“ Dynamic Dualism”: Kurth and Riemann on Music Theory and the Mind

daphne tan

This article examines Ernst Kurth’s critical engagement with the ideas of Hugo Riemann and his
eventual reformulation of harmonic dualism in dynamic terms. The principle of “dynamic dualism”
appears most cogently in Musikpsychologie ([1931] 1947). After discussing the broader psychological
movement within which this book emerged, I outline the aims and audience of Musikpsychologie
and provide a detailed discussion of the dynamic dualism Kurth articulates therein. I then return to
the origin of Kurth’s fascination with dualism, namely to Riemann, tracing points of intersection be-
tween the two figures across several decades. I suggest that Kurth’s displeasure with Riemann’s theo-
ries is symptomatic of a broader philosophical disagreement over the explanatory power of music
theory and its relation to psychology at the time.

Keywords: Ernst Kurth, Hugo Riemann, Musikpsychologie, dualism, tonal system, tonal harmony,
the unconscious, psychology, history of theory.

The fact that I frequently mentioned Hugo Riemann in
particular arises from the outstanding significance of this
scholar, which cannot be ignored in any field of musicology.
Therefore if I repeatedly run counter to Riemann’s theory
in this book (especially with regard to the fundamentals of
harmony) and draw attention to the errors that even this
mighty pioneer has committed in individual instances, then
I would like emphatically to avoid the accusation of a lack
of respect for the lifetime of work, or of failing to recognize
the monumental achievements, for which the field of musi-
cology has Riemann to thank.
—Ernst Kurth
s Ernst Kurth remarks in the epigraph,1 Hugo
Darstellungssysteme (1913), and lengthy references to Riemann
appear in Grundlagen des linearen Kontrapunkts: Bachs melodi-
sche Polyphonie (1917), Romantische Harmonik und ihre Krise in
Wagners “ Tristan” ([1920] 1975) and Bruckner (1925). Finally,
Riemann’s harmonic theory emerges as a major concern in
Musikpsychologie ([1931] 1947). Kurth found much to admire
in the elder scholar’s writings—and as we will see, the senti-
ment was mutual—but he ultimately parted ways with
Riemann over the activity of musical listening, and more to
the point, over what aspects of listening music theory should
investigate.

A Riemann was an unavoidable interlocutor, particularly

for a generation of scholars active in the early decades
of the twentieth century. Riemann, perhaps the most prolific
and prominent theorist of his day, was someone one had to
contend with if one wanted to write about music theory.2
Kurth, a much younger scholar hoping to make inroads with
his own theoretical ideas, was up to the challenge; indeed, he
interrogated Riemann’s harmonic and rhythmic theories in ev-
ery one of his widely read books. An extended critique of these
theories is central to Kurth’s habilitation thesis Die
Voraussetzungen der theoretischen Harmonik und der tonalen
Core ideas in this paper were first presented at the 2015 meetings of the
Society for Music Theory and the Music Theory Society of New York
State, and in a featured presentation for the Indiana University Graduate
Students Symposium. In developing this project further, I benefitted from
conversations with several people: my thanks to Robert Wason, Henry
Klumpenhouwer, and Frank Samarotto for their valuable input; and to
Poundie Burstein, Sebastian Bisciglia, Jenine Brown, and Sarah Marlowe
for their encouragement. Finally, I am grateful to the two anonymous
reviewers for their generous comments and suggestions.
1 Kurth (1917, x); trans. modified from Kim (2003, 327).
2 As Daniel Harrison notes (1994, 6–7): “[Riemann] is chiefly responsible
for setting the agenda of turn-of-the-century music theory. And not only
theory: most central European composers of this century were schooled in
Riemannian doctrine of one type or another.”
This article focuses on a single issue that connects Kurth and
Riemann: dualism. For modern-day readers, the term “dualism”
will likely call to mind “harmonic dualism,” the nineteenth-
century tradition that took as its starting point Hermann von
Helmholtz’s research into the physiology of hearing and vision.3
Recently, harmonic dualism has undergone a revival in North
American music theory. Some scholars have turned with
renewed interest to historical sources—particularly the works of
Moritz Hauptmann, Arthur von Oettingen, and Riemann—
and have argued for the usefulness of the dualist perspective.
Others have formulated new theories that bear the marks of
these sources to varying degrees.4 And many have acknowledged
the polemics precipitated by dualism, particularly in the hands
of Riemann, “its most visible spokesman.”5
3 See Klumpenhouwer (2002) for an overview.
4 See in particular Part II (“Dualism”) of Gollin and Rehding (2011), as
well as Harrison (1994). For recent sustained discussions about
Hauptmann and Oettingen, see, respectively, Moshaver (2009) and Clark
(2001).
5 Klumpenhouwer (2011, 195). Harrison (1994, 7) remarks that “the har-
monic dualists are often ridiculed today for their enormous theoretical
card houses and for their adamant advocacy of technical ideas hardly sub-
stantiated in composed music,” while Klumpenhouwer (2011, 195) has
written a number of articles that “defend dualism against attacks on its in-
ternal structural consistency.”

1
 2 music theory spectrum 0 (2020)
Yet the endurance of dualism as a theoretical conceit in the
generation after Riemann has been less frequently acknowl-
edged.6 Missing, for instance, is an account of dualism’s sec-
ond life in the writings of Ernst Kurth. Within a
comprehensive study of tonal-harmony-as-experienced, Kurth
reformulates Riemann’s harmonic dualism into a principle of
“dynamic dualism.” Like most of Kurth’s ideas, the broad
strokes of dynamic dualism appear in Voraussetzungen, his ear-
liest publication, but it is in Musikpsychologie, his very last, that
they are articulated most cogently. There are, of course, nu-
merous definitions of dualism, and it would be an interesting
task to determine which one fits Kurth best.7 But my main
goal here is more circumscribed: to demonstrate that dynamic
dualism was the result of Kurth’s sustained engagement with
Riemann’s theories over several decades, and that in respond-
ing to Riemann’s polemics head-on, Kurth refined his own
perspective on the tonal system, and more broadly, on the rela-
tionship between music theory and the mind.
It might come as a surprise that Kurth was interested in
such a systematizing enterprise at all, since he is best known to
English-language audiences for his close analyses of the music
of Bach, Wagner, and Bruckner.8 Indeed, before going fur-
ther, it would be useful to revisit one such analytical passage:
bearing in mind Kurth’s analytical prerogatives will help us un-
derstand why he found Riemann’s theoretical writings both
compelling and inadequate.
Example 1 contains an excerpt from Hugo Wolf’s “An den
Schlaf,” which Kurth analyzes in Romantische Harmonik.9
While modern-day scholars have focused on larger-scale har-
monic trajectories, motives, and tonal plans, Kurth limits his
observations to the local level.10 He interprets m. 18 as a dom-
inant seventh in E major, but one that is “withheld” through-
out, made unrecognizable through a confluence of “tension
formations” (Spannungsbildungen). From the first half to the
second half of the measure, “neighbor-note distortions” alter
6 Robert Wason (1985, 117–18) notes that Riemann’s new “evidence” in
1905 resuscitated the dualism debate. I will explore this evidence further
below.
7 For a sample of these definitions, see Mooney (1996, 42ff.), Rehding
(2003, 31), Riley (2004, 5), and Klumpenhouwer (2011, 196–99).
Riemann, of course, provides several definitions of his own; here is one
from the fifth edition of his Musik-Lexikon (1900): dualism is, “broadly
speaking, the assumption of a twofold basis of harmony, [that is] the ma-
jor consonance ([reckoned] from the principal tone upwards) and the mi-
nor consonance ([reckoned] from the principal tone downwards)”;
translated in Rehding (2003, 188). As Harrison (1994, 265) notes,
Riemann talks explicitly about chords, but it is the duality of keys that he
champions.
8 The pioneering efforts of Lee A. Rothfarb, especially his publications
from 1988 and 1991, first brought Kurth to the attention of a wider
English-language audience. Important forerunners are Hsu (1966) and
McCreless (1983).
9 Kurth ([1920] 1975, 199–201). I consulted the 1975 reprint of the third
edition; this analytical vignette does not appear in the original edition.
Rothfarb (1991, 114–16) also presents a translation.
10 See, for instance, Stein (1985) and Taycher (2012).
the chordal root (B) and third (D]), and the leaping tenor
voice “feigns a real chordal progression”; the sonority on beat
three is only “apparently” a new chord. At the same time, the
suspended G]4 in the piano provides initial support for the
voice but lingers longer, resolving only in the final eighth note
of the measure. Conversely, the retained chord-tone B4 in the
vocal part sounds against the low C\3 in the piano left-hand.
In m. 19, the soaring vocal part anticipates the piano
right-hand, grating against the G]4 and elevating the tension
effect. A change occurs in mm. 20–21 as ascending suspension
figures complicate the underlying tonic harmony. Indeed,
Kurth calls attention to the accented “suspension formation” in
m. 21, which appears in the “outer form” of a common-tone
diminished-seventh chord. We hear a similar suspension for-
mation twice more on the downbeats of mm. 22–23; here “the
simplified spelling” (die vereinfachte Orthographie) of a first-
inversion Em7 chord belies the inherent neighbor-note ten-
sions within (i.e., the G\2 in the bass is actually F 2 that Ü
Ü
resolves to G]2, the E4 in the alto is D 4 that resolves to E]4,
and the D\5 in the soprano resolves to C]5). The voice clings to
the unresolved D\5, paying no heed to the resolution tone C]3
in the piano. All of this comes to a head as the secondary domi-
nant (C]7) resolves—fleetingly—to the supertonic in m. 24.
What is most notable in Kurth’s account is not the
“surprisingly simple” (überraschend schlicht) underlying progres-
sion of V7 –I–V7=II–II,11 but that the chromatic alterations to
this diatonic progression engender an “overpowering network
of forces” that “fully permeates [the progression] with tension
effects.” He calls attention to the growing intensity of the pas-
sage as a whole: tension processes that originate within the first
measure accumulate in subsequent measures, bolstered by in-
creasing amplitude in the “outer dynamics.” Like any analytical
interpretation, his says as much about his theoretical preroga-
tives as it does about the music, and I am struck by his concern
for the interaction of performers and for the push and pull
among individual voices. He presents a compelling case for
how dynamic tensions prevail, and indeed define, the
Romantic style. With his ardent commitment to chromatic
music of the long nineteenth century, Kurth pushed back on
the widely held belief in his day that the music of Haydn,
Mozart, and Beethoven represented the pinnacle of musical
development. In this immediate way, then, Kurth diverged
ideologically from Riemann, a theorist who, in the words of
Scott Burnham, perpetuated this belief through “the formula-
tion of a theory of music which covertly embodied as its funda-
mental assumption the ideological premise that the underlying
syntax of the Viennese Classical style could serve as the univer-
sal basis of music.”12
11 Indeed, as Wason (1985, 53) notes, the idea that “every chromatic struc-
ture, without exception, is reducible to a diatonic one” is “implicit to most
Viennese systems of harmony of the first half of the nineteenth century.”
