Strategic Futures Planning: A Guide for Public Sector Organisations

By Ben Ramalingam and Harry Jones

Contents
Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................................vii About the authors ....................................................................................................................vii Executive summary ...................................................................................................................ix

Part I: Futures and Scenario Planning
Chapter 1: Introduction.............................................................................................................1 What is futures planning? ....................................................................................................1 The rise of futures and scenario planning in society ...............................................................1 The rise of futures planning in corporations: Shell International...............................................2 The rise of futures in public sector organisations and government ...........................................3 Why is futures planning important?.......................................................................................5 Chapter 2: Scope and stages of organisational future projects .....................................................9 Breadth and complexity .......................................................................................................9 Different modes of thinking ................................................................................................10 Stages and framework .......................................................................................................11 Chapter 3: Choosing futures methodologies .............................................................................15 The importance of methods ...............................................................................................15 Matching approaches........................................................................................................15 Choosing methodologies based on outcomes .....................................................................15 Choosing methodologies based on objectives .....................................................................16 Choosing methodologies based on information needs .........................................................16 Combining approaches .....................................................................................................17 Chapter 4: Specific methods....................................................................................................19 Scenarios..........................................................................................................................19 Environmental scanning/horizon scanning...........................................................................20 Trend and driver analysis ...................................................................................................21 Visioning ..........................................................................................................................22 Backcasting ......................................................................................................................23 Simulation/gaming ............................................................................................................24 Delphi technique ...............................................................................................................25 Cross-impact analysis ........................................................................................................26 Roadmaps ........................................................................................................................27 Wild cards ........................................................................................................................27 Causal Layered Analysis (CLA)............................................................................................28 Morphological analysis ......................................................................................................28

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Chapter 5: Good practices and common problems...................................................................31 Clarifying objectives, limitations and timeframes of futures work............................................31 Positioning and involvement in an organisational context .....................................................33

Part II: Case Studies
Case study one: Limits to growth..............................................................................................37 The 30-Year Update ..........................................................................................................37 WORLD3..........................................................................................................................38 The driving force: Exponential growth .................................................................................39 The limits..........................................................................................................................40 Nonrenewable resources ...................................................................................................41 Physical capital .................................................................................................................41 The scenarios....................................................................................................................42 Transitions to a sustainable world .......................................................................................43 Suggested guidelines .........................................................................................................46 Case study two: The Mont Fleur scenarios ................................................................................47 Context and participants ....................................................................................................47 Summary of the scenarios ..................................................................................................47 What the project was and was not......................................................................................48 Results from the project......................................................................................................49 Why the project produced these results ...............................................................................50 What scenarios mean ........................................................................................................51 Conditions necessary for a successful scenario effort............................................................51 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................52 Case study three: Cabinet Office UK trends 2001-2006............................................................53 2 Key UK trends: 2001-2006................................................................................................53 Case study four: The Scottish Futures Forum .............................................................................57 Introduction ......................................................................................................................57 The future lecture series .....................................................................................................57 The ‘positive ageing’ project ..............................................................................................59 Public policy debate ..........................................................................................................61 Planned projects................................................................................................................62 Case study five: EC Scenarios Europe 2010 .............................................................................63 Triumphant markets ...........................................................................................................63 Shared responsibilities .......................................................................................................63 Creative societies ..............................................................................................................64 Turbulent neighbourhoods .................................................................................................64 Methodology ....................................................................................................................64 Two stages: partial (theme specific) scenarios and global scenarios .......................................65 Production of partial scenarios ...........................................................................................65 Production of global scenarios ...........................................................................................68

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Contents

Case study six: The LGA Futures Toolkit ...................................................................................71 The origins of Futureswork .................................................................................................71 Case study seven: The UK Climate Impacts Programme Scenarios..............................................77 Introduction ......................................................................................................................77 Why socio-economic scenarios are required for climate change impact assessment ...............78 Approach adopted for the UKCIP socio-economic scenarios.................................................78 Development of the UKCIP SES ..........................................................................................79 Four futures scenarios........................................................................................................80 Initial operationalisation within UKCIP.................................................................................82 Case study eight: Foresight Futures 2020 .................................................................................83 Overview of the scenarios..................................................................................................83 Why use futures scenarios? ................................................................................................85 How can the Foresight Futures 2020 scenarios be used? .....................................................87 Five keys to successful use of scenarios ...............................................................................89 Index .....................................................................................................................................93

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Acknowledgements
Special thanks to all those whose work has been used as a case study in this report: the Club of Rome think tank; Adam Kahane, Mont Fleur facilitator; the UK Cabinet Office; Scottish Futures Forum; the Forward Studies Unit of the European Commission; the UK’s Local Government Association, the UK Climate Impacts Programme in the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, and the Foresight programme managed by the Office of Science and Technology.

About the authors
Ben Ramalingam is a member of the Research and Policy in Development (RAPID) Programme at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), London. He provides strategic advice and support to a wide range of international development and humanitarian agencies, from United Nations international agencies to local civil society organisations. Email: b.ramalingam@odi.org.uk Harry Jones is a research associate working with the Research and Policy in Development Programme. As well as the present study, he has done work for ODI on the complexity theory and international development, with Plan International on disaster risk reduction and for IDRC on the Outcome Mapping methodology. Email: h.jones@odi.org.uk

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Executive summary
trategic futures planning is an anticipatory discipline that supports and complements organisational planning and policy-making processes. The success of organisations such as Shell and of broad ranging initiatives such as the Limits to Growth study has contributed to futures approaches being adopted in many different settings and in many different kinds of organisations, including those in the public and not-for-profit sector. There is now an increasing amount of work being undertaken by public organisations on futures issues. In a 2004 speech to civil servants, the then UK prime minister Tony Blair made explicit links between policy making and futures approaches: “Strategic policy making is a professional discipline in itself involving serious analysis of the current state of affairs, scanning future trends and seeking out developments elsewhere to generate options; and then thinking through rigorously the steps it would take to get from here to there.” The report aims to provide managers, planners and strategists in public sector organisations with more information about futures planning efforts, why they are useful, and what needs to be considered in putting together a futures initiative. It brings together practical examples from a range of efforts, including the Club of Rome’s Limits to Growth work in the 1960s which identified the global challenges facing human development, the Mont Fleur process which steered South Africa out of apartheid and into democracy, health planning futures

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in the Australian state of New South Wales, and the Scottish Parliament’s Scottish Futures Forum. The groundbreaking work of recognised futures planning and scenario experts and institutions have informed and strengthened the report. These include individuals such as Pierre Wack, formerly of Shell Plc, Andy Hines, formerly of Dow Chemical Company, and organisations such as the Henley Management Centre and the Global Business Network. Part I of the report covers the origins where strategic futures work came from, why it is important, how to do it, and the useful methods that could be considered. Chapter One looks at the origins of strategic futures planning, drawing on examples from outside the public sector such as Shell’s groundbreaking use of scenarios in the 1970s. The chapter also explains how futures work is taking on growing importance for public sector organisations, and concludes with a four part rationale of the value of futures thinking. Chapter Two explains how organisational futures projects need to be carefully positioned in terms of their scope and their ambitions, and the need to clarify from the outset the kind of futures project that should be used, depending on context and the available resources. The chapter moves on to cover the key stages that futures projects should cover, and provides an initial insight into the different tools and methodologies that can be utilised. Chapter Three goes into more detail about the different strategic futures tools and methodologies, using powerful examples from the UK government’s Foresight Unit to

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clarify what tools are most appropriate for different kinds of projects. The chapter provides a range of ways in which futures tools might be selected, ranging from the hoped-for outcomes, the kind of analysis that would be most credible and useful, and the kind of thinking processes that would be most appropriate. The chapter ends with a summary of ways in which different tools can be used in combination to strengthen the overall futures process. Chapter Four provides practical insights on specific methodologies, ranging from scenarios and visions – the most famous and widely used futures tools – to less well known methods but equally powerful tools such as Delphi and Backcasting. Chapter Five provides information about the common problems faced by organisations trying to implement futures projects, and provides useful tips and tricks on issues as where to position futures groups within organisations, the appropriate timeframe to look into the future, and how to broaden ownership of futures projects. Part II is made up of a number of case studies of the use of futures planning in leading public sector bodies and organisations. These were drawn from publicly available information about high profile exercises, and cover methods such as scenario planning and trend analysis on different issues. They include futures initiatives that are wide-ranging, including an update to the Limits to Growth study, to more specific initiatives such as the UK Climate Change Impacts programme. Specific case studies are drawn from the following organisations: the Club of Rome think tank; the South African Mont Fleur process; the UK Cabinet Office; Scottish Futures Forum; the European Commission’s Forward Studies Unit; the UK’s Local Government Association, the UK Climate

Impacts Programme in DEFRA, and the Foresight programme managed by the Office of Science and Technology.

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Part I: Futures and Scenario Planning

Chapter 1: Introduction
What is futures planning?
Thinking about and planning for the future has been an inherent part of human activity since the beginning of civilisation. Traditionally, the most common way of looking into the future was through the many different forms of divination, the practice of attempting to discover the future though eliciting a divine response. Today, they seem somewhat far-fetched and included examining the configurations of animal organs and observing the patterns that fire makes as it burns. Since World War II there has been a growing use of a rather more pragmatic and rational set of tools called ‘futures methods’ which attempt to demystify the future in a systematic and creative manner. The movement has led to a number of methods – the most famous of which are scenarios. Futures experts have also worked to test and probe the plausibility of results through discussion and debate. By contrast with their historical roots, modern futures approaches are based on being systematic, rational and explicit about how organisations and individuals think about the future. This involves asking questions such as: What procedures do we use when we think about the future? How do we prepare to carry out our plans and projects? What makes us successful in shaping or adapting to the coming future? At any given time, what alternative courses of action are open to us? What will be the future consequences of choosing to do one thing rather than others? What should we want the future to be?1 The philosophy behind futures approaches is summed up in the following quote from the Institute of Alternate Futures: “…trends, scenarios, visions and strategies are an integral part of most decisionmaking… Their power to make decisionmaking ‘wise’ comes when they are made explicit and consciously shared to provoke thought, stimulate imagination, clarify options, and move people to take action…” In order to understand the potential and value of futures planning for the public sector, it is worth exploring a little more of the history behind it.

The rise of futures and scenario planning in society
It is difficult, if not impossible, to exactly pinpoint the emergence of a new way of thinking. As already noted, futures has roots which stretch back to antiquity. However, there is general agreement that the attempt to anticipate future trends and events through systematic methods was developed in the United States during and after World War II. Techniques such as scenario-based planning which were used by the US military in war games crossed into the corporate world and public sector bodies through the work of the world famous think-tank, RAND Corporation. Having developed out of a military project, RAND’s futures work focused initially on the future of military technology, strategy and operations, a growing concern given the onset of the Cold War. However, the scope soon broadened to include non-military projects.

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The 1950s also saw a growing movement in Europe focused on the scientific and political aspects of futures planning. This period saw the set up of the Centre D’études Prospectives (Centre for Prospective Studies) and the International Futuribles Association in Paris, which still acts as a clearing house for research on the future. Meanwhile, the Science Policy Research Unit in the UK pioneered futures research by presenting critiques of global models of the future as well as attempting to create a theory of futures research. In the former Eastern Bloc states, ‘prognostics’ was considered a crucial process preceding the formulation of a plan, consisting of the analysis of scientific and technological process and the consequences this may have for social progress. The late 1960s saw the founding of the World Future Society (WFS) in the US, whose mandate was to which investigate how ‘social, economic and technological developments were shaping the future’ and ‘to help individuals, organisations, and communities observe, understand, and respond to social change appropriately and effectively applying anticipatory thinking practices’. At the same time, the World Futures Studies Federation was set up in Europe to promote futures education and research. In 1968 the Club of Rome was initiated, a think tank which sprang to global prominence with its project The Predicament of Mankind published in 1972 under the title Limits To Growth. Limits to Growth, which modelled the consequences of a rapidly growing world population and finite natural resources, stimulated debate worldwide about the future of the planet and the human population.

with the Limits to Growth report, the seeds were being sown for one of the first, and almost certainly the most famous, applications of futures planning in the context of a specific organisation with Shell International2. The Shell system of scenario planning emerged because of the need for ‘managerial assumption-smashing’. As one of the originators, Pierre Wack, put it: “...it [was] extremely difficult for managers to break out of their worldview while operating within it. When they are committed to a certain way of framing an issue, it is difficult for them to see solutions that lie outside this framework. By presenting other ways of seeing the world, decision scenarios allow managers to break out of a one-eyed view. Scenarios give managers something very precious: the ability to re-perceive reality...” In the early days of their work with scenarios, Shell planners developed scenarios which simply quantified alternative outcomes of key uncertainties. For example, the price of oil could be $20 a barrel in a given year, or it could be $40. Such scenarios were not particularly useful for long-term planning and decision-making, as they provided only a set of plausible alternatives, with no reasons, justifications or assumptions, thereby offering no basis on which managers could exercise judgment. Such scenarios resembled the straight-line forecasting that Shell and other companies had engaged in for years and were increasingly rejected as inadequate for the complexities of the modern world. The Shell planning team, inspired in part by wider societal initiatives such as the Club of Rome, started to work with the idea that there were a range of driving forces which impacted upon their work, which included but went beyond industry dynamics to

The rise of futures planning in corporations: Shell International
Around the same time that the Club of Rome was capturing global imaginations

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include social, technological, economic, environmental and political factors (see Figure 1). The Shell planners started to focus the development of scenarios around better understanding these broad drivers, and creatively weaving future ‘stories’ built on this new understanding. The early 1970s saw a period of recession in the oil industry because of low prices resulting from an oil surplus after the development of huge fields in the Middle East. This led Shell planners, already obsessing about the key factors which might shape their future, to look at the world from the perspectives of Middle Eastern oil producing nations, and think through different scenarios of how the decisions of this group of nations might shape the world. These scenarios were presented to senior management in 1972, and led the leaders of Shell to realise that business-as-usual mentalities were blinding them to the inevitability of the coming changes. As a result, during the 1970s, Shell was better positioned to handle the oil embargo and

the dramatic rise in oil prices than many of its competitors. It catapulted from being the seventh to the second biggest oil company in the world3.

The rise of futures in public sector organisations and government
The success of Shell and the impact of the 1960s initiatives have led to futures planning and scenarios being adopted in many different kinds of organisations and settings, including the public and not-forprofit sector. But it is important to note that the use of futures approaches by public organisations is somewhat different to its use in corporations. As a recent House of Commons review has put it: “In the private sector, strategy is defined (by the consultants McKinsey & Company) as ‘a coherent and evolving portfolio of initiatives to drive shareholder value and long-term performance’. In the public sector, however, strategy is concerned with long-term public value, a complex and contested concept. Accountability is to Parliament and the public rather than to shareholders.” Despite this, there is undoubted potential for application of futures approaches in the realm of society and politics. This was powerfully demonstrated to the world in early 1990s South Africa. As the Global Business Network has described it: “In South Africa in 1991, a diverse group of South African leaders – community activists, politicians, unionists, academics, economists, and business leaders – used scenario thinking as a way to envision paths to democracy as the country transitioned out of apartheid. Each resulting scenario described a very different outcome of the political negotiations that were then

Contextual environment Working environment

Your organisation or issue

Social Technological Economic Environmental Political

Driving forces

Driving forces

Constituencies Customers Communities Partners Regulation

Figure 1: Drivers of the future

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underway. One scenario, which the group called Ostrich, told of what would happen if the negotiations were to break down between the apartheid government and Nelson Mandela’s African National Congress [burying head in the sand]. Another scenario, Lame Duck, foresaw a world in which a prolonged transition left the government weak and unable to satisfy all interests. A third scenario, Icarus, described a South Africa in which the ANC came to power and its massive public spending resulted in an economic crash. The fourth scenario, Flight of the Flamingos, described how the apartheid government, the ANC, and their respective constituencies might slowly and steadily rise together4.” These scenarios, known as the Mont Fleur scenarios, were subsequently shared widely

throughout South Africa, and became an instrumental common language that helped facilitate public debate in the transition to democracy. FW de Klerk was famously quoted in the press as saying “I am not an Ostrich!” There is now a huge amount of work being undertaken by public organisations on futures issues. Many public sector futures initiatives are regional and sector specific such as the state-specific health futures project in Australia illustrated in Figure 2. Other public sector futures initiatives have taken a global perspective on a particular issue. Perhaps the most famous recent example is the Stern Review of Climate Change, which has re-shaped the way in which policy makers and the public think about the economics of climate change and its impact on the world.

FUTURES PLANNING PROJECT
28 April 2005

Roundtable

Identify key issues and trends which will have greatest impact on health and health care over the next 20 years Identify uncertainties in relation to trends Suggest draft operating principals to guide future action

18 July 2005

Futures Forum

Clarify values relating to health and health care For key issues and trends, identify those matters requiring priority attention and action over the next 20 years Test and refine operating principals which will guide necessary action on key issues over the long-term

May-July 2006

Consultation Document and Consultation process

Undertake state-wide consultation process to finalise the Future Directions for the NSW public health system. The Future Directions will identify priority areas for action and guide decision-making over the long-term.

October 2006

STATE HEALTH PLAN

Use the Future Directions as a framework to develop a high level corporate strategic plan for the NSW public health system outlining strategic directions and service development priorities for the next 5 years (2006-210).

In Australia, the New South Wales Health Futures Planning Project in is the government's response to recommendations for a longer term planning framework for health and health care in NSW. Clarity about the future directions for the New South Wales health care system will help ensure that the system continues to meet patient and community needs over the next 15 to 20 years. While planning for this timeframe in a rapidly changing world presents a challenge, it also provides a unique opportunity for the community and health care personnel to work with government to shape the future of the health system. Figure 2. State-specific health futures project in Australia

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Finally, there are a number of wideranging, multi-sectoral futures initiatives, which involve actively engaging the whole of government in futures thinking. In Finland, for example, the government produces a report on a futures topic once every electoral cycle, which is considered a dedicated Parliament’s Committee of the Future. The government’s most recent report for the 2003–2007 electoral period was on the theme A Good Society for People of All Ages and looked at demographic trends, population policy and preparation for changes in the age structure. A similar initiative was undertaken by the Scottish Parliament, and the recent House of Commons review of the role of futures in the UK government has recommended that the UK parliament set up a Parliamentary Forum for the Future5.

organisational environments are increasingly characterised by levels of unpredictability, surprise and discontinuities. Against this background, one leading thinker has developed a four-part rationale for the adoption of futures thinking: Rationale 1: Decisions have long-term consequences t What we do now will have many future consequences, direct and indirect, foreseen and unforeseen. In one way or another policy and strategy decisions made today will shape the landscape of tomorrow. A policy put in place to address some problem could be ineffectual, leading to a worsening of the problem, could solve the immediate problem but have longer-term side effects bringing up a new set of issues, or could successfully negotiate the difficulties and ensure a better future for the organisation. We see examples of this in the case studies in the latter half of this report. In Limits to Growth – the 30-year update it is argued that humanity is currently in the process of ‘overshooting’ the capacity of earth, and policy decisions made by national governments in the present day could on the one hand lead to industrial decline, food shortages, high death rates and low quality of life, if current policy trends continue, or on the other hand a sustained effort to decrease mankind’s ecological footprint through lowering pollution and controlling birth rates could result in a sustainable society. In the Mont Fleur scenarios it was argued that South Africa’s policy decisions made in the 1990s had the potential to continue crises and negotiations, lead to an incapacitated government, produce collapse through over-ambitious policies, or lead to a sustainable, inclusive democracy and growth.

Why is futures planning important?
The very notion of planning and strategising in organisations is based upon the idea that the future is unpredictable, with only some aspects that can be foreseen. If the future was entirely predictable, then the course of events would be completely determined in advance, and planning would make no difference. On the other hand, if no aspects of the future were foreseeable then setting out plans and strategies would be futile or even counterproductive, as there is no way of knowing in advance what course of action will be most appropriate. As one commentator, JC Glenn, puts it: “You cannot know the future, but a range of possible futures can be known…Gradations of foreknowledge and probabilities can be made; we can be more certain about the sunrise than about the rise of the stock market6.” The insight from JC Glenn above is echoed by those who observe that modern

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Rationale 2: Future alternatives imply present choices These possible long-term impacts need to be considered in weighing up present-day policy decisions. Although decisions are always constrained in some ways, individuals and groups do have the capacity to explore and choose between the possible options for their decisions. Being more aware of the alternative courses that future events may take as a result of a policy decision gives a greater understanding of the nature of those options that must be weighed up, as well as potentially illuminating new options or possibilities that could have preferable longterm consequences. Many things take time to create or set in motion, so it is wise to be mindful in advance. The rationale for the health futures project mentioned earlier is as follows: “We cannot expect the nature of health services in 2023 to be an image of those in 2003 simply adjusted for population growth. There is little doubt that the health services in 2023 will be as different from those in 2003 as today's services are different from those of 1983… Just as there will be increasing demands on the health system driven by demographic and societal factors, the way in which the system delivers health care is more than likely to further change… The system must be capable now to meet future pressures while being sufficiently flexible to meet changing health structures and protocols.” Looking at this from another angle it is clear that you need to know where you would prefer to end up in the future, or how you would prefer the future to pan out, in order to know how to act in the present. If it is not clear where an organisation aims to be in the future, then it is difficult for members to

decide how to act in the present in order to bring these goals about. The UK Climate Impacts Scenarios case study in Part II provides an interesting illustration of how present day policy makers must consider possible future implications of climate change. For example, it identifies the need for present-day housing policy to incorporate an understanding of potential flood plains to ensure sustainable developments are undertaken. In addition, the UK Cabinet Office Trends initiative in the case studies section highlights issues such as demographics, which should be taken into account when present-day decisions are made on a range of subjects, including pensions, benefits, taxation and so on. Rationale 3: Forward thinking is preferable to crisis management Crises are frequently expensive and wasteful, as it is likely to be more costly to reverse a downward trend after it has begun rather than to prevent it in the first place. In many cases the effects of a lack of forward thinking may be disastrous. As the Stern Review on climate change puts it: “The scientific evidence is now overwhelming: climate change is a serious global threat, and it demands an urgent global response7.” The report stated that, if no action is taken today, the overall costs and risks of climate change will be equivalent to losing at least 5% of global GDP each year, now and forever, which could rise to 20% of GDP or more. In contrast, it suggests that the costs of action if taken now could be limited to around one per cent of global GDP each year. Similarly, the Limits to Growth case study shows that a massive loss of life and dip in wellbeing may result from policies focusing on short term issues and only reacting to matters once they are crises. In some environments an organisation

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may never be given a chance to recover from being slow to react to changing circumstances. It is therefore preferable to take a strategic view, exploring options and alternatives, and anticipating eventualities and preparing for contingencies. Forward thinking allows an organisation to understand what can be done today to prepare for an uncertain future, and allow them to rehearse potential strategies. The Singapore government’s Scenario Planning office explains these benefits: “It approximates to a strategic fire-drill. We learn to be forward thinking by ‘living in the future’, whilst positioning ourselves to react to change quickly and nimbly8.” In the case studies, the Mont Fleur process identified a range of scenarios which highlights the importance of forward thinking. This was embodied in the ‘Icarus’ scenario in which short-term thinking and policy making could have led to economic and social collapse for the new regime in South Africa. Rationale 4: Further transformations are certain to occur Change is incessant, and inevitable. Various technological advances have resulted in people and societies being increasingly interdependent; as Nobel Peace Prize-winner Joseph Rotblat puts it: “The fantastic progress in communication and transportation has transformed the world into an intimately interconnected community, in which all members depend on one another for their wellbeing9.” This combination of factors leaves organisations and individuals facing accelerating change. As one thinker

suggests, the possible changes over the next century are probably as great as those which have occurred over the previous millennium. Such turbulence and dynamic change dramatically increases the value of futures thinking. As Glenn puts it: “The increasing complexity and acceleration of change decreases the lead-time for decisions and makes previous expectations less reliable. Forecasting increases lead-time between potential events and current planning. Hence, the faster pace and complexity of change today increases the value of futures thinking, because it increases time and space for analysis to create more intelligent decisions.” There are a number of benefits of strategic futures work that serve to improve an organisation’s likelihood of better dealing with the future. Without strategic futures work, forward planning thinking within an organisation may go on in an ad-hoc manner, at a superficial level, or be discouraged or subsumed by organisational practices. ‘Group-think’ and similar processes can lead to organisations that never question their underlying assumptions about the future. In addition, conventional short-term planning processes can often reinforce existing thinking, as organisations seek out justifications based on existing knowledge, behaviours and trends rather than using wider frames of reference. These can cause an organisation to be inflexible and unreceptive to changing circumstances, which will lead to it being highly vulnerable in times of turbulence. Futures approaches can help address these problems. Through ensuring that an organisation thinks more explicitly, deeply and systematically about the future it is possible to question the received wisdom,

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unpicking the assumptions that lie beneath current dominant views and encouraging receptivity to new thinking. It allows organisations to better understand what they know and don’t know but need to know, better identify upcoming opportunities and threats, and focus on the difficult questions that must be addressed in order to make more intelligent decisions and design better policy and strategy. The more that organisations gain insight into the possible future ramifications of present-day decisions, the greater part they can play in determining the course of their future. The following chapters explain more about how to determine the scope of futures projects, provide an overview of futures methods, and demonstrates good and bad practices to watch out for.

