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Debates in Social TheoryTensions in Sociocultural Theorizing
Gilberto Prez Campos Culture Psychology 2003 9: 171 DOI: 10.1177/1354067X0392004

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Continuing Commentary
Abstract Sawyer (2002) criticizes as untenable the two foundational assumptions that allegedly characterize socioculturalism (process ontology and inseparability of individual and social levels of analysis). While sympathizing with his aim, this comment challenges his construal of both assumptions, as well as his claim of analytic dualism as an alternative to the unresolved tensions in sociocultural theory. A call is made to further this debate. Key Words analytic dualism, inseparability, process ontology, sociocultural theory

Gilberto Prez Campos

National Autonomous University of MexicoCampus Iztacala

Debates in Social TheoryTensions in Sociocultural Theorizing

Keith Sawyers article in a recent issue of Culture & Psychology (Sawyer, 2002) is a very good example of the complexities faced in the effort to clarify even seemingly basic issues within sociocultural psychological theorizing. He must be credited for showing, in the context of certain current debates in social theory, the need for a more careful examination of our background assumptions, and not simply taking for granted that the sociocultural community agrees on the basics. This does not mean that one can easily subscribe to Sawyers views on any of the issues he discusses, however. This comment intends not to examine his argument in depth, although I expose some critical comments, but rather to suggest the relevance for the development of sociocultural psychology of explicitly addressing the issues raised in his paper. With this end in mind, let us start with Sawyers characterization of sociocultural psychology. Sawyer asserts that socioculturalism can be characterized by two foundational theoretical assumptions: a process ontology and the inseparability of individual and social levels of analysis. Before going into the details of this assumption, let me make two general comments. First, Sawyers label socioculturalism seems to take for granted the existence of a clear-cut intellectual eld, dened at least by the two foundational assumptions. Though the label may be used for the sake
Culture & Psychology Copyright 2003 SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi) www.sagepublications.com Vol. 9(2): 171178 [1354067X(200306) 9:2; 171178; 033241]

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Culture & Psychology 9(2)

of brevity, it bypasses the diverse denominations that populate the eld (cultural psychology, sociocultural psychology, cultural-historical psychology, activity theory and sociocultural research, to name the most known), behind which lie diverse intellectual traditions, not all of which would necessarily agree on the foundational character of these two assumptions or with Sawyers version of them. This would be an important issue to carefully map regarding, at least, the prominent socioculturalists mentioned in Sawyers paper, but it will not be attempted in this commentary. Second, Sawyers discourse on process ontology is ambiguous, appearing as an ontological elaboration in itself (e.g. Process ontologies reject the terms . . ., p. 286), and portraying process ontologies as one of the foundational assumptions of socioculturalism, and as a formulation embedded and most thoroughly developed in structuration theory (e.g. Giddens focus on practices is a form of process ontology, p. 286). This ambiguity helps to account for two features of his paper: (1) his main critique focuses on structuration theory, but at the same time leaves aside several of its important features (e.g. double hermeneutic, reexivity and model of the agent, only to mention a few); and (2) socioculturalism is presented as a kind of psychological branch of structuration theory, while at the same time maintaining that [s]ocioculturalists have rarely drawn substantively on sociology, political science or history (p. 301).1 Coming back to the specics of the foundational assumptions, according to Sawyer, the rst one holds that only processes are real; entities, structures or patterns are ephemeral and do not really exist, while the second is the claim that the individual and the social cannot be methodologically or ontologically distinguished (p. 283, emphases added). I would like to underline the fact that Sawyer denes process ontology as a dichotomy. This is curious, in so far as it is advanced, Sawyer says, as an alternative to the traditional split between individualists and sociological realists on the relationship between the individual and the group. Giddens (1984) refers particularly to the dualism between objectivism and subjectivism, which has to be reconceptualized as a dualitythe duality of structure (p. xx). The duality of structure concept makes no reference, as can be easily seen, to the reality/unreality of processes/entities: Structure is the medium and outcome of the conduct it recursively organizes; the structural properties of social systems do not exist outside of action but are chronically implicated in its production and reproduction (Giddens, 1984, p. 374, emphasis added). Rather, it refers to a way of thinking about 172