See, for instance, his comparison of this idea in the theories of Emanuel
Aloys Förster and Simon Sechter.
12 Burnham (1992, 13).
 kurth and riemann on music theory and the mind
example 1. Analysis of Wolf, “ An den Schlaf,” Mörike-Lieder, mm. 17–34
Kurth’s analytical treatises were immensely popular in his time,
as their many reprintings attest, and present-day readers who give
themselves over to his idiosyncratic prose style will be richly
rewarded. Yet as Carl Dahlhaus suggests, a full understanding of
any one of these treatises is only possible in the context of Kurth’s
entire output. And until recently, Musikpsychologie—
“chronologically the endpoint, but methodologically the starting
point of [Kurth’s] entire enterprise”—has received limited schol-
arly consideration.13 Taking Dahlhaus’s cue, we will begin our ex-
ploration of dynamic dualism at the chronological end, with
Kurth’s final articulation of this principle in Musikpsychologie.
The remainder of this article is in three parts. The first con-
siders the aims and audience of Musikpsychologie within the
context of a broader psychological movement. This is followed
by a detailed examination of the principle of dynamic dualism
within that book. From there I return to the origin of Kurth’s
fascination with dualism, namely to Riemann, tracing points
of intersection between the two figures across several decades.
A dedicated comparison of their philosophies and theoretical
ideas undoubtedly deserves a fuller study than I offer here.
Nevertheless, I suggest that the starting point for such a com-
parison is an investigation into the differing ways they pre-
sented their approaches as psychological.
psychology, MUSIKPSYCHOLOGIE, and music theory
Psychology as a field of study experienced a sea change from
1913 to 1931, the period corresponding to Kurth’s most sig-
nificant professional activities. The first of these years marks
13 Dahlhaus (1973). The most comprehensive English-language treatments
of Musikpsychologie appear in Kim (2003), Tan (2013), Tan (2015), and
Tan (2017). An important German-language source is Rösler (1997).
3
the climax of an increasingly contentious debate within aca-
demic philosophy over the status of experimental psychology, a
subspecialty of the discipline. Experimental psychology, which
borrowed its methods from the natural sciences (especially
physiology), had gained an ever-stronger foothold in German-
speaking universities since the turn of the century, as demon-
strated by the rapid establishment of psychological institutes,
academic journals, and societies for experimental research.14
Moreover, between 1890 and 1910 an increasing number of
full professorships in philosophy were held by experimental
psychologists. Alarmed at this latter trend in particular, more
than a hundred philosophers in Germany, Austria, and
Switzerland signed a petition in 1913 demanding that no fur-
ther philosophy chairs be awarded to psychologists.15
This discord among philosophers was interrupted, however,
by the First World War. Psychology became a useful military
instrument in wartime, and its proven utility sparked the post-
war enthusiasm for “applied” psychology within and outside
the academy.16 The intellectual separation of this new applied
14 Among the newly formed psychological institutes, Wilhelm Wundt’s in
Leipzig (est. 1879) and Carl Stumpf’s in Berlin (est. 1894) were the most
influential. Among the newly formed journals were Zeitschrift für
Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane (est. 1890) and the Archiv für
die gesamte Psychologie (est. 1903). Finally, the Society for Experimental
Psychology was founded in 1904, later renamed the German Society for
Psychology in 1929, in an attempt at greater inclusivity.
15 For full accounts of this event, see Ash ([1995] 1998, 47) and Kusch
(1995, 190–94).
16 Also known as “military psychotechnics,” military psychology produced
aptitude tests for pilots, drivers of military vehicles, and machinery opera-
tors. It also conducted research into the reaction times of soldiers, the psy-
chological processes during the firing of handguns, the effectiveness of
camouflage, and many other issues; see Kusch (1995, 222) for a compre-
hensive list of these projects. After the war, applied psychology dealt with
 4 music theory spectrum 0 (2020)
psychology from the psychology of yesteryear was defined by a
further removal from “pure” philosophical problems.17 A new
crisis thus ensued, now among researchers in experimental psy-
chology. Taking a cue from their philosophy colleagues, they
petitioned in 1929–1930 for more professorships—not to re-
place, but to work alongside, philosophy.18
During this turbulent period of disciplinary readjustment, sev-
eral new schools of experimental psychology flourished. Most no-
table are those affiliated with the far-reaching movement known
as “Gestalt psychology,” loosely characterized by the rejection of
elementalism, “the assumption that sensory ‘elements’ are the basic
constituents of mental life.”19 In his seminal text on the subject,
Mitchell G. Ash writes that “the period from 1920 to 1933
marked the high point . . . of Gestalt psychology’s theoretical de-
velopment, its research productivity and its impact on German
science and culture”; it also achieved international prominence
during this time.20 The Berlin school in particular, so-called be-
cause its founders Wolfgang Köhler, Kurt Koffka, and Max
Wertheimer were trained under philosopher Carl Stumpf at the
University of Berlin, is generally regarded as the school of Gestalt
theory. But it cannot be ignored that other rival holistic schools—
for instance, the Graz school, led by Alexius Meinong and
Christian von Ehrenfels, and the Leipzig school of
Ganzheitspsychologie, led by Felix Krueger—laid claim to establish-
ing similar concepts, and further, that individuals sought to high-
light insufficiencies in the Berlin school’s holism.21
It was against this complex backdrop of events that
Kurth’s ideas on the psychology of music developed, emerg-
ing in their most synthesized and detailed form in
Musikpsychologie. Beginning in the foreword and throughout
the first section of this book, Kurth establishes the parameters
of his research agenda, situating it within the realm of music
research (Musikwissenschaft) as well as within pre- and post-
war academic psychology. Let us examine both aspects of this
disciplinary positioning, beginning with the highly suggestive
opening sentences of the foreword:
such issues as “the psychology of advertising, forensic psychology, the psy-
chology of accidents, and aptitude tests for train conductors, insurance
agents, prison guards, dentists and surgeons” (Kusch 1995, 260).
17 As Mitchell G. Ash notes, moreover, “By [1929], a plethora of alternative
psychologies had arisen to deal with the problems of modern youth, sexu-
ality, character, or personality diagnosis and therapy—practical social
problems [that were broad and difficult] to grasp with standard laboratory
methods” ([1995] 1998, 204).
18 See Kusch (1995, 261) and Ash ([1995] 1998, 204).
19 Ash ([1995] 1998, 1).
20 Ash ([1995] 1998, 203). The American reception of Gestalt psychology,
and in turn, the Gestalt critique of American behavioralism, lies outside
the scope of the present article; see Robinson (1995, Chapter 12) for an
account.
21 Influenced by the philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey, Krüger attacked the
Berlin school for neglecting the role of feeling and will in his 1923 address
to the Kongreß für experimentelle Psychologie (Leipzig), “Der
Strukturbegriff in der Psychologie”; Kurth ([1931] 1947, 27) refers to this
source in his discussion of Gestalt psychology.
What is here regarded as music psychology is neither a tone
psychology nor an aesthetics of music; thus this is not an
investigation of artistic production, but rather of psychical
functions that form the very basis of musical hearing in
general, and consequently of any aesthetics, theory, stylis-
tics, and other areas of music research. . . . For this reason
the contents are governed by the interaction of two areas,
music and psychology. [The goal of this study is] to locate
the connection to psychology for all phenomena that are
subject to tonal laws, and therefore to assemble, above all,
material on the frontier of both sciences [music and
psychology].22
Kurth declares music psychology to be no less than the foun-
dation of every area of music research, thus recalling the posi-
tion taken by Wundt (from the experimental side) and
Wilhelm Dilthey (from the “pure” philosophical side) that psy-
chology formed the basis of all human sciences
(Geisteswissenschaften).23 He also singles out two preexisting
research areas, tone psychology and the aesthetics of music,
whose concerns he deems only superficially similar.
Contemporaneous readers would have been familiar with
the term “Tonpsychologie” from Stumpf’s two-volume mag-
num opus of this name; indeed it would be entirely reasonable
to assume from Kurth’s reference that Musikpsychologie is a
not-so-veiled response to Stumpf, just as Stumpf’s
“Tonpsychologie” could be read as a response to Hermann von
Helmholtz’s “Tonempfindungen.”24 Kurth does interrogate
Stumpf’s concept of fusion at length in the third section of his
book, and as seen in the above quote, he also adapts Stumpf’s
22 “Was hier als Musikpsychologie betrachtet wird, ist weder eine
€
Tonpsychologie noch eine Asthetik der Musik; daher auch keine
Untersuchung des künstlerischen Schaffens, sondern jener psychischen
Funktionen, die erst dem musikalischen Hören überhaupt zugrunde
€
liegen, somit auch jeglicher Asthetik, Theorie, Stilistik und weiteren
Gebieten der Musikforschung. . . . Der Stoff unterliegt damit der
Wechselbeziehung zweier Gebiete, der Musik und der Psychologie. Von
allen tongesetzlichen Ph€anomenen war die Verbindung zur Psychologie
zu suchen, somit vornehmlich an der Grenze beider Wissenschaften ein
Material aufzuschichten” (Kurth 1931 [1947], x). All translations of
Musikpsychologie within this article are my own.
23 A doyen of experimental psychology, Wundt maintained throughout his
career that experimentation could only access parts of mental life and thus
needed to remain rooted in philosophy. Dilthey, in a paper entitled “Ideen
über eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie” (1894), criticized
“explanatory or constructive psychology” (based on experimentation) for
the insufficiency of its scope and methods, proposing instead a broader
“descriptive or analytic psychology”; the latter could include experimenta-
tion as well as other forms of analysis and comparison, such as examining
artworks to study forms of mental activity. See Kusch (1995, 162–69). In
addition to influencing Krüger, as mentioned in n. 21, Dilthey had a di-
rect hand in Stumpf’s appointment to the University of Berlin. In turn,
Stumpf’s students, the Gestalt theorists, would later portray their ideas as
consonant with Dilthey’s; see Ash ([1995] 1998, 31–33, 296). Kurth
refers to the 1894 paper and others by Dilthey in Musikpsychologie; see
Kurth ([1931] 1947, 27n.1).