References
1. 2. Bell, Foundations for Futures Studies. The Art of the Long View, By Peter Schwartz, 1991, and Strategic Planning in Shell Pierre Wack, Shell International Petroleum Company Limited, Group Planning, 1986. A fuller account is at: http://www.davisfloyd.com/userfiles/Storying%20 Corporate%20Futures.pdf Sourced from: http://www.gbn.com Governing the Future, House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee, 2007 accessible via: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmpubadm/12 3/123i.pdf JC Glenn, Futures Research Methodology v2.0. HM Treasury, The Stern Review of the Economics of Climate Change, October 2006, pvi. Henley Centre – Understanding Best Practice in Strategic Futures Work. J.Rotblat, in Urry (2003).

3.

4. 5.

6. 7. 8. 9.

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Chapter 2: Scope and stages of organisational future projects
Breadth and complexity
In order to carry out futures work effectively within public sector organisations, or indeed any organisations, it is vital to consider and clarify the intended scope of the project. Futures analysis can be very broad, drawing on work from a wide range of drivers, and applying a number of different frameworks and perspectives. On the other hand, it can also be more specific, focusing on how a narrow set of issues might play out, or on specific factors that are particularly relevant for a particular organisation or decision. What is feasible and what is needed is dependent on the context and the resources available. Importantly, the broader the analyses, the more important it is to bring in a number of different organisations or experts to contribute, and consequently the greater resources required. One of the best examples of wide ranging futures work is that undertaken by the Club of Rome think tank, which aims to address ‘the complex set of the most crucial problems – political, social, economic, technological, environmental, psychological and cultural – facing humanity1.’ Many government initiatives also undertake wideranging analysis, such as the Norwegian government’s Norway 2030 project, which is intended to inform the work of all government departments, and which involves participation of 15 separate departments. It is also important to consider the degree of complexity of the futures analysis which will be undertaken. At one end of the spectrum, futures work can take a fairly linear approach, examining drivers and trends (for example, healthcare, transport, crime, environment) in isolation. At the other end, futures projects take into account a number of drivers simultaneously, exploring how they might affect each other and patterns of interaction that shape the future. The levels of resources available play an important role in determining the scope of the project. The linear approach would allow experts in various fields to be consulted on an individual basis. By contrast, a more complex approach could require considerable in-depth analysis after the collection of a range of views, bringing together experts from different fields in order to take a more integrated and multidisciplinary approach to a problem. There is good reason to believe that in many areas a more complex view would be more likely to bring valuable and useful insights2. A benchmarking of futures organisations undertaken by the UK’s Henley Centre found that ‘almost all’ appear to take a multidimensional, complex approach, even where the topic of concern is quite a specific one3. For example, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a military think-tank, brought together business people, journalists, academics and government officials in examining the issue of ‘Scarcity and Conflict’. The project attempted to identify relationships between a range of key social, economic and political drivers, rather than extrapolating from military trends. The Henley Centre4 best practice report proposes that futures work should involve an iterative ‘journey’ through the steps shown in Figure 1. This shows that the most effective futures efforts incorporate both specific and more general and wide-ranging approaches, and should also move

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Complex
IV. Futures work feeds into specific thinking, tested with audiences III. Futures group builds bigger picture

Specific
V. Apply thinking to specific organisation practice and policymaking II. Making the organisation ‘future-ready’

Wide ranging

the organisation deploys a number of techniques to ensure that the strategic futures thinking is applied to the organisation’s practice. Effective futures processes should continue through this loop on an ongoing basis5.

Simple
Figure 1. The iterative futures journey

between simple and more complex views of the future. I. Agree question In the bottom left-hand corner, the organisation decides that it needs a wider view of the world – either to improve its overall perspective or to achieve a better resolution for a particular problem or issue – and agrees a key question. II. Making the organisation ‘futureready’ The organisation makes itself ready for a futures approach, winning acceptance from senior managers and people at multiple levels within the organisation that a more strategic approach is required to the future. III. Futures group builds bigger picture A futures group applies itself to the work, engaging the organisation as it goes. IV. Futures work feeds into specific thinking, tested with audiences Futures thinking is then applied to the specific issues faced by the organisation to build a new strategic view. This process can be slow, and it can depend on the success of the methods to make the organisation future-ready in Stage II. V. Apply thinking to specific organisation practice and policymaking In this stage,

This journey can be seen in the European Commission’s Europe 2010 Scenarios case study. After the question was agreed, the drivers were identified (Stage II), their inter-relations were analysed (Stage III) and five specific scenarios for the European Commission were formed (Stage IV), which were used to shape decisionmaking (Stage V).

Different modes of thinking
Strategic futures methods can be also characterised as spanning a spectrum from the highly analytical to the highly creative. For example, trend analysis and simulation are in many ways more ‘hard’ analytical tools while visioning and horizon-scanning can involve more creative approaches. Another way of understanding the ends of this spectrum is seeing it as characterised by the differences between qualitative and quantitative approaches, with some projects using statistical and econometric models as the best way to forecast the future, while other projects build on the awareness and insights of unexpected drivers and possible events. Two different types of reasoning of reasoning may be involved. Convergent thinking is about problem solving, bringing a variety of material to bear in order to find a ‘correct’ answer, using description, observation, and deduction. Divergent thinking is related to the creative elaboration of ideas prompted by an

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initial stimulus. Futures planning methods can be designed to foster ‘blue sky’ thinking, or they can be designed to foster rigorous and more analytical thinking. Sense that the future is predictable It has been remarked that futures practitioners can often be split Analytical Creative between those who favour one Sense of ‘multiple futures’ approach or the other. The analytical side tends towards a belief that knowledge of the future can be tied down given appropriate levels of analysis, while the creative tend to 6. feel comfortable with the sense of In this framework, the first phase involves multiple possible futures. The diagram convergent thinking while phases two, three below looks at balancing analytical and and four involve both convergent and creative approaches. 7 divergent approaches. JS Iversen suggests that good futures J Voros also emphasises the importance work should involve a mix of these of a coherent foresight framework to approaches. As he puts it: ensure futures work brings together the various types of reasoning that are “Good future study design must balance the necessary, and feeds effectively into divergent and convergent processes in order organisational strategy. This involves seeing to facilitate a process where the use of two four key elements of the process: inputs, different ways of thinking produces a result foresight work, outputs, and strategy. which is explanatory and creative and rooted in facts, numbers, and explicitly Inputs: this is the gathering of information stated rational assumptions.” and scanning for strategic intelligence. It could involve many tools and techniques, Stages and framework such as environmental scanning and the Due to this need to balance different modes Delphi technique, and could include various of thinking, and assessing matters with workshop formats such as brainstorming in different levels of scope and complexity, it is order to open out the thinking about the important to use a range of methods in near future. These tools are covered in more futures work. Iverson argues that it is useful detail in Chapter Three. to think of futures work as consisting of the following four phases: Foresight work: can be conceived as comprising three broad steps: 1. Mapping and delineation of subject matter. 2. Identification of critical issues Analysis: the sort of question asked here and trends. is what seems to be happening? The 3. Assessments of trends. aim is to make a first attempt at finding 4. Use. patterns in the variety of data which the

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Key questions

Useful methodologies
Delphi

Inputs
“What seems to be happening?”

Analysis Interpretation Prospection

Trends analysis, cross-impact analysis

Foresight

“What’s really happening?”

Causal layered analysis

“What might happen?”

Scenarios, visioning, backcasting

Outputs

“What might we need to do?”

Reports, presentations, publications, roadmaps

“What will we do?” “How will we do it?”

Strategy development and strategic planning; Individual, workgroup, organisation, society, etc.

Strategy
The four elements of futures projects8

Inputs step usually generates. Common tools used here are trend analysis and cross-impact analysis. Interpretation: this stage looks to probe beneath the surface, to ask the question what’s really happening? This can be performed using tools such as causal layered analysis and systems thinking. Prospection: this is an activity of creating forward views, where various views of alternative futures are explicitly examined or created. The question being asked is what might happen? Useful tools at this stage are scenarios, visioning, and backcasting. Outputs: the focus here is communicating the generated insights, and the stimulation of thinking about options, prior to and

as inputs into more formal strategy work. The essence of this step is captured by the question what might we need to do? The aim is to expand the perception of strategic options. There are two types of output – tangible, which would include the actual range of options produced by the work, and intangible, which would include changes in thinking brought about by the process of foresight. Methods employed here could include workshops, reports, multimedia, etc. Strategy: this is where the results of foresight are passed to those making strategic decisions, in order to help direct implementation. The kind of question answered here is what will we do? and how will we do it?

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References
1. 2. Club of Rome, in the Henley Centre Benchmarking UK Strategic Futures Work (2001). The Implications of Complexity Theory for International Development, H. Jones B. Ramalingam and T. Reba, ODI (2007). The Henley Centre Benchmarking UK Strategic Futures Work (2001). The Henley Centre Understanding Best Practice in Strategic Futures Work (2001). ibid The Henley Centre Benchmarking UK Strategic Futures Work (2001). Futures thinking methodologies – options relevant for ‘schooling for tomorrow’, JS Iverson, Danish Technolgical Institute. Foresight Framework all from J Voros (2005) A Generic Foresight Process Framework.

3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

8.

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Chapter 3: Choosing futures methodologies
The importance of methods
As outlined earlier, it is important that futures work produces useful outcomes that can properly inform the strategy and policy of an organisation. But how you get there – the methods chosen – are crucial to the success of the exercise. It is important to understand the role that different tools can play and the way that available tools might fit in with various objectives. This will help ensure that the futures work being carried out is relevant. By being clear and explicit about which methods are used and why, there is greater likelihood that the futures project will gain trust, demonstrate openness, and win enthusiasm of participants. The following analogy from the UK government’s Office of Science and Innovation gives a simple yet powerful introduction to some of the key futures methodologies. “Let us assume you are standing on the bridge of a ship. You scan the horizon (horizon scanning) and see an iceberg and your supply ship. You work out the likely speeds and directions of the iceberg and supply ship (trend analysis) and put the information into the ship’s computer (modelling) and then plot a course (roadmapping) so that you meet with the supply ship and not the iceberg. While you are doing this you daydream of eating some nice chocolate that you hope is on the supply ship (visioning). You realise that the speeds and directions of the iceberg and supply ship might change, so you work out a range of possible options to make sure you have the greatest chance of meeting the supply ship (scenarios). Even with all of this planning, you know there is a chance of the unexpected and hitting the iceberg so you get the crew to do an evacuation drill (gaming). While they are doing it, you work back from the most likely future position of the supply Objectives ship to work out the steps you need to get there (backcasting)1.”

Suitable methods

Horizon scanning Delphi Trend/driver analysis Scenarios Visioning Roadmaps Backcasting Models Simulations/gaming

Looking for challenges and opportunities

Matching approaches
In order to effectively develop a process to explore the future, it is important to match the tools used to the project’s objectives, outcomes and information needs. We look at each of these in turn below.

Assessing social, political and economic contexts

Defining ideal actions

To explore future options

Choosing methodologies based on outcomes
It is important to consider the project outcomes that are

Table 1. Choosing methods based on objectives

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Method
Casual layered analysis Cross-impact analysis Modelling Delphi techniques Econometrics and statistical modelling Horizon scanning Futures wheel Visioning Road mapping Scenarios Simulation, gaming Trend analysis

Quantitative

Qualitative
X

Choosing methodologies based on objectives
The project objectives are usually described in terms of the key questions the project is seeking to inform. It is vital to make sure that every stream of work in the project reflects these questions, because this will make it much easier to ensure that all relevant aspects are covered, and make it easier to draw together the various elements into one coherent output. Typical objectives might be to:

X X X X X X X X X X X

Table 2. The information base of different methods

desired from the futures project. These are the broader goals to which the futures project should contribute. Clarity on the hoped-for outcomes will also help highlight the stakeholders who are most relevant to the project. Typical outcomes might be normative or exploratory: Normative: improved institutions’ strategic preparedness for key external trends and shocks, by informing presentday decision-making. Exploratory: broaden the organisational horizons through improved ‘blue sky’ thinking. For example, the Limits to Growth case study reflects a more normative outcome in that it looks to recommend actions to bring about preferred futures, while the Cabinet Office Trends case study demonstrates a more exploratory and open-ended outcome.

look for challenges and opportunities; assess social, political and economic contexts; define ideal actions; explore future options. Table 1 shows a useful framework which matches specific methods to different kinds of objectives, and how to combine approaches.

Choosing methodologies based on information needs
It is important to consider what sort of information is likely to be of most use for the project’s stakeholders, and/or what type of analysis and evidence they are likely to find most credible. For example, the American organisation Resources for the Future bases its futures work on economic models and highly quantitative approaches, driven by the principle that these kinds of information will carry more weight within the US executive bodies2.

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Typical information considerations might include: Quantitative and qualitative information – what balance to strike? Different kinds of analysis – how to use and combine to best effect? What kind of timeline is being explored, for example, five to ten years, 30 years+, etc?
Figure 1. Connections and dependencies between methods

Based around the quantitative and qualitative distinction, the categorisation in Table 2 (opposite) can be used. For example, the Mont Fleur Scenarios case study highlights a number of qualitative, narrative-based scenarios, the aim of which was to inform and mobilise many different stakeholders across South African society. By contrast, the Foresight Futures 2020 Scenarios case study demonstrates a more detailed and in-depth analysis intended to be used by specialists and senior executives making decisions about strategic issues.

Combining approaches
The OST provide a useful approach for combining the different futures methodologies, based on a number of dependencies between approaches and a number of optional connections. These are demonstrated in Figure 1 above.

References
1. Office of Science and Innovation, Strategic Futures Planning: Suggestions for success: A toolkit, www.foresight.gov.uk Understanding Best Practice.

2.

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Chapter 4: Specific methods
Scenarios
A scenario is a detailed picture of a plausible future world, which describes the future conditions in a way which allows the planner to comprehend the possible problems, challenges and opportunities that it would present. The term was introduced by Herman Kahn in connection with strategic studies carried out by the RAND Corporation in the 1950s and 60s, and transferred into corporate use in the 70s as companies such as Shell used scenario planning to anticipate possible future events and react quickly to changing circumstances. There are a number of different methods for constructing scenarios. Schwarts offers several steps required in their development1: 1. The setting: what are the central concerns, the key issues, of the users of the scenarios? 2. Identify the drivers: identify the driving forces that are likely to have the most important influences on these central concerns of the future. 3. Analyse the drivers: where can the drivers be reasonably predicted, what is known and unknown, the trends and the trend breaks? 4. Assessment of the importance and the uncertainty of the drivers: identify two or three critical factors of the central themes of the scenarios. 5. Select the scenario logics: construct the main themes or assumptions around which the scenarios are to be built. It is important to end up with a few scenarios whose differences are relevant for decision-makers. 6. Develop the scenarios: often done in the form of narratives that represent a plausible sequence of events. 7. Impact analyses: analyse the impact of the scenarios on the key concerns with which the process began. 8. Policy implications: analyse the implications for policy and identify indicators that will help monitor changes as they occur. Scenarios are used to encompass a broad span of possible futures, to ensure that plans could cope with many eventualities, and will be robust under the many different ways in which the future could pan out. In this way, a scenario is not intended as a specific forecast, but rather varieties of scenarios outline various possibilities for alternative futures, constructing a ‘possibility space’ in which the future is likely to unfold2. Thus, a good scenario should not only be plausible, internally consistent, and anchored in clear purposes and assumptions, but also concise and creative, providing real alternatives for the future which can be useful to decision-makers. Scenarios can be developed through long and intricate processes, or in abbreviated workshops, and anything in between. This depends on their intended use and the various resource constraints, for example, scenarios developed from scratch in a four-hour workshop can be used primarily to give a group experience of the process rather than providing concrete inputs into policy. The types of question being answered through the scenario process can be categorised in the following way3: Predictive scenarios: aim to answer the question what will happen? in two

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possible ways – forecasts respond to the question what will happen, on the condition that the likely development unfolds? while what-if scenarios respond to the question what will happen, on the condition of some specified events? Explorative scenarios: respond to the question what can happen? in two ways – external scenarios examines the development of external factors, and strategic scenarios look at what can happen if the organisation acts in a certain way. Normative scenarios: look at how a specific target can be reached, with two angles – preserving scenarios examine how the target can be reached through adjustments to the current situation, and transforming scenarios look at how an answer can be reached when the prevailing structure blocks the necessary changes. The benefit of scenario planning is to give a balanced evaluation of the range of strategies that may be required by an organisation, offering signposts and indicating possible paths to alternative futures. However, difficulties may arise in convincing decision-makers to incorporate the results into their ways of thinking. Also, because they are based on qualitative analysis they are not necessarily particularly precise instruments, and are dependent on the level of creativity, imagination and rigorous thinking that go into them. For examples of the use of scenarios, see the case studies in Part II.

action of ‘watching and collecting information on a company’s rivals and the overall market4’. Brown and Weiner explain that it should be seen as a ‘kind of radar to scan the world systematically and signal the new, the unexpected, the major and the minor5’. It is a process that aims to provide early warning to managers, a system to organise the information flow about various trends and events that may be significant for an organisation. It can be carried out using a number of techniques. One approach is the use of expert panels, which provide observations and judgements about important developments that are underway or expected. As with Delphi, the value of this ‘look out’ panel will depend on the knowledge and cooperation of the panellists, so it is essential to give much consideration to choosing participants who have the required level of expertise and are likely to contribute valuable ideas. A second approach, suggested by Glenn, is to use a computerised online literature review. This involves searching through online databases using carefully selected search terms in order to uncover information that may provide clues to important future trends. Thirdly, a hard-copy literature review can be carried out, and a fourth approach is to commission a number of essays on emerging issues by experts. P Terry6 argues that there are three areas . of focus for environmental scanning: 1. the first is the immediate environment of current concern to the organisation; 2. the second is the probable environment not of immediate concern to the organisation but likely to be in the future; 3. the third is the possible environment, ‘weaker signals’ that may become very serious issues or disappear.

Environmental scanning/ horizon scanning
Environmental scanning was a term coined in the 1960s by Harvard Business School professor Francis Aguilar to describe the

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This can have two aspects: the societal or ‘general’ environment, and the task or ‘specific’ environment. Clearly the boundary between these two is not clear-cut or static. There are a number of ways that organisations can integrate environmental scanning. Passive scanning is ongoing, which will usually involve ad hoc activity, and employees simply ‘bearing in mind’ the need to keep an eye on the environment, almost at a subconscious level. Active scanning involves a much higher level of attention, and involves explicit and systematic activities. In addition to this, Terry argues that organisations can perform such scanning in irregular, regular and continuous modes. Irregular involves a ‘knee-jerk reaction’ to an unanticipated occurrence; regular involves periodic reflection often on specified issues, whereas continuous scanning is the ongoing monitoring of various environmental systems rather than specific events. The downside is that environmental scanning is ‘an imperfect activity7’, and can not achieve total objectivity. Scanners are faced with various decisions about what to focus on, what material to include, and are typically influenced by their overall world view that will favour some factors over others. The ten challenges to local government, in the Local Government Futures case study in Part II, are a useful example of an environmental/horizon scanning approach.

Quantitative trend analysis involves analysing historical data using statistical models or other such analytical tools in order to fit a curve to the data which can be extrapolated into the future. Tools suitable for this task include time series forecasts, trend extrapolations, S-curve analyses, cycle analyses and long-waves analyses. Since these approaches are based on data, they are best suited to fields where there are large and reliable data collections. Their benefits lie in the high degree of objectivity in the method, the ease of communicating their use and their being relatively inexpensive to perform. On the downside (except in highly stable systems) it is often quite unlikely that the future will turn out to run as such a simple extrapolation of the past, so they serve best as a useful starting point for futures discussions. This aspect can be missed, and the data is often taken as an unquestionable prediction of the future. Trend Impact Analysis (TIA) is a method that improves on quantitative trend analyses. TIA uses extrapolations of historical trends combined with and modified by expectations about possible future events. An analyst interested in tracking a particular trend can systematically examine the effects of possible future events, including technological, political, social and economic changes. TIA involves two main steps8: 1. a curve is fitted to historical data to calculate the future trend, given no unprecedented future events; and 2. expert judgements are used to identify a set of future events that, if they were to occur, could cause deviations from the extrapolation of historical data. For each such event, experts judge the probability of occurrence, possible time that the trend will take to be affected, and expected impact.

Trend and driver analysis
The terms trend analysis, quantitative trend analysis, driver analysis, qualitative trend analysis, and trend impact analysis mark out a set of techniques which are used for spotting emerging patterns in historical data and examining where they may lead.

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Step one provides a forecast for a ‘surprisefree’ future, just as with quantitative trend analyses, but then judgement and imagination are needed to identify potential significant events and their impact. These events can be identified using a number of methods, such as literature reviews or a Delphi study. TIA offers clear advantages over straightforward trend analysis, adding more depth and realism to forecasts. Criticisms levelled at the technique focus on the fact that the list of possible events and their potential impact is inevitably incomplete, and can be affected by certain assumptions about the future. Qualitative trend analysis can be seen as more of a matter of interpretation and an ‘art form’ compared to the relatively technical exercises of quantitative trend analyses9. They involve spotting traces and clues about the future, and looking at how these trends and their consequences may affect the system being investigated. Qualitative trend analysis can be used in all areas, but are often most useful to use in situations of considerable change, where quantitative analysis may be inappropriate. Coates10 identifies fours steps for performing qualitative trend analysis: 1. develop a conceptual framework of the forces at play; 2. look for theoretical constructs that shed light on these forces, and identify what is known and unknown about them; 3. seek out any relevant information; and, 4. derive an alternative future implied by the examination of that system. Qualitative trend analyses can give insights into possible future scenarios that may not be possible to get from other techniques, and may bring a greater understanding of

the whole system involved. However, they are unavoidably limited by the personal views and assumptions of those people carrying them out, and it can often be difficult to identify how many different trends may pan out – whether something is a shortterm fad or a major long-term shift. For a concrete example of trend analysis, see the Cabinet Office Key Trends case study in Part II.

Visioning
The creation of a vision of the future that an organisation would like to see is an essential element of normative forecasting. It involves asking the question how would we like the future to evolve? in a systematic, comprehensive manner in order to help answer the wider question of what should we do now? Contemporary normative forecasting had its origins in World War II with the military need for goal and missionoriented planning, and has since been used in many large public and private organisations. The conclusions and suggested guidelines in the Limits to Growth case study in Part II are a powerful example of visioning. The creation of a vision is important because it provides a focus, purpose and direction for the planning process. This provides a normative base against which other goals, objectives, strategies and projects can be judged – it is impossible to know how to act today if we do not know where we want to be tomorrow. The vision expresses the goals that the organisation is striving towards, which can help with the planning of various activities by providing a ‘big picture’ that they should fit into. This also has the effect of bringing the members of the organisation together through underlining the part they are each playing in bringing about these overall aims.

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Visioning is best undertaken when informed with a variety of exploratory forecasts, and analysis of the ways the future might pan out. As such, it is best used as part of a wider foresight process. There are many possible techniques for producing a vision, but the most common are various survey techniques: visions can be formulated through conducting in-depth interviews with people both inside and outside the organisation, through holding meetings and workshops with them, or through the Delphi technique. The vision statement produced can feed into the strategic planning process. It is worth noting that visions can often be easily confused with mission statements and strategic plans. They are interrelated, but the following questions may serve to help distinguish them: mission statement – why do we exist now?; vision statement – where should we be headed?; strategic plan – how do we plan to get there?11. It is acknowledged that normative forecasting is ‘indispensable’ to planning in large organisations12. However, there is significant danger in performing the visioning activity badly. Whereas a well formed vision statement can have the power to motivate and align efforts, visions formed through processes not carrying out the necessary analysis, or taking too narrow a view, can produce nothing but ‘a piece of paper that everyone subsequently ignores’13.

what futures are likely to happen, but with how desirable futures can be attained. It is thus explicitly normative, involving working backwards from a particular desirable future end-point to the present in order to determine the physical feasibility of that future and what policy measures would be required to reach that point.” The activity follows the formulation of an image or several images of a desirable future (such as a vision or normative scenarios). The task of backcasting is then to assess how this future can be achieved, asking questions such as what are the resources to help one get there? what is the state of society that would allow one to move in that direction?, and then what plans and policies can we put in place to work towards this? Futurologists tend to define backcasting as an approach rather than a method, it can be carried out through a variety of techniques such as expert panels, Delphi techniques, and participatory processes. Dreborg16 argues that the following characteristics favour backcasting: when the problem to be studied is complex, affecting many sectors and levels of society; when there is a need for major change, such as when marginal changes within the prevailing order will not be sufficient; when the dominant trends are part of the problem – these trends are often the cornerstone of forecast; when the problem to a great extent is a matter of externalities, which the market cannot treat satisfactorily; and when the time horizon is long enough to allow considerable scope for deliberate choice.

