Consti 2NOTES

CODES AND NOTES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II by PORFERIO JR.
and MELFA SALIDAGA
NOTES AND CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

I. THE INHERENT POWERS OF THE STATE
1. Police Power 2. Power of Eminent Domain 3. Power of Taxation They are inherent powers because they belong to the very essence of government and without them no government can exist.
Similariti !" Di!tin#ti$n!" and Limitati$n Similariti !% they are inherent in the tate they are necessary and indispensable they are methods by which the tate interferes with private rights they presuppose an e!uivalent compensation they are exercised primarily by the legislature
Di&& r n# !% P$li# P$' r "s to regulation regulates both liberty and property "s to who may only the government exercise "s to the property ta#en Emin nt D$main regulates property rights only government and some private entities Ta(ati$n regulates property rights only only the government $wholesome $ta#en for a public use or purpose protection and public improvements for the taxes
destroyed because it is $wholesome noxious or intended for $ta#en for a public noxious purpose use or purpose intangible altruistic feeling that the person has contributed to the general welfare full and fair e!uivalent of the property expropriated
"s to %ompensation
CODES AND NOTES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II by PORFERIO JR. and MELFA SALIDAGA
paid Limitati$n!% &a' (ill of )ights
A. POLICE POWER
P$li# P$' r * is an inherent power of the tate to promote the welfare of society by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. J)!ti&i#ati$n $& (i!t n# % Salus populi est suprema lex the welfare of the people is the supreme law+ Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas a person must use his own property so as not to in,ure another
S#$* % (a) cannot be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or contract (Stone v Mississippi) (b) may use taxing power as its implement (Tio vs Videogram Regulatory Board) (c) may use eminent domain as its implement (Assoc. of Small Lando ners vs Sec. of Agrarian Reform) &d' could be given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts &police power prevails over contract' &e' dynamic- not static- and must move with the moving society it is supposed to regulate W+$ may ( r#i! P$li# P$' r, &a' the .egislature &inherent' &b' President &by delegation' &c' administrative boards &by delegation' &d' lawma#ing bodies on all municipal levels- including barangay &by delegation' &e' /unicipal governments 0 .123s &conferred by statute * general welfare clause of )" 4156'
7ot being a political subdivision but merely an executive authority it has no police power. -MMDA .. / l0Air 1illa2 A!!$#.3
T !t! -Limitati$n!3% (a) La'&)l !)b4 #t * interests of the public generally- as distinguished from those of a particular class- re!uire the exercise of police power (b) La'&)l m an! * the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals Additi$nal limitati$n! -'+ n ( r#i! d by d l 2at 3 87achura )eviewer9% express grant by law &e.g. )" 4156' within territorial limits &for .123s' must not be contrary to law (!ity "overnment of #ue$on !ity vs %ricta) for municipal ordinances $ 1. 2. 3. :. ;. 5. must not contravene the %onstitution or any statute must not be unfair and oppressive must not be partial and discriminatory must not prohibit- but may regulate- trade must not be unreasonable must be general in application and consistent with public policy
<n Ermita0Malat H$t l and M$t l O* rat$r! A!!$#iati$n" In#. .. May$r $& Manila- police power has been characteri=ed as the most essentialinsistent and least limitable of powers extending as it does >to all great public needs.?
>8T@he mere fact that some individuals in the community may be deprived of their business or a particular mode of earning a living cannot prevent the exercise of police power. .. 8P9ersons licensed to pursue occupations which may in the public need and interest be affected by the exercise of the police power embar# in these occupations sub,ect to the disadvantages which may result from the exercise of that power. ? 1overnment can ta#e away a license and increase the cost of license fees even to prohibitive levels- if public interest dictates so- without any constitutional violations. .icenses for regulating non$useful occupation are incidental to the exercise of
police power and the right to exact fees is may be implied from that power to regulate. <n setting the fees- municipal corporations are given wider discretion in this class of licenses &than for licenses issued to regular business'. %ourts have generally upheld these because of the desirability of imposing restraints on individuals who engage in these unuseful enterprises. <n 5n$t .. IAC- the %ourt here ruled that the ban on transportation of carabao under the assailed ordinance and their outright confiscation and disposal without court hearing is a violation of due process hence it is an invalid exercise of police power. The court adopted the measures laid down in the Toribio case Protection general welfare is a function of police power which both restrains and is restrained by due process- which re!uires notice and hearing %ase emphasi=ed the need to have a lawful method to follow due process re!uirement )easons why ordinance is invalid areA 7o reasonable connection between means employed &absolute ban on movement of carabeef' and purpose sought to be achieved &conservation of carabao for general welfare' 2nduly oppressive since petition not given due process or opportunity to be heard in proper court
/. EMINENT DOMAIN
Emin nt D$main * is the use of the government of its coercive authority- upon ,ust compensation- to forcibly ac!uire the needed property in order to devote the same to public use. Eminent domain is also #nown as expropriation- or condemnation. W+$ may E( r#i! , 1. 2. 3. :. ;. The %ongress &inherent' President various local legislative bodies certain public corporations &e.g. 7ational Bousing "uthority' Cuasi$public corporations &e.g. P.DT'
Emin nt D$main Di!tin2)i!+ d &r$m D !tr)#ti$n &r$m N # !!ity Emin nt D$main public right arises from the laws of society and is vested in the state or grantee- acting under the right and power of the state or benefit of the state D !tr)#ti$n &r$m N # !!ity private right vested in every individual with which the right of state or state necessity has nothing to do comes under the right of necessityof self$preservation arises under the laws of society or society itself cannot re!uire the conversion of the property ta#en to public use- nor is there any need for the payment of ,ust compensation
The )egional Trial %ourt &)T%' has the ,urisdiction over a complaint for eminent domain.
R 6)i!it ! $& Emin nt D$main% 1. 2. 3. :. ;. 7ecessity of exercise Private property Ta#ing Public use Dust compensation
7. N # !!ity $& E( r#i! genuine necessity- and must be of public character Ehen exercised by legislature * political &uestion Ehen exercised by a delegate * 'usticia(le &uestion determine theA &a' ade!uacy of compensation+ &b' necessity of ta#ing+ and &c' public use character
8. Pri.at Pr$* rty G n ral R)l % anything that can come under the dominion of man is sub,ect to expropriation
E(# *ti$n!% money and c)ose in action &personal right not reduced into possession- i.e. the right to bring an action to recover debt- money or thing' Private property already devoted to public use cannot be expropriated by a delegate acting under a general grant of aut)ority (!ity of Manila vs !)inese !ommunity)
9. Ta:in2 R 6)i!it ! (Republic vs Castellvi)% &a' expropriator must enter a private property &b' entry must be for more than a momentary period &c' entry must be under the warrant of legal authority &d' entry is for public use &e' the owner is deprived of en,oying his property if ta#ing is under police power- it is not compensable
Ta:in2 Und r Emin nt D$main .! Ta:in2 in P$li# P$' r % P$li# P$' r the pre,udice suffered by the individual property owner is shared in common with the rest of the community Emin nt D$main the individual suffers more than his ali&uot part of the damagesi.e. a special in,ury above that sustained by the rest of the community
<n Ami2abl .. C) n#a- where there is ta#ing in the constitutional sensethe property owner need not file a claim for ,ust compensation with the %ommission of "udit+ he may go directly to the court to demand payment. "rbitrary action of the government shall be deemed a waiver of its immunity from suit. <n City G$. rnm nt .. Eri#ta- an ordinance of Cue=on %ity- under the guise of exercising police power- prescribed that at least 5F of the total area of memorial par#s must be developed and set aside for the burial of paupers. The %ourt held that such ordinance is not an exercise of police power but the ta#ing of private property for public use. Bence- to satisfy the %onstitution- there must be compensation.
;. P)bli# U! P)bli# )! * is whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfareincluding both direct or indirect benefit or advantage to the public <n H ir! $& Ard$na .. R y !- the %ourt held that the %onstitution understand public use in a broad sense as meaning public welfare. That includes development of tourism.
<. J)!t C$m* n!ati$n J)!t #$m* n!ati$n * is fair and full e!uivalent payment for the loss sustainedwhich is the measure of the indemnity- not whatever gain would accrue to the expropriating agency. <t is not mar#et value per se. -E*=a .. D)lay3 W+ r $nly *art $& t+ *r$* rty i! (*r$*riat d% entitlement to conse&uential damages- if any G conse&uential (enefits must be deducted from the total compensation provided conse!uential benefits does not exceed conse!uential damages Payment of the correct amount G Payment within a reasonable time F$rm $& C$m* n!ati$n% /oney &Bowever- in Assoc. of Small Lando ners vs Sec. of Agrarian Reform* payment is allowed to be made partly in bonds because it deals with a revolutionary #ind of expropriation'. Tran!& r $& Titl % payment of ,ust compensation before title is transferred. R #:$nin2 *$int $& mar: t .al) $& *r$* rty% either as of the date of ta#ing or filing of the complaint- whichever comes first Entitl m nt $& int r !t% General Rule: when there is delay- there must be interest by way of damages (Art. ++,-* !!) Exception: when waived by not claiming the interest Paym nt $& Ta( ! % taxes paid from the time of the ta#ing until the transfer of the title- during which the owner did not en,oy any beneficial use of the property- are reimbursable by the expropriator.
Ri2+t $& t+ land$'n r in #a! $& n$n0*aym nt% General Rule: landowner is not entitled to recover possession of the property- but only to demand payment Exception: when the government failed to pay ,ust compensation within ; years from the finality of ,udgment in expropriation proceedings- there is a right to recover property <n D >n #+t .. /a)ti!ta- the court ruled that the expropriation proceeding against the property of petitioner was arbitrary and cannot receive ,udicial approval. There was another area where the expansion of ED " can be underta#en- which will cost government less- affect lesser homeowners- etc. (ut in R *)bli# .!. >n #+t" the same property was ordered expropriated. "pparently- (P 3:6- which called for the ta#ing of the property- was enacted after the 1st De Hnecht case. De Hnecht argued that there was already a law of the case- which should not be disturbed.
%ourt responded that while it is true that there was a law of the case- it is e!ually true that there is constitutional grant given to the tate to ta#e private property upon payment of ,ust compensation. > uch expropriation proceedings may be underta#en by the 8 tate9 not only by voluntary negotiation with landowners but also by ta#ing appropriate court action or by legislation.? The prior court decision is no obstacle for the legislature to ma#e its own assessment of the circumstances that prevailed after the decision as well as supervening events and reaching a conclusion as to the propriety of underta#ing the appropriation of the De Hnecht property. <n the case R *)bli# .. PLDT- the %ourt ordered the P.DT to allow the reconnection of telephone lines of the )epublic. 7o cogent reason appears why Eminent Domain may be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property without loss of title or possession for public use sub,ect to ,ust compensation %ase highlights that even services may be sub,ected to eminent domain <n City $& Manila .. C+in ! C$mm)nity $& Manila- the %ourt said that >8T9he very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of public character.?
<n E*=a .. D)lay- P.D. 7os. 45- :5:- 4I:- and 1;33 prescribed a formula for arriving at ,ust compensation in expropriation proceedings - dispense with the need to appoint commissioners to determine ,ust compensation. The %ourt held that those decrees are unconstitutional and void for they constitute >impermissible encroachment on ,udicial prerogatives.? <n R *)bli# .. CA- the government argued that the nullification should only have prospective effect. The %ourt agreed. Thus under the >operative fact? doctrine- the effect of the invalidated law was allowed to affect transactions completed before the declaration of nullity.
C. POWER OF TA?ATION
P$' r $& Ta(ati$n * is a method by which contributions are exacted from persons and property for the support of government and for all public needs. Jbligation to pay taxes is a duty
Ta( ! .! Li# n! ! Ta( to raise revenues Li# n! for regulatory purpose only ,ustified under police power amount of fees re!uired is usually limited to the cost of regulation
S#$* all income earned in the taxing state- whether by citi=ens or aliens- and all immovable and tangible personal properties found in its territory- as well as tangible personal property owned by persons domiciled therein
P$' r t$ Ta( In#l)d ! P$' r t$ D !tr$y &1' when used validly as an implement of the police power in discouraging and in effect ultimately prohibiting certain things or enterprises inimical to public welfare P$' r t$ Ta( D$ ! N$t In#l)d P$' r t$ D !tr$y
where the tax is used solely for the purpose of raising revenues
W+$ May E( r#i! 1. .egislature 0 %ongress &inherent' 2. President &by delegation 0 tariff powers 8 ec. 2K &2'- "rt. L<- %onsti9' 3. local legislative bodies &conferred by direct authority 8 ec. ;- "rt. M%onsti9' Limitati$n! $& Ta(ati$n% 1. Due Process of .aw 2. E!ual Protection 3. Public Purpose 7. D) Pr$# !! S)b!tanti. % tax should not be confiscatory except when used as an implement of police power Pr$# d)ral % due process does not re!uire previous notice and hearing before a law prescribing specific taxes on specific articles may be enacted. Bowever- where the tax to be collected is to be based on the value of the taxable property- the taxpayer is entitled to be notified of the assessment proceedings and to be heard therein on the correct valuation of the property.
8. E6)al Pr$t #ti$n embodied in ec. 2K &1'- "rt. L<- 1IK4 %onstitution &The rule of taxation shall be uniform and e!uitable. The %ongress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.' Uni&$rmity * persons or things belonging to the same class shall be taxed at the same rate R 6)i!it ! &Tan vs Del )osario'% &a' standards that are used are substantial and not arbitrary &b' categori=ation is germane to achieve the legislative purpose &c' the law applies- all things being e!ual- to both present and future conditions &d' classification applies e!ually well to all those belonging to the same
class E6)itabl ta(ati$n * based on the capacity to pay E6)ality in ta(ati$n * tax shall be strictly proportional to the relative value of the property Pr$2r !!i. !y!t m $& ta(ati$n * the rate increases as the tax base increases
9. P)bli# P)r*$! whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare D$)bl Ta(ati$n @ Dir #t D)*li#at Ta(ati$n when additional taxes are laid on the same sub,ect by the same taxing ,urisdiction during the same taxing period and for the same purpose. despite the lac# of specific prohibition- double taxation will not be allowed if it results in a violation of the e!ual protection clause. Ta( E( m*ti$n! may either beA constitutional "rt. Li- ec. 2K &3' A when lands- buildings and improvements are actually- directly and exclusively for religious- charitable or educational purposes * entitled to exemption statutory$ discretion of legislature
II. CI1IL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS

/ill $& Ri2+t! * set of prescriptions setting forth the fundamental civil and political rights of the individual- and imposing limitations on the powers of the government as a means of securing the en,oyment of those rights. Si2ni&i#an# $& t+ /ill $& Ri2+t! 1overnment is powerful. Ehen unlimited- it becomes tyrannical. The (ill of
)ights is a guarantee that there are certain areas of a person3s life- liberty- and property which governmental power may not touch. (ill of )ights are generally self$implementing.
Cla!!i&i#ati$n $& Ri2+t!

1. P$liti#al Ri2+t! * granted by law to members of community in relation to their direct or indirect participation in the establishment or administration of the government+ 2. Ci.il Ri2+t! * rights which municipal law will enforce at the instance of private individuals for the purpose of securing them the en,oyment of their means of happiness+ 3. S$#ial and E#$n$mi# Ri2+t!+ and4. H)man Ri2+t!.
A. DUE PROCESS
S #ti$n 7" Art. III. N$ * r!$n !+all b d *ri. d $& li& " lib rty" $r *r$* rty 'it+$)t d) *r$# !! $& la'" n$r !+all any * r!$n b d ni d t+ 6)al *r$t #ti$n $& t+ la'!. no precise definition because it might prove constricting and prevent the ,udiciary from ad,usting it to the circumstances of particular cases responsiveness to the supremacy of reason- obedience to the dictates of ,ustice embodiment of sporting idea on fair play guaranty against any arbitrariness on the part of the government
Pr$t #ti$n $& P r!$n %overs .atural &citi=en and alien' and Artificial Persons. "s to the latter- with respect only to property because its life and liberty are derived from and sub,ect to control of legislature D *ri.ati$n -in S #. 7" Art. III3
connotes d nial $& ri2+t t$ li& " lib rty $r *r$* rty not unconstitutional. what is prohibited is deprivation of la .
it)out due process
Ehen the tate acts to interfere with life- liberty- or property- the presumption is that the action is valid.
7. Li&
<t is not ,ust a protection of the right to be alive or to the security of one3s limb against physical harm. The right to life is the right to a good life... a life of dignity and... a decent standard of living.
8. Lib rty (1) freedom to do right and never wrong (Ma(ini) &2' right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude 9. Pr$* rty
anything that can come under the right of ownership and be the sub,ect of contract all things within the commerce of man Bowever- one cannot have a vested right to a public office as this is not regarded as property. <f created by statue- it may be abolished by the legislature at any time. /ere privileges are not property rights and are therefore revocable at will
A!* #t! $& D) Pr$# !!