24 See, for instance, de la Motte-Haber (1986–87).
 kurth and riemann on music theory and the mind
concept of “psychical functions.”25 A close reading of
Musikpsychologie in its entirety, however, reveals that Kurth
employs “tone psychology” more loosely: as a catchall for a
mindset and methodology of which Stumpf’s work is
representative—but so too Helmholtz’s and, as we will see
later, Riemann’s before 1914. Tone psychology, in Kurth’s es-
timation, was closely adjacent to physiology, as both assumed
one-to-one, measurable correspondences between stimulus
and response. In Musikpsychologie, Kurth notes that “tone psy-
chology treats the interplay of stimulus and reaction,” while ig-
noring that “opposite to it, there stands an ‘action,’ the
prevailing of that psychical activity that first captures, forms,
and reorganizes the stimulus”; by focusing on stimulus reac-
tions alone, tone psychology can only address “the sensory area
of music” (Sinnesgebeit der Musik) rather than music itself.26
Alongside this emphasis on psychical activity, “wholeness”
arises as a central point in Kurth’s distinction between tone
psychology and music psychology. He writes,
Tone psychology is more aligned with single impressions
(tone, interval, chord, rhythmic unit, etc.), music psychol-
ogy more with the flowing whole, in that it examines the
individual impressions from this [whole]. The physiologist
says: our sense of hearing is necessary in order to experience
sound waves—whereas the music psychologist from his
standpoint is permitted to say: the sound waves bring forth
only the sensory stimulus in which we experience the pro-
cesses of music.27
Thus when Kurth asserts at the outset of Musikpsychologie
that his goal is to “locate the connection to psychology for all
phenomena that are subject to tonal laws,” he views his project
as specifically consonant with the ongoing Gestalt move-
ment.28 At the same time, Kurth’s notion of psychology
25 See Tan (2013, 62–79 and 154–75) for a discussion of Kurth’s critique of
Stumpf and his concept of fusion. In contrast to “Erscheinungen,” which
are sensory data (and the memory of these), Stumpf (1907, 4–5) defines
“psychische Funktionen” as immediately given mental activities (Akte),
states (Zust€ande), and experiences (Erlebnisse) that include “the noticing of
phenomena and their relations, the synthesis of phenomena into com-
plexes, the formation of concepts, [the acts of] grasping and judging, the
emotions, the desiring, and willing.” Compare Kurth ([1931] 1947, 43):
“It arises particularly in musical phenomena that the unconscious psychical
functions are already, in many ways, conditions for appearances
(Erscheinungen) of conscious cognition (bewußten Erkennen).”
26 Kurth ([1931] 1947, 51; emphasis original).
27 “[D]ie Tonpsychologie ist mehr auf die Einzeleindrücke (Ton, Intervall,
Akkord, rhythmische Einheit usw.) gerichtet, die Musikpsychologie mehr
auf das fließende Ganze, so dass sie die Einzeleindrücke schon von diesem
aus betrachtet. Der Physiologe sagt: unser Gehörssinn ist nötig, um
Schallwellen zu erfahren—w€ahrend der Musikpsychologe von seinem
Standpunkt sagen darf: die Schallwellen verursachen nur die
Sinnesreizung, in der wir die Vorg€ange der Musik erfahren” (Kurth
[1931] 1947, 51). For a more sustained discussion of Kurth’s distinction
between Tonpsychologie and Musikpsychologie, see Tan (2013, 62–79).
28 Tan (2015) investigates this topic, highlighting the particular influence of
Krueger. A recent examination of intersections between the Berlin school
and Kurth’s Grundlagen, can be found in Probst (2018, Chapter 4).
5
embraces both experimental research and non-experimental,
psychologically oriented philosophy. He justifies this position
in the foreword as well:
The academic discipline of psychology can tackle many
issues from quite different perspectives, especially with its
current variety of methods, and it may also, in general, tend
to explain things differently, but even then, the set of prob-
lems remains never fully exhausted. Just as with many
things, for music there will never be a single valid psychol-
ogy but always only ever-changing insights from different
perspectives, as it corresponds to the mental life in its intan-
gible, ever-moving multiplicity.29
So it is that we encounter in Section 1 a long list of intellectual
figures with a shared concern for “holistic experience”
(Ganzheitserlebnis). The experimental psychologist-
philosophers Ehrenfels, Stumpf, Meinong, and Krueger are
among the names, to be sure, but they stand alongside philos-
ophers like Dilthey and Henri Bergson.30 Throughout
Musikpsychologie, moreover, Kurth draws connections among
contemporaneous psychological ideas and various strands of
philosophical thought that exalt the immediacy of experience
and the power of the unconsciousness.31
Kurth’s intended readership for Musikpsychologie is as broad
as his scholarly sources. Having designed the book for musi-
cians with an interest in psychology, while also seeking to
make a contribution to the area of psychology itself, he ex-
pressly reformulated technical terms and omitted music nota-
tion. “In short,” he writes, “it seemed necessary to stick to an
account that should be understandable in both fields, even by
amateurs.”32 Based on the book’s reception, this approach was
only partly successful. While some reviewers heralded
Musikpsychologie as a significant refinement and consolidation
of psychological ideas that were already present in Kurth’s
29 “Die Fachpsychologie kann, besonders bei ihrer heutigen
Methodenvielfalt, vieles noch von ganz andern Seiten her anpacken, mag
auch manches grunds€atzlich noch anders erkl€aren, aber selbst dann bleibt
der Problemkreis nie ganz zu erschöpfen. Sowenig wie sonst wird es auch
für die Musik nie eine alleingültige Psychologie geben, sondern immer
nur wechselnde Einblicke aus verschiedenen Betrachtungsweisen, wie es
dem seelischen Leben in seiner ungreifbaren, stets bewegten Vielfalt
entspricht” (Kurth [1931] 1947, xi–xii).
30 Kurth ([1931] 1947, 26).
31 We read, for instance that “Schopenhauer and Feuerbach, and above all
Dilthey and Bergson—in contrast to rationalistic psychology, which drew
its conclusions from the representational contents of the imagination—
emphasized more the immediacy of experience that happens beyond the
imaginable.” (“Schopenhauer und Feuerbach, dann vor allem Dilthey und
Bergson, betonten gegenüber der rationalistischen Psychologie, die ihre
Schlüsse aus den gegenst€andlichen Vorstellungsinhalten zog, mehr die
Unmittelbarkeit des Erlebens, das sich jenseits des Vorstellbaren abspielt”)
(Kurth [1931] 1947, 53).
32 “Kurz, es schien geboten, eine Darstellung einzuhalten, die auf beiden
Gebieten auch für Dilettanten verst€andlich sein soll” (Kurth [1931] 1947,
x–xi; emphasis original).
 6 music theory spectrum 0 (2020)
prior books,33 others with a narrower, postwar understanding
of “psychology” were unconvinced by his adoption of the
term;34 for these reviewers, the book challenged the very limits
of this word, especially within the current climate of disciplin-
ary transformation.
At this point, it is worth returning to my opening assertion
that Kurth’s attempts to promote his music-theoretical ideas
brought him into contact with Riemann. For if one were to
judge the contents of Musikpsychologie by its cover and fore-
word alone, one might be surprised to encounter traditional
theoretical topics in later portions of the book: the entire third
section is dedicated to tonal harmony and the fourth section to
form.35 Yet this preoccupation with music theory is actually
because of rather than despite Kurth’s psychological outlook.
Indeed throughout his oeuvre, Kurth maintains that accepted
musical “laws,” established through theoretical research and
music pedagogy, have yet-unknown psychological roots; more-
over, locating these roots—these psychical functions—
contributes to other areas of intellectual inquiry, including the
newest forms of psychological research. This argument again
coheres with Wundt’s suggestion that psychology is the foun-
dation for Geisteswissenschaften, and in turn, that humanistic
fields could provide data for psychological analysis.36 In
Musikpsychologie, Kurth observes, “it has been insufficiently
recognized that the principal starting points for an empirical
psychology of music become apparent in the theory [of music],
or more properly: are hidden within it.”37 He notes that con-
temporary scholars have searched “more eagerly than ever” for
musical laws. Yet in doing so, they inadvertently reveal psycho-
logical principles that are entangled with the “special condi-
tions of sounding matter.” This relationship between sounding
matter and its transformation through cognition, between
physical and psychological conditions, emerges most strongly
33 See, for instance, the largely positive reviews by Alfred Lorenz (1930),
Hans Mersmann (1931), and Theodor W. Adorno (1933). In a letter to
Kurth following the publication of Musikpsychologie, Guido Adler, his for-
mer advisor at the University of Vienna, commends the book’s psychologi-
cal direction as well as its relevance to existing areas of Musikwissenschaft:
“My own psychological work and studies have been at a standstill for al-
most three decades, and so for the time being, I do not venture to tell you
my opinion in a strictly scientific manner; I can say now, however, that
the conquest of new territory in your book, with such attentive reference
to the constantly growing [psychological] literature, truly satisfies me, as
does the inclusion of style in the psychological field of research and that
you are nowhere in opposition to my positions about style and style crit-
icism.” (Guido Adler to Ernst Kurth, 29 April 1931, A1.14,
Volltextbriefe zum Inventar Nachlass Kurth, Institut für
Musikwissenschaft, Universit€at Bern.)
34 See, for instance, the more critical reviews by Kurt Herbst (1931) and
Albert Wellek (1931).
35 See Tan (2017) for a discussion of Kurth’s conception of musical form
within Bruckner and Musikpsychologie.
36 Ash ([1995] 1998, 23).
37 “Zu wenig ist erkannt worden, daß die haupts€achlichsten Ansatzpunkte
für eine empirische Psychologie der Musik in der Theorie offenbar werden,
oder richtiger: in ihr verborgen liegen” (Kurth [1931] 1947, 62; emphasis
original).
in music-theoretical work. For “when tackled properly,” Kurth
writes, music theory is “not a dry de[-]composition but instead
contains the most intrinsic secrets.”38
Anticipating the criticism that his project is an unnecessary
overcomplication of rudimentary ideas that are familiar to any
practicing musician, Kurth writes:
For that reason, the difficulty often lies in [the fact] that
well-known concepts must be considered without presup-
position if possible; what music theory simply accepts as
givens are for music psychology only the starting points
with which it must entrench itself in its own
territory. . . . But these riddles that present themselves ev-
erywhere in the basic concepts of practical music theory are
not only the starting points for the philosophical-
speculative interpretation of music but, above all, the
boundaries where the empirical-psychological processes be-
gin to reveal themselves. Here we are searching for those
basic phenomena of theory only to recognize the psychical
functions that are involved in them.39
Thus Kurth argues that a shift in perspective can lead to new
understandings of well-known concepts. Conversely, music
theories fall short when they inadequately acknowledge their
limitations and when they fail to recognize the “circle of
mystery” (R€atselring) that inescapably surrounds them.
Returning to “An den Schlaf” (Ex. 1), Kurth’s analysis can be
understood as an attempt to lead the reader toward psycholog-
ical processes that are present in the act of listening but that
cannot be captured through symbolic notation alone. His prose
invokes feelings of instability, of the ebb and flow of accumu-
lating and abating tensions, in a particular passage of music.
The third section of Musikpsychologie furthers this cause with a
discussion of psychological processes that are latent within a
general system of tonal harmony.40 Kurth underscores that
38 “Die heutige Geistesforschung, und zwar l€angst nicht nur die
Musikwissenschaft selbst, sucht wißbegieriger als je nach den Gesetzen
der Musik; damit werden aber größerenteils psychologische Gesetze frei-
gelegt, die sich allerdings mit den besonderen Bedingungen der
Tonmaterie auseinandersetzen und an sie gebunden sind. Aber nirgends
tritt auch die besondere Eigenart der Tonmaterie samt ihrer
Umgestaltbarkeit selbst deutlicher hervor als in der Theorie; sie ist, richtig
angepackt, keine trockene Zersetzung, sondern schließt die eigentlichsten
Geheimnisse ein” (Kurth [1931] 1947, 63).
