NonAlignment 2.

0: A foreign and strategic policy for India in the 21st century" is a publication by Centre for Policy Research that was released in March 2012. This document identifies the basic principles and drivers that would ma e !ndia a leadin" player on the world sta"e while preservin" its strate"ic autonomy and value system. The document Nonalignment 2.0 was written over 1# months of deliberations by $unil %hilnani& Ra'iv %umar& Pratap (hanu Mehta& )t. *en. +retd., Pra ash Menon& -andan -ile ani& $rinath Ra"havan& $hyam $aran and $iddharth .aradara'an. !t also ha d some inpits -ational $ecurity/dviser $hivshan ar Menon and 0eputy -ational $ecurity /dvisers /lo Prasad and )atha Reddy. This document is an idea to identify the basic principles that should "uide !ndia1s forei"n and strate"ic policy over ne2t decade.

The core philosophy of the document is that 3 success of !ndia1s own internal development will depend decisively on how effectively we mana"e our "lobal opportunities in order to ma2imi4e our choices5thereby enlar"in" our domestic options to the benefit of all !ndians. The report points out that in a situation where the world is no lon"er bifurcated between two dominant powers& nonali"nment today will re6uire mana"in" complicated coalitions and opportunities in an environment that is not structurally settled. Report deals with !ndia1s approach towards the 1/sian theatre&1 the international order& hard3power& internal security& non3conventional security issues li e ener"y and nuclear options& the nowled"e and information foundations of power as well as the state and democracy. The report has "enerated controversy too. The authors of the report have been accused of resurrectin" the buried "host of non3ali"nment& which alle"edly served to limit rather than advance !ndia1s interests.

Contents

7hat is -on /li"nment8 (ac "round of -on3ali"nment 3 !ndia and 9$ durin" -ehru :ra; !ndia < 9$$R !mplications of -on3ali"nment; :nd of -on3ali"nment 1.0; =ailures of -on3ali"nment; The need for -on3ali"nment 2.0; Report )in ;

What

is

Non

Alignment?

!ndia after independence& was presented as an ancient but resur"ent !ndia& full of enthusiasm and idealism tal in" in the lar"er perspective of history and loo in" forward to the future of man ind. !ndia propa"ated her passion for peace and cooperation rather than war or confrontation and Policy of -on /li"nment and anticolonism.

The phrase "non3ali"ned" was first used by . % %rishna Menon at the 9nited -ations *eneral /ssembly in 1>?@ and by Aawahar )al -ehru in 1>?B. (ut as early as in late 1>#0s& -ehru had spelt out the strate"y behind the phrase& first in Constituent /ssembly debates and later in Parliament. !n a radio broadcast in 1>#B& -ehru said& " We shall take full part in international conferences as a free nation with our own policy and not merely as a satellite of another nation." The core idea was that& the very sense of !ndia& with its history and civilisation attributes& demands the pursuit of an independent foreign policy. 0ecisions relatin" to !ndia1s vital interests should not be e2ternally determined. Maintainin" and& if possible& e2pandin" the country1s strate"ic autonomy is a continuin" ob'ective.

.ia -onali"nment& -ehru proposed that !ndia should avoid entering into "other people's quarrels "& unless, and this is important and "our interest is involved". -ehru once said that "We should either be strong enough to produce some effect or we should not interfere at all"& which demonstrates a realistic awareness of the limits of !ndia1s ability to influence events. -ehru also did not rule out enterin" into an alliance if that proved necessary; "We are not going to join a war if we can help it: we are going to join the side which is to our interest when the time comes to make the choice." The way Aawaharlal -ehru conceived -onali"nment was a strate"y and not a doctrine. =or -ehru& the non3ali"nment was a strate"y desi"ned to ma2imise newly independent !ndia1s "ains from the world system. -onali"nment did not mean to choose to become a hermit in"dom. -ehru ept the 7est open for trade and aid& while on the other& it avoided alienatin" the two communist powers in !ndia1s immediate nei"hbourhood& China and the $oviet 9nion. (y adoptin" a policy to be friendly to all& -ehru hoped to receive critical necessary forei"n aid at that time. The -onali"nment 1.0 was 'ust a way of ma in" it clear that India would act in her interests first rather than the interests of Washington, oscow, or !eijing "#eking$.

Background of Non-alignment - India and Nehru

! during "ra#

The end of 7orld 7ar !! led to the circumstances which were accompanied by a possibility of !ndia1s independence. 1>#C to 1>B# is called -ehru :ra and -ehru :ra was the most important and a formative era for !ndia1s forei"n policy. 7hen !ndia became independent& the forei"n portfolio was held by -ehru himself. !t is not that -ehru never wished to "et closer to 9nited $tates. /s a.ice President +The current PM is e6uivalent to .P of interim *overnment, of the

!nterim *overnment in 1>#B& -ehru stressed the stron" "Cultural" lin s between !ndia and 9nited $tates. !n Dctober 1>#> that -ehru visited 9$/ for the first time as !ndia1s Prime Minister. (ut the chilliness of 9$/ towards !ndia was more or less seen in suspicion by !ndia durin" those times. 9nited $tates lac ed any concerns for !ndia. The core sub'ects of 9$ forei"n policy at that time were 3Potential 0an"er from 9$$R and China& =reedom and Peace throu"h -/TD and military alliances& offerin" 9$/!0 to toe their line& a pure commercial approach with a want of business in other countries. -ehru& who represented a self respectin" country& was dis"usted by this ideolo"y. (ut still& it was the critical aid& which actually forced !ndia to approach 9nited $tates. !ndia was viewed by 9nited $tates as a wea and bac ward country which was in dire need of =inancial Resources. 9$/ also over e2pected from !ndia that she would accept the /merican )ine of policy& but -ehru1s policy of -onali"nment and strate"ic3independence was a different approach. !ndia perhaps over e2pected from 9$ ta in" it as a champion of democracy that would support the lar"est democracy.