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their mode of interdependent existence. But Sawyer strongly refuses to accept this very possibility (see especially quotes from Layder and Archer on page 288), which thus brings us to the issue of inseparability. Sawyers exposition on inseparability is no less curious than his treatment of process ontology. He does not hold to his characterization of socioculturalism, based on two foundational theoretical assumptions, because soon he asserts that inseparability is implied by a process ontology (p. 286, emphasis added). At rst sight, this wording could seem a trie, easily dismissed as a minor lapse, but it has the consequence of enclosing inseparability within Sawyers dualistic construal of process ontology: because only process exists, individual and group cannot be separate entities (p. 286, emphases added). And here lies precisely the trap, because it assumes that we are accepting that only process exists. Saying that one takes a process view on the human world does not deny that entities exist; it merely asserts that they exist as moments of a process. Sawyers statement that only process exists leads to the conclusion that nothing can be predicated besides process and, moreover, that the only thing that can be predicated on process is that it is. This is nothing more, in sum, that a reprise of Parmenides (Miguez, 1962). From this view, which is most clearly expressed when Sawyer says a true process ontology is holistic and cannot distinguish between distinct processes that interact without risking a return to entication (pp. 292293), the label process ontology becomes nonsense. This brief analysis allows us to understand the logic underpinning Sawyers argument. It is his own view that for things to be considered real, they must be predicated as distinct ontological realms that causally interact with each other (p. 287) orquoting Archeras possessing autonomous features (p. 290). In this view, process turns out to be precisely the interaction between ontologically separated entities. On the basis of this foundational assumption (analytic dualism), Sawyer constructs an untenable version of process ontology, which does not correspond to the views maintained by structuration theory or socioculturalism, but can be easily subjected to his critique. Seen in this light, inseparability is implied by process ontology, but only to the extent that process ontology is constructed on the basis of analytic dualism. In my view, it is not the same to say that only processes are real and to assert that process is fundamental, or, on the other side of Sawyers equation, to say that entities do not really exist and then that entities are based in process. Sawyer uses them as equivalent 173

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statements, which is understandable from the previous analysis. This divergence takes us to the crux of this discussion. Sawyer uses analytically isolated/separated as synonymous with analytically distinguished, while structuration theory and most authors within the sociocultural psychological eld would refuse to do that. I will concentrate on some of the latter only. But rst let me show how two points of Sawyers critique derive from the perspective sketched so far. If one assumes analytical dualism and equates isolated with distinguished, then it makes sense to state that: (a) empirical research based on the two foundational assumptions turns out to be impossible: how can one study socially situated practice without analytically distinguishing among individuals? (p. 293); and (b) as long as empirical research based on such assumptions is impossible, then this means that in practice socioculturalists accept analytic separability (p. 299). Valsiner has explicitly addressed the issue of separation and distinction in several places. I will only take one of the sources referred to by Sawyer in order to show how he overlooks the crucial issues, translating them into his analytic dualism. In the opening pages of Valsiners The Guided Mind (1998), he warns about a serious danger of crusades against dualisms: crusaders may be left without the phenomena that had interested them (p. 14). In the following pages, we nd his treatment of this issue under the subtitle Exclusive and inclusive separation: distinction between dualism and duality. There it is clear that he argues against any form of dualism because it involves the exclusive separation of the distinguished parts, generating intellectually unproductive concepts in psychology (p. 21). Valsiner summarizes the character of duality very clearly as copresence and relation . . . of differentiated parts that function within the same whole (p. 21). Valsiners formulation seems, in my view, to be more akin to Giddens concern (without being a derivation of structuration theory), and a rejection of analytic dualism as exposed by Sawyer. In any case, it is obvious that Valsiner does not equate separated and distinguished. Surprisingly, however, Sawyer says that [e]xclusive separation corresponds to Rogoffs social inuence view (p. 293). It is surprising because Sawyer sets his analytic dualism apart from Valsiners criticism of exclusive separation, while several statements in his paper point precisely in that direction (e.g. his approving quote from Archer that what is lost with inseparability is any autonomous features which could pertain independently to either structure or agency. Otherwise, such features could be investigated separately 174

