Supreme Court of Georgia. BRISCOE et al. v. MONTGOMERY et al. March 19, 1894. Syllabus by the Court.

A "commercial traveler," whose business it is to travel and sell goods for his employer, though employed and paid for his services by the day, is not a "day laborer," in the sense in which these words are used in section 3554 of the Code, and his wages are not exempt from the process of garnishment. Error from superior court, Floyd county; W. M. Henry, Judge. Action by Montgomery & Co. against J. D. Briscoe. To a judgment sustaining an attachment issued by plaintiffs, said Briscoe and garnishees bring error. Affirmed. West Headnotes Exemptions 163 k 48(3) 163 Exemptions 163I Nature and Extent 163I(C) Property and Rights Exempt 163k48 Earnings, Wages, or Salaries 163k48(3) k. Wages of Mechanics, Laborers, and Seamen. Most Cited Cases One whose business is to travel and sell goods for his employer, though paid for his services by the day, is not a "day laborer," within Code, s 3554, exempting the wages of such laborers from garnishment. *41 Harper Hamilton and J. B. F. Lumpkin, for plaintiffs in error. Dean & Smith and A. G. Ewing, for defendant in error.

LUMPKIN, J.

It was held in Cleghorn v. Saussy, 51 Ga. 576, that the monthly wages of a forwarding clerk in the employment of a railroad company were not subject to the process of garnishment. An examination of the evidence in that case will show that the services of this clerk in the performance of his duties were such as to require at his hands, if not actual "manual labor," in the common acceptation of the term, certainly labor somewhat of that character. In Hightower v. Slaton, 54 Ga. 108, it was held that the monthly salary of a teacher employed in a public school could not be reached by garnishment. This decision seems to rest upon the ground that to allow this to be done would be contrary to public policy, because it would tend to deprive the public of the benefit of the teacher's valuable services; and, besides, it would also be against public policy to allow the secretary and treasurer of the board of education, by whom, in his official capacity, the wages of the teacher were paid, to be subjected to the process of garnishment. Lamar v. Chisholm, 77 Ga. 306, rules that the wages of a clerk and bookkeeper are not subject to garnishment. This decision was made on the authority of Smith v. Johnston, 71 Ga. 748, and the cases there cited. It is obvious that in the discharge of his duties a clerk and bookkeeper must necessarily perform a considerable amount of manual labor. On the same line is the case of Abrahams v. Anderson, 80 Ga. 570, 5 S. E. 778, which cites, in addition to the above cases, other decisions by this court in which section 3554 of the Code has been held applicable. We are not disposed to extend further the doctrine of these cases. In the case at bar it did not affirmatively appear that Briscoe performed any manual labor in the conduct of his business as a traveling salesman for the company he represented. He was employed as a commercial traveler, to sell goods for this company, and his business called him anywhere in the United States the company might require him to go. In point of fact, he traveled for it and sold goods in Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, and Texas. Under these facts, we hardly think he properly falls within the class designated as "day laborers" in section 3554 of the Code, although, by his contract with the company, he was paid by the day. Indeed, a gentleman of his profession occupies a much higher station, socially and commercially, than that of a mere "day laborer," as that term is commonly understood. Judgment affirmed.

Ga. 1894. Briscoe v. Montgomery 93 Ga. 602, 20 S.E. 40 END OF DOCUMENT Westlaw Delivery Summary Report for 1,IP POOL Date/Time of Request: Thursday, May 3, 2012 04:04 Central

Client Identifier: Database: Citation Text: Lines: Documents: Images: Recipient(s):

ATENEO DE MANILA UNI GA-CS-FIND 20 S.E. 40 63 1 0 maanolalia@gmail.com

Supreme Court of Louisiana. STATE ex rel. I. X. L. GROCERY CO., Limited, v. LAND, Judge. No. 14,457.FN1 FN1 Rehearing denied June 30, 1902. June 16, 1902. Application for writs of certiorari and prohibition by the state, on the relation of the I. X. L. Grocery Company, Limited, against A. D. Land, judge of the First judicial district court. Judgment reversed. West Headnotes Exemptions 163 k 48(3) 163 Exemptions 163I Nature and Extent 163I(C) Property and Rights Exempt 163k48 Earnings, Wages, or Salaries 163k48(3) k. Wages of Mechanics, Laborers, and Seamen. Most Cited Cases The exemption from seizure for debt protects laborers on farms and in