Backcasting
Backcasting is the process of planning from a desirable future outcome. It has its origin in the 1970s, when Amory Lovins proposed it as an alternative technique for electricity supply and demand14. The actual term was coined by Robinson, who defined it as15: “The major distinguishing characteristic of backcasting analysis is a concern, not with

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Clearly the usefulness of backcasting depends greatly on the quality of the future visions or scenarios which are worked back from, as well as the judgements about the steps required to reach that future state. Therefore, it is important to incorporate diverse perspectives, and knowledgeable participants. Backcasting is used in the Limits to Growth case study as an overall way of structuring the analysis and thinking.

Simulation/gaming
The use of simulations and games allows you to investigate the dynamics of a system by looking at how different scenarios might play out, and how people or organisations might react to new situations. This approach has been used throughout the ages, for example with the use of war games to train soldiers, models simulations used by designers and architects to test their ideas, and fire drills to improve an organisation’s response to such an emergency. More recently, computer models have hugely expanded the potential for simulation and gaming. Simulations and games use a model of a situation to investigate them. A model is a simplified representation of some phenomenon: examples include a scale model of a building using small physical objects to investigate architectural characteristics, a mathematical model used to represent the forces affecting an atom with various equations, or a computer model using mathematical relationships to generate a picture of the forces at work in an economy. A simulation is the use of this model to explore and predict the possible behaviour of the reallife phenomenon that is being modelled. It allows one to pose various what if…? questions so, for example, a computer model of the economy could simulate the effect of a proposed new taxation in order to understand the possible effects of such a policy. A game,

although notoriously difficult to define, tends to place a player (a person, an organisation, a team, or even a device) in a structure of objectives or competition with other players, standards, and so on. So, for instance, a would-be pilot might be asked to perform aerobatic tasks in a flight simulator, a disaster management team might have to coordinate a response to a fictional event, or children might be taught about disaster risk reduction through the use of a simple computer game where the objective is to fortify a village against impending natural hazards17. Rausch18 suggests some common tasks required in the design of games and simulations: setting objectives, defining scope, and setting resource demands; selecting design features of the model to express and communicate the fixed and variable conditions and their relationships, including the assumptions on which they are based; adapting the design to the characteristics and arrangement of participants and coordinators; selecting a communications system to prepare participants and coordinator for the simulation/game and to provide instructions/guidelines; considering ease of access during simulation and game activities to designers for clarification of questions not answered in the instructions or guidelines; selecting facilities and equipment for delivery of the model and for working the simulation and/or the game; and constructing, reviewing, and piloting simulations. The great strength of simulation and games is the opportunity they offer to

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allow experimentation with various possible future options without the worry of the costs that might be incurred by carrying out such experimentation in real life. They can also offer multidimensional views of a situation that is extremely hard to capture in complex systems19, allowing a broader picture and more detailed examination than otherwise available. However, clearly any simulation or game can only be useful to the extent that the model it is based on represents the situation or phenomenon being investigated. This can be a difficult task, and at every stage a potential forecast or beneficial strategy must be analysed for its realism, and whether it is more a feature of the model than the reality being modelled. The Scotland Futures Forum case study provides an interesting example of gaming in the Young Time Lords Face the Future, where 100 young people participated in dynamic processes exploring their perceptions of the future.

First, the topic of discussion is circulated so that the participants can share general thoughts and comments on the issues under scrutiny before a set structure is decided. These responses are synthesised by the monitoring team, and a questionnaire is then developed and distributed to participants. This questionnaire is drawn up in order to ascertain the opinions of the participants, and to start to find points of convergence and disagreement. Thirdly, the questionnaires are re-distributed a number of times, each time presenting the information from previous questionnaires. The feedback provides each participant with textual and statistical material on the group’s response, as well as their own response. Where a participant’s view differs radically from the group’s, they are asked to reconsider and/or justify it. This process is repeated until a certain level of stability or consensus is reached. Common variations include missing out the first stage, with the monitoring team framing questions based on their own research. Also, there are often one-to-one interviews or group meetings held in between rounds of questionnaires. Its champions see Delphi methods as offering a way of objectively exploring issues that require judgement and decisions. They see the collective judgements and the results of a consensus between experts as more reliable and objective than other methods. The process also highlights the reasons for disagreement in a constructive manner. Delphi techniques are best used to answer four broad kinds of questions20: 1. normative issues such as ‘goal setting’;

Delphi technique
This technique is named after the Oracle at Delphi, famous in classical times for foreseeing the future. It is a set of procedures for eliciting and refining the opinions of a group, usually a panel of experts, in a way designed to minimise the adverse qualities that are usually encountered when groups interact. The basic features are: structured questioning; iteration; controlled feedback; anonymity of responses. While there are a range of Delphi techniques, which differ from application to application, there is set of common elements.

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2. narrative issues such as ‘problem statements’; 3. predictive issues such as forecasting the occurrence of new events, and values and trends of key parameters; and 4. suggestive issues such as developing causal models and formulating new policies. The key to a successful Delphi study lies in the selection of participants, and the group could include both mainstream experts as well as ‘unknown’ people who may be outside the normal lines of communication but may be able to contribute innovative ideas. Criticisms levelled at Delphi techniques question the basis for taking its results as any more objective than other methods, that the pressure to conform with the statistical feedback from the panel is an instance of exactly the sort of ‘adverse quality of interacting groups’ that Delphi claims to eliminate, and that the process can take too long. There are a number of other techniques for ascertaining the opinions of experts, which may be less formalised than Delphi. One example of this is the exploratory process initiated in the UK Climate Impact Scenarios, where the future was approached in an exploratory way by taking into account the knowledge and perceptions of the social and economic players involved.

Cross-impact analysis
An event that occurs often has causal predecessors that made it more likely, and it in turn will have an effect on future events. This interrelationship between events and developments is known as cross-impact. The cross-impact method was first developed by Theodore Gordon and Olaf Helmer in

1966 as a way of forecasting future events based on how they might interact. It was initially developed as a fairly basic game where events occurred according to certain probabilities, and each new occurrence affected the probability of a number of other events occurring. It became clear that the interactions between events constituted a powerful way to examine perceptions about the future (Gordon 1994)21, and this possibility was taken forward in a number of simulations (for example by John Stover in simulating the economy of Uruguay)22. In recent years it has been used as a standalone method as well as integrated with other tools, for example it can be integrated with more deterministic methods to include perceptions about possible interactions, and mailed questionnaires and Delphi studies have been used to collect judgements about probabilities. The first step in conducting a crossimpact analysis is to define the events to be included in the study, in order to ensure that all pertinent possibilities are considered while not over-complicating analysis (the number of interactions to consider increases rapidly with the number of events). The next step is to assign the initial probability that each event will occur by some future year, judged in isolation. After this, the conditional probabilities are calculated, which is the way in which the occurrence of each event will affect the probability of occurrence of the others. These are put into a cross-impact matrix, and a computer programme is used to perform a calibration of the matrix, which produces new estimates of the events probabilities that take into account the interrelationships between the events. The differences between the initial and final probabilities are a result of reducing

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inconsistencies in judgements, not taking into account certain possible combinations of events. After this, sensitivity analysis can be performed to analyse which judgements and events have a particularly large part to play in the overall determination of probabilities, and policy testing can be performed through introducing an additional event (and its cross-impact) to the matrix, and comparing the resulting calibrated matrix with that of the original calibrated one. The selection of events is performed through a literature search, consulting key experts, or other such methods, and can be refined through combining closely-related events, eliminating others, and refining wording for others. Similarly, the initial estimation of probabilities needs to be carried out through consultation with experts. They can either estimate the probability of events ‘judged in isolation’, or include possible interactions; either way, the matrix calibration improves these estimations in light of the interactions between the events. Criticisms of the cross-impact method allude to the fact that the collection of data can be fatiguing and tedious – an eight by eight matrix requires 56 conditional probability judgements to be made, and a 20 by 20 matrix requires 380 judgements. Also, it has not been proven that the conditional probabilities are necessarily more accurate than the estimates of a priori probabilities. However, the act of examining the relationships and interactions of future events is a worthwhile one, and looking at how coherent judgements of probability are in relation to these interactions can add power to futures approaches. The interdependence of drivers and trends which is the primary concern of cross-impact

analysis is at the heart of the Limits to Growth case study, and this approach also features to a certain degree in the Europe 2010 Scenarios case study.

Roadmaps
Roadmaps are visualisations of the future integrating all relevant organisational aspects. Key to a good roadmap is the skill of showing the important, relevant issues. Roadmaps are often documented and presented at several layers of detail. The higher levels are important to create and maintain the overview, while the more detailed levels explain the supporting data, providing an immediate insight in to the most relevant developments. Roadmaps and the roadmapping process serve as excellent communication tools – an effective means to link strategic operations, collaborative ventures, and business plans. However, to achieve success, roadmaps need to involve the appropriate group intelligence, and provide a specific level of detail.

Wild cards
Wild cards refer to incidents with perceived low probability of occurrence but with potentially high impacts and strategic consequences for an organisation or a society if it were to take place. Such sudden and unique incidents might constitute turning points in the evolution of a certain trend or system and are usually serious, destructive, catastrophic or anomalous and essentially not predictable. Important questions surrounding these are which are the most important wild cards for an organisation?, can we anticipate their arrival?, is there anything we can do about them?23. This concept may be introduced into anticipatory decision-making activity in order to increase the ability of organisations

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to adapt to surprises arising in turbulent business environments.

Causal Layered Analysis (CLA)
CLA has been developed by Sohail Inayatullah as a method of deepening thinking about the future, through looking at different layers of analysis. CLA involves participants exploring four different layers of understanding the issues of concern: 1. ‘litany’ involves visible events, issues and quantitative trends that do not necessarily appear connected or continuous; 2. the ‘systemic’ level is concerned with social causes, where interpretation gives economic, cultural, political and historical perspectives on various data; 3. the ‘discourse’ or ‘worldview’ level goes deeper, looking at structures and assumptions that constitute or ‘frame’ a problem; and 4. the ‘metaphor’ or ‘myth’ level, which involves deep stories, unconscious dimensions of the problem, providing the emotional experience behind the worldview.

1. formulation and definition of a problem; 2. identification and characterisation of all parameters toward a solution; 3. construction of a multidimensional matrix (morphological box) whose combinations will contain all possible solutions; 4. evaluation of the outcome based on feasibility and achievement of desired goals; and 5. in-depth analysis of best possibilities considering available resources25.

References
1. 2. 3. Schwarts, quoted from PIU Strategic futures team A Futurist’s Toolbox 2001. PIU Stategic futures team A Futurist’s Toolbox 2001. L. Borjeson, M. Hojer, K. Dreborg, T. Ekvall, G. Finnvedon, Scenario types and techniques: towards a user’s guide, Futures 38 (2006) pp723-739. Fuld & Company, Inc CI Strategies & Tools: Intelligence Dictionary. Brown, A., & Weiner, E. (1985). Superm anaging: How to harness change for personal and organisational success. New York: Mentor. Terry P (1977) ‘mechanisms for environmental scanning’ in Long Range Planning Vol 10 No 3 pp2-9. Marien M (1991) ‘scanning: an imperfect activity in an era of fragmentation and uncertainty’ in Futures Research Quarterly, fall. Glenn, Futures Research Methodology. Cabinet Office Toolkit. (in cabinet office toolkit), originally: Coates, An overview of futures method, in The Knowledge Base of Futures Studies, Vol 2, DDM media group, Australia. Visioning at-a-glance, MAPP . Normative Forecasting by J Coates, in Futures Research Methodolgy, Glenn. The Future Belongs To Those Who..., Institute for Alternative Futures. A Lovins, in J Quist and P Vergragt, Past and future of backcasting: The shift to stakeholder participation and a propasal for a methodological framework, Futures 38 (2006), 1027-1045.

4. 5.

6.

Morphological analysis
This is a method for rigorously structuring and investigating the total set of relationships in complex socio-technical problems. The method is carried out by developing a parameter space of the problem to be investigated, and defining relationships between the parameters on the basis of looking to eliminate inconsistent or impractical combinations of various parameters. Fritz Zwicky applied it to such diverse fields as the classification of astrophysical objects and developing new forms of propulsive power systems24, with five basic steps:

7.

8. 9. 10.

11. 12. 13. 14.

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15. Robinson (1990), Futures under glass: a recipe for people who hate to predict, Futures, Vol. 22 (9): 820-843. 16. KH Dreborg, Essence of Backcasting, Futures 28 (1996) 813-828. 17. http://dev.threeserve.com.un_isdr/ 18. E Rausch, Simulations and games in futuring and other issues, Futures Research Methodolgy (1994). 19. See Implications of Complexity Theory for International Development, H Jones, B Ramalingham and T Reba, forthcoming. 20. Overview of Four Futures Methodologies, Trudi Lang. 21. Theodore Jay Gordon, Cross-impact method, Futures Research Methodology. 22. The use of Probabilistic System Dynamics in the Analysis of National Development Policies: A Study of Economic Growth and Income Distribution in Uruguay, presented at the 1975 Summer Computer Simulation Conference, San Francisco, California, July 1975. 23. J.L Petersen, Out of the Blue: How to anticipate Big Future Surprises, Madison, Lanham, 1999. 24. F Zwicky, Morphological Astronomy, The Observatory. Vol. 68, No, 845, Aug. 1948, S. 121-143. 25. Relevance Tree And Morphological Analysis by The Futures Group (1994), in Futures Thinking Methodologies.

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Chapter 5: Good practices and common problems
Clarifying objectives, limitations and timeframes of futures work
One review of best practice for strategic futures work argues that it is crucial to ensure that people understand and trust the process being used: “Transparent processes where methodologies and objectives are explained fully to the participants are more likely to be successful than ‘black box’ methodologies where the assumptions are concealed.1” This general statement applies particularly to strategic futures, as those who are not familiar with it may view attempts to forecast the future as involving some kind of ‘soothsaying’ or ‘hocus pocus’. Therefore, it is particularly important to clarify the nature of futures work both with those who will be involved in it and those who will be using the outputs. Here are some common problems and misunderstandings. Common problem one: prediction versus forecast versus foresight One of the most common misunderstandings about futures is that it a form of modern-day soothsaying, which enables its users to predict future events. Another common confusion is that futures is about extending the past into the future. A prediction is a confident statement about a future state of affairs. They are ubiquitous in everyday life, but tend mainly to be useful when dealing with systems that can be fully measured and understood. A forecast is more probabilistic statement, often based on conditional hypotheses, and grounded in careful analyses of past experience with the system in question. Foresight is a natural human faculty used for day-to-day decision-making, involving one’s perception of the nature and significance of events before they have occurred. Slaughter argues that: ‘foresight is the ability to create and maintain a high-quality, coherent and functional forward view and to use the insights in organisationally useful ways’. Horton offers an alternative: ‘foresight is a process of developing a range of views of possible ways in which the future could develop, and understanding these sufficiently well to be able to decide what decisions can be taken today to create the best possible tomorrow’. The process of foresight may involve carrying out various exploratory forecasts and predictions, and synthesising the results. Strategic futures planning is often characterised as incorporating a foresight function into organisations. Common problem two: forecasting accuracy versus forecasting precision versus forecasting usefulness It should be noted that these three concepts do not necessarily go hand-in-hand: A forecast could be precise without being accurate, for example the weather forecast could state tomorrow’s weather to within 0.01 degrees C

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but come tomorrow turn out to be inaccurate. Similarly, a forecast could be accurate but not precise, such as forecasting that tomorrow’s temperature will be between -20 and +50 degrees C. Forecasts can be accurate and useful in a variety of different ways, but can also be useful despite being wholly inaccurate. For example, they can be self-defeating such as with what is known as the Lijphart effect2, where the prediction of a future undesirable state of affairs causes actors to move to prevent this ‘natural’ result from epidemic break out may make the epidemic less likely through motivating political action among key stakeholders. Forecasts involved in strategic futures planning can serve a variety of purposes, including a mix of these three. These considerations serve to help answer a common misunderstanding about the nature of futures work: its value is not in forecasting accuracy, and it should not be judged on whether its various forecasts were accurate or not. It has been noted that many: “embark on strategic futures work because they want to know what the future will hold. However, sometimes they confuse prediction with understanding. Managers want to reduce the anxiety caused by the uncertainty of not knowing. This immediately creates a source of disappointment, for it is never possible to know the future.” (Henley Centre 2001.) Forecasts can be intended to be proven wrong, for example in the original Limits to Growth study the authors fully hoped that their predictions of mankind exceeding the carrying capacity of the earth would be seized upon as a warning and prevented from occurring. The value of strategic

futures work should be judged on its ability to help decision-makers make policy now by using methods to look at the range of possible futures, identifying and evaluating possible policy decisions through illuminating and anticipating the various opportunities and threats, and the consequences of one’s actions. The limitations of futures work Strategic futures work is not a ‘silver bullet’, and has its limitations. There are a large number of features of today’s society that, with hindsight, would be nearly impossible to predict 30 years ago. Often the most significant events are those which nobody foresaw, and frequently various new possibilities stemming from some kind of fundamental breakthrough are very difficult to conceive before that breakthrough. Being systematic and rigorous about forward thinking ensures that an organisation does everything it can to take responsibility for the future, by ensuring that the organisation is being as prudent as possible about where it is heading. However, clearly this doesn’t guarantee that the future will be free from surprises. It may make decisions better-informed, but this does not necessarily make decisions easy. Decision-making in the context of uncertainty and a variety of possible futures is complex and tough. The timeframe of futures work It is important to understand that strateg ic futures work will take time to deliver benefits to an organisation. It takes time to learn what approach best suits the organisation, which methodologies best fit the context and environment, and by its nature the results of futures thinking work may not be felt for a number of years after its completion. This can cause anxiety, as

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No of organisations 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 0 to 9 10 to 19 20 to 29 30 to 39 40 to 49 50 to 59 60 to 69 4 3 2 1 0 70 to 79 80 to 89 2 12

9 8

Length of experience in strategic futures work (years)

protagonists look to see concrete results from their efforts. A survey of organisations involved in strategic futures work has found that the considerable length of time for which many of them have been involved in futures work is ‘striking’3, as shown below. Such long-term commitment to futures work involves institutionalising futures within the organisation, and fostering ongoing projects and mobilising resources. This is not easy, however, as the more effective an organisation is with establishing futures as an ongoing process, the more difficult it may be to recognise the impact of averted crises. As Ged Davis of Shell puts it: “One of the difficulties of assessing the value of scenario work is that it’s the dogs that don’t bark that matter. It’s the events that happen that are a crisis for other people that aren’t a crisis for you. It’s quiet preparation ahead of events that matters4.”

by senior management, but throughout the organisation. A study of best practice suggests that: “Much of the effectiveness of strategic futures thinking depends on the willingness of the futures group or organisation to engage with the organisation as a whole and, critically, vice versa. In the world of the learning organisation, this requires inclusive and participatory processes which are designed to engage members of the organisation throughout. This is as true of modelling-based processes as it is of scenario methods, since the assumptions underpinning the model are critical to the acceptance within the organisation of the output, and therefore needed to be tested with stakeholders5.” There are a number of ways that this could be carried out. The Henley centre emphasises indepth stakeholder engagement, in which the proponents of the new ideas stemming from the futures work ‘have to engage with opinion-formers, stakeholders, and networks both inside and outside the organisation to win acceptance for new ideas6’. This involves ensuring that senior managers are exposed to

Positioning and involvement in an organisational context
Ensuring ownership Strategic futures work cannot achieve its objectives without it being accepted not just

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the foresight process, including representatives of all key departments in the process, and distributing information generated throughout the organisation as quickly as possible. Another approach suggested by Andy Hines is what he calls ‘permission futuring’: “The premise is to think of our work with internal clients in terms of dating or courtship. We hope to attract our internal customers enough such that they say ‘yes’ when we ask them for a first ‘futures’ date. If we perform well on this first date, analogous to going for a cup of coffee, we can then ask permission for a second date, perhaps the equivalent of dinner. If we perform well on that, we get to do progressively deeper and more interesting work, provided we ‘deliver the goods’ of the early simpler dates or tasks. Experience suggests this approach is a viable one – my own tasks have generally become more involved, interesting, and futures-oriented over time. A key dynamic that makes this especially suitable for the organisational world is the need that internal clients have for saving face or maintaining credibility. It will almost always be politically wiser not to take the risk of doing a futures-related project. So our sponsors will look for a track record to back them up as they insert their necks in the political noose. The risk of this approach is that we get caught up in ‘delivering the goods’ and lose focus on the futures agenda. Constant checking in with ourselves and our work is the best way to avoid this trap7.” Finding the right position The Henley Centre argues that a strategic futures group should be ‘separate but connected’ to the organisational culture. Strategic futures work needs to draw from diverse sources, to listen to voices which are

Think tanks Dissidents Opinion formers

The organisation

Strategic futures group

Stakeholders

Critics

Advocacy groups

Positioning futures groups

not normally heard, whether inside or outside the organisation. This is demonstrated opposite. This independence will serve to enhance the credibility of the futures work. Through being somewhat unaffected by the day-to-day pressures of organisational life, participants are able to more fully and objectively assess various features of the organisation and environment.

References
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Henley Centre: Understanding Best Practice in Strategic Futures Work, (2001). See Systems Effects, Robert Jervis, 1997. Henley Centre: Benchmarking UK Stategic Futures Work, (2001). Henley Centre: Understanding Best Practice in Strategic Futures Work, (2001). Henley Centre: Understanding Best Practice in Strategic Futures Work, (2001). Henley Centre: Understanding Best Practice in Strategic Futures Work, (2001). Andy Hines, An audit for organisational futurists: ten questions every organisational futurist should be able to answer, Foresight 5.1 (2003).

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Part II: Case Studies

Case study one: Limits to growth
The Limits to Growth, published by the Club of Rome in 1972 is one of the first highprofile applications of futures thinking to world issues. It suggested that mankind was in danger of ‘overshooting’ the capacity of the earth, and it lead to great controversy. Since the first report, many trends appear to support its findings, and The Club of Rome has subsequently released two updates of the report, re-examining the possible consequences and available options. The central aim of the Limits to Growth series is modeling the interaction between the world population, economy and environment. It is a powerful example of the power of computer simulation to produce valuable insights, and used the tool of scenarios to express the possible fate of mankind given different policy trends. More than 30 years ago, a book called The Limits to Growth created an international sensation. Commissioned by the Club of Rome, an international group of businessmen, statesmen, and scientists, The Limits to Growth was compiled by a team of experts from the US and several foreign countries. Using system dynamics theory and a computer model called ‘World3’, the book presented and analysed 12 scenarios that showed different possible patterns – and environmental outcomes – of world development over two centuries from 1900 to 2100. The World3 scenarios showed how population growth and natural resource use interacted to impose limits to industrial growth, a novel and even controversial idea at the time. In 1972, however, the world’s population and economy were still comfortably within the planet’s carrying capacity. The team found that there was still room to grow safely while we could examine longer-term options. In 1992, this was no longer true. On the 20th anniversary of the publication of The Limits to Growth, the team updated Limits in a book called Beyond the Limits. Already in the 1990s there was compelling evidence that humanity was moving deeper into unsustainable territory. Beyond the Limits argued that in many areas we had ‘overshot’ our limits, or expanded our demands on the planet’s resources and sinks beyond what could be sustained over time. The main challenge identified in Beyond the Limits was how to move the world back into sustainable territory.

