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LAS 10 CATEGORIAS DE ARISTOTELES (Extrado de: http://plato.stan ord.ed!/entr"es/ar"stotle# $ate%or"es/ A!tor: &a!l St!dt'ann( past!dt'ann)da*"dson.ed!+

,. The Ten#-old D"*"s"on

,.1 General D"s$!ss"on
After providing his first system of classification (el autor se refiere a la clasifiacin en cuatro tipos de entidades , vista en clase), Aristotle turns to the predicamenta and presents a second, which ends up occupying him for much of the remainder of the Categories. Aristotle divides what he calls ta legomena ( !"), i#e# things that are said, into ten distinct $inds (%&'()# )hings that are said according to Aristotle, are words (De Int %*a+), and so it is natural to interpret his second system as a classification of words# And &ecause the ,nglish word -category. comes from the /ree$ word for predicate, one might naturally thin$ of the second system as a classification of distinct types of linguistic predicates# )here is, however, considera&le de&ate a&out the su&0ect matter of the second system of classification# )here are three reasons to thin$ that Aristotle is not primarily interested in words &ut rather in the o&0ects in the world to which words correspond# 1irst, his locution ta legomena is in fact am&iguous, as &etween -things said.2where these might or might not &e words2and -things spo$en of.2where these are more naturally ta$en to &e things referred to &y means of words# 3econd, Aristotle4s e5amples of items &elonging to the various categories are generally e5tra6linguistic# 1or instance, his e5amples of su&stances are an individual man and a horse# )hird, Aristotle e5plicitly accepts a doctrine of meaning according to which words conventionally signify concepts, and concepts naturally signify o&0ects in the world (De Int %*a+)# 3o, even if he is in some sense classifying words, it is natural to view his classification as ultimately driven &y concerns a&out o&0ects in the world to which our words correspond# )hose scholars dissatisfied with the linguistic interpretation of Aristotle4s second system of classification have moved in one of several directions# 3ome have interpreted Aristotle as classifying concepts# )he o&0ections raised against the linguistic interpretation, however, can again &e raised against the concept interpretation as well# 7ther scholars have interpreted Aristotle as classifying e5tra6linguistic and e5tra6 conceptual reality# 1inally, some scholars have synthesi8ed the linguistic and e5tra6 linguistic interpretations &y interpreting Aristotle as classifying linguistic predicates in

' so far as they are related to the world in semantically significant ways# Although 9 thin$ that this latter interpretation is pro&a&ly the one that &est withstands close te5tual scrutiny, the general character of the second system of classification is most easily seen &y focusing on the e5tra6linguistic interpretation# 3o, in what follows, 9 shall simplify matters &y tal$ing as if Aristotle4s first classificatory system is really a classification of e5tra6linguistic items: and 9 shall note places at which such an interpretation faces difficulties# ;hat then is Aristotle4s second classificatory system< =uite simply, it is a list of highest $inds, which are also $nown as categories# )hat there are highest $inds (or perhaps that there is one single highest $ind) can &e motivated &y noticing the fact that the ordinary o&0ects of our e5perience fall into classes of increasing generality# >onsider, for instance, a maple tree# 9t is in the first instance a maple and so &elongs in a class with all and only other maples# 9t is also, however, a tree and so &elongs in a &roader class, namely the class of trees, whose e5tension is wider than the class of maples# >ontinuing on, it is also a living thing and so &elongs in a class whose e5tension is wider still than the class of trees# And so on# ?ow, once this &asic pattern is &efore us, we can as$ the following @uestionA does this increase in generality go on ad infinitum or does it end at a class that is the most general possi&le< Boes it end, in other words, at a highest $ind< 9t might seem that the answer to this @uestion is o&viousA of course there is a highest $ind 2 &eing# After all, someone might argue, everything e5ists# 3o the class that contains all and only &eings must &e the class with the greatest possi&le e5tension# 9n the Metaphysics, however, Aristotle argues that &eing is not a genus (CCD&'+, %E(C&+%)# According to Aristotle, every genus must &e differentiated &y some differentia that falls outside that genus# Fence, if &eing were a genus, it would have to &e differentiated &y a differentia that fell outside of it# 9n other words, &eing would have to &e differentiated &y some non6&eing, which, according to Aristotle, is a metaphysical a&surdity# Although he does not e5plicitly ma$e this claim, Aristotle4s argument, if cogent, would generali8e to any proposal for a single highest $ind# Fence, he does not thin$ that there is one single highest $ind# 9nstead, he thin$s that there are tenA (%) su&stance: (') @uantity: (+) @uality: (G) relatives: (() somewhere: (*) sometime: (H) &eing in a position: (D) having: (C) acting: and (%E) &eing acted upon (%&'(6'aG)# 9 shall discuss the first four of these $inds in detail in a moment# Iut doing so will ta$e us into matters that, while interesting, nonetheless distract from the general nature of the scheme# 3o 9 will first discuss some of the general structures inherent in Aristotle4s second system of classification, and then proceed to a more detailed discussion# 9n addition to positing ten highest $inds, Aristotle also has views a&out the structure of such $inds# ,ach $ind is differentiated into species &y some set of differentiae# 9n fact, the essence of any species, according to Aristotle, consists in its genus and the differentia that together with that genus defines the species# (9t is for this reason that the highest $inds are, strictly spea$ing, indefina&le 2 &ecause there is no genus a&ove a highest $ind, one cannot define it in terms of its genus and a differentia#) 3ome of the species in various categories are also genera 2 they are, in other words differentiated into further species# Iut at some point, there is a lowest species that is not further differentiated# Jnder these species, we can suppose, fall the particulars that &elong to that species#

