist political movement -- gave up on the use of force before 9/11, except perhaps against Israel, and that
the jihadists still committed to violence constitute a tiny minority. Even this small group primarily focuses on various "infidel" Muslim regimes and considers jihadists who carry out violence against the "far enemy" -- mainly Europe and the United States -- to be irresponsible, reckless adventurers who endanger the survival of the whole movement. In this view, 9/11 was a sign of al Qaeda's desperation, isolation, fragmentation, and decline, not of its strength. Those attacks demonstrated, of course, that al Qaeda -- or at least 19 of its members -- still possessed some fight. And none of this is to deny that more terrorist attacks on the United States are still possible. Nor is it to suggest that al Qaeda is anything other than a murderous movement. Moreover, after the illconsidered U.S. venture in Iraq is over, freelance jihadists trained there may seek to continue their operations elsewhere -- although they are more likely to focus on places such as Chechnya than on the United States. A unilateral American military attack against Iran could cause that country to retaliate, probably with very wide support within the Muslim world, by aiding anti-American insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq and inflicting damage on Israel and on American interests worldwide. But while keeping such potential dangers in mind, it is worth remembering that the total number of people killed since 9/11 by al Qaeda or al Qaedalike operatives outside of Afghanistan and Iraq is not much higher than the number who drown in bathtubs in the United States in a single year, and that the lifetime chance of an American being killed by international terrorism is about one in 80,000 -- about the same chance of being killed by a comet or a meteor. Even if there were a 9/11-scale attack every three months for the next five years, the likelihood that an individual American would number among the dead would be two hundredths of a percent (or one in 5,000). Although it remains heretical to say so, the evidence so far suggests that fears of the omnipotent terrorist -reminiscent of those inspired by images of the 20-foot-tall Japanese after Pearl Harbor or the 20-foot-tall Communists at various points in the Cold War (particularly after Sputnik) -- may have been overblown, the threat presented within the United States by al Qaeda greatly exaggerated. The massive and expensive homeland security apparatus erected since 9/11 may be persecuting some, spying on many, inconveniencing most, and taxing all to defend the United States against an enemy that scarcely exists.
No impact to nuclear terrorism John Mueller, Professor of Political Science at the University of Rochester and Karl Mueller Assistant Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the School of Advanced Airpower Studies at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, Foreign Affairs, May/June 1999
Nuclear weapons clearly deserve the "weapons of mass destruction" designation because they can indeed destroy masses of people in a single blow. Even so, it is worth noting that any nuclear weapons acquired by terrorist groups or rogue states, at least initially, are likely to be small. Contrary to exaggerated Indian and Pakistani claims, for example, independent analyses of their May 1998 nuclear tests have concluded that the yields were Hiroshima-sized or smaller. Such bombs can cause horrible though not apocalyptic damage. Some 70,000 people died in Hiroshima and 40,000 in Nagasaki. People three miles away from the blast sites received only superficial wounds even when fully exposed, and those inside bomb shelters at Nagasaki were uninjured even though they were close to ground zero. Some buildings of steel and concrete survived, even when they were close to the blast centers, and most municipal services were restored within days. A Hiroshima-sized bomb exploded in a more fire-resistant modern city would likely be considerably less devastating. Used against well-prepared, dug-in, and dispersed troops, a small bomb might actually cause only limited damage. If a single such bomb or even a few of them were to fall into dangerous
hands, therefore, it would be terrible, though it would hardly threaten the end of civilization.
