CHAPTER 3

Military Strategy Perspective*

Sylvie Jackson

Basic principles
cotrlcl bc considerccl tl-rat uruch ol u'hat u'e thir-rk of irs stratcgl' t-rr.rd incleecl leaclcrsl-rip todar. ou,'e tltLch to the rlilitan' ancl r.r.rilitan' stvle . N{ilitan' strrltegv continues to l.rolcl rruch interest judging br, the lI5 nrilliorr resnlts idcntiflecl bv i.r google.com scarch (scarch on militan.strateg\'). 'N{ilitrn' striltcg\" is a collectivc nalnc for planning the conduct of u'ar (urnr'.u'ikipeclitr.org) and derives fiorrr the Greek'strate11rl.i'n'here strJ.teg\,\\'as secn as the'art of thc general'. As such it invoh'es tl.re ;rla.nning ancl concitict of a camprligu, the movemcnt and clisposition of fbrces ancl dccepticln of the eneurt' all of u'hich u'ill ring tnle to organisations oprcrating in ctrnrpetitive cuvironmcr-rts. This ciraptcr seeks to clcuronstrate the rclevancc olr-r-rilitan'strate!\r for str.rregic nrJllilgcnrcnt.rnd practice. For the nrilitan,, strateg\,ancl tactics are closelv reli,rtecl irs thev both clcal s'ith clistar-rce, tinte and tirrcc. Strltegl, is large-scale rnci tlctics ere sr-nall-scale. Historicalh', strategvl'ls unclerstood to gc>vcrn the preluclc to a battle u'lrilc tactics controllecl its executior.r. Flol'ever, tl.re rlistinctions became blr-rrred cLrring the Worlcl Wars of the tr.r'er.rtietl.r centrln'. Historicalh', a king or political leaderu'as the n-rilitan' lcacler br-rt as protbssional arr.nies der,elopcci thc roles of politicians and the militan,becamc separated u'ith some holclir-rg the vieu' that thcrc u.ls a neec-l firr sr-rch a separation. Georgcs Clcmenceu, Frencl-r statesurrlrl, saicl (ur,rt..r'ihipcclir.org),'l'ar is too important a business to bc left to soldiers'.'l'his led to the c.lcvelt)pmcnt of icvcls olu'ar (cliscussecl in c'lctdl latcr in the chapter). An unclersttrncling of militan' strategv is relevant tor strategic ur'.lnagement scholirrs and btrsiness manilgcnrcnt students bccause of their colrlnon histon'and l:urguagc. Br.rsiness practitioners u,ill usc rrilit;rrt' uretaphors and both rlilitrn' and business leaciers share a comrrrorl problcm sct: \\.hat to clc) uuder conditions of uncertaint\, ancl stress rr,hen the c()nsequences of frrilurc are unpleasant or viervecl
as unaccept;rble.

It

It nrxrlcl be casv firr business management scholars to c-lisrniss militirrr.experience as being of use, pilrticularh'if ther,cite the number of high-profile liilures discussecl in the historv books or rr-reclia such :rs tl.re Battle olthe Somnrc (1916) in the First \\krrlil \Var or thc US c()untcr insurgencr.operations ir.r Vietnam in the I960s-I970s. Yet this is to discount all thlt has been learnecl,:rs r.r'rilitan'stratcgv hrs evolvcd in tl're fircc of ch;urging environments ancl u'ith the rise ol a cliflbrcnt sfi'le of threat. Another argument might be that busincss orgarrisirtior.rs -rrc n()t Jt \\'ar ar-rcl do not seek to destroy eirch other but u.i1l act in co-operative \\,Avs.s u'ell trs colrpetitive u'avs tor the comnron gooc1. Hos'cvcr, somc organisations clo seek to destrov their competitors, either through acquisition or price compctitior-r, such as W'll-rlart irr the Unitecl Statcs, u'ho lir.r.r to ensure that if thcrc is onlv room for one store ir.r r'r sr.r.rall ton'n. it u'i11 bc thcir storc. When I(omatsu entered tl-re rnarket, their nrission \\'i.ts to 'liill Caterpillar' end tl-ris cor.r-rbative stt'le irllou'ecl them to quicklr' ;rick up a considcrablc rnarkct sl-rare. Thc chilr'neu'spapers in tl-rc Ur"ritccl l{ingdom regularlv cngage in price u'ars in a bicl This chapter is developed by Sylvie Jackson from Philip Davies'original chapter in Strategic Management

A M u lti pl e-Perspective App roach.

SYLVIE JACKSON

31

t() incretse suflicicnt circulatior-r o\.er their rivals to rnake their lor.rgcr-ifl'unsustr-tinable. In grancl strrlteg\', encmics can becontc friends anc{ r'ice r.ersa. Clermlnr. has movecl from being a fi'iend <tf tl're Unitccl States prior to 1914, arl cr-rcrn\r betu'een 1914 and 1945 urd a fl'iend rgain sir-rcc 1955 as:1 ptrtlter in NAT(). The commcrcial sector sces sir-nilar trencls u'ithin the commcrcial clefbncc sector u'here orglrnisirtiot.ts likc BAE Sr.stet.t-ts u.ill cor-nprctc u-ith or co-opcratc in a nenr.ork of alliances u'itl-r aerospitcc partncrs to ensurc thcv gain lucrativc c()ntracts. Militan' ar-rd business striltegies Jrc both coucemccl l-itl-r builcling ancl sustainirlg c()mpctitive ach'antagc and org;rnisirtional cflbctiveness tutclcr uncert;rir-r (mirrbe clar-rgercus) conditior-rs, u'here an unsucccssfll outcome u'ill hl.e irclverse c()nsequences. tr'lanv courrtries in t1-re u'orlcl nou' ltave recellt experience ol u'arflrrc or col'rrpnlson. nrilitan. sen'ice. Fortler rnilitan'persor.rnel movc into busincss ancl take u'hat thct'i-rar-e learnecl tiorn their training u'ith thcm to use fbr thosc rccluirements common to both busincss ar-rci the militan', sr-rcl-r i1s i1 lfcccl firr cohcsion, clear clirection and division of labour. Crse stuclics used ir.r busincss schools -l'his are the ccluivalcnt of a car.npaign plan in tr n-rilitirnr icademJ.. cornmonalitr. of prlrpose rreins that practitioners have an intcrcst in lcamir-rg fl'or.n nrilitan' exlr.nples and finding r.r.rilitan' lletlpltors r.rscfirl s4rer.r cor-rsiclerir-rg thcir oun issues (Boer, 1995; Ramse1,, 1987). Tl-re UI( Defbnce Stratcgic Lc:rclcrship Progrlnrme introduccs generals, cornmoclores ancl air cornr-r-roclores to their commerci;rl c()tlttterparts in e speciallr. clesigr.recl clirr.uhcrc a c()lnpanv brings their strategic issucs to the r.nilitirn' to get thcir vicu'point into l.rcls' thev nright be solvecl ancl r'ice versa. Companies irrvolvecl incluclc l-lovdsTSB, Barclar.s Bar.rk trncl thc BB(-. At lerrst ir clozen of tl.rese cnc()Llnter c-liu's har.e bccn rur-r tc> clatc u'ith both siclcs findir-rg tl.renr hugclr-intirn.native end trsefirl.

Overview of military strategy Development of military strategy

Thc principles lncl ideas embrlccd u'ithin r.nilitan' strategv can be traccd back to 500 RC in crrlr, Sparten thinking and u'ritings of Sr-rn Tzu ir-r 400 BC (Sun, l98l). Stretcgic piannir-rg r-rnd rror.cmcnt u'crc clcntcxrstrated in cirr.r-rpaigns of Alexander tl.re (lreat, Har.rr.ribal, Jr,rlir.rs (laes:rr ar-rcl Qin Shi Huang. Ciertghis I(han on the other hanc'l clid n()t use grarlcl strategv but ou'cc{ his success irr conclucling m()st of Er-rrasia t() thc t.r.rirt.toeuvrist str,le lpproach ancl tcrror - hc uscci the psi'chologr, of the opposing 1-ropulation. He i.rchicvccl consiclerlble rapiclin'of movement due to his amrics'rclilnce ()n the horse herds of N{ongolia u'hich not oulv providecl transport but also horsc rnilk anc-l horse bloocl u'hicir \\'ere the staples of the Mongolian diet. Nlachiavclli (cariv 1600's) clevelopec'l earlv insight on ch:urge (NI;rchiavelli, 1962).Hon'cr,er,rrilitan'strltcgvclicln()tbec()rreastrbjectolscriousstuch'ur-rtil theeighteenth celttun,. A 'strlte
g,v

of exl.raustiou'

w.as

imProvisecl bv Frec-lerick tlrc C]rcrt cluring the

Se'r'e

n Ycrrrs'

War (1756-1763) to l-rolci off the enelr\r lncl consen'e l-ris firrces. I3r'exploiting his cer-rtral position, ar-rd nroviug t.rlong irtterior lir.res, he u.as lblc to c()ncentrrte ()n oue opp()ncnt .lt r tinrc rrrrcl holcl off
defbat r-ir-rtil :r diplon.rltic solution u'as rerchecl. Tl.re Frer-rc[r Revolution ancl Nirpoleonic Wtrrs rcr,olutioniseci r.nilitan, strateg\r ils the arrival of chetlpl small lrms allolr.'cd firr the gro\\'th of armics to bccome t.r.rassecl fbrmations u.hich coLrld be diviclec'l into diflbrent levcls of n.robilin, ancl fireprou'cr. Napoleon trs botl'r le adcr rnd ge ncr;rl dealt u.ith er'.lncl strategr. ancl operational strategv ancl rciricvccl success throLrslr supcrior manoeuvre until his opp()nents adoptecl those srme strategies. (larl r,on Clauseu'itz (1982) u'as I sturlcnt of N;rpoleon's u'ork, l Prussiirn l'ith a backgrotrncl in philosophv u.hose ()tt War has become a biblc of strateg\r clealing u.ith political ancl militan'leaclership. Likc Napolcon, he believecl in the corrccl-rt of victon'through birttle ancl clestruction of the enemr. lt all cost althclugl-r he c'licl rec()guise 'the strategv of attrition'u'l-rcre tl.re enerrrv u'oulcl Lre u'om cftru'n. Ger.rerals of the Alerican (livil Wlr ( l86l-I865), such ls Lee, Ciraut i'tnc{ Shcrmirn) \\'ere also ir.rfluenced bv Napolcon but the aclherence to his principlcs in tl.re fice of thc teclrnological aclvances such ls tl-re long-range riflc oftcn led to clislstrotts conseclLlerlces. Tl-re tirr.re ancl s;lace ilr u'hich \\'ar \\'as wagec-l also c[.rangeci u'ith thc ldvent of railroac-ls aud steam po\\'crn'l.rich allou'ec.l for tr:rnsp<)rtxtion of large forces ancl introcticccl combat