39 “Darum beruht die Schwierigkeit oft gerade darin, daß altbekannte
Begriffe eine möglichst voraussetzungslose Betrachtung erfahren müssen;
was die Musiklehre schlechtweg als Gegebenheiten hinnimmt, bildet für
die Musikpsychologie erst Ansatzpunkte, bei denen sie sich in ihr eigenes
Gebiet eingraben muß. . . . Jene R€atsel aber, die sich überall an den
Ausgangsbegriffen der gangbaren Musiklehre eröffnen, bilden nicht bloß
die Ausgangspunkte für die philosophisch-spekulative Deutung der
Musik, sondern vor allem die Grenzen, an denen sich die empirisch-
psychologischen Vorg€ange zu enthüllen beginnen. Wir suchen jene
Grunderscheinungen der Theorie hier nur auf, um die psychischen
Funktionen zu erkennen, die an ihnen beteiligt sind” (Kurth [1931] 1947,
63–64).
40 Each of the three chapters highlights an experiential aspect: chord fusion,
or why we sense simultaneous tones as harmonious (Chapter 1: “Der
Zusammenklang”); chord tension, or why we feel tension when hearing
 kurth and riemann on music theory and the mind
while music theorists have taken great pains to explain tonality
as a logical, balanced system, music psychology unveils another
system that is not immediately apparent to the ear or eye: “The
implications now are different for psychology than they are for
theory. As only needs to be briefly indicated here, theory chains
itself to the system of major and minor tonalities, which is in es-
sence also a system of dynamic strivings.”41
dynamic dualism and its three layers of
development42
Though accounts of the tonal system often begin with root
motion by fifth, Kurth’s music-psychological theory empha-
sizes instead the distinctive experiential power of the leading
tone: “the leading tone is the initiating point where the psy-
chological-dynamic processes interpenetrate most intensely,
while the roots represent the pivotal points of the physically
given relationships.”43 His theory hinges, moreover, on a
leading-tone effect (Leittonwirkung) that expresses itself in
three different contexts: as a pure sensation of motion; as
“color” within a chord; and as an evanescent resolution
within an ongoing progression. Crucially, in the course of
musical listening, and as a given context develops, the
leading-tone effect accumulates in layers of development
(Entwicklungsschichten); the longer one listens, the greater the
possibility that one will acquire a “double, triple, etc.
leading-tone effect.”44 These effects are readily showcased in
an elaborate context such as a Wolf Lied, but in
Musikpsychologie Kurth employs further illustrative tools to
isolate them for discussion. That is, he attributes an abstract
“fundamental form” to each: (1) the scale, with its upward-
and downward-striving leading tones, embodies the sensation
of motion; (2) the chord, and particularly the distinction be-
tween major and minor, captures the sensation of color; and
(3) the circle of keys, with the possibility of moving in
sharpwise and flatwise directions, engenders the impression
simultaneous tones (Chapter 2: “Die Dynamisierung des Klanges”); and
chord movement, or what underlying principles govern our responses to
chord successions (Chapter 3: “Die Klangbewegung”).
41 “Für die Psychologie sind nun die Folgerungen daraus noch andere als für
die Theorie. Für diese kettet sich, wie hier nur kurz angedeutet zu werden
braucht, hieran das System der Dur- und Moltonarten, das im Grunde
ebenfalls ein System dynamischer Strömungen ist” (Kurth [1931] 1947,
209; emphasis mine.)
42 This is the heading of Musikpsychologie, Section 3, Chapter 3, Subsection
2 (“Der dynamische Dualismus und seine drei Entwicklungsschichten”).
In this subsection, Kurth lists the three layers (three times, in fact) but
does not discuss them in order. One also needs to read Subsection 1
(“The Fundamental Motion”) to fully understand the three layers, particu-
larly the first.
43 “Der Leitton ist der Ansatzpunkt, wo die psychologisch-dynamischen
Vorg€ange am intensivsten eindringen, w€ahrend die Grundtöne
Angelpunkte der physikalisch gegebenen Verwandtschaften darstellen”
(Kurth [1931] 1947, 211; emphasis original).
44 “Doppelte, dreifache Leittonwirkung usw.” (Kurth [1931] 1947, 212).
7
of changing colors.45 In highlighting the bifocal construction
of each theoretical concept (up/down, major/minor, sharp/
flat), he calls attention to their attendant tensions, their
“dynamic dualism.” Collectively, Kurth’s three layers of dy-
namic dualism provide a framework for understanding why it
is that similarly constructed chords and progressions can be
perceived and felt differently, often radically so.
1. LEADING-TONE STRIVING IN THE SCALE: THE SENSATION OF
MOTION
Kurth implies that since the sensation of motion is psychologi-
cally primary among experiences, the scale is ontologically pri-
mary within a dynamic theoretical system. He elaborates:
In general, it is not the theory of individual chords but
rather only the theory of chordal motions that constitutes
harmony. They are of such variety, however, that to grasp
them, one must first refer back to the simplest fundamental
motion. And this lies in the connection of two octave-
related tones—in the scale, through whose dynamic dispo-
sition each chordal tension is determined.46
Beginning with the major scale, Kurth emphasizes that multi-
ple ways of hearing and of experiencing motion therein are
available. He writes, “The unity of tones is not decisive, and
the ‘structure’ of the scale is not external. Rather, it is the op-
posite: with tonal motion, just as in the case of the single tone
and the chord, one confronts the psychological phenomenon
that multiple [scalar] tendencies can crisscross and pass
through one another.”47 As Example 2(a) shows, it is possible
to perceive the major scale as two tetrachords with identical
intervallic content, giving rise to a repeating pattern of felt mo-
tion: “The progression of two whole tones and a semitone
(C–D–E–F) repeats itself (G–A–B–C), and with it, [repeats]
the simple dynamic of leading-tone intensification toward goal
tones of motion.”48 The fourth and fifth scale degrees play
45 In Voraussetzungen, Kurth’s descriptions of the scale and chord closely re-
semble those in Musikpsychologie; see Chapters 3 (“The Sensation of
Motion and Harmonic Energy”) and 8 (“The Modes as Opposing Forms
with Regard to Harmonic Energy: The Explanation of Minor”), respec-
tively. In the earlier work, however, he does not yet situate these theoreti-
cal constructs within an overarching dynamic system.
€
46 “Uberhaupt macht noch nicht die Lehre von den einzelnen Kl€angen die
Harmonik aus, sondern erst die von den Klangbewegungen. Sie sind aber
von solcher Vielfalt, daß man zu ihrer Erfassung zun€achst auf die ein-
fachste Grundbewegung zurückgreifen muß. Und diese liegt in der
Verbindung zweier Oktavtöne, der Skala, durch deren dynamische
Lagerung jede Akkordspannung mitbedingt ist” (Kurth [1931] 1947, 205;
my emphasis).
47 “Die Zusammengehörigkeit der Töne ist keine eindeutige, die ‘Struktur’
der Skala keine €außerliche; im Gegenteil: wie beim Einzelton und Klang,
so steht man auch bei der Tonbewegung vor der psychologischen
Erscheinung, daß sich mehrere Wirkungstendenzen durchkreuzen und
durchdringen können” (Kurth [1931] 1947, 208).
48 “Die Folge zweier Ganztöne und eines Halbtones (c–d–e–f) wiederholt sich
genau (g–a–h–c), und damit die einfache Dynamik einer Leittonzuspitzung
gegen Zieltöne der Bewegung” (Kurth [1931] 1947, 205).
 8 music theory spectrum 0 (2020)
(a)
(b)
example 2. (a) Leading-tone strivings in the major scale
(“ melodic” representation). (b) “ Harmonic” representation of the
major scale
distinctive, pivotal roles within this conception of the major scale:
^4 is an intermediate goal away from ^1, and ^5 initiates another
motion toward ^ 1. Moreover, ^3 acts as an intermediate leading
tone (Zwischenleitton) in the lower tetrachord, anticipating the in-
tensified trajectory of ^ 7 in the upper tetrachord. It is in this dia-
lectical striving away from and back to the tonic that Kurth
locates the “effects” (Wirkungen) of subdominant and dominant.
Then again, one could instead attend to the tonic-chord scale
degrees as pivotal points of motion, as shown in Example 2(b),
that is, hearing ^1–^3–^ 5–^1 as a “gravitational field” to which all
other scalar tones relate. Kurth notes that any “harmonic” striving
in this hearing “rests strongly in itself.” By contrast, listening to
the scale as a progression of two tetrachords (Example 2[a]), is
suggestive of movement beyond the basic chord, indeed of caden-
tial motion; thus it is this hearing that is melodically primordial.49
Turning to the minor scale, Kurth presents only one exam-
ple of experiencing motion, shown in Example 3, while ac-
knowledging the possibility of many others. Here, the
aforementioned gravitational field comes into play, with the
minor triad C–E[–G offering points of repose for the interme-
diate tones D and F. In the upper portion of the scale, two
conflicting dynamic courses prevail: one “upwardly striving
with the leading-tone tetrachord G–A–B–C,” and one striving
downward “in its exact [intervallic] reversal C–B[–A[–G.”50
49 “Neigt man im Hören mehr zu diesem [d. h. c–e–g–c], so ist auch die
‘harmonische’ Strebung in der Skala eine ganz andere; sie ruht st€arker in
sich. . . . Diese Hörweise der Skala [d. h. erst gegen die Unterdominante,
dann zur Dominante und in die Tonika zurück] ist die melodische
ursprünglichere, indem sie von der Bewegungsdynamik an sich und noch
nicht von Dreikl€angen beeinflußt ist” (Kurth [1931] 1947, 207). Even
further possibilities for experiencing the scale are outlined in Kurth
([1931] 1947, 207–8). Readers might regard Kurth’s melodic-harmonic
distinction as somewhat tenuous; indeed, following Heinrich Schenker,
Example 2(b) could be described as a melodic composing-out
(Auskomponierung) of the tonic triad. For Kurth, however, this reading
would suggest that the triad takes priority over the sensation of motion.
Ultimately, it is his emphasis on the embodied quality of music listening
that put him at odds with Schenker; for more on this, see Tan (2015, esp.
120–23) and Tan (2017, esp. 20–21).
50 “Aufw€artsstrebend mit dem Leitton-Tetrachord g–a–h–c, abw€arts in des-
sen genauer Umkehrung (zwei Ganztönen und einem Leitton nach unten)
c–b–as–g” (Kurth [1931] 1947, 208).
example 3. Leading-tone strivings in the minor scale
Indeed, the different trajectories of motion in the second half
of the minor scale distinguish it from its major counterpart.
