Yale University Department of Music

Riemann's "Ideen zu Einer 'Lehre von den Tonvorstellungen' ": An Annotated Translation Author(s): Robert W. Wason, Elizabeth West Marvin and Hugo Riemann Source: Journal of Music Theory, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Spring, 1992), pp. 69-79 Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of the Yale University Department of Music Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/843910 . Accessed: 20/11/2013 13:21
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Duke University Press and Yale University Department of Music are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Music Theory.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 184.171.106.7 on Wed, 20 Nov 2013 13:21:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

RIEMANN'S "IDEEN ZU EINER 'LEHRE VON DEN

TONVORSTELLUNGEN'
":

AN ANNOTATED TRANSLATION

Robert W. Wason and Elizabeth West Marvin

INTRODUCTION Although the theories of Hugo Riemann (1849-1919) have had an extraordinaryinfluence upon European musical thought, American music theorists have shown little interest in his work.' The relatively recent coming of age of American scholarshipin music theory nearly coincides with the "SchenkerianRevolution," and, as most American theorists are aware, the father of that revolution did not hold a high opinion of Riemann.2 If, by some chance, one chooses to venture into this forbidden territory anyway, the going is difficult:with the exception of Riemann's History of Music Theory,none of his works is easily obtainable, and few have been translated into English.3 Moreover, while Mickelsen's recent translation of Book III of the History of Music Theory is certainly a useful contribution, it must be remembered that the defects of the original have long been well-known. 69

This content downloaded from 184.171.106.7 on Wed, 20 Nov 2013 13:21:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Riemann's most severely criticalcontemporarieshad to admirehis virtuoso handlingof the earlier sources (even though he was occasionally self-serving there as well), but it was clear to at least one of them that his "history of harmonic theory" was essentially the "history of Riemann's harmonic theory."4 Riemann's "first period"5 is known to most American theorists largely through secondary sources. While translations of these early works would be useful, the secondary sources are fortunately quite complete, at least with regardto his ideas on harmony.6The crowning achievement of Riemann's "second period" in the realm of practical harmony is his "theory of tonal functions"--the work for which most Americans probably know him best. Yet like most of Riemann's ideas, this theory too has continued to generate controversy.' The documents that survive from Riemann's "thirdperiod" are fragmentary, but they are not without interest.8 Here, one sees the mature theorist trying to reconcile music-theoretical views he has held for most of his life with recent researches in empiricalscience, and, in the second essay, with researchin early music and the newly-founded discipline of ethnomusicology. Presumably,the crowningachievement of that period, had Riemann lived long enough to complete it, would have been a comprehensive Lehre von den Tonvorstellungen(the phrase remains untranslated at present for reasons that will become clear later). The first of the two essays, presented in complete translation here, deals exclusively with matters related directly to Riemann's harmonic theories; thus, sufficient secondary literature already exists to provide a context for its critical reading. It is hoped that the present translationwill contribute to a resurgence of interest in Riemann's work, one result of which may be to provide the context for a critical reading of the second essay in the near future. Already in Section I, but especially in sections III and IV of this first essay, Riemann deals with familiar aspects of his theory of harmony. Despite its quaint and occasionally awkward character ("under-thirds,""over-thirds,"and the like), most of the terminology in this translation corresponds with that used by one of his more widely-knownEnglish translators,Henry Bewerung (1862-1923). An which has been subimportantexception is the term Klangvertretung, jected to a bewildering array of translations that are not only awkward, but inaccurate. One of the keystones of Riemann's notion of tonal imagination, Klangvertretung, denotes a psychological processing of each sounding note into a mental representation that considers each of its six harmonicmeanings (as root, third or fifth of a major or minor chord). Thus, for example, John Fillmore's translation of Riemann's "Die Natur der Harmonik," which renders the term "chord 70