32

INSTITUTIONALIST PERSPECTIVES

in the Seconcl Bocr War (1899-t902) and l{r-rsso-Jr;ranese War (1904-I905), the First World War strilteqv u'as dominirtecl bv tire previotts oflbnsive thinking. Thc lVrr siru'armies or.r it hrgcr scale tharr cvcr seert bcforc but cluicklv clevelopcd into a stratcgr.of attrition olt rhe Westem Front as the abilitv to nlell()clt\-re n'as lost. This r:lpicl cxpansion of fbrces outpaccd tlre trair-rir.rg of of]'icers u.ho r'"'oulcl be lblc to l.rrrtcllc stratcgic plannir-rg of sr.rch rr large forcc. "1'ecl-urologicll aclr.anccs also hacl a significant influcr-rce olr strategv such as tl-rc autornobilc ;'rnd thc tank, tclephor-rcs anc'l radio telegraphr', poison gas, artillen, techtriclucs ar-rrl ireri'.rl rcconuaissance. N,lore than irnr. previous u.;rr, rnilitrn. stratcg\. \\.as clirectccl bv tl-re Clrirncl Stra.tcgl of a coalition of countries.'I'echnolclgical changc has hird a significtrnt impact on strategv sincc, rrllou'ing firr rapici movcn-lcnt of troops, usecl to great eflbct bt'the Germans in
the Sccond Worlcl War and the developmcr-rt lncl cle;llor.nrcr-rt of strrrtegic clcception alrcl sophisticatcd rtrses lecl bv British Intelligencc to n.risleecl Gcrrnan pl'.rnners resulting in ineflbctir.c actions. Thc periocl firllou'ing the Secorrci Worlcl \\rrrr, knon'll as thc Cold Wirr n trs donrir-ratecl bv the tl-rreat ofnuclear u'capons Iucl total uorlcl ar-rnihilation. The t\\'o most pou'crfirl nrrtions, the Unitccl States and the Sor-iet Ur.rion, r;rther thau ovcrth'figl"rt u'itl-r each ()thcr usecl other countrics rs proxies. With irnpror.ecl communicirtion attcl cot-t.tt-t.r;-tnd technologics, tl.re cliflbrencc bct\\-een the strategic irnc-l the tactical levels becanre more confirscd. Stratcgv since the Cold \Var has bccn dcfrneci ancl c'kx.ninatccl bv the superp()\\.er statlls ()lthc Llnitecl States. Tcchnologr"s nrle is nou'r'ieu'ed '.rs a \\'a\.to rlrinimise casualties and impror.e efficiencr'. Itt the same u'itv that orgartisations changc in line n'ith thcir cnvironrnent, so thc role of the rnilit.rn.in lttr-Iltv coulttrics tod'av l.ri-rs changccl. Whilst there is still r neecl to defLnci thc countn.and its interests, thc perceivccl increased threat oltcrrorisr.n post 9/l I hrrs led to manv securitl'rer,ieu's ancl the introciuctiort ofjoint uorking olthc ;-rrmecl firrccs u-ith securin'scn,ices tcl proviclc 'horrclanci securitr''. In acldition, 1'rcacckccping aud hr-rmanit'.rrian aicl sllpp()rt h;rve beconrc ncu' rolcs firr some countrics u'ith the risc of utr-tt is httoun i1s the 'three block tvar' u'liich er.nbraces the icleir thlt ri'itl'rin.r sr.nall rrea, lrmed lbrccs tuav bc rcsponsiblc fbr u'arfiglrting, peaceheeping lncl ofle ring hun-rlnitrri'.ln rricl. 'l'hese are clearlv r.en, diflbrent rolcs ancl rccluire consiclcrable flexibilitr'. Couplec'l n'ith this is the nen' idca of 'etlbcts-based tt'ar', u-here the irctual'n'ar'itself is pirrt of a rruch \\'icler strategvi r1n crantple olthis is lrirq, u.here renroval of Saddam Flusseit-t ancl cle fc;rt olhis trool'rs coulcl bc sccn as part ole \\'ider strategv of bringing clcmocracv to the couutn'. Conflict irncl u'irrfare continlre in r.n;rrrv plrts of the urrrlcl often rentrtirling uuresolvccl ancl resulting itt hunran sr.rfl-erir.rg. As long as there are inclcpcnclent states, disagreements ovcr tcrritories and resollrccs irr.rcl minorities u'hose politicirl or religious i.rspirations ere bcing clenied, there u'ill be cor.rt.licts.

at sea. I)cspite the irttrodLlction of tl-re rllrcl'rine gun u'l-rich hircl dcmonstratcd its clcfcnsive capabilitics

Principles of war
X'Iilitan'strategists analr'se actual car.r-rpaigns ar.rc'l aim to cleduce fionr practice the esscntial principles of uar lncl constrllct a clear cloctrine on thc b;:rsis of u'hich commanclcrs cln plan arnd light battles. This is a highlv prrgmatic and tl.rcon'-btrilcling proccss. Neu- technologies are tcstecl in simulations ancl exercises tcst thcir irlpirct. I)efi:at in campaigns all<t*'s filr manv lessons to be learned ancl innovltior-rs -l'hcre ir-r militrrrv stratcg\'. coutinucs to be considerablc intellectr.tal in\.estmeut in militan, strategv

not <tttlt' in rnilitln' stafF colleees ancl headquarters but also in acaclernic clcpartments ancl spccialist profbssional jounr:rls. Doctrine is tl-re best estimati()n ol the u'a1. the countrr's arr.netl fbrces ancl those slro counancl thet.n shonlcl go about their n-rilitan'business. According to British l)efbnce L)<tctrir-re (BDD,2001, p. 3 I), cloctrine is not rncrelt.a record of plst prJctice, it is an rssessment of the best apprroach based ot.t tt souncl uuderstaucling of current impcrltir,es ancl lessons leamecl fiom past experiencc - both the goocl aucl tl'rc bac1. As fir as thc British are conccrned, cloctrine is flexiblc to irllou' comrnlndcrs to seize the irtitiative and adopt un()rthodox or in.raginative c()urses of action rs the ()pportunities lrisc; cloctrine is about e l'av of tl.rinking, r'rot about \\'het one must think.

SYLVIE JACKSON

33

l)octrine states that ir-r planr-ring ftrr u'ar ancl in excclrtirlg that phll, corr.rmanclers anc'l their stirfli at all Ievels need to takc ccrtain principles into consicleration. Thesc are not rigicl lau.s but pror.idc gr-ridar-rcc. The l0 prir-rciples olrvar (BDD, 3 2-3 3) arc aclclrcssccl bclol-. These are similar to th()sc of NATO;rr.rd tl-re US Arr.nr'.

l. Selection ond ruoitttettance oJ'niw. lt is csscntial to sclect ancl clcarh'deflne tl-re overall aim (the tr{aster Principlc). Elch phirse of the l'ar ancl cach scparate ()perati()n is c-lircctecl tou-arcls this su;rrcnte aiur, but it l'ill hrr'e its ourr limitccl ain'r u'hich nlllst bc clearlv dcfinccl, simplc ancl direct. Once the aim is clcfinecl, all eflbrts rre clirectccl t() its rttainmcnt unless/until the situation chirnges lncl ir neu' air-n is recluirecl.
2. Mnintrnance of ucornle . Morale is often tl-rc kcv t()
moralc are therefbre essenti.rl.
success) rather than pl'u'sical qualities. Goocl moralc provicles courage) erlerg)', detennination, skill ancl ;r bold oflbr-rsive spirit u'hich cannot be compensatecl fbr bv r-rurnbers ol fbrces, anrrnrent irnd rcsourccs. L)evclopmcnt and maintcnancc ol

3. (ffinsite nctiln. Until the initiative is seizecl '.rnd the oflcr-rsive tirkcn, success cannot bc achicr-ecl. Tl-rc attacker u'ill gain the initiative 'is the cnelnr, h'.rs to react to tl-re attacker's moveurents. Whilst oflbnsivc action ir.rvolves risk, it c.loes ir.nprove thc morale of its fbrces.

4.

Secu.ritl,. This cntails adccllrltc clcfcr-rcc ol l-righ valuc assets (sucl-r as bases, platfirmlsl \\'crlp()ns svstcms and n'ren) ancl infomration to prcscn'c'.r c()nlnr'.ulcler's fi'eeclorl olaction. It shor,rlcl not imph' undrie crlrtion ancl ar-oidirnce of risks. irs it is bold ectior.r n'hicl-r leacls to sllccess.

5. Surprise. Surprise is a most cflcctive and pou.crful influence because it c'an achieve results out ol all proportion to thc cllorts cxper-rdcc1. Thc clcr.r'rcnts of surprise are sccrec\,) conceah.nent, deception, originirlifl', ludlcin' and speed.
6. Concentt'ation
oJ'Jbrce .

ancl materiirl) at the decisive time

the decisive blou-l-hcn and *here recltrirecl.