1. ubstantive Due Process 2. Procedural Due Process "s a substantive re!uirement- it is a prohibition of arbitrary laws. "s a procedural re!uirement- it relates chiefly to the mode of procedure which government agencies must follow in the enforcement and
application of laws. <t is a guarantee of procedural fairness.
S)b!tanti. D) Pr$# !!
S)b!tanti. d) *r$# !! A re!uires intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life- liberty or property R 6)i!it !% &a' .awful ub,ect &b' .awful /eans
Pr$# d)ral D) Pr$# !!

Pr$# d)ral d) *r$# !! A is the restriction on actions of ,udicial and !uasi$ ,udicial agencies of government. 7. J)di#ial D) Pr$# !! R 6)i!it !% &a' <mpartial and %ompetent %ourt &b' Durisdiction lawfully ac!uired over the person of t he defendant and0or property &c' Bearing not necessarily trial$type hearing+ submission of position papers is enough right of a party to cross$examine the witness against him in a civil case is an indispensable part of due process the filing of a motion for reconsideration cures the defect of absence of a hearing %ases in which notice and hearing may be dispensed with without violating due processA abatement of nuisance per se
preventive suspension of a civil servant facing administrative charges cancellation of passport of a person sought for the commission of a crime statutory presumptions (d) Dudgment rendered upon lawful hearing -/an#$ E!*an$l Fili*in$ .. Palan#a3 8. Admini!trati. D) Pr$# !! R 6)i!it !% &a' )ight to a hearing &b' Tribunal must consider the evidence presented &c' Decision must have something to support itself &d' Evidence must be ubstantial &e' Decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearingor at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected &f' Tribunal- body- or any of its ,udges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the facts and law of the controversy &g' Decision is rendered in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can #now the various issues involved- and the reason for the decision rendered <n administrative proceedings- the !uantum of proof re!uired is only !)b!tantial .id n# - such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as ade!uate to support a conclusion. The la' i! .a2) when it lac#s comprehensible standards that men >of common intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application. <t is repugnant to the %onstitution in two respectsA it violates due process for failure to accord persons fair notice of conduct to avoid+ and it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes arbitrary flexing of the 1overnment muscle.
<n E!trada .!. Sandi2anbayan- it was held that there was no violation of due process because the nature of the charges against the petitioner is not uncertain and void merely because general terms are used or because it employed terms that were not defined. The "nti$Plunder law does not violate due process since it defines the act which it purports to punishgiving the accused fair warning of the charges against him- and can effectively interpose a defense against on his behalf. A !onnecticut statute ma/ing it a crime to use any drug or article to prevent conception violates t)e rig)t of marital privacy )ic) is it)in t)e penum(ra of specific guarantees of t)e Bill of Rig)ts. "lthough the (ill of )ights does not mention NprivacyO the %ourt ruled that that the right was to be found in the PpenumbrasP of other constitutional protections. >The Qirst "mendment has a penumbra where privacy is penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion.?
<n L$#+n r .. N ' 5$r:- .ochner was charged with violation of the labor laws of 7ew Ror# for wrongfully and unlawfully permitting an employee to wor# more than 56 hours in one wee#. The statute allegedly violated mandates that no employee shall contract or agree to wor# more than 16 hours per day. <ssueA Ehether the statute is unconstitutional. )ulingA Res. The statute is unconstitutional.
The statute interferes with the liberty of a person and the right of free contract between employer and employee by determining the hours of labor in the occupation of a ba#er without reasonable ground for doing so. The general right to ma#e a contract in relation to oneOs business is a liberty protected by the 1:th amendment. The state may interfere with and regulate both property and liberty rights to prevent the individual from ma#ing certain #inds of contracts in its exercise of police power which relates to safety- health- morals and general welfare of the society. <n this instance- the 1:th amendment cannot interfere. The trade of a ba#er is not an alarmingly unhealthy one that would warrant the stateOs interference with rights to labor and contract.
0octrine1 T)e rule must )ave a more direct relation* as means to an end* and t)e end itself must (e appropriate and legitimate* (efore an act can (e )eld to (e valid )ic) interferes it) t)e general rig)t of an individual to (e free in )is person and in )is po er to contract in relation to )is o n la(or. Jur cases include %ourt of <ndustrial )elations -An2 Tibay .!. CIR3 as an administrative court which exercises ,udicial and !uasi$,udicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees. 7ational Telecommunications %ompany &PB<.%J/ "T vs. "lcua='7ational .abor )elations %ommission or 7.)% &D(P vs. 7.)%' and school tribunals &"teneo vs. %"$(oard of Discipline- "lcua= vs. P ("N$n .!. J)d2 Dam !- Tin#er vs. Des /oines %ommunity chool District' also are clothed with !uasi$,udicial function. <t is a !uestion of whether the body or institution has a ,udicial or !uasi$,udicial function that ma#es it bound by the due process clause. &Dudicial function is synonymous to ,udicial power which is the authority to settle ,usticiable controversies or disputes involving rights that are legally enforceable and demandable or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights. <t is a determination of what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are with respect to a matter in controversy'. <n An2 Tibay .!. CIR- the %ourt laid down cardinal re!uirements in administrative proceedings which essentially exercise a ,udicial or !uasi$ ,udicial function. These areA
&1' the right to a hearing- which includes the right to present oneOs case and submit evidence in support thereof &2' The tribunal must consider the evidence presented &3' The decision must have something to support itself &:' The evidence must be substantial. ubstantial evidence means such a reasonable evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as ade!uate to support a conclusion &;' The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearting or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected &5' The tribunal or body of any of its ,udges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy and not simply accept the views of a subordinate
&4' The (oard or body should- in all controversial !uestions- render its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can #now the various issues involved and the reason for the decision rendered.
/. EBUAL PROTECTION
S #ti$n 7" Art. III. N$ * r!$n !+all b d *ri. d $& li& " lib rty" $r *r$* rty 'it+$)t d) *r$# !! $& la'" n$r !+all any * r!$n b d ni d t+ 6)al *r$t #ti$n $& t+ la'!.
The E!uality Protection %lause is a specific constitutional guarantee of the E!uality of the Person. The e!uality it guarantees is >legal e!uality or- as it is usually put- the e!uality of all persons before the law. embraced in the concept of due process embodied in a separate clause to provide for a more specific guaranty against undue favoritism or hostility from the government
D) Pr$# !! Cla)! attac#s arbitrarin !! in general E6)al Pr$t #ti$n Cla)! attac#s )n'arrant d *artiality $r *r 4)di# S)b!tanti. E6)ality * all persons or things similarly situated should be treated ali#e- both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. E6)ality in n&$r# m nt $& t+ la' * law be enforced and applied e!ually R 6)i!it ! $& 1alid Cla!!i&i#ati$n% &a' it must be based on substantial distinctions &b' it must be germane to the purposes of the law &c' it must not be limited to existing conditions only must be enforced as long as the problem sought to be corrected exists &d' it must apply e!ually well to all members of the class both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed
<n D G)=man .. C$m l #" petitioners theori=e that ec. :: of )" K1KI is violative of the e!ual protection clause because it singles out the %ity and /unicipal Election Jfficers of the %J/E.E% as prohibited from holding office in the same city or municipality for more than four years. The %ourt held that the law is valid. The singling out of election officers in order to >ensure the impartiality of election officials by preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of their place of assignment. <n Orm$# S)2ar C ntral .. Orm$# City- Jrmoc %ity imposes a tax on Jrmoc ugar %entral by name. Jrmos ugar %entral is the only sugar central in Jrmoc %ity. The %ourt held that such ordinance is not valid for it would be discriminatoory against the Jrmoc ugar %entral which alone comes under the ordinance.
C. SEARCH AND SEICURE

S #ti$n 8" Art. III. T+ ri2+t $& t+ * $*l t$ b ! #)r in t+ ir * r!$n!" +$)! !" *a* r!" and && #t! a2ain!t )nr a!$nabl ! ar#+ ! and ! i=)r ! $& '+at . r nat)r and &$r any *)r*$! !+all b in.i$labl " and n$ ! ar#+ 'arrant $r 'arrant $& arr !t !+all i!!) (# *t )*$n *r$babl #a)! t$ b d t rmin d * r!$nally by t+ 4)d2 a&t r (aminati$n )nd r $at+ $r a&&irmati$n $& t+ #$m*lainant and t+ 'itn !! ! + may *r$d)# " and *arti#)larly d !#ribin2 t+ *la# t$ b ! ar#+ d and t+ * r!$n! $r t+in2! t$ b ! i= d. S #ti$n 8" Art. III * deals with tangi(les+ embodies the castle doctrine &a man3s house is his castle+ a citi=en en,oys the right against official intrusion and is master of all the surveys within the domain and privacy of his own home.' This provision applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tas#ed with enforcement of the law. <t does not protect citi=ens from unreasonable searches and sei=ures perpetrated by private individuals.
S #ti$n 9" Art. III. -73T+ *ri.a#y $& #$mm)ni#ati$n and #$rr !*$nd n# !+all b in.i$labl (# *t )*$n la'&)l $rd r $& t+ #$)rt" $r '+ n *)bli# !a& ty $r $rd r r 6)ir ! $t+ r'i! " a! *r !#rib d by la'. -83 Any .id n# $btain d in .i$lati$n $& t+i! $r t+ *r # din2 ! #ti$n !+all b inadmi!!ibl &$r any *)r*$! in any *r$# din2.
S #ti$n 9 -73" Art. III * deals with intangi(les S #ti$n 9 -83" Art. III * E(#l)!i$nary R)l &which embodies the Doctrine of the Qruit of the Poisonous Tree' E(#l)!i$nary R)l * evidence obtained in violation of ec. 2- "rt.<<<- shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding &Qruit of Poisonous Tree Doctrine'. -St$n +ill .. Di$:n$3 available to natural and artificial persons- but the latter3s boo#s of accounts may be re!uired to open for examination by the tate in the exercise of police power or power of taxation
The right is personal (Stone)ill vs 0io/no) G n ral R)l % only a ,udge may issue a warrant.
E(# *ti$n% orders of arrest may be issues by administrative authorities but only for the purpose of carrying out a final finding of a violation of a law
1alid Warrantl !! S ar#+ !

87JTEA each of these re!uires probable cause- except stop and fris#9 1. ! ar#+ ! in#id ntal t$ la'&)l arr !t &rule 125- )ules of %ourt' * for dangerous weapons or anything that may have been used or constitute in the commission of an offense R 6)i!it !% 1. the item to be searched was within the arrestee3s custody or area of immediate control 2. the search was contemporaneous with the arrest 8. ! ar#+ ! $& m$.in2 . +i#l ! <n Ania2 .. C$m l #- twenty meters away from the gate of the (atasan- a truc# was stopped and searched. The motorists had not given any evidence of suspicious behaviour nor had the searching officers received any confidential information about the car. The %ourt held that the search was not ,ustifiable as a warrantless arrest of a moving vehicle as there was no probable cause.
9. ! ar#+ ! $& *r$+ibit d arti#l ! in *lain .i '
R 6)i!it !% 1. prior valid intrusion to a place 2. evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who has the right to be there 3. evidence is immediately apparent :. there is no further search ;. n&$r# m nt $& #)!t$m! la'
<. #$n! nt d ! ar#+ ! 6. !t$* and &ri!: &limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons' <n T rry .. O+i$- the stop$and$fris# rule is stated thusA >&E'here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in the light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the person with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous- where in the course of investigation of this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and ma#es reasonable in!uiries- and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others3 safety- he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.? St$*0and0&ri!: r)l serves a t'$0&$ld int r !tA &1' the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection+ (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self$preservation. -Mala#at3 D. r$)tin ! ar#+ ! at b$rd r! and *$rt! $& ntry E. ! ar#+ ! $& b)!in !! ! in t+ n&$r# *$li# r 2)lati$n! ( r#i! $& .i!it$rial *$' r! t$
1alid Warrantl !! Arr !t

1. in flagrante delicto 2. hot pursuit
3. the offender escaped from the penal establishment
R 6)i!it ! $& a .alid 'arrant

Arr !t Warrant 1. Pr$babl Ca)! uch facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably prudent must refer to man to believe that an one &1' specific offense has been committed offense and the person soug)t to (e arrested )ad committed it 2. P r!$nal d t rminati$n $& *r$babl #a)! by t+ 4)d2 The ,udge personally determines the existence of probable cause+ it is not necessary that he should personally examine the complainant and his witnesses (Soliven vs Ma/asiar) Pr$# d)r % &1' personally evaluate the fiscal3s report- or &2' if 819 is insufficientdisregard it and re!uire the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses Pr liminary in6)iry &tas# of the ,udge' * determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrant of arrest Pr liminary in. !ti2ati$n *r$* r &tas# of the prosecutor' * ascertainment whether the offender should be held for trial or be S ar#+ Warrant uch facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and the o('ects soug)t in t)e connection of t)e offense are in t)e place soug)t to (e searc)ed The ,udge must personally e2amine in the form of searching !uestions and answers... in writing and under oath... the complainants and his witnesses... on facts personally #nown to them... and attach to the record their sworn statements and affidavits. (Silva vs 3residing 4udge)
released 3. A&t r 7ot merely routinary but must 7ot merely routinary but must (aminati$n be pro(ing and exhaustive be pro(ing and exhaustive )nd r $at+ $r a&&irmati$n $& t+ #$m*lainant and t+ 'itn !! ! + may *r$d)# :.Parti#)larity G n ral R)l % it must $& d !#ri*ti$n contain the name5s of t)e persons to (e arrested E(# *ti$n% if there is some descriptio personae which will enable the officer to identify the accused G n ral R)l % when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow. E(# *ti$n% when no other more accurate and detailed description could have been given.
<n 1alm$nt .. G n. D 1illa- the %ourt held that not all searches and sei=ures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. " reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of the case.
%hec#points are not illegal per se... )outine inspection and few !uestions do not constitute unreasonable searches. <f the inspection becomes more thorough to the extent of becoming a search- this can be done when there is deemed to be probable cause. <n the latter situation- it is ,ustifiable as a warrantless search of a moving vehicle. Pr$babl Ca)! * facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of a warrant that are in themselves sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely upon them. <n C$rr$ .. Li!in2- the "ffidavit of %ol. %astillo stated that in several issues of the Philippine TimesA?... we found that the said publication in fact foments distrust and hatred against the government of the Philippines. The %ourt held that the affidavit does not establish probable cause- and is nothing but conclusions of law. <n /)r2$! .. C+i & $& Sta&&- a search warrant for the newspaper EE
Qorum is issued on the basis of a broad statement of the military that (urgos- Dr. is >in possession of printing e!uipment and other paraphernalia... used as means of committing the offense of subversion.? The %ourt held that such allegation is not sufficient to establish probable cause. <t is a mere conclusion of law unsupported by particulars. The %ourt also held that the search warrant description has the >sweeping tenor? ma#ing the document a general warrant. The search warrant particularly statesA?all printing e!uipment- typewriters... of the EE Qorum newspaper and any other documents...? <t is not re!uired that the property to be searched should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is directed. <t is sufficient that the property is under the control or possession of the person sought to be searched. <n S$li. n .. J)d2 Ma:a!iar- the %ourt clarified the meaning of >personally? in the search and sei=ure clause. <t stated that in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of existence of probable cause- what is re!uired is personal determination and not personal examination. <n Lim .. F li(- the %ourt held that the ,udge in issuing a warrant of arrest cannot rely solely on the certification or recommendation of a prosecutor that probable cause exists. The ,udge must loo# at the report- the affidavits- the transcripts of stenographic notes &if any'- and all other supporting documents behind the Prosecutor3s certification. <n St$n +ill .. Di$:n$- the %ourt held that the following description is insufficient for it amounts to a general warrant authori=ing the officer to pic# up anything he pleasesA > (oo# of accounts- financial recordsvouchers...and other documents showing all business transactions....?
The %ourt further held that the ob,ection to an unlawful search or sei=ure and to evidence obtained thereby is purely personal and cannot be availed by third parties.
D. MIRANDA RIGHTS
S #ti$n 78" Art. III.
7. Any * r!$n )nd r in. !ti2ati$n &$r t+ #$mmi!!i$n $& an $&& n! !+all +a. t+ ri2+t t$ b in&$rm d $& +i! ri2+t t$ r main !il nt and t$ +a. #$m* t nt and ind * nd nt #$)n! l *r & rably $& +i! $'n #+$i# . I& t+ * r!$n #ann$t a&&$rd t+ ! r.i# ! $& #$)n! l" + m)!t b *r$.id d 'it+ $n . T+ ! ri2+t! #ann$t b 'ai. d (# *t in 'ritin2 and in t+ *r ! n# $& #$)n! l. 8. N$ t$rt)r " &$r# " .i$l n# " t+r at" intimidati$n" $r any $t+ r m an! '+i#+ .itiat t+ &r 'ill !+all b )! d a2ain!t +im. S #r t d t nti$n *la# !" !$litary" in#$mm)ni#ad$" $r $t+ r !imilar &$rm! $& d t nti$n ar *r$+ibit d. 9. Any #$n& !!i$n $r admi!!i$n $btain d in .i$lati$n $& t+i! $r S #ti$n 7D + r $& !+all b inadmi!!ibl in .id n# a2ain!t +im. ;. T+ la' !+all *r$.id &$r * nal and #i.il !an#ti$n! &$r .i$lati$n! $& t+i! S #ti$n a! ' ll a! #$m* n!ati$n t$ t+ r +abilitati$n $& .i#tim! $& t$rt)r $r !imilar *ra#ti# !" and t+ ir &amili !.
called the FMiranda D$#trin G &/iranda vs "ri=ona'
Miranda D$#trin A prior to any !uestioning during custodial investigation- the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent- that any statement he gives may be used as evidence against him- and that he has the right to the presence of an attorney- either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights- provided the waiver is made voluntarily- #nowinglyand intelligently. P)r*$! $& t+ D$#trin <n /iranda v "ri=ona- the 2 upreme %ourt established rules t$ *r$t #t a #riminal d & ndantH! *ri.il 2 a2ain!t ! l&0in#riminati$n &r$m t+ *r !!)r ! ari!in2 d)rin2 #)!t$dial in. !ti2ati$n by t+ *$li# . Thus- to provide practical safeguards for the practical reinforcement for the right against compulsory self$incrimination- the %ourt held that >the prosecution may not use statements- whether exculpatory or inculpatory- stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self$incrimination.
R 6)i!it ! $& t+ Miranda D$#trin