The 30-Year Update
Now in a new study, Limits to Growth: The 30-Year Update, the authors have produced a comprehensive update to the original Limits, in which they conclude that humanity is dangerously in a state of overshoot. While the past 30 years has shown some progress, including new technologies, new institutions, and a new awareness of environmental problems, the authors are far more pessimistic than they were in 1972. Humanity has squandered the opportunity to correct our current course over the last 30 years, they conclude, and much must change if the world is to avoid the serious consequences of overshoot in the 21st century. When The Limits to Growth was first published in 1972, most economists, along with many industrialists, politicians, and Third World advocates raised their voices in outrage at the suggestion that population growth and material consumption need to be reduced by

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1.4
ecological footprint of humanity

1.2 1.0
number of Earths carrying capacity of the Earth

0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Ecological footprint versus carrying capacity This graph shows the number of Earths required to provide the resources used by humanity and to absorb their emissions for each year since 1960. This human demand is compared with the available supply: our one planet Earth. Human demand exceeds nature’s supply from the 1980s onward, over-shooting it by some 20 per cent in 1999. (Source: M. Wackernagel et al.)

deliberate means. Over the years, Limits was attacked by many who didn’t understand or misrepresented its assertions, dismissing it as Malthusian hyperbole. But nothing that has happened in the last 30 years has invalidated the book’s warnings. On the contrary, as noted energy economist Matthew Simmons recently wrote, “The most amazing aspect of the book is how accurate many of the basic trend extrapolations… still are some 30 years later.” For example, the gap between rich and poor has only grown wider in the past three decades. Thirty years ago, it seemed unimaginable that humanity could expand its numbers and economy enough to alter the earth’s natural systems. But experience with the global climate system and the

stratospheric ozone layer have proved them wrong. All the environmental and economic problems discussed in The Limits to Growth have been treated at length before. There are hundreds of books on deforestation, global climate change, dwindling oil supplies, and species extinction. Since The Limits to Growth was first published 30 years ago, these problems have been the focus of conferences, scientific research, and media scrutiny. What makes Limits to Growth: The 30Year Update unique, however, is that it presents the underlying economic structure that leads to these problems.

WORLD3
The World3 computer model is complex, but its basic structure is not difficult to

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understand. It is based in system dynamics – a method for studying the world that deals with understanding how complex systems change over time. Internal feedback loops within the structure of the system influence the entire system behaviour. World3 keeps track of stocks such as population, industrial capital, persistent pollution, and cultivated land. In the model, those stocks change through flows such as births and deaths; investment and depreciation; pollution generation and pollution assimilation; land erosion, land development, and land removed for urban and industrial uses. The model accounts for positive and negative feedback loops that can radically affect the outcome of various scenarios. It also develops nonlinear relationships. For example, as more land is made arable, what’s left is drier, or steeper, or has thinner soil. The cost of coping with these problems dramatically raises the cost of developing the land – a nonlinear relationship. Feedback loops and nonlinear relationships make World3 dynamically complex, but the model is still a simplification of reality. World3 does not distinguish among different geographic parts of the world, nor does it represent separately the rich and the poor. It keeps track of only two aggregate pollutants, which move through and affect the environment in ways that are typical of the hundreds of pollutants the economy actually emits. It omits the causes and consequences of violence. And there is no military capital or corruption explicitly represented in World3. Incorporating those many distinctions, however, would not necessarily make the model better. And it would make it very much harder to comprehend. This probably makes World3 highly optimistic. It has no military sector to drain

capital and resources from the productive economy. It has no wars to kill people, destroy capital, waste lands, or generate pollution. It has no ethnic strife, no corruption, no floods, earthquakes, nuclear accidents, or AIDS epidemics. The model represents the uppermost possibilities for the ‘real’ world. The authors developed World3 to understand the broad sweep of the future – the possible behaviour patterns – through which the human economy will interact with the carrying capacity of the planet over the coming century. World3’s core question is: how may the expanding global population and materials economy interact with and adapt to the earth’s limited carrying capacity over the coming decade? The model does not make predictions, but rather is a tool to understand the broad sweeps and the behavioral tendencies of the system.

The driving force: Exponential growth
For more than a century, the world has been experiencing exponential growth in a number of areas, including population and industrial production. Positive feedback loops can reinforce and sustain exponential growth. In 1650, the world’s population had a doubling time of 240 years. By 1900, the doubling time was 100 years. When The Limits to Growth was published in 1972, there were fewer than four billion people in the world. Today, there are more than six billion. Another area of exponential growth has been the world economy. From 1930 to 2000, the money value of world industrial output grew by a factor of 14 – an average doubling time of 19 years. If population had been constant over that period, the material standard of living would have grown by a

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factor of 14 as well. Because of population growth, however, the average per capita output increased by only a factor of five. Moreover, in the current system, economic growth generally occurs in the already rich countries and flows disproportionately to the richest people within those countries. Thus, according to the United Nations Development Program, the 20% of the world’s people who lived in the wealthiest nations had 30 times the per capita income of the 20% who lived in the poorest nations. By 1995 the average income ratio between the richest and poorest 20% had increased from 30:1 to 82:1. Only 8% of the world’s people own a car. Hundreds of millions of people live in inadequate houses or have no shelter at all, much less refrigerators or television sets. Social arrangements common in many cultures systematically reward the privileged, and it is easier for rich populations to save, invest, and multiply their capital.

The limits
Limits to growth include both the material and energy that are extracted from the earth, and the capacity of the planet to absorb the pollutants that are generated as those materials and energy are used. There are limits to the rates at which sources can produce these materials and energy without harm to people, the economy, or the earth’s processes of regeneration and regulation. Resources can be renewable, like agricultural soils, or nonrenewable, like the world’s oil resources. Both have their limits. The most obvious limit on food production is land. Millions of acres of cultivated land are being degraded by processes such as soil erosion and salinisation, while the cultivated area remains roughly constant. Higher yields have compensated somewhat

for this loss, but yields cannot be expected to increase indefinitely. Per capita grain production peaked in 1985 and has been trending down slowly ever since. Exponential growth has moved the world from land abundance to land scarcity. Within the last 35 years, the limits, especially of areas with the best soils, have been approached. Another limit to food production is water. In many countries, both developing and developed, current water use is often not sustainable. In an increasing number of the world’s watersheds, limits have already been reached. In the US the Midwestern Ogalallah aquifer in Kansas is overdrawn by 12 cubic kilometers each year. Its depletion has so far caused 2.46 million acres of farmland to be taken out of cultivation. In an increasing number of the world’s watersheds, limits have already, indisputably, been exceeded. In some of the poorest and richest economies, per capita water withdrawals are going down because of environmental problems, rising costs, or scarcity. Another renewable resource is forests, which moderate climate, control floods, are home to a number of useful species, from rattan vines to dyes and sources of medicine. But today, only one-fifth of the planet’s original forest cover remains in large tracts of undisturbed natural forests. Although forest cover in temperate areas is stable, tropical forest area is plummeting. From 1990 to 2000, the FAO reports that more than 370 million acres of forest cover – an area the size of Mexico – was converted to other uses. At the same time that forests decline, demand for forest products is growing. If the loss of 49 million acres per year, typical in the 1990s, continues to increase at 2% per year, the unprotected forest will be gone before the end of the century.

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Counted in GDP
Manufactured consumer goods

Resource-obtaining capital
mines

Resource output

Industrial capital
steel mills tool factories robots

Agricultural capital Industrial output
irrigation systems tractors

Agricultural

Service capital
schools hospitals

Service output

Industrial investment (+)

Flows of physical capital in the economy of World3 It is important to distinguish between money and the real things money stands for. This figure shows how the economy is represented in World3. The emphasis is on the physical economy, the real things to which the earth’s limits apply, not the monetary economy, which is a social invention not constrained by the physical laws of the planet. industrial capital refers here to actual hardware - the machines and factores that produce manufactured products. The production and allocation of industrial output are central to the behaviour of the simulated economy in World3. The amount of industrial capital determines how much individual output can be produced each year. This output is allocated among five sectors in a way that depends on the goals and needs of the population. Some industrial capital is consumed; some goes to the resource sector to secure raw materials. Some goes to agriculture to develop land and raise land yield. Some is invested in social services, and the rest is invested in indutry to offset depreciation and raise the industrial capital stock further.

Nonrenewable resources
A prime example of a nonrenewable resource is fossil fuels, whose limits should be obvious, although many people, including distinguished economists, are in denial over this elementary fact. More than 80% of year 2000 commercial energy use comes from nonrenewable fossil fuels: oil, natural gas, and coal. The underground stocks of fossil fuels are going continuously and inexorably down. Between 1970 and 2000, however, even though billions of barrels of oil and trillions of cubic feet of natural gas were burned, the ratio of known reserves to production actually rose, due to the discovery of new reserves and reappraisal of old ones.

Physical capital
Nonetheless the stock of reserves is finite and nonrenewable. Moreover, fossil fuels use is limited by the planet’s capacity to absorb their byproducts after burning, such as the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide. Fossil fuels may be limited by both supply and sinks. Peak gas production will certainly occur in the next 50 years; the peak for oil production will occur much sooner, probably within the next decade. Energy efficiency and renewables offer the best prospect for a sustainable future. Materials are another finite resource. If population rises, and if those people are to have housing, health services, education, cars, refrigerators, and televisions, they will

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need steel, concrete, copper, aluminum, plastic, and many other materials. But if an eventual nine billion people on earth all consumed materials at the rate of the average American, world steel production would need to rise by a factor of five, copper by a factor of eight, and aluminum by a factor of nine. From source to sink, the processing, fabricating, handling, and use of materials leaves a trail of pollution. Such materials flows are neither possible nor necessary. Fortunately, growth in materials consumption has slowed, and the prospects for further slowing are good. The possibilities for recycling, greater efficiency, increased product lifetime, and source reduction in the world of materials are exciting. On a global scale, however, they have not yet reduced the vast materials flow through the economy. At best, they have slowed its rate of growth. Another fundamental limit to growth is sinks – the capacity of the planet to absorb the pollution and waste resulting from human economic activity. The most intractable wastes are nuclear wastes, hazardous wastes (like human synthesised chemicals), and greenhouse gases. They are chemically the hardest to sequester or detoxify, and economically and politically the most difficult to regulate. Current atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide and methane are far higher than they have been in 160,000 years. It may take decades for the consequences of climate change to be revealed in melting ice, rising seas, changing currents, greater storms, shifting rainfall, and migrating insects, birds or mammals. It is also plausible that climate may change rapidly.

The scenarios
Using the World3 computer model, Limits to Growth: The 30-Year Update presents ten

different scenarios for the future, through the year 2100. In each scenario a few numbers are changed to test different estimates of ‘real world’ parameters, or to incorporate optimistic predictions about the development of technology, or to see what happens if the world chooses different policies, ethics, or goals. Most of the scenarios presented in Limits result in overshoot and collapse through depletion of resources, food shortages, industrial decline, or some combination of these or other factors. Under the ‘business as usual scenario’ world society proceeds in a traditional manner without major deviation from the policies pursued during most of the 20th century. Population rises to more than seven billion by 2030. But a few decades into the 21st century, growth of the economy stops and reverses abruptly. As natural resources become harder to obtain, capital is diverted to extracting more of them. This leaves less capital for investment in industrial output. The result is industrial decline, which forces declines in the service and agricultural sectors. About the year 2030, population peaks and begins to decrease as the death rate is driven upward by lack of food and health services. A similar scenario assumes that the world’s endowment of natural resources doubles, and further postulates that advances in resource extraction technologies are capable of postponing the onset of increasing extraction costs. Under this scenario industry can grow 20 years longer. But pollution levels soar, depressing land yields and requiring huge investments in agricultural recovery. The population finally declines because of food shortages and negative health effects from pollution. Other scenarios address the problems of pollution and food shortages by assuming more effective pollution control

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Limits to growth

State of the world Resources

Industrial output

Population

Pollution

Food

1900

2000

2100

Human welfare and footprint

Human welfare index

Human ecological footprint

1900

2000

2100

Scenario 2: More abundant non-renewable resources This table postulates that advances in resource extraction technologies are capable of postponing the onset of increasing extraction costs. Industry can grow 20 years longer. population peaks at 8 billion in 2040, at much higher consumption levels. But pollution levels soar (outside the graph!), depressing land yields and requiring huge investments in agricultural recovery. The population finally declines because of food shortages and negative health effects from pollution.

needed per unit of industrial output (resource efficiency technology), in combination all these features permit a fairly large and prosperous world, until the bliss starts declining in response to the accumulated cost of the technologies. This technology program comes online too late to avoid a gradual decline in human welfare throughout the century. By the end of the 21st century, a stable population of less than eight billion people is living in a high-tech, low pollution world with a human welfare index roughly equal to that of the world of 2000. But industrial output begins to decline around 2040 because the rising expense of protecting the population from starvation, pollution, erosion, and resource shortage cuts into the capital available for growth. Ultimately this simulated world fails to sustain its living standards as technology, social services, and new investment simultaneously become too expensive.

Transitions to a sustainable world

technologies, land enhancement (an increase in the food yield per unit of land), and protections against soil erosion. Even a scenario with these features however, results in overshoot and collapse. After 2070 the costs of the various technologies, plus the rising costs of obtaining nonrenewable resources from increasingly depleted mines, demand more capital than the economy can provide. The result is rather abrupt decline. If to this scenario one adds reductions in the amount of nonrenewable resources

The world can respond in three ways to signals that resource use and pollution emissions have gone beyond their sustainable limits. One way is to disguise, deny, or confuse the signals. Generally this takes the form of efforts to shift costs to those who are far away in space and time. An example would be to buy air conditioners for relief from a warming climate, or to ship toxic wastes for disposal in a distant region. A second way is to alleviate the pressures from limits by employing technical or

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and sustainable than perpetual material growth. Scenario 7 supposes that after Industrial output 2002, all couples decide to limit their family size to two children and have access to effective birth control technologies. Because of age Population structure momentum, the population Food Pollution continues to grow for another generation. But the slower population growth permits industrial output to rise faster, until it is 1900 2000 2100 stopped by rising pollution. Under this scenario, world Human welfare and footprint population peaks at 7.5 billion in 2040. A globally effective, two Human welfare index children policy introduced in 2002 reduces the peak population less than 10%. Because of slower population growth, consumer goods per capita, food per capita, and life expectancy are all higher than in the scenario where the world’s Human ecological footprint endowment of natural resources was doubled. 1900 2000 2100 But industrial output peaks in Scenario 9: World seeks stable population and stable industrial output per person, and adds 2040 and declines. The larger pollution, resource, and agricultural technologies from 2002 In this scenario population and industrial output are limited, and in addition technologies are added to capital plant emits more pollution, abate pollution, conserve resources, increase land yield, and protect agricultural land. the resulting society is sustainable: nearly 8 billion people live with high human welfare and a continuously declining which has negative effects on ecological footprint. agricultural production. To sustain food production, capital must be diverted to the agricultural sector. Later economic fixes. For example, reducing the on, after 2050, pollution levels are amount of pollution generated per mile of sufficiently high to have negative impacts driving or per kilowatt of electricity generated. on life expectancies. These approaches, however, will not eliminate But what if the world’s people decide to the causes of these pressures. The third way moderate not only their demand for children, is to work on the underlying causes, to but also their material lifestyles? What if they recognise that the socioeconomic system has set a goal for themselves of an adequate but overshot its limits, is headed toward collapse, not excessive standard of living? and therefore seek to change the structure of If the model society both adopts a the system. World3 can be used to test some desired family size of two children and sets a of the simplest changes that might result from fixed goal for industrial output per capita, it a society that decides to back down from can extend somewhat the ‘golden age’ of overshoot and pursue goals more satisfying

State of the world Resources

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Limits to growth

fairly high human welfare between 2020 and 2040 in the previous scenario. But pollution increasingly stresses agricultural resources. Per capita food production declines, eventually bringing down life expectancy and population. These changes cause a considerable rise in consumer goods and services per capita in the first decade after the year 2002. In fact, they rise higher and faster than they did in the previous run, where industrial growth was not curtailed. But this economy is not quite stabilised. It has an ecological footprint above the sustainable level, and it is forced into a long decline after 2040. The world of Scenario 8 manages to support more than seven billion people at an adequate standard of living for almost 30 years, from 2010 to 2040, but during that time the environment and soils steadily deteriorate. To remain sustainable, the world in this scenario needs to lower its ecological footprint to a level below the carrying capacity of the global environment. Scenario 9: world seeks stable population and stable industrial output per person, and adds pollution, resource and agricultural technologies from 2002. Moving in this direction, in another scenario the world seeks stable population and stable industrial output per person, and adds pollution, resource and agricultural technologies starting in 2002. In this scenario, population and industrial output are limited as in the previous run, and in addition technologies are added to abate pollution, conserve resources, increase land yield, and protect agricultural land. The resulting society is sustainable: nearly eight billion people live with high human welfare and a continuously declining ecological footprint. Under this scenario, the world decides on an average family size of two children

and sets modest limits for material production, as in the previous scenario. Further, starting in 2002 it begins to develop, invest in, and employ the technologies that increase the efficiency of resource use, decrease pollution emissions per unit of industrial output, control land erosion, and increase land yields until food per capita reaches its desired level. The society of this scenario manages to begin reducing its total burden on the environment before the year 2020; from that point the total ecological footprint of humanity is actually declining. The system brings itself down below its limits, avoids an uncontrolled collapse, maintains its standard of living, and holds itself very close to equilibrium. In a final scenario, the sustainability policies of the previous scenario are introduced 20 years earlier, in 1982. Moving toward sustainability 20 years sooner would have meant a lower final population, less pollution, more nonrenewable resources, and a slightly higher average welfare for all. Under this scenario, population levels off just above six billion instead of eight billion. Pollution peaks at a much lower level and 20 years sooner, and interferes less with agriculture than it did in the previous scenario. Life expectancy surpasses 80 years and remains high. Life expectancy, food per capita, services per capita, and consumer goods per capita all end up at higher levels than they did in the previous scenario. Two general insights from this effort are valid and relevant. The first insight is the realisation that waiting to introduce fundamental change reduces the options for humanity’s long-term future. The second insight is that the model world’s goal for industrial goods per capita, even with all the ameliorative technologies, cannot be

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sustained for the resulting population of more than seven billion. The final four scenarios also suggest some general conclusions: A global transition to a sustainable society is probably possible without reductions in either population or industrial output. A transition to sustainability will require an active decision to reduce the human ecological footprint. There are many choices that can be made about numbers of people, living standards, technological investment, and allocations among industrial goods, services, food, and other material needs. There are many trade-offs between the number of people the earth can sustain and the material level at which each person can be supported. The longer the world takes to reduce its ecological footprint and move toward sustainability, the lower the population and material standard that will be ultimately supportable. The higher the targets for population and material standard of living are set, the greater the risk of exceeding and eroding its limits.

Speed up response time. Look actively for signals that indicate when the environment or society is stressed. Decide in advance what to do if problems appear. Minimise the use of non renewable resources. Prevent the erosion of renewable resources. Use all resources with maximum efficiency. Slow and eventually stop exponential growth of population and physical capital.

Suggested guidelines
The authors do suggest a few general guidelines for what sustainability would look like, and what steps we should take to get there: Extend the planning horizon. Base the choice among current options much more on their long-term costs and benefits. Improve the signals. Learn more about the real welfare of human population and the real impact on the world ecosystem of human activity.

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Case study two: The Mont Fleur scenarios
The Mont Fleur Scenario Process was undertaken in South Africa from 1991-92, in the context of deep political and social divisions caused by apartheid. It brought people together from a range of organisations and backgrounds to think creatively about the future of their country, and provided an innovative approach and an important contribution in the midst of a deep conflict. Provided here are excerpts from the scenario process as originally published in the South African newspaper The Weekly Mail and The Guardian Weekly, in July 1992. It offers an invaluable example to the importance of providing foresight in times of change, the power of building scenarios, and offers advice for constructing a scenario process. constitutional matters, and many other areas. They ranged from informal, off-therecord workshops to formal, public negotiations. The Mont Fleur project was one type of forum that, uniquely, used the scenario methodology. The purpose of Mont Fleur was ‘not to present definitive truths, but to stimulate debate on how to shape the next ten years’. The project brought together a diverse group of 22 prominent South Africans – politicians, activists, academics, and businessmen, from across the ideological spectrum – to develop and disseminate a set of stories about what might happen in their country from 1992 to 2002.

Summary of the scenarios
The scenario team met three times in a series of three-day workshops at the Mont Fleur conference centre outside Cape Town. After considering many possible stories, the participants agreed on four scenarios that they believed to be plausible and relevant: Ostrich, in which a negotiated settlement to the crisis in South Africa is not achieved, and the country’s government continues to be nonrepresentative. Lame Duck, in which a settlement is achieved but the transition to a new dispensation is slow and indecisive. Icarus, in which transition is rapid but the new government unwisely pursues unsustainable, populist economic policies. Flight of the Flamingos, in which the government’s policies are sustainable and the country takes a path of inclusive growth and democracy.

Context and participants
The historical context of the project is important to understanding its impact. It took place during the period between February 1990, when Nelson Mandela was released from prison, and the African National Congress (ANC), Pan African Congress (PAC), South African Communist Party (SACP), and other organisations were legalised, and April 1994, when the first all-race elections were held. During these years, dozens of forums were set up in South Africa, creating temporary structures that gathered together the broadest possible range of stakeholders (political parties, civic organisations, professional bodies, government departments, trade unions, business groups, etc.) to develop a new way forward in a particular area of concern. There were forums to discuss education, housing, economic policy,

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The Mont Fleur scenarios

Strategic Futures Planning

Flight of the flamingoes
Inclusive democracy and growth

YES Are the government’s policies sustainable? YES NO Icarus
Macro-economic populism

Is the transition rapid and decisive? YES Current negotiations NO Lame duck
Incapacitated government

Is a settlement negotiated? NO Ostrich
Non-representative government

Logic of the scenarios

The group developed each of these stories into a brief logical narrative. A 14-page report was distributed as an insert in a national newspaper, and a 30-minute video was produced which combined cartoons with presentations by team members. The team then presented and discussed the scenarios with more than 50 groups, including political parties, companies, academics, trade unions, and civic organisations. At the end of 1992, its goals achieved, the project was wrapped up and the team dissolved.

What the project was and was not
The ideas in the Mont Fleur team’s four scenarios were not in themselves novel. What was remarkable about the project was the heterogeneous group of important figures delivering the messages, and how this group worked together to arrive at these messages. The approach was indirect and the results subtle. Mont Fleur did not resolve the crisis in South Africa. The project, along with

other, non-scenario forum processes, contributed to the establishment of a common vocabulary and mutual understanding. The shared language of Mont Fleur extended beyond the negotiating elite, and was thus able to include such dialogues as an exhortation to Flamingos in a Sunday church sermon and a concern raised about Lame Duck on a rural radio phone-in. This kind of common understanding, together with many other factors, promoted agreement upon a settlement to the crisis. The participants did not agree upon a concrete solution to the country’s problems. They reached a consensus on some aspects of how South Africa ‘worked’ on the complex nature of the crisis, and on some of the possible outcomes of the current conditions. More specifically, they agreed that, given the prevailing circumstances, certain strongly advocated solutions could not work, including armed revolution, continued minority rule (Ostrich), tightly circumscribed majority rule (Lame Duck), and socialism (Icarus). As a result of this process of elimination, the broad outline of a feasible and desirable outcome emerged (Flamingos). The process was not a formal, mandated negotiation. Rather, it was an informal, open conversation. At the first workshop, some of the participants expected to encounter difficulties in agreeing on anything. Over the course of the meetings, they talked until they found areas of shared understanding and agreement, several of which were relevant to the formal negotiations which were occurring simultaneously. It did not deal with the differences among the participants. Negotiation

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The Mont Fleur scenarios

tends to focus on identifying the positions and interests of the parties and then finding a way to narrow or reconcile these differences. The Mont Fleur process, in contrast, only discussed the domain that all of the participants had in common: the future of South Africa. The team then summarised this shared understanding in the scenarios. The aim of such non-negotiating processes is, as Marvin Weisbord, an organisational consultant, has stated, to ‘find and enlarge the common ground’.

Non-representative Government
International community “too radical” Liberations movement maintains the bottom line International community tolerant

STAND OFF

Government inflexible

Negotiations break down “Moderate alliance” government Resistance Repression Negative business Economic and violence climate stagnation The crisis worsens Back to negotiations No social delivery

Ostrich scenario

Results from the project
The Mont Fleur project produced several different types of results: substantive messages, informal networks and understandings, and changed ways of thinking. The primary public output of the project was the group of scenarios, each of which had a message that was important to South Africans in 1992. The message of Ostrich was that a nonnegotiated resolution of the crisis would not be sustainable. This was important because elements of the National Party (NP) government and the business community wished to believe that a deal with their allies, instead of a negotiation with their opponents, could be sufficient. After hearing about the team’s work, NP leader FW de Klerk was quoted as saying, “I am not an Ostrich.” Lame Duck’s message was that a weak coalition government would not be able to deliver and therefore could not last. This was important because the nature, composition, and rules governing the Government of National Unity (GNU) were a central issue in the pre-election negotiations. The NP wanted the GNU to operate subject to vetoes and other restrictions, and the ANC wanted unfettered ‘winner takes all’ rules. Lame Duck explored the boundary in a GNU between compromise and incapacitation. Icarus warned of the dangers of a new government implementing populist economic policy. This message, coming from a team which included several of the left’s most influential economists, was very challenging to the left, which had assumed that government money could be used to eradicate poverty quickly. The business community, which was worried about Icarus policies, found the team’s articulation reassuring. The fiscal conservatism of the GNU was one of the important surprises of the postelection period. The simple message of Flight of the Flamingos was that the team believed in the potential for a positive outcome. In a country in the midst of turbulence and uncertainty, a credible and optimistic story makes a strong impact. One participant said recently that the main result of the project was that: “We mapped out in very broad terms the outline of a successful outcome, which is now being filled in. We captured the

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The Mont Fleur scenarios

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Long transition - Political settlement - All party coalition - Sunset clauses Lowest common denominator decision-making - Indecisive policies - Purports to respond to all, satisfies none Uncertainty because of long transition Investors hold back

Macro-economic populism (fly now, crash later) Capacity constraints and imbalances

Insufficient growth

Massive social spending spree

Economic and social collapse

Insufficient growth

Social crisis inadequately addressed

Popular government

Some form of authoritarian rule?