Free trade doesn’t deter war Katherine Barbieri, Department of Political Science, University of North Texas, February 1996, Journal of Peace
Research, p. 42-43 This study provides little empirical support for the liberal proposition that trade provides a path to interstate peace. Even after controlling for the influence of contiguity, joint democracy, alliance ties, and relative capabilities, the evidence suggests that in most instances trade fails to deter conflict. Instead, extensive economic interdependence increases the likelihood that dyads engage in militarized dispute; however, it appears to have little influence on the incidence of war. The greatest hope for peace appears to arise from
symmetrical trading relationships. However, the dampening effect of symmetry is offset by the expansion of interstate linkages. That is, extensive economic linkages, be they symmetrical or asymmetrical, appear to pose the greatest hindrance to peace through trade. Although this article focuses exclusively on the pre-WWII period, elsewhere I provide evidence that the relationships revealed here are also observed in the postWWII period and more extended period, 1870—1985 (Barbieri, 1995). Why do the findings differ from those presented in related studies of the trade—conflict relationship, which reveal an inverse relationship between trade and conflict? Several explanations, other than the temporal domain, can be offered. First, researchers differ in the phenomena they seek to explain, with many studies incorporating both conflictual and cooperative interstate behavior (e.g., Gasiorowski, 1986a, b; Gasiorowski & Polachek, 1982; Polachek, 1980, 1992; Polachek & McDonald, 1992). Studies that focus exclusively on extreme forms of conflict behavior, including disputes and wars, differ in their spatial and temporal domains, their level of analysis, and their measurement of central constructs. Preliminary tests reveal that the composition of dyads in a given sample may have a more dramatic impact on the empirical findings than variations in measurement. For example, the decision to focus exclusively on ‘politically relevant dyads’ may be one source of difference (Oneal et al., 19%). Perhaps the primary component missing from this and related research is the inclusion of a more adequate assessment of the costs and benefits derived from interdependence. I have repeatedly argued that the conflictual or pacific elements of interdependence are directly related to perceptions about trade’s costs and benefits. Yet, a more comprehensive evaluation of these costs and benefits is needed to see whether a link truly exists between the benefits enjoyed in a given trading relationship and the inhibition of conflict in that relationship, or conversely, the presence of net costs for at least one trading partner and the presence of conflict in that relationship. For example, are trading relationships that contain two partners believed to benefit from trade less conflict-prone than those containing at least one partner perceived to be worse off from trade? I have merely outlined the types of relationships believed to confer the greatest benefits, but such benefits and costs require a more rigorous investigation.
AT: UN Credibility
( ) Iraq hypocrisy destroyed UN credibility Dilrook Kannangara, Lankaweb, Sri Lanka - Oct 18, 2007 Why Fundamental rights must be protected for the
sake of human rights However, the UN has lost its credibility on human rights. If 600,000 deaths in Iraq and another 200,000 in Afghanistan don’t justify a UN monitoring office while propagating one for Sri Lanka, the UN must be governed by hypocrisy and hypocrisy cannot make the world a better place. Ms Louise Arbour goes home empty handed after she
failed to win a multi million dollar fatcat project. The Sri Lankan ‘peace’ industry is worth many times more than its war, but, ironically for the ‘peace’ industry to flourish the war should continue to wage! The salary of a peace activist is at least twenty (20) times that of the highest paid defence official; peace activists get more foreign trips than the army general, a peace activist is safer than an army officer and therefore a peace worker has a bigger stake in the war!
( ) Internal reform undermined UN credibility SwissInfo, September 26, 2007, Calmy-Rey calls for a "more coherent" UN
Swiss President Micheline Calmy-Rey has urged improvements in the way the United Nations operates and called on member states to fulfil their political duties. Speaking at the opening of the UN's 62nd General Assembly in New York, she described the crackdown on pro-democracy protesters in Myanmar as "alarming" and urged all sides to engage in dialogue to resolve the situation. "The international community has approved a great many development objectives in recent decades," Calmy-Rey told world leaders on Wednesday. "Unfortunately, the [UN's operational] system remains fragmented and the transaction costs – borne to a great extent by the beneficiary countries themselves – are very high." While acknowledging that the UN had embarked on a process of reform to respond more effectively to global challenges, Calmy-Rey said to strengthen the UN's credibility and efficiency, "we must now demonstrate that we have the political determination to bring these reforms to completion".