This content downloaded from 184.171.106.7 on Wed, 20 Nov 2013 13:21:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

substitution," is certainly misleading (Riemann/Fillmore, 28). Mickelsen, on the other hand, chooses to render the term as "chordrepresentation"(Mickelsen, 85); this, although an improvement over Fillmore, still does not capture Riemann's meaning. Elsewhere, Mickelsen offers "Klang-representation"(Mickelsen, 216), following Bewerung, who prefers to transliterate Klang as "clang" (Riemann/ Bewerung, passim). Of crucial importance here is the translation of the term Klang, which has a more specific meaning to Riemann than simply "chord," as Fillmore and Mickelson would translate it. Klang (to use Fillencompasses both an "over-chord"and an "under-chord" more's terminology) and therefore connotes a tonal complex above and below the pitch in question; hence, the translation of Klangvertretunghere is "representationof a tonal complex." The notion of Klangvertretung,together with the more familiar "musicallogic" and the less familiar Tonvorstellung,form the basis of the psychological sphere of musical activity that Riemann postulates, as Rummenh6llerhas remarked.9While Riemann's earlier works had dealt with the first two ideas, the present work attempts the first investigation of Tonvorstellung.Yet, Riemann admits that this notion is not really a new one; indeed, the very opening of the present article stresses the continuity and evolution of ideas from his dissertationon, and examples of Riemann's emphasis upon the logical understanding of music may be found in any number of his works. Even Riemann's famous theory of tonal functions abstractshis earlier harmonictheory from its material source in a move toward the psychological domain that becomes much more pronounced in the present work (Rummenhaller, 104). It seems certain that Riemann saw this theory as a further step towards an understandingof the mental processing of music, as well as a means of expressing in notation the musical-logicalactivities that occur in the musical imagination. In the present essay, Riemann sets forth these priorities from the outset: the ultimate work to which he hopes his ideas will contribute is an obvious revision of Helmholtz's Lehre von den Tonempfindungen (our emphasis). In Riemann's estimation, Helmholtz's primaryerror was to place too much stock in physical and physiological investigations. Carl Stumpf (1848-1936), the pioneering empiricalpsychologist and ethnomusicologist, fares little better in Riemann's essay.1' According to Riemann, instead of producing a true Tonpsychologie, Stumpf "became bogged down in the detail-work of the preliminary tone-psychological investigation of intervals" (p. 82).11 In direct contrast to these empirical, "inductive"approaches, Riemann places the focus of his "deductive"investigation squarely on the mind, declaring ultimately that 71

This content downloaded from 184.171.106.7 on Wed, 20 Nov 2013 13:21:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

the 'Alphaand Omega'of musicalartistryis not found in the actual, sounding music, but rather exists in the mental image of musical that occurs in the creativeartist'simagination-a mental relationships into notationand re-emerges in imagethatlives beforeit is transformed an artistic theimagination creation of thehearer.Theprocessof notating as well as the soundingperformance of the workare merelyexpedients to transplant musicalexperiences into from the composer'simagination the imaginationof the musicallistener.(p. 82, Riemann'semphasis) Thus, in the face of the empirical, materialistinvestigationsby Helmholtz and Stumpf, Riemann clings resolutely to an independent existence of mind, maintaining that his method is "deductive."12What, one might ask, is the relationshipof this "mentalmusic"to the sounding music of the external world? Though it would be unfair to accuse Riemann of ignoring this question--and, indeed, we shall return to it later in this Introduction--his fuzziness on this point was the source of subsequent criticism;moreover, it is at the heart of one of the major difficultiesin translatingthe work. With a clearer idea of Riemann's agenda, we are now in a position to consider the most important problems of translation. They begin right at the outset, with the title itself. We have chosen to render Riemann's proposed study as "On the Imagination of Tone," primarily because it underscores the work's relationship to Helmholtz by paralleling Ellis's translation. At the same time, it seems clear that Ellis made a wise choice, since this form of the title begs an unresolvable question of translation (which Ellis presumablychose to beg as well): whether Lehre can be taken to mean "theory." Given that Riemann's Lehre remained incomplete, divining the true nature of the "theory" to which these "ideas" were to be a contribution is difficultindeed. The translationof Tonvorstellungen presents an even more difficult problem. The dictionarydefinitionof Vorstellungis alreadyconfusing: a common, concrete meaning of the verb vorstellenis "to introduce, to place before," though in certain contexts it may take on the more abstract meaning, "to represent." On the other hand, the reflexive verb sich vorstellenhas an abstractmeaning, retainingthe "placingbefore" as a metaphor--"to place before the mind, to imagine." Thus the meaning of the noun Vorstellungin common speech may vary from "introduction" to "idea." Beyond these common meanings, however, the word has a long history as a philosophical term, and indeed, a history of controversy among translatorsof Kant and Schopenhauer. While most translatorsof Kant's works render Vorstellungas "representation,"'3 Wolfgang Schwarz argues strongly and persuasively for "presentation"in a recent revised translation, "because it avoids 72