factories and other places where workmen possess no particular skill. Exemptions 163 k 48(3) 163 Exemptions 163I Nature and Extent 163I(C) Property and Rights Exempt 163k48 Earnings, Wages, or Salaries 163k48(3) k. Wages of Mechanics, Laborers, and Seamen. Most Cited Cases Mechanical engineers, electrical engineers, clerks, cashiers, bookkeepers, and that class of employees whose employment is associated with mental labor and skill, are not laborers, within St.1876, No. 79, amending Code Prac. art. 644 (LSA-C.C.P. art. 2253), exempting from seizure for debt the wages of laborers. Syllabus by the Court 1. Mechanical engineers, electrical engineers, clerks, agents, cashiers of banks, bookkeepers, and all that class of employes whose employment is associated with mental labor and skill, are not considered as laborers. 2. The exemption from seizure protects laborers on farms, plantations, factories, and other places, where workmen possess no particular skill without trade labor. The skilled labor in trades is not exempt. *513 **433 David Thompson Land, for relator. Respondent judge (Leonard, Randolph & Rendall, of counsel), pro se.

BREAUX, J. Exemption vel non from seizure for debt of the wages of a locomotive engineer under the provisions of statute No. 79 of 1876, amending and re-enacting article 644 of the Code of Practice, is the issue before us for decision. A mechanical engineer running a passenger train is one who possesses skill and expertness. His position is highly responsible, and requires judgment, attention, and the conscientious discharge of duty. His character and reputation are fair subjects of inquiry when he presents himself for employment, as well as the training and experience he has had. The statute exempts 'laborer's wages,' a term of very broad meaning, it is true, but it remains that the skilled mechanic thoroughly versed in all the details and intricacies of his art is not to be compared with a laborer who hires himself

out to serve on plantations, or to work and toil in manufactories as a mere servant, subject, without question, to the will and direction of the master. The former is frequently consulted in matters of the utmost importance, and his suggestions nearly always considered and heeded. We are only concerned with the words 'laborer's wages,' and whether or not the wages of the master mechanic in charge of a passenger train are exempt. We do not think they are, and in our view, he is not a laborer within the meaning of the statute. To illustrate, we will mention that his coal heaver, who throws over the coal from the bin to the furnace, is exempt, but not the mechanic whose knowledge, trained eye and hand are relied on to protect the hundreds of passengers whose safety depends on his skill and duty intelligently performed. He commands those about him whenever necessary in the performance of his work. He is an employe, and not a mere laborer. He is not a mere laborer, any more than the highly trained electrical engineer, or any other trained tradesman who receives salary or wages. The following is an authority in point: 'Artificers, handicraftsmen, or miners, etc., do not necessarily or properly fall under the denomination of laborers, there being, as I take it, a known distinction between a journeyman in any art, trade, or mystery or other workmen employed in the different branches of it and a laborer.' Lowther v. Radnor, 8 East, 124. Referring to Webster's definition, it is said that a laborer is one who works at a toilsome occupation; a man who does work requiring little *514 skill, as distinguished from an artisan. 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 71, and authorities cited in support of note 4; Railway Co. v. Baker, 14 Kan. 563. A civil engineer is not a laborer or workman. Railroad Co. v. Leuffer, 84 Pa. 168, 24 Am. Rep. 189. Worcester defines a laborer to be 'one who labors'; one regularly employed at some hard labor; a workman; an operative; often said of one who gets a livelihood by coarse manual labor as distinguished from an artisan or professional man. Id. 'Clerks, agents, cashiers of banks, and all that class of employes where employment is associated with mental labor and skill, were **434 not considered laborers;' citing Railroad Co. v. Callahan, 49 Ga. 511; Oliver v. Boehm, 63 Ga. 172; Richardson v. Langston, 68 Ga. 658; Hinton v. Goode, 73 Ga. 234. It has been said that such and similar statutes are presumably intended to protect a class of men who are ill fitted to protect themselves, men who are dependent upon the fruits of their daily toil for the daily subsistence of themselves and their families, and that they should not be extended by forced construction so as to include a class of men who are competent to take care of themselves, and need no such protection. 'Muzzle not the ox which treadeth out the corn,' denotes a subdivision in the great army of industry which does not include the energetic, self-reliant mechanic of this country. The opinions of our learned Brother of the district court always arrest our attention and command our consideration. We have seldom had occasion to differ from his views. In this case our premises and the authorities at hand, different from his, have led us to a different conclusion, and we are therefore constrained to write a different judgment. It is therefore ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the writs of certiorari and prohibition be perpetuated, and the judgment of the district court in this case is avoided, reversed, and annulled, and the judgment rendered by the city court is reinstated, at costs

of the judgment debtor.