US-China conflict won’t go nuclear Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (Pennsylvania) September 9/29, 2004
U.S. military capacity is now so overstretched by the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts that a Chinese move to realize its own top strategic objective, the scooping up of Taiwan to complete the hat trick with Hong Kong and Macao, would find the United States hard-pressed to be able to respond at all. A U.S. threat of a nuclear attack on China -- with China's inevitable nuclear counterstrike -- would be so wildly unacceptable in political terms in the United States itself as to be out of the question for any U.S.
administration. The idea of causing Los Angeles to disappear because China had seized Taiwan would be a trade-off that no American leader would even dare contemplate. America is lucky so far that China has not yet sought to match its economic reach in Asia with a corresponding assertion of political influence. That doesn't mean that Asia will inevitably become a sphere of Chinese dominance. What will happen instead -- what is already happening, in fact -- is that other Asian powers such as Japan, Korea and India will increasingly take steps to check Chinese power by increasing their own military capacity. In other words, what was a situation in which the United States stood between Japan and Korea and the imposition of Chinese influence will now become one in which those countries will become more dependent on their own resources to defend themselves. The response of the Koreans could be said to be a move toward resolving the problems between South and North Korea to enable them to present a united front to the Chinese. The response of Japan that can be expected will be limited remilitarization. The health and peace of the region will depend on the degree to which the competition among these countries will be economic, rather than political and military. What will this modification of the balance of power in Asia mean for the United States? First of all, none of this will happen tomorrow. The extension of China's reach and the Japanese and Korean response will be gradual and spread out across the years, although there may well be some pinpricks at the extremities sooner rather than later.
The Chinese themselves will avoid direct confrontation with the United States at all costs. It is not their way. Conflict between the two countries would be asymmetrical in the extreme in any case. Basically, the two can't attack each other. Nuclear warfare is out. The million-man People's Liberation Army isn't portable. The Chinese are definitely not into terrorism.
US nuclear primacy checks escalation with China Keir A. Lieber, the author of War and the Engineers: The Primacy of Politics Over Technology, is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. Daryl G. Press, the author of Calculating
Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats, is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. March/April 2006(Foreign Affairs) For almost half a century, the world's most powerful nuclear states have been locked in a military stalemate known as mutual assured destruction (MAD). By the early 1960s, the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union had grown so large and sophisticated that neither country could entirely destroy the other's retaliatory force by launching first, even with a surprise attack. Starting a nuclear war was therefore tantamount to committing suicide. During the Cold War, many scholars and policy analysts believed that MAD made the world relatively stable and peaceful because it induced great caution in international politics, discouraged the use of nuclear threats to resolve disputes, and generally restrained the superpowers' behavior. (Revealingly, the last intense nuclear standoff, the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, occurred at the dawn of the era of MAD.) Because of the nuclear stalemate, the optimists argued, the era of intentional great-power wars had ended. Critics of MAD, however, argued that it prevented not greatpower war but the rolling back of the power and influence of a dangerously expansionist and totalitarian Soviet Union. From that perspective, MAD prolonged the life of an evil empire. This debate may now seem like ancient history, but it is actually more relevant than ever -- because the age of MAD is nearing an end. Today, for the first time in almost 50 years, the United States stands on the verge of attaining nuclear primacy. It will probably soon be possible for the United States to destroy the longrange nuclear arsenals of Russia or China with a first strike. This dramatic shift in the nuclear balance of power stems from a series of improvements in the United States' nuclear systems, the precipitous decline of Russia's arsenal, and the glacial pace of modernization of China's nuclear forces. Unless Washington's policies change or Moscow and Beijing take steps to increase the size and readiness of their forces, Russia and China -- and the rest of the world -- will live in the shadow of U.S. nuclear primacy for many years to come. One's views on the implications of this change will depend on one's theoretical perspective. Hawks, who believe that the United States is a benevolent force in the world, will welcome the new nuclear era because they trust that U.S. dominance in both conventional and nuclear weapons will help deter aggression by other countries. For example, as U.S. nuclear primacy grows, China's leaders may act more cautiously on issues such as Taiwan, realizing that their vulnerable nuclear forces will not deter U.S. intervention -- and that Chinese nuclear threats could invite a U.S. strike on Beijing's arsenal. But doves, who oppose using nuclear threats to coerce other states and fear an emboldened and unconstrained United States, will worry.