The vicious circle of political, economic and social crises worsens

Lame Duck scenario

Icarus scenario

way forward of those committed to finding a way forward.” The second result of Mont Fleur was the creation of informal networks and understandings among the participants – an influential group from across the political spectrum – through the time they spent together. These connections cumulatively provided the basis for the subsequent critical, formal agreements. The third result, the least tangible yet most fundamental, was the change in the language and thought of the team members and those with whom they discussed their work. The Mont Fleur team gave vivid, concise names to important phenomena that were not widely known, and previously could be neither discussed nor addressed. At least one political party reconsidered its approach to the constitutional negotiations in light of the scenarios.

Why the project produced these results
How can such a simple story-telling process produce these kinds of results? A scenario conversation has several characteristics that make it powerful.

The scenario process is logical. There is no place in the core of a scenario conversation for positions or values. Instead the discussion is about facts and logic: can you convince your fellow team members that the story you are putting forward is plausible? The process is open and informal. Building scenarios can be creative because the process is ‘only’ about telling stories, not about making commitments. This allows people to discuss almost anything, even taboo subjects. Early in the Mont Fleur process, one of the ANC members proposed a story called ‘The Chilean Option: Growth through Repression’ (a play on the ANC slogan, ‘Growth through Redistribution’). This precipitated an important discussion which would not have had a place in a normal left-wing party political debate. The process is inclusive and holistic. A story about the future has to be able to encompass all aspects of the world: social, political, economic, cultural, ecological, etcetera. Moreover, the process of telling several stories encourages people to surface and listen

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Strategic Futures Planning

The Mont Fleur scenarios

Inclusive democracy and growth Political settlement Facilitating international environment - Regional stability - Access to world markets

Good government - Clear and consistent policies - Efficient: not corrupt - Observes macro-economic constraints Broad participation - People have a say Social reconstruction - More social investment - Decrease in violence Sustained economic growth - Business is confident - Investment is high - Employment increases

Pierre Wack, who pioneered scenario planning at Royal Dutch/Shell, said that scenario work involves ‘the gentle art of reperceiving’. A scenario process can facilitate shifts in language, thinking, and action. Each of these reframings provides for a more constructive basis for working on difficult issues.

What scenarios mean
Plausible scenarios must be internally consistent and based on credible interpretations of present trends. Scenarios are a strategic planning tool. They identify what has to be done to secure a desired outcome. Scenarios imply the future is not fixed but can be shaped by decisions and actions of individuals, organisations, and institutions. Scenarios are used to avoid being caught off guard; to challenge conventional mental maps about the future; to recognise signs of change; and to test strategies in different circumstances. There is no standard method of developing scenarios. It is a creative process that harnesses the expertise of the people involved. For a successful scenario planning exercise it is important to set up a skilled team who can understand the present; identify the predictable elements about the future; identify plausible possible pathways into the future; and recognise divergent views. Overleaf is a chart of the Mont Fleur scenario process.

Flight of the Flamingos

to multiple perspectives. In discussing a fundamentally unpredictable future, there is no one truth; this accords respect for the points of view of all of the participants (in a conflict, one or more parties is usually not being heard) and it allows everyone to see more of the world. The process elicits choices. One of the premises of scenario thinking is that the future is not predetermined and cannot be predicted, which means, therefore, that the choices we make can influence what happens. In a situation where people feel swept along by overwhelming, inevitable currents, this is an empowering world view. During its transition, South Africa was haunted by apocalyptic visions; the scenario stories helped people rationally think through their options. The process is constructive. A scenario conversation turns the attention of a group away from the past and present – where the debate is often mired – toward the future. It shifts from looking for ‘The Solution’ to exploring different possibilities, and from the separate interests of the parties (as in negotiation) to their common ground (the future in which they all will live).

Conditions necessary for a successful scenario effort
The most important element required for the success of this type of scenario project is proper timing: are public leaders ready to talk together about the future? If there is readiness, then two other things become critical: how the process is led and how the team is composed. The process must be:

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The Mont Fleur scenarios

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Credible. The people who convene and lead the project must be broadly respected. They must be seen as advocates of the process and not of any particular position or outcome. Informal and reflective. A scenario exercise is a ‘Track Two’ process, which must be separate from (parallel or prior to) ‘Track One’ formal negotiations. The power of scenario work comes from its status as an exercise in reflection and imagination, which is not directly linked to action. Therefore, although it is possible to follow on from constructing scenarios (what might happen) to creating a vision (what we want to happen), and then to planning action (what we will do), these processes must be carefully insulated from one another. Inclusive. The value of these projects is that they build the common ground among different perspectives and parties. It is therefore important to be as inclusive as possible. The Mont Fleur project was unfortunately diminished by the fact that the Inkatha Freedom

Party wasn’t included, which has been an important dissenter in South African politics. The team needs to be: Respected – composed of leaders who are influential in their own communities or constituencies. They need not hold official positions. Open-minded (in particular, not fundamentalist) and able to listen to and work with others. Representative of all the important perspectives on the issues at hand. Any stakeholder must be able to see their point of view represented by someone on the team, though they need not be formal representatives of these groups or positions.

Conclusion
The Mont Fleur exercise demonstrated the informal, indirect scenario approach to be an innovative and productive method for a society in conflict to approach the future. This approach is different from and complementary to negotiation. As this project demonstrates, it is a promising tool for future attempts to reach public consensus.

Team members’ ideas

First team workshop September 1991

Brainstorming 30 initial ideas

Research 9 preliminary schools

Research

Second team workshop November 1991 Consultation

Assessment 4 draft scenarios Refinement 4 final scenarios Consultation

Third team workshop March 1992

Dissemination, debate, and use

The scenario process

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Case study three: Cabinet Office UK trends 2001-2006
This 1997 report provides an overview of the research on some key economic, social, technological and other trends likely to affect the UK in the period 2001 – 2006. The work looks at likely trends in: income, wealth and other inequalities; science, technology and innovation; public ethics, values and attitudes; demography; the labour market; the environment and the UK’s position in the world. Contrasts between trends affecting the UK, Europe and the rest of the world have also been included where relevant data could be found. A range of representative sources was consulted in compiling this synopsis, which includes futures work undertaken by UK and foreign organisations from business, academia and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), as well as government sources. The intention was to focus on those trends that are reliably predictable, linear or otherwise grounded in evidence, avoiding projections based on pure speculation or trends subject to volatility. Key trends in this excerpt are from the five year timeframe (2001 – 2006), although the report continues to provide trends for 2006–2011. This is particularly interesting because of the pertinence of many of the observations! some other countries which face more rapid ageing and a more serious fall-off in the birth rate. By 2005, around 36.5% of the UK population will be paying tax on their working income to support the 22% of the population then in retirement. The average life expectancy for UK men is likely to have risen to 78 years by 2006, while the average life expectancy for women will have risen to around 81 by the same time. If past trends continue there is likely to be an increase in the number of births to girls under 16. Births in this age group have been rising since 1993 to the highest recorded level ever in 1996. However births are strongly correlated with a range of factors including employment opportunities, educational performance between 11 and 16, as well as sex education. These factors may reverse the trend in the UK. Information and communications technologies Multimedia and communications technologies, including the internet, mobile phones and digital television, are likely to have become entrenched as an integral part of daily life in the UK over the next five years. For example, it is predicted that by 2003 60% of all households in the UK will have internet access (either through a PC or digital TV connection) and the total number of internet access terminals (PC, TV and mobile phones) in the UK may exceed the national population. This may be compared against the current figure of 450 million

Key UK trends: 2001–2006
Demography In common with the rest of Western Europe, the UK’s population will continue to age over the next decade, although the fullest economic/social impacts of a ‘top-heavy’ population distribution are unlikely to be felt until after 2015. The changing age balance of the UK population is less marked than

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Cabinet Office UK trends 2001-2006

Strategic Futures Planning

regular internet users globally, a figure expected to grow to two billion by 2005. By 2005, several billion domestic appliances and other machinery are likely to be connected to the internet through the use of automated wireless technologies. Digital television is expected to be in use by 15 million subscriber homes by 2005. Because of the spread of digital TV, up to 50% of Internet access may be through non-PC devices within three years. On-line retailing (e-commerce) is likely to become more popular, with internetbased sales rising to around £2.5bn to £3bn by 2003. By 2006, up to 10% of medical prescriptions could be administered over the internet. The value of the European wireless data market alone is projected to exceed the European voice data market by 2006. Computer memory with average memory access time of one nanosecond will be in use by 2005. Molecular computing will also be in use by 2005. By 2005 Artificial Intelligence (AI), virtual reality and advanced ‘data mining’ technologies will allow organisations to assimilate data and solve problems well beyond the range of today’s machines. Health Individual health looks set to remain an important issue within the UK. Although the incidence of communicable diseases is likely to decline, chronic diseases and mental illnesses are likely to increase in prevalence. The growing prevalence of trade and travel, global warming and social trends will ensure that new infectious diseases continually

emerge or re-emerge, often through foodborne routes. Childhood ill health resulting from socio-economic factors has been rapidly rising but the policy challenges are being recognised. Nearly one third of UK children currently live in poverty (as defined by relative measures), compared with one in ten in 1979. This is known to correlate with ill health. The government has committed itself to using financial and other means to take significant numbers of children out of poverty and hence reduce poverty linked ill-health. There are some tentative signs that the longer-term trend may now be in reverse Increasing rates of drug use and abuse among young people are likely to continue. The number of 15 to 24 yearolds using drug treatment agencies in 1997 was 50% higher than in 1993. All the genes in the human genome are likely to have been mapped by 2005, leading to new understandings of and perhaps treatments for human genetic diseases. It is thought that electronic implants able to stimulate the muscles in disabled people will be in use by around 2004. The number of people taking out private health insurance in 1997 had risen by 4% compared with 1990 figures. In the same period, the total value of private medical insurance claims rose by over 50 per cent. These trends look set to continue. Housing A combination of economic, social and political drivers will continue to affect where people live, buy houses and what they can afford to buy. The average UK household

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Strategic Futures Planning

Cabinet Office UK trends 2001-2006

size is currently 2.34 people. This is projected to drop to 2.29 by 2006. One reason for this is that young people who have tended to stay longer with their parents over the last 20 years will become independent sooner. As a consequence of this, and other factors, the number of private household dwellers is expected to have risen from 49,131,000 to approximately 49,783,000 by this time. Married couples will continue to make up the greatest percentage of household dwellers in England (44%) whilst around 31.4% of dwellers will be lone persons. Some 6% of dwellers will be lone parents and approximately 10.4% will be cohabiting couples. The remainder of households will be other ‘multiperson’ houses. The number of first time house-buyers under 25 dropped from 28.1% of all first time buyers in 1988 to 16% in 1999. In 2006, it is expected that the majority of first-time mortgage borrowers will remain in the 25–34 age bracket. The number of mortgage borrowers earning between £10k and £15k per annum has dropped from 28.2% to 13.2% of all borrowers between 1988 and 1999. The number of borrowers earning over £25k has risen, in the same time, from 14.% to 50% of all borrowers. Initial repayments as a percentage of income for first time buyers have remained at around 14% since 1971. Crime The British Crime Survey indicates an average overall increase in crime over the last 20 years (1981 to 1997) but a decline over the last few years in both burglary and vehicle crime. Criminal organisations are

already adapting to the opportunities offered by the internet and the vulnerabilities of increasingly networked societies. The notion of organised crime may also change, as the internet offers greater individual opportunities for empowered small actors to perpetrate serious crimes with disproportionately large effects. The increasing use of technology in the home (arising from factors such as the growing numbers of tele-workers) may make domestic premises more attractive targets for burglary. However, the move towards a 24-hour society will mean less predictable patterns of domestic movement, which may discourage some criminals. Electronic services (such as online banking), knowledge and information, and identity will increasingly become targets for criminals, especially if physical property is made a more difficult target. Transport and infrastructure It is estimated that between 221 and 237 million people will be using UK air travel services per year by 2005. Between 2001 and 2006, an annual 1.69% increase in road traffic is anticipated. By 2006, car ownership in the UK is likely to be at 0.47 cars per person. By 2006, demand for UK rail services is projected to have risen by 23% since 2000. The environment UK air quality is getting cleaner, though the impact of greater extremes of weather will continue to cause sporadic social disruption. The change in the earth’s atmosphere and gradual increase in average temperature will

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Cabinet Office UK trends 2001-2006

Strategic Futures Planning

mean that the UK is likely to endure bouts of extreme weather on a more frequent basis. Heavy rains resulting in floods and dry summers resulting in drought will undoubtedly be more common. Road traffic NOx emissions are predicted to drop by 46% by 2005, due to implementation of a variety of EU Directives. Although CO2 emissions will rise slightly in the latter half of the coming decade, they will then fall again. The UK total CO2 emissions currently stand at around 154 million tonnes carbon (MtC) per annum. This is expected to fall to 151.7 MtC by 2005. By 2005, lead emissions will decrease by 90% compared to 1995 levels. Employment and the national economy The UK economy is expected to continue growing at its recent average rate of 2 – 2.5% per annum until 2006. This growth, and a parallel expected growth in productivity, will come through the acquisition of new labour skills, greater specialisation and the application of new technologies. By 2006, almost one-third of the UK workforce are likely to be employed in the distribution and transport sector, and around one quarter employed in business and miscellaneous services, emphasising the continued decline in traditional manufacturing industries. By 2006, only 14.5% of the UK workforce is expected to be employed in manufacturing, around 6% in construction and about 2% in the primary/utilities sector. By 2006, 18% of the UK workforce could be working as managers and administrators, with around 14%

working in clerical and secretarial roles and something like 12% in personal and protective services. A projected 9.5% of the UK workforce is likely to be working as factory operatives or in unskilled manual roles, with an anticipated 7.5% in sales roles and around 5.75% in other roles. By 2005, it is likely that basic IT literacy will be regarded as an essential prerequisite for skilled employment. Union membership looks set to continue its decline as workers become more generally skilled, educated and inclined towards individual negotiation of employment terms. Countries like Russia, India and China are likely to suffer an IT ‘brain drain’, as many of their most skilled workforce come to work in the Western world.

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Case study four: The Scottish Futures Forum
In its first year, the Scottish Futures Forum has adopted a wide range of approaches to help the Parliament become more porous to new ways of thinking. A range of futures techniques has been used to stimulate public policy debate: scenarios, Delphi, visioning, gaming, surveys, futures cafes and systems mapping, as well as the more traditional collaboration tools of workshops, drama, networking and lectures. thinking in Scotland – that it will continue to act as a focal point for MSPs, policy makers, academics, businesses and the wider public to come around the table, to learn together in a creative environment, and to test and promote new forms of social innovation for the future. The report illustrates how the forum has blended in-depth futures work with open participation events, producing instructive debates and creative learning all round. Key highlights of the forum’s work over its first year include the Future Lecture Series, the Positive Ageing Project, and Public Policy Debates. Future work includes a project on future policies around illegal drugs and alcohol.

Introduction
The Scottish Futures Forum is helping to develop the knowledge transfer agenda in Scotland. It has created new information pathways into the decision-making process, a process which will be further developed in 2007. Our ‘Supporting Local Futures’ programme will encourage local communities to think, learn and plan for their own specific futures – with, in turn, the forum promoting the social innovations which emerge to MSPs (Members of the Scottish Parliament) and parliamentary committees. Over 1,000 members are now registered on the forum’s website. In our first year over ten Scottish universities, and many businesses have worked with the forum. As the Parliament approaches its third session the challenge to be open and responsive to those it serves, and to be creative in planning for the future is as important as ever. As this report makes clear, the forum has a role in this process and has made an encouraging start. In the next four years it will take a more focused approach, working closely with MSPs and parliamentary committees to take a futures look at ‘drugs and alcohol’, ‘environmental futures’, and ‘funding the future’. Our aspiration for the forum is that it will become a central point for futures

The future lecture series
The forum was asked by MSPs and others to develop a high quality lecture series. The forum wanted to bring international experts, known for their ‘big ideas’ and in some cases controversy, to Holyrood, to share and debate their views with MSPs. In March 2006, Geoff Mulgan, director of the Young Foundation and former head of policy and strategy at Ten Downing Street, spoke about the need for more social innovation in Scotland. His inspiring lecture, co-hosted with the International Futures Forum, described how Scotland was ideally placed to be creative and innovative when testing new public policies: “Scotland should now be in the forefront of (social) innovation. It is the right size, has the right traditions, and sits in the right part of the world... and it has a very strong network of organisations involved in social enterprise, like the school for social

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entrepreneurs based in Fife. The potential payback is very substantial.” In September 2006, academic Professor Howard Gardner, spoke at the forum about his ‘GoodWork’ Theory and his most recent book Changing Minds. Howard Gardner is one of the world’s leading thinkers. Originally a psychologist, much of his most famous work has been done in the field of education. His interests are, however, extremely wide and embrace many of the key issues facing contemporary society. In the mid-1990s, along with other renowned academics, Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi from Harvard and William Damon from Stanford, Gardner founded what has become known as the ‘GoodWork’ project. It began from a consideration of the relationship between high-level performance in whatever field and social responsibility; in other words, between excellence and ethics. In a world where conditions are changing rapidly and where market forces are often the only decisive factor, the project promotes the concept of GoodWork to establish what assists its development. An education specialist, Gardner explored with the forum the relationship between ethics and excellence describing how ‘work’ can be both socially responsible and personally fulfilling. In his lecture, educationalists from across Scotland also heard Gardner launch his new theory, ‘Five Minds for the Future; the kinds of minds that people will need if they – if we – are to thrive in the world during the coming era’. In June, Right Reverend Alison Elliot, former moderator of the Church of Scotland spoke at the forum on the ‘Spirit of Innovation’. Drawing on her time and travels as moderator, Alison stressed the need for us to look for innovation in the most marginalised areas of society. “Often the

most marginalised in society have the sharpest focus on what needs to be done when producing innovative public policy”, she said. This has, in part, led the forum to consider the establishment of a ‘Supporting Local Futures’ programme, being launched in 2007; an attempt to bring local communities to think, learn and plan for their own local futures. In September 2006, controversial Danish academic Professor Bjorn Lomborg addressed a packed Garden Lobby at the Scottish Parliament. Listed by Time Magazine as one of the top 100 global influences, Lomborg’s lecture, ‘Are We Destroying the Future?’ generated much debate from the Scottish environmental lobby. Lomborg’s description of the ‘Copenhagen Consensus’ sparked some lively debate; global warming he told the audience is important, especially to the developing world but, there are other areas, such as the prevention of Aids /HIV, education and poverty that should be seen as a priority. US Senator George Mitchell, the United Nations prize-winning peacemaker, spoke to the forum in October 2006, examining ‘A Future for International Peace?’. Senator Mitchell spoke to MSPs and a high level business audience about his humanitarian approach to resolving conflicts and discussed lessons for Scotland in dealing with problems of sectarianism. The forum is very pleased by the success of the futures lecture series. The presiding officer, George Reid MSP has said that , sharing big ideas and new thinking at Holyrood is important to the Parliament’s commitment to being open and accessible to the wider community. The Forum will announce its forthcoming lecture speakers early next year when we can look forward to hearing more high level speakers and more ‘big ideas’.

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The ‘positive ageing’ project
Conscious that Scotland will have an increasingly ageing population in the future, ‘positive ageing’ has been a core theme running throughout the forum’s project work throughout 2006. The Parliament’s Equal Opportunities Committee spokesperson on ageing, Sandra White MSP explained the , importance of the ageing study: “The fact that by the middle of this century over one third of Scotland’s population will be over 50 years old, presents massive challenges for policy making today. It is vital that Scotland develops initiatives and policies to ensure older people have the opportunity to positively contribute to society in the way they want. That is why Scotland’s Futures Forum futures study into positive ageing has been so important; to get policy makers thinking now about the positive impact having an older population could make and to challenge government and businesses to prepare the way. The forum’s ageing project is a good piece of work which has used creative methods to stimulate a positive debate in Scotland.” The Forum Project Board, led by Lord Sutherland, developed a hybrid futures approach, using various techniques. The ‘learning to emerge’ was considered through a scenario exercise, published in January 2007. Here are some of the sessions that contributed to the development of the forum’s positive scenarios. Power to the people “If you love your Granny, don’t buy her a computer for Christmas!” was the feeling of one older person attending the forum’s ‘Power to the People Conference’. The event saw 150 elderly people in the parliamentary chamber discussing how older people can

better participate in public life and describe how older people are a real asset to society and not the burden they are often portrayed to be. Her point was that many older people increasingly feel alienated by the fast pace of change and usage of technology. The forum believes many older people would appreciate help, particularly around the internet, texting and digital television; for example, ‘peer training’ schemes and intergenerational schemes, where young people teach older people about technology in return for advice on life issues. This conference heard from SAGA, The POWER Inquiry, DWP Anti-Apathy, Microsoft , and Ofcom. Some very interesting points came from this lesson around the barriers that older people experience in engaging in decision-making processes. The drama of getting older During stage three of the forum’s project into Positive Ageing, the Foxtrot Theatre Company was commissioned to produce an interactive play that would help stimulate discussion with community groups. The audience was very open and some interesting findings came from the sessions. In general, people were quite optimistic about getting older. An overwhelming majority felt their generation had a better time of it than their parents’ generation. However, an overwhelming majority felt their children’s generation was not likely to have as good an old age as they themselves would. This perhaps reflects a sense of what some commentators have described as ‘a golden age of seniors’, arguing that as the largest and wealthiest consumer group there is a lot to look forward to for them. However, younger generations did not have so much to look forward to, for example, inability to afford proper housing, loss of professional pension, the changing nature of

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‘family’, etc. The play told the story of a couple, Bill and Shirley and her friend Christine. The play profiled each of the characters, all with different attitudes to ageing. As a couple Bill and Shirley had very different views on retirement and their relationship started to suffer. Christine, while worried about health in older age, was determined to live an active life, and spend her savings travelling to see her family in New Zealand. By the second scene, the play moved on to profile the characters in 2026. Shirley had had a stroke and Bill was her carer. Christine was living in sheltered accommodation. The scene describes a very positive conversation between the three via digital television. The play ‘paused’ between each scene and, through a facilitator, drew the audience into a discussion. The actors, in character, also entered into the discussion. As a participation tool, the theatre proved very powerful. Attitudes to retirement There was a real sense that preparing for retirement took time. The shift from work to retirement was massive, often sudden and abrupt. Most people felt things need not be that way. More care and attention should be taken to help people move from work to retirement over a phased period. People felt employers should take more time to prepare their staff for retirement, as much as ten to 15 years ahead of actually retiring. People wanted to see reduced hours options, flexible working, time off for volunteering, and the chance to find new interests and skills outside working life. There was a genuine mixture of opinion about working beyond retirement. Some very much looked forward to it, as the character Bill said, “If I never see another column of numbers again, I would be happy”. Others for either

social or financial reasons wanted to continue working or try something new, like start their own businesses. According to Barclays Bank, the number of middle-aged people starting businesses has grown by 50% over the past decade and now accounts for almost a quarter of new businesses. This variance in opinion reflects the forum’s belief that government and business should look together at how to provide a range of options for people making the transition in work from their 50s to 60s and 70s, to ensure they can make the right choices for themselves. A business perspective (possibility spaces) The forum has been conscious of a dearth of information on how Scottish businesses are preparing for an older population, and workforce. Using a ‘possibility space’ technique, the forum brought together a number of businesses to consider their attitudes to pensions, employment practices, finance and the environment. The possibility spaces produced a very rich dialogue with business and their conclusions helped inform the finding of the overall ageing project. An academic perspective (Delphi exercise) The forum commissioned a Delphi exercise, where three respected academics from Scottish Universities were asked to give their futures view of ageing. The essays concentrate on three key areas and heavily influenced the forum’s ageing project. An overall philosophical view of ageing in the future. An economic view of ageing in the future. A learning and training perspective of ageing in the future.