This content downloaded from 184.171.106.7 on Wed, 20 Nov 2013 13:21:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

any association of duplicatingor copying things which themselves are To Kant, given nowhere but in the presentations we have of them."'14 a "presentationsignifies any modificationof the mind, as such belonging to the inner sense" (Schwarz, 269). Terminological correctness and consistency are especially importantfor Kant, because, in describing the genesis of "ideas," he employs a clear hierarchyof terms beginning with Vorstellung-the first stirring of the mind. A conscious Vorstellungmarks Perzeption, progressingeither to Empfindung(sensation) or Erkenntnis(which Schwarzrenders as "cognition"),the latter consisting "in the determinate reference of given presentations to an object" (Schwarz, 263). The next step from "cognition"is either to Anschauung (which Schwarzrenders "intuition")--"thatpresentation which can precede any act of thinking something"(Schwarz, 266)--or to Begriff (concept), which refers "mediately to the object through a common characteristic"(Schwarz, 115). From "concept" one moves to "empirical concept" or "pure concept," and from the latter ultimately to the "idea" (Idee), which is formed from concepts but which transcendsexperience. Thus, though a Vorstellungmight appear to be what one thinks of as an "idea" in common parlance, the two terms are widely separatedin Kant's usage. Schwarzbemoans the "inflationary use of Idee for all kinds of presentations,"citing Kant himself, who remarksthat "anyone used to these distinctionsmust find it abhorrent to hear the presentation of red color called an idea" (Schwarz, 115). Though the terms Anschauung and Vorstellung are used by Schopenhauer, their meanings differ considerablyfrom Kant's usage. According to Schopenhauer, Vorstellungis the "exceedingly complicated physiological process in the brain of an animal, the result of which is the consciousness of a picture there."'5While Schopenhauer's explanation retains the metaphor of "setting something before" the mind, this "exceedingly complex physiological process" has moved much closer to a Kantian "idea." Consequently, it is perhaps understandablethat an earlier, less criticaltranslationrendered Die Weltals Wille und Vorstellungas The World as Will and Idea.16 Schopenhauer's use of Vorstellung is also considerably closer to Riemann'sdespite Handschin's claim that Riemann's Lehre von den Tonvorstellungenis "echter Kantianismus."17 Now, if one is willing to sacrifice the "setting before" metaphor, other translationsbecome available. Carl J. Friedrich, the translator of a "popularized" version of Kant, addresses the problem as follows: Even more perplexingis the term Vorstellung.Another substantive with a distinct "verbal"connotation, the term is often translatedas or "presentation." But this usage is often misleading "representation" 73

This content downloaded from 184.171.106.7 on Wed, 20 Nov 2013 13:21:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

as the verb vorstellen means primarily "to imagine," and ...

