That October, the years of fieldwork paid off with the discovery of the ship's remains.

After 20 years of investigation, the waters of Imari ay finally yielded, albeit in more than one piece, one of the khan's ships. !t government"financed constr!ction of a new fish"farming installation directly atop the wreck site was slated to begin shortly. #hile that pro$ect provided f!nds to %O&'#A's investigations, the 2,(00"s)!are" foot site had to be completely e*cavated by the end of 2002. #ork this past year""aided by a large team of divers, !nderwater comm!nication systems, and an intensive program of e*cavation in cooperation with the Takashima +!se!m of ,olk -istory and .!lt!re and the ,!k!oka .ity +!se!m""proceeded rapidly. In a series of dives, I was able to watch as the site yielded an incredible array of well"preserved feat!res and artifacts. The main portion of the wreck site lies in /0 feet of water and is b!ried beneath fo!r feet of thick, visco!s m!d. #orking with a doc!mentation crew, I watched as they mapped each artifact, photographing and then recovering ceramics, tortoiseshell combs, scraps of red leather armor, h!ll planks, and part of a watertight b!lkhead. The artifacts range from personal effects, s!ch as a small bowl on which was painted the name of its owner, a commander #eng, to provisions and the implements of war. The provisions incl!de a large n!mber of storage $ars in vario!s si1es, all of them hastily and cr!dely made. They hint at the rapid, if not r!shed, pace of the khan's mobili1ation for the invasion. &o, too, do the anchor stones. .hinese anchor stones of the period are !s!ally large, well"carved, single stones that were set into the body of the stock to weight the anchor. Those fo!nd at Takashima are only ro!ghly finished and made of two stones. +ore easily and )!ickly completed than their longer, more finished co!nterparts, they are not as strong as the single stone anchors. It may be that these hastily fabricated anchors contrib!ted to the fleet's demise in the storm that dashed %!blai's hopes for the con)!est of 2apan The weapons recovered from the site incl!de b!ndles of iron arrow tips or crossbow bolts, spearheads, and more than 30 swords and sabers. 4!ring one dive, I saw a +ongol helmet !pright on the bottom, fish swimming in and o!t of its pro$ecting brow. .lose to the helmet was perhaps the most ama1ing discovery yet made""tetsuhau or ceramic pro$ectile bomb. %O&'#A has recovered si* of these from the wreck. They are the world's earliest known e*ploding pro$ectiles and the earliest direct archaeological evidence of seagoing ordnance. .hinese alchemists invented g!npowder aro!nd A.4. 500, and by 6600 h!ge paper bombs m!ch like giant firecrackers were being !sed in battle. .hinese so!rces refer to catap!lt"la!nched e*ploding pro$ectiles in 6226, b!t some historians have arg!ed that the references date to later rewritings of the so!rces. In his recent book In Little Need of Divine Intervention, which analy1es two 2apanese scrolls that depict the +ongol invasion, owdoin .ollege historian Thomas .onlan s!ggests that a scene showing a sam!rai falling from his horse as a bomb e*plodes over him was a later addition. .onlan's research masterf!lly ref!tes many of the traditional myths and commonly held perceptions of the invasion, downplaying the n!mber of ships and troops involved and arg!ing that it was not the storms b!t the 2apanese defenders ashore, as well as conf!sion and a lack of coordination, that thwarted the khan's two invasions. !t his s!ggestion that the e*ploding bomb is an anachronism has now been demolished by solid archaeological evidence. +oreover, when the 2apanese *"rayed two intact bombs, they fo!nd that one was filled $!st with g!npowder while the other was packed with g!npowder and more than a do1en s)!are pieces of iron shrapnel intended to c!t down the enemy. The site has yielded fragmentary h!man remains. A crani!m, resting where a body had perhaps been p!shed face down into the seabed, and a pelvis, possibly from the same individ!al, now rest in the conservation lab awaiting analysis. This state"of"the"art lab, at the Takashima +!se!m of ,olk -istory and .!lt!re, is filled with containers of freshwater in which artifacts rest. Initial st!dy of the artifacts has revealed new information abo!t the khan's forces. Only one percent of the finds can be attrib!ted to a

+ongolian origin7 the rest are .hinese. The +ongol invasion was +ongol only in name and in the allegiance of the invading sailors and troops. The f!t!re of the finds is !ncertain. #hile the e*cavation has been f!lly f!nded by the 2apanese government, it has only committed f!nding for conservation of ten percent of the collection. ,or now, the rest will remain in freshwater tanks. The e*isting m!se!m is too small to ho!se all of the artifacts, and 2apan remains firmly gripped by economic recession. 8iven widespread interest, and the significance of the discovery, perhaps the time has come for an international f!nding effort to assist the e*pensive b!t archaeologically and c!lt!rally rewarding work being accomplished there. Takashima Island's local government is interested in f!rther e*ploration of the lost fleet of %!blai %han, and %en1o -ayashida and his colleag!es contin!e to work off the island's shores. -ayashida believes, like Thomas .onlan and other historians, that the khan's fleet si1e was e*aggerated, and that h!ndreds, not tho!sands, of wrecks lie b!ried here. 9ven so, the remains now emerging from the m!d and water are one of the greatest !nderwater archaeological discoveries of o!r time, providing critical new information abo!t Asian seafaring and military technology, as well as an invasion cr!shed by a legendary storm. Relics of the Kamikaze:

Facing the Khan's Wrath

%!blai %han's ascendancy to leadership of the +ongols, fra!ght with internal dissension and civil war, coincided with his long and diffic!lt con)!est of .hina. :eeding to obtain additional reso!rces and to demonstrate his power and legitimacy as the +ongol r!ler, %!blai, grandson of 8enghis %han, opened a second front in 2apan even as he fo!ght the last remnants of .hina's &!ng 4ynasty for control of the mainland. The khan sent envoys, demanding the 2apanese s!bmit, b!t the bakufu, 2apan's military r!lers, reb!ffed them. In 62;/, with the assistance of his %orean vassal state of %oryo, the khan assembled a fleet that historical acco!nts s!ggest was as large as <00 ships to ferry 25,000 troops across the narrow, 660"mile straits of Ts!shima, which separate the %orean penins!la from %y!sh!. &ailing from %oryo in early October, the fleet overwhelmed 2apanese defenders on the islands of Ts!shima and Iki before landing at the ancient trading port of -akata =modern ,!k!oka>. The 2apanese were waiting for them with a force of abo!t (,000 sam!rai and gokenin, or armed retainers. 2apanese so!rces s!ggest that the battle, while hard fo!ght, was going badly for them. The sam!rai, who fo!ght as individ!als, were no match for the +ongols with their tactics of fighting en masse, and their !se of poison"dipped arrows and catap!lt" la!nched e*ploding shells. After a week of battle, the 2apanese had retreated ten miles inland to 4ai1af!, the fortified capital of %y!sh!. The invaders looted and b!rned -akata, b!t wary of 2apanese reinforcements and perhaps the weather on a coast notorio!s for typhoons, the fleet commanders prepared to withdraw. On October 20, the wind shifted and blew hard. The fleet, with some ships dragging anchor and drifting to shore, departed. +ost historical acco!nts claim as many as 500 ships and 65,000 men were lost in the ?storm? that ended the first invasion, b!t others s!ggest that the ma$ority of ships simply escaped with the changing wind, with only a handf!l wrecking on the beach. %!blai %han sent more envoys to demand s!bservience from the 2apanese, b!t the bakufu, emboldened by the retreat from -akata, contin!ed their defiance, e*ec!ting the khan's ambassadors. The bakufu also strengthened their defenses, relocating loyal sam!rai to estates near -akata and, in 62;(, ordering them to b!ild a 62./"mile"long stone wall along the coast7 it was completed in si* months' time. The sam!rai at -akata organi1ed local fishermen and traders into a coastal naval force of small craft and trained the local inhabitants as a defense force. The khan and his vassals had not been idle. .hinese histories report that %!blai ordered %oryo to b!ild <00 ships and assemble 60,000 troops for a new invasion. In .hina, drawing from the newly defeated &!ng navy and new ships b!ilt e*pressly for the invasion, %!blai reportedly gathered a force of 5,000 ships

and 600,000 troops. &ailing separately in +ay 6236, the two fleets were s!pposed to rende1vo!s at Iki Island in the straits of Ts!shima. !t the %orean force, after recapt!ring Iki from the 2apanese, sailed on for -akata witho!t waiting for the larger .hinese force. The 2apanese, alerted by spies, were waiting for them. Thwarted by the stone wall fortifying the beach, the invaders fell back to &hikanoshima Island in the middle of -akata ay. 2apanese defense craft raided the fleet as it lay at anchor, sam!rai warriors springing onto the decks of the enemy ships to fight it o!t with their crews. Other craft were set on fire and sent drifting into the mass of enemy warships. ,inally, the %oryo fleet retreated to Iki Island, its role in the invasion over. The .hinese contingent, after a delay, finally sailed in 2!ne and arrived at the small island of Takashima in Imari ay, 56 miles so!th of -akata. #eeks of battle on the small island's shores and hilly co!ntryside were at best a stalemate for the defenders when a s!dden storm ma!led the fleet on the evening of 2!ly 50. According to 2apanese records, most of the invading ships were driven ashore and sank, killing nearly all of the 600,000 invaders. At the entrance to Imari ay, says one 2apanese acco!nt, ?a person co!ld walk across from one point of land to another on a mass of wreckage.? %!blai %han never again sent a force against 2apan. -e abr!ptly canceled plans for a third invasion in 623(. The 2apanese embarked on a series of p!nitive raids against %orea and .hina, many of them more piratical than naval. If there was a policy, it was fo!nd in 2apan's !ltimate retreat into the solit!de and sec!rity of their home islands, which they now believed were protected by the gods, who twice had sent winds and storms to thwart an enemy's ambitions. The myth of that protecting force, the kamika1e, wo!ld not die !ntil seven cent!ries later, in the last desperate months of #orld #ar II.
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