2. MAJOR-MINOR OPPOSITION IN THE TRIAD: THE SENSATION OF
COLOR AND CHARACTER
In the triad, individual notes are charged with their scalar ten-
dencies, infusing the chord with potential directionality. The
quale of a chord is a result of both the chord-as-sonorous-
event and the direction of suggested motion. Kurth notes that
this sensuous aspect of harmony is rarely discussed, because
the immediacy of the impression overpowers the complexity of
the moment: “[music] theory and naı̈ve listeners often ignore
these [tension processes], because as immediate aural impres-
sions they express themselves in intensive sound colors.”51
As Example 4 highlights, a major triad contains an upward
leading-tone tendency that lies “concealed” (verborgen) in the
chordal third. Kurth is quick to emphasize that the experience
of this tendency is markedly different from that of a leading
tone within the scale, but the felt impression of upward striv-
ing is nonetheless present. When it comes to the minor triad,
Kurth, like many before him, goes to great lengths to explain
its opposite-yet-equal relationship to major. With emphasis on
parallel triads and with explicit reference to Riemann’s har-
monic dualism, he writes,
The minor triad with the same root has the opposite con-
struction (not, as Riemann would like, one whose root is
displaced by a fifth [downward, i.e., F minor]). For the C
minor triad, with respect to the C major triad, involves a
transformation in the characteristic third scale degree,
which contains the suggestion of a downward-striving ten-
dency in relation to the form of the chord of nature (a
transformation of the E to E[); [and] again, only the sug-
gestion, because the consonance [of minor] is also com-
plete: it is based only on intervals that are contained in the
chord of nature and constitutes the only other consonant
triadic form besides the major chord, determined through
the fusion of the same constituent intervals.52
51 “Theorie und naives Hören gehen an ihnen vorüber, weil sie sich als
unmittelbare Gehörseindrücke in intensiven Klangfarben kundgeben”
(Kurth [1931] 1947, 212; emphasis mine). At the end of Section 3 (pp.
238–49), Kurth identifies three intermingled sources of color in music: in-
strumental color, color within a fused simultaneity, and the movement of
color (Farbenbewegtheit) through the movement of chords.
52 “Gegenform ist der Molldreiklang gleichen Grundtons (nicht, wie
Riemann wollte, eines um eine Quint entfernten Grundtones); denn dem
C-Dur-Dreiklang gegenüber bedeutet der c-Moll-Dreiklang eine
Ver€anderung im charakteristischen Terzton, der bei Beziehung auf
Naturklangsform die Andeutung einer Tiefenstrebung (Ver€anderung des e
zu es) enth€alt, wieder nur die Andeutung, da die Klangkonsonanz auch
 kurth and riemann on music theory and the mind
example 4. “ Concealed” leading-tone strivings within major
and minor triads
For Kurth, the dualism of major and minor triads lies not in
their outer, symmetrical construction but in the opposite striv-
ings of their chordal thirds. Moreover, one perceives these
strivings not in isolation but as attributes of the entire chord,
as chordal color: “the tonal striving that is inherent in the third
tone radiates over the respective characters of major and minor
chords, which are at once idiosyncratically clear and yet beyond
words.”53
Notably, Kurth’s explanation for the sources of upward- and
downward-directed tensions is not dualist, since he derives the
downward-striving tendency of the minor chord from a trans-
formation of the major chord. But why not point instead to
leading-tone strivings in the descending minor scale as the
source for the chordal third in minor? One reason might stem
from Kurth’s assertion that the major scale, with its balanced
dynamic trajectory, is the generative element of the tonal sys-
tem; the minor scale, with its various forms, cannot do the
same conceptual work.54 However, in referencing the chord of
nature, he also acknowledges that the major triad is acoustically
privileged; and in so doing, he reveals that he, too, cannot
shake the long history of grounding tonality in the overtone
series.55 Recognizing the possible confusion that might ensue
from his explanation of major-minor duality, he clarifies in
two footnotes:
Nevertheless, the present view maintains that the major
mode has no actual primacy in music. Only according to the
eine vollst€andige ist: sie besteht nur aus Intervallen, die im Naturklang
enthalten sind und stellt die einzige noch konsonante Dreiklangsform
neben dem Durakkord dar, durch Verschmelzung der gleichen
Teilintervalle bedingt” (Kurth [1931] 1947, 214–215).
53 “Die im Terzton verfestigte Tonstrebung strahlt aber in den eigenartig
klaren, gleichwohl mit Worten nie beschreibbaren Gesamtcharakter der
Dur- bzw. Mollakkorde aus” (Kurth [1931] 1947, 216). In Romantische
Harmonik ([1920] 1975), Kurth acknowledges a similar emphasis on the
chordal third in August Halm’s harmony treatise (1900) but remarks that
Halm fails to identify the third’s origin in the leading tone. According to
Kurth, “Halm is entangled in Riemann’s representation of major and mi-
nor as formal-inversion of triads, [and] therefore does not get away from
the sonic foundation of music” (183, emphasis original). See Rothfarb
(2009, 53–54), for more on Halm’s energetic reading of the major third.
For the ramifications of Kurth’s dynamic dualism for augmented and di-
minished chords, see Kurth ([1931] 1947, 215n.4).
54 Kurth ([1931] 1947, 209).
55 Cook (2002) provides a short history of this pursuit. Unlike Schenker,
Kurth in no way attributes any mythical import to the chord of nature; see
Clark (1999).
9
physical point of view, and not the psychological one, is
there something primary for the major triad (chord of na-
ture) since in music the degree of consonance [for major and
minor] is the same and the strivings are of the same nature,
only polar opposites of one another.56
The entire opposition between “monistic” and “dualistic”
theory is thus invalid. The present explanation would be
“monistic” in the sounding sense while “dualistic” in the en-
ergetic sense.57
In arguing that there is something special about the major
triad from an acoustic (or “physical”) perspective, Kurth aligns
himself with harmonic monism. But when insisting that psy-
chological equivalence is more important he situates himself
within a dualist camp.58 Indeed, Kurth reassures the reader
that though the sources of tension in major and minor triads
are not identical, their outward striving, the leading-tone ef-
fect, is.
3. SHARPWISE AND FLATWISE DIRECTIONS AROUND THE CIRCLE OF
KEYS: THE SENSATION OF CHANGING COLORS
Kurth’s third fundamental form is the circle of keys
(Tonartskreis). As he explains, it is generally accepted that the
ordering of major and minor keys as either a dominant-related
series (increasing sharps) or a subdominant-related series (in-
creasing flats) governs the tonal system and its colorful exten-
sions (farbenreichen Ausweitungen), but the true dynamic aspect
of these arrangements remains concealed. The solid arrows in
Example 5 indicate that a single move sharpwise entails raising
one scale step to activate a new leading tone; for instance, C in
G major becomes C] in D major. Conversely, as the dotted
arrows in Example 5 indicate, a move flatwise causes a leading
tone in the starting key to deactivate: “the tone that was previ-
ously most intense (vordem intensivst wirkende Ton) is low-
ered.”59 As Kurth underscores, leading-tone strivings govern
the perceptual experience of the circle of keys; root relation-
ships are only an external reification of this experience: “This
56 “Die vorliegende Auffassung schiebt dem Dur gleichwohl kein eigen-
tliches Primat in der Musik zu. Nur nach physikalischem Gesichtspunkt
l€age für den Durklang (Naturklang) eines vor, psychologisch nicht, da für
die Musik der Konsonanzgrad der gleiche und die Strebungen gleichen
Wesens, nur polar einander entgegengesetzt sind” (Kurth [1931] 1947,
215n.3; emphasis original).
57 “Der ganze Gegensatz zwischen ‘monistischer’ und ‘dualistischer’ Theorie
wird damit hinf€allig; ‘monistisch’ w€are die vorliegende Erkl€arung im klan-
glichen, ‘dualistisch’ im energetischen Sinn” (Kurth [1931] 1947, 215n.2).
58 For a succinct comparison of harmonic monism and dualism, see
Klumpenhouwer (2002, 459). In Voraussetzungen, Kurth speaks positively
of the harmonic theory of Georg Capellen, who coined the term
“monism”; he views Capellen’s work as a “unification of the methods of
Riemann and Sechter” (Rothfarb 1979, 136). See Bernstein (2002, 800–
2), for an overview of Capellen’s ideas.
59 Kurth ([1931] 1947, 210). Note that Kurth does not mention that flatten-
ing ^7 generates a new ^4 (intermediate goal). Harrison’s (1994) own
“renewed dualist theory,” which bears a striking resemblance to Kurth’s,
does address this transformation; see especially section 1.3.3.
 10 music theory spectrum 0 (2020)
example 5. “ Activating” (solid arrow) and “ deactivating”
(dotted arrow) a leading tone between G major and D major
activation and deactivation of leading tones causes a change of
intensity units, already indicating a psychological-dynamic ef-
fect that penetrates the chordal voicing of the succession of fif-
ths.”60 Thus from their origins in the scale, leading tones
undergo “psychologically radical conversions” (psychologisch
durchgreifende Umsetzungen) to form the basis of large-scale
tonal motions.
Notably, leading-tone strivings accumulate: traveling in the
dominant direction around the circle of keys increases the
overall number of upward-striving leading tones, while travel-
ing in the subdominant direction decreases them. Kurth likens
increasingly distant key relationships “like that between C ma-
jor and D major or C major and A major, C major and E ma-
jor, etc.” to “simple dominant relationships” that grow
exponentially.61 The circle also governs individual harmonies
within a progression, as well as chord-to-chord successions.
But just like melodic strivings within the major and minor tri-
ads, the effects of leading-tone activations cannot be brought
to conscious awareness through description alone. They must
be experienced. Kurth writes,
The chordal motion, which creates the relational impact
among the individual chords in the circle of fifths, processes
further, in a new way, those differences in intensity that
originate in the leading-tone transformation: going beyond
the individual chordal tensions, it allows a streaming play of
tension and color to be experienced; [this play of tension and
color] is indeed regulated through leading-tone (accidental-)
units but is felt as a singular harmonic phenomenon. A simple
explanation of latent leading-tone differences or even of the
degrees of distance from the fundamental would never suf-
fice to call the phenomenon to the mind of another to
whom one wished to show these effects; for these constitute
effects of a peculiar degree and character, which are only de-
ducible through their sounding.62
60 “Dies Einschalten und Ausschalten von Leittönen bewirkt einen Wechsel
von Intensit€atseinheiten, weist also bereits auf eine psychologisch-
dynamische Wirkung, welche die Klanglagerung der Quintreihen
durchdringt” (Kurth [1931] 1947, 210, emphasis original).
61 “Entferntere Verh€altnisse hingegen (wie zwischen C-Dur und D-Dur
oder C-Dur und A-Dur, C-Dur und E-Dur usw.) sind am besten als
potenzierte Dominantverh€altnisse den einfachen Dominantverwandtschaften
gegenüberzustellen” (Kurth [1931] 1947, 213).
Finally, leading-tone accumulation also allows Kurth to
explain the effects of distant modulations within a single
piece of music. Here his position as a monotonal theorist
steeped in a world of highly chromatic music is evident, as
he argues for the psychological sustainability of a global
tonic:
There is a tonal memory that goes beyond the aural memory; it
does not capture the reality of the tone, but rather certain
energetic conditions, which [tonal memory] retains as its
center. . . . The [global tonic] can be so firmly held in
mind—semi-consciously [or] even unconsciously—that the
entire character of the modulation is determined through
it.63
In Wolf’s “An den Schlaf,” for instance, the initial tonic, A[,
continues to exert its strength even as the music strays toward
the key of E major and leading tones are deactivated. Of
course, A[/G] continues to sound until the end of the work.