the de-

rivativenoun may mean: (a) the act of imagining,(b) the thing imagined, and (c) the image in the mind.'8is Friedrich's approach to the problem proves to be the most practical with respect to Riemann's work. In fact, "the act of imagining"and "the image in the mind" are precisely the two most prevalent meanings of the term, as Riemann understandsit. The "thingimagined," on the other hand, is indistinguishablefrom the "imagein the mind." For while music may exist in the outer world, such "music"is only a transmitting agent from an inventing mind to a receiving mind. When we think of music, we are not imaginingthings in the outer world; on the contrary, our mental musical images are the music. Indeed, in an earlier essay that Riemann himself cites in the present work, he goes so far as to say: The mechanical,materialallureof the real tone is so strongthat to a certainextent it even acts obstructively on the consciouspursuitof the more intricatetonal manuverings that one findsin the highestartistic achievements.Thus I question . . whetherhearingas an act of receptioncan ever achievethe high degreeof perfectionthat is available to the tonal imagination.19 Friedrich'sapproach to Vorstellungalso works because the hierarchy of terms and the terminological exactitude found in Kant is notably absent, and thus one need not-and cannot--distinguish between the first stirringsof the mind and the final "idea":Vorstellung is a nearly ubiquitous, all-purpose term for Riemann. (And thus it must be admitted from the outset that the exact epistemological status of Tonvorstellungis difficult to pin down. Riemann's essay is barely saved from this dilemma by the structure that his familiar brand of technical music theory imposes on it, despite the essay's apparently philosophical theme.)20 In order to capture the breadth of the term, this translation generally favors "imagination" over "conception," since the latter is more at home in restrictive, technical contexts. It must be rememberedthat while the term Tonvorstellungen is rendered as "the imaginationof tone" in the title, partiallyin an attempt to retain the parallelism with Helmholtz's title, Riemann uses the term much more broadly than this English "equivalent."Thus, in the body of the essay, Tonvorstellung,or its plural, is rendered variously as "tonal imagination," "tonal understanding,""tonal images," and occasionally "tonal conception" (to differentiate more finely from "perception" or "sensation"),as context demands. The verbal derivativeis treated in like fashion. Earlier we posed the question about the relationship of these inward "tonal images" to outer, sounding music. It was Handschin's 74

This content downloaded from 184.171.106.7 on Wed, 20 Nov 2013 13:21:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

opinion that with the notion of Tonvorstellung,Riemann had entirely ignored this problem, falling into a "subjectiveidealism" (Handschin, 124-126). Seidel comes to Riemann's defense on this, pointing out that Riemann inquires into the "recognizable characteristicsthat an imagined tone has in common with an actually sounding tone, when the latter is correctly imagined" (Seidel, 85). By inquiring into the relationship between purely mental musical activity and music in the outer world, Riemann moves from a theory of "musicalcognition" to at least the beginnings of a theory of "musicalperception." In fact, if there is a central theme to this wide-ranging,five-partessay, it is precisely the relationshipbetween music of the mind and that of the outer world; true, Riemann hardlyresolves that dichotomy, but in each section, he treats some aspect of the "musicalimagination"and then goes on to attempt an investigationof the relation between the object of his inquiry and sounding music. The music of the mind- Tonvorstellung-rests upon two interrelated notions, which Rummenh6ller regards as basic axioms of Riemann's epistemology (Rummenhiller, 107): "representationof tonal complexes" (described above), and "the principle of the greatest economy of the musical imagination." Already in Section I of the essay (which deals with the single tone) Riemann defines "representation of tonal complexes" and then proceeds to the second notion, accordingto which the mind "moves directlytoward rejection of more complicated structures,where other possible meanings suggest themselves that weigh less heavily on the powers of interpretation.. ." (p. 88). Still speaking of the single tone, Riemann introduces examples from the real world of music: simple tunes that undergo peculiar alterations by whole and half step. The examples are not mere curiosities, however; their point is that "no power on earth can force the healthy musician to hear something other than . .. bothersome intonational errors" (p. 90, below), rather than true "modulations"-the latter would become "understandable" only through the "representation of tonal complexes" and the arrangement of key relationships that Riemann will develop as a consequence of this theory in Section IV. Riemann ends Section I with more questions about what the mind actually imagines; though he had earlier maintained that "in the case of intensive musical temperaments, all the attributes of actually sounding music obtain" (p. 83), his remarkson the "aestheticvalue of string quartet music" (p. 91) make it clear that processes involving pitch and rhythm are central to the "musical imagination." In Section II, Riemann turns to the phenomenon of "tonal motion." That such motion may be located in tonal space with exactitude through the phenomenon of "absolutepitch" leads to an investigation of that as well. Just intonation represents a "cognitive law" for 75