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Young Time Lords face the future (gaming) In October 2006, through a series of gaming and drama exercises, the forum worked with 100 young people aged between 14 and 18. With Young Scot, a very dynamic and successful organisation, the forum spent the day discussing young people’s attitudes to personal finance and getting older. It became clear that young people understood the need for more financial literacy skills. It was interesting to note that at the beginning of the session, around 85% of the young people felt they received sufficient financial literacy education at school and over 90% of them said they expected to have some kind of pension provision by the time they were 40years-old. However, by the end of the day, it became clear that very few of the young people actually knew what a pension was, and many thought that the government would provide them with a pension post retirement. At the end of the session, over 80% of the young people said they would welcome more financial planning skills and education. Most of the young people did not think they would have personal debt, excluding a mortgage and car, by the time they were 30 and yet, over 90% of young people said, financial planning was of little interest because it was too far in the future. Over 50% said, if given £1,000 today, they would spend the whole sum on luxury goods. Around 45 per cent said they would save a portion of the money.

The Tomorrow Project, Careers Scotland and Scottish Enterprise, brought together 100 people from various sectors to consider work in the 21st century. The Scottish Council Foundation’s work on how to take an asset-based approach to education, work and retirement was hugely useful in this session. From this event four specific questions came to the fore, which provided the focus of the ageing project. 1. A pension crisis has been high on the public agenda recently but what are the attitudes of Scottish business and young people to work, pensions and savings in the future? 2. It has been clearly established that an increase in skills leads to increased productivity in the workplace. What new skills and re-training will be required by an ageing population, to meet the needs of work in the future? 3. Many have argued that ‘crisis’ is only a term to be used if society does not adjust its practices now to meet the economic and social realities of the future. How do we enable and empower people to meet this new environment? 4. How can the skills of an ageing population, through, for example, volunteering, mentoring and other forms of ‘work’, best contribute to society in the future? Scottish Expo Fair 2006 Scottish Policy Innovation Forum (SPIF) aims to foster new ideas and ways of thinking about public policy. Some have argued that there has been less policy innovation than many people expected since devolution. Scottish distinctiveness has often meant not following the line of England, rather than striking out on its own. The SPIF was created

Public policy debate
Another key role for the forum during 2006 has been to stimulate public policy debate by bringing the futures work of partner organisations to Holyrood. Below are three of the highlight events from 2006. The Tomorrow Network The Tomorrow Network in Scotland, a network made up of the Scottish Executive,

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to meet this need for bottom-up thinking about Scottish solutions to Scottish problems. Its role is to bring together existing knowledge and ideas and stimulate new ones, across the public service, academia and civil society. The Futures Forum was pleased to partner SPIF in running The Scottish Policy Expo which showcased to MSPs some of the most innovative policy ideas coming out of Scotland’s universities. These related to the shape of society, the balance of the economy, the structure of the public sector and public services delivery. The expo helped stimulate public policy debate on issues such as tackling social inequalities, and pursuing a distinctive Scottish economic development programme and reform of the public sector. Goodison Group in Scotland The Goodison Group, which was founded in England about five years ago, takes its name from its founder, Sir Nicholas Goodison. Sir Nicholas was the chairman of the London Stock Exchange, chairman of the TSB Group and deputy chairman of Lloyds TSB. The forum was delighted to partner the Goodison Group in Scotland (GGiS) to run an event to consider policy innovation. The GGiS is an independent group of people coming together to stimulate and support wide-ranging discussion on the hugely important issue of lifelong learning, with a particular focus on post compulsory learning and skills in Scotland. While the primary focus of the group is quite explicitly economic, the social and cultural dimensions are very important. The purpose of the GGiS is to take a longer-term view of the issues involved in education and training, outside the normal pressures and timescales of government strategies and initiatives.

Planned projects
Alcohol and drugs are very topical and there is a good deal of new and provoking work emerging, in particular, the RSA Commission’s forthcoming report on Illegal Drugs and the Impact on Communities and Public Policy’. During 2007, the forum’s focus will be on stimulating new debates around alcohol and drugs. Of course, across Scotland, a wide range of views exist on the best way to tackle issues around alcohol and drugs. The forum does not develop policy, but uses fresh approaches to look over the horizon and stimulate public policy debate on the near and long-term actions that should be taken.

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Case study five: EC Scenarios Europe 2010
The approach of the year 2000 was used as an opportunity by the European Commission to reflect upon future developments that could affect their activities. The Scenarios for Europe 2010 were drawn up to ‘stimulate debate inside and outside the commission on the future of European integration; and to develop a tool to put the union’s policies and strategies into perspective and contribute to their improvement.’ Provided below is a brief summary of each of the five scenarios, followed by a detailed description of the method used. It serves as an interesting example of foresight in the context of a large regional organisation, and offers an interesting method for producing scenarios.

The hundred flowers
This scenario will be marked by things such as: trend growth slowdown; exploitation of some technologies (for example, biotechnologies); devolution of large organisations; and, explosion of one-person operations and informal networks. Belief in neighbourhood solidarity and local self-help will be strong and women will be particularly active. Paid work will be less important. Common will be anti-consumerism and ‘doit-yourself’, but enthusiasm for information and communication technologies will grow. ‘Green’ values will be prevalent. There could be a crisis of large bureaucracies and nation-states. Creation of new states may happen. Noticeable will be participation at local level, apathy at national and European level (especially large states). Mistrust of government and big business (including media) will be common. Other trends include: disobedience, tax evasion and boycotts. National administrations are deemed to be largely incapable of reform and bureaucracies are seen to be largely irrelevant. Public functions performed by associations and private organisations.

Triumphant markets
‘Third Industrial Revolution’ will be marked, accompanied by an explosion of entrepreneurship (‘virtual enterprise’). Unchallenged leadership of the US model i n technological innovation will also be present and enterprise organisation (shareholder value). Also, strong emphasis on self-reliance but widespread feeling of insecurity. Residual family solidarity. Materialism and consumerism common. There will be greater acceptance of social exclusion. Regions versus central governments (national and EU) will show tension and there will be ‘inequality of governance’ across localities and social groups. People will be increasingly withdrawing from public life and there will be mistrust of collective action. There will be a downsized public sector and outsourcing of public services will be common. The private sector may take over traditional public functions.

Shared responsibilities
‘Third Industrial Revolution’ will be facilitated by policies for re-orientation of technologies toward the users (public/private partnerships). Stakeholder model of enterprise will be apparent: ‘win-win’ flexibility. There will be a renaissance of social/ecological awareness, belief in responsibility and civic solidarity, and widespread tolerance of diversity. New politicians will be at odds with old bureaucrats. There could be a European initiative for reform of public sector and a broad consensus both for the reform of the

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public sector and social institutions. Any reform will be according to the principles of: decentralisation, transparency and responsibility. There will be an important minority – ‘active citizens’ who will be conditioning political and community life. There will also be an increased role for evaluation and control mechanisms relative to regulation and implementation (and shrinking of traditional ministries could be widespread).

Creative societies
This scenario would be marked by: trend growth slowdown; strong political impulsion to develop green technologies and training technologies. There would be reorganisation of enterprises around democratic/egalitarian lines and there would be revolutionary social/ecological awareness. Reaction against structures dominated by ‘economic rationality’ would be common. Violent uprisings (in a number of countries) could be sparkled by an EU coordinated plan to cut social protection. Europe-wide forums would be formed to discuss the future of European societies. We would see a crisis and reform of nation states around socioecological priorities. There would be increasing participation in community and political life following a period of social upheaval. NGOs would be active in the provision of some public services (education, training, assistance to lowincome people).

the future but also a ‘back to roots’ intolerance (including gender backlash). Also likely: creeping racism, and concern with economic and even physical security (urban crime, mafias, war in the near abroad). There could be a political centre of gravity towards right-wing populism (‘Fortress Europe’) and a re-legitimisation of the state as well as diffuse support of authoritarianism. Media may be encouraging a fear of diversity. Security may prevail over transparency. Obsolescence of public services could also be prevalent1.

Methodology
The building of the Scenarios Europe 2010 followed a methodology called Shaping Actors-Shaping Factors. Its development has benefited from regular contacts between the Forward Studies Unit and numerous international institutes active in future studies. In particular, we would like to mention the French Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers, the Dutch institute Clingendael, the Anglo-American Global Business Network, the German think-tank EUCIS, the association Futuribles International and strategic think-tanks of large companies such as Shell. The Unit also maintains close contacts with planning and future studies departments in EU Member States and large international organisations, such as the OECD. The basic sequencing of the construction of the Scenarios Europe 2010 is similar to the methods developed and used by Futuribles and CNAM and sometimes referred to as the école française (analysis of variables, partial scenarios, global scenarios). The brainstorming methods that were used are closer to the Anglo-Saxon tradition. Furthermore, the objective of the exercise and the fact that it was organised within an institution like the European

Turbulent neighbourhoods
A trend would see growth slowdown with Europe increasingly at a disadvantage in world competition, especially in hi-tech sectors. Political interference in reorganisation of large enterprises would be seen and there would be increasing riskaversion. There would be a pervasive fear of

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Commission sometimes led the unit to break new ground in regard to the existing methods. This included the writing up in full of the partial scenarios as well as the technique used for the final selection of the global scenarios.

to ensure control of the process and consistency of output, the methodology followed by each working group was broadly the same. Specifically, the production of the partial scenarios can be described as a six-step process: 1. Kick-off paper: to start the discussion, the coordinators present a paper illustrating the main facts about the theme under consideration and putting relevant questions about the future. 2. Selection of variables: the group holds a brainstorming exercise to put together a rather comprehensive list of the variables that can have an impact on the theme under consideration. Each variable is subsequently classified as factor or actor. Factors are defined as the structural trends that are considered important in shaping future outcomes (in considering each trend, one should bear in mind also the possibility of shocks and inflection points). Actors are defined as those players that can influence factors in an interactive fashion. Through reflection and discussion, the initial list of variables (typically numbering around 50) is reduced to a more manageable set (ten to 15). 3. Construction of ‘mini-scenarios’2. A questionnaire is submitted to each member of the working group, in which he is asked to sketch alternative paths of evolution for each shaping actor or factor. The answers are elaborated to yield comparable sets of alternatives. In practice, this means producing alternative ‘stories’ (each summarized in a two-line sentence) for each actor/factor. These receive the name of ‘mini-scenarios’. Figure 1 shows the actors/factors selected for the theme of economic adaptability and the titles of

Two stages: partial (theme specific) scenarios and global scenarios
Given the broad scope of the project, it was decided from the beginning that the construction of the scenarios would involve two separate stages resulting in two distinct products, the first of which would provide the material for the second. Specifically, the first stage of the project aimed at producing partial scenarios (theme-specific), to be subsequently integrated into the global scenarios presented in this publication.

Production of partial scenarios
The production of the partial scenarios worked as follows. Five themes were chosen for their capacity to capture and illustrate developments relevant for the future of Europe and its process of integration. They were: institutions and governance; social cohesion; economic adaptability; enlargement of the EU; and Europe’s external environment. For each theme a working group was created, comprising 12 to 15 commission officials chosen for their competence on the subject and their interest in a scenario exercise. Each working group was coordinated by a member of the Forward Studies Unit and the coordinator of the project was involved in the five groups to ensure consistency. A total of over 60 officials took part in the exercise. The process was designed so as to encourage participants to ‘think aloud’ and for group dynamics to generate contrasting mental pictures about the future. At the same time,

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EC Scenarios Europe 2010 1. Demography 2. Technology/Organisation Low population growth, No major breakthrough. medium participation growth Downsizing. Continuing despecialisation of Europe in high-tech Low population growth, high participation growth, openness to emigration No major breakthrough. Increasing dualism. Increasing despecialisation of Europe in high-tech

Strategic Futures Planning 3. Culture/Values 4. Globalisation Increasing individualism. Globalisation continuing, Fear of the future sectoral resistances, local difficulties Strongly increasing Globalisation individualism. Social and accelerating. “Borderless geographical world” segregation. Power of lobbies Globalisatin slowing down, trade conflicts, regional blocks

Low population growth, low participation growth, closure to emigration

Major breakthrough. Europe Renaissance of innovating and/or catching up social/ecological awareness. Regions/localities experiments

Major breakthrough. Increasing Revolt of the bottom half Global crisis technologically-induced against globalisation inequality. Europe catching up Major breakthrough. Increasing technologically-induced inequality. Europe falling behind 5. Macroeconomic policies (EMU) 6. Industrial policies Broad EMU with limited “Horizontal” policies coordination and no major tensions (competitiveness approach) Broad EMU with limited coordination and major tensions Broad EMU with strong coordination Failure of EMU 7. Social and employment policies Continuing “decremental” adjustment of social protection 8. International regulations Mixed strength of institutions

Acceleration of deregulation Strong labour market deregulation. Mixed strength of institutions. and privatisation Residual welfare state Increasing regionalism “New” industrial policies (focus on users) “Mercantilistic” industrial policies Strong resistance against welfare state reform Radical reform of welfare state: universalism and individual incentives 12. NGOs Not significant economic role Weak institutions. Reversal of liberalisation Strong global institutions (economic security council)

9. European integration Braod enlargement, deep integration

10. Public actors Governments constrained by interdependence and lack of consensus Downsizing of government Institutional review

11. Trade unions Continuing decline. Persistence in protected sectors Terminal decline

13. Transnational corporations TNCs increasingly important

Broad enlaregment, shallow integration Narrow enlargement, deep integration

Significant economic role Very significant economic role (taking over welfare state)

Delining corporative advantage of TNCs (multinational SMEs) Polital reaction against TNCs

Decline reversal (new corporatism)

Failure of enlargement

Paralysis
Figure 1

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the ‘mini-scenarios’ corresponding to each actor/factor. 4. Selection of the ‘pivot variables’. The actors/factors considered with their alternatives are still too numerous to allow the formation of contrasted pictures of the future. Each group is

Figure 2

asked to concentrate on a smaller number of variables, which are most liable to make the difference between the possible versions of the future. To facilitate the choice each factor/actor can be ranked along two dimensions:

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uncertainty and impact. Those variables that score the highest on both dimensions are selected as ‘pivot variables’. This allows concentrating on five to six variables instead of ten to 15. 5. Selection of the scenarios. Taking into account only the pivot variables, the group selects a number (typically ranging from six to eight) of plausible and consistent combinations of the ‘mini-scenarios’. This means that each combination contains one mini-scenario (in some cases a mix of two miniscenarios) for each ‘pivot variable’ and that the mini-scenarios are considered to fit well with each other across the variable spectrum. An appropriate title is chosen for each combination. Figure 2 presents two examples drawn from the working group on economic adaptability: the white boxes indicate the miniscenarios which are retained for each of the pivot variables (note that only five variables are considered instead of the 13 in the previous Figure). Once the working group is satisfied with the selection of combinations, the other (non-pivot) variables are attached to each combination, as it subjectively seems fit. Finally, through a process of merging and elimination, the combinations selected are reduced to five. Each of these five combinations of mini-scenarios provides the ‘skeleton’ for a different scenario. 6. Writing of the partial scenarios. Based on the ‘skeleton’ of mini-scenarios, a script (about 3,000 words long) is produced to give narrative form to each partial scenario.

governance, five scenarios on social cohesion, etc.), the Forward Studies Unit moved to the second stage of the scenarios project, namely the production of global scenarios. This stage was coordinated and implemented by the three authors of the present publication. They were assisted by a steering group including ten other colleagues from the Forward Studies Unit and other departments in the European Commission, all of which had been already involved in the first stage. The production of the global scenarios involved a number of steps. Consistency ranking of the combinations of partial scenarios: in principle, each global scenario can be seen as a combination of five partial scenarios, one for each theme. The theoretical number of such combinations, however, is extremely high. An apposite technique is used to rank the possible combinations for overall consistency, so that only those combinations exhibiting a sufficiently high degree of consistency are retained for further consideration3. Selection of the global scenarios. Concentrating on the combinations retained from the consistency exercise, the steering group retains the eight to ten more salient and consistent combinations. This means not only that the partial scenarios contained in each combination should not appear to contradict each other, but also that there should be some salient feature that clearly distinguishes each combination from the others. The combinations are reduced to five through a process of merging and elimination. These five combinations provide the ‘skeletons’ for the global scenarios. Analysis of the key drivers of the global scenarios: based on a rereading of the

Production of global scenarios
Each working group having produced a set of five partial scenarios (five scenarios on

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partial scenarios, a number of key drivers, recurring in the different working groups, are selected. The role of the key drivers is succinctly described for each global scenario. Contradictions and lacunas are identified and eliminated. Test presentation of ‘skeleton’ scenarios. Based on the ‘skeleton’ for the global scenarios, a visual presentation is prepared for the purpose of discussion with test groups, both inside and outside the institution (ten presentations were organised within the commission and 20 were given to outside audiences from Europe, the US and Asia.) Criticisms and comments were collected, examined and, if deemed appropriate, incorporated in the scenarios. Writing of the global scenarios. Based on the ‘skeleton’ combinations of partial scenarios and the analysis of key drivers, a script (about 4,000 words long) is prepared to give a narrative form to each global scenario. Finalisation of the global scenarios. The draft global scenarios are subjected to two rounds of screening and discussion: first by the authors, then within the steering group. Following that, a final version of the global scenarios is produced for publication. The two-stage process described above was implemented for the first time in the construction of the Scenarios Europe 2010, with innovations being introduced practically at each step. While conceived with the specific subject(s) in mind, the process has proved to be flexible enough to accommodate a wide range of possible topics4. The Forward Studies Unit continues to work on applications of the Shaping Actors-Shaping Factors method with a view to further improving its scenariobuilding capabilities.

References
1. Cabinet Office – Generic Scenarios: A Strategic Futures paper (December 2002), Ruth Cousens, Tom Steinberg, Ben White & Suzy Walton. Certain experts on prospective methodology call the phase mentioned in paragraphs (3) to (5) ‘morphological analysis’. The American F. Zwicky used it for the first time in 1947. For more information consult the book From Anticipation to Action. A Handbook of Strategic Perspective by Michel Godet. The technique works as follows. Let gov, coh, eco, enl, wld stand for the groups of scenarios on governance, social cohesion, the economy, enlargement and the world environment, respectively. The ten possible couples of groups are: gov/coh, gov/eco, gov/enl, gov/wld, coh/eco, coh/enl, coh/wld, eco/enl, eco/wld, enl/wld. As each group contains five scenarios, each couple of groups consists of 25 (five x five) combinations of two individual scenarios, for a total of 250 combinations. Each of these combinations is assigned a score for consistency, ranging from zero to five. At this point one can calculate a measure of the overall consistency of each theoretically possible combination of five partial scenarios, by summing up the individual scores of the ten couples of scenarios contained in each combination. An electronic spreadsheet programme allows easily to perform the calculations and to rank the combinations starting from those with the highest overall score (50). For instance, the Unit’s Shaping Actors-Shaping Factors methodology was used by the Norwegian government for the scenario exercise code-named Norway 2030 (started in 1998).

2.

3.

4.

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Case study six: The LGA Futures Toolkit
The Local Government Association (LGA) promotes better local government and represents the interests of local authorities in England and Wales. It works with and for its members, various different types of local authorities, to ‘realise a shared vision of local government that enables local people to shape a distinctive and better future for their locality and its communities’. Its futures toolkit for local governments was produced in the context of the emphasis on forward thinking in the Modernising Government white paper and the Cabinet Office report Professional Policy Making For The Twenty First Century (1999). The LGA recognised that local authorities will be required to start looking ahead, to become more preventative and to shift the balance of effort away from curing problems to anticipating and preventing them. This introduction to the LGA Futures Toolkit serves as a useful example of looking to work futures thinking into policy at a local level, including a discussion of the challenges that this might present. Before the reorganisation of 1974, local government in England was almost a no-go area, but since then each new government seems to have regarded it as ripe for intervention. Change in local government has almost become endemic as new structures, new ways of working, changes in responsibilities, etc. have been introduced in a continual stream of reform. At the same time local authorities have faced considerable criticism for failing to attract the interest of their electorates and to deliver effective services, they have also faced tight budgetary controls, the loss of some of their traditional functions and the imposition of new responsibilities often without extra resources to provide them effectively. In the face of this onslaught local authorities have quite reasonably concentrated on the shortterm, responding to new demands as they have been placed on them.

The origins of Futureswork
Perhaps because even more threats have emerged, such as the removal of responsibility for education and the possibility of regional assemblies, which appear to question the very existence of local government, the Local Government Association, the English local authorities collective body, identified a need to look to the longer term. “Most of the LGA’s work is concerned with ‘here and now’ issues: influencing government in the short-term, lobbying for amendments on Bills and providing guidance notes and circulars from government departments. But much is likely to change over the next five, ten,15 years and so it is very important to think about the longer term.1” Some success in thinking ahead had already been achieved: “Good policy planning and lobbying by local government in the run-up to the 1997 general election led to the prospective local government legislation, to the replacement of Compulsory Competitive Tendering with Best Value and the innovative ‘New Commitment’ pathfinder projects2.” To build on this success and to think about what local government might be doing in a decade’s time the LGA embarked in early 1999 on a new policy priority Futureswork. It

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was seen as important for local government “to be setting the agenda rather than just reacting to it,” and to be seen as innovative and influential3. The aim of the programme is to explore the roles that local authorities and councillors might play within their communities in the future. Five initial themes were selected for examination in the Spring of 1999: patterns of local governance; new ways of service delivery; effective public services; finance; and the information society. A series of workshops involving people from the business, voluntary and academic communities as well as local government examined these themes concluding that local authorities would face many questions about their role and the way they should operate over the next ten years. Ten Challenges to Local Government were posed as a result of these discussions4. The challenges were intended to prompt local authorities to discuss the issues they raised and encourage them to consider ways in which local government should respond. The challenges were: The challenge of global change, particularly in relation to local economies, the environment and the implications of the enlargement of the European Union. New needs and new forms of exclusion, related to changing demographic and social patterns and the growth of information technology, which it was argued could produce a new division between the information rich and the information poor.

Rising expectations on the part of the public which may be expected to spill over from the market sector and bring new demands on to local authorities. Sustainable solutions to problems instead of the tendency to look for a quick fix which was too often seen in the past. Centralisation or community leadership, which derives from the tension in the government’s modernisation programme between improving national standards and the development of local community. Appropriate structures for joined up government and the effective provision of services which may lead to different patterns of delivery. New roles for councillors; new measures of success in part resulting from new ways of testing local opinion. Local government’s core business and particularly whether direct service provision will be as important in the future. Local financial autonomy and accountability, including other ways of raising local revenue such as income or transport taxation. And the $64,000 question, can local government rise to the challenge? To further the discussion the LGA General Assembly in December 1999 focused around four propositions designed to encourage debate about the future of local government by the elected members present: local government needs a new breed of councillor; local government should stop delivering services; there will always be excluded groups; there is no place left for local government.