Yet even in cases where the global tonic is no longer acousti-
cally present, it nevertheless determines the character of the
modulation from its seat in the imagination: “the [starting]
tone becomes imaginary and yet [it persists as] a point of rela-
tion of magical power.”64
*
Kurth invites the reader to compare his psychological ap-
proach to older, well-known music theories, emphasizing that
“it is not an intellectual schematic but rather a dynamic inner
tension on which this ‘diatonic’ chordal system is formed and
that animatedly interfuses [it], despite appearances of outer
rigidity.”65 Scale-degree theory (Stufentheorie), with its system-
atic construction of triads and seventh chords on degrees of
the diatonic scale, can certainly appear to gloss over experien-
tial differences among these chords.66 Yet it is Riemann’s
62 “Die Klangbewegung, welche die Relationswirkung zwischen den einzel-
nen Kl€angen im Quintenkreis schafft, verarbeitet jene ursprünglich in
Leittonver€anderung beruhenden Intensit€atsunterschiede wieder in neuer
Weise: über die einzelnen Akkordspannungen hinausgehend, l€aßt sie ein
strömendes Spannungs- und Farbenspiel ins Empfinden treten, das zwar
durch Leitton- (Vorzeichen-)Einheiten geregelt ist, aber als eine harmo-
nische Erscheinung für sich verspürt wird; so ließe sie sich auch nie durch
bloße Erkl€arung der verborgenen Leittonunterschiede oder auch der
Entfernungsgrade der Fundamente für jemand ins Bewußtsein rufen, dem
etwa diese Wirkungen zu zeigen w€aren; denn auch sie stellen Wirkungen
eigenen Grades und Charakters dar, die nur durch ihr Ertönen selbst dar-
stellbar sind” (Kurth [1931] 1947, 212; emphasis original).
63 “Es gibt eben auch ein Tonged€achtnis, das über Gehörsged€achtnis hinausgeht;
es erfaßt nicht die Realit€at des Tones, sondern gewisse Energiezust€ande,
als deren Zentrum er vorschwebt. . . . Dennoch kann er halbbewußt, sogar
auch unbewußt, so fest vorschweben, daß der ganze Charakter der
Ausweichungen durch ihn bestimmt ist” (Kurth [1931] 1947, 232; em-
phasis original).
64 “Der Ton wird imagin€ar und doch ein Beziehungspunkt von magischer
Kraft” (Kurth [1931] 1947, 232).
65 “Es ist kein intellektuelles Schema, sondern eine dynamische
Innenspannung, welche dieses ‘leitereigene’ Klangsystem bildet und trotz
scheinbarer, €außerlicher Starre lebensvoll durchsetzt” (Kurth [1931] 1947,
218; emphasis mine).
 kurth and riemann on music theory and the mind
theory of harmony that Kurth singles out as the greatest of-
fender. Recall that Kurth refers to Riemann within his discus-
sion of major and minor triads. In a subsequent section, he
states in no uncertain terms that his predecessor’s theory lacks
pragmatism and perceptual relevance:
From this standpoint [that logic is paramount], one can
only consider it unfortunate that Riemann’s chordal system,
an impressive conceptualization and complete geometrical
representation of harmony, contradicts hearing. For how
simple would the problems of music theory be—despite the
somewhat large exertion of thinking—if they were all sub-
mitted to such rational symmetrical construction, which
furthermore, would merely have to be tied to the chord!67
Riemann’s appearance in Musikpsychologie, for anyone familiar
with Kurth’s earlier writings, is hardly a surprise. Less obvious,
however, is that the principle of dynamic dualism is an out-
growth of Kurth’s engagement with Riemann over several dec-
ades, and that the increasingly psychological tenor of
Riemann’s writings would prompt Kurth to refine his own
psychological views. In the next section, we will spend some
time with Kurth’s responses to Riemann before and after
1918.
responses to riemann
Ludwig Holtmeier has suggested that the “theory of dualistic
derivation” is “synonymous with the notion of ‘science’ (or
rather, its more inclusive German correlate, Wissenschaft).”68
And Alexander Rehding has noted that Riemann in particular
“was interested not so much in the results of science as in the
prestige that science enjoyed in his time.”69 Kurth makes a
similar observation about Riemann in Voraussetzungen, align-
ing Riemann’s dualist explanations for minor with tone psy-
chology.70 As we have seen, Kurth firmly disavows any
association with tone psychology in 1931, but already in 1913,
he deems tone-psychological findings inadequate as the basis
for music theory, or to use Riemann’s term, for musikalische
Logik. He writes:
The area in which the deficiency of scientific premises
emerges is in the uniform and complete transition from
acoustics to musical logic. And as long as tone psychology
provides no clearly decisive solution to that basic question
[i.e., of the transition from acoustics to musical logic] as a
66 See Kurth ([1931] 1947, 219) for an assessment of Sechter’s work.
67 “Von diesem Gesichtspunkt kann man es gewiß nur als schade bezeich-
nen, daß Riemanns Klangsystem, eine imposante Denkleistung und volle
Geometrisierung der Harmonik, der Hörweise widerspricht; denn wie
einfach w€aren—trotz der etwas größeren Denkanstrengung—die
Probleme der Musiktheorie, wenn sich alles solch verstandesm€aßigem
Symmetrieaufbau fügte, der zudem lediglich an den Klang zu knüpfen
h€atte!” (Kurth [1931] 1947, 219n.1).
68 Holtmeier (2011, 11).
69 Rehding (2003, 108).
70 See Rehding (2003, 52–53 and 108–9), for a discussion of Riemann’s
attempts to make Stumpf’s fusion hypothesis work to dualistic ends.
11
foundation for building all systems of music theory, it must
be admitted at the outset that our entire music theory can-
not do without a certain instinctive character alongside of
an objective scientific one.71
Lee A. Rothfarb has rightly highlighted that what Kurth is re-
ally after is a psychological logic, and he continues, “if psycho-
logical logic is what we need, then variable human instincts
and mental processes come into play, meaning that no music
theory can be wholly objective or unassailably ‘scientific.’”72 The
distinction between “instinctive” and “objective scientific” in
the passage above certainly supports Rothfarb’s interpretation.
Yet later in Voraussetzungen Kurth insists, “to a certain extent
music psychology, too, can be objectively defined.”73
Indeed, Kurth was not immune to the call of Wissenschaft.
In 1913, however, his position more closely resembles a late-
nineteenth-century stance, one taken by Wundt for instance,
that “the human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) are based on
‘immediate’ (unmittelbare) experience and the natural sciences
upon ‘mediate’ (mittelbare) experience, abstracted from the for-
mer.”74 That is, he was critical of music theories that relied on
acoustics not because of their claim to science but because of
their pursuit of logical consistency at the expense of immediate
experience. Moreover, he took umbrage with the idea that a
theory could have greater intellectual import simply because it
described the world in measurable, precise ways.75
Kurth was particularly critical of the justification for har-
monic dualism that Riemann set forth in 1905, which reads:
[W]hat distinguishes major from minor comes down to the
essence of major consonance being the simplest ratios in the
increase in speed of vibration [4:5:6], and that of minor conso-
nance, by contrast, being the simplest ratios in the enlarge-
ment of the vibrating mass (wavelength, length of string,
etc.). Thus, put simply, the principle of major can be seen
to lie in growing intensity, the principle of minor with ac-
cumulating mass. . . . Hauptmann’s “downward-dragging
weight” of the minor chord can be fully grasped only when
one recognizes the growing mass of the deeper tones con-
nected to tone 1, in contrast to which the upward-striving,
bright luminous character of the major consonance is best
explained in terms of all the tones connected to tone 1 (the
prime) owing their origin to the increases in frequency.76
Furthermore, Riemann held that if undertones weren’t natural,
his dualist principles could operate independently of actual
sound: “These series do not require verification by way of
71 Trans. Rothfarb (1989, 22).
72 Rothfarb (1989, 19); emphasis mine.
73 Trans. Rothfarb (1979, 97); emphasis mine.
74 Ash ([1995] 1998, 23).
75 He writes in Voraussetzungen: “The dispute concerning the scientificity of
music theories is thus relegated simply to preliminary psychological dem-
onstrations, and as long as these remain hypothetical, the idea of the sci-
entificity of music theory is relative. In this sense, the scientific status of
Riemann’s theories, too, remains relative, even though the system as such is
carried out with mathematical exactitude.” Trans. Rothfarb (1989, 22);
emphasis mine.
76 Trans. Bent (2011, 182).
 12 music theory spectrum 0 (2020)
acoustical phenomena, referral to which only complicates and
confuses the understanding of what are in themselves very sim-
ple ratios.”77
Kurth disputes this explanation in the fourth chapter of
Voraussetzungen. He singles out the reference to Hauptmann’s
The Nature of Harmony and Meter, in which the author also
suggests that the character of the minor triad corresponds to
the “hanging boughs of the weeping willow as contrasted with
the aspiring arbor vitae.”78 Kurth notes that this is merely a vi-
sual metaphor and not one that is immediately given through
musical listening and associated embodied responses. Further,
he argues, Riemann’s suggestion that the gravitational center
of the chord lies in its highest note goes against human experi-
ence. Kurth writes: “In our perception we recognize only
weight pressing upon a base and not pendulous weight, and
even the most comprehensible, systematic presentation is inca-
pable of changing anything in the psychology of our musical
perception.”79 Nevertheless, he is willing to admit the allure of
dualism. He muses that perhaps the perceptual given of the
overtone series could spark an analogous but purely abstract
undertone series. In this way, “the physical basis of the theory
would no longer be dual, but the organization of the system
would still be based upon a type of psychological dualism.”
That is, undertones could be plausibly imagined.80
Moreover, Kurth does not dismiss the idea that musical
phenomena carry impressions of mass and weight. On the
contrary, he suggests that in musical listening, the sensation of
motion (which we encountered in relation to dynamic dual-
ism) as well as the sensations of mass and weight give rise to a
“conception of space” (Raumvorstellung), underscoring: “in the
conception of space with regard to tones, it is not so much a
matter of any specific geometrical formations as it is of the
aforementioned characteristics of the spatial dimension: mass
and weight.”81 Almost two decades later, Kurth further devel-
ops this idea, devoting an entire section of Musikpsychologie to
the impressions of “Force, Space, Matter” (Section 2). He
writes,
All indications of that unreality seem imprinted in the
strange phenomenon of the concept of space. We are able
to feel force directly, and we recognize in sounding symbols
its forms of development; this manifests itself emotionally
and sensually. We are able to absorb the sensation of matter
in the sensory impression; to be sure, it is based only on a
psychically conditioned transformation of the sounding
stimuli. Space, however, eludes both the clear inner feeling
and the precise becoming-conscious; the concept of space
slips away just when one wants to elevate it into the realm
of clarity, [into] a geometric-descriptive space. Space and
matter are phenomena of an intermediate layer between
subconscious depth processes and the actual sounding
world. Nevertheless, the sensations of space and matter in
77 Trans. Bent (2011, 185).
78 Hauptmann ([1888] 1989, 17).
79 Trans. Rothfarb (1979, 127).
80 Trans. Rothfarb (1979, 62–63).
81 Trans. Rothfarb (1979, 106).
music are psychological phenomena, [i.e.,] basic functions
of hearing, [and] not random constructions of fantasy.82
In brief, immediate impressions of space, motion, matter, and
force occur in the course of music listening, but they can never
be brought to full and precise conscious awareness, not least
through any tangible external representation.