This content downloaded from 184.171.106.7 on Wed, 20 Nov 2013 13:21:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Riemann; possessors of absolute pitch who claim to hear enharmonic distinctions in sounding music are to be regarded with skepticism, he warns, for such distinctionsoccur only in the tonal imagination.21 Riemann ends the section with one of his more thought-provokingspeculations: "the realization of ascents and descents in concrete cases leads, for every melodic formation, to the recognitionof a middle level, which forms the point of "indifference"for ascents and descents" (p. 96). According to Riemann, this "middle level," which may be at the beginning of a piece, forms the absolute basis for relative ascents and descents within the piece. In Section III, Riemann treats the familiar"representationof tonal complexes" in such detail that it can only be considered digressive. Yet the end of the section is once again occupied with problems of real music. Riemann bringsup the perennialproblem of the "dissonant"II chord (as discussed by Hauptmann-and Sechter, for that matter). While the "Law of the Greatest Possible Economy of the Musical Imagination"seems to necessitate such an interpretationin the "musical imagination,""our musical practice knows nothing of [this problem], and our tonal consciousness is even less aware that d:f:a would not be a pure minor chord, but rather a type of diminishedtriad. .. ." Indeed, in this late essay Riemann maintains that we even imagine a 117chord with two pure fifths, and not as a composite of dominant and subdominant,for otherwise we would not be able to imagine the dominant of 11.22 "This enharmonicidentificationof acoustical values that differ by a syntonic comma is simply indispensable to our musical hearing" (p. 100). In Section IV, in which the "Lawof the Greatest Possible Economy of the Musical Imagination" yields the boundaries of an otherwise endless key-relation scheme, Riemann seems less able to relate this notion to real music, ending merely with the feeble assertion that traditional theories of rhythm, motive, and phraseology can form the basis of a theory of "tonal imagination"in these areas. But in Section V, Riemann turns to the imagination of what he calls "complex voice motions." Here, he attempts to take melodic and harmonic intervals of real music whose interpretationsare not immediately apparentand consider them the composite of simpler, "understandable"motions through what he calls "auxiliarymental images" (Hilfsvorstellungen). Though Riemann never says so explicitly, one presumes that such "complex"motions are difficult or impossible to account for directly by the strings of thirds and fifths developed in Sections III and IV. Thus, for example, Riemann chooses to imagine the dominant and subdominant in succession when negotiating the melodic tritone.23 After attempting to extend this technique briefly to more complex chromatic progressions, Riemann concludes: 76

This content downloaded from 184.171.106.7 on Wed, 20 Nov 2013 13:21:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

That we imaginetonal relationshipsthoroughlyin the sense of pure tuningis beyondquestion... how it is possiblein spite of this that the imperfectcompensatoryintonationof our commonlyused tempered musicsatisfiesus and provesto be a usablemeansof allowingthe tonal of imaginingsof the composerto arise once again in the imagination the listener must be reserved for discussion in a later, new study (p. 109). Thus, the climax of the essay places the dichotomy of the mind and the real world once more in center stage, the last lines reiterating Riemann's belief that the future of music theory depends on developing his theory of "enharmonicidentification."24 Significantly, this is the one law Riemann proposes that reaches beyond the mind to the outer world; that he places its development at the top of the agenda for the

mechanisms to explain the relationship between his "cognitive laws" and sounding music. Had this been the startingpoint of his "new, later study," Riemann's Lehre von den Tonvorstellungenmight well have been the first step towards a "Theory of Musical Perception." NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION

nextgeneration of theorists the importance of developing emphasizes

1. One who has shownconsiderable interestis David Lewin,whose variouscomments on and interpretations of Riemann'swork will be cited as appropriate below. 2. See, for example, Counterpoint; A Translation of "Kontrapunkt" by Heinrich Schenker,trans. John Rothgeb and JiirgenThym (New York and London, 1987), 1: xxv, xxx, 7-9, 135-39, amonga numberof possiblepage references. 3. ElmarSeidel providesa tabularlist of Riemann's on harmonyon publications in Beitrage zur Musikthepp. 41-42 of "Die Harmonielehre Hugo Riemanns," ed. MartinVogel (Regensburg,1966),39-92. A list orie des 19. Jahrhunderts, of published of these works(arranged folEnglishtranslations chronologically) lows: New Lessonsin Harmony... to whichis addedTheNatureof Harmony by Dr. Hugo Riemann,trans.John Fillmore(Philadelphia, 1887)(cited below as "Riemann/Fillmore"); HarmonySimplified,trans. Henry Bewerung(Lon"Consonanceand Dissodon, 1896) (cited below as Riemann/Bewerung); nance:A Discussionof the Problemof Harmonic Dualism"(translation of Das Problem des harmonischenDualismus [Leipzig, 1905], trans. S. Harrison Lovewell(Boston, 1925;typescript in Boston PublicLibrary andin New York Public Library);Historyof Music Theory(Books I and II), trans. Raymond Haggh (Lincoln, 1962); Hugo Riemann'sTheoryof Harmony:A Study by WilliamC. Mickelsen and "History of Music Theory,Book III" by Hugo Riemann, trans. and ed. WilliamC. Mickelsen(Lincoln, 1977) (cited below as MarkMcCune,"HugoRiemann's'Ueber TonalitAt': A Trans"Mickelsen"); lation," Theoria1 (1985): 132-150.

77

This content downloaded from 184.171.106.7 on Wed, 20 Nov 2013 13:21:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

4. "Inthe foreword[to the Historyof Music Theory]HerrRiemannsays that he has strivenat the very least not to leave out anythingessentialto the courseof the development[of theory], and to give a coherentaccountof the genesisof the variousconceptsof the 'present-day theory[Lehre].'To the extentthatthis of antiquity, it is moreor less true. However,sinceby the appliesto the writings term 'present-day Lehre' Riemannunderstands only his own Harmonieleere this wordcannotbe writtenmorecorrectly), (underthe presentcircumstances, ... that claim is made under false pretenses."BernhardZiehn, "UeberDr. der Musiktheorie im 9.-19. Jahrhundert'," in GeHugo Riemanns'Geschichte cago, 1927), 292: (Our translation.) *Fora recent(and morebalanced)view of Riemann'sversionof the history of harmonictheory, see Scott Burnham,"Methodand Motivationin Hugo Riemann's History of Harmonic Theory," Music Theory Spectrum 14/1 (1992): 1-14. 5. MickelsendividesRiemann'slife and work into three periods:the firstperiod from 1872-1890,the secondfrom 1890-1909,andthe thirdfrom 1909to 1919. See, for example,his Table of Contents,pp. v-vi. 6. A fundamentalarticle is Richard Miinnich, "Von Entwicklungder Riemannschen Harmonielehre und ihremVerhiltnis zu Oettingenund Stumpf," Riemann-Festschrift (Leipzig, 1909;rpt. Tutzing, 1965):60-76. ElmarSeidel offersthe mostcomprehensive discussion of Riemann's on harmony in writings "Die Harmonielehre cited above. (Muchof Mickelsen's text Hugo Riemanns," is basedupon Miinnichand Seidel.) An articleby Gerhard Wuenschfurnishes a good introductionto Riemann in English: "Riemann'sMusicalTheory," Studiesin Music(Ontario)2 (1977): 108-24. Riemann's"Systemof Tonal Functions" serves as Lewin'spoint of departure in a most imaginative of the formalproperties of this system, exploration andothersderivedfromit; see DavidLewin,"A FormalTheoryof Generalized TonalFunctions," Journalof MusicTheory 26/1 (1982):23-60. In the midstof an articleon Wagner,Lewinlaunchesinto an excursuscontainingan extraorof the relationship betweenRiemann'sharmonic dinarydiscussion systemand the muchbetter-known see "Amfortas's to Titurelandthe Stufentheorie; Prayer Role of D in Parsifal:The Tonal Spacesof the Drama and the Enharmonic Music7/3 (1984):336-349. In addition,Lewin'sreC6/B,"Nineteenth-Century 1987) containsa numberof sections that are indebtedto Riemann. See, for example,the "harmonic space"that Lewindescribeson pp. 20-22, as well as his Chapter transformations of Riemannian 8, whichstudiesnetworks involving For the latter,Lewincites as a precedentRiemann'sGrosseKompo"Klangs."
cent book Generalized Musical Intervals and Transformations (New Haven, sammelte Aufsiitze zur Geschichte und Theorie der Musik, ed. J. Goebel (Chi-