Militirn'success goes t() the side ul.rich can conccutrrtc supcriclrforcc (noral rrcl ;rhce. It is not about numbcrs but irbclut being ablc to dcliver

Ecottowty oJ' eJJkt. A baliurcec.l erlplovnrcnt of firrces couplecl u'ith judicious expencliture of all resources provides econolrry olcfl'crrt in ircl'rievir-rg an cflbctive concentr;ltion et the clecisive tir.ne ancl place.

7.

8. Flexibilitt'. A high degree of tlexibilitl' allons pre'arrangecl pl'.rns to be rrltereci to meet char.rging situations ancl unexpectecl clevekrpments. It entails goocl trair.ring, org'.rnisation, discipline arrd stafF u'ork alcxrg u'itl-r rapidin.of clecision-making bv the commandcr.

9.

operations require co-operation to be successful. 'l'he increasec-l interclepenclence ol the indir,idual amred se rvices ancl increasing mutull clepenc'lence of ;rrrned tbrces ol allies lnd coalition p'.1rtners hils made c()-operati()n vital. Clooc'ls-ill anc'l the clesire to co-operilte ilrc csscntial at all levels. With the increrrsccl hunrirnitarian role, it is ;rlso necessilrlr to co-operatc l-ith non-governmental agencics, manv of u'hclrn n'ill hlve aims trud objectives ir'hich seetn i1t vJriJnce tu
Co-operntion.

N\ militan'

those in tl.re militan'plan. 10. Sustoinnbilitt,.This c()\'crs tl"rc klgistics ancl aclrninistretive rrransemerlts ul.ricl.r irllos-the fbrce to rnaintain thc nccessarr,of comba.t p()\\'cr firr thc tir-nc rccluireci to meet its objectives.

van, accord ng

'l'he ebove prir-rciples ol u'ar need to be aclaptecl t() c()ntert) so their rel:rtir,e importnce u'ill to circurrstilnce. Historical perspectives and cxperiencc arc lihelr, t() cre-rtc r \ie\\ on importance in diflbrent countries. For example, Austrllia's inr'oh,cmerrt ir-r thc Victnlr-r-r Wlr in the 1960s has macle it ven' u'ln' ol rnission creep - u'here a sr.r.rall ir.ritial commitment bccarle a rnajor involvement. The Unitecl Stiltes is in a similar situation u'ith Iraq, u'hcrc u'hat thcr, thought

34

INSTITUTIONALIST PERSPECTIVES

\\'ould be 'a short-term courrt.ritmcnt is likelv to corltinlrc to bc ir lengthv colnllitment of largc tlutubers ol troops. The Unitecl States is also corrscir-rus of the r-reed to mininrise clsu;rltics to r.'ai', tair.r civilitrn tnorale urcl support fbr tl-re conflict u'l.rich clates back to its ou.n inroh.ernent in the
Victnarn !V,rr.

Linking military strategy to strategic management

Whilst thcse are thc principles ol n'ar, a parallel can be seen u'ith organisntions operating in highly cornpetitivc euvirottuctrts.'l'hcv rrlso nced to iclentif\,a kcv rlim uith all opcrations supp()rting the kev airr.r. J'hev ueecl to lnait.tti-tin tl're r.noralc of their staff tcl tbstcr the n'ill to rr'in ancl secure their lrssets illtcl inforn-ration ri'hicl.r is Iikclv to bc their conrpctitive ad\'rntage. Surprise and ofl'ensive acrion
are liev to tl-re ir.rtrocilrction olncu'products and scn'ices, r,rhilst r.r.raintainir-rg ecolt()mv of

cflitrt

rrncl

flexibilin' in their prlanning and cxecution of stratcgr.. Finallr, co-operation is increirsinglr' irnport;rnr l ith su1-rpliers rncl partuers in alliance s and, like tl-rc r.niiitarr,, sustirinabilifi' nrust be built in to ensllre thc overi'rll objcctive is gaincd irud not just the qr-rick u.ins. Essentiallr,, tl-re n.rilita.n'apprclach does flt u-cll ir.rto the classic business strateg\' fiarncu-ork of analvsis, choicc ancl impler.nent:rtion. Using the fi'ltleu-ork of ottr scvcn Cls moclel - c()ntext, c()lrpetellces, culture, ct.rnrpc1i11g, c()rp()r1tc, cbangc ilncl control, let r-rs look at sorre olthcsc ilrels in r.nore detail.

Context
Corttert is thc t:trvirr)nment ir-r lvhich the rnilitan. crmplign is to tekc place. Accorcling to Britisl-r I)octriuc (BDD,2001, p. I 2), rnilitarv activities arc concluctecl at cliflbrent lo'els involving ciiflbrcnt peo;rlc, fl'or.r.r the scnittr political leaclcrship olthc st:rte to the anled firrces at tl-re fbrcfirrnt of militan. opcrations. Within NATO there rre four lcvels currellth' acccptecl trs providing a framcll'ork fbr c<tt.t.tt.t.trttttl and itnalt,sis: the grand strategic, tl-re nrilitarv strltegic, thc operational and tactical. Clrand str.rtegv c()\'ers the tirll rirtrge of isst-tes associatecl u'ith tl-re mlintenance of political ir.rclcper-rclence ar.rd tcrritorill integritv aucl the pursuit of l'iclcr n;rtiontrl interests. -I'hc difhcultics ir.r Iracl u,hicl-r harvc beer-r seen sitrce the defi::rt of Sacldan.r Hussein hrrve stemmecl frorn a l;rck of consenslrs about thc policv objectives in the region - the Grancl Strategr'! Similar difllculties hlve occurrcd ir-r the Balkar.rs and reflect r1 poor strategv process in NATO. The lack of a deflnecl encl state has lcd to a lacli of agrccmenr ovcr n-rilitarv str:ltcg\'. N{ilitarr. strilte gv is thc cor-r-rpollent part of the grar.rd stratcg\r. The operrrtiotral lo'el is u'hcre campaigus are prlannecl ancl the tactical level is l.hcrc n'ar frghting actllelh.takes place. I'he levels of tvar provicle a tiarnex'ork firr tl-re cornmand and control cllopcrations and:r useftll tool firr the lnalt'sis olpolitico-militen';rctivitv bcfirre , cluring;rncl aftcr the concluct of rrilitan'{rpe1'.,i,r1r. Accorcling to lSritish Doctrinc (ibid., l-3), this cssence of planning ar each level is to icientih, the clesirecl end,thc n)&!sit1 lvhich it is to be achievecl and aciccluare ?neltLts c)f rchievins it. Ilthis cannot be achievcd at au\, Ievcl, the issr-re neecls to be bahnccd at the level alrove. Militan' strttegv recosuiscs that thc strategic enr.ironr.nent is con-rplex rrnd uses an an?lh,sis ven, sirttillr to PF,S'I'(Greiss, 1985). This covers political, econonric, phvsical, scientific:rncl technical, social ar-rd crtltural trncl lcgal, etl-rical ancl moral perspcctive s. Assessmcnt of thesc areas is subjective jttst as it is u'itl.r business, but thc militan'rlso have to consider the iclca of n;rtionai interests u,ithil it. Whilst thcre nrav be gencral conscnslrs of csser-rtial irlterests, there is also the idcr of vital intcrests anci t.n:rrginrl interests u.hcre therc is cousiclerable scopc for interpretatior-r. 'l'he stretegic cloctrine neecls to be flexible ct'tough to copc u-ith shifts in perccption olnarionll interesr reflectecl in policv. Witir thc char.rgecl ettvirontnettt itncl rr'lr on terror, tl-rere has been a neecl to clevelop counterir-rsurgenc\'operiltions uhich do not flt reirclilv into the cliflbrent levels describecl above.'l'his has led to the t.uatlrlettvrist approach. Tl're aim is to shatter the ener.n\"s or,crall coltesiot.r anc-l rr'ill to figl-rt rathcr than his rnaterial. It air.ns to applv strcngth against identitrcd vulnerabilities and covers the tl.rree conceprs

SYLVIE JACKSON

35

deep, chtse ancl renr (.Bulloch, 1996, pp. 4-16). Deep opcrations tend to be political, ciiplornatic and psvchological in nature. l,{ilitan.involr'cmcnt mav bc throrlgh covcrt lncl clandestine actior-r sucl-r as cross-border c()-operation ancL sun'eillance of areas. Close operations take place at the tactical levcl ancl inr.olr'e reassr,rring thc public and ftrstering im;lrovccl cor.nmr.rnitv relations or thc\,u'ill bc rcircti\c to ir.rsurgent group's rctivities. Rear operations cover not onh' phvsicll pr()tecti()n of tire firrce, br-rt -l'l"rc also secure ;lolitical ar-rd ptrblic support fion-r u'lricl.r all govcmr.r-rcnt fi'ecdom of actior-r follou's. militan, comrrander rnev ider-rtifv g()\,cmmcnt vulncrubilities such ls im;lort:rnt peoplle or econt-rmic assets lnd use these as clecisive points in their campaign. With clccp, closc ar-rd rear opcrrrtiorrs, Bulloch (ibid.) suggcsts tl-rerc is'..r cliscrcte and unclcfrnec{ brlance alnong reasslrrAnce) the application of deterrence and n'rilitan.acti()n. To achievc victor\', llritish Doctrinc (BDD, 2001, p. 3-6) states that those comrnancling at all levels of u'arfhre need to cor.nprehend the n'ar.s in lhicl-r the enernr"s militlrv fbrce is structurcc-l and clcprloved, ancl uh'at are its inhcrcnt strcngths ancl ueaknesses. Hn.rpl.rasis is on defbat anci disnrption of tl.re encm\. bv tirking tl-re initiltivc ancl applving constant and unacceptable prcssure tt the times anci places thc enemv least suspects. A ker, chirracteristic is the attacking of the enemv commandcr's decision rlirking proccss bv atter-npting to get inside l-ris decision-rr.raking o,cle and ;rresenting thelr n'ith tl-rc neccl to malie clecisions at ;1 fistcr ratc tl-ran that u'ith u'hich ther, can cope, thus takir-rg inlppro;.r'in1c or n() rcti()r1 and parah,sing thcir caprlbilitl' tcr react. Colonel fohn Bovcl, tr US Air Force pilot;rncl rnilitln'strategist olthe l;rte t\\'entieth ccntllry', is credited u'ith thc c()nccpt that thc decision o'cle or O()DA loop (scc Figurc 3.1) reacts to irr.t er-ent ancl thc ket, to victorv is to be .rble to crcatc sitnirtions u herein the commander c'.rn makc nrore appropriate clecisions nlore cluicklv than the encm\'. This manoeuvrist irpproacl'r is or.re u'hicl-r could bc corrsiderccl and usccl bv br-rsincss organisations m()rc. \\re do scc s()mc usc of thc aprprrorcl.r r.itl.r the discrecliting of cor-r-rpetitors - Nat West banking oflering \\'hat other banks hlve stoppccl oflcring (branches, pcrsonal c()ntact) etc.) ancl the canrpaign bcnvccn Proctor ancl Gamble aud Lever Brothers over thc nov u.'ashing prou'cler u.hich tl-re c()mpctitor saicl disir-rtegr;rted clothes.

