CanWittgensteinhelp free the mind from rules?

The philosophicalfoundations of connectionism

ltiel E. Dror & Marcelo Dascal

(Eds.), The Future of the Cognitive Revolution, In D. Johnson &C. (pp. 217-226).Oxford University Press.1997

For more details:http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/-id/

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IS

Itiel E. Dror & Marcelo Dascal

CanWittgenstein Help Free the Mind from Rules?

The PhilosophicalFoundations of Connectionism

The question whether or not the construct "rule" is essential for cognition is one of the main divisions between connectionist and rival approaches in cognitive science. In this chapter, we consider the philosophical significance of this division, and its implications for cognitive research, in the light of several possible interpretations of Wittgenstein's paradox of following a rule. The conclusion is that the rejection of rules by connectionism makes it philosophically incompatible with the symbolic rule-governed approach; nevertheless, the rejection of rules does not necessarily lead, on its own, to a single way of conceptualizing the mind and its place in nature. Wittgenstein's notions of "form of life" and "language games" are used as an aid for understanding the philosophical foundations of connectionism. This was our paradox: no course of action could be detennined by a role, becauseevery course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if everything can be made out to accord with the role, then it can also be made out to conftict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conftict here. (Wittgenstein, 1953) 1. The "New Science of the Mind" now has two entrenched and well-developed paradigms fighting for supremacy. As candidates for pure and applied scientific theories, both paradigms seek to gather support from their ability to provide coherent formalized models of mental activities and from their successful implementations. Furthermore, both are believed to provide a set of principles capable of explaining all cognitive phenomena, that is, a unified theory of cognition and eventually of the mind. (See Anderson, 1983; Newell, 1990, for the symbolic approach; Grossberg, 1982; Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986, for connectionism.) Although philosophical issues are often mentioned in the debate, they are usually overshadowed by the quest for "empirical support." (See Dror & Young, 1994, for a discussion of how this quest for empirical support can affect the development of cognitive science.) However, the interpretation of such support depends on diver-

217

218 Connecn'onism gent philosophical assumptions. Consequently, progressin the debatecan only be achieved if, in conjunctionwith the empiricalandpracticaldevelopment of eachparadigm,their philosophicalassumptions and orientationsare carefully exalnined.In this chapter,we examineone cluster of suchassumptions, namely,thosepertaining to the role of "rules" in cognition. More specifically,we inquire what are the philosophicalimplications of the connectionistattemptsto provide a "rule-free" account of cognition. 2. The so-called"cognitive revolution" in psychologybrought abouta rehabilitation of mentalism,in the wake of the allegedinability of behaviorismto account for higher cognitive processes. Oncereinstated.the mentalisticoutlook legitimized the use of several concepts that had been ruled out by behavioristic strictures. Among them was the idea that cognition is the exerciseof a set of competences, which are best describedas the mastery and application of rules. Thus, Newell, Shaw,and Simon(1963)investigatedthe rulespeopleusefor reasoningandproblem solving; Chomsky(1965, 1980, 1986)conceivedthe grammarof a languageasthe setof rules that every competentspeaker internalizes;Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) consideredmemory as a content-addressed, rule-basedsystem; visual recognition wasexploredthrough paradigmsof template-matching, feature analysis,and structural descriptions (palmer, 1975;Wmston, 1975). The development of the moderncomputerprovidedboth a useful ~etaphor and supportfor the view that rules lie at the centerof cognitiveprocesses. The softwarehardwaredistinction, interpretedasparallel to the mind-brain distinction, pennitted the symbolic approachto emphasizethe non-reductionistic characterof the new approach (e.g.,Putnam's (1967)notion of "functionalism"). The mind wasconceived as equivalentto a set of software, rather than to its neuronal underpinnings.Like computerprograms, it was said to operateby following symbolic rules. In so-called "traditional AI," computerswere usedto model suchprocesses as well as to make useof suchmodel~.Newell and Simon (1972) implementedthe means-ends problem-solving rule in their GeneralProblemSolver; Wmograd(1972) appliedChomsky'stheory of grammarto simulatelanguage understanding in SHRDLU; structural descriptionshave beenusedin computerlearning and in computer vision (Ballard & Brown, 1982),to namea few examples. The underlyingideology of this approachis that a physical symbolsystemhas the necessary and sufficient meansfor generalintelligence(Newell & Simon,1976). The physical symbol systemcontainselementsthat are put together through symbolic structuresto form expressions.Rules- which are themselves expressions create, modify, reproduce,or destroy other expressionsbasedon their symbolic structureandthe elements they contain. 3. The rise of connectionismwas promptedby dissatisfactionwith the meager practical achievements of the symbolic approach, if comparedwith its pretensions, aswell asby advances in exploring the neuralnetworksof the brain. (For a discussion on the relationship betweenthe biology of the brain and cognitive computations, seeDror and Gallogly, 1996.)The insistenceon using rules loomedlarge asa possiblecausefor the failures of the symbolicapproach. Rules were relatively easy