+ ?ow, if we accept the characteri8ation of said6of and present6in that 9 have given, we can see that Aristotle4s two classificatory systems can, so to spea$, &e laid on top of each other# )he resulting structure would loo$ something li$e the following#

3u&stance 3aid6of ?ot Mresent69n ?ot 3aid6of ?ot Mresent69n

=uantity Kelatives =uality L 3aid6of Mresent69n ?ot 3aid6of Mresent69n

3ome features of this system are worth pointing out# 1irst, as 9 have already noted, Aristotle gives pride of place in this scheme to primary su&stances# Fe says that were primary su&stances not to e5ist then no other entity would e5ist ('&*)# As a result, Aristotle4s categorialism is firmly anti6Mlatonic# ;hereas Mlato treated the a&stract as more real than material particulars, in the Categories Aristotle ta$es material particulars as ontological &edroc$ 2 to the e5tent that &eing a primary su&stance ma$es something more real than anything else, entities such as 3ocrates and a horse are the most real entities in Aristotle4s worldview# Noreover, among secondary su&stances, those at a lower level of generality are what Aristotle calls -prior in su&stance. than those at a higher level ('&H)# 3o, for instance, human is prior in su&stance than &ody# ;hether this is to &e interpreted in terms of the greater reality of the $ind human is an open @uestion# ?onetheless, Aristotle4s e@uating an increase in generality with a decrease in su&stantiality is at least in spirit strongly anti6Mlatonic# )here is one other interesting general feature of this scheme that is worth pointing out &efore loo$ing at its details# Aristotle4s re0ection of the view that &eing is a genus and his su&se@uent acceptance of ten distinct highest $inds leads to a doctrine concerning &eing itself that is at the center of Aristotle4s Metaphysics# (9t should &e noted, however, that there is genuine disagreement over the e5tent to which Aristotle accepted the doctrine of &eing that appears in the Metaphysics when he wrote the Categories.) According to Aristotle, some words do not e5press a genus &ut instead are what he calls pros hen homonyms 2 that is, homonyms related to one thing (pros hen), variously called cases of -focal meaning. or -focal connection. or -core6dependent homonymy. in the literature on this topic (%EE+a+( ff#)# 3uch words are applica&le to various items in the world in virtue of the fact that those items all &ear some type of relation to some one thing or type of thing# An e5ample of such a homonym, according to Aristotle, is -healthy.# A regimen, he says, is healthy &ecause it is productive of health: urine is healthy &ecause it is indicative of health: and 3ocrates is healthy &ecause he has health# 9n this case, a regimen, urine and 3ocrates are all called -healthy. not &ecause they stand under some one genus, namely healthy things, &ut instead &ecause they all &ear some relation to health# 3imilarly, according to Aristotle, things in the world are not &eings &ecause they stand under some genus, &eing, &ut rather &ecause they all stand in a relation to the primary &eing, which in the Categories he says is su&stance# )his e5plains in part why he says in the Metaphysics that in order to study &eing one must study su&stance (%EEGa+', %E'Da%E6%E'D&D)#