La. 1902 State ex rel. I.X.L. Grocery Co. v. Land 58 L.R.A. 407, 108 La. 512, 32 So. 433, 92 Am.St.Rep. 392 END OF DOCUMENT Westlaw Delivery Summary Report for 1,IP POOL Date/Time of Request: Thursday, May 3, 2012 04:13 Central Client Identifier: Database: Citation Text: Lines: Documents: Images: Recipient(s): 0 maanolalia@gmail.com ATENEO DE MANILA UNI LA-CS 32 So. 433 106 1

Supreme Court of Minnesota. WILDNER v FERGUSON. Nov. 3O, 1889. **795 (Syllabus by the Court.) **794 1. *112 Where a garnishee proceeding is to be determined on the disclosure alone, no supplemental complaint being filed, and no claim made by a third person, the statute does not contemplate any findings of fact. 2. Whether one is a "laboring man or woman," within subdivision 11, s 310, c. 66, Gen. St., exempting wages, is, the kind of work done being shown, a question of law, and not of fact. 3. That subdivision means only those whose work is manual.

4. An agent who sells goods by sample is not within its meaning. Appeal from municipal court of Minneapolis; MAHONEY, Judge. West Headnotes Exemptions 163 k 48(3) 163 Exemptions 163I Nature and Extent 163I(C) Property and Rights Exempt 163k48 Earnings, Wages, or Salaries 163k48(3) k. Wages of Mechanics, Laborers, and Seamen. Most Cited Cases An agent who sells goods by sample does not come within the meaning of Gen.St. c. 66, s 310, exempting the wages of any "laboring man or woman." Exemptions 163 k 48(3) 163 Exemptions 163I Nature and Extent 163I(C) Property and Rights Exempt 163k48 Earnings, Wages, or Salaries 163k48(3) k. Wages of Mechanics, Laborers, and Seamen. Most Cited Cases Exemptions 163 k 150 163 Exemptions 163VI Protection and Enforcement of Rights 163k150 k. Trial. Most Cited Cases Whether one is a "laboring man or woman," within Gen.St. c. 66, s 310, subd. 11, exempting wages, is, the kind of work done being shown, a question of law, and not of fact. Exemptions 163 k 48(3)

163 Exemptions 163I Nature and Extent 163I(C) Property and Rights Exempt 163k48 Earnings, Wages, or Salaries 163k48(3) k. Wages of Mechanics, Laborers, and Seamen. Most Cited Cases That subdivision means only those whose work is manual. Garnishment 189 k 173 189 Garnishment 189VI Proceedings to Support or Enforce 189k166 Trial of Issues Between Plaintiff and Garnishee 189k173 k. Verdict and Findings. Most Cited Cases Garnishment 189 k 180 189 Garnishment 189VI Proceedings to Support or Enforce 189k174 Judgment Against Garnishee 189k180 k. On Answer. Most Cited Cases Where a garnishee proceeding is to be determined on the disclosure alone, no supplemental complaint being filed, and no claim made by a third person, the statute does not contemplate any findings of fact. *113 Noyes & McGee, for appellant. R. H. Day, for respondent.

GILFILLAN, C. J. This is a proceeding in garnishment, the debtor defendant appealing from the judgment of the court below against the garnishee defendant. The point made by appellant is that the debt reached by the garnishment, being for wages due the appellant, was exempt, under subdivision 11, s 310, c. 66, Gen. St. After the

court below had filed its decision, directing judgment for the plaintiff, the appellant requested it to find whether, at the times covered by the garnishment, the appellant was a laboring man, within the meaning of subdivision 11, and thereupon the court found as a fact that he was. The appellant claims that that finding is conclusive upon the point. There are two reasons why it is not so: First. That the statute regulating garnishments, as it allows judgment against the garnishee on the disclosure alone, only when the full disclosure amounts to an admission of indebtedness, or of the possession or control of property, etc., of the defendant, does not contemplate a finding of facts, as in ordinary actions. The disclosure is not the same as a trial of disputed facts in ordinary actions. Where issues are made on a supplementary complaint filed, and perhaps where a claim is made by a third person, a trial must be had as in a civil action, and, if the trial is by the court, it ought probably to state its findings of fact as in ordinary actions. Where the decision of the court below is upon the disclosure alone, it is that we must look to, and not to the court's statement of facts. Second. Where the occupation of the defendant is shown, whether he comes within the meaning of subdivision 11 is a question of law, and not of fact. The appellant was agent for the garnishee, selling its goods by sample, driving about for that purpose with his own horse and buggy, receiving a weekly salary. Subdivision 11 exempts "the wages of any laboring man or woman, or of his or her minor children, in any sum not exceeding fifty dollars, due for services rendered by him or them for and during ninety days preceding the issue of process," etc. All men who earn compensation by labor or work of any kind, whether of the head or hands, including judges, lawyers, *114 bankers, merchants, officers of corporations, and the like, are in some sense "laboring men." But they are not "laboring men" in the popular sense of the term, when used to refer to a man's employment, and that is the sense in which, we must presume, the legislature used the term. In Wakefield v. Fargo, 90 N. Y. 213, under an act making stockholders in a corporation liable for debts due "laborers, servants, and apprentices," for services performed for the corporation, the court construed the word "laborers" to refer to those whose services were manual or menial; those who are responsible for no independent action, but who do a day's work or stated job under the direction of a superior; and held that it did not include one who kept the accounts of receipts and disbursements, and, in the absence of the superintendent, had charge and control of the business. In Jones v. Avery, 50 Mich. 326, 15 N. W. Rep. 494, it was held that a traveling salesman, selling by sample, did not come within the meaning of a constitutional provision making stockholders of a corporation liable for "labor debts" of the corporation. There are many cases holding that contractors, consulting or assistant engineers, agents, superintendents, secretaries of corporations, and livery stable keepers, do no come within the meaning of the term. Powell v. Eldred, 39 Mich. 554; Aikin v. Wasson, 24 N. Y. 482; Short v. Medberry, 29 Hun, 39; Dean v. De Wolf, 16 Hun, 186; Krauser v. Ruckel, 17 Hun, 463; Ericsson v. Brown, 38 Barb. 390; Coffin v. Reynolds, 37 N. Y. 640; Brusie v. Griffith, 34 Cal. 306; Dove v. Nunan, 62 Cal. 400. We do not think the legislature intended the exemption to operate in favor of any but those who are laboring men or women in the sense that their work is manual. Persons of that class usually look to the reward of a day's labor for immediate or present support, and such