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The report of these discussions5 suggests a recognition of the need for change but, not surprisingly, sees a continuing role for local government. Although it is anticipated that services will increasingly be provided by a range of providers often outside local government, the role of local authorities as community representatives and leaders is seen as offering them an effective future. The ten challenges were also noted in a parallel report produced by the Society of Local Authority Chief Officers, (SOLACE 2000), Rebirth or Stillbirth? Reviewing key trends and the role of local politics the SOLACE report suggested two alternative scenarios for local government in 2010. The ‘Renaissance’ scenario sees local authorities who are responsible for the strategic commissioning of services, risk taking, brokerage, planning, advocating, governance, scrutiny, enabling and representing the interests of their areas whereas ‘The Pits’ sees them as bankrupt, bureaucratic, boring, non-performing, directed, demotivated, not valued, derided, disaffected, Public sector shelf-stackers. In order to achieve a renaissance it is argued local authorities will need to address fundamental changes; failure to do so is most likely to lead to ‘The Pits’ and inevitable oblivion. The Futures Toolkit In order to help authorities in facing these challenges the LGA decided to develop a Futures Toolkit containing resources to assist them and it was at this stage that CUDEM was invited to become involved. CUDEM was identified as an appropriate partner because members of the research group were involved in the MA in Foresight and Futures Studies offered by the University, the only such course in the UK. “The purposes of the toolkit were:

to highlight some of the drivers of change; to save councils reinventing the same wheels; to provide guidance on how questions (how we can stimulate local discussion and debate); to help to prompt what if questions about the future6.” A working group composed of the director of strategy at the LGA, two local government officers and members of CUDEM met in early 2000 to draw up a structure for the toolkit and to divide up responsibility for the production of the material. Most of the development work was done independently with two more meetings during the process to coordinate efforts. The toolkit, which was published in July 2000, provides: an introduction which outlines the argument for a longer term view; information on the likely ‘drivers of change’ over the next ten to 20 years; three scenarios of the world in which local government may be operating; ways to help authorities think about the future; some case studies illustrating how councils are already considering the future and its potential implications; materials for use in local workshops; guidance to other sources of help and assistance. Also included in the toolkit are a video Fast forward to 2010: Issues for tomorrow’s council and a CD ROM localgovernment.net which gives authorities access to a range of resources. The introduction to the toolkit outlines why local authorities should consider the

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future, both in general terms, pointing out the changing circumstances in which authorities are likely to be operating, and by more specific reference to requirements being placed on them. Among these the Local Government Act 2000 that requires authorities to consider the long-term ‘wellbeing’ of their areas as part of a mandate for local political and community leadership is particularly significant. Section four of the act requires local authorities to prepare a community strategy, the first component of which is a long term vision for the area. The need for policy-making to be forward-looking and take a long-term view of the likely impact of policy is regarded as a core competency of the Modernising Government agenda and the Cabinet Office report Professional Policy Making For The Twenty-First Century7. In preparing the sections for which CUDEM was responsible we were concerned to make the material accessible, which meant limiting the length of the content of each driver and method described and as far as possible expressing the ideas in easily understood terms. The Drivers of Change were arranged under the following headings: demographic change; technology; globalisation; environment and natural resources; work and employment; inequality and social cohesion; patterns of settlement; attitudes and values; and governance, the state and politics. Each was presented on two sides of a separate A4 sheet to enable it to be easily copied and used either together or individually to initiate discussion. Bullet

points were used to illustrate important issues. Summaries of potential changes and questions for consideration plus a brief list of resources to provide further information were included. Sample slides for use on a projector were included for each ‘driver’, listing the most likely potential changes and questions which may arise. Some loss of depth would be inevitable in this form of presentation but it was considered more important to provide a relatively brief starter for discussion than a lengthy paper which would probably not have been used. A similar approach was adopted for the futures methods. Using a classification based on the assumptions on which different futures methods are based, eight different methods for Foreseeing, Managing or Creating the future were outlined: Foreseeing – extrapolation – causal models Managing – scenarios – Delphi exercises – issues management Creating – brainstorming – creative imagery – community visioning Each method, again intended to be described on no more that two sides of A4, though presented as part of a pamphlet, was presented using the following headings: introduction, where the basis and the assumptions behind the method are briefly explained; requirements, which sets out what is needed to carry out the method; procedure, where the steps to be taken in running the method are outlined;

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advantages; and disadvantages. The intention was to provide users with guidance in using each of the methods to enable them to run their own exercises rather than rely on outside experts. The toolkit also included: A brief video with two sections: the first consisting of a ‘news bulletin’ from 2010 envisaging developments such as Regional Assemblies, privatised schools and pensions, congestion charging, joint public-private ventures for library services and compulsory voting in mayoral elections; and the second of interviews with a range of councillors about the future of local government. Three scenarios of local government in 2010. – Modernised Markets in which economic growth is high but fluctuating; society is prosperous but divided; crime, congestion and the environment remain unresolved concerns and local authorities have fewer functions and are focused on efficient service delivery in a competitive environment. – A New Dimension in which growth is fairly high but stable enabling a more cohesive society and councils are in the forefront of initiatives to rebuild civil society and involvement in governance. – On The Edge in which growth is low; society is divided with those who can afford to do so purchasing private services particularly in education and health and local authorities struggling to improve. Although the scenarios were well written and in themselves quite convincing there may be some

doubt about their use by individual authorities. Rather like the scenarios in the SOLACE report there is one that is likely to be favoured and a risk that the others will be rejected. If this were to happen the value of these less desirable visions of the future, in encouraging authorities to think of ways they might be avoided and the more favourable future achieved, would be lost. This serves to emphasise the care with which the scenario method needs to be used if it is to be effective. A directory of sources of local data available to authorities. Nineteen case studies of futures or visioning activities that have been carried out by a range of councils and groups of councils, either in-house or involving local partner organisations and community representatives. The brief details given indicate that 13 focused on a date for their exercise, eight choosing 2020 with others looking ten years ahead and the furthest 30; nine included local organisations and four the local community; two used the Ten Challenges to Local Government as the starter for their debate and one focused on Agenda 21. Relatively few mention any specific methods but three used scenarios, two visioning and two mind-maps, others used timelines, guided visualisation and structured open space methods. For more resources and information see http://www.lga.gov.uk/Publication.asp?lsecti on=0&ccat=28&id=-A7805B01

References
1. Jones D (2001) the LGA Futures Toolkit, presentation by Doug Jones (head of strategy group, LGA) to LARIA Annual Conference 2001.

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2.

3.

4.

5. 6.

7.

Local Government Association (1999) An Introduction to Future Work http://www.lga.gov.uk/lga/futures/introduction.ht m (29/09/99). Jones D (2001) the LGA Futures Toolkit, presentation by Doug Jones (head of strategy group, LGA) to LARIA Annual Conference 2001. Local Government Association (1999) Ten Challenges to Local Government, LGA circular 502/99, August. LGA (2000) Debating Futures? Issues from the LGA General Assembly, December 1999. Jones D (2001) the LGA Futures Toolkit, presentation by Doug Jones (Head of Strategy group, LGA) to LARIA Annual Conference 2001. Strategic Policy Making Team Cabinet Office (1999) Professional Policy Making for the Twenty First Century

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Case study seven: The UK Climate Impacts Programme Scenarios
The UK Climate Impacts Programme (UKCIP) helps organisations assess how they might be affected by climate change, so they can prepare for its impact. UKCIP is part of a wider programme of research into climate change being undertaken by Defra (Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs). It works with its stakeholders and coordinate research on how climate change will have an impact at regional and national levels, providing support and guidance throughout the process for both stakeholders and researchers, acting as a bridge between researchers and decisionmakers in government organisations and business. Its socio-economic scenarios for climate change impact assessment offer an insight into why foresight work is needed in the present day for a wide range of organisations. They also provide some considerations on how best to go about constructing scenarios for such broad relevance. reflect upon possible alternative futures and to make sense of what this means for them in the context of climate change impacts. This report presents a toolkit, so that studies can select and develop socio-economic scenarios and apply them within climate impact assessments. The report contains: 1. An explanation of why socio-economic scenarios are required for climate change impact assessment. 2. A presentation of the national level scenarios commissioned by the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) and developed for the programme by a team led by SPRU (Science and Technology Policy Research) at the University of Sussex, and comprising the Centre for Social and Economic Research on the Global Environment (CSERGE), the Climatic Research Unit (CRU) and the Policy Studies Institute (PSI). They are linked to scenarios developed for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) and the scenarios used in the Department of Trade and Industry’s (DTI’s) Natural Resources and Environment Panel of the UK Foresight Programme. 3. Guidance on the use of socio-economic scenarios at a regional level, drawing on the consultation process during the development of the national level scenarios, along with commissioned papers which review initial experience of their use in some first stage regional studies within UKCIP .

Introduction
The first signs of climate change are already emerging, and will continue into a future which will be very different from today. Enormous challenges are faced in devising socio-economic scenarios for the assessment of future impacts and there is very little experience to draw upon. Socio-economic scenarios have not been widely used within impacts studies, but this report will serve to encourage their use more widely within the UK Climate Impacts Programme (UKCIP). The aim has been to develop a scenarios framework through which stakeholders are able to

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Why socio-economic scenarios are required for climate change impact assessment
Whilst the use of climate scenarios as inputs into vulnerability, impact or adaptation assessments is well established, there is far less experience of using socio-economic scenarios. However, studies to assess climate change impacts suffer from serious weakness if by default they merely assume that the projected future climates will take place in a world with a society and economy similar to today. Difficult though the task is of constructing climate scenarios, it is generally acknowledged that the job of generating socio-economic scenarios is even more complex. This is because while most aspects of climate projection are based on wellunderstood physical processes, there is less understanding of the interactions of factors operating in socio-economic systems, which change very rapidly. For this reason it is not possible to construct socio-economic scenarios on the same long-term time-scales as climate scenarios. Scenarios are coherent, internally consistent and plausible descriptions of possible future states of the world, used to inform future trends, potential decisions, or consequences. They can be considered as a convenient way of visioning a range of possible futures, constructing worlds outside the normal timespans and processes covering the public policy environment. Different social and economic structures will affect sensitivity to climate change, as they affect the potential for response and adaptation. The impacts of future climates will also be fundamentally determined by future technology and governance structures. Here are some illustrations:

Land use change and development of the built environment is giving rise to loss of biodiversity irrespective of climate change. In some cases climate change will exacerbate these pressures, in other cases it will cause additional direct threats. Flooding events may be worse if there is a larger population living on the flood plain as a result of planning decisions. The effect of climate change on crop yields will depend on how many farmers have planted the crops, whether their farm income is dependent on that crop, in turn depending on agricultural subsidies, access to technology and so on. Some technological developments, such as improvement of weather forecasting, may enable better precautions to be taken to diminish vulnerability to extreme weather events.

Approach adopted for the UKCIP socio-economic scenarios
Development of the UKCIP socio-economic scenarios (UKCIP SES) has had the benefit of some new work, but use of scenarios has only recently been undertaken significantly within public policy in the UK. Official projections are generally extrapolated trends that, with the exception of demographic data, rarely exceed 15-20 years ahead. The land use planning guidance currently stretches up to 2021. In the private sector, only multi-national enterprises have large strategic and corporate teams with mediumand long-term planning horizons. Many small and medium size enterprises invariably focus on the next year or two ahead. However, with the accelerating pace of change surrounding globalisation and technological development, there has been increased recognition that more strategic,

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innovative perspectives can provide useful insights. Thus, the UKCIP SES have been able to draw on the work for the DTI’s Foresight Programme, which itself was related to new work developed for the IPCC. In this work, led by SPRU, a predictive approach to the future was avoided in developing the scenarios. Instead the future was approached in an exploratory way, taking into account the perceptions and knowledge of social and economic players involved. The approach adopted was to emphasise that futures scenarios are a tool for visioning the future; they are not a set of prescriptions of how the future will evolve.

is sufficient: to make people think about the future; to present options; to examine the robustness of long-term strategies; and to indicate the boundaries of risks and chances. TRANSPARENT (clear exposition of assumptions). The scenarios need to be transparent in order to be acceptable to stakeholders and impact researchers. A clear methodology is needed to enable different impact studies to be comparable. General principles of scenario construction were applied with the following aims. The basic scenario dimensions It was decided to make the more qualitative dimensions of socio-economic change the basis of scenario construction. The two dimensions relate to: (1) governance and the capacity of institutions at different levels to manage change; and (2) the orientation of social and political values. This choice was made on analytical grounds, on the basis of the scenarios literature, and follows a similar set of dimensions chosen in the IPCC SRES socio-economic scenarios. The choice has been justified by stakeholder engagement throughout the project but could of course be different. Other scenario dimensions Other dimensions of future developments are associated to a greater or lesser extent with governance and values. Some dimensions such as population develop in a predictable, semi-autonomous way, while others such as technology are more dependent on social values and regulation. The task of elaborating storylines in the context of these qualitative dimensions has a strong subjective and judgmental flavour where stakeholder contributions have been valuable.

Development of the UKCIP SES
A review was undertaken of existing scenario work and this suggested four criteria for the development of the socio-economic scenarios in this study: RELEVANT (applicable to public and private sector decision-making). The scenarios m should be of relevance to impact researchers and constructed in a way that allows them to be broken down on a regional and/or sectoral scale. The scenario framework must be flexible enough to integrate sector-specific options or subscenarios. Relevance to stakeholders involves identifying the main variables influencing vulnerability to climate change. CONSISTENT (based on coherent assumptions). Scenarios for impact assessment have to be integrative and comprehensive. They need to embody a consistent storyline and set of illustrative quantified indicators. CREDIBLE (not overestimating the rate of change). The scenarios should describe a set of credible outcomes that, nevertheless, challenge present-day assumptions. Being prospective in nature, the scenarios should cover a range of alternative outcomes which

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Relevance at national and regional levels The scenarios refer to the UK, but are applicable at a regional/country level. National indicators have had to be supplemented by expert guidance about differences between regions within the UK. At the same time, the UK operates in a wider European and global context. Therefore, scenarios for developments in the UK implicitly assume characteristics about the development of Europe and the world at large. Consistency of indicators The need of the climate impacts research community for a variety of quantified indicators meant that a considerable amount of attention has been paid to consistency within scenarios. No formal modelling has been undertaken within this project, but a set of consistency checks has been applied to ensure that different indicators (for example, household formation and economic growth), although determined through expert judgement, are telling the same story. Where possible, sector specialists were consulted in choosing relevant indicators and defining indicator values. Symmetry in treatment of scenarios A balance has had to be struck between scenarios which appear plausible because they extrapolate current trends, and those which represent a break with the past and are deliberately more challenging to the conventional wisdom. A deliberate decision was made to develop a set of four scenarios which were clearly separate and distinctive, but which did not break all bounds of plausibility. Equivalent effort has been devoted in this study to elaborating each scenario – a practice recommended to users of the scenario framework. This does mean

however, that in terms of, for example economic growth, the scenarios are more extreme than typical Treasury forecasts. Drivers and impact domains In order to facilitate use by the climate impacts research community, the exposition of each of the scenarios is based around drivers and impact domains. The drivers are: values and policy; economic development; and settlement and planning. The impact domains are: agriculture; water; ecosystems; coastal zones; tourism; and the built environment.

Four futures scenarios
The four socio-economic scenarios which have been developed for the UK by the SPRU team are set in a global context for two time-frames: the 2020s and the 2050s. They are based on a review of the large global futures literature which identified five main dimensions of change highlighted in previous scenario planning exercises: the composition and rate of economic growth; the rate and direction of technological change; the nature of governance; and social and political values. Social and political values, and the nature of governance have been taken to be fundamental and independent determinants of future change. In particular, it was assumed that economic growth, demographic changes and technological changes are primarily an outcome of the relationship between socio-political values and the interests of organisations, although they clearly have an influence on the development of values and the nature of governance. In addition, economic,

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The UK Climate Impacts Programme Scenarios

Four socio-economic scenarios for the UK

demographic and technological changes are more easily quantified and amenable to modelling, whereas values and governance cannot be quantified in any useful way. The scenario framework segments the future ‘possibility space’ into four quadrants following other work on scenario development. Here they are defined by a ‘values’ and a ‘governance’ axis. The horizontal values dimension captures alternative developments in core social and economic values as they might be represented in choices by consumers and policymakers. At one end of the spectrum (CONSUMERISM), values are dominated by the drive to private consumption and personal freedom. The rights of the individual and the present are privileged over those of the collective and the future. Resources are distributed through free and competitive markets, with the function of governance limited to guaranteeing trade and capitalist accumulation. At the other end (COMMUNITY), values are shaped by concern for the common good. The individual is seen as part of a collective, with rights and responsibilities determined by

social goals. There is greater concern about the future, equity and participation. Civil society is strong and highly valued, and resources are allocated through more deeply managed markets. The vertical governance dimension aims to show alternative structures of political and economic power and decision-making. The future of governance at the UK and regional levels will be influenced to a great extent by developments in the European Union, and at the global level. At one end of the spectrum (INTERDEPENDENCE), the power to govern is distributed upwards, downwards and outwards away from the national state level. International economic, political and cultural relationships strengthen, and regional and national boundaries become more permeable. There may be a role for regional decision-making and for regional particularities, but this will be in the context of globalised economic and political systems. At the other end of the spectrum (AUTONOMY), economic and political power is retained at national (National Enterprise) and regional (Local Stewardship) levels. Sovereignty is retained over key areas of policy, and the process of economic globalisation is weakened. Governments have greater autonomy in decision-making, and economic, political and cultural boundaries are maintained or strengthened. National and regional development is based on local capabilities and resources. These two dimensions generate a set of associations which can be applied to understanding of changes at a national, sectoral and regional level. The implications of the dimensions for each of the four scenarios are elaborated in this report. Storylines are presented for each scenario, covering: values and policy; economic development; and settlement and planning. To facilitate their use in climate impacts

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assessments, the storylines have also been developed for key impacts domains, including: agriculture; water; ecosystems; coastal zones; tourism; and the built environment. Quantitative indicators are provided for demography, economic growth and development, land use change and settlement patterns.

Initial operationalisation within UKCIP
The UKCIP SES has already provided a useful toolkit for several studies. The scenarios have been shown to be capable of flexible application for varying purposes, for example: awareness raising on socio-economic dimensions of climate change impact studies (South East scoping study, Wales scoping study); providing inputs to the development of broad regional strategies and policies as undertaken by organisations such as the Regional Development Agencies and Regional Planning Bodies (North West UKCIP SES operationalisation study); and as the basis for development of quantified regional socio-economic scenarios for use in integrated work (Regional Climate Change Impact and Response Studies in East Anglia and North west England – RegIS). The framework scenarios provide a set of standard, unifying assumptions about the basic social and economic dimensions of change. Qualitative assumptions about social values and approaches to governance, as well as quantitative assumptions about economic growth and population change, can be applied across a range of studies. They also provide an

opportunity to take a systematic approach to exploring linkages between local, regional and global scales. Knowledge has accumulated on what are realistic expectations for the application of the UKCIP SES, along with both their strengths and constraints. New reference frameworks have also become established below the UK level. More specifically, in addition to the establishment of the devolved administrations in Scotland and Wales, developments at a regional level in England have proceeded apace in the past two years, particularly with the emergence of Regional Planning Guidance which virtually covers the first time period of the scenarios (2020s). These changes suggest the need for a link between the scenarios and developments in strategic planning at a regional level. To complement the scenarios, guidance is given on their use, drawing on experience during phase one of UKCIP for the benefit of next stage studies. The scenarios are not intended to act as a ‘blueprint’. The research team carrying out a sectoral or regional study, by virtue of its expertise, will be best placed to develop detailed scenarios. Teams will need to consider carefully how to use the scenarios for maximum effectiveness in their studies. Guidance is given on the following issues: selection and modification of the scenarios to the regional scale; their use with stakeholders; quantification of the scenarios at a regional scale; and their integration with climate scenarios.

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Case study eight: Foresight Futures 2020
The UK Foresight programme is managed by the Office of Science and Technology and ‘brings together key people, knowledge and ideas to look beyond normal commercial time horizons to identify potential opportunities from new science and technologies and actions to help realise those opportunities.’ These scenarios were developed by a team of researchers at SPRU-Science and Technology Policy Research, University of Sussex, in consultation with stakeholders from business, government and academia. The framework builds on an extensive review of national and global futures scenarios and draws on work of related scenarios exercises from the Foresight programme and more broadly. The Foresight Futures 2020 scenarios give a valuable insight in to how to conduct a foresight process which can produce useful results for a variety of different stakeholders, and valuable advice for how those stakeholders can use and apply their work (taken from the UK Foresight Report). All decisions, whether in business or in government, are taken against an uncertain future. Against this background of uncertainty, business needs to choose more robust strategies that will bring benefits even in very different futures. Planning more robust strategies can be made easier by assessing different options against three or four possible future scenarios. For example if a business is involved in providing office accommodation it might want to consider its strategies against a scenario where demand increases in and around London, one where demand increases evenly throughout the UK, and also a future where overall demand falls in the UK. Getting started can be difficult and too often we are trapped in our own preconceptions of what the future might be like. This publication aims to help start the process of planning for the longer term. It provides you with four alternative scenarios of change in the UK over the next 20 to 30 years against which you can test your business strategies. Set out at the back of this report is guidance for those new to using scenarios. The guidance covers: Why use scenarios? How to use scenarios to develop strategies. Five keys to ensure success when using scenarios.

Overview of the scenarios
Scenarios are not intended to predict the future. Rather, they are tools for thinking about the future based on four assumptions: The future is unlike the past, and is shaped by human choice and action. The future cannot be foreseen, but exploring the future can inform present decisions. There are many possible futures, scenarios map a ‘possibility space’. Scenario development involves rational analysis and subjective judgement. The four scenarios in this report describe what the UK could be like during the period 2010–2030. They have been developed by identifying social and economic trends. For example, potential changes in the balance of control between regional and national government. This and a range of other factors have been used to build up four scenarios of the future.

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storyline for each scenario. In Interdependence addition, Snapshot 2010, which can be found at the end of this report, provides key performance Global World sustainability markets indicators for each of the scenarios. The indicators were chosen to Conventional cover a wide range of economic, development Community Individual social and environmental issues National Local and relate to commonly-used enterprise stewardship statistics, such as the UK Quality of Life indicators1. However, all of the storylines and indicators presented here are only examples Autonomy of what may happen in the future. They are intended as tools to Figure 1: Four UK futures scenarios help users on their way. The four scenarios are: Figure one shows the four scenarios and conventional development in relation to world markets; two drivers of change: social values (x axis) global sustainability; and systems of governance (y axis). Social national enterprise; values range from individualistic values to local stewardship. more community orientated values. It takes account of social and political priorities and World markets the pattern of economic activity that results People aspire to personal independence, from them. Systems of governance deals material wealth and mobility to the exclusion with the structure of government and the of wider social goals. Integrated global decision-making process. It ranges from markets are presumed to be the best way to autonomy where power remains at a deliver this. Internationally coordinated national level to interdependence where policy sets framework conditions for the power increasingly moves to other efficient functioning of markets. The institutions, for example, up to the EU and provision of goods and services is privatized down to regional government. wherever possible under a principle of The scenarios are presented as storylines ‘minimal government’. Rights of individuals which set out some general trends and to personal freedoms are enshrined in law. provide more detail in a number of areas: economic and sectoral trends; employment and social trends; regional development; health, welfare and education; the environment. A synopsis of key drivers and underlying assumptions is given alongside the National enterprise People aspire to personal independence and material wealth within a nationally-rooted cultural identity. Liberalised markets together with a commitment to build capabilities and resources to secure a high degree of national self-reliance and security are believed to best deliver these goals. Political

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and cultural institutions are strengthened to buttress national autonomy in a more fragmented world. Global responsibility People aspire to high levels of welfare within communities with shared values, more equally distributed opportunities and a sound environment. There is a belief that these objectives are best achieved through active public policy and international cooperation within the European Union and at a global level. Social objectives are met through public provision, increasingly at an international level. Markets are regulated to encourage competition amongst national players. Personal and social behaviour is shaped by commonly held beliefs and customs.

Drivers
Social values Governance structures Internationalist Libertarian Weak Dispersed Consultative Minimal Enabling markets

Role of policy

Economic trends
Economic development High growth High innovation Capital productivity Rapid Towards services Health and leisure Media and information Financial services Biotechnology Nanotechnology Manufacturing Agriculture

Strutural change Fast-growing sectors

Declining sectors

Local stewardship Social trends People aspire to sustainable levels of welfare in federal and networked Unemployment Medium-low communities. Markets are subject to Income High social regulation to ensure more equally distributed opportunities and Equity Strong decline a high quality local environment. Areas of conflict Social exclusion Active public policy aims to promote Immigration/emigration economic activities that are small Political accountability scale and regional in scope, and acts to constrain large-scale markets and Table 1: World markets technologies. Local communities are either side of this, and encourage us to strengthened to ensure participative and explore a number of different, logicallytransparent governance in a complex world. consistent pathways as a way of framing Guide to using the scenarios questions about the future. Good scenarios help us to understand how key drivers might interact and affect the Why use futures scenarios? future. Scenarios go beyond a single best In this guide we illustrate why organisations estimate, or a ‘high’ and ‘low’ projection should use scenarios in their planning

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process; how to use scenarios to test and refine strategies; and five keys to the successful use of scenarios. Adding value to strategy-setting s Although scenario exercises vary in their specific aims, they possess a number of common traits, which distinguish them from more traditional forecasting approaches. Not only are they looking into the far future, usually one or more decades ahead, but they also assess developments across a broad area. The use of exploratory scenarios approaches should be considered when: the future is uncertain; the ability to adapt to future change is restrained or if adjustments carry the risk of negative effects over the longer term (for example, technological ‘lock-in’); there are opportunities for positive gains from pursuing ‘robust strategies’. Broadly, the benefits of scenario planning are:

Drivers
Social values Governance structures Nationalist Individualist Weak National Closed State-centred Market regulation to protect key sectors

Role of policy

Economic trends
Economic development Medium-low growth Low innovation Maintenance economy More stable economic structure Private health and education Domestic and personal services Tourism Retailing Defence Public services Civil engineering

Strutural change Fast-growing sectors

Declining sectors

Social trends
Unemployment Income Equity Areas of conflict Medium-high Medium-low Decline Unemployment Poor public services Inequality

Table 2: National enterprise

It expands the range of future outcomes considered in strategic decision-making, so strategies are developed to be more robust under a variety of circumstances. This avoids the risk of ‘putting all eggs in one basket’. It places under scrutiny the assumptions underlying strategic decisions, for example about long-term growth

prospects or consumer preferences. The process of engaging with scenario elaboration itself can be a valuable contribution to preparing the ground for change. If carried out in an inclusive and positive process, scenario planning can encourage self-reflection within the organisation, strengthen

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Drivers
Social values Governance structures Internationalist Communitarian Strong Coordinated Consultative Corporatist Political Social and environmental goals

How can the Foresight Futures 2020 scenarios be used?
The Foresight Futures can be used in a range of different ways, depending on the needs of the individuals or organisations and the resources available. Users are encouraged to develop their own conclusions about the futures, employing the scenarios as a starting point and then elaborating and evaluating them in ways that are in tune with their needs. Over the past three years, a number of organisations have used the scenarios to explore the future. For example, a number of trade associations have used the scenarios to challenge views of future prospects in their sectors; government departments have explored strategic policy issues and research; and research projects, including a number of Foresight projects, have used the scenarios to assess long-term socio-economic trends. Based on a review of these exercises and insights from the futures literature, this section provides guidance on the use of the Foresight Futures scenarios. It offers some ideas and recommendations, without attempting to be prescriptive. There are two basic approaches to the use of the scenarios. Approach 1 To use the scenarios to stimulate thought on what the future holds and to consider the implications for medium and long-term strategies. Such exercises are usually carried out on a small scale with one-off brainstorming events. Typically they start with a presentation and discussion of the scenarios, followed by a brainstorming session to consider the implications. Involving representatives from all interested

Role of policy

Economic trends
Economic development Medium-high growth High innovation Resource productivity Fast Towards services Education and training Large systems engineering New and renewable energy Information services Fossil fuel energy Traditional manufacturing

Strutural change

Fast-growing sectors

Declining sectors

Social trends
Unemployment Income Equity Areas of conflict Low Medium-high Improvement Structural change Change of skills Political accountability Institutional rigidity

Table 3: Global responsibility

strategic thinking at all levels, and help overcome organisational rigidities and routines.