No Chance of Iranian retaliation – Strikes would be so devastating that they would have no capability to strike back Dr. Dan Plesch, Director of the School of Oriental and African Studies’ Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy, Martin Butcher, Martin Butcher is an international consultant on security politics, September 2007, Considering a war with Iran: A discussion
paper on WMD in the Middle East, School of Oriental and African Studies, http://www.rawstory.com/images/other/IranStudy082807a.pdf The US B-2A carries a new earth penetrating conventional weapon, the Massive Ordnance penetrator. The MOP is a 30,000lb bomb carrying 6.000lbs of explosives and capable of penetrating up to 60 meters [200 feet] through 5,000 psi reinforced concrete.5 This puts at risk even the most hardened facilities such as Natanz and increases the flexibility of STRATCOM’s conventional strike options.6 This weapon is in the final testing stage and could be fitted to the B2 bomber in late 2007 or early 2008.7 In recent years, hugely increased funding for military technology has taken "smart bombs" to a new level. New "bunkerbusting" conventional bombs weigh only 250lb. According to Boeing, the GBU-39 small-diameter bomb "quadruples" the firepower of US warplanes, compared to those in use even as recently as 2003. A single stealth or B-52 bomber can now attack between 150 and 300 individual points to within a metre of accuracy using the global positioning system.8 One B2 bomber dropped 80 500lb bombs on separate targets in 22 seconds in a test flight. Using just half the available force, 10,000 targets could be attacked almost simultaneously. This strike power alone is sufficient to damage
Iranian political, military, economic and transport capabilities. Such a strike would take "shock and awe" to a new level and leave Iran with few if any conventional military capabilities to block the straights of Hormuz or provide conventional military support to insurgents in Iraq. ] The US air force can hit the last-known position of Iranian military units, political leaders and supposed sites of weapons of mass destruction. One can be sure that, if war comes, George Bush will not want to stand accused of using too little force and allowing Iran to fight back. "Global Strike" means that, without any obvious signal, what was done to Serbia and Lebanon can be done overnight to the whole of Iran. We, and probably the Iranians, would not know about it until after the bombs fell. Forces that hide will suffer the fate of Saddam's armies, once their positions are known.
Iran has a limited capability to attack Israel – the effects will be minimal anyway Martin van Creveld, Professor of Military History at Hebrew University, 10-24-2007, “Actually, Iran is not so
tough”, International Herald Tribune, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/10/24/opinion/edcrevald.php Should the U.S. strike at Iran - we are talking about a strike by cruise missiles and manned aircraft, not about an invasion for which Washington does not have the troops - then Iran will have no way to hit back. Like Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 1991, Iran's most important response may well be to attack Israel, which probably explains why Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his generals keep making threats in that direction. Even so, they have few options. Iran's ground and naval forces are irrelevant to the mission at hand. Iran may indeed have some Shihab III missiles with the necessary range, but their number is limited and their reliability uncertain. Should the missiles carry conventional warheads, then, militarily speaking, the effect will probably be close to zero. Should they carry unconventional ones, then Iran, to quote former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir speaking not long before the first Gulf War, will open itself to "awesome and terrible" retaliation.
Peace negotiations check US-Russian escalation Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, President of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems. July 2007 “WILL
AMERICA FIGHT RUSSIA”. Defense and Security, No 78. LN Ivashov: Numerous scenarios and options are possible. Everything may begin as a local conflict that will rapidly deteriorate into a total confrontation. An ultimatum will be sent to Russia: say, change the domestic policy because human rights are allegedly encroached on, or give Western businesses access to oil and gas fields. Russia will refuse and its objects (radars, air defense components, command posts, infrastructure) will be wiped out by guided missiles with conventional warheads and by aviation. Once this phase is over, an even stiffer ultimatum will be presented demanding something up to the deployment of NATO "peacekeepers" on the territory of Russia. Refusal to bow to the demands will be met with a mass aviation and missile strike at Army and Navy assets, infrastructure, and objects of defense industry. NATO armies will invade Belarus and western Russia. Two turns of events may follow that. Moscow may accept the ultimatum through the use of some device that will help it save face. The acceptance will be followed by talks over the estrangement of the Kaliningrad enclave, parts of the Caucasus and Caspian region, international control over the Russian gas and oil complex, and NATO control over Russian nuclear forces. The second scenario involves a warning from the Kremlin to the United States that continuation of the aggression will trigger retaliation with the use of all weapons in nuclear arsenals. It will stop the war and put negotiations into motion.