persons are more in need of the exemption than any others. This debtor defendant is not within that class. Judgment affirmed.

Minn. 1889. Wildner v. Ferguson 6 L.R.A. 338, 42 Minn. 112, 43 N.W. 794, 18 Am.St.Rep. 495 END OF DOCUMENT Supreme Court of Georgia. OLIVER v. MACON HARDWARE CO. et al. March 23, 1896. Syllabus by the Court. 1. Primarily, a clerk in a mercantile establishment is not a "laborer," in the sense in *404 which that word is used in section 1974 of the Code, even though the proper discharge of his duties may include the performance of some amount of manual labor. If the contract of employment contemplated that the clerk's services were to consist mainly of work requiring mental skill or business capacity, and involving the exercise of his intellectual faculties, rather than work the doing of which properly would depend upon mere physical power to perform ordinary manual labor, he would not be a laborer. If, on the other hand, the work which the contract required the clerk to do was, in the main, to be the performance of such labor as that last above indicated, he would be a laborer. In any given case, the question whether or not a clerk is entitled, as a laborer, to enforce a summary lien against the property of his employer, must be determined with reference to its own particular facts and circumstances. 2. Although the intervention filed in the present case alleged in general terms that the intervener was a clerk, that the amount he claimed was due him for services and labor performed as a clerk, and that as such clerk he performed manual labor, yet, as it failed by other appropriate allegations to show to which of the classes above indicated he belonged, it was bad for uncertainty, and properly dismissed on demurrer. Error from superior court, Bibb county; John L. Hardeman, Judge. Intervention of Henry E. Oliver in the matter of a judgment against the

Macon Hardware Company. Judgment against the intervener, and he appeals. Affirmed. West Headnotes Labor and Employment 231H k 233 231H Labor and Employment 231HIV Compensation and Benefits 231HIV(A) In General 231Hk231 Liens, Priorities, and Preferences 231Hk233 k. Persons Entitled. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 255k82(2) Master and Servant)

Labor and Employment 231H k 249 231H Labor and Employment 231HIV Compensation and Benefits 231HIV(B) Actions 231Hk247 Pleading 231Hk249 k. Complaint, Petition, or Declaration. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 255k82(2) Master and Servant) A petition alleging in general terms that petitioner was a clerk, that the amount he claims is due him for services performed as clerk, and that as such clerk he performed manual labor, is insufficient to entitle petitioner to a lien on the property of his employer, under Code, s 1974, which may be summarily enforced, since, primarily, a clerk is not "a laborer," within that section, though the proper discharge of his duties may include the performance of some amount of manual labor. Alex Proudfit, for plaintiff in error. Dessau & Hodges, for defendant in error.

LUMPKIN, J.