of

Competences
(iompctcnces fhll into t\\.o areas for the militan'- thc attributes, skills and compctenccs of incliviclutrls and nrilitan' competcncc u'hich is refbrrecl to as capabilin'. A capabilitv u'ill lllou' tl.re nrilitarv to achievc a clefinccl purpose at r,arioLrs levels - stratcgic, opcratic.rntrl ()r trctic;1l and takc into rrcconrtt all\'thing
Observation

Orientation

..Decision

Figure 3.1 OODA loop

35

INSTITUTIONALIST PERSPECTIVES

ar-rd u'ithout cor.rsultation u'ith Parliirmcnt. Thc lorlg clecline <tf (,irrtldiirn Defbncc Forccs thnngh lack of inr,estrnenr l-rirs led to ftrss of consiclerablc cltrrlbilitv artcl a difhcultr, in fLrlfllling tl-reir NATO lncl pc:rcekeeping obligations firr the UN. Gcnerirl Rick Hillicr, Chicf olDctbnce Forces, reported (Hobson,2006) the so\,emnrenr hild Itt-tllottllcecl CAD l7.t billion \\'()rth of nerr'pnrjects: 3 foint Support Ships,4 str..lreqic rrtlrlsport aircraft, l7 tacticrl transp()rt aircraft, l6 mecliurn-to hcarv lift hclicopters ancl 2300 mecliun-sizecl logistics trucks to plug the ca;rlbilitv gap. Tl-re military irucl bttsiuess persprcctives ol1 c()lnpetellccs ;1re ven' sir.nilar. Force plarlners in cicfbr.rce polio'use resourcc-bitseci theon.(Chapter 9) to argr,rc for capabilities implicitlr', rvl-rile business strltegists hrlve rrppliecl resource -basecl theorr, to help cxplain Britain's clefbat of the Franco-Spanish fleet at T'rafi.rlgar in I805 (lringle rrnci I(roll, 7997) in terms of the supcrior rcsources that the Rritish I-r'acl ir-r respect of trctici'rl ebilitv. Thct. irrguc thtrt thc Roval Nar.r.hacl der.elopcd supcrinr c()lnperences in tert.t'ts olskrll u'ith weapons, acceptance olcirstrillties and rr morc aegressir-e tirctical cloctrine. Thcse c()lllpctctlces u'crc inirnitable because the Rovirl Navv had, bv meirns of its r.rar.al bkrckadc, pre\/entccl Frencl-r 'lncl SPanish navrrl units fionr lcquiririg the *..r.,.,.j.*pcrience. For rnilit;rrv thc liet'clpabiliti'is 'fiel-rtir-rg pou'cr' ancl this is maclc up of three inter-relatcd componcnts: c()nceptual, rttorel ancl phvsical. The conceptual componcrrt pror.ic-les the tl.rought pnrcesses neecled to clevclol-r tl-re abiliti' to fight. It comprises lcssclns firrn-r the prast and also thinhing about hou, tl-re A'r.r.recl Forces can best ()peratc in the present ancl in thc tuturc. It inclucles n()t orlhr cloctrilc ;rrrcl the principles olu'ar but also conccptual thinking to ensure the clevclo;rmcnt of fighting p()\\-er irrt<r tlre firtr.rrc. Thc clefbr"rce capabilitics (BDD,2001, p. 1-2) to clelivcr fighting po\\,cr;rre a robust rruci rcsporlsivc ltteilns of cotnmancl; a proccss to infirrnt; a lreans to prcpare; mcilsllres ancl resources

thc euemY might clo t() prcvellt the lction. Tactical cap;-rbilities u.ill gencrallr.ollr'influcnce the actual birttleficlcl as thev have a shorter rtlnqe. Stratcgic capabilin'coulcl, f'rrr examplc, c.r-er c.'siclcrable clistirnce irncl clcstrtlv tltc ettet.nt''s strategic assets, such as a cruise missile. Irlaritinte cirpabilitr,cor-rld prcvent the enentv fionr usinq r seJ itrei.l .rncl might cr.rtril the usc of aircrlft ,r. ....i., space-based sun.eillrrtlce, ri'l.rich nright lnean that ships u'ere not usccl irt all. Hinge (2000) (.ur*,*,.clefbnce.gor..a.) in l'ris bo<rk Prcparcdncx susgests that u'hen clefrning thc militirrr, cirpabilitv recluirccl fbr ,'r flitr-rri fbrce, the capabilifi'u'ill rlot be btrilt iu response to a single c()ntext n()r a single point i1 tine rather future , capabilitv dccisittns are basecl on being able to meet rhe challcnges of a range olpossible firtures. For thc militan', strategic c;rpabilin' crn txke considerable timc ro build u;-r. An aclditional clullensc is thr.rt the capabilitv uust bc relevlr.rt to recluircmer.rts tbr both the presellt and the hrtr-rre (u'$\'.'.rtlreiufir.crttrt, 25 Atrgust 2006). fhis challenge is mircle n'rore cliflictrlt by the c6st ancl lo'g leacl tir-nes firr accluisitiotr and the ler-rgth of timc tl.rar c:rpital cqrripmcnt u'ill remain in serr.ice (ir somc cases 30-50 I'ears). Ciirpabilitr-like cotnpetenccs is not just lbout eclr-ripment but nceds to be gnclerstgod its rt t'ttttttbcr <lf lreas u'hich coutribtrte. These inclucle orgrnisatior-r, erluipn1g111) pers()ltuel) trailing, doctrine, fecilities attcl su;-rport. Bv ac-lopting this u'icle r,ieu-, arr.ncd fbrccs can .,-rrr'r.. that i1r'esturcr-rt is ulacle in all the appropriatc rreas. For cxirmprlc introc{ucing nen'technologics u.ill not gir,e capirbili6' ilfirrces are llot trairtecl in their r.tse. The Australian Defbnce Forccs hr\re cngrlgcd Noctic Solutions (ibid.)ttt assist in the clo'elopment of tools that \\.ill llssist in cap:lbilitv clecision-makirrg. The tools arc collccpts oltlperltictns fbr a rangc of illustrati\,e planning sceuarios that iclcntifi'poter.rtial nilit1r6. rcspollscs to crisis evellts. Thc possible respollses rre able to emplrtr. a r:rnge of n.rilitirn- capabilitics thirt cilll theu be tcstecl agaiust otte lnother for tl'rcir cost-cflcctir.cness. Whilst clpabilitv tal<cs tir.r-rc to builcl ttp, it can be lost relrrtilelv cluiclilv eithcr becausc of changes in stnrcture or beclrsc 9f n6t kcepir.rg up tvitl'r technologr, clcr-elopments; for ex'.rmple, tl'rc ertensive recluction of British trcltlps in Gernlitnv citrring tl.rc last cottple ol\,ears nreans thrt tl.rc capabilitv shonn c-ltrring Excrcise Lionheart in 1984, nherc 131,000 tr()ops cirrrie(i or.rt a flclci trlining e\ercisc in \\rcst Clennarrr', is r.ro krnger i1 place artcl nottlci be difllcLrlt to rebr.rilcl. At the sanrc tiure, otl'rcr c.lp:rbilities hrrve bcen clcer.lecl tg<r itlrportant to be lost. hr 2006 the British Govemmcnt reve:rlccl tl.rirt it hacl rgreecl t() the c()ntirllliurce of uuclclr dcte rrent capabilitv clespitc the htrge costs involved, the non-prolifbration agrecnrcllts irl

place

SYLVIE JACKSON

37

'the tnoral is to the material as three to orlc'. The rnoral component is deper.rdent or-r good morale thc conviction that the purp()se is morallr. arrd etl-ricallv sor-rnd. Contributors include training, cttrtficlcnce in etlttipn.rcnt, fhir ancl firm clisciplir"rc, self--respect and a clear unclerstancling of ri'l-rat is happening aud rvhat is recprired. Moralc in tl-re British Forccs in Iraq cluring the current conflict l-ras beer-r dentccl br, lack of equipmer.rt (boclr.armour) ancl bv thc prosecutior-r of inclividual solclicrs for ill treatment ollrecli solcliers anc'l civilians. The phvsical cornponent is rhe means to fight and cor,ers fir-c
l.rr.rcL

t() project; the t-ueatrs to protect; thc ability to sr.rstrin, all of u,hich are ileccssrln, to ()pcri1te. Thc moral comporrent is abotrt persuading peoplc to fight. Napoleon (ibicl., p. 4-l ) is su1-rposed ro have rcmarked

eler-neuts: manp()\\'er) eqnipment, collectir,e perfbrmancc, rcadiness ancl sustainabilitr'. These clcarlr. c1efired c()nlponelrts rnakc it relatir.elr' casv to cleterminc u'hether 'fighting pon.er' capabilin. is in place. Hotv manv bttsinesses have clearlv clctined their rcquirccl competeuces and hou. ther. can measllre rheir perfirrr.n:rnce against thent i