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parties is crucial for the success of these exercises. So, in a business, people from marketing, finance and production should be included, rather than just staff from the strategy or research unit.These exercises are usually: participative; based on the experience of practitioners; a mechanism to engage key people in the development of strategy. Frequently their use depends on a ‘champion’ of scenario planning at a senior level of management. Their function is to attract interest and to stimulate creative thinking. Approach 2 To use the scenarios as the basis for a research-based study on a specific sector or issue. The scenarios provide the conceptual framework for the study. When the scenarios are used in this way the approach typically: is based on data in addition to expert knowledge; includes scientific methods as well as consultation; uses the scenarios to assess outcomes.

Drivers
Social values Governance structures Localist Cooperative Strong Local Participative Interventionist Social and environmental

Role of policy

Economic trends
Economic development Low growth Low innovation Modular and sustainable Moderate Towards regional systems

Strutural change

Fast-growing sectors

Small-scale manufacturing Food and organic farming Local services Retailing Tourism Financial systems

Declining sectors

Social trends
Unemployment Income Equity Areas of conflict Medium-low (larger voluntary sector) Low Strong improvement Land use Under-investment Environmental restrictions

Table 4: Local stewardship

The main challenge for this approach is to combine the ‘soft’ scenario tool with ‘hard’, quantitative methods. This report offers a number of indicators as an illustration of trends, but again these should

only be seen as a starting point. If it seems appropriate, they can be revised, specified or complemented by other indicators. Simple modelling and cross-impact analysis

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can be employed to ensure consistency and analytical depth.

Five keys to successful use of scenarios
There are five key challenges to meet in order to use scenarios successfully.These are as follows. Engaging stakeholders Scenario exercises can only be successful in promoting creative and unconventional thinking if those with an interest trust the process and are engaged throughout. To convince stakeholders of the value of these exercises, it is vital to: Be clear about the aims and limitations of the approach. Scenarios are not aiming to predict the future, nor even to identify the most likely future. Instead, they map out a ‘possibility space’ to inform the decisions of the present. The scenarios method is based on subjective choices (as is any other approach to explore uncertain futures) but unlike other tools, it allows stakeholders to consider the underlying assumptions and to discuss and challenge how this might affect the future. Provide sufficient detail. Experience has shown that the first presentation of the scenarios is crucial. It needs to give enough detail to convey the basic logic of the scenarios without overwhelming the audience. It can be helpful if participants have the chance to become familiar with the scenarios in advance. Explain how the results will be used. If participants are to be convinced of the importance of their contribution, the aim of the scenario planning process needs to be well-defined and clear indications

An exercise carried out by the Foresight Crime Prevention Panel provides an example for a typical one-off scenario planning event. The aim of the panel was to explore the crime potentials of new technologies and to ensure that these potentials were minimized through preventive action. The 1998 Foresight Futures scenarios were used in a one-day workshop to structure thinking about the future of crime. Groups organised around each of the four scenarios developed sectoral scenarios for the crime of the future. They identified new technologies likely to be used by criminals, as well as potential prevention strategies and necessary responses. Results of the workshop were fed into the panel’s consultation paper and report.

The RegIS study investigated the combined effects of the UKCIP socioeconomic scenarios (based on the same framework as the Foresight Futures scenarios) and the UKCIP98 climate scenarios, for two regions of the UK. This was the first UK regional integrated assessment of the impacts of climate change on agriculture, water, biodiversity and the coastal zone. In RegIS, two of the UKCIP socioeconomic scenarios were further developed with local decision makers from East Anglia and North West England. This provided quantified indicators (for example, for agricultural crop prices) for the 2050s, for input into the RegIS sectoral models.

need to be given as to how the results will feed into decision-making. Getting the process right Maximising the learning benefits of scenario planning exercises requires close attention to process. Careful planning and structuring of the scenario elaboration, synthesis and evaluation stages of scenario planning is

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needed. The details of the process should be tailored to the needs and resources available in each case.The process needs to: allow for the integration of the different viewpoints and technical expertise; be iterative, combining creative, participative workshops with work carried out by individuals or small groups to synthesise and elaborate scenarios; be realistic about the time and resources needed to complete an exercise as this tends to be under-estimated; allow time for analysis of the results; involve stakeholders. The scenario elaboration workshop is perhaps the most critical stage. Key points to consider are: it takes time to familiarise participants with future thinking; the initial workshop should be at least a full day. a typical structure for the workshop might be: aim of the process, introduction scenario approach, presentation of scenarios, elaboration of sectoral scenarios (for example, transport in 2020) in break-out groups, feedback, planning next steps. moderation by a professional with scenario experience is recommended. We recommend that three principles are applied in scenario elaboration and evaluation: symmetry, balance and triangulation (comparison). Symmetry Equivalent effort is devoted to the elaboration of all the scenarios chosen. Balance The scenario storylines and indicators are developed as neutrally and dispassionately

as possible – covering the same areas and seeking to avoid bias towards or against any particular scenario. Triangulation (comparison) A process of ensuring that the distinctiveness and coherence of scenarios is retained (mainly by viewing the narratives side-by-side). Adapting the scenarios The scenarios provide a generic framework but they are in themselves not relevant to many sectors or policy areas. The aim of the framework and these guidance notes is to provide a means for scenarios to be elaborated for any given area of interest. This requires: the identification of key drivers in the sector (for example, international markets, social preferences, regional planning); an assessment of the links between drivers and relevant sectoral trends; specialist knowledge of the sector. The scenario framework is a flexible tool which should be adapted and altered to suit the needs of a given study; it can be modified and ‘played with’. They should not be taken as an authoritative set of projections. The benefit of using a common set of basic dimensions (values and governance) is that these have proven robust in a number of different settings. However, these dimensions may not always be relevant, or there may be an interest in testing alternatives. New dimensions and new scenario labels would then be the right course to take. Producing four scenario elaborations can be time-consuming, with diminishing returns. One alternative approach is to

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choose a smaller number of scenarios for in-depth analysis (say two or three). Some studies have chosen to look at diametrically-opposed scenarios (world markets and local stewardship, for instance). However, we recommend that the symmetric two-by-two matrix approach to scenario elaboration is retained during a first phase to avoid the risk of narrowing down the thinking too soon. Effort devoted to the development of indicators will vary between studies. Indicators may illustrate the storylines, or they may be outputs of the scenario planning exercise that are used in further analysis (planning, options appraisal or scientific modelling). We recommend that scenarios are kept simple to make them accessible and to test them with non-specialist audiences. In longer or more intensive scenario planning exercises, users may want to introduce extreme events and feedback mechanisms. There are several ways to adapt the scenarios: Two scenarios can be combined, for example one for the UK level, and one for the international level. It is, of course, essential to choose the combination carefully. The choices made will depend on what is realistic and relevant for the study in question. For example, a scenario exercise on the UK manufacturing industry could examine the effects of an international World Market scenario combined with a National Enterprise scenario. Major shocks or extreme events are not part of the scenario storylines presented here. They can, however, be introduced during the planning process. This involves the identification of relevant ‘side swipes’ (for example through a

brainstorming session), and a subsequent analysis of impacts under each scenario. Another approach would be to introduce a third dimension (driver of change) relevant to the sector: high or low technology scenarios have been tried in a number of exercises including the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), (which are based on the same principal axes as the Foresight scenarios)2. In this case the effects of different assumptions about the adoption of energy technologies in the future was analysed in detail for one of four socio-economic scenarios. If the original set of scenarios is thought to over-simplify trends it is possible to add a second round of scenario elaboration encouraging participants to think about feedback mechanisms. This allows learning processes to be taken into account. One option would be to organise this round of the evaluation as a ‘game-playing’ simulation. Taking account of major shocks The exploratory and synthetic approach used in these scenarios suggests that change occurs gradually along a single trajectory. Future states are seen as the outcome of an accumulation of changes over time, all pointing in the same direction. But not all change is like this. The direction of change may itself vary over time, with one set of conditions being replaced by a new set. This change in direction may take place slowly (as part of the process of economic and social development), or it may happen suddenly as a result of major, surprise external events (such as terrorist attacks, or rapid changes in the natural environment). If the change is slow it may be

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possible for one scenario to be superseded by another (a shift from World Markets to Global Responsibility, for instance). If the change is sudden, the question to be asked is how resilient is a given scenario to its impact? Answering this question will be very difficult, mainly because large-scale, unanticipated events are hard to foresee. We suggest that governments and other organisations build up inventories of ‘shock’ events, by scanning conventional and unconventional sources, and through brainstorming. The question of resilience could then be investigated by applying the shock to each of the scenarios and trying to assess how easily each of them could recover or adapt to their impacts. Taking scenario planning further We believe that scenario planning is one example of a broader set of tools that today’s business and public sector organisations need to apply more consistently. Economic and political conditions change rapidly, and foresight enables organisations to think about early warning signs for identified trends, plan for possible responses by the organisation, and develop ways of increasing their capacity to adapt. Periodic scenario planning exercises can be helpful, but beyond this the organisation may also seek to embed futures ‘routines’ within many business processes. Generating greater awareness about future trends throughout the organisation is a condition of organisational change, and is likely to lead to a more agile and responsive business.

2.

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2000). IPCC Special Report – emissions scenarios. A Special Report of IPCC Working Group III.

References
1. Department of the environment transport and the regions, 1999. Quality of Life counts – indicators for a strategy for sustainable development for the United Kingdom: a baseline assessment. London.

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Index
A
Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 72, 85, 87 Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 5-6, 20, 32, 51-52, 63, 69, 83, 89 Adapting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 24, 55, 90 African National Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 47 Agenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34, 57, 61, 72, 74-75 Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45, 80, 82, 85, 89 AIDS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39, 58 Alternative futures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 19-20, 28, 77 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, ix-x, 2, 7, 9-12, 15-17, 20-24, 26-29, 64, 68-69, 83, 88, 90-91 Analysis of National Development Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 ANC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 47, 49-50 Art . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 22, 51 Artificial Intelligence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v, 19, 77-79, 89-90, 92

B
Backcasting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, x, 12, 15, 23-24, 28-29 Balance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 17, 53, 62, 71, 80, 83, 90 Biotechnology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 British Crime Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

C
Cabinet Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv, vii, x, 6, 16, 22, 28, 53-56, 69, 71, 74, 76 Cabinet Office Toolkit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Cabinet Office Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 16 Capital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv, 39-44, 46, 85 Causal Layered Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, 12, 28 Centralisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 Change . . . . . . . . v, x, 2, 4, 6-8, 15, 22-23, 28, 37-39, 42, 44-45, 47, 50-51, 55, 59, 71-74, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77-80, 82-89, 91-92 CLA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, 28 Climate change. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v, x, 4, 6, 8, 38, 42, 77-79, 82, 89, 91-92 Climatic Research Unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 Communities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 52, 57-58, 62, 71-72, 85 Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 47, 51-52, 85-88 Consistency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65, 68-69, 80, 89 Creative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv, 1, 10-11, 19, 50-51, 57, 59, 64, 74, 88-90 Crime. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 55, 64, 75, 89 Criticisms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22, 26-27, 69

D
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Decision-making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2, 10, 16, 27, 31-32, 57, 59, 79, 81, 84, 86, 89 Decline. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 40, 42-43, 45, 54-56, 66, 85-86 Defining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15, 24, 28, 80 DEFRA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x, 77 Demography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53, 66, 82 Development. . . . . v, vii, ix, 3, 13, 20, 29, 37, 39-40, 42, 58-59, 62, 64, 72-73, 77-88, 91-92 Digital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53-54, 59-60 Downsizing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 Drivers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 9-10, 19, 27, 54, 68-69, 73-74, 80, 84-88, 90 DTI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77, 79

E
EC Scenarios Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv, 63-69 Econometrics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Economic . . . . . . . . 2-4, 7, 9, 15-16, 21, 26, 28-29, 38, 40, 42-43, 47, 49-50, 53-54, 60-62, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64-66, 68, 75, 77-88, 91-92 Economics of climate change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 8 Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 41, 47, 53, 58, 61-62, 64, 71, 75, 84, 86-87 Emissions scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77, 91-92 Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53, 56, 60, 66, 74, 84 EMU. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 Engaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 10, 59, 86, 89 Environment . . . . . vii, 9, 20-21, 32, 34, 37, 39, 45-46, 53, 55, 57, 60-61, 65, 69, 72, 74-75, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77-78, 80, 82, 84-85, 91-92 Equal Opportunities Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 European . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii, x, 10, 54, 63-64, 66, 68, 72, 80-81, 85 European Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii, x, 10, 63-64, 68 European Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72, 81, 85 Executive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, ix-x, 16, 61 Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19, 28, 31, 34, 38, 59, 77-78, 82, 88-90 Exploratory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16, 23, 26, 31, 79, 86, 91 Exponential . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv, 39-40, 46

F
Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 6-7, 9, 19-21, 42, 48, 53-55, 64-65, 67, 69, 78, 83 Failure of EMU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 Feedback . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25-26, 39, 90-91 Financial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54, 60-61, 72, 85, 88 Five Minds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 Flamingos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 47-49, 51 Flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 24, 47, 49, 51 Flooding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 Food . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii, 5, 40, 42-46, 77, 88 Forecasting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 7, 22-23, 26, 28, 31-32, 78, 86

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Index

Forecasts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-23, 31-32, 80 Foresight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v, vii, ix-x, 11-13, 17, 23, 31, 34, 47, 63, 73, 77, 79, 83-92 Forward Studies Unit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii, x, 64-65, 68-69 Futures Forum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv, vii, ix-x, 25, 57-62 Futures Research Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 28-29 Futures Toolkit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v, 71-76 Futureswork . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v, 71 FW de Klerk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 49

G
Generic scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Global. . . . . . . . iv, ix, 2-4, 6, 38-39, 42, 45-46, 54, 58, 64-66, 68-69, 72, 77, 80-85, 87, 91 Global Business Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix, 3, 64 Global environment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45, 77 Global responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85, 87, 91 Globalisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66, 74, 78, 81 Governance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63, 65, 68-69, 72-75, 78-82, 84-88, 90 Governments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 63, 66, 71, 81, 92 Groups. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x, 6, 25-26, 34, 47-48, 52, 59, 63, 65, 69, 72, 75, 89-90 Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71, 73, 75, 77-78, 80, 82-83, 87, 90

H
Harvard Business School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix, 4, 6, 41-42, 54, 60, 75, 84-86 HIV. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 HM Treasury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 House of Commons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 5, 8 House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Housing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 41, 47, 54, 59 Humanity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 37-38, 45

I
Icarus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 7, 47-50 Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 28, 90-91 Identify. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-9, 19, 21-22, 51, 83, 89 Immigration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 Impact . . . . . . . . v, 3-4, 19, 21-22, 26, 33, 46-47, 49, 55, 59, 62, 65, 67, 74, 77-80, 82, 92 Inclusive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 33, 47, 50, 52, 86 Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19, 79-80, 82, 84, 88-92 Individual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 54-56, 66, 69, 75, 81 Industrial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 37, 39, 42-46, 63, 66 Industry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 42, 77, 91 Inequality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63, 66, 74, 86 Information . . . . . . . iii, ix-x, 11, 15-17, 20, 22, 25, 34, 53, 55, 57, 60, 63, 69, 72-75, 85, 87

95

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Innovation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15, 17, 53, 57-58, 61-63, 85-88 Inputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-12, 19, 78, 82 Integrated. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 26, 65, 82, 84, 89 Intergovernmental Panel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77, 91-92 International . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, vii, 2, 8-9, 13, 29, 37, 57-58, 64, 66, 81, 85, 90-91 International Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii, 13, 29 International Futures Forum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Internet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53-55, 59 Interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 22, 28 IPCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77, 79, 91-92 Issues . . . . . . . ix-x, 4-6, 9-11, 17, 19-21, 25-29, 37, 51-52, 58-59, 62, 71-74, 76, 82, 84, 87 IT . . . . ix, 1-12, 15-16, 19-28, 31-34, 37-40, 42, 44-45, 47-48, 50-61, 63-65, 68-69, 71-75, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77-80, 83-84, 86-91

K
Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 11, 20, 26, 28, 55, 57, 62, 79, 82-83, 88, 90

L
Lame duck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 47-50 Land . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39-40, 42-43, 45, 78, 82, 88 Learn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 32, 46, 57-58 LGA Futures Toolkit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v, 71-76 Lloyds TSB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 Local government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii, x, 21, 71-76 Local Government Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 Local Government Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii, x, 71, 76 Local Stewardship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81, 84-85, 88, 91 Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48, 50, 89 London Stock Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

M
Macroeconomic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 Managers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix, 2, 10, 20, 32-33, 56 Manufacturing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56, 85, 87-88, 91 Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii, 11, 16, 57 Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv, 63, 75, 81, 84-85, 90-91 Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28, 38, 63-64, 85 Members . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-7, 22, 33, 48, 50, 57, 71-73 Methodology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv, vii, 8, 28-29, 47, 64-65, 69, 79 Methods . . . . . . . . . . iii, ix-x, 1, 8, 10-12, 15-17, 19, 22, 25-27, 32-33, 59, 64-65, 74-75, 88 Microsoft. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Modelling. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-16, 80-81, 88, 91 Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 10, 15-16, 21, 24, 26, 74, 89

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Index

Mont Fleur Scenario Process. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47, 51 Multimedia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 53

N
Nanotechnology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 National . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5, 29, 47-49, 53, 56, 63-64, 72, 77, 80-81, 83-86, 91 National enterprise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81, 84, 86, 91 Natural resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 42, 44, 74, 77 Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48-49, 51-52, 56 Nelson Mandela . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 47 NGOs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53, 64, 66 Nonrenewable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv, 40-41, 43, 45 Normative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16, 20, 22-23, 26, 28 Normative forecasting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22-23, 28

O
Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii-iv, 15-16, 22, 24, 31, 33, 85 Open-minded . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Oracle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Organisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 5-7, 9-10, 15-16, 20, 22-24, 27, 32-34, 61, 63, 66, 86, 92 Ostrich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 47-49 Outputs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-12, 31, 91 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v, 8, 27-29, 53, 83

P
Parliament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix, 3, 5, 8, 57-59 Participative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85, 88, 90 Passive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Past. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21, 28, 31, 37-38, 51, 53, 60, 72, 80, 82-83, 87 People . . 1, 5, 7, 9-10, 22-26, 29, 31, 33, 39-47, 50-51, 54-55, 58-64, 71-72, 79, 83-85, 88 Personal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22, 28, 56, 61, 81, 84-86 Physical. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv, 23-24, 41, 46, 55, 64, 78 Planning . . . . . . . . i, iii-v, ix-xi, 1-8, 10-13, 15-17, 19-29, 31-34, 38-46, 48-52, 54-62, 64-69, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71-76, 78-92 Policy . . . . . . . . iv, vii, ix, 2, 4-8, 15, 19, 23-24, 27, 32, 37, 44, 47, 49, 54, 57-59, 61-62, 71, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74, 76-78, 80-81, 83-88, 90 Pollution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 39, 42-45 Poor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38-39, 72, 86 Population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 5-6, 37, 39-46, 53, 59-61, 66, 78-79, 82 Positioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv, 7, 33-34 Positive ageing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv, 57, 59 Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 4, 23, 27-28, 37, 47, 52, 59, 66, 81, 84 Private . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 22, 54-55, 63, 75, 78-79, 81, 86 Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv, 39-42, 44-45, 65, 68, 73, 88

97

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Programme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v, vii, x, 26, 57-58, 62, 69, 72, 77-83 Public . . . . . . . . . i, iii-iv, ix-x, 1, 3-4, 8-9, 22, 47, 49, 51-53, 57-59, 61-64, 66, 72-73, 78-79, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85-86, 92 Public policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv, 57-58, 61-62, 78, 85 Publication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37, 65, 68-69, 75, 83

Q
Qualitative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 16-17, 20-22, 79, 82 Quantitative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 16-17, 21-22, 28, 82, 88

R
RAPID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii, 47, 53, 85, 91 Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix, 5-7 Regional Assemblies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71, 75 Regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63, 66, 77, 80, 89, 92 Relevance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29, 77, 79-80 Renaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63, 66, 73 Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii, 2, 8, 25, 28-29, 38, 53, 73, 77, 80, 82-83, 87-88 Resource . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19, 24, 37, 40-43, 45, 87 Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . iv, ix, 2, 9, 16, 23, 33, 37, 39-46, 71, 73-75, 77, 81, 84, 87, 89-90 Retailing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54, 86, 88 Reviewing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24, 73 Roadmaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, 15, 27 RSA Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

S
Scarcity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 40 Scenario. . . . . . iii-iv, ix-xi, 1-4, 7, 19-20, 28, 33, 42-45, 47, 49-52, 59, 63-65, 68-69, 73, 75, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79-81, 83-84, 86, 88-92 Scenario planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, x-xi, 1-2, 7, 19-20, 51, 80, 86, 88-89, 91-92 Scenarios, Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv, 63-69 Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii, x, 2, 15, 17, 53, 77, 83 Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, ix, 1, 8-9, 11, 23-24, 65, 85 Scottish Parliament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix, 5, 57-58 Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26-27, 65, 67-68, 82 Shell International . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, 2, 8 Significant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20, 22-23, 32, 54, 66, 74 Simple . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 15, 21, 24, 49-50, 88, 91 Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, 10, 16, 24-25, 29, 37, 91 Slow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 10, 46-47, 91 SMEs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 Socio-economic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v, 54, 77-82, 87, 89, 91 Sovereignty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 Stakeholder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28, 33, 52, 63, 79

98

Strategic Futures Planning

Index

Storylines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79, 81-82, 84, 90-91 Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 3, 5, 8, 11-12, 15, 25, 57, 73-76, 88, 92 Sustainable. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv, 5-6, 37, 40-41, 43-47, 49, 72, 85, 88, 92 Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 21, 31, 34, 38-39, 57, 78, 81, 84, 87-88

T
Teams. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78, 82 Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii, x, 1, 42-43, 53, 55, 59, 66, 72, 74, 77-79, 83, 91 Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 24, 42, 44, 51, 57, 69, 83, 86, 91 Thinking . . . . . . iii, ix-x, 1-3, 5-8, 10-13, 16, 20, 24, 28-29, 32-33, 37, 49, 51, 57-59, 61-62, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71, 83, 87-91 Third World. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix-x, 1, 10-12, 15, 21, 26-28, 57, 83-84, 89, 92 Tourism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80, 82, 86, 88 Traditional. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42, 56-57, 63-64, 71, 86-87 Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 55-56, 72, 77, 90, 92 Treasury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 80 Trend . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, x, 6, 10-11, 15-16, 19, 21-22, 27, 38, 53-54, 63-65

U
UK. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv-v, vii, ix-x, 2, 5-6, 8-9, 13, 15, 17, 26, 34, 53-56, 73, 75-84, 89, 91 Under-investment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 Unemployment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85-88 Union. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56, 63, 72, 81, 85 United Nations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii, 40, 58 Users . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19, 31, 54, 63, 66, 75, 80, 84, 87, 91

V
Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26, 50, 53, 63, 66, 74, 79-82, 84-88, 90 Visioning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, 10, 12, 15-16, 22-23, 28, 57, 74-75, 78-79

W
Weak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 49, 66, 85-86 World markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84-85, 91 World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 22 WORLD3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv, 3, 37-39, 42, 44 Writing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65, 68-69

Y
Young Foundation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

99

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