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. . . [and then] dualism would once more be the name of the game [p. 290] ).2 So, Sawyer does not face Valsiners criticism of exclusive separation. Furthermore, he claims that Valsiner (together with Cole and Wertsch) accepts some form of separability (p. 293). This is difcult to understand as long as his formulation poses inseparability and analytic dualism as mutually exclusive with no intermediate points: what could it mean then to talk about some form of separability/inseparability? Given Sawyers views, it comes as no surprise that he quotes parts of Wertschs work that are easily assimilated to his analytic dualism, concluding from them that the latter implicitly criticizes inseparability claims (see p. 295). But the conclusion would not be so obvious if, for example, in the rst quote (human action and sociocultural setting [are] analytically distinct, yet inherently interrelated levels of analysis), analytically distinct were not interpreted as analytically separated, but as a form, in Valsiners terminology, of inclusive separation. This alternative reading could be sustained considering other parts of the referenced paper (Wertsch, 1994): for example, sociocultural settings are produced and reproduced through human action; mediational means constitute the very structure of the action they mediate; mediated action involves at the same time innovation and creativity as well as reiteration. Sawyers reading of Coles work leads us to think that either his perspective compels him to bypass those features that do not t, or, in the worst case, that he purposefully chooses only fragments that can be made to appear as coincidental with or as support of his argument.3 For example, he says, Cole implicitly accepts that the cultural system can be analyzed as a structure analytically distinct from instantiation in human action; he refers to such cultural systems as tertiary artifacts (p. 296). Two comments are in order. First, the concept of tertiary artifacts cannot be applied to a cultural system because it refers, fundamentally, to a kind of artifact (Wartofsky uses it to refer to works of art, for example) (Cole, 1996, pp. 121122). Second, Cole (1996) takes up this concept in order to develop the idea of mediation as a core feature of a theory of culture in mind:
I want to generalize . . . [Wartofskys] conception by linking the notion of artifact on the one hand to notions of schemas and scripts and on the other hand to notions of context, mediation, and activity found in contemporary cognitive psychology, anthropology, and allied parts of the cognitive sciences. (p. 122)

Cole tries to develop a concept of artifact that transcends the duality 175

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of objectivitysubjectivity, claiming that artifacts are simultaneously ideal and material. The aim is to show that this formulation supersedes the inner and outer approaches to culture and mind that dominate contemporary discourse (p. 124). I cannot see how, from these ideas, the claim can be derived that the cultural system can be analyzed as a structure analytically distinct from instantiation in human action. The worst misrepresentation of Coles ideas can be found in the reference to the experimental studies reported in Cultural Psychology as implying a causal relation between context and individual that Giddens explicitly rejects (p. 296). Sawyer clearly decontextualizes the quoted fragment. This is located in a chapter that reviews, in historical and personal terms, cross-cultural research on cognitive development. Sawyer not only ignores Coles depiction of the sociohistorical context where that research took place and how the former shaped the ends of the latter, but he also passes over the context offered by the sentence from whence the quoted fragment is taken: In 1966 we obtained a grant to continue and expand our research; instead of focusing on a particular content domain, we sought to study the impact of schooling on cognitive development, broadly conceived (Cole, 1996, p. 77). This passage is self-explanatory. In closing this commentary, let me summarize the main points of my criticism and, more importantly, advance some possible suggestions for the future. I sympathize with Sawyers effort to put sociocultural theorizing within the wider context of social theory and its debates. This is especially necessary because different strands of sociocultural theorizing take inspiration from such diverse sources that it may be easier to stay at the level of agreement on general claims than to critically examine how each concretizes them in specic concepts and research strategies. Further, I agree with Sawyer that Giddens structuration theory has been a very important reference point for the theorizing of several of the active scholars in the eld; but it has not been the only one, nor has it been important in the same way to the authors drawing on it. My main disagreement derives from Sawyers characterization of the allegedly foundational assumptions of socioculturalism: process ontology and inseparability. I have tried to show that his construal of both assumptions is profoundly marked by his own analytical dualism, rendering them as untenable and, even, absurd. This means that his proposed resolution to the tensions in sociocultural theory, analytical dualism, cannot still be proclaimed as a solid alternative. This problem is further complicated by his careless reading of some 176