&1' any person under custodial investigation has the right to remain silent+ &2' anything he says can and will be used against him in a court of law+ &3' he has the right to tal# to an attorney before being !uestioned and to have his counsel present when being !uestioned+ and &:' if he cannot afford an attorney- one will be provided before any !uestioning if he so desires. C)!t$dial in. !ti2ati$n defined "ny !uestioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been ta#en into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. (egins as soon as the investigation is no longer a general in!uiry unto an unsolved crime- and direction is then aimed upon a particular suspect who has been ta#en into custody and to whom the police would then direct interrogatory !uestions which tend to elicit incriminating statements. hall include the practice of issuing an invitation to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed- without pre,udice to the liability of the inviting officer for any violation of law.
E(tra4)di#ial #$n& !!i$n i! Admi!!ibl '+ n% &a' Loluntary &b' Eith assistance of counsel &c' <n writing- and &d' Express Ri2+t! Und r C)!t$dial In. !ti2ati$n &a' To be informed of right to remain silent and to counsel %arries the correlative obligation on the part of the investigator to explain and contemplates effective communication which results in the sub,ect understanding what is conveyed. -P $*l
.. A2)!tin3 &b' To be reminded that if he waives his right to remain silent- anything he says can and will be used against him &c' To remain silent &d' To have competent and independent counsel preferably of own choice &e' To be provided with counsel if the person cannot afford the services of one &f' 7o torture- force- violence- threat- intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him &g' ecret detention places- solitary- incommunicado- or other similar forms of detention are prohibited &h' %onfessions or admissions obtained in violation of these rights are inadmissible as evidence &exclusionary rule' Ri2+t! T+at May / Wai. d 8waiver must be in writing and in the presence of counsel9 &a' )ight to remain silent &b' )ight to %ounsel Ri2+t! T+at Cann$t / Wai. d &a' )ight to be informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel &b' )ight to counsel when ma#ing the waiver of the right to remain silent or to counsel )ight to counsel de parte is not unlimited. "ccused cannot repeatedly as# for postponement. Be must be provided with counsel de oficio. )" 436IA victims of un,ust imprisonment may file their claims with the (oard of %laims under DJD R ! G !ta A The declaration of the accused ac#nowledging guilt made to
the police des# officer after the crime was committed may be given in evidence against him by the police officer to whom the admission was made- as part of the res gestae. <n P $*l .. Galit- rights under custodial investigation may be waived. The %onstitution says+ >These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.? <n localities where there are no lawyersthe tate must bring the individual to a place where there is one. T rminati$n $& ri2+t! )nd r #)!t$dial in. !ti2ati$n% Ehen %harges are filed against the accused &in such case- ections 1: and 14 come into play'. <n G)tan2 .. P $*l - the %ourt held that urine sample is admissible. >Ehat the %onstitution prohibits is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused- but not an inclusion of his body in evidence- when it may be material. <n fact- an accused may be validly compelled to be photographed or measured- or his garments or shoes removed or replaced- or to move his body to enabl#e the foregoing things to be done- without running afould of the proscription against testimonial compulsion.
E. RIGHT TO /AIL
S #ti$n 79" Art. III. All * r!$n!" (# *t t+$! #+ar2 d 'it+ $&& n! ! *)ni!+abl by r #l)!i$n * r* t)a '+ n .id n# $& 2)ilt i! !tr$n2" !+all" b &$r #$n.i#ti$n" b bailabl by !)&&i#i nt !)r ti !" $r b r l a! d $n r #$2ni=an# a! may b *r$.id d by la'. T+ ri2+t t$ bail !+all n$t b im*air d . n '+ n t+ *ri.il 2 $& t+ 'rit $& +ab a! #$r*)! i! !)!* nd d. E(# !!i. bail !+all n$t b r 6)ir d.
/ail * is security given for the release of a person in custody of law- furnished by him or a bondsman- to guaranty his appearance before any court as may be re!uired >ind! $& /ail
&a' %ash bond &b' ecurity bond W+$ May In.$: , " person under detention even if no formal charges have yet been filed &)ule 11:- )ules of %ourt' W+$ Ar Entitl d, &a' Persons charged with offenses punishable by )eclusion Perpetua or Death- when evidence of guilt is strong &b' Persons convicted by the trial court. (ail is only discretionary pending appeal. &c' Persons who are members of the "QP facing a court martial. <n Paderanga v. %"- all persons actually detained- except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or death when evidence of guilt is strong- shall- before conviction- be bailable bu sufficient sureties.
Jne is under the custody of the law either when he has been arrested or has surrendered himself to the ,urisdiction of the court- as in the case where through counsel petitioner for bail who was confined in a hospital communicated his submission to the ,urisdiction of the court. Ot+ r Ri2+t! in R lati$n t$ /ail The right to bail shall 7JT be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be re!uired.
Fa#t$r! in Fi(in2 Am$)nt $& /ail &a' "bility to post bail &b' 7ature of the offense &c' Penalty imposed by law &d' %haracter and reputation of the accused
&e' Bealth of the accused &f' trength of the evidence
&g' Probability of appearing at the trial &h' Qorfeiture of previous bail bonds &i' Ehether accused was a fugitive from ,ustice when arrested &,' <f accused is under bond in other cases Im*li#it Limitati$n! $n t+ Ri2+t t$ /ail &a' The person claiming the right must be in actual detention or custody of the law. <n P $*l .. D$nat$- charged with rebellion- a bailable offense- alas nevertheless agreed >to remain in legal custody during the pendency of the trial of his criminal case.? The %ourt held that he does not have the right to bail- because bu his act he has waived his right.
&b' The constitutional right is available only in criminal cases- not- e.g. in deportation and extradition proceedings. N$t % &a' )ight to bail is not available in the military. <n C$m ndad$r .. D 1illa- soldier under court martial does not en,oy the right to bail. <t is because of the disciplinary structure of the military and because soldiers are allowed the fiduciary right to bear arms and can therefore cause great havoc... 7or can appeal be made to the e!ual protection clause ebcause e!ual protection applies only to those who are e!ually situated.
&b' "part from bail- a person may attain provisional liberty through recogni=ance. <n US .. P)r)2anan- the %ourt held that extradition is not a criminal proceeding. Bence- since bail is available only in criminal proceedings- a respondent in an extradition proceeding is not entitled to a bail. Be should apply for a bail in the court where he will be tried.
F. RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

S #ti$n 7;" Art. III.
7. N$ * r!$n !+all b + ld t$ an!' r &$r a #riminal $&& n! 'it+$)t d) *r$# !! $& la'. 8. In all #riminal *r$! #)ti$n!" t+ a##)! d !+all b *r !)m d inn$# nt )ntil t+ #$ntrary i! *r$. d" and !+all n4$y t+ ri2+t t$ b + ard by +im! l& and #$)n! l" t$ b in&$rm d $& t+ nat)r and #a)! $& t+ a##)!ati$n a2ain!t +im" t$ +a. a !* dy" im*artial" and *)bli# trial" t$ m t t+ 'itn !! ! &a# t$ &a# " and t$ +a. #$m*)l!$ry *r$# !! t$ ! #)r t+ att ndan# $& 'itn !! ! and t+ *r$d)#ti$n $& .id n# in +i! b +al&. H$' . r" a&t r arrai2nm nt" trial may *r$# d n$t'it+!tandin2 t+ ab! n# $& t+ a##)! d% Pr$.id d" t+at + +a! b n d)ly n$ti&i d and +i! &ail)r t$ a** ar i! )n4)!ti&iabl .
T+ Ri2+t! $& t+ A##)! d In#l)d

1. 2. 3. :. ;. 5. 4. K. %riminal due process+ Presumption of innocence+ )ight to be heard by himself or counsel+ )ight to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him+ )ight to speedy- impartial and public trial+ )ight to meet the witnesses face to face+ )ight to compulsory process to secure attendance of witnesses and production of evidence+ and trial in absentia
7. Criminal D) Pr$# !!
Criminal *r$# !! in#l)d ! a' <nvestigation prior to the filing of charges b' Preliminary examination and investigation after charges are filed c' Period of trial
R 6)ir m nt! $& Criminal D) Pr$# !! 1. <mpartial and competent court in accordance with procedure prescribed by law+ 2. Proper observance of all the rights accorded the accused under the %onstitution and the applicable statutes &example of statutory right of the accusedA right to Preliminary investigation' Mi!trial may be declared if shown that proceedings were held under circumstances as would prevent the accused from freely ma#ing his defense or the ,udge from freely arriving at his decision. There is violation of due process when law not published and a person is impleaded for violation of such law. There is violation of due process when appeal is permitted by law but there is denial thereof.
8. Pr !)m*ti$n $& Inn$# n#

(urden of proof to establish the guilt of the accused is with the prosecution. %onviction depends on the strength of prosecution- not on the wea#ness of the defense The presumption may be overcome by contrary presumption based on the experience of human conduct. &e.g unexplained flight may lead to an inference of guilt- as >the wic#ed flee when no man pursueth- but the righteous are as bold as a lion.?' The constitutional presumption will not apply as long as there is some rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed- and the inference of one fact from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate. * %ooley 7o inference of guilt may be drawn against an accused for his failure to ma#e a statement of any sort.
<n D)mla$ .. C$m l #- for the purposes of dis!ualification in an electionsection : of (P (lg. ;2 says that? the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact &dis!ualification'.? The %ourt held that this provision violates the guarantee of presumption of innocence. "lthough filing of charges is only prima facie evidence and may be rebutted- the proximity of elections and conse!uent ris# of not having time to rebut the prima facie evidence already in effect ma#e him suffer as though guilty even before trial.
E6)i*$i! R)l * evidence of both sides are e!ually balanced- in which case the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the accused.
9. Ri2+t t$ b H ard by Him! l& and C$)n! l

<ndispensable in any criminal prosecution where the sta#es are the liberty or even the life of the accused "ssistance of counsel begins from the time a person is ta#en into custody and placed under investigation for the commission of a crime. This is not sub,ect to waiver. )ight to counsel means the right to effective representation. <f the accused appears at arraignment without counsel- the ,udge mustA &a' <nform the accused that he has a right to a counsel before arraignment+ &b' "s# the accused if he desires the aid of counsel+ &c' <f the accused desires counsel- but cannot afford one- a counsel de oficio must be appointed+ &d' <f the accused desires to obtain his own counsel- the court must give him a reasonable time to get one.
;. Nat)r and Ca)! $& A##)!ati$n
P)r*$! &$r t+ Ri2+t t$ b in&$rm d $& t+ Nat)r and Ca)! $& A##)!ati$n &1' To furnish the accused with a description of the charge against him as will enable him to ma#e his defenses+ &2' To avail himself of his conviction or ac!uittal against a further prosecution for the same cause+ &3' To inform the court of the facts alleged. The description and not the designation of the offense is controlling &The real nature of the crime charged is determined from the recital of facts in the information. <t is not determined based on the caption or preamble thereof nor from the specification of the provision of law allegedly violated.' <f the information fails to allege the material elements of the offense- the accused cannot be convicted thereof even if the prosecution is able to present evidence during the trial with respect to such elements.
1$id &$r 1a2) n !! R)l * accused is denied the right to be informed of the charge against him and to due process as well- where the statute itself is couched in such indefinite language that it is not possible for men of ordinary intelligence to determine therefrom what acts or omissions are punished and hence- shall be avoided. <n E!trada .! Sandi2anbayan" the %ourt held that the Void for Vagueness octrine merely re&uires a reasona(le degree of certainty and not a(solute precision or mat)ematical e2actitude.
<. T+ Trial
Fa#t$r! in D t rminin2 W+ t+ r T+ r I! 1i$lati$n &a' Time expired from the filing of the information &b' .ength of delay involved &c' )easons for the delay &d' "ssertion or non$assertion of the right by the accused &e' Pre,udice caused to the defendant.
E&& #t $& di!mi!!al ba! d $n .i$lati$n $& t+i! ri2+t% it amounts to an ac!uittal and can be used as basis to claim double ,eopardy. This would be the effect even if the dismissal was made with the consent of the accused
R m dy i& t+ Ri2+t i! 1i$lat d &1' Be can move for the dismissal of the case+ &2' <f he is detained- he can file a petition for the issuance of writ of habeas corpus. S* dy trial 0 1. Qree from vexatious- capricious and oppressive delays 2. To relieve the accused from needless anxieties before sentence is pronounced upon him
Im*artial trial * the accused is entitled to the >cold neutrality of an impartial ,udge?. <t is an element of due process. P)bli# trial% The attendance at the trial is open to all irrespective of their relationship to the accused. Bowever- if the evidence to be adduced is >offensive to decency or public morals?- the public may be excluded. The right of the accused to a public trial is not violated if the hearings are conducted on aturdays- either with the consent of the accused or if failed to ob,ect thereto. The right to be present covers the period from arraignment to promulgation of sentence. G n ral R)l % the accused may waive the right to be present at the trial by not showing up. Bowever- the court can still compel the attendance of the accused if necessary for identification purposes. E(# *ti$n% <f the accused- after arraignment- has stipulated that he is indeed the person charged with the offense and named in the information- and that any time a witness refers to a name by which he is #nown- the witness is to be understood as referring to him.
Trial in "bsentia is mandatory upon the court whenever the accused has been arraigned. There is also Promulgation in "bsentia Ehile the accused is entitled to be present during promulgation of ,udgment- the absence of his counsel during such promulgation does not affect its validity The trial in absentia does not abrogate the provisions of the )ules of %ourt regarding forfeiture of bail bond if the accused fails to appear at his trial. " court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines as this is a necessary conse!uence of the nature and function of a bail bond
I. T+ Ri2+t t$ M
t t+ Witn !! ! Fa# t$ Fa#