.. /hen$e the Cate%or"es0

)he issue concerning the origin of the categories can &e raised &y as$ing the most difficult @uestion there is a&out any philosophical positionA why thin$ that it is correct< ;hy, in other words, should we thin$ that Aristotle4s list of highest $inds contains all and only the highest $inds there are< 7ne might, of course, re0ect the idea that there are some metaphysically privileged $inds in the world# Iut here it is important to distinguish &etween internal and e5ternal @uestions concerning a system of categories# ;e can approach category theory e5ternally in which case we would as$ @uestions a&out the status of any system of categories, whatsoever# 3o, for instance, we could as$ whether any system of categories must e5hi&it some $ind of dependency on the mind, language, conceptual schemes or whatever# Kealists will answer this @uestion in the negative, and idealists of one stripe or another in the affirmative# 9n addition, we can as$ a&out our epistemic access to the ultimate categories in the world# And we can adopt positions ranging from a radical s$epticism a&out our access to categories to a $ind of infalli&ilism a&out such access# 9f, on the other hand, we approach category theory from an internal perspective, we will assume some answer to the e5ternal @uestions and then go on to as$ a&out the correctness of the system of categories under those assumptions# 3o, for instance, we might adopt a realist perspective and hence assume that there is some correct metaphysically privileged list of mind and language independent highest $inds as well as a correct account of the relations &etween them# And we can then try to determine what that list is# ?ow, Aristotle certainly &elongs to this latter tradition of speculation a&out categoriesA he assumes rather than defends a posture of realism with respect to the metaphysical structures in the world# 9t is thus appropriate to assume realism along with him and then in@uire into the @uestion of which categories there might &e# 7ne way of approaching this @uestion is to as$ whether there is some principled procedure &y which Aristotle generated his list of categories# 1or, if there is, then one could presuma&ly assess his list of highest $inds &y assessing the procedure &y which he generated it# Jnfortunately, with the e5ception of some suggestive remar$s in the Topics, Aristotle does not indicate how he generated his scheme# ;ithout some procedure &y which one can generate his list, however, Aristotle4s categories argua&ly lac$ any 0ustification# )he issue is, of course, complicated &y the fact that his list might &e 0ustified without some procedure to generate it 2 perhaps we can use a com&ination of metaphysical intuition and philosophical argumentation to convince ourselves that Aristotle4s list is complete# ?onetheless, without some procedure of generation Aristotle4s categories at least appear in an uneasy light# And as a matter of historical fact the lac$ of any 0ustification for his list of highest $inds has &een the source of some famous criticisms# Oant, for instance, 0ust prior to the articulation of his own categorial scheme, saysA

