of / The Jurisdiction / the Hegelian


/ by nancy jean-luc

remark:Hegel should not be A begin witha preliminary of a politior as oneexample considered here in his singularity, In I lift the that from cal philosopher amongothers. question in factto a limiting him,I address myself point of political in generaland of philosophical a limiting politics, philosophy for which are not unrelated to which reasons to Hegel, point in philosophy his (finalin all sensesof theword), finalposition I do not mean simply that and relief sharpness. givesspecial pointto lightinsofaras he repreHegel bringsthislimiting - and an opening-up - of philosophy.I sents a closing-off mean also, and more precisely, thatthissame pointappears, in the Statesman of Plato,forexample,in although differently, theSovereign of Hobbesor of Rousseau,and thatit reappears in the"sovereignty" with itsproblems of Bataille.The analysis I shallproposeshould engage withall the analysesthusprogrammed. The generalform of thequestionposed on thispointis the How do following: thingsstand withrespectto the minimal articulation between thejuridicaland thepolitical which is the - not of its articulation of the effectuation of the law (droit) execution or of its application as a practical or material probut of decision which the makes the law effective? This cess, decisionis itself an act of law,but it is notin theorderof the of in theorderof the particularthe law,it inheres generality (I adopt here the termsof the Social ityof its employment This howeveris nothingother in, 1). Contract, employment than that of the social institution as such, if this requires



and originally somethinglike a right(droit) necessarily of itsregulation here notas an instrument understood "right" or itself but as thatby whichthe social institution recognizes itself itself). (thatis to say,institutes reflexively "symbolizes" with thejuridicalat thispointas the articulates The political But latter's implication. sincethe law is such onlyas it operative law of as the effective declaresand decides itself effectively itself the juridical articulates such and such a collectivity, as to itsowninstituting equallywellat thispointto thepolitical, one could showthatit of which condition: a doublearticulation It is in and of theprince. in Rousseau,of thesovereign is that, that decides as to the the of articulation the judgment general as such (and law,of thejudgmentthatpronounces legitimacy as we shallhaveto pointout,perhapsgoes whoseproblematic, of the so-called"decisionist" beyondthe habitualframework is the This judgmentof the particular problematic). judgment and the generaljudgmentof the of a law (droit), generality in of this,in Kantianterms, of a law (and virtue particularity of a determining theperhapsunrealizable judgment synthesis and a reflective judgment). of thedeclathemotif contains Sincetheterm"jurisdiction" of the rationthatdecidesand, in its modernsense,the motif effective power of the law (of the law or of the power of I shallcall thisarticulaor another), judgmentin one district
tion political jurisdiction.

of the Hegelianmonarch. And so I come to thejurisdiction whichis wellknown I willnotdwellon the generalscheme, whichcharacterizes and up to a point established, Hegel's State totalitarian the of the as itself, thought ofRight Philosophy or as an organism of thesocialtotality in thatit is thethought is the which of thelifeof theSubject, character as theorganic mind of the people, whichin its turn is the culmination, of the world of the "self-consciousness accordingto history, of mind"(#347).It is in thiswaythat"theStateis theactuality the ethicalIdea" (#257), and thatone mightsay (although thatremain somedifficulties be admitted, it must overlooking,



on a closerexamination) thatthe Stateis the finaltruth of the in totalsystem of subjectivity. could case (One any appeal to theend of theRemark at #552of theEncyclopedia: philosophy existsin the end onlyas the State,as thatStatethatdevelops the truth of the Protestant religion.) But in pronouncing thattruth is the State,one has not yet said anything. It is stillnecessary to determine of the content thistruth, thatis to say,of theStateas such.Hegel determines in mostradical fashion,in oppositionto the State the this, conceived as theadministration of relations individubetween is that to to civil als, say, society:
sonalfreedom, thentheinterests individuals as suchbecome ofthe the ultimate end of theirassociation, and it follows thatmemof the Stateis something bership optional.But the State'srelationto theindividual is quitedifferent from this.SincetheState is mind objectified, it is only as one of its members thatthe individual himself has objectivity, and an genuineindividuality, ethical life.Union as such is the truecontent and aim, and the is the livingof a universal life (#258; the individual's destiny in one or two points). translation is Knox's modified

IftheState isconfused with civil andifitsspecific endis society, laiddownas thesecurity and protection and perof property

the veritable content of the Statemeansthatthe Stateeffects therelation, it does notpoliceor regulate it. The effectuation of therelation is truesubjectivity, thussubjectivity is the truth of the State. That is, the truthof the subjectivity is not - but with its its its and needs, interests, individuality rights therelation between individualities as therelation to theSpirit and the relation of the Spiritto the self. In a sense, and all other differences aside, nothingelse determines the zoonpolitikon, man's political"animality" or "naturalness" forAristotle: thecommerce of ethicaldiscourse, which aims at the city's "living well," a living-together-

A number of other textsconfirmthe importanceof thisopposition, in particular the marginal notes in the sections on property. - "die Vereinigung - should be That union as such als solche"



of needs and interests. according-to-the-good independently natureof the Unionas suchdenotesthe excessof the specific zoonpolitikon, itsexcesswithrespectto the social organization the effectuaand finally of relations thatbenefit the partners, in excessof any regulaitself as absolutely tionof the relation to or as absolutely tion of relations.As opposed diverging as "unionas such" definespolitics froma policing of society, the (immanent? we shall see to whatdegree) transcendence of the collective life. deterWe should keep clearlybeforeus thisfundamental whichis here,surely, thatof the totalState,thatis, mination, socialorganizathattranscends as an organism of subjectivity in its naand but which is nonetheless, simultaneously, tion, as of the relationand in its description ture as effectuation we inevitable the locus of an transcendence, question (Can to like a requirement not takeintoaccountsomething simply and an ultimate on thecontrary, effect therelation? Isn'tthat, notonly"as man'slastquestion," crucial but,"taking question, to twist of it farther last the still, onlyslightly question being," one of Bataille's and thelocusofa singular phrases1) complicaitself. tion in Hegelian theory This of themonarch. This complication is thatof thetheory as as for a reason is true,in thefirst formally simple itis place, the truthof this truthis the apodictic:if the State is truth, monarch. the monarch Indeed, is,to quote onlya fewphrases, and the base of everything" "the summit (#278), the "absoof the whole" decisive moment (#279), and "the exislutely the of thewhole,within tenceof sovereignty as thepersonality is The monarch to its that conforms reality concept"(#279). of thetruth of theState;he is,therefore, thetruth (thereality) the truthof the "trueend," thatis, of "union as such." Or - the conagain,the onenessand uniquenessof the monarch - makethe ceptof whichis above all determined bythemonos and thustheeffective truth of union,theeinof theVereinigung,
1 Cf. Le Collegede sociologie, p. 533.