ThePhilosophicalFoundations of COMectionism 219 to formulate; but they rendered systems too rigid to be able to capture the specific properties of cognitive processes. The use of rules resulted in failure to exhibit a number of processes,such as pattern recognition, pattern completion, automatic generalization, and graceful degradation, that are important for models of cognitive processes.(See Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986.) With the development of an alternative way of simulating and accounting for the computational processesunderlying cognitive abilities, connectionists also developed an alternative conceptual framework for those cognitive processesthat previously seemedto be naturally conceptualized in terms of rules. (See Dror & Young, 1994.) Based on the idea of flow of activations between massively interconnected simple-units, a framework was established where rules-as explanatory constructs-became altogether unnecessary.The idea of parallel distributed processing would now unmask rules as fictitious theoretical constructs. In this respect, Wittgenstein's denunciation of the paradox underlying the use of the notion of "following a rule," and its possible interpretation as rejecting the explanatory value of rules altogether. could be a powerful philosophical ally to this framework.

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4. Wittgenstein showsthat explanationsin terms of rule following must be completelymistaken.For example,how can one ascertainthat a rule hasbeenfollowed, say,in constructing a given sequence of numbers?Suppose you are given a sequence of numbers,<2,4>; What is the rule for generatingit and its continuation? None-Wittgenstein would say-because an infinite numberof rules could generate the given sequence (e.g.: multiply the preceding number by 2; add 2 to the precedingnumber;etc.). One might suggest that the next numberwill determinewhich rule hasbeenused: if 6, then the rule is add two; if 8, then it is multiply by 2. Yet, no matterhow many exemplarsof the sequence are given, aslong asthe list is finiteas it necessarilyis-there will be indefinitely many rules that are able to generate the sequence. Thus, it is impossibleto detenninewhich is the rule that is being followed; and,in fact, one can raisethe questionwhether a rule is beingfollowed at all. Suppose we enlargethe sequence of numbersfrom <2,4> to <1,2,4,8>. Is its rule now multiply thepreceding numberby 2, or add the two preceding numbersand add to thesumtheposition of the numberin thesequence minus2, sinceboth yield the same sequence? The appeal to rule following, therefore,seems to havelost its explanatoryvalue, sinceindefinitely many rules can be madeto conform to any courseof events.Thus, we can never deteimine which rules underlie a phenomenon;and this leads us to questiontheir existencealtogether.This conceptualargumentshould bolster connectionism'sresolve to provide an accountof cognition that doesnot rely at all on the problematicconstruct"rule." 5. Regardingthe role of rules, the contrast-both practical and conceptualbetweenthe connectionist and the symbolic approaches can be best illustrated by consideringan example.THEO and TheoNet are two models that have beenproposedto account for processes of reasoning used by experts who forecast solar flares.This kind of reasoninginvolvesthe use of infonnal reasoningwithin a frame of constraints, and the use of partial and inaccurate information. Both models