t t+ Witn !! ! Fa# t$ Fa#
P)r*$! ! $& t+ Ri2+t t$ M
&1' To afford the accused an opportunity to cross$examine the witness &2' To allow the ,udge the opportunity to observe the deportment of the witness Prin#i*al E(# *ti$n! t$ t+i! Ri2+t &1' The admissibility of >dying declarations? &2' Trial in absentia under ection 1:&2' Eith respect to child testimony Testimony of witness who was not cross$examined is not admissible as evidence for being hearsay. <f a prosecution witness dies before his cross$examination can be completed- his direct testimony cannot be stric#en off the record- provided the material points of his direct testimony had been covered on cross. The right to confrontation may be waived.
D. C$m*)l!$ry Pr$# !!
The accused is entitled to the issuance of su(poena ad testificandum and su(poena duces tecum for the purpose of compelling the attendance of witness and the production of evidence that he may need for his defense. Qailure to obey * punishable as contempt of court. There are exceptional circumstances when the defendant may as# for conditional examination- provided the expected testimony is material of any witness under circumstances that would ma#e him unavailable from attending the trial.
E. Trial in Ab! ntia Trial in Ab! ntia May Only / All$' d I& t+ F$ll$'in2 R 6)i!it ! Ar M t% &1' the accused has been validly arraigned+ &2' "ccused has already been arraigned+ &3' "ccused has been duly notified of the trial+ and &:' Bis failure to appear is un,ustifiable.
G. HA/EAS CORPUS
S #ti$n 7<" Art. III. T+ *ri.il 2 $& t+ 'rit $& +ab a! #$r*)! !+all n$t b !)!* nd d (# *t in #a! ! $& in.a!i$n $r r b lli$n" '+ n t+ *)bli# !a& ty r 6)ir ! it. Writ $& Hab a! C$r*)! * is a written order issued by a court- directed to a person detaining another- commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner at a designated time and place with the day and cause of his caption and detention. Pri.il 2 $& t+ Writ $& Hab a! C$r*)! * the right to have an immediate determination of the legality of the deprivation of physical liberty. T+ Pr !id nt may !)!* nd t+ *ri.il 2 %
&1' in cases of invasion or rebellion &2' when public safety re!uires it. Babeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a person3s liberty has been ,udicially ad,udged to be illegal or unlawful -In r % S)m)l$n23 The writ is a prerogative writ employed to test the validity of detention To secure the detaineeOs release The action shall ta#e precedence in the calendar of the court and must be acted upon immediately
W+ n a.ailabl &enumeration not exclusive' restoration of liberty of an individual sub,ected to p)ysical restraint may be availed of where- as a conse!uence of a ,udicial proceedingA 1. there has been deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of the person 2. the court has no ,urisdiction to impose the sentence- or 3. an excessive penalty has been imposed- since such sentence is void as to the excess. /ay be extended to cases by which rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto Ehen moral restraint is exerted &%aunca vs ala=ar' )ight was accorded a person was sentenced to a longer penalty than was subse!uently meted out to another person convicted of the same offense. &1umabon vs Director of Prisons' 2nlawful denial of bail W+ n n$t a.ailabl &enumeration not exclusive' the person alleged to be restrained is in the custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which has ,urisdiction to do so desaparecidos &disappeared persons' * persons could not be found+ remedy is to refer the matter to %ommission on Buman )ights
Pr$# d)r 7eed to comply with writ+ disobedience thereof constitutes contempt W+$ may !)!* nd t+ *ri.il 2 The President Gr$)nd! &$r S)!* n!i$n $& t+ *ri.il 2 1. invasion or rebellion 2. when public safety re!uires it
S #ti$n 7E" Art. 1II. T+ Pr !id nt !+all b t+ C$mmand r0in0C+i & $& all arm d &$r# ! $& t+ P+ili**in ! and '+ n . r it b #$m ! n # !!ary" + may #all $)t !)#+ arm d &$r# ! t$ *r . nt $r !)**r !! la'l !! .i$l n# " in.a!i$n $r r b lli$n. In #a! $& in.a!i$n $r r b lli$n" '+ n t+ *)bli# !a& ty r 6)ir ! it" + may" &$r a * ri$d n$t (# din2 !i(ty day!" !)!* nd t+ *ri.il 2 $& t+ 'rit $& +ab a! #$r*)! $r *la# t+ P+ili**in ! $r any *art t+ r $& )nd r martial la'. Wit+in &$rty0 i2+t +$)r! &r$m t+ *r$#lamati$n $& martial la' $r t+ !)!* n!i$n $& t+ *ri.il 2 $& t+ 'rit $& +ab a! #$r*)!" t+ Pr !id nt !+all !)bmit a r *$rt in * r!$n $r in 'ritin2 t$ t+ C$n2r !!. T+ C$n2r !!" .$tin2 4$intly" by a .$t $& at l a!t a ma4$rity $& all it! M mb r! in r 2)lar $r !* #ial ! !!i$n" may r .$: !)#+ *r$#lamati$n $r !)!* n!i$n" '+i#+ r .$#ati$n !+all n$t b ! t a!id by t+ Pr !id nt. U*$n t+ initiati. $& t+ Pr !id nt" t+ C$n2r !! may" in t+ !am mann r" (t nd !)#+ *r$#lamati$n $r !)!* n!i$n &$r a * ri$d t$ b d t rmin d by t+ C$n2r !!" i& t+ in.a!i$n $r r b lli$n !+all * r!i!t and *)bli# !a& ty r 6)ir ! it. T+ C$n2r !!" i& n$t in ! !!i$n" !+all" 'it+in t' nty0&$)r +$)r! &$ll$'in2 !)#+ *r$#lamati$n $r !)!* n!i$n" #$n. n in a##$rdan# 'it+ it! r)l ! 'it+$)t n d $& a #all. T+ S)*r m C$)rt may r .i '" in an a**r$*riat *r$# din2 &il d by any #iti= n" t+ !)&&i#i n#y $& t+ &a#t)al ba!i! $& t+ *r$#lamati$n $& martial la' $r t+ !)!* n!i$n $& t+ *ri.il 2 $& t+ 'rit $r t+ (t n!i$n t+ r $&" and m)!t *r$m)l2at it! d #i!i$n t+ r $n 'it+in t+irty day! &r$m it! &ilin2.
A !tat $& martial la' d$ ! n$t !)!* nd t+ $* rati$n $& t+ C$n!tit)ti$n" n$r !)**lant t+ &)n#ti$nin2 $& t+ #i.il #$)rt! $r l 2i!lati. a!! mbli !" n$r a)t+$ri= t+ #$n& rm nt $& 4)ri!di#ti$n $n military #$)rt! and a2 n#i ! $. r #i.ilian! '+ r #i.il #$)rt! ar abl t$ &)n#ti$n" n$r a)t$mati#ally !)!* nd t+ *ri.il 2 $& t+ 'rit. T+ !)!* n!i$n $& t+ *ri.il 2 $& t+ 'rit !+all a**ly $nly t$ * r!$n! 4)di#ially #+ar2 d &$r r b lli$n $r $&& n! ! in+ r nt in $r dir #tly #$nn #t d 'it+ in.a!i$n. D)rin2 t+ !)!* n!i$n $& t+ *ri.il 2 $& t+ 'rit" any * r!$n t+)! arr !t d $r d tain d !+all b 4)di#ially #+ar2 d 'it+in t+r day!" $t+ r'i! + !+all b r l a! d.
Lan!an2 d$#trin -Lan!an2 .! Gar#ia3% % has the power to in!uire into the factual basis of the suspension of the privilege of the writ. <t is written in "rticle L<<- ec. 1K of the %onstitution.
H. WRIT OF AMPARO
A.M. N$. JD0K0780SC -8< S *t mb r 8JJD3 THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO SECTION 7. !etition" The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life- liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee- or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal #illings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
SEC. 8. #$o %a& 'ile" The petition may be filed by the aggrieved party or by any !ualified person or entity in the following orderA 1. "ny member of the immediate family- namelyA the spouse- children and parents of the aggrieved party+ 2. "ny ascendant- descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity- in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph+ or 3. "ny concerned citi=en- organi=ation- association or institution- if there is no #nown member of the immediate family or relative of the aggrieved party. The filing of a petition by the aggrieved party suspends the right of all other authori=ed parties to file similar petitions. .i#ewise- the filing of the petition by an authori=ed party on behalf of the aggrieved party suspends the right of all othersobserving the order established herein. SEC. 9. #$ere to 'ile" The petition may be filed on any day and at any time with the )egional Trial %ourt of the place where the threat- act or omission was committed or any of its elements occurred- or with the andiganbayan- the %ourt of "ppeals- the upreme %ourt- or any ,ustice of such courts. The writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. Ehen issued by a )egional Trial %ourt or any ,udge thereof- the writ shall be returnable before such court or ,udge. Ehen issued by the andiganbayan or the %ourt of "ppeals or any of their ,ustices- it may be returnable before such court or any ,ustice thereof- or to any )egional Trial %ourt of the place where the threat- act or omission was committed or any of its elements occurred. Ehen issued by the upreme %ourt or any of its ,ustices- it may be returnable before such %ourt or any ,ustice thereof- or before the andiganbayan or the %ourt of "ppeals or any of their ,ustices- or to any )egional Trial %ourt of the place where the threat- act or omission was committed or any of its elements occurred.
SEC. ;. (o oc)et 'ees" The petitioner shall be exempted from the payment of the doc#et and other lawful fees when filing the petition. The court- ,ustice or ,udge shall doc#et the petition and act upon it immediately. SEC. <. Contents of !etition" The petition shall be signed and verified and shall allege the followingA 1. The personal circumstances of the petitioner+ 2. The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat- act or omission- or- if the name is un#nown or uncertain- the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation+ 3. The right to life- liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent- and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits+ :. The investigation conducted- if any- specifying the names- personal circumstances- and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals- as well as the manner and conduct of the investigationtogether with any report+ ;. The actions and recourses ta#en by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat- act or omission+ and 5. The relief prayed for. The petition may include a general prayer for other ,ust and e!uitable reliefs. SEC. I. *ssuance of t$e #rit" 2pon the filing of the petition- the court- ,ustice or ,udge shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The cler# of court shall issue the writ under the seal of the court+ or in case of urgent necessity- the ,ustice or the ,udge may issue the writ under his or her own hand- and may deputi=e any officer or person to serve it. The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which shall not be later than seven &4' days from the date of its issuance. SEC. D. !enalt& for Refusing to *ssue or Serve t$e #rit" " cler# of court who
refuses to issue the writ after its allowance- or a deputi=ed person who refuses to serve the same- shall be punished by the court- ,ustice or ,udge for contempt without pre,udice to other disciplinary actions. SEC. E. +o, t$e #rit is Served" The writ shall be served upon the respondent by a ,udicial officer or by a person deputi=ed by the court- ,ustice or ,udge who shall retain a copy on which to ma#e a return of service. <n case the writ cannot be served personally on the respondent- the rules on substituted service shall apply. SEC. K. Return- Contents" Eithin seventy$two &42' hours after service of the writ- the respondent shall file a verified written return together with supporting affidavits which shall- among other things- contain the followingA 1. The lawful defenses to show that the respondent did not violate or threaten with violation the right to life- liberty and security of the aggrieved party- through any act or omission+ 2. The steps or actions ta#en by the respondent to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or persons responsible for the threat- act or omission+ 3. "ll relevant information in the possession of the respondent pertaining to the threat- act or omission against the aggrieved party+ and :. <f the respondent is a public official or employee- the return shall further state the actions that have been or will still be ta#enA i. to verify the identity of the aggrieved party+ ii. to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible+ iii. to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or disappearance+ iv. to determine the cause- manner- location and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have brought about the death or disappearance+ v. to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance+ and vi. to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.
The return shall also state other matters relevant to the investigation- its resolution and the prosecution of the case. " general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed. SEC. 7J. efenses not !leaded eemed #aived" "ll defenses shall be raised in the return- otherwise- they shall be deemed waived. SEC. 77. !ro$ibited !leadings and %otions" motions are prohibitedA The following pleadings and
1. /otion to dismiss+ 2. /otion for extension of time to file return- opposition- affidavitposition paper and other pleadings+ 3. Dilatory motion for postponement+ :. /otion for a bill of particulars+ ;. %ounterclaim or cross$claim+ 5. Third$party complaint+ 4. )eply+ K. /otion to declare respondent in default+ I. <ntervention+ 16. /emorandum+ 11. /otion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim relief orders+ and 12. Petition for certiorarimandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order. SEC. 78. Effect of 'ailure to 'ile Return" <n case the respondent fails to file a return- the court- ,ustice or ,udge shall proceed to hear the petition ex parte. SEC. 79. Summar& +earing" The hearing on the petition shall be summary. Bowever- the court- ,ustice or ,udge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify the issues and determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties. The hearing shall be from day to day until completed and given the same priority
as petitions for habeas corpus. SEC. 7;. *nterim Reliefs" 2pon filing of the petition or at anytime before final ,udgment- the court- ,ustice or ,udge may grant any of the following reliefsA &a' Temporary Protection Jrder. The court- ,ustice or ,udge- upon motion or motu proprio- may order that the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family be protected in a government agency or by an accredited person or private institution capable of #eeping and securing their safety. <f the petitioner is an organi=ation- association or institution referred to in ection 3&c' of this )ule- the protection may be extended to the officers involved. The upreme %ourt shall accredit the persons and private institutions that shall extend temporary protection to the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family- in accordance with guidelines which it shall issue. The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply with the rules and conditions that may be imposed by the court- ,ustice or ,udge. &b' <nspection Jrder. The court- ,ustice or ,udge- upon verified motion and after due hearing- may order any person in possession or control of a designated land or other property- to permit entry for the purpose of inspecting- measuring- surveying- or photographing the property or any relevant ob,ect or operation thereon. The motion shall state in detail the place or places to be inspected. <t shall be supported by affidavits or testimonies of witnesses having personal #nowledge of the enforced disappearance or whereabouts of the aggrieved party. <f the motion is opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the information- the court- ,ustice or ,udge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition.
The movant must show that the inspection order is necessary to establish the right of the aggrieved party alleged to be threatened or violated. The inspection order shall specify the person or persons authori=ed to ma#e the inspection and the date- time- place and manner of ma#ing the inspection and may prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all parties. The order shall expire five &;' days after the date of its issuance- unless extended for ,ustifiable reasons. &c' Production Jrder. The court- ,ustice or ,udge- upon verified motion and after due hearing- may order any person in possession- custody or control of any designated documents- papers- boo#s- accounts- lettersphotographs- ob,ects or tangible things- or ob,ects in digiti=ed or electronic form- which constitute or contain evidence relevant to the petition or the return- to produce and permit their inspection- copying or photographing by or on behalf of the movant. The motion may be opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the information- in which case the court- ,ustice or ,udge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition. The court- ,ustice or ,udge shall prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all the parties. &d' Eitness Protection Jrder. The court- ,ustice or ,udge- upon motion or motu proprio- may refer the witnesses to the Department of Dustice for admission to the Eitness Protection- ecurity and (enefit Programpursuant to )epublic "ct 7o. 5IK1. The court- ,ustice or ,udge may also refer the witnesses to other government agencies- or to accredited persons or private institutions capable of #eeping and securing their safety. SEC. 7<. .vailabilit& of *nterim Reliefs to Respondent" 2pon verified motion of the respondent and after due hearing- the court- ,ustice or ,udge may issue an
inspection order or production order under paragraphs &b' and &c' of the preceding section. " motion for inspection order under this section shall be supported by affidavits or testimonies of witnesses having personal #nowledge of the defenses of the respondent. SEC. 7I. Contempt" The court- ,ustice or ,udge may order the respondent who refuses to ma#e a return- or who ma#es a false return- or any person who otherwise disobeys or resists a lawful process or order of the court to be punished for contempt. The contemnor may be imprisoned or imposed a fine. SEC. 7D. /urden of !roof and Standard of iligence Re0uired" The parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence. The respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove that ordinary diligence as re!uired by applicable laws- rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty. The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary diligence as re!uired by applicable laws- rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty. The respondent public official or employee cannot invo#e the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed to evade responsibility or liability. SEC. 7E. 1udgment" The court shall render ,udgment within ten &16' days from the time the petition is submitted for decision. <f the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence- the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate+ otherwise- the privilege shall be denied. SEC. 7K. .ppeal" "ny party may appeal from the final ,udgment or order to the upreme %ourt under )ule :;. The appeal may raise !uestions of fact or law or both.
The period of appeal shall be five &;' wor#ing days from the date of notice of the adverse ,udgment. The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas corpus cases. SEC. 8J. .rc$iving and Revival of Cases" The court shall not dismiss the petition- but shall archive it- if upon its determination it cannot proceed for a valid cause such as the failure of petitioner or witnesses to appear due to threats on their lives. " periodic review of the archived cases shall be made by the amparo court that shall- motu proprio or upon motion by any party- order their revival when ready for further proceedings. The petition shall be dismissed with pre,udice upon failure to prosecute the case after the lapse of two &2' years from notice to the petitioner of the order archiving the case. The cler#s of court shall submit to the Jffice of the %ourt "dministrator a consolidated list of archived cases under this )ule not later than the first wee# of Danuary of every year. SEC. 87. *nstitution of Separate .ctions" This )ule shall not preclude the filing of separate criminal- civil or administrative actions. SEC. 88. Effect of 'iling of a Criminal .ction" Ehen a criminal action has been commenced- no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The reliefs under the writ shall be available by motion in the criminal case. The procedure under this )ule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available under the writ of amparo. SEC. 89. Consolidation" Ehen a criminal action is filed subse!uent to the filing of a petition for the writ- the latter shall be consolidated with the criminal action. Ehen a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subse!uent to a
petition for a writ of amparo- the latter shall be consolidated with the criminal action. "fter consolidation- the procedure under this )ule shall continue to apply to the disposition of the reliefs in the petition. SEC. 8;. Substantive Rig$ts" This )ule shall not diminish- increase or modify substantive rights recogni=ed and protected by the %onstitution. SEC. 8<. Suppletor& .pplication of t$e Rules of Court" The )ules of %ourt shall apply suppletorily insofar as it is not inconsistent with this )ule. SEC. 8I. .pplicabilit& to !ending Cases" This )ule shall govern cases involving extralegal #illings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof pending in the trial and appellate courts. SEC. 8D. Effectivit&" This )ule shall ta#e effect on Jctober 2:- 2664- following its publication in three &3' newspapers of general circulation.
I. SPEED5 DISPOSATION OF CASES