(Berlin and Stuttgart,1902), 479-480. 7. Seidel (pp. 83-92) recountsmuchof the historyof this controversy.Also see

sitionslehre, vol. 1, Der homophone Satz (Melodielehre und Harmonielehre

to Schenkerand Schoenberg (Ann Arbor, 1985), 126-7. For a more sympa-

Hellmut Federhofer, Akkord und Stimmfiihrung in den musiktheoretischen Systemen von Hugo Riemann, Ernst Kurth und Heinrich Schenker (Vienna, 1981), 13-31 and Robert W. Wason, Viennese Harmonic Theoryfrom Albrechtsberger

78

This content downloaded from 184.171.106.7 on Wed, 20 Nov 2013 13:21:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

thetic view, see Tom Christensen, "TheSchichtenlehre of Hugo Riemann," In TheoryOnly 6/4 (May, 1982):37-44. Jahrbuch der Musikbib8. "Ideenzu einer 'Lehrevon den Tonvorstellungen'," liothekPeters21/22(1914/15;rpt. Vaduz, 1965):1-26;"NeueBeitrige zu einer Jahrbuchder Musikbibliothek Lehre von den Tonvorstellungen," Peters 23 (1916, rpt. Vaduz, 1965):1-21. 9. PeterRummenhiller,Musiktheoretisches Denkenim 19. Jahrhundert (Regensburg, 1967), 102. 10. See Elizabeth WestMarvin,"Tonpsychologie andMusikpsychologie: Historical on the Studyof MusicalPerception," Theoria 2 (1987):59-84, for Perspectives a discussion of the historical contextof Riemann'snotionof Tonvorstellungen. 11. All page indications in parenthesesrefer to Riemann'sessay, below. 12. But sucha "deductive" methodis hardlythe deductivemethodof Hauptmann, for example.Rummenhillercharacterizes it muchmore accurately as "induction at a higherlevel" (Rummenholler, 104). 13. ImmanuelKant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. NormanKemp Smith(New York, 1950). 14. ImmanuelKant, Critiqueof Pure Reason, trans. WolfgangSchwarz(Darmcited as "Schwarz." Schwarz cites the Encyclopedia stadt, 1982),xxii;hereafter Britannica and the OxfordEnglishDictionaryas corroboration of his choice. Others agree, includingStephan Korner, Kant (New Haven and London, 1982). 15. ArthurSchopenhauer,The Worldas Will and Representation, trans. E. F. J. Payne(IndianHills, Colorado,1958), xvii. 16. Trans.Haldaneand Kemp, 5th ed. (London, 1906). 17. JacquesHandschin,Der Toncharacter (Zurich,1948), 126. 18. The Philosophyof Kant;ImmanuelKant'sMoral and PoliticalWritings, ed. with an introduction (New York, 1949), xxxi. by CarlJ. Friedrich 19. "Spontane Phantasietditigkeit und verstandmaiBige Arbeit in der tonkiinstlerischen Produktion,"Jahrbuchder Musikbibliothek Peters (1909): 46; quotedby Rummenholler, p. 106. (Our translation.) 20. ErnstKurthcomplains thatRiemann's to a repetition essayamounts essentially of his harmonic theory;see his Musikpsychologie (Berlin, 1931), 47. 21. It mustbe emphasized that Riemann's difpositionon this issueis considerably ferentfromthat of Hauptmann, Oettingen,or Helmholtz,all of whom sought to introducejust intonationinto actualmusicalpractice. 22. Seidel speculatesperceptively that Riemannmay well have given up the doctrine of the "apparent consonance" of secondarychordshad he lived longer (Seidel, p. 61). 23. CompareLewin'sdiscussionof the "harmonic intuition"of the tritone (Genand Transformations, eralizedMusicalIntervals pp. 17-20); Lewinlikewiseapto similarHilfsvorstellungen on pp. 18-19. peals (implicitly) 24. Riemannfirstproposedthistheoryin Musikalische Syntaxis (Leipzig,1877);see especiallypp. 33-34, 92, and 117 through120.

79

This content downloaded from 184.171.106.7 on Wed, 20 Nov 2013 13:21:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions