Germany's Russia Question: A New Ostpolitik for Europe Author(s): Constanze Stelzenmller Source: Foreign Affairs, Vol.

88, No. 2 (March/April 2009), pp. 89-100 Published by: Council on Foreign Relations Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20699496 . Accessed: 18/04/2013 21:24
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Germany's

Russia

Question

A New Ostpolitik for Europe ConstanzeStehenm?ller

Last
Berlin

July, more than 200,000 people flocked to a public park in

to hear Barack Obama, then the Democratic candidate for choice of Germany's

United States, deliver a speech calling for renewed presidentof the

transatlantic partnership and cooperation. The was deliberate. To theGermans

long-divided capital as the backdrop forhis only public speech in

listening to him that summer

Europe

a set evening in the Tiergarten,Obama made specialappeal, citing"a of ideals that speak to aspirations sharedby all people," the same was the basis of the relationship between "dreamof freedom"that West Germany during theCold War. Now theUnited States and will Germany respond to the call and join that Obama ispresident, theUnited States as a key European partner in addressingglobal
challenges and threats? There aremany reasons for Germany to rise to the occasion. For one, there is a dearth of leadership elsewhere inEurope. The European Union remains embroiled in a debate about institutional reform. In theUnited

his confidence Kingdom, Prime Minister Gordon Brown?despite current financial crisis?remains disengaged from both the during the eu and the transatlantic alliance. French President Nicolas Sarkozy, meanwhile, shows more Atlanticist inclinations than any of his prede cessors, but he has yet to prove that he can build lasting coalitions in Europe or convince his country of the need for economic modernization.
Stelzenm?ller isDirector States. of the Berlin Office of the

Constanze

German Marshall

Fund of theUnited

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Constanze Stelzenm?ller

has thoroughlyexamined itsguilt for perpetratingtheHolocaust and World War II?and in theprocess has become a robustdemocracy.Since regaining Germany now has the chance to trulybecome a "partner in leadership" active Germanyhas developed an increasingly with more than 6,500 troops foreign policy,
currentlydispatched on full sovereignty after unification in 1990,

crossroads of the continent, and its strength as one of theworld's fore most exporters, even in the current economic downturn. Germany

its strategiclocation at the for leadership: its 82million inhabitants,

Likewise, there aremany reasonswhy Obama

should look toGermany

Vi u TT With the United States. an additional

proved

countries

in in of diplomatic efforts Afghanistan.Berlin is also at theforefront

it formerly ignored, such as Georgia now has the chance to and Iran, and has a European

Last October, the German parliament ap 1,000 troops for nato's stabilization operations

from the Balkans toAfghanistan. country?

operations outside the

claimeda leadership role indealing with theglobal challengeof climate

change. Germany then U.S.

in leadership" with the United States,as suggestedin 1989by "partner

President George H. W. Bush. as a leader not to be But to grasp this opportunity?and recognized

truly become

of the transatlantic crucial to the credibility alliance,but it isviewed withmounting skepticism German public. by the The most important relationship Germanywill have to navigate is that with Russia,withwhom ithas deep historicalties. Germany is
Russia's

Chancellor Angela Merkel will have to overcome voters?German some formidable obstacles. She must grapple with the ongoing economic crisis while steering her grand coalition government through more than a dozen local and regional elections, culminating in a federal election in September. At the same time, theGerman government will as President Obama to use face a test of its military force, willingness will expect greater involvement fromGermany in international security missions, most notably inAfghanistan. The success of thatmission is

United States but also by fellowEuropeans and her own justby the

on Russia's energysupplies, of itsoil and gas fromthe buying a third

country.There
[90]

largest trading partner and has become

increasingly reliant from Russia, as

is a genuine military threat to Europe

foreign affairs

? Volume 88No. 2

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s Germany Russia Question became clear in the August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia s threats to counter U.S. and inRussian President Dmitry Medvedev

Russian missiles inKaliningrad. missile defense plans by stationing inparticular But thekey challengeforthe West?and Germany?is
political, not

West.

In Russia's effortto gain leverage inEurope, its close ties toGermany are its greatest asset. At the same time, Berlin's strategic pursuit of what German policymakers have insisted on labeling a "strategic evolving tensions between Russia and the West. It has also given

At worst, Russia's regional and global ambitions could end up rolling back democratic reforms on Europe's eastern borders? splitting the transatlantic alliance in the process.

Russia appearsdeterminedtokeep Europe and the United resurgent while doing businesswith the States out of its"nearabroad," all the

military. Fueled

by revisionist nationalism,

newly

withMoscow has put Germany in themiddle of the partnership"

Western

The oldGerman questionhas long Germany a unique responsibility. been solved, with Germany firmly within Europe and the positioned
group of nations. But now, there is a new and similarly urgent German question for the twenty-first century: Is Germany when necessary?

Russia's behavior and to stand up to Moscow

able andwilling to use itsconsiderablepolitical resourcesto change

becoming

normal

When Obama placeshisfirst phone call toBerlin,one of thetop items on his agendawill be military support, particularlyin Afghanistan.
was After reunification, it widely understood to use that a fundamental test

of the of a newly sovereign Germanywould be its maturity willingness

was crossed in March 1999,when military force.This threshold it joined the nato air campaign against Serbia. As former Chancellor
normal."

Gerhard Schr?der said at the time, German foreign policyhad finally

"become

Since nato's German

Democratic Republic of theCongo. The peacekeeping force in the

then, Germany has sent thousands of troops to serve in stabilization mission inAfghanistan, and in 2006 it led an eu

in navy sentwarships to thewaters off the coast of Lebanon 2006 and, more recently, to those off the coast of Somalia. The return foreign a f fa 1rs? March/April 2009 [91]

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Constanze Stelzenm?ller

of themilitary option toGermany's foreignpolicy tool kitwas a

necessary?if normalizing challenges

theBosnian Serbmilitias and the Taliban posed new and demanding

for the Bundeswehr.

long deferred and reluctantly undertaken?step the country's international profile. Adversaries

toward

such as

other army in Europe, moving from a bloated force focused on ter ritorial defense to a streamlined military with sustained and varied

more thanperhaps any the German militaryhas transformeditself

In the course of these missions,

force as an exceptional measure required Whether Germany of the nation by exceptional circumstances, . decides tO lise torce in the sucj1as ^ prevention of genocide in the Balkans or the need for alliance solidarity will be a question future ??

operational experience. However, Germany's military deployments have not heralded a new In each case, German paradigm of military engagement. framed the decision to use policymakers

not: but rather of ability of

in Afghanistan.

political Will.

a resultant and shame of twentieth-century German history?and to act yearning for its country righteously in international affairs.

highly popular with theGerman public, which has a deep sensitivityto the guilt

has pfove| effective and impersatives

Invoking

absolute moral

about military intervention as a binary choice between good and evil, an Germany's policymakers have lost important opportunity. They have missed the chance to challenge the German public to a serious and nuanced conversation about foreign policy that extends beyond a result, it the black-and-white landscape of moral imperatives. As without the specter of genocide a or an existential threat.

Yet byplayingto thisdesire,and by repeatedly decisions portraying

to rally has become difficult for military intervention popular support first became evident in the summerof The price for this strategy
was on the brink tiny country in the Balkans,

peace in the region and push streams of refugees intowestern Europe? but therewere no signs of an impending war crimes catastrophe. This Schr?der with little support for intervention, left then Chancellor on was to and he opposition votes in parliament rely ultimately forced [92] FOREIGN AFFAIRS 88 'Volume No. 2

war. The conflict had thepotential to destabilize the fragile of civil

2001,when Macedonia,

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s Germany Russia Question for authorization Macedonia. Less a modest combined nato-eu mission to join months later, after the 9/11attacks, Schr?der than six to

had to threaten resignation to get the necessary votes in parliament inAfghanistan.

toprovide Taliban forthe U.S.-led fightagainst the German support for Germany to transcendthis self Why has itbeen so difficult framework? The powerful postwartabooagainsttheuse binary imposed
to foreign policy in cautious and incremental

of force is one reason. Second, the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent war were seismic shocks for a German political culture against terrorism accustomed developing

constraints rather than choices has proved very difficult to break. In recent years, the German government has made a sustained the country's values as much the German as it serves its interests.Defense

more than40 yearsofparti thehabit?honed during And finally, steps. of external tionand limited formulating policy in terms sovereignty?of

toconvincethepublic that effort Afghanistanreflects keeping troopsin

experts

have echoed thisargument. all the from majorGerman politicalparties

Nonetheless, component

of the in military Afghanistan, remainsskeptical developmentefforts next election, complying with additional troop requests from the
States or nato would of the operation. With less than a year until Germany's government cost the Merkel more

public, although supportive of Germany's

United

political capital than itcan afford.

Nonetheless,

likely

will be a of hard power, and whether itdecides to use force in the future not of ability but rather of political will. The latter,however, is question a resource thatGerman continue to deploy sparingly. policymakers will

tousemilitaryforceeffectively. Ithas crossedthe threshold capabilities

it is clear thatGermany

has developed

the necessary

soft

touch

As

its profile abroad, its most cherished foreign policy tool?Zivilmachty or "soft power"?is being Germany continues to increase

West Germany Russia.After World War II, by a resurgent challenged

rebuilt its identity and legitimacy based on a commitment to multi lateralism, international law, and human rights;proud of itsachievements, it setout to export this model. This has ledGermany to promote dialogues foreign a f fa 1rs? March/April 200p [93]

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Constanze Stelzenm?ller

with Russia. The goal in engagingRussia, as theGerman Foreign paper in 2006, has been "Ann?herung Ministry put it in a key strategy
durch Verflechtung?or "rapprochement through economic interlocking." It motto of West German "change through rapprochement/' the legendary has been based on the assumption

and exchanges on culture, the rule of law, and regional issues?particularly

or isa clunky, Wandeldurch but echo of" wholly intentional, Ann?herung?

that successfully

of the1970s. Berlins current Chancellor Willy Brandt sOstpolitik policy Russia intotherule-based world ofEuropewould be thegreatest guiding
war between triumph ofGermany's softpower. Last summer's Georgia and Russia, therefore, came as a most unpleasant surprise. German reactions to the conflictwere predictable at first.Compelled a sense of by impending crisis, German policymakers and parlia of engagement

was

mentarians had rushed to visitGeorgia in themonths before the war unfolded, war. As the Mikheil Saakashvili Georgian President andwas blamed forhis country'squick defeat. While theRussian was swiftly many German routing military Georgia's militaryforces,
as a Germany widely condemned in dangerous, irresponsible gambler

and commentators called for avoiding discussions policymakers about causes and responsibility and stressed the need to maintain a even a dialogue with Russia. Some German analysts pushed for on the part of both eu. stance of strict neutrality Germany and the as Russian troops continued their march However, through the disputed territory of South Ossetia and into the Georgian heartland, in Sochi, a Russian resort town on the Black and Medvedev a Merkel flew Sea, turned into frosty exchange. Immediately afterward,

Merkel

A long-planned the mood inBerlin shifted meeting between abruptly.

member of nato. Back

and the German Chancellery on Russia Foreign Ministry?not previously known for agreeing much at to demonstrate total unity on the pains subject. policy?were The harsh tone emanating from Berlin clearly startledMoscow. stance of the eu and Germany's response, combined with the strong German

inBerlin, a spokesperson in Merkels office said a war marked that the "caesura" inGermany's relations with Russia. ForeignMinister Frank-Walter Steinmeier called Russia's actions "illegal" and "disproportional." The

toTbilisi, where she publicly reaffirmed Georgia's rightto become a

meted out by theglobal financial thebrutalpunishment markets, may

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foreign

affairs

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be what stopped Russia from pushing even deeper intoGeorgia. It also a wave of on the part of prompted temporarily constructive behavior Russia's top diplomats, who were suddenly willing to cooperate on a range of previously thorny issues, such as a U.S.-European proposal for imposing sanctions against Iran in the un Security Council.

hugging

the

bear

For the West, as the German

beginning now, the signals remainmixed. Germany did push, along with France and to resume eu-Russian talks on a new partnership agreement, Italy, and it also led European resistance toU.S. efforts tomove Georgia and Ukraine closer to nato membership. At the same time, Germany against Europe and began referring to its relationship with Russia
foreign a f fa 1rs? March /April 2009

in the Caucasus was a "defining moment," was it the weekly Die Zeit wrote last September. But of a new era inGermany's relationship with Russia? For thewar

rebuked Medvedev forthreatening lastfall to deploymissiles sternly

as

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Constanze Stelzenm?ller a a "modernization partnership" instead of "strategic" one, which seemed

Russia: although most Germans see little connection between the events in the southern Caucasus and the state ofGerman-Russian relations,

to be a subtledowngradingof the relationship. Recent polls suggest concerned about that theGerman public is becoming increasingly

are suspicious of theRussian embrace and those split between thosewho who choose towalk into itdeliberately?between bear haters and bear are said to spear huggers.Merkel and her Christian Democratic Union head the formergroup,whereas Foreign Minister Steinmeier and the So

nonethelesssaythey those surveyed disapproveofRussia sbelligerence as an energysupplier. and distrustitsreliability German political landscape is Conventionalwisdom holds thatthe

to lead thelatter. cial Democratic Partyare thought Although thereis,of

more course, some truth to this clich?, the political reality is complicated. Merkel has recalibrated the German-Russian relationship coolly

and deliberately, especially compared to her predecessor,Schr?der, Russian President VladimirPutin a "flawless democrat" who called then Moscow fora gas pipeline under theBaltic Sea and signedplanswith Merkel metwithRussian human rights office. groups justbeforeleaving
countries in eastern Europe, especially Poland. Yet at the same time, she has been adamant about the need for continued engagement with Russia. She has firmly resisted calls from some eastern countries to cancel the Baltic pipeline pro European as as calls for a common ject, well European energy policy thatwould minimize the influence of largeRussian and German energy companies. the cause of post-Soviet countries, such as Georgia championing or Ukraine, that are to She West. seeking align themselves with the community. There has been much

with policymakersinpublic, and shehas forgedcloser relationships

state visit to Moscow, during her first

she has criticized top Russian

And Merkel has avoided defendingU.S. missile defense plans or has leftthedetails ofRussia policy to thediplomats and thebusiness Merkel afraidof offending caution: Is Russia, her Social Democratic or But thereis coalition Quite possibly. partners, theenergy companies?
s speculation about the chancellor

much closer to home: pro-Russian another reason forher caution that is a sense of alienation eastern sentiment, aloofness toward Europe, and from theUnited States are all common in her own party.

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Germany Meanwhile, some foreign

sRussia Question

casually remarked in an aside during a speech inBerlin). But this is an equally simplistic characterization. Steinmeierhas a detached that makes him disinclinedto seek a personal relationship rationalism Minister Sergey Lavrov. Unlike with hisRussian counterpart, Foreign some other top figuresinhis party, not he has described Germany's
as position "equidistant" from Russia and theUnited States; in fact, he considers himself an Atlanticist. In an attempt tomove Germany away from dependence on Russia, he has pushed harder than any of his pre decessors for energy-supply diversification, looking to develop resources

has insisted on the importance of a "strategic partnership' with Moscow, even at timeswhen to do sowas to come across as tone-deaf with regard to Russia's faults, such as after last year's clearly flawed Russian more choice," he presidential election ("One could have imagined

as thechief in of thepro-Russianfaction embodiment Berlin. Indeed,he

commentators have to Steinmeier pointed

in theBlack Sea, inCentralAsia, and by pursuingrenewable-energy most precisetodescribeSteinmeier's Overall, itisperhaps technologies. Ministry's policy of "rapprochement Unfortunately,theForeign
as one of realist balancing in an increasinglymultipolar world.

position

out to have a fundamental through economic interlocking" has turned eco flaw: it assumed a reciprocity of interests and intentions. Whatever nomic interlocking there is appears to be happening strictly downstream, with Russian state-owned companies purchasing German assets while German companies struggle to get a foothold in the Russian market. Nor has there been any noticeable diversification inGermany's energy no supplies. Finally, this strategy of rapprochement offered guidance country. Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of thewar in theCaucasus, many ofGermany's diplomats seemed to be in a collective state of shock.

when Russia invadedand occupied parts of a neighboringsovereign

generation

apart

The

divide

between German

orparty notby institutional driven butby age and experience. affiliation set Russia policy in who Russia Many of those Germany spenttime in in the1990s, when the had already memory of theSoviet threat begun
to fade. no small measure Germany had just been reunified, thanks in foreign affairs 2009 March/April [97]

policymakers

over Russia

is largely

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Constanze Stelzenm?ller

now around 50,witnessed a Russia that embraced reform generation, soon slid into chaos and rampant commer against all historical odds yet cialism.They see theflaws ofRussia's current leadership and are disturbed deliveries as a political weapon abroad?but are nonetheless grateful

to theleadership of Mikhail Gorbachev andBorisYeltsin. This German

by its recent aggression, aswell as by its willingness to use energy for stable energy supplies and a burgeoningmarket for trade. cohort is a decade youngerand isfound The opposinggenerational

mainly in parliament and the press. The Russia they know?and, in some cases, have studied in and lived in?is that of Putin and his self

are appalled at talkof wonder, then,thatthey Germany's "equidistance" from Russia and theUnited States and that theyaccuseGermany's
Russia policymakers of naively overestimating their influence on Moscow.

a statemarked by vicious tribal rivalry proclaimed "power vertical." It is and rampant corruption and where journalists, nongovernmental no constant persecution. It is organizations, and opposition activists face

United States also feed into German attitudes Differingviewsof the aboutRussia.The generation grewup inpeace running Germany today ?^ ^ ^ ^ ? nuc^ear with little umbrella, prepa on thrust w rationforthe leadership challenges War world.Habit and them by thepost-Cold instinct made them sidewith theUnited
States throughout the 1990s and, once more, and prosperity under the benign protection

The

"strategic

German

partnership with Russia has worked to SOOthe insecurities.

. . .

his treatment ofGerman policymakers as equals at a time when they were at U.S. condescension. (The Russians nurse a similar chafing

with the United States. The depth of their any senseof commonality a measure is of the strength United of thebelief in the disillusionment a ofGermans with parents felt States they up. For generation growing Third Reich, the United States?or at and grandparents tainted by the United States?really had stood in locoparentis. leastthe idealof the One of Putin'smore shrewd insightsinto theGerman mind was

9/11 attacks. But as they see it,what they received for their solidaritywas rejection, demands for allegiance, and little credit for their contributions. For many, the gradual unraveling of theweb of falsehoods surrounding the Iraq war further undermined

inan outburst of sympathy and grief, after the

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Germany resentment at

sRussia Question

as being treated strategically irrelevant by theUnited States.) The "strategic partnership" with Russia, therefore, has served to soothe German insecurities. But it has also inflated an unrealistic that has produced notions such as amis "rapprochement through economic interlocking"?representing States during the run-up to the Iraq war. sense of influence over Russia

guided confidence comparableperhaps only toBritishhopes ofbeing

able to sway theUnited

measured

engagement

Th e wa r in theCaucasus was a definingmoment for German attitudes there will be many more such moments in the toward Russia?but

some months to come.Future challengesposed byRussia will thrust It is timefora new policy. hard choices onGermany's leadership.
war era would continue to for the post-Caucasus Ostpolitik hope for the eventual democratic transformation of Russia and be open to cooperation whenever it is possible. Yet itsmost immediate An along Europe's eastern

aimwould be the stabilizationand democratizationof the nations

to boundary, from Belarus Georgia. At present, nato or the eu is not a realistic or even useful prospect membership in for any of these countries. Either accession process would create more

was upgraded last December to theEastern Partnership plan,which

outlined

and the eu are a key force for pushing democratic and economic change?and that this change is in the self-interest of those countries' neighbors to thewest. Germany should know this better than any country inEurope because itprofited themost from the previous rounds of nato and eu enlargement. The European Neighborhood halfhearted method of engaging states on Europe's borders Policy?a that has so far served as a poor substitute for full eu membership? such as nato a future free-trade zone and visa-free travel regime for the eu and six countries on Russia's a periphery. But what is needed is an across-the genuinely transformational scheme. This would require and capacity-building measures foreign to substantial infusions of conditional [99]

nato asks too little of a candidate's internal problems than it solved: whereas the eu demands too much. affairs, it is clear that the benefits of access to Western clubs Nonetheless,

thana bilateral, from board,rather ranging approach, high-level dialogue

a f fa 1rs? March/April 2009

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Constanze Stelzenm?ller development and reconstruction aid, cultural and academic exchanges, and generous support for building civil society. At the same time, migration, organized crime, the movement of goods and people,

measures shouldbe flankedby commonEuropean policies on these

and energy. West shouldengageRussia broadlyand Germany and the as theBush imaginatively?rather thangrudginglyand selectively,
administration did?and conflict inGeorgia contain or counter it when necessary. As the showed, firmness and unity from Europe can go

a longway, especiallywhen backed up by theUnited States. Eu members and the United Stateswill all lose?to Russia, mostly?if
they compete against one another in eastern Europe.

with Moscow

than any other country on the continent. The future of as a leader in as a partner for the Europe and Germany's legitimacy tomention the future of its soft United States?not power?depends on its success in this role. However, to take up this challenge, Germany will have to overcome an array of entrenched reflexes. First, it will have to think of eastern as a dis as a zone of first-order strategic interest rather than Europe its foreign policy not in terms of constraints but in terms of choices. must overcome its fear of dependency on Russia, recognizing Third, it customers as much as Western that Russia needs its they need Russia. most to understand important,Germany will have Finally, and perhaps that this new approach is not just about interests and strategy but also safety,prosperity, and democratic values and freedoms: the aspirations in West Germany. To the extent that Russia acts to

would bynecessity be pan-European. Such a comprehensive policy not onlybecause of and leader, But Germany shouldbe its initiator for easternEurope but also because its itshistorical responsibility with Russia gives itgreater weight and authority special relationship

countries. will have to conceiveof Second, it parate jumble of faraway

about solidarity, namely,defending the rightsof countriesthat seek

United Statesonce and thatthe Berlin lastsummer Obama spokeof in

protected

Western

these essentialrights, Germany and all ofEurope must comprehend arebeing confronted with an authoritarian thatthey challengeto liberal
as much as reasons ofmoral self-preservation democracy. For no an option. That, in the end, is longer solidarity, balancing is then the answer to the new German question.?
[lOo] FOREIGN AFFAI RS -Volume88No. 2

deny

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