Talking Points

Congressman Wolfs Inquiry and the Senate Select Committee Report

In his November 6th letter, Congressman Wolf inquires about pre-September 11th visa
processing issues, and essentially focuses on the visa applications of the terrorist hijackers.
He requests an OIG investigation of whether visa laws, policies and procedures in effect at
that time were properly followed with regard to the hijackers. Specifically, he asks whether
their visa applications were (1) destroyed; (2) filled in completely, (3) subject to denial or
further scrutiny, including personal interviews; or (4) accepted and visas issued within
existing policy and regulation. A fifth question relates to possible information in the
Department linking any of the hijackers to terrorist concerns before the visas were issued.

Answers to these questions may be pertinent to the recent Senate Select Committee Report,
Recommendation 16, tasking Inspectors General to conduct investigations into September
11,2001 personal accountability. IGs are tasked to

"review the factual findings and the record of this inquiry and conduct
investigations and reviews as necessary to determine whether and to what
extent personnel at all levels should be held accountable for any omission,
commission, or failure to meet professional standards in regard to the
identification, prevention, or disruption of terrorist attacks, including the
events of September 11, 2001.... Based on those investigations and reviews,
agency heads should take appropriate disciplinary and other action...."

What happened? At this stage (12/26), based on our interviews and review of information
available to the GAO, we can tentatively answer the Congressman's five questions as
follows:

1) Four of the 23 hijacker visa applications were destroyed. Their destruction (at Berlin and
Jeddah) was carried out in accordance with policies prevalent at that time.
2) Most, if not all of the remaining 19 applications were not filled in completely (at Riyadh,
Jeddah, Abu Dhabi and Dubai).
3) Nevertheless, apparently under the prevailing policies at that time, the applications were
not subject to further scrutiny, nor the applicants to personal interviews.
4) Currently, it appears probable that the consular officers who accepted those applications
and issued the visas to the hijackers were apparently acting within existing policy in
effect at their respective posts.
5) We are unable at this point to determine whether there was information available within
the Department linking any of the 19 hijackers to terrorist concerns before the visas were
issued.

How did we get there? According to information available from the Visa Office, the
October 2002 GAO report on the visa process and our report to Senator Grassley, several
factors impacted the Department's ability to properly and effectively carry out its obligations
in the visa process. From 1997 to September 2001:

• Visa demand rose significantly more sharply than did trained staff available to
perform the function.
 • Sufficient resources to permit proper personal interviews of every visa applicant were
never allocated.
• Consular sections regularly experienced extended staffing gaps when no eligible or
qualified consular officers were available to adjudicate visas, particularly during
summer months.
• Posts were consistently exhorted to "do more with less," to "work around" American
staff who had inadequate language training, and to lessen officer involvement in
much of the visa process.
• Posts were given broad discretion in processing visas, running their visa operations,
and encouraged to promote travel to the U.S. and customer service for visa applicants.
• Many visa officers faced pressures from local officials, from other sections and
agencies at their posts, and from interested parties hi the U.S., including the Hill, to
issue visas, but rarely, if ever, to refuse applicants.
• For terrorism screening consular officers relied mainly on CLASS name checks to
determine whether visa applicants were suspected of being terrorists.
• Prior to September 11,2001 the CLASS lookout system apparently did not contain
the names of any of the 19 terrorist hijackers.

How will we inspect? To prepare our response we reviewed the GAO files and have spoken
with their investigators. We are conducting file reviews and discussions at the Visa Office
and the NEA regional bureau regarding visa laws, policies, procedures, home office
instructions to the field, and related communications in place during the November 1997 to
June 2001 timeframe during which the visas were issued. We are also reviewing the contents
of CLASS with the INR/TIPOFF staff.

In January 2003 we will travel to the relevant Middle East posts and interview the officers
who issued the visas and obtain a description from each regarding all the relevant factors
involved in their issuing visas to the 19 terrorist hijackers. We will inquire into visa practices
at post as they understood them, including but not limited to personal appearance policies,
adequacy of staffing, space and time, their supervisors' directions and guidance, interviewing
techniques and training, and the roles of their "Front Offices" in setting visa policy at post
and involvement in the visa process. We plan to ask similar questions of their consular
supervisors, focusing on the political ambiance at the Middle East posts. If we ascertain at
that point that individual ambassadors, principal officers or DCMs were involved in
encouraging or pressuring visa officers to issue visas "for political reasons," or the like, we
would propose to interview those persons and verify the details of their involvement.

OIG/ISP/CE (NJK) 12/17/02