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of the core ideas of prominent authors in the eld, although one could say in his defense that the task of characterizing their formulations was too heavy to be successfully accomplished in a brief paper and from a birds-eye view. I do think that some unresolved tensions exist in sociocultural theorizing. And I do not assume that the theories of the prominent authors are perfectly congruent in every aspect. Sawyers paper has the virtue, even if, in my perspective, it may be severely questioned, of pointing to a task that must be done. I only hope that this brief comment may trigger some further reection on these issues. Notes
1. I assume that there are, of course, links between structuration theory and sociocultural psychological theorizing, accepting that the rst encompasses issues . . . [that are] the concern of all the social sciences (Giddens, 1984, p. xvi). But precisely because of this, sociocultural psychology cannot be thought of as a mere subsidiary of the former. It would be better to think of the relationship as a dialogue between structuration theory as an ontology of potentials (cf. Cohen, 1989) and substantive theorizing related to specic research problems and agendas. Only on this basis can one trace the specic links that have been constructed between the two. Within anthropology, for example, Holland, Lachicotte, Skinner and Cain (1998) present a detailed account of alike concerns and how they were faced, drawing on Vygotsky and Bakhtin. Similar analyses would be very helpful within sociocultural psychology. 2. Wenger (1998), an author who does in fact recognize his debt to Giddens, denes duality as follows: duality is a single conceptual unit that is formed by two inseparable and mutually constitutive elements whose inherent tension and complementarity give the concept richness and dynamism (p. 66). This characterization clearly converges with Valsiners in several features, but they diverge concerning the specic dualities that are offered to account for diverse phenomena or processes. 3. There are some problems with Sawyers quotes of Cole (1995): this article covers pages 105118, but in Sawyers paper there are quotes to pages 197 and 198 and to a Figure 8.1 that does not exist in the text. Moreover, the problem is not a confusion between the two references of Cole (1995, 1996), because in the 1996 book, pages 197 and 198 are on a different topic and Figure 8.1 is located on page 231. This makes it difcult to locate the context of the quoted fragmentssomething that is important, as will be shown in a moment.

References
Cohen, I.J. (1989). Structuration theory: Anthony Giddens and the constitution of social life. London: Macmillan. Cole, M. (1995). The supra-individual envelope of development: Activity and

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practice, situation and context. In J.J. Goodnow, P.J. Miller, & F. Kessel (Eds.), Cultural practices as contexts for development (pp. 105118). (New Directions for Child Development, Vol. 67.) San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Cole, M. (1996). Cultural psychology: A once and future discipline. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Giddens, A. (1984). The constitution of society: Outline of the theory of structuration. Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press. Holland, D., Lachicotte, W., Skinner, D., & Cain, C. (1998). Identity and agency in cultural worlds. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Miguez, J.A. (1962). ParmnidesZennMeliso: Fragmentos. Buenos Aires: Aguilar. Sawyer, R.K. (2002). Unresolved tensions in sociocultural theory: Analogies with contemporary sociological debates. Culture & Psychology, 8(3), 283305. Valsiner, J. (1998). The guided mind: A sociogenetic approach to personality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Wenger, E. (1998). Communities of practice: Learning, meaning, and identity. New York: Cambridge University Press. Wertsch, J.V. (1994). The primacy of mediated action in sociocultural studies. Mind, Culture, and Activity, 1(4), 202208.

Biography
GILBERTO PREZ CAMPOS is Associate Professor of Psychology at the National Autonomous University of MexicoCampus Iztacala. He is part of a research group with a strong interest in cultural psychology and is personally interested in addressing the core issues involved in the foundation of cultural psychology as a discipline. His empirical research involves the use of the communities of practice concept in order to develop a pedagogical alternative for teaching and learning psychology with undergraduate students and in the analysis of a governmental program of parent education. ADDRESS: Prof. Gilberto Prez Campos, UNAMCampus Iztacala (Psic), Av. de los Barrios # 1, Los Reyes Iztacala, Tlalnepantla, Estado de Mxico, C.P. 54090, Mexico. [email: gperez@servidor.unam.mx]

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