Returning to Kurth’s youthful suggestion for salvaging
dualism—as an imagined abstraction—it is worth noting that
this bears significance in two of Riemann’s later publications:
“Ideas for a Study ‘On the Imagination of Tone’” (Ideen zu
einer “ Lehre von den Tonvorstellungen,” 1914–15) and “New
Contributions toward a Study ‘On the Imagination of Tone’”
(Neue Beitr€age zu einer Lehre von den Tonvorstellungen, 1916).
In these, Riemann rehearses yet another justification for dual-
ism, described by Daniel Harrison as follows: “Riemann’s in-
ability to provide a respectable acoustic explanation for his
experiences of major/minor duality forced him to consider a
psychological-philosophical explanation. And, while he does
82 “Alle Zeichen jener Unwirklichkeit erscheinen nun dem merkwürdigen
Ph€anomen der Raumvorstellung aufgepr€agt. Die Kraft vermögen wir
unmittelbar zu erfühlen und wir erkennen in tönenden Symbolen ihre
Verlaufsformen; sie gibt sich also gefühlsm€aßig und sinnlich kund. Die
Materieempfindung vermögen wir im sinnlichen Eindruck aufzunehmen,
freilich beruht sie erst in einer psychisch bedingten Umwandlung der
Tonreize. Der Raum aber entzieht sich sowohl der deutlichen Erfühlung
wie auch dem klaren Bewußtwerden; die Raumvorstellung verfließt sogar
gerade dann, wenn man sie in die Regionen der Deutlichkeit, eines
geometrisch-anschaulichen Raumes heben will. Raum und Materie sind
die Erscheinungen einer Zwischenschicht zwischen unterbewußten
Tiefenvorg€angen und der eigentlichen Klangwelt. Dennoch sind auch
Raum- wie Materieempfindungen in der Musik psychologische
Ph€anomene, Grundfunktionen des Hörens, nicht etwa zufallsbedingte
Phantasiegebilde” (Kurth [1931] 1947, 116).
Kurth’s conception of space as resistant to reification, combined with
his emphasis on an embodied sensation of motion, resembles Bergson’s
treatment of the subject in An Introduction to Metaphysics ([1912] 1999).
Bergson begins this essay by considering the movement of an object in
space. The viewer, “placed outside the object itself,” can express this mo-
tion using various points of reference and symbols; this is what Bergson
terms “relative” motion. In contrast to this, he describes an “absolute”
movement that anticipates Kurth’s perspective: “I am attributing to the
moving object an interior and, so to speak, states of mind; I also imply
that I am in sympathy with those states, and that I insert myself in them
by an effort of imagination. . . . And what I experience will depend neither
on the point of view I may take up in regard to the object, since I am in-
side the object itself, nor on the symbols by which I may translate the mo-
tion, since I have rejected all translations in order to process the
original” (21).
In Musikpsychologie, Kurth cites Bergson on a few occasions, though
not this particular essay; see n. 31 above. Dahlhaus (1973) proposes that
Bergson’s influence is pervasive throughout Kurth’s life’s work: “decisive
themes, from which Kurth’s music-theoretical thinking were determined
and supported, go back to Bergson (and Schopenhauer, by whom Bergson
was in turn influenced).” De la Motte-Haber (1986–87, 103), in contrast,
suggests that Bergson’s influence has been over-estimated by scholars after
his time. Tan (2013, 31–34) briefly examines these differing viewpoints,
but a focused study on this subject by a scholar well versed in Bergson’s
writings is warranted.
 kurth and riemann on music theory and the mind
not go so far as to say that the duality of major and minor is
an act of the ‘imagining spirit’ . . . the psychological nature of
this duality for him . . . is strongly suggested.”83 So described,
Riemann would seem to be operating along similar lines to
Kurth in 1913.
“What do we really imagine?,” Riemann asks several times
in the 1914–15 article. By this he means, what can we be
taught to imagine? For the ultimate goal of his course of study
is to train the mind of the listener to access the mind of the
composer. He notes that one would be misguided to search for
the essence of musical artistry in the musical work itself; how-
ever, musical notation serves as a reliable conduit for the trans-
ference of mental images. Riemann writes:
[T]he ‘Alpha and Omega’ of musical artistry is not found in
the actual, sounding music, but rather exists in the mental
image of musical relationships that occurs in the creative
artist’s imagination—a mental image that lives before it is
transformed into notation and re-emerges in the imagina-
tion of the hearer. The process of notating an artistic crea-
tion as well as the sounding performance of the work are
merely expedients to transplant musical experiences from
the composer’s imagination into the imagination of the mu-
sical listener.84
Reading Riemann, it is clear that seeing is knowing. Robert
Wason and Elizabeth West Marvin posit that Riemann’s use
of the word “Vorstellung” comes closest to that of
Schopenhauer, that is, “an exceedingly complicated physiologi-
cal process in the brain of an animal, the result of which is the
consciousness of a picture there.”85 Brian Hyer, in turn, high-
lights Riemann’s explicit appeals to visual representation, in-
cluding his allusions to painting and reading. Hyer writes:
“For Riemann, the decisive factor in the cognition of music—
the moment music comes alive—is visual rather than aural. It
is the ability to form visual images from the raw data of aural
perception that allows a musician to synthesize musical experi-
ence into a unified temporal consciousness.”86 Components of
Riemann’s theoretical apparatus also presuppose a correspon-
dence between the aural and visual senses. His Table of Tonal
Relations, for instance, is a spatial grid for relating pitches,
harmonies, and keys; as Hyer notes, it “represents a vast ab-
straction from musical experience, a mental construct, less real,
perhaps, than imaginary.”87
In Riemann’s teaching, such mental constructs line the
path from confusion to clarity. Indeed, his belief that the mind
seeks clarity, simplicity, and order is reflected in the study’s
credo: “that from the very start and from then on we investi-
gate the active imagination, the images of tone, and that we seek
to ascertain which categories of thought guide and determine the
living, working musical imagination, and which categories
83 Harrison (1994, 263).
84 Trans. Wason and Marvin (1992, 82).
85 Wason and Marvin (1992, 73; emphasis mine).
86 Hyer (1995, 104).
87 Hyer (1995, 102). See also Mooney (1996).
13
impose rules upon it.”88 Hence the student learns to envision a
single tone in one of six possible ways—as major and minor
triadic roots, thirds, and fifths—thus engendering a
“representation of a tonal complex” (Klangvertretung). In turn,
each interval of a third or fifth can represent two possible
triads—one major and the other minor. Finally, given mani-
fold possibilities of meaning for a single tone or single interval,
Riemann’s Principle of the Greatest Economy for the Musical
Imagination is applied: the mind will select the meaning that
“weighs less heavily on the powers of interpretation.”89 All
told, Riemann presents a musical logic that could be construed
as a psychological logic, just as Kurth, a year prior, had indi-
cated was sorely needed.
Indeed, in the 1914–15 article, Riemann distances himself
from Stumpf’s and Helmholtz’s tone-psychological work, em-
phasizing the inadequacy of their physical and physiological
foundations.90 And in their place, he adopts a new ally: Kurth.
In a 1918 review of Kurth’s Grundlagen, Riemann suggests
that their approaches to music and mind are fundamentally
the same. He writes,
In contrast [to the foregoing faults of Grundlagen], much
more important, actually new, striking, and sensational is
Kurth’s aesthetic fundamental philosophy of the essence of music:
his oppositional stance against the attempts at [establishing a]
tone-psychological foundation for the theory of music. Here
Kurth proves to be an intrepid comrade-in-arms for the es-
tablishment of a study on the imagination of
tone. . . . Essentially, what appears here is identical to what
I stated as ideas for a study on the imagination of tone in
the Jahrbuch der Musikbibliothek Peters (1914–15 and
1916).91
Kurth, however, was reluctant to go to battle alongside
Riemann, responding immediately that their ideas were far
from identical.92 For since his 1913 habilitation thesis, Kurth
had deepened his conviction that a psychology of music had to
account for impressions that were irretrievable from the depths
of the unconscious; this put him increasingly at odds with his
predecessor. Kurth also grew more adamant that the
88 Trans. Wason and Marvin (1992, 85).
89 Trans. Wason and Marvin (1992, 88).
90 Sounding very much like Kurth, Riemann states: “The hope that Stumpf
would transport the foundation of music theory from a physiological to a
psychological domain has not been fulfilled, and music listening still
appears as a physical process in Stumpf, even more so than in Helmholtz.
The ‘logical activity’ of musical hearing, which I had postulated already in
1873, plays no role in his work” (trans. Wason and Marvin 1992, 82).
91 “Viel wichtiger, wirklich neu, frappierend und sensationell ist dagegen die
€asthetische Grundanschauung Kurths vom Wesen der Musik, seine oppositio-
nelle Stellungnahme gegenüber den Versuchen tonpsychologischer Grundlegung
der Theorie der Musik. Hier erweist sich mir Kurth als ein wackerer
Mitstreiter für die Grundlegung einer Lehre von den
Tonvorstellungen. . . . Im Grunde ist das, was er dabei findet, identisch
mit dem, was ich als Ideen zu einer Lehre von den Tonvorstellungen im
Jahrbuch der Musikbibliothek Peters (1914/15 und 1916) vorgetragen
habe” (Riemann 1918, 27; emphasis original).
92 See Kurth (1918).
 14 music theory spectrum 0 (2020)
unconscious was a “self-existing power” (eine selbstbestehende
Macht) that deserved attention.93 Indeed, the very opening of
Romantische Harmonik highlights Kurth’s emphasis not on
imagination or representation, but on inaudible forces and
movement. He writes: “Harmonies are reflexes of the unconscious.
Everything sounding in music is only the apparent emanation
of far more powerful primordial processes, whose forces circu-
late in the inaudible realm.”94 And in Musikpsychologie he
makes a distinction between unconsciously experienced psychic
contents and consciously arranged mental concepts:
In conscious life, the entirety of an expression becomes
clearer the more it is organized; in the unconscious [life], it is
the reverse: any structuring threatens to cloud the totality.