Some confusion has arisen in the decisions of this court with reference to the question whether or not a clerk employed in a store, office, or other place of business, is a "laborer," within the meaning of sections 1974 and 3554 of the Code; the former giving laborers a general lien for their labor upon the property of their employers, and the latter exempting the wages of laborers from the process of garnishment. In Butler v. Clark, 46 Ga. 466, the question arose as to whether the wages of one employed in a mill as "receiving and shipping clerk," and who "performed any other duties required of him" by his employer, were subject to garnishment. In dealing with the case, this employe was treated as "a hired workman," and accordingly adjudged to be a laborer, within the meaning of the statute. In Claghorn v. Saussy, 51 Ga. 576, the monthly wages of a "forwarding clerk" in the employment of a railway company were held not to be subject to the process of garnishment. It was the duty of that clerk to attend daily to the forwarding of goods, and to render other services which necessarily required the performance of a considerable amount of manual labor. The case is cited in Oliver v. Boehm, 63 Ga. 172, where it was decided that a person "employed as clerk, bartender, and boy of all work, to labor in and about a retail grocery and liquor store," was a laborer entitled to the lien provided for by section 1974 of the Code. The scope of this boy's employment seems to indicate that the greater part of his work consisted of manual labor, rather than of services requiring mental or intellectual skill and capacity. Indeed, in Richardson v. Langston, 68 Ga. 658, Justice Crawford, in referring to Oliver's Case, said "he specifically set out at length the actual manual labor which he performed." The learned justice doubtless referred to the record of the case, as only the headnote of the decision is reported in 63 Ga. In Richardson's Case the court ruled that an affidavit to foreclose a laborer's lien, in which it was alleged that the defendants, merchants selling dry goods and groceries, were indebted to the deponent "for services rendered as clerk, laborer, and general service in said store," was not demurrable as not sufficiently setting out the fact that the plaintiff was a laborer. The opinion was written by Justice Crawford, who dissented from the judgment. We make the following extract from his comments on the case: "I do not understand that clerks, or persons doing general service, although they may labor, are therefore laborers, in legal contemplation. If they are to be included in the general term 'laborers,' then I see no limit to the exercise of this extraordinary right of having execution on oath, by all agents and employes, such as cashiers, tellers, and bookkeepers of banks, secretaries, treasurers, bookkeepers, salesmen, and superintendents of manufacturing companies, as well as all the officials of railroads below the president, whether in the offices or on the roads. To enlarge upon class legislation by implication should not be the policy of courts, and especially so where ex parte summary remedies are allowed." We will next notice the case of Hinton v. Goode, 73 Ga. 233, in which it was decided that "one who is employed merely to labor as clerk in a store is not such a laborer as is contemplated by section 1974 of the Code, giving a lien to a laborer on the property of his employer." Justice Blandford, who delivered the opinion of the court, said: "Laborers, as used in the statute, mean what were generally and universally known as laborers at the time of the passage of the act. A laborer

is one who works at a toilsome occupation,-a man who does work requiring little skill, as distinguished from an artisan,-sometimes called a laboring man. Webster. Clerks, agents, cashiers of banks, and all that class of employes, whose employment is associated with mental labor and skill, were not considered laborers, and were not intended by the statute to be embraced therein as laborers, so as to have a lien for their wages. And this is the effect of the previous rulings of this court." In Ricks v. Redwine, Id. 273, it was held that "a clerk employed in a store or other establishment unless he performs manual labor, is not a laborer entitled to have a lien upon his employer's property which can be summarily enforced."*405 In that case Justice Hall observed that all the former cases on the subject were reviewed in the Case of Hinton, supra. In Lamar v. Russell, 77 Ga. 306, 2 S. E. 467, it was held that the wages of a clerk and bookkeeper were not subject to garnishment; citing Smith v. Johnston, 71 Ga. 748, which was a case involving the right to garnish the wages of a railroad clerk. Then follows the case of Abrahams v. Anderson, 80 Ga. 570, 5 S. E. 778, which is substantially on the same line, and cites a number of cases, including several of those above mentioned. This brings us to the case of Briscoe v. Montgomey, 93 Ga. 602, 20 S. E. 41, holding that a "commercial traveler" was not a day laborer, whose wages were exempt from the process of garnishment. In the course of a very brief discussion of that case the writer remarked, "It is obvious that in the discharge of his duties a clerk and bookkeeper must necessarily perform a considerable amount of manual labor." It was not necessary, however, in that case, to go to the bottom of the subject with which we are now delaying, and this accounts for the evident looseness of the expression last above quoted. We think all the cases previously decided can be reconciled and harmonized by adopting the line indicated in the first head note of the present case. It states the idea about as clearly as we can express it. Every human being who follows any legitimate employment, or discharges the duties of any office, is, in a very broad sense, a laborer. The president of the United States, the governor of this state, and the justices of this court are all laboring men, in the sense that they do a great deal of hard work, much of which is, indeed, attended with physical and muscular exertion; but at the same time they cannot property be termed "manual laborers," either in the popular sense in which these words are used and understood, or in the sense in which the term "laborers" was employed in the statutes under consideration. The legislature manifestly had reference to the work in which such "laborers" were engaged, rather than to the particular designation by which they were usually distinguished one from the other. In determining whether a particular clerk, or other employe, is really a laborer, the character of the work he does must be taken into consideration. In other words, he must be classified, not according to the arbitrary designation given to his calling, but with reference to the character of the services required of him by his employer. The headnote indicates the rule to be followed in assigning him to that class to which he rightfully belongs. 2. From the foregoing it follows that an intervention filed in an equitable proceeding, containing only the allegation set forth in the second headnote, was bad for uncertainty, because it entirely, failed, by other appropriate allegations, to show that the intervener belonged to that class of clerks

entitled to liens as laborers. Judgment affirmed.