Zero threat of war with Russia George Perkovich, Vice President for Studies at the Carnegie Endowment, Foreign Affairs, March/April, 2003
As for Russia, a full-scale war between it and the United States now seems inconceivable. Given the desires for larger cuts in nuclear forces that Russia displayed in negotiating the 2002 Moscow Treaty, Russia hardly seems enough of a threat to justify the size and forward-leaning posture of America's present arsenal.
No risk of US-Russian nuclear war Robert A. Manning, senior fellow and director of Asian studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, 3/10/2000
We don't want to go any lower because we need these weapons for nuclear deterrence, according to State Department spokesman James Rubin. But how many nukes do we need for deterrence to be credible? China, which President Clinton has talked of as a "strategic partner," has a grand total of 20 - count them - strategic warheads that could hit the United States. Nuclear wannabes like North Korea, Iran, and Iraq would have only a handful if they did manage to succeed in joining the nuclear club. Russia, which has 6,000 strategic warheads, is no longer an adversary. During the Cold War, it was not hard to envision a conventional war in
Europe escalating into nuclear conflict. But today it is difficult to spin a plausible scenario in which the United States and Russia escalate hostilities into a nuclear exchange. Russia has no Warsaw Pact, and not much of a conventional force to speak of. Yet U.S. nuclear planners still base their targeting plans on prospective Russian
targets, though no one will say so.
MSU satellite data is best and proves no catastrophic warming Thomas Pearson, research analyst at CEI, 2002, in Global Warming and Other Eco-myths edited by Ronald
Bailey, pg. 322 Highly accurate temperature measurements, however, have been taken from space using microwave sounding units (MSUs) aboard satellites since 1979. The data series graphed on the opposite page shows the difference between recorded temperature and the 1979 mean values. In October 2001, the average global temperature departure was 0. 1450C, with a Northern Hemisphere temperature departure of 0. 1460C and a Southern Hemisphere departure of 0. 1430C, yielding an average increase of only 0.060C per decade.. The satellite data are highly correlated with balloon temperature data taken from radiosonde instruments, strengthening the confidence in the accuracy of the satellite data. MSUs measure the temperature of the lower troposphere, the atmospheric layer from the surface to 20,000 feet. This layer of the atmosphere is important for climatic research because, according to global circulation models, global warming would be much more pronounced in the lower troposphere than on the surface. The failure of the satellite data to verify rapid global warming predictions provides a strong argument against fears that man-made global warming will result in a climate catastrophe.
History proves increased CO2 is not correlated with temperature rise DAILY MAIL (London), January 12, 2004
Then there's the claim that the climate is the hottest on record. But this statistical record goes back only a few centuries, if that. Yet there's plenty of other evidence that the climate in Europe was warmer than now by at least two degrees in 1100, when vines grew in Northumberland and farmers settled in Greenland. Since this was followed by the Little Ice Age, which lasted until 1880, it's hardly surprising - and surely a cause for rejoicing - that since then the climate has warmed up by about 0.6 degrees, well within normal patterns. As for the presumed villain of the piece, carbon dioxide, this makes up such a tiny fraction of the atmosphere that even if it doubled it would make little difference to the climate. And, like sea levels, it doesn't correlate with climate change. Historically, it has increased hundreds of years after the climate has warmed up. Between 1940 and 1975, when industrial activity - which produces carbon dioxide - rose rapidly, the climate actually cooled.