Culture
I)espite the firct that cacl-r of the sen'iccs, reginrents, ships and lir bases has its ou-n unique traclitions, stories irncl ritr.rals, culture is the g|.rc that holcls thc militan' fbrces togcthcr. To the outsider it nrigl-rt seer-rr tl-rirt therc is but one c()mm()n cultnre but in rcirlif it is uot thc case. Hol'cr-er, the rr-rilitan- recogtrise the r-rcccl to co-operatc :rt irll levcls ancl incrc;-rsinglt, u,ith otl-rcr organisations, be thev allics, tl.rror-rgh NATO, ir-r joint pcacckccpir-rg firrces with othcr n:rrious or in more and more joir-rt l'orhing u'ithin their oun armcd fbrces. Therc is oftcn much good natured joking benveen the cliflbrent scn'ices. In the Unitcci l(ngclon.r, the armv all'avs c()mment that the R{F uhen irl.av tror-r-r home base tlust first scarch clut thc nearest frve star hotcls to stay ir.r.'fhe,\ustrirliar-r r.nilitan.dcscribes its sepirratc sen'ice cultures rs thc Three Ds: dumb (armv), dcvious (air fbrcc) ancl cleflant (nan'). The firct that this tcrminoloev is irctllalh' l1-rprovecl of bv thc scn'ices themsclvcs is perhll-rs inclicativc of

their selficonficler-rce.
Research hirs shou'n (tr{irrshall, l97ll) that cultrirc is irlportar-rt becansc pcople clo not ultimatelr. the ir countn' i'rlone bnt also fbr their fiicnds - the mer.nbers of thcir tearn. This has beett clcmonstrrted [-rr.solcliers lihe Wilficc] ()u'en, the poet irncl infhr-rtn, colltpan\r comr.nlncler, u'hcr clespite hatir-rg tlte u'ar, aficr rccuperatirrg fion-r concussior.r lncl trcnch fbr.er, returncd to the battleficlcl to be u'ith l.ris trool-rs. Hc clied ir.r action ir-r 1918.

tight or die fbr

Thc nrilitrrn' n'orlcl is a ven' different one t() that of the civilian :rnd it is the culture tl.rat makcs so. The'soldier'is marked out bv thc diflbrent str,le of lris unifirrr.r.r, his lifestvlc, rank anc.l uhat is expectcd of hin.r - to kill or be killecl. The militarr. s.orlcl is sclf'-containecl and provides cvcn'thing; at thc srme time, it asks even'thir-rg of- its members. Onlv recenth,, u'ith the entn' of u'omen inro a u'ic1er role in the rlilitan', hirs the culture begun to change. For somc countries, this is not the case, i1s \\r()lren have aluavs hacl an ecl.rivllent role to men, firr cxlmple Isracl. Tl-re self--containecl uorld is sustainecl u'ith much socialising firr both the militan' and their f.irrilics, thus creirting inclusir,eness. Forurer urilitan, u'ivcs complain tl'rat u'ives and fhnilics are regardecl ls apper-rdages of the soldier lnd s;rt'thev gret'tirccl clf being 'thc u'ifb ol . . .'. ()flicers lnd solcliers g() thr()ugh a t\/pc of rite of pessille n'hen thev joir-r u'hich is risorous ancl proviclcs a clcar set olvalucs - this creates a llcling of bcing elite. Tl-re lifc of tl-re soldier is r,en,strlrctlrrecl ancl u'hilst this r-nakes it cliflicr-rlt for long career soldicrs to fit back into the u.'icler choices ol sociefl' n.hen thev le:r\.e; it is also becorning clear that the structurc ancl r-alues are a dral' fbr manr. \()ung people l'hose lives hck ther-r-r.

it

Organisatiorts such as thc managemellt consultant N{cl(nsev havc usecl sir.nilar techniqucs u'ith oltough inten'ieu's lnd takir-rg on ne\\'coclcs encl values. Lihe the milit..rn', tl'rcre is lL sense of bclonging, even after vou leave the organisation. Profbssions such as the lau' ancl n're dicir-re also have strong culturcs ancl a sense of belonging. T'here is a divicle benr.een opcrations ancl stafljobs in the militan,: onlv those u.ho in the infhntn,, armollr or cavaln' r"'ill attain thc top-ranking jobs, as it is fblt that to send other people t() \\'ar voll
car.rcliclates passing a series

38

INSTITUTIoNALIST PERSPECTIVES

nlust have experienced c()mbet votirsclf. Staff jobs arc increasingh. complex and there is recognition that t.nore profbssionalism is required in areas such as logistics, procurement, human resources, ii,r"n.. and project manasement, although the notion of militan, staff becomir.rg functional specialists ir.r staff jol'rs is still facing resistance. With tire civilianisation of an incrcasing number of stirff jobs, thc cultural cliflbrence betn'een militan'staff and cir.il sen'ar-rts is a u..icle gulf according ro man\.n'rilitan staff u,hcr clo not ltnclerstand the clock u'atching, but arc quick to praise thc political skills of their cir,ilian colleagues. Hcalth sen'ices have similar prroblems u'ith meclical staff rcgarding then.rselvcs as the clite against an arlrv olpcn-pushing management, \\'ho c1o not add value. At'rv large organisation can learn from the militan' that although a common culture is ideal, the cornmon values and co-operation are the componeuts of success and a coherent orqJrrisition.

Competing
The idca of cl.roosing hon', l,hen and u.hcrc to collpetc and for \\'har pLlrpose is diflbrent fbr the -l-he miiitan'. choice to compete is inacle generallr, at politicrl lo'el n,hich u-ill determinc solre s()rt of end state.'l'his should trllor.v the r.nilitan'to clevise a sr-ritable rnission u,irh a sct of objectir.es.'fhc r.rtission is broken dou'r-r into a set of activities fbr cach compollent of the ftrrcc. This is knoun as missiou analvsis. An imp()rtant part of r.nissior-r analr.sis is to alu'avs kccp in rlind the reason for the oper:rtiot.t (Master principrlc), so that if circumstances rlter, changes can be macle to the plirn. The concept of Mission Comrnatrcl n'as adopted bv thc British in relatir.elv recent years br,rt the rreecl lbr deccntralisec.l coumand, lieeclom ancl speecl of action and initiative u'hich is responsir-e to sr,rpcrior direction can bc traced back t() the loss of British tr()ops on thc beaches at Gallipoli. Otlicers *,'erc tolcl to trke the beaches, u'hich thev achieved relativclv easilr', but as rhev had no further orclers or knon4e clge ol the su;rcrior contmander's intention to c()ntinue firrthcr inlar-rd ancl defbat the encm1., ther, stat,cd on the beachcs, beconrir-rg easv trrgets. Hacl thev knou'n of the intent, thcv coulcl have pressecl on ir-rlarrd ancl fbn,cr lives u.ould har,c bcen lost. Missiclr (lommancl has the fbllorving ker,elentcnts (BDD, 2O0l ,p.3,7):
I . A comm:luder ensurcs that his suborclinates understand his intentior-rs, their ou,n rrissions, and the strategic, operational ancl tactical context.

2. Sr-rborclinatcs are told u'hat eflect thc'n. ilre to achieve ancl the rcason u,hv it is necessan'. 3. Sr-rbordinates are alloca.tcd sufllcicr.rt resollrces to carn,out thcir r.nissions. 4. A corttmandcr uses the ir-rinin.u.rm ol control so as not to linrit Lrnr.recessarilr. his subordinate's
ficcclom of action.

5. Subordinirtes decidc firr themsclves hou'best to achicr,c thcir

A,nothe

missions.

r contribution br, rnilitan' strateg\, to comperiti\.c strategv is thc idea ol ofli:nsir,e action arrd the usc of surprise. Oflbr"rsive action, particlllarlv u'here firrces rrav be uiclch'dispersed, u'hilst rishr,, is ustrallv more successftll than remaining krckcd in a defbnsir.'e enclave. Lau'rence (1962) clescribes hou the Ar:rb fbrces in the Nliddlc East gained the initiativc over the Turks br, rneans of such tactics. Bnsitresses rnav flnd this a uscful strategv l'hcn operating in neu' markets rvl-rcre there are n() establisl-reci competitors, or rl,.hen cleveloping neu. technologics.

Corporate
As iclentifled earlier thc role of defbnce in man\.collntries has changed, particularlv in tl.re last l0 t<t 20 vears. A number of countrics such as Clhile ancl Jorclan har-e alrl'avs usecl their armed fbrces for a number of roles abor,e and bevond that of clefbnce, firr exan"rple the clcr,elopl.nent of infrastructure such as roads ancl fbr sr.rpporting mcdic;rl sen'ices or even running hospitals. Thc u'icler remit thar-r

SYLVIE JACKSON

39

clcfcnding 'hearth and hor.ne' hrs lecl t() nc\\- r-isitrn stetcrncnts - the UI( Ministn' of Defbnce, lbr exlt.nple,'Defer-rdirrg the Unitcd I(ingclor.n and its interests; ilctirlg as firrce fbr goocl in thc u'orld.' Tl-ris cl-ranged role arose in response to thc Stratcgic L)eftncc Revie*'ol 1998 uhich recognised the changing enviroutrent. Thc UI( hacl also seen more deplovment of its armcd fbrccs (ancl continues to clo so) in the last l0 r'cars than since the Seconcl Worlcl War. L'rcicecl thcre is a r.ieu'u'itl.rir.r the UI( N,loD that thcr,arc opcratir-rg in perrnanent'or,erstretch'anc1 are having to call or-r l higher level of resen'ists than ever before and are also in c{anger olregul:rrlv brelching the agreed targets fbr nr,rrnbcr

of

clavs per vcer

on

cle;rkrvmer.rt.

1999 in response to c'.rlls fron-r the UI( Cabinct Ofllce anc'l Treasun'to clcrnonstrate value frrr m()ne\'. the Brllncecl Scorecard u,'as introduced rrs a stratcg\r and perfirrm;rnce reviet- tool.'I'his tool clevelopecl bv I(aplan and Norton (I(rplan and Norton,1992) is u.'iclelv knou'n and used br,tens of thousends of organisrtions. Its development ir-r thc United Sttltcs fireant that earlr. intercst ancl adopters h:u.e beer-r in the Ur-rited States and turope but intercst is sprcacling to defcncc in other countries through telching ancl discussicln i1t courses at thc Dcfcncc Acldclnr,of thc Unitcd I(ngdom. In rcspronse to the suggestion br, I(lplan trnd Norton tl-rat the scorecarcl be ;ldapted and tailclrecl tcr suit the organisation (an uur,rsual aspect t() r'n()st lnirnagement moclels), both the US l)epartrnent of Def'ense ancl the UI( MoD have aclaptecl the original scorcc;rrd discusscd in a number of books and -fhe articles bv I{a;rlan ancl Norton (IQplan irnd Nortor.r, 1992J. original scorectrrcl populatecl bv the a.uthor btrt ls suggcstecl bv I(rplan and Nortrirr is shou'r'r in Figurc 3.2. As can bc seen, thcre arc firur pcrspecti\:es: Fir.rirncial, Custclrler, Internirl llrLsiness, irnd Innovirtion and Learr-ring. Tl-re latter beir-rg i1n areil often r-reglcctccl bv most olganisations. Realisticlllv these prerspectives uork lrell for'Lrusiness'trpe organisations but are less applicable to the public scctor. Sorle organisations havc madc nrinor arnenclments but str.rch largelr' to thc original ftrrurat. C)thers l-rave felt the r.reed to ider-rtift.a specific 'peoplc' pcrspcctivc cithcr in aclditior-r or insteacl of onc of thc othcr perspectivcs. The LIS DoD is onc such orgar-risrtion, but keeping fbur persl'rectives. We see in Figr,rre 3.3 that the Cristorr-rer perspective l-ras n'idcned to crnbracc Opcrational Goals (cssentiallv thc role olthe organis'.rtion as dcfincd bv governrnent - the cr.rstorner); the ir.rnovation and learning pcrspcctivc hls bccornc 'fltr,rre chlllengcs'; financial allci intcmrl business perspectives have bccome institr,rtion'.r1 goirls and thc people perspective is callecl firrcc managcmcnt goals. Intcrcstir-rg1r,,
Financial perspective
How do we look to our shareholders?

In

customerperspective
How do our customers

see

us?

. . . .

.a

./

t/

lncrease revenue groMh Cost reduction lncrease asset utilisation optimum investment strategy

lnternal business perspective

What must we excel at?

lncrease lncrease lncrease lncrease

market share customer retention customer acquisition customer satisfaction

(.-

..,fi,...
, )

. . . .

lncrease research and development Build products optimally Faster delivery oJ products After-sales seruice

,/
lnnovation & learning perspective
How can we continue to improve?

Figure 3.2 Completed Balanced Scorecard as suggested by Kaplan and Norton

40

INSTITUTIONALIST PERSPECTIVES

Force management
Ensure sustainable military tempo
l\,4aintain l\.4aintain

Operational goals
Are they postured to succeed? Are they employed

quality

worklorce

lonsistent with
the strategy?

workforce satisfaction
l\y'arntain

Shape the force of the future

reasonable force costs

DoD framework Balanced Scorecard

Forces managemenl risk Operational risk

Are lorces currently ready?

Do we have the forces available?

Slreamline the decrsion process. drive financial management & acqursit on excellence

nstitutional risk

Future challenges risk

Drive Joint operatlons

(coNoPS)
experiments

Define future human skills and compelences

Deflne & develop transformation capabilities

Develop more effective organisations

Future challenges goals

Figure 3.3 US Department of Defense Balanced Scorecard

the central box covering the hcaclir-rgs of the persprectivcs refbrs to thesc as risks, tvhich rcrnincls thc orgtrnisation that thcrc ;rre risks to lrc cor.rsicierecl irncl trken into ecc()Lutt bcfbrc the goirls n'ill bc
acl-rier,ecl.

The UI( MoD has also idcntifrecl the importance ol risk in irchicving its strategic goals ancl has rdaptecl the 3 x 3 matrix, shou.ir-rg likelihood ancl im;rlct (high, meclium and lou-), to the Balancecl Scorccarcl, to shorv the kev potcntial problen.rs fhcing the go;rl realisatirxr of thc four perspectives (Figurc 3.4). Likc thc US DoI) examplc, tl-rc fbr.rr perspectives l-rave also bccn adaptcd to suit the organisation. An altcmative is to shou.' cach of tl-re strategies fbr elch ;rersprective scparateh' or-r the risk grid but this u'oulcl not identifv the specific risks. As cxpected, ttrkirrg iuto eccoultt thc currcnr 'ovcrstretch' situatiot-t, ()peratiorls success .rnd sustainabiliq' are tl-re kev risks identificd on thc cllrrent
scorccard.

Thc UI( MoD Balanced Scorccarci u';rs introclucecl in 1999 ancl has sccn a scries of char.rges, u'ith thc current scorecarcl shou'n in Figr-rre 3.5 being the first one to be in placc for more thirn ir 1-r'etrr periocl. As use olthe scorecarcl hirs mlturcd, the scorecard becomes a better managcmcnt tool. The
Defbr.rce Mlnirger.nent Board has stated,

Thc Defcncc Balanccd Scorecarcl is fbr managir-rg, not just fbr reporting perfbrmance. It shoulcl allou'thc Dcfcncc Management Boarcl to make sensible, infirn.r.red xssessments olhou'thc department is cloing, in orcier to decide n'hcre particr-rlar effcrrts have to be n.rade.
The UK Defbnce B;rlancecl Scorccrrcl nou'forms the basis of the Departmental Plrn as it encaprsulrtes thc Board's kcv objectives anci prioritics, inclucling the Pr.rblic Scn'ice Agreement t;rrgets (from the gor.ernment) \\,hich cover the firll r;rr-rge of NloD business. Like the L]S DoD scorecarcl there are fotrr perspectives, trlthclugh in this case thc\r are laici out in the same sfi.le firrrnrr.t as the original I(aplan anci Norton scorecarcl. ln thc salnc \\.av that the United States l.ras r-rsed operation:rl goals instetrd of cLrstomer, the United l(ingclorn has identifred 'Purpose'ls its custot.lterp('rspcctivc. rgrrir.r picking u;r the iclea of its role. Futilre (lapabilities (sirlilar

t() that of tl-re United States) c()\,ers tl-re innovation iurcl lcaming. Thc linancill perspectir.e l.ras beer.r broadened to cover all resourccs inclucling rranpo\\'err ar.rcl er.rabling processcs covcrs thc intcrr-ral

SYLVIE JACKSON

41

------------+t

+-

lmpact

3 e

:
J

c j
I

o o 4

o o

: )
1.

o
----------------

I :
<-levels
4. Equipment

Key:

Operations 2. Finance 3. l\,4anning

availability

5. Sustainabilily

lnfrastructure

This figure is used

Figure 3.4 lllustrative example of risk picture for UK MoD with permission of UK MoD; however the views expressed are those of the author
and not the UK MoD

Purpose A Current operationsi To succeed in Operations and l\li itary Tasks today B Future operations: Be ready for the tasks of tomorrow. C Policyi Work with AllieS, other governments and multilateral institutions
to provide a security framework that matches new threats and instabilitles. D Wider government: Contribute to the Government's w der domest c reiorm agenda. and achieve our PSA and PPA largets.

Are we fit for today s

challenges and ready far tamotrow's tasks?

Are we making the best use af out rc'ources? Resources E Finance: Maximise our outputs wlthin
allocated financial resources. F Manpower: Ensure we have the people we need. G Eslate: l\,4aintain an estate of ihe right slze and quality ln a sustainable manner. to achieve defence oblectives. H Reputation: Enhance our reputation amongsl our own people and externally.

Are we a high peiorming organisation? Enabling processes Delending the UK and its interesls: acting as a torce lor qood in the world
I Personnel management: l\,4anage and invest in our people to g ve of their best. J Health and satety: A safe environment for our slaff. conlractors and visitors. K Logistics: Suppod and sustain our Armed Forces. L Business management: Deliver lmproved ways of working.

Are we
building far luture success?

Future Capabilities M Future eltects: More i exible Armed Forces to deliver greater efiect. N Efficiency and change: lvlore I exible and ell cient organisations and
processes to suppol( the Armed Forces. O Future capabilities and inlrastructure: Progress future equ pment afd capital infrastructure projects to time, quality and cosl estimates. P Future personnel plans: Develop the skills and professional expert se we need for tomorrow. Q Science, innovation and technoloqy: Exploil new technoloq es.

Figure

3.5 UK Defence Balanced Scorecard

2005-2007

42

INSTITUTIONALIST PERSPECTIVES

This figure is used

Figure 3.6 Strategy map with permission of UK MoD; however the views expressed are those of the author and not the UK MoD

business perspectivc ll.rich icientifles those activities ultich uill :rllos' achier.ement of thc purposc. With thc developr.nent of tl-re Ralancecl Scorec'.rrcl bi' I(aplln :rncl Norton into a strategv tool car.ne the cleveiopment of strategv r.r.raps u'hicl.r shou' hou' the strategies fbecl into thc or,erarching go;rls or -l'he vision lirr tl-re organisation. UI( tr{oD do'ekrped their stratcg\.mlp (shor.r'r-r in Fiqnre 3.6) in retr()spect, thus it tcnc-ls to suggest that lll stratesies fcccl into eacl.r of the stratcgies in thc abor-e perspective . Hou'ever, u'h:rt has been interesting is thc rer.isecl strutegv map l'hich shou's it illustrltecl

Future Ops - The scorecard's rrimary focus

This figure is used

Figure 3.7 Strategy map as campaign plan with permission of UK MoD; however the views expressed are those of the author and not the UK MoD

SYLVIE JACKSON

43

as a canpaign plan (Figure 3.7). Nlanlgelrent tools and techniqr-res have not all'avs been received l.ell itt the militan' as there is oftcn a r.ie.,r, that business l-ras nothing to do l'ith thcn.r - indeed u'hilc teaching the Balancecl Scorccarcl to a group on the Aclvanced Command ancl Statf Course at the loint Sen-ices Cclmrnatrd and StafF Collcgc at the Defbnce Acaclcmv of the Unitecl I(ngclorn, the author enc()Llntered some hostilitr. from militan' historian st;rff ancl fbrcign r.nilitarv str.rdents) l.hose vielr'r.r.'as 'rve tlre n,arriors, u'l.rat is the relevance of this to us . . . i'TI-re adaprtation olthe tool to fircet clrganisation tteeds, culture and lenguage is a uselirl lcsson firr rll orgenisrrtious. The adoption of br,tsiness strateg\. has been useill fbr thc rnilitan' iu rnrnv cour-rtLics, but it can :llso be useful to us because thct, h;rr.e ofter-r adapted it to suit their needs ancl in some cases acldec-l value to the original rnoc-lcls, tools ancl technique s. Onc such area is the UIt X{oD adaptatior-r of tl.re Balancecl Scorecard. Br, cl-rar.rging the perspective titlcs, thev have created a simple model to explain

strategic man:lgernent.

The rnrdcl shou'n in Figure 3.8 u.as clevelopred br,the ar.rthor to cxplain the concept of strategic managernerlt to the ne\\'h'appointec-l majors on the Intermediate Clornmand and Staff Cclurse (Land) rlur at the l)efbnce Actrdemr.of the United l(ngdom. The explanation begins bv asking them if the organisatiou is still the sxme as thc onc tl-rev joinecl about 10 \'ears ago. Whcn tho. respor.rcl in the negetive it trllorvs the author to cxplain tl-rat all organisatior.rs rurclert'.rke s()me s()rt of environntental scanning and ar.rrlvsis to sec il thc u'orlcl is cl.rar.rgirrg. As tl-re u'orlci changcs) so too cloes the role of the orgat.risation. If the orgar.risatior-r chrrnges, tl.ren the resorlrccs rcquired to irchieve the purpose change too; as do the activities to achio'e the pr-rrpose. Finlllv ue need to consider potential fllture chirllcngcs and prcpare fcrr charrple to ensurc flture caprbilitv lnd capircitr,. The model sl-rou's this ir.r l simplc u'av and alklr''s an easier explirnation of thc X{oD Balar-rced Scorecirrcl as a usclul ()ne-page i-rusiness plan. 'fhis rloclel hls bcen receir.ed u.ell bv militarv stuclcnts both inlancl and overseas '.rnd has non, been rrdop'rtcc-l b), the Directorate of Perlormance ancl Anah'sis u'ho cornpile tl-re Balar.rced Scorccrrd on L'rehalfof tl-re Defcnce N{anagement Board. Figure 3.9 shon's thc same diagrar.r.r u'ith the kev rctivitics aucl tools anc-l techniclues mappecl '.rgainst cach arca. Tl-rc modcl also firrms a usetul basis tbr anv organisational busincss plan ;rs it remincls us to consider resolrrces ancl activities. tr{ost strategic plans consic.ler the proclucts and scn'ices of the organisetion and their future linkec'l n'ith thcir markets. Often the resources and actir.ities plav a much smlller pilrt if thet' even \\'arrent a mention. Since org:rnisations selclom follon' thc logical steps to srrategic choices and implemcntation which takes into full acc()Llnt con'lpctcnccs and resources, this is a usefirl reminclcr.
The world

/'a
t,,rJl

What is happening in the world?

\I
I
we need?

[;;;-l I do
I

I\ .ll
What is our pu rpose?

-l r" -" t---:need to do?

I
]

need ro for the future?

a-=.

Figure 3.8 Strategic management

44

INSTITUTIONALIST PERSPECTIVES

The world
What is happening in the world?

Pestle Swot

/.a
Resources f inance

f**;.r
I
we

neeoz

t
Capability capacity

+
t'rtrt

\\
[wr."'.*-_]
Elf

iciency

i
i
|

neeo to

ooz

lean
I

*;_l
do

\\

need to for tne tuture?

{i-_.

The organisation

Figure 3.9 Strategic management with management tools and techniques

Change
Change n'itl-rin the cxistir.rg paracligir-r has u'orked u'cll for nri'ur\, \'crrs u'ithin tl.re militlrr'. Flistoricallr', thc n.rilitan' has ahvat's hacl to ernbrace ne\\' \\'erporln'- ,rlthongh tl-re t..rnk l-as fiercclv rcsistecl bi, tl-re cavaln'in 1916. Hotvct'er, even tocla)', the British Alrnv is r.rot convincecl of the clemise of the tirlk, citing its c.lcplovment ir-r Iracl - Operation'fclic - as vital. TI're idea of changine roles o'err.2-3 r,eirrs is all part of the job'.ruci is u'elcorr.recl bv most. Whilst it keeps peoplc fresh, there is little cloubt tl.rat the n.rilitln' loses ot-tt u'ith people in neu'posts hrrving t() go through l stcc;.r lerrrnins ctrn'e (plrticr-rlarlv iu strff jobs), cloing thc job u'ell for l2-18 rnonths, then taking their cvc otf thc ball rs ther. become interested ir-r u'hat thcir t.rert p'rosting u'ill be . In terrns olknori'ledgc m:lnaqcment) thcre are a lot ol gcneralists ir-r the rnilitirry but fbw specialists, and krrorrlcclge is oftcn losr as due to stafF shortages, p()sts are 'gapecl' n'ith r.ro opp()rtutlitv firr proper hlnclovers. Lr ac'lclitior.r, since recognition in most armcd fbrccs is bt'promotion, oflicers openlv acknolleclgc tlur rl.rev riill engage in change fbr change sakc to pr<tve thet' achievecl s()mething dLrring their postir.ru tirr thcir rlssessments bv ser-rior st:rf}-. Cl'rirnges or-rtsicle the paraciigm also prcsent problerr.rs. Nlr-rch major char-rge is regarc-lcd as being

imposed bv governurent rnd unnecessar\'. Irr thc Unitecl I(ingckrrn, tl're Strategic Dcfcnce Reviel' in 1998 lcd to signifrcant changes ttl role, rcs()Llrces lncl lctir-ities, crerrting a Russian doll nestilg eflbct fbr chirttge u'hicl.r lr'as clear and logicll. Untbrtunatelv this u,as siclcsu'ipecl bv demurds firrm go\rerllmcnt to recluce costs fitrther u'l-rich icd to the introcluction of an cfhcierlcv programme ;rnd ltter thc introduction ol busir-ress pr()cess rnaniUiement. F{ol'er,cr, couplcc-l l-ith the mtrjor cl-rrr.rge programme leacling froru thc Strategic Dettncc Revieu' and the inciir.icl,ral changes, it becomes clear that change in thc Ul( X{oD is confirsine ancl in dlnger of sub-optir-nisatirtr-r rrs ciiflerent arcls searclr

fbr cluick u'ins.

Furthermore, u'hilst ernrv rcgiments nrergec{ relativelv clsilr. in thc past, this u'as not a regular ()r signifrcant occurrcnce. Todar', in response to tl-re changing role of the Anlccl Folces, tl-re necd to nlerge ()r even clisbancl regin-rents (Northem lrcland) has lcd to r.najor chanse particularh'firr front-line troops tvith, firr cxample, all sir Scottisl.r Regirncnts mcrging ir.rro onc. l'his hacl been fblt ven'l<eenlr. ir.r the Armv where vou join a regirlent u'ith lll its traclitions ancl culture; n,hercas in both tl.re Nar.r. ancl the Air Force vcltr join the organisation ancl therefirrc rccluction in stafling is less immediatelv fclt. FI<tu'er-er, the militarl approach is one of cornrnand, leaclership and manaqement end therefirre ollcc a decisior-r is made anc-l:rtt order givcn (elen irr rron-operltional u'ork), opren o1-r1-rosition is not irllou'ec-l ancl people are c\pectecl to get ()n r.r-ith tl-re implententation of change. The ar-mv st\,le of 'ci.rn do'et'ett if thev are short olrcsources and fircus on task mcans that a grert cleal ci-ur be rcl-rier.ed. This
1-rositive

attitlldc is one l'hich ntanr'<trqanisations cor.rld learn fl-om.