India

!!%

!t is always alle"ed that despite its policy of -on3 ali"nment& !ndia could not eep herself non3ali"ned practically as it moved closer to 9$$R and became its ally. This is factually incorrect. -ehru had first approached the 7est and it was only after the 7est refused that !ndia as ed the 9$$R for its pro'ects such as $teel 9nits. Dn the 0efense front also& 9$ and 9% were often reluctant to sell or e2tend lines of credit to !ndia. -onetheless& the 9nited $tates remained !ndia1s lar"est provider of aid +to less propa"andistic effect than $oviet aid, throu"hout the Cold 7ar. !n the decade of fifties& !ndia initiated its friendly relationships with 9$$R. !ndian Prime minister1s visit to Russia and return visit of $oviet leaders ir ed 9$/. !n )ate ?0s 9$/ came in open support to Pa istan on %ashmir

!ssue. The chances of bri"ht !ndia 9$ relations were almost lost and the chances of bri"ht !ndia 9$$R relations appeared. (y the end of ?01s decade& 9$ had started re"ardin" !ndia as a Pro3soviet country.

Implications

of

Non-alignment#

0espite of initial rumblin"s from 9$ con"ress& !ndia was fairly successful in its policy of non3ali"nment. !ndia received aid from both bloc s and neither too !ndia as a threat. !n -ehru :ra& !ndia was able to maintain satisfactory relations with 9$ as well as 9$$R. Eowever& !ndia found herself movin" closer and closer to the $oviet 9nion. The reasons were;

9nited $tates ept supplyin" arms to Pa istan despite repeated admonition from !ndia =rom -ew 0elhi1s perspective& 9$ was an unreliable partner& it was proved in 1>B0s durin" financial crisis and food crisis. 9$$R reassured !ndia re"ardin" the security measures a"ainst a potential Chinese attac !ndia and 9$ remained in contravention over the nuclear 6uestion !ndia was sub'ect to a nuclear blac mail by 9$ +alle"edly, when it deployed its aircraft carrier 9$$ :nterprise durin" the !ndia F Pa istan 7ar of 1>C1 !ndia did not li e the 9$ presence at &iego 'arcia in the !ndian Dcean 7e can say that !ndia and 9$ relations remained acerbated for the first few decades of !ndia1s impendence and that is why !ndia tilted towards Moscow and signed the Indo%&oviet 'riendship (reaty in )ugust *+,*.

"nd

of

Non-alignment

(.0#

Throu"hout the Cold 7ar& non3ali"nment was used to serve !ndia1s interests foremost. !t was a strate"y not a doctrine and with the end of the cold war& non3ali"nment died& leavin" a "host nown as the unusable do"ma of -on3ali"nment.

)ailures

of

Non-alignment#

The critics of -on3ali"nment say that the bi""est failure of the policy was the !ndia1s failure to deal with China in 1>B2. !t was said that !ndia could move closer to 9$ to counter the ab'ect poverty& "rim state of economy and problems in forei"n trade. Eowever& these were problems of !ndia as a state and not !ndia as a country with independent forei"n policy. The failure was not of non3ali"nment& but of an economy spirallin" out of control +the concurrence with the China warG pushin" of !ndia1s =ive Hear Plans off schedule, and held policies held to because they had become articles of faith than strate"ies.

*he

need

for

Non-alignment

2.0#

The Centre for +olicy %esearch seems to have replicated fairly well -ehru1s strate"y of retainin" strate"ic autonomy. Het it seems to be a half hearted "uide for !ndia1s forei"n policy in 21st century.

!ndia1s enhanced economic and security capabilities enable it to influence e2ternal events and outcomes in a widenin" orbit compared to the Cold 7ar years. !ndia en'oys "reater levera"ebut bears "reater responsibility in dealin" with re"ional issues such as $outh /sian and :ast /sian economic inte"ration and "lobal issues such as climate chan"e and ener"y security. =urthermore& in a "lobalises world& e2ternal issues impact our economic and social development prospects while domestic choices we ma e as a country& in turn& have an impact on the

e2ternal environment. Promotion of !ndia1s interests demands far "reater en"a"ement with the world than ever before. 0ependin" on the issue at hand& !ndia will find itself wor in" with shiftin" and variable coalitions rather than throu"h settled alliances or "roupin"s. The country has inherent assets& such as a favourable demo"raphy& a strate"ic location and a culture of creativity and innovation& which create a window of opportunity to drive !ndia1s emer"ence as a front3ran in" power& a master of its own destiny but "eneratin" a ran"e of public "oods that ma e the world a better and safer place to live in.