Because one extracts the particulars from the whole, they are
no longer psychic contents, but rather become concepts; they
experience an “abstraction” (extraction) from the whole and
are lifted out of their embedding in the psychical original-
impression and thus from their original character.95
In contrast to his own views, Kurth positions Riemann’s
alongside philosophies that treat the unconscious as an embry-
onic state where conscious thoughts lie before they are fully
formed.96 He questions whether Riemann’s study of
Tonvorstellungen “can suffice” to capture the full experience of
music listening. Surely, he writes, “not if one accepts uncon-
scious processes only as weakened representations, and this
appears to inform Riemann’s agenda throughout.”97 Indeed,
with his exercises on tones and intervals, Riemann presumes
with certitude that focused concentration will call to mind dor-
mant representations. Moreover, his Table of Tonal Relations
advances a static, grid-like conception of space that prescribes
how tones could (or should) be heard;98 this was far removed
93 Kurth ([1931] 1947, 41–42).
94 Kurth ([1920] 1975, 1).
95 “Im bewußten Leben wird das Ganze eines Eindrucks um so klarer, je
mehr es sich gliedern l€aßt, im unbewußten ist es umgekehrt: jede
Gliederung droht die Totalit€at zu trüben. Denn indem man die
Einzelheiten aus dem Ganzen herauslöst, sind sie nicht mehre psychische
Inhalte, sondern werden zu Begriffen, sie erfahren eine ‘Abstraktion’
(Herausziehung) aus dem Ganzen, werden aus ihrer Einbettung im psy-
chischen Ureindruck, somit aus ihrem ursprünglichen Charakter
herausgehoben” (Kurth [1931] 1947, 29). Here, I read “psychischen
Ureindruck” as synonymous with “psychischen Funktion,” discussed in
the first part of the article.
96 Gottfried Leibniz exemplifies such a stance with his “petites perceptions”;
see Kurth ([1931] 1947, 41n.4). Trevor Pearce (2008) provides a valuable
account of the philosophical origins of Riemann’s theory of musical hear-
ing, situating it within a nineteenth-century Kantian tradition that
includes Christopher Sigwart, Moritz Wilhelm Drobisch, and Hermann
Lotze.
97 “Was aber jenes Grundpostulat betrifft, so erscheint es fraglich, ob die
Bezeichnung einer ‘Lehre von den Tonvorstellungen’ genügen kann;
sicherlich dann nicht, wenn man die unbewußten Vorg€ange nur als
geschw€achte Vorstellungen anerkennt, und das scheint Riemanns
Ansichten durchwegs zugrundezuliegen” (Kurth [1931] 1947, 47).
98 As Burnham (1992, 6) notes, “Riemann conceives of harmonic motion
spatially, as the filling in of possible spaces in a coherently arranged under-
lying network.”
from Kurth’s conception of an ineffable, evolving space (recall:
“Space, however, eludes both the clear (inner) feeling and the
precise becoming-conscious; the concept of space slips away
just when one wants to elevate it into the realm of clarity,
[into] a geometric-descriptive space”). Finally, the entire study
of Tonvorstellungen, with its emphasis on “the consciousness of
a picture there,” brushes aside experiences that elude categories
of thought—sensations of motion, space, and matter, along
with color and tension—experiences that accompany even ru-
dimentary constructs like the scale, chord, and circle of keys.
Thus while it may have raised music theory to the rank of an
“actual science” (eigentliche Wissenschaft), for Kurth, it never-
theless fails to account for the true essence of music.99
99 See Kurth ([1920] 1975, 182n.1). Locating precise antecedents for
Kurth’s view of the unconscious, which undergirds his criticisms of
Riemann, is no easy feat. As many commentators have rightly suggested,
comparisons to Arthur Schopenhauer are inevitable; Kurth frequently
references “the psychic activity of the will,” and as I note above (n.31), he
explicitly references Schopenhauer in relation to the immediacy of experi-
ence. Moreover, there are hitherto unacknowledged similarities in their
treatments of the body (as intrinsic to one’s perception of the external
world and to the will); this is what I find most suggestive for
Musikpsychologie and worthy of further investigation. Kurth’s ([1931]
1947, 108) insistence, for example, that “we imbue the changing position
of bodies with that feeling of motion that in reality lies within us,” reso-
nates with Schopenhauer’s discussion of the body in The World As Will
and Representation. For instance: “[The body] is given in intelligent per-
ception as representation, as an object among objects, liable to the laws of
these objects. But it is also given in quite a different way, namely as what
is known immediately to everyone, and is denoted by the word
will. . . . The act of will and the action of the body are not two different
states objectively known, connected by the bond of causality; they do not
stand in the relation of cause and effect, but are one and the same thing,
though given in two entirely different ways, first quite directly, and then
in perception for the understanding.” (Schopenhauer [1859] 1966, Vol. 1,
§18, 100; emphasis original.) Daniel A. Schmicking (2007) discusses this
passage in his illuminating article on Schopenhauer’s relevance for the
modern-day study of embodied cognition. Kurth’s own relationship to
this area is considered in Tan (2017).
Other influences on Kurth’s unconscious have been posited. Helga de
la Motte-Haber (2008, 569), for instance, suggests that his main influen-
ces are Gustav Theodor Fechner and Eduard von Hartmann, who both
provide extensive treatments on the topic—or in Kurthian terms, treat the
unconscious as a self-existing power. Kurth indeed refers to these figures
in Musikpsychologie on several occasions but finds neither viewpoint en-
tirely satisfactory. He suggests that bifocal layers of consciousness (Ober-
oder Unterbewußtsein) found in both philosophies fail to capture the irra-
tional processes that govern musical experience; Kurth ([1931] 1947,
41n.1). Moreover, he asserts that Fechner’s “inner threshold,” which must
be overcome for something to be brought to consciousness, does not yet
address the unconscious itself; Kurth ([1931] 1947, 53n.1). See
Heidelberger (2010) and Gardner (2010) for more on Fechner and
Hartmann, respectively.
Brian Hyer’s (1990) provocative reading of Romantic Harmony through
the lens of Sigmund Freud also merits consideration here. With Hyer, I
agree that Kurth would likely have encountered Freud’s writings during
his student years in Vienna, though probably only Interpretation of
€
Dreams. (Hyer alludes to the “Ich,” “Es,” and “Uber-Ich,” concepts Freud
formulated only in 1923, years after Romantic Harmony.) Kurth may even
 kurth and riemann on music theory and the mind
both sides now
The point of departure for harmony as we see it is the truest
and most exhaustive analysis possible of what a musician of
our time and culture actually hears in chords and their
connections—uninfluenced by any theoretical prejudices.
The direct evidence of true musical perception and under-
standing provides the empirical facts whose simplest and
most complete “comprehensive description” . . . is the true
task of a theory of harmony.
—Rudolf Louis and Ludwig Thuille
Several scholars have proposed that Kurth provides an im-
portant continuation of Riemann’s thinking. Ernst Bücken, a
contemporary of Kurth, notes admiringly that “the overcom-
ing of rationalistic music theory, encouraged and attempted
by Riemann [in his Tonvorstellungen essays], has only now be-
come a reality in the works of the Bern professor Ernst
Kurth.”100 Hermann Erpf, a student of Riemann, also por-
trays Kurth’s contributions as following on the heels of his
teacher’s. While criticizing Kurth for avoiding specific termi-
nology, he ventures: “Kurth [in Romantische Harmonik] pro-
vided highly valuable new suggestions for music theory, which
had become completely helpless and unproductive after the
conclusion of Riemann’s work, as he taught a new vision of
the artwork, as opposed to the rigidity in paper concepts, and
first, made the starting point of his contemplation not a
formal-theoretical idea but rather the living artwork.”101 More
recently, Holtmeier has taken an even stronger stance, declar-
ing, “[I]t was thanks to Kurth that many of Riemann’s central
theoretical ideas gained considerable popularity: almost all im-
portant later developments of Riemannian concepts did not
have found Freud’s ideas compelling, since they, too, were shaped by the
writings of Schopenhauer, Hartmann, and further, Kurth’s philosophy
professor Wilhelm Jerusalem; see Gödde (2010, 271). Moreover, as
Hyer notes, the fact that Kurth never cites Freud in his writings is of
minimal consequence; to do so would have been ill advised from a pro-
fessional standpoint, since Freud was generally not welcomed by univer-
sity intellectuals. I am less convinced, however, that Kurth adopted
Freud’s unconscious sexual drives as a ready model—or that we need to
do so in order to understand Kurth. At issue is how we are to read his
analytical prose style. The psychoanalytical potential of Kurth’s theoreti-
cal ideas, which Hyer and Wolfgang Krebs (2006), too, identify, is based
on the assumption that Kurth ascribes some measure of agency to the
music itself (for instance, that one chord can prevent another from re-
solving). This is certainly a reasonable perspective to take when reading
Grundlagen, Romantische Harmonik, and Bruckner. However, Kurth’s
analyses cannot be divorced from the conceptual foundations expressed
in Voraussetzungen and Musikpsychologie. With these texts in mind, the
analyses must be interpreted differently: as attempts to situate the reader
within the music; put another way, agency rests in the listener as a partic-
ipant moving through the musical landscape. For a more detailed consid-
eration of Kurth’s “participant perspective,” see Tan (2017).
100 Bücken (1924–25, 358); trans. Rothfarb (1991, 3).
101 Erpf (1927, 12–13); emphasis original. For more on the intersection of 104 Harrison (1994, 16). Wason (In Preparation) discusses Schenker’s own
Riemann’s and Kurth’s ideas in Erpf’s work, see Harrison (1994, 308–13),
and Holtmeier (2011, 39–40).
15
refer back to Riemann’s writings directly but took a detour via
Kurth.”102
To be sure, Kurth’s mature writing bears some resemblance
to Riemann’s in its tone and content. Indeed, it might seem
curious that after making a name for himself with style-
historical analysis, Kurth takes an approach to harmony that,
while serving as a corrective to Riemann’s own, is nevertheless
speculative. Musikpsychologie appears to be a turn away from
what Wason has described as the “new empiricism” of the
early twentieth century: a renewed focus on practical analysis,
of which the harmony treatise of Robert Louis and Ludwig
Thuille is exemplary (see quote above).103 Yet Kurth and
Riemann each contend that his study of harmony is able to ex-
plain, in a comprehensive fashion, what a listener actually hears
in chords and their connections, to quote Louis and Thuille.
Riemann, on the one hand, promises his listener the means of
cutting through uncertainty and the path to absolute clarity.
Kurth, on the other hand, encourages his listener to revel in
the anfractuous journey through musical time.
Kurth’s displeasure with harmonic dualism is symptomatic
of a broader philosophical disagreement over the explanatory
power of music theory and its relation to psychology at the
time. But lest his own emphasis on “dualism” in
Musikpsychologie be viewed, ultimately, as a red herring, con-
sider Harrison’s assertion that dualism is a “tried-and-true
strategy of human inquiry . . . one of the very basic mental
instincts in human beings.” Indeed, “the dual organization of
ideas leaves no field of endeavor and experience untouched.”104
It is perhaps inevitable, then, that Kurth, a theorist who situ-
ated his approach to music within a broad context of worldly
experiences, would eventually articulate a theory of harmony
with dualist over- (or under-) tones. Dualism gave Kurth a fa-
miliar frame of reference from which to counter what he
regarded as static, schematic music theories. In describing how
opposing forces govern the experience of listening to scales,
chords, progressions, and beyond, Kurth uses the language of
dualism to approach an intangible: the dynamic aspect of music.
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Music Theory Spectrum, Vol. 0, Issue 0, pp. 1–17, ISSN 0195-6167,
electronic ISSN 1533-8339. V C The Author(s) 2019. Published by Oxford
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DOI: 10.1093/mts/mtz017