SYLVIE JACKSON

45

Control

to be lerrrccl. (lor.rtrol is exercisecl throtrgh cor-r-rr.n;rncl uhich is sLlpportcd bv orclcrs, cr.rlture and ttornls ol lrehru'iottr. To reirrfbrce tl-ris, rhe nrilitan' use their ou'r-r policc ancl separatc legal svstcrr.
l)r-rrirtg operetions, obeving orders is vital lr.rcl in thc past ir.rcluclecl cxtre nre me'rsllles such as shooting ciescrters in thc First World War, 360 British solc{icrs were shot ftrr dcsertion, u'l-rich has causccl sglurc c()lttrovcrsv since. In August 2006, the Britislr Governr.nent annouuced tl.rat all 360 solc]icrs uoulcl be parclonecl, t-t.tuch to the relief of tl-reir fiarrrilics u'ho hirve fbr.rgl-rt to clear thcir nanrcs, clcclaring thtt most l'ere sr-rfle ring frclm shcll shock. 'fhc lnnourrcement hls Lrrought fLrtl-rer contror.crsr., u'ith stlsgestions that tl-ris is sartitising histon', as shootir.rq cleserters \\'r1s ir c()l11rrron rcsp()nse in tl-re militan. ir.r tlrc p:rst. Inclcccl, in 1942, u'hen the Gcrr.nirrr Armv n'as aclvrrncinq on -Nlosc()\\., Stalin issued ir Ilo retrcilt orcicr attcl ettfirrcccl tl-re orcler bv cieploving sclurrcls of sccrct police to cxccute those u'ho 't'hcri Ir consiclerable c()ncem even toclar. in the c1icl r.rot obev it. T'his action srrvcrl the Re.t Itini'. nrilitan', uhcrc thcrc have bccn rcfirsals bv solnc to be c-leplor.ecl to Iraq c)n the grounc{s that this is rrlt 'r.tnlaufll rtar' artd rr-lrich has lccl to court c.rscs at thc highest levels in the Unitecl ICngclorn. Cot.t.tt.t.tr'urd is clifttrcnt fior.r-r l,cadcrsi-ri;l ilncl i\{rnlrqcnrer'rt, rll ofu'hich irre recognised in the r-nilitan'. The UI( l)cfLncc Leirdership ancl Nliruagenrcnt Ccutre (sct u;-r ls rr rcsult ol the Stratcgic l)efbnce Revien ) has oficrccl the firllou'ing clefrnition:

Colttrol is of vital iruportatrce to militan'stratcg\'. Loss of control

leircls

to mutill\,ancl is somethinq

l 1-rositiot-t of rtrthoritv ancl respor-rsibiliti' to ul-ricl-r n-rilitlrl' nlcn rrncl u-omcn are lprl'rointccl. Leadership ancl r.r.rlnlgcmcnt ilre tl.re kev cornp()ncnts to the succcssfirl erercisc of Clommancl. Sr.rccessfirl lrlan'.rgiclrent is rcaciilv merlsurecl lgainst objective criteria but conrnrurdcrs ilre rrot lcaclcrs until their positi()n hirs been ratiticd ir-r tl-re l-rearts and mir-rc-ls of thosc thcr. cor.nrllnd.
Commtrnci is

legllll

Thc DI,MC hle clepictecl this in tl'rc cliagranr in Figure 3.10, eltl-rough thcr.'.rckr-rou'leclge thlt is not jr-rst tbout the p()\\'er of iuthoritr'. Nlilitan' ofhccrs lre i-rsecl to h:.rr-ir.rg commancl in oPcratiollal settings uhcrc their suborr:linirtes n'ill opcrate 24/7 x required. Thc rnove to staff postir-rgs uherc thct'lna]'be uorking u-ith lirrge numbers olciviliar.rs in thc purclusing, logistics, fiulncc anci hltt-ttrtt't rcsottrccs trees causcs problert-ts firr sorle, rs civil servilnts hlve r-ert diflercnt erpect.tti()ns Jt tvork irtrcl clo not respoucl to cot.ult.truttl. Hou'cr-er, most militen'ofllccrs colttillric to fiutction in their ()perrtiollal strle artd excrcise control thror-rgh use of clerrcllir.res lncl orclers. The rcrluirerrent f()r sLlch a flerible sn'ic fi'orn ofllcers ltas nrcant thrt milllv Arnrccl Forces hirve rcsistcd the civililnisirtion of tl-reir clefcncc clcpartmeuts, evcn though it savcs;r cor-rsiclcr'.rble lr-nount of t-r-roner'.
lclclersl-ri1-r

Figure 3.10 Military command and its relationship with leadership and management

46

INSTITUTIONALIST PERSPECTIVES

()perltior-ralh', control ovcr stratesv is cxcrcised through thc use of maps and concems hou' mucl.r llncl has beeu gaiuecl or lost - this car.r be clcirrlv seen bv evcn.()nc inrolved on both sides of thc conflict. Tl-re use of r.isual comtrunic'.rtion like thcsc m;rps, rather than a lot of tcxt, is a uscful u'ar' of couvcvit-tg progress tou'ards strategic goirls rrncl is an areir oluse iihicl-r ci-rn be transfcrred to business. 'l'he traflic ligl-rt sr,ster.r.rs olthc Birlir.rcecl Scorecard rrncl Talrlcar-r cltr Borcl arc usecl fbrnon-operational rcportir-rg of perfbrrrancc in tl.re rr-rilitan..

Summary
Like business str'ateg\') rnilitan' strategv has er-oli'ecl but clue to its resource-basecl appr<lach, it lras llrgelr, evolvecl iu response t() technoloev in;rroviding clpabilitv or colrrpctence. l'he role of militan,, i'ts ()nc that defbncls the ntrtion anci its interests, has not churgcc{, nor its kev capabilin..'fl-re cl.rangir.rg opert.rting environmcnt has nleir.lft thrt thc old s'av of runninq nrilitarl' c:rmpaigrrs using the lcvcls of u'ar is uo louger applicablc btrt neecls to take into lccour-rt a srand strateg\r of coalitions ol urtions silch as through NATO or the UN Sectrrifi. Council or altem'ativclv bc much more flexiblc Llsing strategies like the Lr.tluocLn-risr.ipproach. Thc nrilitarv shor.r. lLs that thei'arc clear about their kcv capabilin''fighting potvcr'ar-rcl its components irncl have a \\'a\.to measLu'e nhcthcr this captrbilitv is irt plrrcc. At ;-r lon'cr level, sonrc sutr-components of capabilitv hn'c been lost but llc\\' ()nes gainecl in linc u'ith chirngcs in technoios\' :1nd thc perceptior-r ol tr changecl 'cne rnr.' ir.r the firrm of
tcrrorisnr. Nlanv rnilitan' commenclers no\\' fbel that their biggest b;rttlc is u'ith government ()\'er allocation ol fuuds arrci pressure fbr eflicicnci' in clelivering crrpabilitr'. Busincss is r"rot t-rnd never u'ill bc nar. We clo not itctuallv kill competitors, althoueh soructimcs \\'c iire happv to put them out of br.rsi ncss. Like thc rnilitan' \\'c can leirru fi'on-r thc prrlcticcs and u'isrior.r.r of other contexts. J'hc main lesson to be lcamt fiorn this ref-lection on r.nilitan, practice is the inrport;rnce clf hurnan fhctors in thc strategl process (the ruoral c()mp()nent). Clltrsenitz, u'ho tooli p.lrt in thc Nirpoleonic War, remincls r.rs that thc Gcr-reral lives in l rcalm ol cnrotior-r, fcrrr anc-l ir.rtellectr-rirl tr.rnnoil. He has to trrkc clecisions blsecl on inarlecluatc datl lhile phvsicrrlh'tirec-l .r'rcl irfi'.ric-I. His r.r.ristirkes coulci result iu n'.rtionll clefeat. Eveu victorv is painfirl. Wcllington,;rs l.rc irrsprecteci the battlcfrclcl olWaterlocr in 18I5 aficr thc Frcnch hrcl been clefbirteci, slid tirat tircrc u'as onlv one thing n,orsc tl-rlr-r a battle \\'on lncl tl.rat u'ls a battle lost. Uncler such contlitions ol crtrcl-nc fcirr tl.re inclividual strategist crlnnot relv mcrelv c'rt.t rt sor-rncl lr-ralvticll techniqr-re. Strutegists need to Llnclerstand ancl cleal n'ith
cln()tions.

Thc r.nilitarl have begur.r to lcarn fiom br-rsir-ress irs thev begir.r to r.rnclerstand that il tl-rev get the business spacc right (humur resorlrces, fir.rarrce, proclrrcment ancl logistics) thror.rgh the adoption of bcst business pr:lctice thcn tl-re battle spacc u'ill cnd up n'ith better resonrces and thc commander l.ras ln()re chilncc of- succcss. As the rnilit:rn' becorlc more conficlcnt ancl matllre irr their usc ol business striltegv rrncl practiccs, thcir ldaptatior.r of them to tit thcir clifltrcnt sct of circumstances can ofler busine ss ir benchtllrk in uncicrstancling tl're need to tailor models. tools and tcchnicpres t() flt cliflbring
orglnisrrtions.

References
Boar, 8.,'Sun Tzu and Machiavelli on Strategy', Journal of Business Strategy, xxvi, I (1995) 16-18. British Defence Doctrine (BBD) (2001) Joint Warfare Publication, 0-01. Bulloch, G.,'Military Doctrine and Counterinsurgency: A British Perspective', Parameters, XXVI, 2 (1996) 4-16. Greiss, T. E., Definitions and Doctrine of the Military Arf (Wayne, NJ: Avery, 1985). Hinge, A., Preparedness (Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 2000). Hobson, S., lnterview General Rick Hillier, Janes Defence Weekly (9 August 2006). Kaplan, R. and D. Norton, 'The Balanced Scorecard - Measures That Drive Performance', Harvard Business Review, 10, 1 (1992) 71-79.

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Lawrence, T. E., The Seven Pillars of Wisdom (London: Penguin, 1962). Machiavelli, N., Ihe Prince (London: Penguin, 1962). Marshall, S. L. A., Men Against Fire (Gloucester, Mass.: peter Smith, 1978). Pringle, C. D. and M. J. Kroll, 'Why Trafalgar Was Won: Lessons from Resource-Based Theory', Academy Management Executive, 11, 4 (1997) 73-89. Ramsey, D., The Corporate Warriors (London: Grafton, 1987). 5un, T., The Art of War (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1981). von Clausewitz, C., On War (London: Penguin, 1982).

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