AT: Water Wars
Water conflict doesn’t escalate—too many limiting factors Jacques Leslie, Harper's Magazine, July 1, 2000
Yet such wars haven't quite happened. Aaron Wolf, an Oregon State University specialist in water conflicts, maintains that the last war over water was fought between the Mesopotamian city states of Lagash and Umma 4,500 years ago. Wolf has found that during the twentieth century only 7 minor skirmishes were fought over water while 145 water-related treaties were signed. He argues that one reason is strategic: in a conflict involving river water, the aggressor would have to be both downstream (since the upstream nation enjoys unhampered access to the river) and militarily superior. As Wolf puts it, "An upstream riparian would have no cause to launch an attack, and a weaker state would be foolhardy to do so." And if a powerful downstream nation retaliates against a water diversion by, say, destroying its weak upstream neighbor's dam, it still risks the consequences, in the form of flood or pollution or poison from upstream. So, until now, water conflicts have simmered but rarely boiled, perhaps because of the universality of the need for water. Almost two fifths of the world's people live in the 214 river basins shared by two or more countries;
the Nile links ten countries, whose leaders are profoundly aware of one another's hydrologic behavior. Countries usually manage to cooperate about Water, even in unlikely circumstances. In 1957, Cambodia, Laos,
Thailand, and South Vietnam formed the Mekong Committee, which exchanged information throughout the Vietnam War. Through the 1980s and into the 1990s, Israeli and Jordanian officials secretly met once or twice a year at a picnic table on the banks of the Yarmuk River to allocate the river's water supply; these so-called picnic-table summits occurred while the two nations disavowed formal diplomatic contact. Jerome Delli Priscoli, editor of a thoughtful trade journal called Water Policy and a social scientist at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, believes the whole notion of water conflict is overemphasized: "Water irrigation helped build early communities and bring those communities together in larger functional arrangements. Such community networking was a primary impetus to the growth of civilization. Indeed, water may actually be one of humanity's great learning grounds for building
community.... The thirst for water may be more persuasive than the impulse toward conflict."
Water wars won’t happen Journal of Commerce March 31, 1999
So far the often-repeated prediction that ""the next war in the Middle East will be over come true. When disputes have arisen, the states involved have shown a willingness
water' ' has yet to to reach agreement and conclude details. The economics underlying water issues demonstrate the futility of any military conflict that is purely over water. The victor would still not gain all the water needed to satisfy national requirements.
AT: WTO Credibility
( ) No impact to WTO collapse – free trade and economic success continue Veena Jha, Project Coordinator of UNTAD-Dehli, 2002, Salvaging the WTO’s Future, ed. Dasgupta, p. 461
All these criticisms of the WTO must be viewed against the backdrop of the difficulties and sometimes even the impossibility of negotiating multilateral agreements with such a diverse membership as that of the WTO. In this milieu doing away with the WTO may be an impossibility and a forum for trade negotiations or certainly trade disputes may be an economic necessity. However diluting the power of the WTO and the development of a pluralistic world order, which provides the economic space for countries to undertake activist trade and industrial policies may be a feasible option. The alternative to the WTO, which is constantly loading the agenda with newer and newer public and domestic policy issues, is not a Hobbesian state of nature. The reality of today’s economic relations is a world marked by a multiplicity of international and regional institutions that check one another. Of course the threat of unilateral action by the powerful is always present in a plurilateral system of several coexisting institutions. However, the powerful also hesitate to take such action as it may threaten the legitimacy of these institutions as well as lead to the formation of opposing coalitions.
( ) Plurilateral institutions check WTO collapse impacts Veena Jha, Project Coordinator of UNTAD-Dehli, 2002, Salvaging the WTO’s Future, ed. Dasgupta, p. 453
In other words, the alternative to the WTO is not another institution, but the emergence of several other plurilateral institutions such as MERCOSUR, SAARC, SADCC, ASEAN and others. This is already happening. Instead of overburdening the WTO, it may be useful to discuss public policy issues in these regional forums. Only when a consensus appears to be emerging from these regional forums should the issue be take to the WTO for discussions. Thus regional forums should serve as a filter before taking issues for discussions in the WTO. This would reduce its jurisdiction to manageable limits and make it another institutions coexisting with other international organizations, notably UNCTAD, regional trade groupings, UNDP and several others. It would also ensure that there are multiple checks and balances in the system, which will enable developing countries to develop their own economic, and policy values, its own rhythm of development and strategies of its own choice.
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