S #ti$n 7I" Art. III. All * r!$n! !+all +a. t+ ri2+t t$ a !* dy di!*$!iti$n $& t+ ir #a! ! b &$r all 4)di#ial" 6)a!i04)di#ial" $r admini!trati. b$di !.
S*
dy Trial .!. S*
dy Di!*$!iti$n $& Ca! ! S* dy di!*$!iti$n $& #a! ! )efers to disposition of cases &"ll phases' Dudicial- !uasi$,udicial or admin. Proceedings
S* dy trial )efers to trial phase only %riminal cases only
P ri$d! &$r d #i!i$n &$r #$)rt! & ec. 1;- "rt. L<<<' %A 2: months from submission
"ll lower collegiate courtsA 12 months unless reduced by % "ll other lower courtsA 3 months
P ri$d! &$r d #i!i$n &$r C$n!tit)ti$nal C$mmi!!i$n! & ec 4- "rt. <M$"' 56 days from date of submission for decision or resolution Fa#t$r! #$n!id r d in d t rminin2 '+ t+ r t+ ri2+t i! .i$lat d 1. 2. 3. :. .ength of delay )eason of delay "ssertion of the right or failure to assert it Pre,udice caused by delay n )nr a!$nabl d lay in r !$l)ti$n $& a #a! %
R m dy in #a! t+ r +a! b Dismissal through mandamus
J. RIGHT AGAINST SELF0INCRIMINATION

S #ti$n 7D" Art. III. N$ * r!$n !+all b #$m* ll d t$ b a 'itn !! a2ain!t +im! l&. /a! d $n% 1. H)manitarian reasons * it is intended to prevent the tate- with all its coercive powers- from extracting from the suspect testimony that may convict him+ 2. Pra#ti#al reasons * a person sub,ected to such compulsion is li#ely to per,ure himself for his own protection A**li#abl t$% %riminal prosecutions- government proceedings- including civil actions and administrative or legislative investigations
Tran!a#ti$nal Imm)nity Stat)t * testimony of any person or whose possession of documents or other evidence necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted is immune from criminal prosecution for an offense to which such compelled testimony relates.
U! and Fr)it Imm)nity Stat)t * prohibits the use of the witness3 compelled testimony and its fruit in any manner in connection with the criminal prosecution for an offense to which such compelled testimony relates. May b Claim d by% 1. A##)! d * at all times+ there is a reasonable assumption that the purpose of his interrogation will be to incriminate him 2. Witn !! * only )en an incriminating &uestion is as/ed- since the witness has no way of #nowing in advance the nature or effect of the !uestion to be put to him Be cannot invo#e right to self$incrimination whenA a) The !uestion is relevant and otherwise allo ed even if the answer may tend to incriminate him or sub,ect him to civil liability b' the !uestion relates to past criminality for which the witness can no longer be prosecuted c' he has been previously granted immunity under a validly enacted statute
Jnly natural persons can invo#e this right. Dudicial persons are sub,ect to the visitorial powers of the state in order to determine compliance with the conditions of the charter granted to them.
S#$* % &1' Testimonial %ompulsion <n Lillaflor v. ummers- since the >#ernel of the privilege? was the prohibition of >testimonial compulsion?- the %ourt was willing to compel a pregnant woman accused of adultery to submit to the indignity of being tested for pregnancy. (eing purely a mechanical act- it is not a violation of her constitutional right against self$incrimination.
&2' Production of Documents- Papers and %hattels. ExceptionA when boo#s of accounts are to be examined in the exercise of police power and power of taxation. Ehat is prohibited is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the witness or to otherwise elicit evidence which would not exist were it not for the actions compelled from the witness.
The right does not prohibit the examination of the body of the accused or the use of findings with respect to his body as physical evidence. Bence- the fingerprinting of an accused would not violate the right against self$incrimination. Bowever- obtaining a sample of the handwriting of the accused would violate this right if he is charged for falsification. The accused cannot be compelled to produce a private document in his possession which might tend to incriminate him. Bowever- a third person in custody of the document may be compelled to produce it.
Ri2+t May b Wai. d% EitherA a' Directly- or b) (y failure to invo/e it P)JL<DED the waiver is certain and une&uivocal and intelligently and illingly made.
S #ti$n 7E -73" Art. III. N$ * r!$n !+all b d tain d !$l ly by r a!$n $& +i! *$liti#al b li &! and a!*irati$n!.
J. RIGHT AGAINST IN1OLUNTAR5 SER1ITUDE

S #ti$n 7E -83" Art. III. N$ in.$l)ntary ! r.it)d in any &$rm !+all (i!t (# *t a! a *)ni!+m nt &$r a #rim '+ r $& t+ *arty !+all +a. b n d)ly #$n.i#t d.
In.$l)ntary S r.it)d * the condition of one who is compelled by forcecoercion- or imprisonment- and against his will- to labor for another- whether he is paid or not. In.$l)ntary S r.it)d In#l)d ! (1) Sla. ry *civil relation in which one man has a(solute po er over the lifefortune and liberty of another+ (2) P $na2 * a condition of enforced servitude by which the servitor is restrained of his liberty and compelled to labor in li&uidation of some de(t or o(ligation- real or pretended- against his will
G n ral R)l 7o involuntary service in any form shall exist. E(# *ti$n! 1. 2. 3. P)ni!+m nt &$r a #rim for which the party shall have been duly convicted & ec. 1K- "rt. <<<' P r!$nal military $r #i.il ! r.i# in the interest of national defense & ec. :- "rt. <<' Na.al nli!tm nt * remain in service until the end of voyage so that the crew would not desert the ship- ma#ing it difficult for the owners to recruit new hands to continue the voyage &)obertson vs (aldwin' !osse comitatus * in pursuit of persons who might have violated the law- the authorities might command all male inhabitants of a certain age to assist them &2 vs Pompeya' R t)rn t$ '$r: $rd r in ind)!tri ! a&& #t d 'it+ *)bli# int r !t &Hapisanan ng /anggagawa sa Hahoy vs 1otamco' !atria !otestas * unemancipated minors are obliged to obey their parents so long as they are under parental power and to observe respect and reverence to them always &"rt. 311- %ivil %ode'
4.
5. 6.
2 vs "n "ct providing for the method by which the people of the town Pompeya may be called upon to render assistance for the protection of the public and the preservation of peace and good order is constitutional. <t was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the state and does not violate the constitutional prohibition on involuntary servitude. Polloc# 7o indebtedness warrants a suspension of the right to be free from vs compulsory service- and no state can ma#e the !uitting of wor# Eilliams any component of a crime- or ma#e criminal sanctions available for holding unwilling persons to labor.
>. CRUEL AND INHUMAN PUNISHMENT
S #ti$n 7K" Art. III. 7. E(# !!i. &in ! !+all n$t b im*$! d" n$r #r) l" d 2radin2 $r in+)man *)ni!+m nt in&li#t d. N it+ r !+all d at+ * nalty b im*$! d" )nl !!" &$r #$m* llin2 r a!$n! in.$l.in2 + in$)! #rim !" t+ C$n2r !! + r a&t r *r$.id ! &$r it. Any d at+ * nalty alr ady im*$! d !+all b r d)# d t$ r #l)!i$n * r* t)a. 8. T+ m*l$ym nt $& *+y!i#al" *!y#+$l$2i#al" $r d 2radin2 *)ni!+m nt a2ain!t any *ri!$n r $r d tain $r t+ )! $& !)b!tandard $r inad 6)at * nal &a#iliti ! )nd r !)b+)man #$nditi$n! !+all b d alt 'it+ by la'.
W+ n i! a * nalty F#r) l" d 2radin2 and in+)manG, &1' " penalty is cruel and inhuman if it involves torture or lingering suffering. Ex. (eing drawn and !uartered. &2' " penalty is degrading if it exposes a person to public humiliation. Ex. (eing tarred and feathered- then paraded throughout town. Standard! U! d &1' The punishment must not be so severe as to be degrading to the dignity of human beings. &2' <t must not be applied arbitrarily. &3' <t must not be unacceptable to contemporary society &:' <t must not be excessive- i.e. it must serve a penal purpose more effectively than a less severe punishment would. E(# !!i. Fin " fine is excessive- when under any circumstance- it is disproportionate to the offense.
7oteA Qr. (ernas says that the accused cannot be convicted of the crime to which the punishment is attached if the court finds that the punishment is crueldegrading or inhuman.
)easonA Eithout a valid penalty- the law is not a penal law.
L. NON IMPRISONMENT FOR DE/T

S #ti$n 8J" Art. III. N$ * r!$n !+all b im*ri!$n d &$r d bt $r n$n0*aym nt $& a *$ll ta(. Qor +)manitarian reasonsS an added guaranty of the liberty of persons against their incarceration for the enforcement of purely private debts because of their misfortune of being poor
D bt A any civil obligation arising from a contract- expressed or implied- resulting in any liability to pay in money. S#$* $& 2)aranty a2ain!t im*ri!$nm nt &$r n$n0*aym nt $& d bt <f an accused fails to pay the fine imposed upon him- this may result in his subsidiary imprisonment because his liability is e2 delicto and not e2 contractu.
A FRAUDULENT d bt may r !)lt in t+ im*ri!$nm nt $& t+ d bt$r i&% 1. The fraudulent debt constitutes a crime such as estafa+ and 2. The accused has been duly convicted. POLL TA? 1eneral )uleA 7on$payment of taxes is punishable with imprisonment. ExceptionA Qailure to pay a poll tax P$ll ta( A a specific sum levied upon every person belonging to a certain class without regard to his property or occupation. " tax is not a debt since it is an obligation arising from law. Bence- its non$payment maybe validly punished with imprisonment.
M. DOU/LE JEOPARD5
S #ti$n 87" Art. III. N$ * r!$n !+all b t'i# *)t in 4 $*ardy $& *)ni!+m nt &$r t+ !am $&& n! . I& an a#t i! *)ni!+ d by a la' and an $rdinan# " #$n.i#ti$n $r a#6)ittal )nd r it+ r !+all #$n!tit)t a bar t$ an$t+ r *r$! #)ti$n &$r t+ !am a#t.
D$)bl 4 $*ardy * when a person was charged with an offense and the case was terminated by ac!uittal or conviction or in any other manner without his consent- he cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense. R 6)i!it ! $& D$)bl J $*ardy 1. 2. 3. :. valid complaint or information filed before a competent court to which defendant has pleaded- and defendant was previously ac!uitted or convicted or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
T'$ -83 >ind! $& D$)bl J $*ardy (1) W+ n a * r!$n i! *)t t'i# in 4 $*ardy $& *)ni!+m nt &$r t+ !am $&& n! &1st sentence of ection 21' (2) W+ n a la' and an $rdinan# *)ni!+ t+ ec. 21' !am a#t &2nd sentence of
Sam O&& n!
R 6)i!it ! &$r a .alid d & n! $& d$)bl 4 $*ardy% &1' Qirst ,eopardy must have attached prior to the second. &2' The first ,eopardy must have terminated. &3' The second ,eopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first. W+ n d$ ! 4 $*ardy ATTACH% -7!t r 6)i!it 3 &a' " person is charged
&b' 2nder a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction &c' (efore a court of competent ,urisdiction &d' "fter the person is arraigned &e' uch person enters a valid plea. W+ n d$ ! 4 $*ardy NOT atta#+% &a' <f information does not charge any offense &b' <f- upon pleading guilty- the accused presents evidence of complete self$ defense- and the court thereafter ac!uits him without entering a new plea of not guilty for accused. &c' <f the information for an offense cogni=able by the )T% is filed with the /T%. &d' <f a complaint filed for preliminary investigation is dismissed. W+ n d$ ! &ir!t 4 $*ardy TERMINATE% -8ND REBUISITE3 1' 2' 3' :' "c!uittal %onviction Dismissal E0J the EMP)E Dismissal on the merits.
consent of the accused
E(am*l ! $& t rminati$n $& 4 $*ardy% &a' Dismissal based on violation of the right to a speedy trial. This amounts to an ac!uittal. &b' Dismissal based on a demurrer to evidence. This is a dismissal on the merits. &c' Dismissal on motion of the prosecution- subse!uent to a motion for reinvestigation filed by the accused. &d' Discharge of an accused to be a state witness. ac!uittal. This amounts to an
W+ n #an t+ PROSECUTION a** al &r$m an $rd r $& di!mi!!al%
&a' <f dismissal is on motion of the accused. ExceptionA <f motion is based on violation of the right to a speedy trial or on a demurrer to evidence. &b' <f dismissal does 7JT amount to an ac!uittal or dismissal on the merits &c' <f the !uestion to be passed upon is purely legal. &d' <f the dismissal violates the right of due process of the prosecution. &e' <f the dismissal was made with grave abuse of discretion. W+at ar #$n!id r d t$ b t+ FSAME OFFENSEG% &a' Exact identity between the offenses charged in the first and second cases. &b' Jne offense is an attempt to commit or a frustration of the other offense. &c' Jne offense is necessarily included or necessary includes the other. .ote1 where a single act results in the violation of different laws or different provisions of the same law- the prosecution for one will not bar the other so long as none of the exceptions apply.
Sam A#t
Double ,eopardy will result if the act punishable under the law and the ordinance are the same. Qor there to be double ,eopardy- it is not necessary that the offense be the same.
S)* r. nin2 Fa#t! 1' 2nder the )ules of %ourt- a conviction for an offense will not bar a prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former information whereA &a' The graver offense developed due to a supervening fact arising from the same act or omission constituting the former charge. &b' The facts constituting the graver offense became #nown or were discovered only after the filing of the former information.
&c' The plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the fiscal and the offended party. 2' 2nder &1'&b'- if the facts could have been discovered by the prosecution but were not discovered because of the prosecutionOs incompetence- it would not be considered a supervening event. E&& #t $& a** al by t+ a##)! d <f the accused appeals his conviction- he E"<LE his right to plead double ,eopardy. The whole case will be open to review by the appellate court. uch court may even increase the penalties imposed on the accused by the trial court. <n "lmario v. %"- the %ourt held that the delays were not unreasonable+ hence- there was no denial of the right to speedy trial. econd- the dismissal was with the consent of the accused. Bence- reinstatement did not violate the right against double ,eopardy.
N. E? POST FACTO LAWS AND /ILL OF ATTAINDER

S #ti$n 88" Art. III. N$ ( *$!t &a#t$ la' $r bill $& attaind r !+all b >ind! $& E( P$!t Fa#t$ La'! &1' Jne which ma#es an action done before the passing of the law- and which was innocent when done- criminal- and punishes such action. &2' Jne which aggravates the crime or ma#es it greater than when it was committed. &3' Jne which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than that which the law annexed to the crime when it was committed. &:' Jne which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less testimony than the law re!uired at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the accused. na#t d.
&;' Jne which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only (2T- in effect- imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right- which- when done- was lawful. (6) Jne which deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled such as the protection of a former conviction or ac!uittal- or a proclamation of amnesty. -In R >ay 1ill 2a! >ami3 C+ara#t ri!ti#! $& E( P$!t Fa#t$ La' &a' /ust refer to criminal matters &b' Pre,udicial to the accused &c' )etroactive in application <n La#!$n .. E( #. S #.- the %ourt held that in general- ex post facto law prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. )" 7o. K2:I is not a penal law.... The contention that the new law diluted their right to a two$tiered appeal is incorrect because >the right to appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by law. )" K2:I pertains only to matters of procedure- and being merely an amendatory statute it does not parta#e the nature of ex post facto law.? <n Cald r .. /)ll- the %ourt said that when the law alters the legal rules of evidence or mode of trial- it is an ex post facto law. ExceptionA &(ea=ell v. Jhio' unless the changes operate only in limited and unsubstantial manner to the disadvantage of the accused. <n /ay$t .. Sandi2anbayan- the accused was convicted by the andiganbayan for estafa on /ay 36- 1IK6. "ccused appealed. Jn /arch 15- 1IK2- (P (lg. 1I; was passed authori=ing suspension of public officers against whom an information may be pending at any stage. Jn Duly 22- 1IK2- the court suspended the accused. The upreme %ourt ruled that "rt. 2: of the )evised Penal %ode that suspension of an officer during trial shall not be considered a penalty. The suspension in the case is merely a preventive and not a penal measure which therefore does not come under the ex post facto prohibition.
/ILL OF ATTAINDER (ill of attainder * is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without ,udicial trial. <f the punishment be less than death- the act is termed a bill of pains and penalties.? -C)mmin2! .. Mi!!$)ri3
&"ll (ills of "ttainder are Ex Post Qacto .aws' El m nt! $& /ill $& Attaind r 1. There must be a law. 2. The law imposes a penal burden on a named individual or easily ascertainable members of a group. 3. There is a direct imposition of penal burden without ,udicial trial.
O. PRI1AC5 OF COMMUNICATION
S #ti$n 9-73" Art. III. T+ *ri.a#y $& #$mm)ni#ati$n and #$rr !*$nd n# !+all b in.i$labl (# *t )*$n la'&)l $rd r $& t+ #$)rt" $r '+ n *)bli# !a& ty $r $rd r r 6)ir ! $t+ r'i! " a! *r !#rib d by la'. F$rm! $& C$rr !*$nd n# ! and C$mm)ni#ati$n C$. r d 1. 2. 3. :. ;. letters messages telephone calls telegrams- and the li#es
Intr)!i$n int$ t+ Pri.a#y $& C$mm)ni#ati$n May / All$' d 1. 2pon lawful order of the court- or 2. Ehen public safety or order re!uires otherwise as prescribed by law. Ehen intrusion is made without a ,udicial order- it would have to be based upon a government official3s assessment that public safety and order demand such intrusion.
P)bli# Ord r and Sa& ty * the security of human lives- liberty- and property against the activities of invaders- insurrectionists- and rebels. RA N$. ;8JJ :n$'n a! t+ Anti0Wir ta**in2 La' provides penalties for specific violations of private communication. 2nder ec. 3 of the "ct allows court$authori=ed taps- under specific conditions for the crimes of
treason- espionage- provo#ing war and disloyalty in case of war- piracymutiny in the high seas- rebellion- conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion- inciting rebellion- sedition- conspiracy to commit sedition- inciting to sedition- #idnapping.
P. RIGHT TO PRI1AC5
<n O*l .. T$rr !- the right to privacy being a fundamental right- the government has the burden of proof to show that a statute &"J no. 36K in this case' is ,ustified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn.
><n no uncertain terms- we also underscores that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good. <t merely re!uires that the law be narrowly focused.? <ntrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards and well$defined standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions. <n R$ .. Wad - the %ourt held that abortions are permissible for any reason a woman chooses- up until the Ppoint at which the fetus becomes Nviable-O that is- potentially able to live outside the mother3s womb. (a) The %onstitution does not explicitly mention any right to privacy but the %ourt has recogni=ed that such right does exist in the %onstitution. The %ourt deemed abortion a fundamental right under the 2nited tates %onstitution- thereby sub,ecting all laws attempting to restrict it to the standard of strict scrutiny. Ehere certain >fundamental rights? are involved- the %ourt has held that regulation limiting these rights may be ,ustified only by a >compelling state interest.? &b' The right to privacy is broad enough to encompass a womanOs decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. (ut a womanOs right to terminate her pregnancy at whatever time- in whatever way and for whatever reason she alone chooses is 7JT absolute. Ehile recogni=ing the right to privacy- the %ourt also ac#nowledges that some state regulation in areas protected by a right is appropriate. " state may properly assert important interests in safeguarding health- in maintaining medical standards- and in protecting potential life.
B. WRIT OF HA/EAS DATA

Writ $& +ab a! data * is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life- liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee- or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering- collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person- family- home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. <t is governed by The )ule on the Erit of Babeas Data &"./. 7o. 6K$1$15$ % * full text'- which was approved by the upreme %ourt on 22 Danuary 266K. That )ule shall not diminish- increase or modify substantive rights.
C$n!tit)ti$nal /a!i! S #ti$n <-<3" Art. 1III. Pr$m)l2at r)l ! #$n# rnin2 t+ *r$t #ti$n and n&$r# m nt $& #$n!tit)ti$nal ri2+t!" *l adin2" *ra#ti# " and *r$# d)r in all #$)rt!" t+ admi!!i$n t$ t+ *ra#ti# $& la'" t+ int 2rat d bar" and l 2al a!!i!tan# t$ t+ )nd r0*ri.il 2 d. S)#+ r)l ! !+all *r$.id a !im*li&i d and in (* n!i. *r$# d)r &$r t+ !* dy di!*$!iti$n $& #a! !" !+all b )ni&$rm &$r all #$)rt! $& t+ !am 2rad " and !+all n$t dimini!+" in#r a! " $r m$di&y !)b!tanti. ri2+t!. R)l ! $& *r$# d)r $& !* #ial #$)rt! and 6)a!i04)di#ial b$di ! !+all r main && #ti. )nl !! di!a**r$. d by t+ S)*r m C$)rt.
The )ule ta#es effect on 2 Qebruary 266K- following its publication in three &3' newspapers of general circulation.
W+$ may &il a * titi$n &$r t+ i!!)an# $& a 'rit $& +ab a! data, G n ral r)l % The aggrieved party. E(# *ti$n!% <n cases of extralegal #illings and enforced disappearancesthe petition may be filed byA &1' "ny member of the immediate family of the aggrieved partynamelyA the spouse- children and parents+ or &2' "ny ascendant- descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity- in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
W+ r #an t+ * titi$n b &il d, &1' )egional Trial %ourt where the petitioner or respondent resides- or that which has ,urisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered- collected or stored- at the option of the petitioner. &2' upreme %ourt+ &3' %ourt of "ppeals+ or &:' andiganbayan- when the action concerns public data files of government offices. 7o doc#et and other lawful fees shall be re!uired from an indigent petitioner. The petition of the indigent shall be doc#eted and acted upon immediately- without pre,udice to subse!uent submission of proof of indigency not later than 1; days from the filing of the petition.
T+ . ri&i d 'ritt n * titi$n !+all all 2 t+ &$ll$'in2% &a' The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent+ &b' The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life- liberty or security of the aggrieved party+ &c' The actions and recourses ta#en by the petitioner to secure the data or information+ &d' The location of the files- registers or databases- the government officeand the person in charge- in possession or in control of the data or information- if #nown+ &e' The reliefs prayed for- which may include the updating- rectificationsuppression or destruction of the database or information or files #ept by the respondent. <n case of threats- the relief may include a prayer for an order en,oining the act complained of+ and &f' uch other relevant reliefs as are ,ust and e!uitable.
W+ n i! t+ 'rit $& +ab a! data i!!) d,
2pon the filing of the petition- the court- ,ustice or ,udge shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The cler# of court shall issue the writ under the seal of the court and cause it to be served within three &3' days from its issuance+ or- in case of urgent necessity- the ,ustice or ,udge may issue the writ under his or her own hand- and may deputi=e any officer or person to serve it. The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which shall not be later than ten &16' wor# days from the date of its issuance. " cler# of court who refuses to issue the writ after its allowance- or a deputi=ed person who refuses to serve the same- shall be punished by the court- ,ustice or ,udge for contempt without pre,udice to other disciplinary actions. The writ shall be served upon the respondent by the officer or person deputi=ed by the court- ,ustice or ,udge who shall retain a copy on which to ma#e a return of service. <n case the writ cannot be served personally on the respondent- the rules on substituted service shall apply. The respondent shall file a verified written return together with supporting affidavits within five &;' wor# days from service of the writ- which period may be reasonably extended by the %ourt for ,ustifiable reasons.
C$nt nt! $& R t)rn &a' The lawful defenses such as national security- state secrets- privileged communication- confidentiality of the source of information of media and others+ &b' <n case of respondent in charge- in possession or in control of the data or information sub,ect of the petitionA &i' a disclosure of the data or information about the petitioner- the nature of such data or information- and the purpose for its collection+ &ii' the steps or actions ta#en by the respondent to ensure the security and confidentiality of the data or information+ and &iii' the currency and accuracy of the data or information held+ and &c' Jther allegations relevant to the resolution of the proceeding.
Ehen the respondent fails to file a return- the court- ,ustice or ,udge shall proceed to hear the petition ex parte- granting the petitioner such relief as the petition may warrant unless the court in its discretion re!uires the petitioner to submit evidence. <nstead of having the hearing in open court- it can be done in chambers when the respondent invo#es the defense that the release of the data or information in !uestion shall compromise national security or state secrets- or when the data or information cannot be divulged to the public due to its nature or privileged character. The hearing on the petition shall be summary. Bowever- the court- ,ustice or ,udge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify the issues and determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties. 2pon its finality- the ,udgment shall be enforced by the sheriff or any lawful officer as may be designated by the court- ,ustice or ,udge within five &;' wor# days. Ehen a criminal action has been commenced- no separate petition for the writ shall be filed- but the reliefs under the writ shall be available by motion in the criminal case- and the procedure under this )ule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available under the writ of habeas data. Ehen a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subse!uent to a petition for a writ of habeas data- the petition shall be consolidated with the criminal action. "fter consolidation- the procedure under this )ule shall continue to govern the disposition of the reliefs in the petition. The introduction of the Erit of Babeas Data into Philippine Dustice ystem complemented several writs used in the Philippines. These writs which protect the rights of the individual against the state are as followsA The Writ $& Hab a! C$r*)! * a writ ordering a person who detained another to produce the body and bring it before a ,udge or court. <ts purpose is to determine whether the detention is lawful or not+ The Writ $& Mandam)! * a writ ordering a governmental agency to perform a ministerial function+
The Writ $& Pr$+ibiti$n * a writ ordering a person to prohibit the commission of an illegal act+ The Writ $& C rti$rari * a writ ordering a person to correct an erroneous act committed with grave abuse of discretion+ and The Writ $& Am*ar$ * a writ designed to protect the most basic right of a human being. These are the right to life- liberty and security guaranteed by the %onstitution.
R. ACCESS TO PU/LIC INFORMATION

S #ti$n D" Art. III. T+ ri2+t $& t+ * $*l t$ in&$rmati$n $n matt r! $& *)bli# #$n# rn !+all b r #$2ni= d. A## !! t$ $&&i#ial r #$rd!" and t$ d$#)m nt! and *a* r! * rtainin2 t$ $&&i#ial a#t!" tran!a#ti$n!" $r d #i!i$n!" a! ' ll a! t$ 2$. rnm nt r ! ar#+ data )! d a! ba!i! &$r *$li#y d . l$*m nt" !+all b a&&$rd d t+ #iti= n" !)b4 #t t$ !)#+ limitati$n! a! may b *r$.id d by la'. the citi=enry has a right to #now what is going on in the country and in his government so he can express his views thereon #nowledgeably and intelligently. d
Ri2+t! G)arant
1. )ight to information on matters of public concern + and 2. %orollary right of access to official records and documents. These are political rights that are available to citi=ens only &(ernasPhilippine %onstitution- p. K;'.
Limitati$n!% >"s may be provided by law? Lalmonte v (elmonte 1IKI The people have a right to access official records but they canOt compel custodians of official records to prepare lists- abstractssummaries and the li#e- such not being based on a demandable legal right. Then right to privacy belongs to the individual and must be invo#ed by the individual. " public agency li#e the 1 <
(aldo=a v Dimaano 1I45 .egaspi v %ivil ervice %ommission 1IK4 %have= v P%11 1IIK Echegaray case
cannot invo#e the right to privacy. Dudges cannot prohibit access to ,udicial records. Bowever- a ,udge may regulate the manner in which persons desiring to inspect- examine or copy records in his office- may exercise their rights. Personal interest is not re!uired in asserting the right to information on matters of public concern. Ehat matters constitute >public concern? should be determined by the court on a case to case basis. Public concern &def.' * writings coming into the hands of public officers in connection with their official functions <ll$gotten wealth is- by its nature- a matter of public concern. Privileged communicationA &1' national security- &2' trade secrets- &3' criminal matters pending in court% held that ma#ing the .ethal <n,ection /anual inaccessible to the convict was unconstitutional.
S. FREEDOM OF E?PRESSION
Fr d$m $& S* #+ A >at once the instrument and the guaranty and the bright consummate flower of all liberty.? &Eendell Philips' S#$*
Qreedom of Expression is available only insofar as it is exercised for the discussion of matters affecting t)e pu(lic interest. Purely private interest matters do not come within the guaranty &invasion of privacy is not sanctioned by the %onstitution'. covers ideas that are accepta(le to the ma,ority and the unort)odo2 view. &Jne of the functions of this freedom is >to invite dispute? * 2 upreme %ourt+ >< may not agree with what you say- but < will defend to the death your right to say it.? $ Loltaire' The freedom to spea# includes the right to silent. &This freedom was meant not only to protect the minority who want to tal# but also to benefit the ma,ority who refuse to listen. $ ocrates'
Im*$rtan# The ultimate good desired is better reached by a free trade in ideas * that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the mar#et+ and that truth is the only ground upon which their
wishes safely can be carried out. M$d ! $& E(*r !!i$n &a' Jral and written language &b' ymbolisms &e.g. bended #nee- salute to the flag- cartoons'
El m nt! $& Fr
d$m $& E(*r !!i$n
&1' Qreedom from prior restraint or censorship &2' Qreedom from subse!uent punishment
Fr
d$m Fr$m Pr .i$)! R !traint $r C n!$r!+i*
S #ti$n ;" Art. III. N$ la' !+all b *a!! d abrid2in2 t+ &r d$m $& !* #+" $& (*r !!i$n" $r $& t+ *r !!" $r t+ ri2+t $& t+ * $*l * a# ably t$ a!! mbl and * titi$n t+ 2$. rnm nt &$r r dr !! $& 2ri .an# !.
C n!$r!+i* * conditions the exercise of freedom of expression upon the prior approval of the government. Jnly those ideas acceptable to it are allowed to be disseminated. %ensor- therefore- assumes the role of arbiter for the people- usually applying his own sub,ective standards in determining the good and the not. uch is anathema in a free society. <n N ' 5$r: Tim ! .. Unit d Stat !- the %ourt held that prohibition of >prior restraint? is not absolute- although any system of prior restraint comes to court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutionality. <n N ar .. Minn !$ta- the exceptions to the prohibition of >prior restraint is enumerated by the %ourt- thusA >Ehen a nation is at war- many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort .... 7o one would !uestion but that government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of sailing dates of transports or the number or location of troops.... The security of the community life may be protected against incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by
force of orderly government.? <n SWS .. C$m l #- ec. 1 of )" 7o. I665- the Qair Election "ct says that surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen &1;' days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven days before an election. The provision is challenged as violative of freedom of expression. The %ourt held that as prior restraint- the rule is presumed to be invalid. The power of the %omelec over media franchises is limited to ensuring >e!ual opportunitytime- space and the right to reply? as well as to reasonable rates of charges for the use of media facilities for >public information and forums among candidates.? Bere the prohibition of speech is direct- absolute and substantial. 7or does the rule pass the J3(rien test for content related regulation because &1' it suppresses one type of expression while allowing other types such as editorials- etc. and &2' the restriction is greater than what is needed to protect government interest because the interest can be protected by narrower restriction such as subse!uent punishment. <n R % R 6) !t &$r Radi$0T1 C$. ra2 $& t+ E!trada Trial- the %ourt held that the propriety of the Estrada trial involves the weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information- on the one hand- and the fundamental rights of the accusedon the other hand- along with the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial... Eith the possibility of losing not only the precious liberty but also the very life of an accused- it behooves all to ma#e absolutely certain that an accused receives a verdict solely on the basis of a ,ust and dispassionate ,udgment...? The doctrine of freedom of speech was formulated primarily for the protection of >core speech-? i.e.- speech which communicates politicalsocial or religious ideas. %ommercial speech- however- does not. There need not be total suppression+ even restriction of circulation constitutes censorship
1ros,ean vs "merican Press %o. (urgos vs %hief of taff
the search- padloc#ing and sealing of the offices of /etropolitan /ail and Ee Qorum by military authoritiesresulting in the discontinuance of publication of the newspapers- was held to be prior restraint /utuc vs the %J/E.E% prohibition against the use of taped ,ingles in %J/E.E% the mobile units used in the campaign was held to be unconstitutional- as it was in the nature of censorship
anidad vs %J/E.E%
the %ourt annulled the %J/E.E% prohibition against radio commentators or newspaper columnists from commenting on the issues involved in the scheduled plebiscite on the organic law creating the %ordillera "utonomous )egion as an unconstitutional restraint on freedom of expression
But... 1on=ales vs %J/E.E%
the %ourt upheld the validity of the law which prohibitedexcept during the prescribed election period- the ma#ing of speeches- announcements or commentaries for or against the election of any party or candidate for public office. D2 T<Q<%"T<J7A the inordinate preoccupation of the people with politics tended toward the neglect of the other serious needs of the nation and the pollution of its suffrages. <glesia ni %risto The (oard of )eview for /otion Pictures and Television vs %" &()/PT' has the authority to review the petitioner3s television program. Bowever- the (oard acted with grave abuse of discretion when it gave an >M$rating? to the TL program on the ground of >attac#s against another religion.? uch a classification can be ,ustified only if there is a showing that the tv program would create a clear and present danger of an evil which the tate ought to prevent. Primicias vs The respondent mayor could only reasonably regulate- not Qugosos absolutely prohibit- the use of public places for the purpose indicated. 7ational Press the upreme %ourt upheld the validity of ec. 11&b'- )" 55:5%lub vs which prohibited any person ma#ing use of the media to sell %J/E.E% or to give free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes except to the %J/E.E%. This was held to be within the power of the %J/E.E% to supervise the en,oyment or utili=ation of franchises for the operation of media of communication and information- for the purpose of ensuring e!ual opportunitytime and space- and the >right to reply-? as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media facilities. JsmeTa vs % reaffirmed validity of )" 55:5 as a legitimate exercise of %J/E.E% police power. The regulation is unrelated to the suppression of speech- as any restriction on freedom of expression occasioned thereby is only incidental and no more than is necessary to achieve the purpose of promoting e!uality. 7JTEA This is not inconsistent with the ruling in PP< vs %J/E.E%- because in the latter- % simply said that %J/E.E% cannot procure print space without paying ,ust
"diong vs %J/E.E%
1on=ales vs #atigba#
compensation. %J/E.E%3s resolution prohibiting the posting of decals- and stic#ers in mobile units li#e cars and other moving vehicles was declared unconstitutional for infringmenet of freedom of expression. (esides- the constitutional ob,ective of giving the rich and poor candidates3 e!ual opportunity to inform the electorate is not violated by the posting of decals and stic#ers on cars and other vehicles. >O. rbr adt+ d$#trin ? U prohibits the government from achieving its purpose by means that weep unnecessarily broadly- reaching constitutionally protected as well as unprotected activity+ t)e government )as gone too far+ its legitimate interest can be satisfied without reaching so broadly into the area of protected freedom. petitioner !uestioned the classification of the movie as >for adults only.? the petition was dismissed because the (oard did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
Fr
d$m Fr$m S)b! 6) nt P)ni!+m nt
S #ti$n 7E-73" Art. III. N$ * r!$n !+all b d tain d !$l ly by r a!$n $& +i! *$liti#al b li &! and a!*irati$n!.
Eithout this assurance- the individual would hesitate to spea# for fear that he might be held to account for his speech- or that he might be provo#ing the vengeance of the officials he may have critici=ed. 7ot absolute+ sub,ect to police power and may be regulated &freedom of expression does not cover ideas offensive to public order' !* #+ in !#+$$l *r mi! ! n$t ab!$l)t
Ri2+t $& !t)d nt! t$ &r
1eneral )uleA a student shall not be expelled or suspended solely on the basis of articles he has written ExceptionA when the article materially disrupts class wor# or involves substantial disorder or invasion of rights of others- the school has the right to discipline its students &in such a case- it may expel or suspend the student'
T !t! $& .alid 2$. rnm ntal int r& r n# (criteria in determining t)e lia(ility of t)e individual for ideas e2pressed (y him' % 1. %lear and present danger rule 2. Dangerous tendency doctrine 3. (alance of interest test 7. Cl ar and Pr ! nt Dan2 r R)l * when words are used in such circumstance and of such nature as to create a clear and present danger that will bring about the substantive evil that the tate has a right to prevent. &"s formulated by Dustice Bolmes in S#+ n#: .. Unit d Stat !' Cl ar * causal connection with the danger of the substantive evil arising from the utterance Pr ! nt * time element+ imminent and immediate danger &the danger must not only be probable but also inevitable'. -G$n=al ! .. C$m l #3 <n A/S0C/N .. C$m l #- the %omelec banned >exit polls? in the exercise of its authority to regulate the holders of media franchises during the lection period. <t contends that >an exit poll has the tendency to sow confusion considering the randomness of selecting interviewees.... Bowever- the %ourt said that exit polls constitute an essential part of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Bence- the %omelec cannot ban totally in the guise of of promoting clean- honest- orderly and credible elections. The ban does not satisfy the clear and present danger rule because the evils envisioned are merely speculative. &speech inside an auditorium with K66 persons' speech is often provocative and challenging. hence- >fighting words? are not sufficient to convict a person absent a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil The respondent mayor could only reasonably regulate- not absolutely prohibit- the use of public places for the purpose indicated. the condition of /anila at that time did not ,ustify the mayor3s fears. there was no clear and present danger. decided in 1I:4
Terminiello vs %ity of %hicago
Primicias vs Qugosos
7avarro vs Lillegas
)eyes vs (agatsing
&compare with Primicias case' % sustained respondent mayor3s act of refusing to issue a permit enabling students to hold a public rally. /ayor feared the rally would result to public disorder. $ decided in 1I46 the denial of a permit to hold a public rally was invalid as there was no showing of the probability of a clear and present danger of an evil that might arise as a result of the meeting. The burden of proving such eventually rests on the /ayor.
8. Dan2 r$)! T nd n#y D$#trin A if the words uttered create a dangerous tendency of an evil which the tate has the right to prevent.&Caban!a2 .. F rnand =3 Dustice Bolmes- criti&ue of this doctrineA Every idea is an incitement. <f believed- it is acted on unless some other belief outweighs it- or some failure of energy stifles the movement at its birth. &f' the %alibrated Pre$emptive )esponse Policy is null and void. )espondents are en,oined from using it and to strictly observe the re!uirements of maximum tolerance. <t is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force or violence be advocated. <t is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. " mere tendency toward the evil was enough. "ccused declaredA >The Qilipinos li#e myself must use bolos for cutting off &1overnor$ 1eneral' Eood3s head for having recommended a bad thing for the Qilipinos- for he has #illed our independence.? Be was sentenced to ,ail.
(ayan vs Executive ecretary Ermita %abansag vs Qernande=
People vs Pere=
9. /alan# $& Int r !t Test * when particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public order- and the regulation results in an indirect- conditional- partial abridgment of speech- the duty of the courts is to determine which of the two conflicting interests demands the greater protection under the circumstances presented. -Am ri#an C$mm)ni#ati$n! A!!$#iati$n .. D$)d!3
CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER RULE li(erty is preferred
DANGEROUS TENDENC5 RULE Aut)ority is preferred
/ALANCE OF INTEREST RULE the issue is resolved in the light of the peculiar circumstances obtaining in each particular case
<n M)t)# .. C$m l #- the preferred freedom of expression calls all the more the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to ma#e more meaningful the e!ually vital right of suffrage.
Ehen faced with border line situations where freedom &of expression' to spea# V freedom to #now &to information' are invo#ed against &vs.' maintaining free and clean elections$ the police- local officials and %J/E.E% should lean in favor of freedom. Qor in the ultimate analysis- the freedom of the citi=en and the regulate are 7JT "7T"1J7< T<%. tateOs power to
There can be no free and honest elections if in the efforts to maintain them- the freedom to spea# and the right to #now are unduly curtailed. Ee examine the limits of regulation. D. Qeliciano shows that regulation of election campaign activity may not pass the test of validity ifA <t is too general in its terms 7ot limited in time and scope in its application <t if restricts oneOs expression of belief in a candidate or oneOs opinion of his or her !ualifications <f it cuts off the flow of media reporting <f the regulatory measure bears no clear and reasonable nexus with the constitutionally sanctioned ob,ective. The regulation stri#es at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and- by displaying it on his car- to convince others to agree with him. " stic#er may be furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it placed in his private vehicle- the expression becomes a statement by the ownerprimarily his own and not of anybody else. The 2 n ral r)l for a speech to be considered libelous or defamatory isA
.ibel U falsity G actual malice &uttered in full #nowledge of its falsity or with rec#less disregard' E( m*ti$n% Ehen the sub,ect of the supposed libelous or defamatory material is a public officer. Defamatory words may be uttered against them and not be considered libelous. The reason is that 1' they as#ed for it &>they voluntarily thrust themselves into the public eye and therefore should not be thin$s#inned?'+ 2' itOs a matter of public interest+ and 3' public figures have the opportunity and resources to rebut whatever is said against them. &Policarpio vs /anila Times'+ & N ' 5$r: Tim ! .! S)lli.an' <n N ' 5$r: Tim ! .. S)lli.an- The 7ew Ror# Times is protected under the freedom of speech in publishing paid advertisement- no matter if it contained erroneous claims and facts. aid publication was not >commercial? in the sense that it communicated information- expressed opinion- recited grievances- protested claimed abuses- and sought a financial support on behalf of a movement. That the Times was paid for publishing the advertisement is as immaterial as the fact that newspapers and boo#s are sold.
7ewspapers do not forfeit the protection they en,oy under speech freedom ,ust because they publish paid advertisements. Jtherwise- newspapers will be discouraged from carrying >editorial advertisements? and so might shut off an important outlet for the promulgation of information and ideas by persons who do not themselves have access to publishing facilities. Jn errorsA > ome degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of every thing+ and in no instance is this truer than that of the press.? Erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate. /oreover- criticism of official conduct does not lose its constitutional protection merely because it is effective criticism and hence diminishes their official reputations. Presence of clear and present danger of substantive evil must be proved. "ctual /alice needs to be proved if a public official wants to recover damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct. >Even a false statement may be deemed to ma#e a valuable contribution to public debate since it brings about the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth- produced by its collision with error.? <n 1on=ales v. Halaw$Hatigba#- Hapit sa Patalim was classified as >Qor "dults Jnly? by the /T)%( and was suggested to have certain portions cut0 deleted.
BeldA /T)%( do not have the power to exercise prior restraint. The power of the /T)%( is limited to the classification of films. The test to determine whether a motion picture exceeds the bounds of permissible exercise of free speech and- therefore should be censored- is the clear and present danger test.
A!! mbly and P titi$n

The right to assemble is not sub,ect to prior restraint and may not be conditioned upon the prior issuance of a permit or authori=ation from the government authorities. Bowever- the right must be exercised in such a way that it will not pre,udice the public welfare. &D la Cr)= .. C$)rt $& A** al!3 <f assembly is to be held at a public place- permit for the use of such place- and not for the assembly itself- may be validly re!uired. Power of local officials is merely for regulation and not for prohibition. -Primi#ia! .. F)2$!$3 Permit for public assembly is not necessary if meeting is to be held inA a private place+ the campus of a government$owned or operated educational institution+ and freedom par#. -/.P. /l2. EEJ 0 FT+ P)bli# A!! mbly A#t $& 7KE<H3 <n J/L R y ! .. /a2at!in2- retired D. D(. )eyes sought a permit from the %ity of /anila to hold a march and rally on Jct 25- 1IK3 2$;pm from .uneta to gates of 2 Embassy- and was denied by the /ayor due to Lienna %onvention Jrdinance and fear of subversives may infiltrate the ran#s of the demonstrators.
BeldA no ,ustifiable ground to deny permit because (ill of )ights will prevail over Lienna Jrdinance should conflict exist &none proven because ;66m not measured from gate to 2 Embassy proper' and fear of serious in,ury cannot alone ,ustify suppression of free speech and assembly$ only clear and present danger of substantive evil. 7otesA the %ourt is called upon to protect the exercise of the cognate rights to free speech and peaceful assemblyS Tanada vs (agatsing % sustained the petitioner3s motion compelling the mayor of /anila to issue a permit to hold a rally- but changed the
/alabanan vs )amento
Lillar vs T<P
7on vs Dames
P(/ Employees "ssoc vs P(/
meeting place to 2garte Qield- a private par# &several students were suspended for 1 year for conducting demonstration in the premises of a university outside the area permitted by the school authorities' % emphasi=ed that the students did not shed their constitutional rights to free speech at the schoolhouse gateand permitted the students to re$enroll and finish their studies. &several students were barred from re$enrollment for participating in demonstrations' while the %ourt upheld the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning- which includes the right to set academic standards to determine under what circumstances failing grades suffice for expulsion of students- it was held that this right cannot be utili=ed to discriminate against those who exercise their constitutional rights to peaceful assembly. % abandons its ruling in "lcua= vs P (" &that enrolment of a student is a semester$to$semester contract and the school may not be compelled to renew the contract' upholding the primacy of freedom of expression- because the students do not shed theur constitutionally protected rights at the school gate. right to free assembly and petition prevails over economic rights.
T !t! $& a la'&)l a!! mbly

-73 P)r*$! T !t ideally- the test should be the purpose for which the assembly is heldregardless of the auspices under which it is organi=ed
-83 A)!*i# ! T !t Evengelista vs EarnshawA the mayor of /anila prohibited the members of the %ommunist Party from holding any #ind of meeting- revo#ing all permits previously granted by him on the ground that the party had been found &by the fiscal3s office' to be an illegal association.
<n P $*l .. /)!t$!- (ustos and several people sent complaint letters via
counsel against Dustice of Peace )oman Punsalan- who charged them with libel. BeldA (ustos and the others were ac!uitted)atioA the guarantees of free speech and a free press include the right to critici=e ,udicial conduct. "nd these people did so in proper channels without undue publicity- believing they were right. Ri2+t $& A!!$#iati$n
S #ti$n E" Art. III. T+ ri2+t $& t+ * $*l " in#l)din2 t+$! m*l$y d in t+ *)bli# and *ri.at ! #t$r!" t$ &$rm )ni$n!" a!!$#iati$n!" $r !$#i ti ! &$r *)r*$! ! n$t #$ntrary t$ la' !+all n$t b abrid2 d.
The )ight of "ssociation is deemed embraced in freedom of expression because the organi=ation can be used as a vehicle for the expression of views that have a bearing on public welfare. right to organi=e does not carry with it right to stri#e Employees "ssoc vs %" Lictoriano vs Eli=alde )ope Eor#ers3 2nion Jccena vs %J/E.E% <n re Edillon
right of association was not violated where political parties were prohibited from participating in the barangay elections to insure the non$partisanship of the candidates. (ar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. <ntegration does not ma#e a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member.
T. O/SCENIT5 CASES
2 vs Hottinger % ac!uitted accused who was charged of having offered for sale pictures of half$clad members of non$%hristian tribes- holding that he had only
People vs 1o Pin
Pita vs %" /iller vs %alifornia
presented them in their native attire "ccused was convicted for exhibiting nude paintings and pictures- notwithstanding his claim that he had done so in the interest of art. %noting that he has charged admission fees to the exhibition- held that his purpose was commercialnot merely artistic. % declared that the determination of what is obscene is a ,udicial function. Test of JbscenityA whether the average person- applying contemporary community standards- would find that the wor#- ta#en as a wholeappeals to the prurient interest whether the wor# depicts- in a patently offensive way- sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable law whether the wor#- ta#en as a whole- lac#s serious literary- artistic- political or scientific value
Dustice Douglas- dissentA < do not thin# we- the ,udges- were ever given the constitutional power to ma#e definitions of obscenity. Jbscenity is a hodgepodge. $ The %ourts should not apply a national standard but the standard of t)e community in which the material is being tested. <n R n$ .. ACLU- %ommunications Decency "ct see# to protect minors from obscenity on the internet. BeldA overbroad- vague- unconstitutional. 7otesA exual expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the Qirst "mendment.
The internet is not an >invasive? medium because it re!uires a series of affirmative steps more deliberate and directed than merely turning a dial &tv or radio'. There is no effective way to determine the identity or the age of a user who is accessing material through email- mail exploders- newsgroups or chat rooms.
The %ommunity tandard as applied to the internet means that any communication available to a nationwide audience will be ,udged by the standards of the community most li#ely to be offended by the message. The effect of %D" is such that when a site is bloc#ed for being >indecent? or >patently offensive? the remaining content even if not indecent cannot be viewed anymore. <mposition of re!uirements &adult identification number or credit card' would bar adults who do not have a credit card and lac# the resources to obtain one from accessing any bloc#ed material. <t burdens communication among adults. The %D" is punitive- a criminal statute. The %D" is a content$ based blan#et restriction on speech- and as such- cannot be properly analy=ed as a form of time- place and manner regulation. The %D" was replaced with %hild Jnline Protection "ct- 1. The scope had been limited to material displayed only on the world wide web. %hat and email were not included. The classification of content was limited as >harmful to minors? using the /iller L %alifornia Test. o- it was upheld by the upreme %ourt.
7otesA the %ourtOs Durisprudence teaches that it is the publisherOs responsibility to abide by that communityOs standards. The fact that distributors of allegedly obscene materials may be sub,ected to varying community standards in the various federal ,udicial districts into which they transmit the materials does not render a federal statute unconstitutional. $ Criticism of 2fficial Conduct .agun=ad vs otto Lda. the %ourt granted the petition to restrain the public de 1on=ales exhibition of the movie >/oises Padilla tory-? because it contained fictionali=ed embellishments. (eing a public figure does not destroy one3s right to privacy. "yer Productions vs the tribunal upheld the primacy of freedom of Dudge %apulong expression over Enrile3s >right to privacy-? because Enrile was a public figure and a public figure3s right to privacy is narrower than that of an ordinary citi=en. (esides- the movie >Qour Days of )evolution &sabi ni %ru='? 0 >" Dangerous .ife &sabi ni 7achura'? 0 >The Qour Day )evolution &sabi sa case'? would not be historically faithful
2 vs (ustos People vs "larcon
<n re Durado
<n re otto
<n re Tulfo
<n re .aureta
Waldivar vs andiganbayan
without including therein the participation of Enrile in the ED " revolution. % compared criticism of official conduct to a >scalpel that relieves the abscesses of officialdom? newspaper publications tending to impedeobstruct- embarrass or influence the courts in administering ,ustice in a pending suit or proceeding constitutes criminal contempt which is summarily punishable by the courts. a publication that tends to impede- embarrass or obstruct the court and constitutes a clear and present danger to the administration of ,ustice is not protected by the guarantee of press freedom and is punishable by contempt. <t is not necessary that publication actually obstructs the administration of ,ustice- it is enough that it tends to do so. a senator was punished for contempt for having attac#ed a decision of % which he called incompetent and narrow$minded- and announcing that he would file a bill for its reorgani=ation Tulfo3s > ang#atuta# na (obo? column was held contumacious. Qreedom of the press is subordinate to the decision- authority and integrity of the ,udiciary and the proper administration of ,ustice. a lawyer was held in contempt and suspended from the practice of law for wrting individual letters to members of the % division that decided a case against his client- arrogantly !uestioning their decision a member of the (ar who imputed charges of improper influence- corruption and other misdeeds to members of the upreme %ourt was suspended from the practice of law as >neither the right of free speech nor the right to engage in political activities can be so construed or extended as to permit any such liberties to a member of the bar.?
U. FREEDOM OF RELIGION
S #ti$n <" Art. III. N$ la' !+all b mad r !* #tin2 an !tabli!+m nt $& r li2i$n" $r *r$+ibitin2 t+ &r ( r#i! t+ r $&. T+ &r ( r#i! and n4$ym nt $& r li2i$)! *r$& !!i$n and '$r!+i*" 'it+$)t di!#riminati$n $r *r & r n# " !+all &$r . r b all$' d. N$ r li2i$)! t !t !+all b r 6)ir d &$r t+ ( r#i! $& #i.il $r *$liti#al ri2+t!. R li2i$n d &in d >any specific system of belief- worship- conduct- etc.- often involving a code of ethics and philosophy? &defined by %ru=' <n A2li*ay .! R)i= religion is defined as >a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his %reator. ! C$ntain d S #ti$n <" Art. III $& t+ C$n!tit)ti$n
T'$ G)arant
&1' 7on$establishment clause &2' Qree exercise of religious profession and worship
7. N$n0 !tabli!+m nt Cla)!

reinforces ec. 5- "rt. << on the separation of church and tate other provisions which support thisA ec 2&;'- "rt. <M$% 8a religious sect or denomination cannot be registered as a political party9- ec ;&2'- "rt. L< 8no sectoral representative from the religious sector9- and ec 2I &2'- "rt. L< 8prohibition against the use of public money or property for the benefit of any religion- or of any priest- minister or ecclsiastic9- ec. 2K &3'- "rt. L< 8exemption from taxation of properties actually- directly and exclusively used for religious purposes- ec :&2'- "rt M<L 8citi=enship re!uirement of ownership of educational institutions except those owned by religious groups9- ec 2I&2'- "rt L< 8appropriation allowed where the minister is employed in the armed forces- penal institution or government$owned orphanage or leprosarium9
S#$* A The tate
&a' cannot set up a church+ &b' cannot pass laws which aid one religion- all religions or prefer one over another+ &c' cannot influence a person to go to or remain away from church against his will+ nor &d' force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. Rati$nal A
to delineate boundaries between the two institutions+ and to avoid encroachment by one against the other. A )ni$n $& C+)r#+ and Stat '$)ld it+ r% tend to destroy government and to degrade religion+ or result in a conspiracy because of its composite strength separation of church and state is not a all of )ostility
The 1overnment is neutral. <t protects all- but prefers none and disparages none. Qreedom of religion includes freedom from religion+ the right to worship includes right not to worship
T'$ .al) ! !$)2+t t$ b *r$t #t d by t+ n$n0 !tabli!+m nt #la)! % (1) 1$l)ntari!m * the growth of a religious sect as a social force must come from the voluntary support of its members because of the belief that both spiritual and secular society will benefit if religions are allowed to compete on their own intrinsic merit without benefit of official patronage. (2) In!)lati$n $& t+ *$liti#al *r$# !! &r$m int r&ait+ di!! n!i$n * voluntarism cannot be achieved unless the political process is insulated from religion and unless religion is insulated politics. Engel vs Litale recitation by students in public schools in 7ew Ror# of a prayer composed by the (oard of )egents was unconstitutional
Everson vs (oard 2 upreme %ourt sustained the law providing free of Education transportation for all schoolchildren without discriminationincluding those attending parochial schools (oard of 2 upreme %ourt sustained the law re!uiring the Education vs "llen petitioner to lend textboo#s free of charge to all students from grades 4$12- including those attending private schools <n %verson and Allen- the government aid was given directly to the student and parents- not to the church$related school "dong vs %heong in line with the constitutional principle of e!ual treatment eng 1ee of all religions- the tate recogni=es the validity of marriages performed in conformity with the rites of /ohammedan religion )ubi vs Provincial the expression >non$%hristian? in >non$%hristian tribes? (oard was not meant to discriminate. <t refers to degree of civili=ation- not to the religious belief. <slamic Da3wah by arrogating to itself the tas# of issuing halal %ouncil of the certifications- the tate has- in effect- forced /uslims to Philippines vs accept its own interpretation of the Cur3an and unna on Jffice of Exec. )alal food. ec. Intram)ral R authorities 1on=ales vs "rchbishop of /anila Qonacier v %" li2i$)! Di!*)t A outside the ,urisdiction of the secular where a civil right depends upon some matter pertaining to ecclesiastical affairs- the civil tribunal tries the civil right and nothing more. where the dispute involves the property rights of the religious group- or the relations of the members where the property rights are involved- the civil courtws may assume ,urisdiction.
8. Fr
E( r#i! Cla)!
E( r#i! Cla)! %
T'$ A!* #t! $& Fr 7. Fr
d$m t$ / li .
&a' absolute &b' includes not to believe (c) >everyone has a right to his beliefs and he may not be called to account because he cannot prove what he believes?
8. Fr
d$m t$ A#t A##$rdin2 t$ On H! / li &!
&a' happens when the individual externali=es his beliefs in acts or omissions &b' sub,ect to regulation+ can be en,oyed only with proper regard to rights of others &c' Dustice Qran#furterA the constitutional provision on religious freedom terminated disabilities- it did not create new privileges... its essence is freedom from conformity to religious dogma- not freedom from conformity to law because of religious dogma 1erman vs (arangan % found that petitioners were not sincere in their profession of religious liberty and were using it merely to express their opposition to the government Ebralinag vs division % reversed 1erona vs ec. of Educ. - and uperintendent of chools of upheld the right of petitioners to refute to %ebu salute the Philippine flag on account of their religious scruples. To compel students to ta#e part in a flag ceremony when it is against their religious beliefs will violate their religious freedom. People vs Wosa invocation of religious scruples in order to avoid military service was brushed aside by the % Lictoriano vs Eli=alde )ope % upheld the validity of )" 33;6- exempting Eor#ers 2nion members of a religious sect from being compelled to ,oin a labor union "merican (ible ociety vs %ity the constitutional guarantee of free exercise of /anila carries with it the right to disseminate information- and any restraint of such right can be ,ustified only on the ground that there is a clear and present danger of an evil which the tate has the right to prevent+ Bence- %ity ordinance imposing license fees to on sale is inapplicable to the society Tolentino vs ec. of Qinance the free exercise clause does not prohibit imposing a generally applicable sales and use tax on the sale of religious materials+ the registration fee is not imposed for the
exerise of a privilege- but only for the purpose of defraying part of the cost of registration C$m* llin2 Stat Int r !t t !t 8Estrada vs Escritor9 the constitution3s religion clause3s prescribe not a strict bu a (enevolent neutrality &which recogni=es that government must pursue its secular goals and interests- but at the same time- strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits benevolent neutrality could allow for accomodation morality based on religion provided it does not offend the compelling state interest test. two steps &as regards the test'A in!uire whether respondent3s right to religious freedom has been burdened+ and ascertain respondent3s sincerity in her religious belief.
<n C nt n$ .! 1illal$n0P$rnill$!- the %ourt held that solicitiations for religious purposes re!uires not a prior permit from D ED as it is not included in solicitations for >charitable or public welfare purposes.?
R li2i$)! T !t! PurposeA to stop government3s clandestine attempts to prevent a person from exercising his civil of political rights because of his religious beliefs. <n Pamil .. T l r$n- ec. 214; of the )evised "dminsitrative %ode is !uestioned whether or not it is consistent with the religious clause of the %onstitution. aid %ode dis!ualifies an >ecclesiastic? from being elected or appointed to a municipal office. even Dustices voted to consider this a prohibited >religious test.? Qive ,ustices said it is not a religious test but a safeguard against the constant threat of union of %hurch and tate that has mar#ed the Philippine history. &Bence- since the ma,ority vote needed under the 1I43 %onstitution to nullify a statute was not reached- the dis!ualification remains enforceable.' invocation of religious scruples in order to avoid military service was brushed aside by the %
People vs Wosa
1. RIGHT TO TRA1EL
S #ti$n I" Art. III. T+ lib rty $& ab$d and $& #+an2in2 t+ !am 'it+in t+ limit! *r !#rib d by la' !+all n$t b im*air d (# *t )*$n la'&)l $rd r $& t+ #$)rt. N it+ r !+all t+ ri2+t t$ tra. l b im*air d (# *t in t+ int r !t $& nati$nal ! #)rity" *)bli# !a& ty" $r *)bli# + alt+" a! may b *r$.id d by la'.
Lib rty G)arant
d by S #. I Art. III
1. freedom to choose and change one3s place of abode+ and 2. freedom to travel both within the country and outside Limitati$n! .iberty of "bode * >upon lawful order of the court? )ight to Travel * >national security- public safety or public health as may be provided by law? %aunca ala=ar K2 Phil K;1 vs Ehether a maid had the right to transfer to another residence even if she had not paid yet the amount advances by an employment agencyA Res. The fortunes of business cannot be controlled by controlling a fundamental human freedom. Buman dignity and freedom are essentially spiritual * inseparable from the idea of eternal. /oney- power- etc. belong to the ephemeral and perishable. )ubi vs Provincial The respondents were ,ustified in re!uiring the members (oard of /indoro of certain non$%hristian tribes to reside in a reservation1I1I for their better education- advancement and protection. The measure was a legitimate exercise of police power. Lillavicencio vs Prostitutes- despite being in a sense lepers- are not .u#ban chattels but Philippine citi=ens- protected by the same 1I1I constitutional guarantee of freedom of abode. They may not be compelled to change their domicile in the absence of a law allowing such. alonga vs the case became moot and academic when the permit to Bermoso travel abroad was issued before the case could be heard. I4 %)" 121 .oren=o vs Dir. of .aws for the segregation of lepers have been provided the
Bealth 1I24
world over and is supported by high scientific authority. uch segregation is premised on the duty to protect public health. /anoto# vs %" (ail posted in a criminal case- is a valid restriction on the 1IK5 right to travel. (y its nature- it may serve as a prohibition on an accused from leaving the ,urisdiction of the Philippines where orders of Philippine courts would have no binding force. /arcos vs The liberty of abode and the right to travel includes the /anglapus right to leave- reside and travel within oneOs country but it 1IKI does not include the right to return to oneOs country. 7JTEA %ourt warned that this case should not create a precedent because /arcos was a class in himself. Philippine )ight to travel may be impaired in the interest of national "ssociation of security- public health or public order- as may be provided ervice Exporters by law. vs Drilon "n order temporarily suspending the deployment of 1IKK overseas wor#ers is constitutional for having been issued in the interest of the safety of JQEs- as provided by the .abor %ode.

Consti 2NOTES

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CODES AND NOTES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II by PORFERIO JR.

and MELFA SALIDAGA

NOTES AND CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

paid Limitati$n!% &a' (ill of )ights

II. CI1IL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS

Cla!!i&i#ati$n $& Ri2+t!

it)out due process

A!* #t! $& D) Pr$# !!

application of laws. <t is a guarantee of procedural fairness.

Pr$# d)ral D) Pr$# !!

C. SEARCH AND SEICURE

1alid Warrantl !! S ar#+ !

9. ! ar#+ ! $& *r$+ibit d arti#l ! in *lain .i '

1alid Warrantl !! Arr !t

3. the offender escaped from the penal establishment

R 6)i!it ! $& a .alid 'arrant

called the FMiranda D$#trin G &/iranda vs "ri=ona'

R 6)i!it ! $& t+ Miranda D$#trin

&e' Bealth of the accused &f' trength of the evidence

F. RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

T+ Ri2+t! $& t+ A##)! d In#l)d

8. Pr !)m*ti$n $& Inn$# n#

9. Ri2+t t$ b H ard by Him! l& and C$)n! l

;. Nat)r and Ca)! $& A##)!ati$n

t t+ Witn !! ! Fa# t$ Fa#

P)r*$! ! $& t+ Ri2+t t$ M

I. SPEED5 DISPOSATION OF CASES

S* dy trial )efers to trial phase only %riminal cases only

R m dy in #a! t+ r +a! b Dismissal through mandamus

J. RIGHT AGAINST SELF0INCRIMINATION

J. RIGHT AGAINST IN1OLUNTAR5 SER1ITUDE

>. CRUEL AND INHUMAN PUNISHMENT

)easonA Eithout a valid penalty- the law is not a penal law.

L. NON IMPRISONMENT FOR DE/T

consent of the accused

W+ n #an t+ PROSECUTION a** al &r$m an $rd r $& di!mi!!al%

N. E? POST FACTO LAWS AND /ILL OF ATTAINDER

B. WRIT OF HA/EAS DATA

W+ n i! t+ 'rit $& +ab a! data i!!) d,

R. ACCESS TO PU/LIC INFORMATION

d$m $& E(*r !!i$n

d$m Fr$m Pr .i$)! R !traint $r C n!$r!+i*

1ros,ean vs "merican Press %o. (urgos vs %hief of taff

But... 1on=ales vs %J/E.E%

d$m Fr$m S)b! 6) nt P)ni!+m nt

Ri2+t $& !t)d nt! t$ &r

Terminiello vs %ity of %hicago

(ayan vs Executive ecretary Ermita %abansag vs Qernande=

CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER RULE li(erty is preferred

DANGEROUS TENDENC5 RULE Aut)ority is preferred

A!! mbly and P titi$n

P(/ Employees "ssoc vs P(/

T !t! $& a la'&)l a!! mbly

Pita vs %" /iller vs %alifornia

2 vs (ustos People vs "larcon

7. N$n0 !tabli!+m nt Cla)!

S#$* A The tate

T'$ A!* #t! $& Fr 7. Fr

d$m t$ A#t A##$rdin2 t$ On H! / li &!

Lib rty G)arant

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9. ! ar#+ ! $& r$+ibit d arti#l ! in lain .i '