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220 Connectionism receiveinformation on recentactivity of the sun(numberof flares,size,distribution, and so on). THEO is a role-based expert system(Shaw,1989),whereasTheoNet is a three-layerconnectionistnetwork (Bradshawet at. 1989). THEO processes the data through the knowledgeencodedin it, in the form of symbolicrules.For example,a rule in the knowledgebaseof the expertsystemmay state: "If more than one ZUrichclassflare has occurredin the past 24 hours and its sizewas largerthan 5, then there is a .85 probability that an M-classflare will occur in the next 24 hours." In other words, the systemrelies on a symbolic meaningful connectionbetweenentities suchas ZUrich classBaretits size, and the probability of an M-classflare; and all this is encodedin the systemin the form of rules. Thus, the rules of the system are the underlying entities that capture its knowledge and action. In contrast,TheoNet doesnot have suchrules. TheoNet processes the data through a set of connections that go through a hidden layer of units before the final output vector is produced.Each connectionin the network hasa weight associated with it (which the network learns through training). The input data triggers a simple flow of activation betweenthe units. The system has no underlying symbolic rules. Accountingfor processes of reasoningusedby expertsthat forecastsolar flares can rely either on the connectionistor on the symbolic rule-governedapproaches. THEa and TheoNet perform equally well, and both' perform as well as skilled humanforecasters. Alternative accounts, suchasthese,basedon the two competing approaches, havebeenproposed for a variety of cognitive processes (e.g.,modelsfor word identification; for a review seeRueckl & Dror, 1994).Such"matches,"however, have not been conclusive, and have not proven the empirical supremacyof either approach. 6. But what is the deepersignificance,if any, of this contrastbetweenthe two approaches? Is it a symptom of their radical incompatibility or can they be reconciled in somehigher theoretical synthesis? Are they guidedby and orientedtowurd radically different visions of mind and cognition; or are they mere "notational variants" of the samephilosophicalattitudetoward the mind? Repliesto thesequestionsvary broadly. Somereject the incompatibility thesis on the groundsthat one of the approaches (connectionism)is not in fact an alternative explanation for cognitive processesat the psychological level (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988).Others acceptboth approaches? viewing them as complementary, insofar asthey accountfor different cognitive processes (Estes, 1988;Schneider& Detweiler, 1987).Still others seethe two approaches asdifferent levels of description of the sameprocess, and considerconnectionismto be either the properimplementation of the symbolic approach(Broadbent, 1985),or an intemlediate level betweenthe symbolic and the neurallevels (Smolensky,1988). One might argue,however,that the two approaches are not so easily reconcilablebecause (1) they are indeedconceptuallyincompatible,and (2) they represent completelydifferent conceptions of cognitionand mind. On this view,the divergence concerningthe role of rules is crucial because it uncoversthe deeperdifferencesin philosophicaloutlook. The issueis not just whether rules are implicitly represented in connectionist systemsthrough some form of hidden representations(Hinton,

ThePhilosophicalFoundanons of Connectionism 221 1986), or whether the connectionist approach merely introduces a sub-symbolic level (Smolensky, 1988). Such interpretations of connectionism may be remnants of the "old" paradigm forced on the "new" one-a very common phenomenon when revolutionary ideas are introduced (Dror & Young, 1994; see J. Dror, 1994, 1995, for how the acceptance of new ideas is constrained by previous beliefs). It is not uncommon to find concepts derived from the symbolic approach embedded in connectionist systems (e.g., Miikkulainen,1993). Another example is Pollack's (1988) attempt to employ a commonly used computer structure-a stack-in a connectionist network. Other examples are provided by the new generation of "hybrid" models that combine modules of symbolic rules with modules of connectionist networks within a single operating system. Such systems may prove to be technologically efficient, as they seek to,exploit the best in each approach. . But the occasional success of such eclectic implementations is not, by itself, proof of explanatory compatibility and conceptual harmony between the two approaches, for it may be due to the plasticity in the practice of the programmers. From a theoretical and philosophical point of view, one should focus rather on apresumably ideal-notion of "pure connectionism" and examine where it may lead us. In particular, what is the significance of its claim to be, in sharp contrast to "pure symbolism:' entirely "rule-free"?