of its tranand the immanence achievement of the relation, scendence. examine the Hegelian State without We cannot therefore thatis, without the monarch, standingaside, for examining consider of the moment,from the question commentators the greater importance,that of the State-as-government, in the the short, State-as-its-functionaries, State-as-apparatus, in thesense theState-as-organism, or rather, State-as-machine, of This of a collective gesture reading is further organism. in Fleischsupportedby certainitemsin the commentaries, B. as well E. as or for Weil, by Bourgeois's mann, example, thatwe isolateand This gesturerequiresfurthermore study.2 out of thatpartof "ideological fora moment, sliding" neglect, of the monarch, ceras such thatthe theory the speculative on one but tainly, plane only,requires.(The phrase "clumsy ideologicalsliding"is Adorno's,fromthe thirdof his Etudes an surHegel;* as ithappens,thephrasein context accompanies odd slidingon Adorno'sown part,whichcuts offhis quotations from Hegel's text at the very moment of Hegel's - while the excised speculativededuction of the monarch of theÉtudes.) quotationis used in Hegel's favorin the first it is enoughto keep to E. Weil'sprinciple In thisrespect, (but ". . . theHegelianthesis morefaithfully thanhe does himself): deservesto be judged on the plane thatit [of the monarch] claimsas its own, thatof reason."4 ifwe are to answer to the thelastcondition correctly Finally, internal not so muchto seek in the necessities of the system: a form of even were it the constitution, Hegelian monarchy in its narrowsense," as best (thiswould stillbe "monarchy I proposediffers in princi#273 has it,and here the analysis as to the twoconverge), ple fromthatof Bourgeois, although
ou la logiquede Hegel (Paris: Pion, 1968); Eugène Fleishmann,La Scienceuniverselle Eric Weil, Hegel et la philosophie du droit(Paris: PUF, 1979); Bernard Bourgeois, "Le Prince hégélien," in Hegel et la philosophie du droit(Paris: Vrin, 1978). 3 Theodor W. Adorno, Troisétudessur Hegel (Paris: Pavot, 1979). 4 Eric Weil, Hegel et l'état (Paris: Vrin, 1974), p. 60. 2



seek the truth of all constitutions, the truth of thepolitical as such. (A precise examination of Hegel's early thinking on wouldsupportthis:the first of the theory of politics inklings the monarchare at least visibleas of 1802.)
TheMonarch theWhole oftheState

The necessity of the monarch follows fromthe verynecesthe mostabsoluteand compelling thereis, of subjectivity, sity, or of Spirit. it as ". . . in itstruth, follows: #278puts subjectivexists as and as The subject, ity only only person." personality is the of achievement theabstraction of subjectivspirit's logic in and as the concreteness of the of existence the subject. ity The subjectexistsas an empirical as that subject, person.The Statecannotexistsave through and in such an existence. We in thisnecessity theabsolutenecessity of the system recognize and of the processof the Spiritin general,the necessity for the conceptto be achieved,according,for example, to this ". . . theconceptis phrasefromtheend of thePhenomenology: the necessity and the blossoming of the Dasein thathas substanceas itsessenceand existsforitself." It is to thisabsolute and ontological whichsimultaneously involves the constraint, of the the manifestation of and what one logic concept, spirit, thephysics or thephysiology of the call,in manysenses, might that the and of Idea, verysingularposition complication the monarch correspond. nor the This monarchis thusreallyneither the substance, nor the foundation of the State; nor is he eitherits finality, of its Idea the elementsof the State and of the moments as thisorganiccopresence and persons), (institutions, powers, theDa-seinof the is to as an effective that itself, presence, say, in and as this of the essenceof the political existing political, of powers(he is zoon.Thus he is in no fashion a concentration
right or its power. But he is all thatat once insofaras he is "at once"ofall that.He is the copresence of only-the absolutely-but



notan absolutemonarch), still less a personalpower(he is not a despot). Distinctfromthe people (insofaras it is a true people accordingto its spirit)as well as fromthe legislative - thesynthesis and governmental he is- and is only of powers, theState,thatis to say,itsorganicity selected itself, existing/or out of itself, autonomized is to (that itself) say,autonomizing and existing as such. The monarch, at thatrate,is less the in theStatethanthesuperior individual supremeindividual of - and thisindividthe State,or the Stateitself as individuality as such, is not so much superior(in the sense of a uality, of powers,of functions, or of rights) to the other hierarchy in the individualities as it is superioreven to anything which, creates a hierarchical and subordinate relaState, superiority tions.Hegel can writein #284: them can be . . . only or theindividuals thecouncils composing The very of themonarch, insofar as the responsible. majesty decisive is placedaboveall responsibility supreme subjectivity, fortheaffairs of theStategovernment. This "aboveresponsibility" of powerdesignates a superiority - so separate - thatitis really so absolute of another naturefrom the superiority of commandor of administration. According to a logic whichis perhapsstillthatof sovereignty (now the monarch is the existence of sovereignty; cf. #278), the word is a doublet of of the (this "supremacy" "sovereignty") monarch is beyondthesystem of supremacy, or of superiority in general.If the monarch is the "summit" (#273),it is notas thetop of an edifice, as thelaststoneof a pyramid, butas the of perfection the edificerealizedforitself (he would be then notthe placingof the laststoneof the pyramid, but the form or thenatureof thatstone,whichis itself a pyramid, and the in thewholepyramid . . .). If,as #279putsit,"sovonly pyramid existsonlyas subjectivity," thatis to say,as an "auereignty todétermination withno foundation" and an "ultimate ele- and if "subjectivity mentof decision" existsonlyas subject,"



not through is beyondsovereignty then the sovereign itself, of thatvery theincarnation butthrough somenewsuperiority sovereignty. - its "all at The monarchis thus the whole of the State that is to say, as someonewhose once" as something extra, that of the State. (Everything personal unityaccomplishes in generalis persends us back thusto the axiom thatunity is a man The monarch and that the is sonal, person unitary.) withotherindividuals in addition, who is not to be numbered to existas a unity. their union on the but who causes contrary - as a ¿s the accomplishment of the relationship The monarch to itself. relationship in himis thuslessa political which The problematic emerges of the existenceof the than the problematic problematic of the of as the political such, problematic the individuation a zoonpolitikon as such. #279 makes this clear: "a society, a it does not have concrete as a as can be, community,family, on the contrary, moment"; except as an abstract personality of theStateis realonlyifitis a singleperson." "thepersonality of a zoon(and this The existence of thezoonis the existence to Aristotle; determination would not be, in the end, strange whatbelongs onlyto Hegel,on theotherhand,or themodern is of the zoe as subjective the life). assignation age, And thisnecessity thatof existence in general,thatof the thereis of existence whichmeansthat,precisely, existentiality "in general" recovers no existence or redoubles the necessity of the concept, whichis to effect to the passage to existence, as an exisconceiveitself as existence and to engenderitself that is to as a certain as tent, existent, the"this" say,necessarily of a "naturalexistence," is nothing says#280. This necessity else thanthe one established the by ontological proof,as the same sectionsays,the necessity of the "passage fromthe abto one soluteconceptto being."And since,at leastaccording of thesidesof thesystematic consideration of therelationship lifeis thedivineSpirit between theStateand religion, "ethical insofar as it residesin the consciousness of self,in the con-



who composeit" of a people or of the individuals sciousness of #552),it is possibleto say thatthe existence (Encyclopedia, theontological the monarch stemsfrom proofbothaccording to a montage"in series" and accordingto a montage"in authorized by the expression parallel"(bothbeingessentially of #280: "the same passage from the concept to being" a conversion, it is nota passagebutrather dasselbe Umschlagen: a metamorphosis and a precipitation). Thus the monarchexecutes the Umschlagen of the State within the conversion of union as such into theunity existence, of a real person.Now it might wellbe thatthe problematic of in existence,of the concreteexecution,is the Umschlagen as old as philosophy, thanthe else,in a determination nothing As the Platonic of the of the science very political. problematic Kairos 305 c-d),or, in Aristotle, as the architectonic (Statesman scienceof praxis, or again, withRousseau, as the discourse which is a politicalact (Social Contract, the Introduction), of the allies itself with philosophy political always principally a of Verwirklichung. The concept of the logic of effectuation, is at leastalso thatof the concrete effectuation of its political - and perhaps,if the contentof thisessence,as the essence true Good or the ethical Idea, is itselfnothingpolitical, of thepolitical isjust thatof effectuperhapsthentheconcept ation(and thus,of the effectuation of the philosophical). It is thisalso, forexample,thatthe eighthof the Theses on Feuerbach says or evokes in its way: "All social life is essentially The problemof the politicalin this sense is not practical." determined fromthe politicalas a point of departure,but from theproblem or rather the metaphysical of exisrequisite tence. The essenceof the political in thissense of the consists - in the existence of thelogos or of thesubstance of humanity existence of union as such.If political is the probphilosophy lem of a science,it is alwaysa questionof the problemof a scienceof effectuation and of the effectuation of thisscience. A scienceof the transcendence of the conceptin itsexistence (see also #27,28, 29, and 337 Rem.of xhe Philosophy ofRight).


in No WaySymbolic TheMonarch

The monarch, as thisreal person,is thus the truthof the union because he is its existence.Now the union must be envisagedin two ways: 1. As to itscontent, theunionshouldbe theaccomplishment which to thepersonin general("the of therelation is essential in relation withanfinds himself essentially particular person otherparticularity," (and we remember #182).Now theperson is a person) is not even morethana subject, thatthe monarch, whichknowsitself as it is "the singularity the subject, simply and which as such freewill"{Encyclopedia, an absolutely #448), and to in relation to the"beingof otherpersons" is essentially Thus the theirrecognition {ibid.,#490, 491). person is still of the subject accordingto the and finally the singularity of of theefficacy into division or rather the singularities people, but rather effecin thisway,is not"divided" a people (which, itself knows which tuated),for the people is "the substance free"{ibid., #514). For all thesereasons,the accomplishment otherthanthe effectuaof personsis nothing of the relation to it,of essential and in the relation tion,in the particularity "the Dasein of if is defined as and in general, right itself right free will(vouloir it, which,as Hegel clarifies libre)," through but as englobmustbe takennotjust as juridicalright, "right of of all the determinations the ing presence (the Dasein) of these determifreedom"{ibid.,#486). Now the totality nations is foundin therelation to free of freewill(volonté libre) in such. will,or the people as of the union as such of The monarch, beingthe existence - or more theDaseinof right the people,is theverypresence, in existenceof the effective exactlyhe is the presentation He does notoperate of freewilland of itsrecognition. presence betweenpersonsand in thispresence,whichin the relation it. buthepresents the mindof thepeople is alreadyefficacious, does not of freedom) therelation To accomplish (offreedoms, the finish meanto perfect it,butto incarnate it,to completely



that it is in itself.The monarchis, to make it perfection is the present of right. Or: his existence existence redundant, or quality of right, but only and not,by itself, any property in as pure its The or existence sum ecceity. ecceity absolutely but the being-there, as dasein is no right, here,in position, of or its person, right, again Darstellung. Now the properdetermination of rightis precisely, as the willand of of rational Daseinof freewill, notsimply "theunity of this will,"but the effective (and efficient) positing singular unity: for ofthis the law(dasGesetz) is (the content truth) (gesetzt) posited theconsciousness ofintelligence with determination as a power (ibid., #485). having validity is by itsessence an effective Right positing (justas it is "theempiri... cal existence of freedom consciousof itself"[Phil.Right, The of is its #30]). efficacy right in sum the rightof right, sensible declaration to the intelligence, of its and the exercise is decided and legitimate power.Right right posited.Positing isjuris-diction. (die Setzung) The efficacy of unionis thuspositing, as Gesetz(t)-sein ecceity of thejurisdiction of freedom. The monarchdoes not incarnate the union to furnish it in some fashion withfleshand a it because union as such is rightand visage. He incarnates as such is the Da-sein of "right" as a general formof right freedom thelatter in itself (we should constituting legitimacy of course dwell at some other time on the nature of this freedom). to thecontent of theunionor of the Thus, and with respect of themonarch isjustified notonlyby the State,theexistence or as far as the of the ontological proofapplied pursued Spirit determination whichrepeople, but also by the ontological of its the of as its quires right right factuality, ecceity jurisdiction. We thus touchfor the first timeon a singularity whichis of the existence of perhapsthe mostdetermining singularity



is in no way a reprethe monarch:it is thathis incarnation It is hard to undera a sentation, figuration, symbolization. on severaloccasions standhowE. Weil,forexample, can write or sovereignty, the universal, thatthe monarch"represents" etc. Precisely, the monarchis what he is that is to say, - onlybecause a necessity, reexists unique but polymorphic, bothof the people and of the quires thatthe representation of theState, in the should be, gone beyondand principle right in effective transcended presence.In no waydoes the Hegerole.At thesame timehe has no have a symbolic lian monarch an important one exception, one, as we shallsee), power(with and especially notanyabsolute power buthe is (and does not of power,the mightof the the absolute position symbolize) thanits efficacy withno othercontent people and of right and this contentmakes the essence of right,for "concrete of the spirit"(marginalnote to rightis the absolutenecessity notein thesame section, to another or #28), again,according of a dizzying and in a formula (ethicité) radicality: "ethicality - existence." does not has a right The monarch, then, symOn thecontrary, bolize,in themostgeneralsenseof theterm. he opens perhapsthe questionof a symbolization, caughtbeof tween a Greekmeaning and, letus say,a Lacanianmeaning of thepeople and whichwouldbe thesymbolization theterm, - a questionin whichthis of the right (or of one in theother) would of symbolization forthemoment, acceptance, enigmatic as such. relation otherthantheefficacy ofthe nothing designate of content the of that first this on Let us conclude aspect the union, and hence of the contentof the person of the immediate a simple, between monarch: presenceand a reprethe monarch sentation, poses thequestionof an absolute(that as of copresence of a is to say, aside,an individuation) putting or of the relation a question such,or of reciprocal presence, thequestionof thesubject, than in which is nothing other, fact, as of all thesubject-of-representation, is notfirst ifthesubject the support-of-the-idea-or-of-the-image (thatis to say,of the but is firstof all the subject of a second representation),



which necessarilypasses through the presentation-to-itself - through relationas such. a self to a self of presentation whichlies at the heartof It is the questionof thisrelation the second aspect under whichunion should be considered: 2. Union as such should in effectbe envisagedas to its or as to its "modality." "form," In otherwords, in orderto understand theexistential unity we wouldhave therelation, of themonarch as it accomplishes to be able to understandwhat is the case withthe relation - or modality - of the relationas such should be itself. Being its itsabsorption, itsreabsorption, able to be questioned before - for that solutionor its reliefin the monarch'ssubjectivity alone would permitus to discernthe being or the specific which is a subjectivity as the of this subjectivity, modality but whose substancemust of an individual existence subject, butrather of thisindividual, the notbe thesubstance precisely the an itself. same contents of therelation time, (At interrogationabout the relation would necessarily be an interrogation - and of freedom.) about the essenceof right in manyways,thequesNow we shallhave to observethat, indicatedeverywhere tion of relationposes a limit-question, butneverlookedat foritself by Hegel at leastneverwithout the resolution of the relationin an arche-teleopresupposing This resolution therefore the presupconstitutes logicalunity. of condition the monarch. the determination However, posed of the monarch is precisely thatalso whichmakesthispresupSuch is the positioncome forthand rendersit problematic. double hypothesis to guide us in our work and whichalso marks offtheultimate of vacillation, even edge of incertitude, of transgression, of philosophical about the political thought in general. is in orderbeforewe envisage thequestionof the (A remark relation: to the extentthatthePhilosophy ofRight places itself in the System, I leave aside, forthisquestion, the textof the about the of and Phenomenology struggle self-consciousnesses, about the dialecticof the masterand the slave. For many



reasonseitherknownor to be looked into,thePhenomenology as such.It is no accident does not if,at the fitintothe System its resolution less same time,his texton relation presupposes - or at or otherwise than the System does. And if in addition - the political of thecompleis nottheelement thesame time We come back to this tionof thePhenomenology ofSpirit. may - or question.For the timebeing it is the logic ordered by - the Statewhichshould guide us.) for I shall envisage three successivemodes of access to the questionof the relation: to those in terms nearest as faras possible, 1. Takingthings, which could elements thefirst of thePhenomenology, bringthe would be but in theEncyclopedia to our attention relation forand in the of consciousnesses of the struggle the element themas such. I will whichconstitutes processof recognition in recallin a word how thisrecognition, order to be thatof - impliesthe risk of - of my existenceas freedom freedom death, but how, because the death of the other suppresses a requirement lifemanifests at thesame time, just recognition ends by the relation and the struggle as freedom, as essential and in is immediately, master and slave.This relation between whichis a community, withwhatproducedit,itself conformity it" (Encyclopedia, that"of need and of the concernto satisfy #431-434). intothefirst One might supposethatthiswouldbe an entry - but In a sense thisis not untrue level of social institution. it exceptaccording thenwe see thatwe wouldnotbe entering in favorof a singlesubjecto a mode of relation: (a) resolved of need, is not a as whose community, community (b) tivity; thatof freedom. - and moreoverwe We will not get the State out of this essencefromcivilsociety knowthatthe Stateis of a different hand on the other is not it possible to consider the (but ifitbelongsproperly as a civilsociety, master-slave community to #182putsit; the the addition as modern the to world, only it a Statenor a civilsociety, is neither master-slave community



Even more,as a has not yet or not reallyanyjurisdiction). of societyas and subsistence of substance principle spiritual as an independent such,the State"mustprecedecivilsociety must precede the The relation of freedoms (ibid,). reality" to seek, entitled of need. We would be therefore community in in not yetstabilized domination even place of the relation of the State. the principle and need, thatis, in the itself, fight of the As we know,the Philosophy ofRightindicatesnothing is or relationas struggle, for recognition, kind: the struggle even absentfromit. The dialectic of the master and the slave the of notthatof onlyconcerns, says#57, stage consciousness, the objective is only spirit.Thus the relationof domination natural which to is This (ibid.), sayessentially very nonpolitical. whichputsat stakethe recognition and the affirmarelation, if I mayso put it,into tionof freedom, sees itself "repressed," thestatus of the natural and "unreal""pointof view," outside of which or beyondwhichright is "already" from the present, start condensesthe difficulty: of itself it (ibid.).This "already" - except as forbids us to know how one accedes to the right in a marginal indicated note to the same section(#57): "The idea of freedomis genuinely actual onlyas the State." But the reason for this puttingaside of the struggleis in the System of theEncycloindicated, (in the sections clearly I in the to which have referred), pedia veryplace that we should concentrate The Reupon: in the place of the fight. markto #433 says: The fight forrecognition and thesubmission toa master is the within which theliving-in-common ofmen wasborn, phenomenon inthis ofStates. is a as a beginning Violence, which, phenomenon, it is notforall that a foundation ofright, foundation, although in the passage constitutes the necessary moment and justified in desire drowned of consciousness which thestate goesfrom ofuniversal It andin singularity to thestate self-consciousness. is theexterior subor phenomenal of States, nottheir beginning
stantial principle.

The struggle is thus separatedfromthe principleof the Stateand of right it is onlythe unleashing of for,as violence,



therefore does not and which desireplungedin itssingularity, in relation witha freedom. knowitself as freedom However, and a necessary of principle, thisviolenceis a phenomenon about this is said one. But justification, nothing justified statewhich of this is said of the right rightless nothing strange ofviolence the is about leadsto right. said jurisdiction Nothing and as ifbytheopposite whereright would"begin"externally, of right.Nothingis said eitherabout the link,here, of the nor about the processof pasto the principle, phenomenon But to universalconsciousness. sage fromclosed singularity as thisis because,in a completely exteriority generalfashion, forthe State.(Thus, for a principle such could neverfurnish to onselfthe "To the #544: represent example, Encyclopedia, of the State as a pure Constitution-conceivedinstitution of thatis to say,as themechanism through-the-understanding, externalto one anbetweenforcesinternally an equilibrium whata Stateis.") idea of the fundamental other, goes against of an In violence, mustthusbe a "phenomenon" exteriority a of between of consciousnesses, presupinteriority principle as The questionof the relation posed subjectivity-in-common. Which over" as thus is "phenomenal." "skipped struggle amounts to saying that there is in some way no real of the State." "phenomenology in warthat itis precisely to recallthat But thisis themoment will withits monarchand by its monarch, the State-subject, of States The struggle realize itself nevertheless completely. of the of the universalinteriority will be the effectuation WorldSpirit. Everything happensas if the "leap" beyondthe of this relationas such were to produce a finalresurgence of the relation and this time in the personal authority the in the to monarch carries his (who only right war, person as vioitself he reallyholds),in his authority exercising right of a principlewithout lence. (What,in this presupposition as well as in the resurgence and without violence, exteriority in the matter of of the State,is overlooked of war as a truth This death whichis what is at stake in the struggle? death,



at the end?; cf. Phil. and glorified in the beginning, avoided that willhave to be taken a This is #324-328. question Right, up elsewhere.) of the 2. Now we can seek the true "substantial principle" State thus,of the relation. This principle is thepeople: Thesubstance which knows itself and in which theabsolute free, is no lessbeing, has efficacy as thespirit of a people duty-to-be
#514). (Encyclopedia,

The people is thus the true elementof ethicallife and its makes to #156of thePhilosophy As an addition ofRight reality. as a starting forthat clear,we cannottaketheindividual point, whichleads onlyto wouldbe "a pointof viewdevoidof spirit, to The ethicalIdea has thusitsreality a collection." according - to find - or impossible the relation.But it is quite difficult to thepeople is. If in as people or according whattherelation of the people, we factit is a questionof the ethicalsubstance - as theSitte finditalready positedand disposedof as a custom whereSittlichkeit #151),and it is in the appears (Phil.Right, theconstitusame waythatwe shallfindeach people positing the of of to "thenatureand tioncorresponding degree culture of this people" (#274). And if it is a the self-consciousness we willfindonly of thepeople itself, of theformation question this,in #181: intoanother of thefamily, as itspassage The extension princiof the sometimes the peaceful extension ple,is, in existence, - intoa nation, which has as a result a intoa people family combination of familial natural common sometimes the origin, which a combination havebeen dispersed, collectivities which or a of a master, of thedomination can be either theeffect thelink ofneeds andof about union through voluntary brought mutual them. helpin satisfying indicatednever correspondto the The three possibilities or or domination, eithernature, of substantial principle right: and "peaceful"possithe first need (besidesand in addition, of "phenomenal" the its for contravenes, necessity part, bility



of States). In other words,the violencein the "beginning" of the of as sociality of right is carequestion origin sociality avoided or bypassed. fully In the "FirstPhilosophy of the Spirit"of Jena, Hegel preof the passage fromthe famsentedtheexplicit development of the family, the a the of to totality people: singular spirit ily it and as such suppressed; as singular, is onlyan ideal totality, and so it is not for itself, existsonly as a possibletotality, itself (see thetext "always readyfordeathand has renounced de France, PressesUniversitaires editedbyG. Planty-Bonjour, on the contrary, p. 144). The suppressionof singularities, in the act oneself of another,where becoming accomplishes universalconsciousnessemerges,the absolute ethical subof a people. Now,on theone hand,in thetext stanceor spirit is indiscernible of familial the suppression itself, singularity in the fight for of individual thesuppression from singularity between a hesitation there is a and perpetual recognition, of the relation and an engendering (unless a presupposition the fight that understood it is more interesting hypothesis which takesplace in the bosomof the family, forrecognition leave in place a model in some howeverwould nonetheless as manyproblemsas ways"Oedipal," whichwould confront thatof Freud).And on theotherhand,the people,appearing theuniversal does notpermit of ethicality, liketheuniversality - whichis be determined of a to of the singularity spirit people to the conceptwe are examining. essential nevertheless It is truethatat thesame epoch,in theSystem ofEthical Life, the ethical Idea, which had already for its "concept""the absolute being-one of individualities" (see p. 110 of the Taminiaux translation, publishedby Payot),had for "intuithenappeared as the tion""an absolutepeople." Individuality as of the concept,subsumingintuition exteriormultiplicity of ethicallife moment In theseconditions, the first interior. in Hegel's own was determined "accordingto the relation," state of "imperfect a terms.But the relation onlydesignated whose perfection a unitymade up of intuition unification,"



thus as beyonda suband of the concept,to be understood in in intuition still of dispersed the individualities sumption of "the exhibition relation was supposed to be democracy, the absolutereality of ethicallifein everyone" (p. 199). in the was alreadypresent, We see thenthatour difficulty that is to of the as say,in the people intuition, presupposition of the of a presentation (and in the intention) presupposition in passingfrom democrelation as union.But we also see that, racy to monarchy, Hegel did not only swerve,or regress, he also politically: sharpenedthe point of the mostdifficult question. By designating the concrete existence of the inscribes monarch as the personof the people, Hegel finally in the element intuition of intuition, of sensiblepresentation. whichdemocracy the "exhibition" The monarchis or makes if I dare was supposedto be. But also he makesmorevisible, it the incarnation of relation. of put thus,the mystery or towarda mo3. We mustnow turntowardan element, - if ment never yet mentioned,but to which the narrow - imbrication in the people was to lead. obscure of the family or an even more can lead to a confusion (That imbrication when we read in #156: "the ethicalsubobscureindecision, and a people":this"and" stance... is therealspirit of a family element is love. The relation This has no recognizable status.) of whichthe fight is the phenomenon has love as itssubstantial content. #535 of theEncyclopedia says it clearly: - theunion The State theethical substance is,conscious ofitself, oftheprinciple ofthefamily and that ofcivil this same society; which is in the family as the sentiment of love is the unity of the State, essence which at the same time, thanks to the second of and self-active receives the the will, principle knowing of a known ... form universality. (I pass over the questionswhichthe wholeapparatushere indicated raise,forexamplethe absenceof the people. might of the State'sprincipleseems to displace, Each presentation the lie to the precedingone.) or deflect, give - the essence - of the State, Love is thus the true element



as it thusof the union. And it is this,as manytextsconfirm, of the self by another as it effeceffectuates the existence of the It shouldbe shownhowitis thetexts tuates therelation. of the truedescription youngHegel about love whichfurnish or which which itin terms therelation, and thatfurnish imply I here content shall a myself program politicalproblematic. "There is no TheSpirit with a brief ofChristianity: passagefrom so called,exceptbetweenliving trueunion,no love properly livingfor one beingsof equal power,who are thus entirely another.. . ." But love is also, in the same text,set over universality: againstabstract of to all those to extend as having conceived The loveof men, at relation no has one whom with all, oneknows whom nothing, . . . The loveofone's invention. loveis an insipid universal this into enters whom with men of love the is everyone neighbor which is be a being cannot is thought A beingwhich relation. loved. well be, once again as a could perfectly Thus the monarch of the trueand unique possibility existence, tangible present, the of love the be To love. sure, union,the locus of political in a for be will not evoked, generalmannerlove as such king of feeling, in the orderof the immediacy and, as the remains additionto #158 puts it: "In the State, feelingdisappears, must as law; therethecontent of unity therewe are conscious be rationaland knownto us." noteto #157 makesclear the (In the same way,a marginal natural "To emergefrom of theStateto thefamily: opposition of two unity unityis only purifiedin the being-for-itself beings":the relationof two beingsdoes have the essenceof in the autonomousperson,the love, but in being-for-itself, sich of love is "purified"[Einigkeit reinigt being-by-the-other in . . .]; thereis thussome impurity love.) of the it remainsthatthe "known"rationality Nonetheless the of truth of the immediate union, State is the Aufhebung is not,or is scarcely, and thusof love. And if thisAufhebung of love is as such (whereasthe principled positing designated



it is perhaps also for a reason at the withoutambiguity), theone Hegel explicitly from proposes:notthe oppositelimit of love,butthe of thefeeling reasonof thenatural immediacy in which is operative reasonof theelusiveexcessof mediation love. In fact,the text of the additionto #158 continues in sum the tone of the earlywritings: recapturing in loveis thatI do notwishto be a selfmoment The first if I were, thenI and that, and independent subsistent person moment isthat The second andincomplete. would feel defective in I count forsomething in another that I find person, myself forsomething in turn comes tocount while theother theother, tremendous in me. Love,therefore, is themost contradiction; more itsince there is nothing cannot resolve theunderstanding which is negated thanthis of self-consciousness stubborn point I ought Loveis topossess as affirmative. andwhich nevertheless ofthis contradiction. andtheresolving atoncethepropounding of an ethical of it,loveis unity As a resolving type. of the contradiction" "The mosttremendous (to saynothing are tremendousfor the underfact that all contradictions is thus here an excessof the general there that and standing, itselfas the real is mediation of mediation) tremendousness which mediation this it is Now real of mediation just persons. as a personand in hisperson.That is effectuates themonarch is not,any more the monarch as #279 and #281 stress, why, Whatis accessible to understanding. thanlove,accessible only without is in to speculative reason, the monarch, "immediacy in itselfbeyond which one foundation, being concentrated is that of the cannot go" (#281). But this concentration - in the same way moreoveras the concentration in union of means himself of a personin generalreally happensonlyby it is thisvery In the hisexistencemonarch, through-the-other. The and whichis concentrated, otherness unified, presented. of love,iftheStateis in general truth is theobjective monarch truth of union. the objective of the exteriority love whichis theAufhebung Nevertheless, of individuals in the State. And should itselfbe aufgehoben




what must thus be replaced(releve) is not the replacement (releve)that love brings about, but rather what in love makes the momentopposed to the autonomous personality, thus the momentof the giving-up-of-the-self to the other: not the Aufof the How far can an Aufhebung hebung,but the Aufgebung. how far a of the be Aufgebung, may replacement gift-of-self thoughtas an assumptionof love, and fromwhat point does it not constitute on the contrary a "pure and simple" negation of of love (which would be in some way an love, or a renunciation to the renunciation of death, or to the avoidance appendage of death of which we have spoken)? This is a question whose close investigation must be reserved for another occasion. But it contains the principle of the conclusion which we should draw from it here: The "substantial"truthof love for the State is posited, all thingsconsidered, only if twicejuggled: once because love has no place in the State, and again because love is the "tremendous contradiction." To which it is worth adding a third "trick":that of relatingthe substance of love to the phenomenon of the fight,for if both pertain to the determinationof the people, their relation and its process should be presented as such- something for which Hegel does not furnish the slightestindication. I am simplybringingtogether In raising this last difficulty, the pieces of the general difficulty we have traversed: the people which is finallya people only if it is a State (#349), and which is a finished State only if it "has" (or "is"?) a - has the realityof a double relation,of struggleand monarch of love, which finds itself twice put aside from the proper formationof the State, inasmuch as its two terms find themselves distanced from each other, and inasmuch as each remains subjected to a modality of nonunderstanding (either because it is onlya "phenomenon," or because it is the "tremendous contradiction"),or as each is in some way referred back to the extreme limitof the conditionsof the functioning and apprehension of the dialectic itself.

Contradiction" a "Tremendous The Monarch


The searchfor the relationas such thus leads to a triple is at work impasse.But thissearchalso provesthattherelation and that the truthof the monarchcannot be everywhere, It is thathowof the relation. otherthanthe truth anything conof everas thesimultaneous which, resurgence everything cerningthe relation,has remained unresolved as well as the of everything which, concerning beingthe finalexhibition had alwaysbeen supposed to be resolvedalready. relation, in thepresupposition of the soluThe impassethusconsists of the relation:but thispresuppositionor of the resolution thequestion out all the more,againstan emptiness, tionbrings with comesto fillthisemptiness The monarch of therelation. But this with his his whole effective body, body. presence, elusive. notbe symbolic, also remainsfinally whichmust of renot a matter,in these conditions, It is certainly of in his interrogation Hegel withan insufficiency proaching essential and ultimate the or of relation the of theorigin being the veryformof such a of the relation.For it is precisely in adof being falsified questionwhichhas everylikelihood is not substantiatedbeingonlytherelavance,iftherelation - and if the or its subjects of itsterms not the autonomy tion, oriwithout relation is perhapsnecessarily beingand without be have to "recognized." gin. But it is just thiswhichwould of the or the he masks because impossibility question Hegel, solution showsthe impasseof the philosophical the question, of and opens up at thesame timethe necessity of therelation, in realization without thisrelation originand without thinking a substantial unity. Which amountsto sayingthat the monarchresolvesthe but in factconcealsit, and thus rechannels tripledifficulty, it untilit arrivesat his own singularity. and exacerbates that is in factthe strangest of the monarch The singularity "tremenis a He also, he perhapsabove all, can be imagined. dous contradiction."



A contradiction first of all. The presupposition of position, is as soon as right of theunionof personsbeingthatof right, of bythepeople),thejuris-diction presupposed (accomplished or manifestation the monarchis onlyits formal presentation: own personality and in fact,not onlyis the monarch's insiga monarch of a mistake to nificant is objective ("it require qualities,he has only to say 'yes' and put the dots on the - additionto #280),but his poweris only formal: i's" As a (We cannot) mayact capriciously. saythatthemonarch of his decisions of fact, he is boundby the concrete matter no more he hasoften isstable andiftheconstitution counselors, It is the is important. Butthis name tosign hisname. todo than to#279). togo (addition which itisimpossible last word beyond is onlythe on thisaccount, of themonarch, The juris-diction "But thisname is the of the union as right. namingof right, - itdoes nothave it would sanction not because summit," right it thepowerforthis butbecauseitaccomplishes it,completes is the monarch The name of effective individual existence. as But by thisaccountit is thus of the Gesetz. the real Setzung of right. sanction thejuridical reallyright, The scalesimmediately tip fromthe side of pure formality toward substantial The dotson the i's, the signature, efficacy. the name,and again the mouthof the monarchwho says"I and are the decision will"(#279) constitute which,even if it adds nothingto the contentof the rightof the people, the sayingof the law and of the councilsintothe transforms But the decision itselfis infinitely doing of a subjectivity. The textof and it adds itself. undecidable:it adds nothing, #279 is formidably ambiguous: cutsshort itssingle into all particularity Thislastreabsorbs self, oscilitletsitself which ofprosandconsbetween theweighing "/ and bysaying nowthiswayand nowthat, lateperpetually and actuall activity itsdecision and so inaugurates will" makes ality. makeit clear,is the "abstract as manyadditions This "I will,"



I will"(Ilting, and empty 3:679): themonarch givesitonlythe But this his of concreteness speech(bouche). speech¿s by this factconcretewill. willinto concretewill is a of abstract This transformation is thesubjectof the The monarch (performation). performative - is the of thepeople whilethepeople thespirit enunciation, is not But the statement (énoncé). subjectof the statement effectivethatis to say,it is notstated exceptin theenunciabutobviously tion.This verysimple, general veryformidable, We mustrecogof the monarch. rulesthe position constraint nize in it the homologousconstraint (and perhaps homogestressin of "decisionism" neous one) whichthe theoreticians for thejuridical act in general the law (droit):the necessity residue that established, prealwaysto containan ultimate which not and law does written or deliberated contain, pared, of thislaw, the decisionthatlaw should is the performative of enunThe constraint thatitis effectively makeright, gesetzt. of discourse, is of theexistence as a generalconstraint ciation, of constraint of juris-diction the constraint (this just precisely not onlyin Roman law, dictionbeing,as we know,inscribed butin the Romanconceptof law as such).And thisconstraint is perhapsnotjust an isolatedcase, thatof (whichmoreover makesjurisdicbut whichon the contrary juridicaldiscourse, of thewhole of every tionin generaltheconstraint discourse, order of discourse)alwaysrequiresthe existential posit of a who is the and individual who of an judex, says right, unique notuniquebecausehe takesthispowerto himself (he mustbe the is the monarch Constitution), by legitimated legitimated: nor becausepeople have decided to giveit to him (forthenit would be thisdecision,takenby others,whichwould be the real decision,the paradoxical decision of giving up one's speakinga questionof powerto decide),forit is notproperly individa single a "power."But thejudexis unique becauseonly thathe is because ual canspeak. The monarch is theindividual
is indivisiis individual, that is, because juris-diction jurisdiction

of the indivisiis the hypostasis ble.In thissense the monarch




ble unityof the modern State as the French Republic "one and indivisible"had (self-) proclaimed it. The monarch makesthe voice of the people, because the voice as such is unique, indivisible,incomparable,and because for that it should be distinsense guished, given special status,personifiedin the strongest of the word. - and now for the being of the So much for the position monarch: Insofar as he effectuatesthe solution of the relation, the dis-solutionin the "union as such" of somethingwhose unity will always have been presupposed, the monarch simply efAnd it is indeed this logic fectuatesthe logic of subjectivity. which,in principle,hides or forbidsthe question of the relation. There is no "real" problem of relation once the - even thought of as the effectuationof a self in relation - takes its origin in the movementof a selfwhich goes another And it is indeed this to itsexteriorin order to appropriate itself. logic which intervenes in the trulyinitial movement of the ofRightas the process of the formationof the State. Philosophy The origin which we could not find in the fight,in love, or in the people, we now find in this other instance of relation, namely, the contract. The contract is the birthplace of right insofar as it is the exchange of propertyaccording to the rule of a reappropriation, even a superappropriation of the property thus alienated: himself relates from himself A personbydistinguishing himself thatthesetwopersons to another and it is onlyas owners person, is identity reallyexist(Dasein) for each other.Their implicit fromone to the of property the transference realizedthrough willand without detriment otherin conformity with a common to the rights of either.This is contract (#40). (In a certain fashion,contractthus has the same "form" as the fight and as love, the form of passage-into-or-throughthe-other. But nevertheless it is here something else other - through than the person which "passes": it is his property



whichhoweverhe is as a person. And reciprocally; if the in thestruggle contract is notan element or in love,itis thatin in one and theotherthereis an Aufgebung of theself,to which the notionsof "mutual consent"and "the maintenance of are no longerpertinent.) rights" - and We have here the beginning of the relation of right wellaffirm thatthe principle of the yetwe can also perfectly Statecannotbe here. For the development of the contract is carriedout in civilsociety. Now the State precedes and exceeds this,and the monarchis thisexcess. The rightof the in itsmostclearly Stateis lacking attested all, the origin.After of contract is itself to the essence of principle opposed by as Hegel had remarkedin 1802 in his The itself, monarchy Law: Scientific Ways of Treating The form ofsuchan inferior relation as thecontractual one has itsway forced into theabsolute of the ethical In majesty totality. thecaseofthemonarchy, for theabsolute example, universality ofthecenter andtheoneness oftheindividual is undertherein nowaccording to a contract of fullauthorization as a stood, relation between a supreme civil servant totheabstraction ofthe nowaccording as to therelation contract of an ordinary State, a matter between twospecific eachof whom needsthe parties - andbyrelations andso as a relation ofquidproquo of other, this kind which in the of the the Idea and finite, wholly sphere theabsolute oftheethical aredestroyed . . . (tr. majesty totality Knox, Pennsylvania, pp. 123-4). contractof the (However, it is not clear if the primitive from it need; proceeds rather Philosophy of Rightproceeds froma superiornecessity, thatof the constitution of identity; but Hegel does notestablish a superior of category contract.) thecontract furnishes theoriginof right If, in spiteof this, if will it be once more refused, (even againstRousseau,as a of theState,in #258,and in favor of the monarchy), principle it is that the contractbrings propertyinto play. In and thesingular thatis, in through property personis constituted, relation to himself. The moment the contract is this preceding one:




Possession (Besitz) which is property-ownership (Eigentum). willin general, of theabstract Freedomis here the freedom or, of a singlepersonrelatedonlyto himself eo ipso,the freedom (#40).

Thus the personentersinto relationwithanotheronlyin and is onlydifferentiated himself from himself, differentiating as in property, from himself bywhichhe relatesto something whose his own. (Which passes through taking-possession, to showhow Hegel shouldbe developed,particularly analysis on as a violenceof appropriation, avoidslookingat it straight thelines,and howin a readablebetween which is nevertheless under the priorconis treated similar way taking-possession of a recognizedrightof the originalowner [see sideration to be born.The gap is still at thisstagetheright #50],whereas findappears here as the absence of arwhichwe constantly for domiand the fight betweentaking-possession ticulation nation.) butit which foundspersonality, So itis notexactly property which founds every appropriation, is ownership-of-self by of the personconThe personality itself. whichit objectivizes to to oneselfbeforerelating of relating sistsin the possibility to anyoneelse). Beelse (and, by thisintermediary, anything fore property and the contract, there is thus the of the person: differentiation-of-self
as a of himself withhis consciousness wayor other,but rather and restriction concrete abstract completely ego in whichevery In personality, value is negatedand without therefore, validity. of oneselfas an object,but an object is knowledge knowledge and so an object to thelevelof simpleinfinity raisedbythinking (#35). purelyself-identical

meregeneralconPersonality beginsnot withthe subject's in some determined as an ego concretely of himself sciousness

follows whichimmediately And the sentence assignsthismoand to peoples: to individuals mentor thisprocessidentically untiltheyhave and nationshave no personality "Individuals as achievedthispure thought." however, which, (This thought



of an the additionto thissectionshows,is also the thought in the order of nature: for the "unbearablecontradiction" of man as well as "the lowest"of his personis "the highest" The person is and as such despicablecontingency. singular of theperson.It is doubtthuswhat"bears"thecontradiction bearsmorethananyone.But there lessalso whatthemonarch unbearableor tremendous, has alagain, the contradiction, in of the resolved itself the identity principle.) ready The differentiation-of-self is the productive differentiation - and hereat least it takes place, in its of the Self as such And it is thispersonality, the personality byitself. principle, the capacity to the Self,which"essentially involves for proper as in it. the is the #36 Here, rights," puts beginning, right only relation-to-self. And the people is a selfas muchas the individual.The secret of the people is thesecretof the Self.That is why the origin and the nature of the people remained - and once discovered are indistinguishable undiscovered fromthoseof the person.The relation totheother, difference as effective and the into the other,will exteriority passage but derived and subnever in the long run be anything - and this subordination ordinate (foreignhowever to the in »the Phenomenology) profoundlogic of self-consciousness the in of the self the otherto be contained permits Aufgebung or overlooked. themonarch theSelfof union, Bythisaccount, accomplishes he accomplishes itas self and thisaccomplishment also swings over into the absolute nonproperty of the monarch,pure material of a subjectwho is onlythe subjectof his punctuality who knowshimself as an obthus,doubtless, (and signature of anything at all: the ject, noteven beingas yeta proprietor pen withwhichhe signsbelongsto the State),a subjectexchangeablewithany other(exceptthathis birthmustdeterminehim in the naturallineage of a family, as a hereditary monarch,and that furthermore, "just because everyoneis of the it must be arrangedthatit is not capable being king, but a singleone . . . because in the State thereis everyone,



nureiner ist)"(Ilting, p. 678), butthis onlyone (sic:da imStaate of the absolute also property accomplishes accomplishment in which the State.On the one hand thissuperiorproperty of the mine must disappear: "Abandonment(Aufgeben) (or: property butsomething person notto have anyprivate that thus a note to someproperty) #46, better," indicating says as it givesa place to a is onlyrecognized insofar theAufgebung - and as the On the other hand "better"reappropriation. of thisreappropriationthe personof the monarch, summit in his singularity, as the holderof thereal and ultimate power who of decision.It is in fact the monarchas an individual to the otherStatedecides the relation of the State-individual thatis to say,of warand peace (cf.#320-329). In individuals, of but thetotalsubstance thiscase, his "I will"is nottheform Not onlydoes his mouthopen, but he himself juris-diction. - decides.The logicof and not the councilsor the assemblies and the logic of union the logic of performance, existence, in a logic of punctualand arriveat theirsynthesis finally decision.(And it is doubtlesson thispoint thata indivisible and should be concentrated, of "decisionism" critical analysis it contains:an onof the indivisibility of the presupposition indivisiand existential performative, tological, semiological, voice of in and the the voice Is sovereign jurisgeneral, bility. atomic?Would it in particular, diction indivisible, definitively The Hegenot be alreadydividedwhenit enunciates [itself]? of thesequestionsto stand lian monarch allowsthe necessity theories than decisionist out better do, and precisely perhaps But war by whathis being keeps as undecidedor uncertain. this end to an indecision.) puts
theTotality The Monarch from Separate

is of the State-Subject In the verycenterof thisrealization of this realizathe as necessity ontological lodged, however, thatis to say,his detachof the monarch, tion,thesingularity



It is as thisindividual his Absonderung. ment,his separation, that he has value. Everything happens as if the monarch of the this in the order of sensiblecertainty, realizedhimself of at thebeginning certitude and thepoorest thatis therichest Also the positionof the monarch,as a the Phenomenology. nevertheless whichnecessitates position, escapesthe deduction of science, it.As thePhenomenology putsit: "Whenone requires that it deduce, as a crucialtest,a testit could not survive, find a priori(or any way one wantsto put it) a construct, it is only man so identified, or a certain certain just that thing or whatpersonit is aimingat, but the requestsay whatthing The Philosophy to say it is quite impossible." of Right(which the "immanent the monarch, recalls,in presenting developtest" ment" of "philosophical science," #279)facesthis"crucial so called (X, Y, or Z), is the without facingit: thismonarch, spiritof a people who can produce him,by its Constitution the spirit of the^ of a reigning and by the legitimizing family; people as such shouldbe "deduced (or any wayone wantsto put it)": we have seen whatthiswas a questionof. And if,in the end, "the Germanic peoples" are designated(#358,with in as "the people of suffer"theJewish people" counterpoint thelossof theformer world), yetdenotesin nothing ing"from of the it the efficacy of the trueConstitution (to say nothing "barbarism" of theseGermanic peoplesas #359evokesit). But of logicput intoplayin the constraint suchis thefundamental people and in the monarch. The logicof the ontological proofis in generalsuch thatit can only of an efficacy whoseexistence deduces the necessity in the from the at a distance deduction, contingency emerge in existencewhich of its position.And it is this Umschlagen of the monarch(for,says producesat once both the majesty #281,he unitesthe ungroundednatureof the will,absolute to the ungroundednature of contingent exissubjectivity, tence)and the factthat,as the same sectionsays: forthoughtful is a topic of themonarch treatment themajesty since method of inquiry, other than alone, byphilosophy every




the speculativemethodof the infinite Idea whichis purely annulsthe natureof majesty altogether. self-grounded, On one side, only the self-groundedness of speculation can thinkthe ungroundedness of majesty.On the other side, this thought,which thus excludes everycomprehension of underwhichis perhaps standing,is itselfa contemplation (betrachten), in its turn,by reason of its "nature" (what is "to contemplate"), or of its object (the ungroundedness of the existent),or for both reasons together,less a process of appropriation than the - and infinitely - relation beindication of an infinite distant tween philosophyand the monarch. In this sense, philosophy at once masters the monarch and recognizes only in his majestythe unbridgeable distance from existence to the concept. That is to say, in this case, the unbridgeable distance from the union as such to the concept of its subjectivity, the distance from the people as efficaciousto the concept of the - or the distance from the relation to the Self in organism general. What philosophycan only contemplate here, insofar as it contemplates the singular distanceof the monarch, is distance itself as the institutionof the relation. Philosophy - and if I may so put it, contemplatesthe relation,separation thus avows of itself its separation from the separation that makes the relation,this separation thatit has not been able to assume in love nor in the fightnor in the people. Thus the subject who is the monarch is so only at the price of negation or rather of the breaking out or dispersion of in himself.Inasmuch as he is neither an absolute subjectivity monarch (and even in relation to war, he should not in right - or rather the be that) nor a simple symbol, the monarch that he is- confirmshimself as being necessarilythe majesty Not a dialectical opposite through opposite of a subjectivity. which subjectivity re-establish itself,but what mightbe might in which, a splitting called a distancingin itselfof subjectivity, - come like the relation finally,something might just barely to light.



thissingularself, I say in general all theselves; each of myself,

On the one hand, in fact,thismonarchcan onlybe delivered over to the universalizing logic of the this:"When I say

me"(Phenomenology). themisjust whatI say: me,thissingular as we saw, only says "me," or rather"I" (in The monarch, it is German, alwaysich),to sign,to affixhis name. And the of the propername is never,as we know(as Dersingularity rida knows), enough not to be able to be reiterated. singular fits also intoabsolute the monarch As an absolutesingularity, is he or better, exactly, juridicallyand exactly reiterability, Whichmeansthathisjurisdicand interchangeable. reiterable in sense of "democratic" a nonconstitutional tionis absolutely the term. of the singular-State On the otherhand, thissame positing in the Subject above all as the totalization is to be understood of subjectsand of their union. By this account, whether or Anführer monarch, (the termis in #280),it is all the Party, and Stateis in subjectivity, same: theessenceof thetotalitarian and itsprocess.The in theorganicity thatmakesitsstructure of of organicity monarch is theorganor thesuperorgan itself, which is thus of itself the "Grund #278, finally determining itself. the Grundof Grundlosigkeit (dialectically) contradicts the efnevertheless But thisverydetermination fective separationof the ecceityof the monarch.And this butcannot, to resolve thatHegel wants contradiction, opens in of totalitarian of a dis-organization law the possibility politics. the of the of the and Between totality individuality subjectivity thereis as muchdialectical the monarch, linkageas absolute in moreBatailto it now terms For individuality, say rupture. lean (thatis to say,hyper-Hegelian) than Hegelian,is necesin of the in thus the the sarily separation, noncompletion relation(also in love) and thusof subjectivity. Strictly speakin should that the of the we totalization ing, say organic HegelianStatethemonarch is lacking: either he is notan individual, or else he is one, and thenhe is exceptedfrom thetotality, he it. It is thusthatwe withdrawn from exceedsit or he remains




can solicitthe opposed meaningsinvoluntarily placed by Marx in the expression "personifiedsovereignty," by which he characterizes the monarch in his commentary as just as it is - of these paragraphs of Hegel. erroneous The closure of individualitymakes the incompleteness of the relationas such. The monarch records thisincompleteness - and just as much as he brings about the union. Or rather - he effectuatesthe union by not beyond what Hegel thinks completing the relation, by inscribingit in the space of the separation which is that of the relation itself. For the incompletenessof the relationis the relation itself. This does not mean thataccording to another and more subtle dialecticthe monarch accomplishes,completes,the relation. It means that in spite of the dialectic the Hegelian monarch - which is not a political solution, but inscribes something which formsthe limit,the inevitableoutcome of the solution of the Political according to subjectness. Relation resists,insists,and inscribesitselfas separation. Separation is visible or readable everywhere upon the monarch: as ecceity,he has value only through his body, his immediate natural being; as jurisdiction,he is only the singular differenceof the mouth which pronounces or of the hand is insignifiwhich signs. In all these respects,his individuality cant: what signifiesis only his separation. But separation does it distances, and in this sense it inscribes. not signify, of the relation. The relation What it inscribesis thefinitude is in finitudebecause it is incompleteness.(Thus itis not.) And the thoughtof finitudeis doubtless necessarily,beyond what in Heidegger seems to subject it to a "unity"(even a nonsubjective one), a thoughtof relation.Now finitudein general (or if Hegel never thinksof finitudeas such) is also, for finiteness, Hegel, the inevitableelementofjurisdictionas such. He says it about the decision of justice: in #529 of the Encyclopedia etc.to 2 4/5 2 3/4, That3 years, 10thalers, oronly 2 1/2 etc., years, decided be in sense cannot is should be what lawful, any infinity, thata and yetit is of thegreatest from theconcept, importance



is positive interwhat decision should be taken. Thus,of itself, toput butonly andarbitrary, in thelawas thecontingent venes ofview ofexternal from thepoint a term tothe ofdecision, process This is howit happens and howit has always considerations. in every to of itself it is onlynecessary legislation; happened inthis consciousness havea determined respect against spurious be thelawcan and must as ifinall respects goalsand chatter, on purely determined understanding, by reasonor juridical inperIt is an empty exercise rational and intelligent grounds. of thiskindin thedoand expect to demand fection anything mainof thefinite. of an alreadysubstantially is nottheapplication Juris-diction intothedeterminate relation reason,itis theentrance present of thatthrough whichfinite individuals themselves first place of all in relation:right the copresenceof freedoms, but in finitude and separation. To be sure,one can also findquickly enough, along this path, somethingarbitraryabout the monarch. But the Hegelianmonarch as we have undermust, stood,offerus fromthispoint on, as an object of thought, - and especiallythis,that other than a monarch something whatI have called "political jurisdiction" requires,fromthe center of and the avowal of the very by philosophical thought of thepolitical, an essential withdrawal of thePolitical as subject and as organicity. A withdrawal whichrespondsto the relation, which takes the relation back everywherein the - which"desocializes," "union" one mighttryto say, organic and which"depoliticizes" the politicalsubject. sociality, The questionof the monarchbecomesthe following: How to think so that it in consists neither subpolitical jurisdiction missionto the Subject,nor in a simplesymbolism (a flag is of a "place" of the "symenough),but in the circumscription bolization" of the relationitself, if a "symbolization" is not a but exactly the establishment of a relation, fusion, subjective and the plotting out of its separation. This questionwould be thatof the "voice"of a "people," insofaras a people would not be a subject, and as its voice - and separated would pass through a place, a mouth,apart



an affirThere remainsdoubtlessto be invented fromitself. of the relation whichis an affirmation of separation mation Such or represses. is whattheStatedenies,refuses, and which a task,I make clear in closing,does not presentitselffor - undertherubric - as willhave been understood of "socime of runs the risk which the State," reducing always etyagainst and of ignoring thesequestionsto the topicof "civilsociety," of the relahere. The affirmation encountered the exigency in a sense which tionwould have to be a political affirmation, remainsto be discovered. Translated by Mary Ann and Peter Caws