Ga. 1896. Oliver v. Macon Hardware Co. 98 Ga. 249, 25 S.E. 403, 58 Am.St.Rep. 300 END OF DOCUMENT Westlaw Delivery Summary Report for 1,IP POOL Date/Time of Request: Thursday, May 3, 2012 04:19 Central Client Identifier: Database: Citation Text: Lines: Documents: Images: Recipient(s): 0 maanolalia@gmail.com ATENEO DE MANILA UNI GA-CS-FIND 25 S.E. 403 172 1

Supreme Court of Georgia. KLINE v. RUSSELL. July 23, 1901. Syllabus by the Court. 1. Where a debtor claimed that a sum which his creditor was seeking to reach by a process of garnishment was due to him as a laborer, and therefore not subject to such process, it was not upon the trial of an issue thus arising erroneous to charge: "If the contract of employment contemplated that the clerk's services were to consist mainly of work requiring mental skill or business capacity, and involving the exercise of his intellectual faculties, rather than work the doing of which properly would depend upon a mere physical

power to perform ordinary manual labor, he would not be a 'laborer.' If, on the other hand, the work which the contract required the clerk to do was, in the main, to be the performance of such labor as that last above indicated, he would be a 'laborer."' Oliver v. Hardware Co., 25 S. E. 403, 98 Ga. 249. 2. According to the rule laid down in the case above cited, and in view of the evidence appearing in the record, the plaintiff in error was not a laborer whose wages were exempt from the process of garnishment. See Ensel v. Adler, 35 S. E. 334, 110 Ga. 326, and cases cited; Stuart v. Poole, 38 S. E. 41, 112 Ga. 818. 3. The preceding notes deal with the only questions presented in the motion for a new trial, in so far as the grounds thereof were verified by the trial court. Error from superior court, Fulton county; J. H. Lumpkin, Judge. Action by J. J. Russell against B. H. Kline. From the judgment, Kline brings error. Affirmed. West Headnotes Exemptions 163 k 48(3) 163 Exemptions 163I Nature and Extent 163I(C) Property and Rights Exempt 163k48 Earnings, Wages, or Salaries 163k48(3) k. Wages of Mechanics, Laborers, and Seamen. Most Cited Cases Whether an employee is a laborer depends on whether his labor, considering the entire period of his employment contract, is principally physical or principally involves the exercise of mental faculties. *477 Geo. W. Brooks, for plaintiff in error. R. J. Hancock, for defendant in error.

PER CURIAM. Judgment affirmed.

Ga. 1901. Kline v. Russell 113 Ga. 1085, 39 S.E. 477 END OF DOCUMENT Westlaw Delivery Summary Report for 1,IP POOL Date/Time of Request: Thursday, May 3, 2012 04:21 Central Client Identifier: Database: Citation Text: Lines: Documents: Images: Recipient(s): 0 maanolalia@gmai ATENEO DE MANILA UNI GA-CS-FIND 39 S.E. 477 36 1

Supreme Court of Texas. BELL et al. v. INDIAN LIVE-STOCK CO. March 19, 1889. Commissioners' decision. Appeal from district court, Cooke county. Action by Bell & Gardner against J. P. Addington, Indian Live-Stock Company, garnishee. Plaintiffs appeal. West Headnotes Exemptions 163 k 27 163 Exemptions 163I Nature and Extent

163I(B) Persons Entitled 163k26 Residence 163k27 k. Domicile in General. Most Cited Cases Exemption laws of the state protect the property of nonresidents as well as residents. Exemptions 163 k 48(1) 163 Exemptions 163I Nature and Extent 163I(C) Property and Rights Exempt 163k48 Earnings, Wages, or Salaries 163k48(1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases One employed by a livestock company as manager at a monthly salary of $200, though he is also a stockholder, is entitled to the exemption. Exemptions 163 k 48(1) 163 Exemptions 163I Nature and Extent 163I(C) Property and Rights Exempt 163k48 Earnings, Wages, or Salaries 163k48(1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases Wages voluntarily left in the possession of the employer after they become due cease to be "current," and are not exempt. *344 Davis & Garnett, for appellants. C. C. Potter, for appellee.

ACKER, J. J. P. Addington was indebted to appellants, for which they brought suit and

garnished appellee. The garnishee answered that Addington was in its employ as its manager for the compensation of $200 per month; that he was a non-resident; that there was to his credit on the books of appellee *345 the sum of $624, due to him as current wages for personal service; and that the money was not subject to garnishment under the laws of this state. Appellants controverted the answer upon the following grounds: (1) That Addington, being a nonresident, was not entitled to the benefits of the laws of this state which exempt from garnishment current wages for personal service; (2) that the $624 in the hands of the garnishee to the credit of Addington were not current wages for personal service, within the meaning of out constitution and statutes. The trial court held the money exempt, and discharged the garnishee on its answer. It was proven on the trial that Addington owned $150,000 of the stock of appellee company, which was pledged for its full value. The two questions involved in the case are properly presented here for out determination: 1. Are current wages due to a non-resident for personal service subject to garnishment in this state? 2. Is the sum of $624 due by a corporation to one of its stockholders on a contract to pay the stockholder $200 per month for his services as manager of the company 'current wages for personal service' within the meaning of the constitution and laws of this state? The constitution (article 16, s 28,) provides that 'no current wages for personal service shall ever be subject to garnishment.' Substantially the same language is found in article 218 of our Revised Statutes, and it is there provided that 'where it appears upon the trial that the garnishee is indebted to the defendant for such current wages, the garnishee shall nevertheless be discharged as to such indebtedness.' Clause 16, art. 2335, Rev. St., which article enumerates the articles of personal property exempt from forced sale, is as follows: '(16) All current wages for personal services.' The foregoing are the only provisions of our laws, organic or statutory, bearing upon the questions in this case. It will be observed that none of these, in terms or by necessary implication, are limited in their application to citizens or residents of this state. Such provisions affect the remedy merely, and it seems reasonable to us that the law of the forum should apply in determining the rights of the parties. We are to interpret these provisions of our laws in accordance with the obvious intent of those who enacted them, and that intent is to be arrived at by giving to the language employed its ordinary significance. We are to declare what the law is, without expanding or contracting its purview. The constitution declares that no current wages for personal service shall ever be subject to garnishment, and the statute reiterates this declaration. We discover nothing in the context or the language used to support the view contended for by appellants, that these provisions of our laws were designed for the benefit and protection of residents of this state only. It seems to us that the context and the language used tend very strongly to support the converse of the proposition insisted upon by appellants. Article 183 of the Revised Statutes authorizes the issuance of the writ of garnishment when an original attachment has been sued

out, and article 152 authorizes the writ of attachment to issue upon the ground that the defendant is a nonresident. The exemption laws in force prior to the adoption of the present constitution expressly limited their application to citizens or residents of this state. The convention that framed the present constitution, and the legislature that enacted the present exemption laws, must have had some purpose in omitting the limitation contained in the previous laws, and we are unable to conceive any reason for the change other than the design that the benefits of these laws should inure to non-residents as well as to the citizens of our state. We do not consider it necessary to discuss the effect which the adoption of the Fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States had with reference to state statutes discriminating in favor of its own citizens, and against citizens of other states. The laws of several of the American states contain provisions similar in some respects to these provisions of our laws. In the absence of adjudications by our own courts, we look for authority to the decisions of those states where like questions have been determined. In the case of Railroad Co. v. Barron, 83 Ill. 366, the defendant in the original action, whose wages were garnished in the state of Illinois, was a resident of the state of Wisconsin, and claimed the benefits of the following statute: 'The wages and services of a defendant, being the head of a family, and residing with the same, to an amount not exceeding twenty-five dollars, shall be exempt from garnishment.' It was held that the non-resident was entitled to the exemption. In the case of Lowe v. Stringham, 14 Wis. 244, the debtor being a nonresident, temporarily in that state, in delivering the opinion of the court Judge PAINE uses the following language: 'We think also there was no error in the instructions of the circuit court in respect to the plaintiff's right to the venefit of the exemption law. The statute makes no discrimination between temporary and permanent residents, nor does it purport to confine its privileges to residents at all. It exempts certain articles of the debtor and his family. And we think it would be entirely inconsistent with the beneficent intentions of the statute, as well as with the dignity of a sovereign state, to say that the temporary sojourner, or even the stranger within our gates, was not entitled to its protection.' In the case of Sproul v. McCoy, 26 Ohio St. 577, the court says: 'The exemptions from execution or sale allowed to 'every person who has a family,' under the provisions of the act of April 16, 1873, may be claimed by any debtor against whom an action is prosecuted in the courts *346 of this state, whether such debtor be or be not a resident of this state.' In some of the states the benefits of the statutes exempting personal property and wages from liability to seizure for payment of debts are expressly limited to residents of the respective states, and the decisions made under such statutes of course conform to them. The statute under which the decision in Lowe v. Stringham, 14 Wis. 244, supra, was rendered, was amended in 1861, so as to limit the benefits of the statute to 'married persons, or persons who have to provide for the entire support of a family, in the state of Wisconsin.' The case of Bank v. Railway Co., 45 Wis. 172, cited by appellants, was decided under this amended statute.

Our attention has been called to but one case in which it seems to have been held, in the absence of statutory limitation, that the exemption of personal property does not apply in favor of non-residents of the state where the property is sought to be subjected, and that is the case of Hawkins v. Pearce, 11 Humph. 45, (decided in 1850.) The opinion does not recite the statute under which the decision was made, but we infer from the argument used in the opinion that the statute contained no limitations, but, like the provisions of our laws, granted the exemption in general terms to all persons. That decision was placed principally upon the ground that such statutes are designed to protect the state against pauperism, and to prevent indigent persons from being deprived of all means of subsistence whereby they would become charges upon the poor-fund. We consider the reasoning in that opinion unsound, and somewhat fallacious. We cannot consent to attribute the enactment of such laws to a purpose so sordid and inhuman. We prefer to attribute such legislation to the more humane and philanthropic purpose of protecting to the employe his current earnings to meet and defray the current expenses of his living, that he may enjoy a credit to the extent of his current earnings, and not be forced into a condition of abject dependence and want. We are constrained to hold with the weight of authority, as well as the established rules of construction, that current wages due to a non-resident for personal service are not subject to garnishment in this state. We have had more than ordinary difficulty in our investigation and decision of the second question involved in this case. In most of the states where laws of like character have been enacted, the exemption is given for a stated amount of 'wages,' or for the 'earnings' for a given length of time preceding the service of the writ. In all of the states, we believe, the protected wages of earnings must be the proceeds of, or compensation for, personal service. With us, the protected fund must be not only 'wages for personal service,' but must be also 'current wages.' It is evident that it was not intended that all wages for personal service should be exempt, but only such as are current. Webster defines 'current' to mean 'running or moving rapidly; now passing or present, in its progress, as, a current month or year.' Bouvier says the word 'current' is 'a term used to express present time, current month, etc.' 'Wages' are the compensation given to a hired person for service, and the same is true of 'salary.' The words seem to be synonymous, convertible terms, though we believe that use and general acceptation have given to the word 'salary' a significance somewhat different from the word 'wages' in this: that the former is understood to relate to position or office, to be the compensation given for official or other service, as distinguished from 'wages,' the compensation for labor. It is of little or no importance, however, in determining the question now being discussed, whether the distinction here suggested be recognized or not. We have to deal with the phrase 'current wages,' without other limitation as to time or amount, and we think the exemption would apply without regard to whether the compensation be called 'wages' or 'salary.' Counsel for appellants argue with much force and persuasive earnestness, that this exemption was provided for the benefit of such employes as require their wages as they are earned to defray the expenses of their living, and not for the protection of persons who receive for their services $200 per month, and whose circumstances

are such that they are able to leave their earnings in the hands of their employer until the wages for more than three months have accumulated to their credit. It appears that Addington was employed by the garnishee 'at a monthly salary of $200 per month;' that he had been so employed for about 18 months, and had drawn on his employer for money as he needed it; that on the 1st day of April, 1886, he requested to know how his wages account stood, and there was found to be due him to sum of $624.50. While we think it clear that the money in the hands of the garnishee was due to Addington as wages for personal service, within the meaning of that phrase as used in our constitution and statutes, we are also of opinion that the money had ceased to be current wages, and that it was subject to the writ of garnishment. The wages were payable monthly, and were exempt for the month current at the time of the service of the writ, but the exemption ceased to appoly when the wages became past due. Cases may arise, however, in which a party would not be entitled to the benefit of the writ of garnishment sued out after the wages became due. It appears that the wages were voluntarily left by Addington in the hands of the garnishee, and were past due. As there is no controversy about the facts, we are of opinion that the judgment of the court below should be reversed, and judgment rendered here in favor of appellants for $624.50, with interest from May 1, 1886, the date of the judgment below. *347 STAYTON, C. J. Report of commission of appeals examined, their opinion adopted, judgment reversed, and rendered for appellants. Tex. 1889 Bell v. Indian Live-Stock Co. 11 S.W. 344 END OF DOCUMENT Westlaw Delivery Summary Report for 1,IP POOL Date/Time of Request: Thursday, May 3, 2012 04:24 Central