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7. The implications of suchan entirely "'rule-free" connectionistinterpretation could be far-reaching; a different conceptionof cognition is likely to emerge.With the rejection of the needfor "rule" modesof explanation,the last bastionof dualism is conquered;not only is the mentalno longer a separate ontological domain,but it is no longer a distinct epistemological domain,with its specialmodeof explanation, either.The mind is thereby completely and finally naturalized,as it neverhad been before. In this way, a remarkable Ockhamian ontological economy is achieved, along with a no less valuable epistemologicaleconomyobtainedthrough the simplification of the explanatorymachineryof science. 8. Wittgenstein'sparadox-one could argue-would lend further support to this conceptualization. The trouble is that, construedas above,Wittgenstein'sargumentundermines not only the appealto rulesbut alsothe appealto any other fonD of data-based generalization.For it showsthat an indefinite numberof hypotheses are equally possible candidatesto capture the regularity underlying any given set of cases-the well-known fact that dataunderdetermine theory.To be sure,this would provide a unifonn accountof regularities acrossall domains,but only at the cost of making suchan accountequally problematicthroughout.It is doubtful that connectionism would be willing to give up the reliability of generalizations of all sorts. The games"interpreting Wittgenstein"and "interpretingWittgenstein's rule following argument" are amongthe toughest in town. Despitethe danger,it may be worthwhile, for the purposes of understanding the philosophicalfoundationsof connectionism,to makea move.Wittgenstein's argumentagainstrulescan be interpreted asshowingthe theoretical uselessness of this concept,sinceits allegedwork can be performedby resortingto more economical conceptssuchas"activity" or "training." This is particularly clear in his remarkson language. Wtttgensteinrejectsthe notion

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222 Connectionism that languageis taught ostensively-that is, "[T]he teaching of languageis not explanation,but training." Languageis not a set of rules-that is, "(L)anguageis part of an activity, or of a form of life"; "Explanation is never completed. . . and never shall!" Wittgensteinis interpretedasrejecting "rules" as the underlying conceptof cognitive processes and mentaloperations,whereby roles operateon mental symbols. That is, Wittgenstein is attacking the very conception of the symbolic approachaspointless."Bingo !" would exclaim the connectionist;"Our enemy'sfoe is our friend; thank you Mr. Wittgenstein!" 9. But the connectionistshouldbewareof his newly acquiredfriend. For one thing, Wittgensteinis not necessarily ruling out the notion of rules altogether;he is not substitutingthe "rule" approach with a "rule-free" approach. Wittgensteinrather suggestsconceptualizing regularities as "social practices." After all, one might attemptto accountfor suchpracticesin terms of the acquisition of rules, which are then put to use.Furthermore,Wittgenstein stressesthat suchpracticesdo not necessarily sharea commondenominatorto which they all can be reduced(seeGert, 1995).Human activity, and presumablythe mind, are to be conceivedas an irreducibleplurality of (language)gamesgroundedin a variety of "forms of life." "Bingo again!" the connectionisteuphorically might exclaim. "After all, aren't we also talking about a plurality of processorsworking in parallel, with no single 'executive' that controls all the movesin the game or even all the gamesthat are played in the mind? The 'practices' you talk about, the 'language-games,' are the 'form of life' of the connectionist network playing 'games' of recurrent patterns, interactive flow of activations,and modifications of weights. Wittgenstein'ssocial network of interactions is really a wonderful model for the inner structure and workings of the connectionist framework and of the mind. Thanks again, Mr. Wittgenstein!" 10. But now, in view of thesenotions of Wittgenstein,can connectionism pr0vide insight into the workings of cognition?If we no longer are seekingto reveal an "inner essence" of symbolicrules that allegedlygoverncognition, what is it that we are seeking? Connectionism's reply is that cognition arisesthroughinformation processingthat occursby parallel distributedprocessing of simple activations(Wittgenstein's practicesof languagegamesand forms of life). Connectionismcan aid in understandingthe mechanismsand operations of this processingin a variety of ways.Connectionism can examinecomputationallyhow complexcognitiveabilities decompose into different subsystems, or what the principles and characteristics are by which information is processed (for a discussionon the ways connectionism can be usedfor studyinghigh-levelcognition,seeI. Dror, 1994).For example, if we want to explorewhich subsystems are involvedin a cognitive ability, we can usethe "split networks" techniqueor modular architectureas meansof decomposing a cognitive ability into its subsystems. Thesetechniques detenninewhich processes are computationally distinct and are thus likely to be carried out by different subsystems. Jacobset al. (1991)usedmodular architectureto explore the ways in which visual imagesare decoded.Their investigation showedthat visual processingis divided into distinct subsystems that process "what" and "where" information.

ThePhilosophicalFoundations of Connectionism 223 Another example for using connectionism to explore cognition is by lesioning connectionist models and examining how they break down. The changes in performance due to artificial damage to specific connectionist models are then compared to changes in performance in people with brain damage. This technique has been used to explore the operations involved in reading and their breakdown in dyslexia. (For a summary of these models, see Rueckl & Dror, 1994.)

11. The aboveexamplesshow how connectionism can accountfor mentalphenomena that previously had been accountedfor by the symbolic rule-governed approach. However,Wittgenstein'snotions alsocan opennew horizonsin exploring cognition. Giventhat the mind is not governedby symbolicrules,we caninvestigate phenomena that we observebut haveno understanding, so far, of how they work. One way for conductingsuch studiesis to examinethe performanceof a connectionist network while the representation of information is systematicallymanipulated.This technique of manipulatingrepresentations examines the effectiveness of different processingschemesto achieve a given cognitive ability. Given that we know what infonnation is initially available,we can examinethe flow of information processing ~ackwards- from the cognitive performance backto the initial information. We beginby constructinga connectionistmodelthat is trainedto performa certain cognitive task.Insteadof giving the network the initial input, we takethis initial input and experimenton it; we processit in a variety of ways, eachof which producesa different representation of the initial input. We then feedeachrepresentation to the network, and examinewhich one(s)enable(s) the network to perform the cognitive task in question.This way we are able to ascertainthe information processing necessary for a given task.The systematicmanipulationof representations pr0videsmany importantinsightsinto the information processing involved in cognitive abilities. Dror, Zagaeski, andMoss (1995)usedthis technique to examinethe information processinginvolved in three-dimensionalobject recognition independent of orientation, basedon sonar.They trained a three-layerfeed-forwardnetwork that had248 units to recognizethree-dimensional shapes. Then they examinedthe network'sability to generalizeand recognizethe shapes when they were presented in orientations that were not usedin the training. The manipulation of the representation included two formats: One was a time domain representationthat was createdby digitizing the echowaveform(it had the maximum temporalresolutionand no frequencyresolution); the other was a frequency domain representationthat was createdby the power spectrum(it had the maximum frequencyresolution and no temporalresolution). The network that usedthe pure time domainrepresentation failed to perform the task, whereasthe network that usedthe pure frequencydomain representation was able to generalize andcorrectly recognizethe shapes evenwhen they were presentedin novel orientations.Thus, the performanceof the connectionistnetworks suggests that one needsto processfrequencydomaininformation for object recognition by sonar.In addition,a cross-correlation between the emittedsonarsignaland the returning echoes wascreatedasinput to the network.The network wasunableto perform the taskusing cross-correlational representations. Given the success of the network usingonly information containedin the actualecho,the connectionistnet-

224 Connectionism work demonstratedthat one does not need to examine the echoesrelative to the emittedsound,but rather that the echoby itself encodes the shape information of the object. 12. At this point, we have a better idea of what is at stakein trying to understandthe philosophicalorientation of connectionism's view of mind, in the light of Wittgenstein's view of rules.To be againstthe symbolic approach per sedoesnot yet determine whether one's naturalization of the mind should go inwards (to the domainof activitieswithin the brain) or outwards(to the domainof activities within the socialperspective), or perhapsboth ways.Freud laid the foundationof psychology with the assumptionthat the inner powers can explain behavior. However, Freud'smeansto achieveaccessto the inner powers were rejected as unscientific. Methodological behaviorism, claiming the scientific impenetrability of the inner powers,resortedto the outer powers.The cognitive revolution, in turn, proposedto go into the inner powersthrough the notion of executive-drivensymbolic manipulation according to rules. Wittgenstein renouncesthis latter notion and therefore rejectsit asa meansof explainingthe inner powers.Similar to behaviorists, Wittgenstein turns to the outer powers.Connectionismprovides a meansto accountfor the inner powerswithout resorting to the false and illusory construct of rules. Seenin this light, the relationshipbetweenWittgensteinand connectionism is not just one of "complementarity"(Mills, 1994;for a critique seeDascal, 1995);the former providing a phenomenologicaldescription of the phenomenathat the latter attempts to explain.Rather,Wittgensteinshouldbe seenas someonewho clearsthe groundfor new modesof explanationof cognitive phenomena through the rejection of a familiar, commonsense, and yet unreliable theoreticalconstruct.

Acknowledgments We thank Wllliam K. Estes,Daniel L. Schacter, Jay G. Rueckl, JamesIntriligator, and Ofra Rechterfor their commentson an earlier version of this chapter.Please sendall correspondence concerningthis chapterto: ltiel Drar, PsychologyDepartment,BentonHall, Miami University, Oxford, OH 45056.USA

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