9t was an enterprise worthy of an acute thin$er li$e Aristotle to try to discover these fundamental concepts: &ut as he had no guiding principle he merely pic$ed them up as they occurred to him, and at first gathered up ten of them, which he called categories or predicaments# Afterwards he thought he had discovered five more of them, which he added under the name of post6predicaments# Iut his ta&le remained imperfect for all that L (Oant, Critique of Pure Reason, )ranscendental Boctrine of ,lements, 3econd Mart, 1irst Bivision, Ioo$ 9, >hapter %, 3ection +, %E) According to Oant, Aristotle4s list of categories was the result of an unsystematic, al&eit &rilliant, &it of philosophical &rainstorming# Fence, it cannot stand firm as a correct set of categories# As it turns out, although Oant did not $now of any procedure &y which Aristotle might have generated his list of categories, scholars have given a num&er of proposals# )he proposals can &e classified into four types, which 9 shall callA (%) The Question pproach: (') The !rammatical pproach: (+) The Modal pproach: (G) The Medie"al Deri"ational pproach. P#Q# Ac$rill (%C*+) is the most prominent defender of the =uestion Approach# Fe ta$es as evidence for his interpretation Aristotle4s remar$s in Topics 9 C# Ac$rill claims that there are two different ways to generate the categories, each of which involves as$ing @uestions# According to the first method, we are to as$ a single @uestion 2 what is it< 2 of as many things as we can# 3o, for instance, we can as$ of 3ocrates, what is 3ocrates< And we can answer 2 3ocrates is a human# ;e can then direct the same @uestion at the answer we have givenA what is a human< And we can answerA a human is an animal# ,ventually, this process of @uestion as$ing will lead us to some highest $ind, in this case 3u&stance# 9f, on the other hand, we had &egun as$ing that same @uestion of 3ocrates4 color, say his whiteness, we would eventually have ended at the highest $ind @uality# ;hen carried out completely, Ac$rill claims, this procedure will yield the ten distinct and irreduci&le $inds that are Aristotle4s categories# According to the second method of @uestioning, we are to as$ as many different @uestions as we can a&out a single primary su&stance# 3o, for instance, we might as$ 2 how tall is 3ocrates< ;here is 3ocrates< ;hat is 3ocrates< And in answering these @uestions, we will respondA five feet: in the Agora: Fuman# ;e will then reali8e that our answers to our various @uestions group into ten irreduci&le $inds# 7f all the proposals that scholars have given, Ac$rill4s is the most supported &y Aristotle4s te5ts, though the evidence he cites is far from conclusive# Iut from a philosophical point of view, the @uestion method suffers from some serious pro&lems# 1irst, it is far from clear that either method actually produces Aristotle4s list# 3uppose, for instance, 9 employ the second method and as$A does 3ocrates li$e Mlato< )he answer, let us grant, is -yes.# Iut where does that answer &elong in the categorical scheme< Ac$rill might respond &y forcing the @uestion to &e one that is not answered with -yes. or -no.# Iut we can still as$ the @uestionA is 3ocrates present6in or not present6in

* something else< )he answer, of course, isA not present6in: &ut where in Aristotle4s list of categories does not present6in &elong< 9t is indeed hard to see# 3imilar pro&lems face the first method# 3uppose 9 were to as$A what is 3ocrates4 whiteness< 9 might respond &y saying -a particular.# Again, where does &eing a particular &elong in Aristotle4s list of categories# 7f course, particulars are part of the four6fold system of classification that Aristotle articulates# Iut we are not at the moment concerned with that scheme# 9ndeed, to advert to that scheme in the present conte5t is simply to re6open the @uestion of the relations &etween the two main systems of classification in the Categories. ,ven if Ac$rill can find some plausi&le route from @uestions to Aristotle4s categories, the methods he propose still seem unsatisfactory for the simple reason that they depend far too much on our @uestion6as$ing inclinations# 9t may &e that the @uestions that we in fact as$ will yield Aristotle4s categories: &ut what we should want to $now is whether we are as$ing the right @uestions# Jnless we can &e confident that our @uestions are trac$ing the metaphysical structures of the world, we should &e unimpressed &y the fact that they yield any set of categories# Iut to $now whether our @uestions are trac$ing the metaphysical structures of the world re@uires us to have some way of esta&lishing the correctness of the categorial scheme# >learly, at this point we are in a circle that is too small to &e of much help# Nay&e all metaphysical theori8ing is at some level laden with circularity: &ut circles this small are generally unaccepta&le to a metaphysician# According to the grammatical approach, which traces to )rendelen&urg (%DG*) and has most recently &een defended &y Nichael Iaumer (%CC+), Aristotle generated his list &y paying attention to the structures inherent in language# 7n the assumption that the metaphysical structure of the world mirrors the structures in language, we should &e a&le to find the &asic metaphysical structures &y e5amining our language# )his approach is @uite involved &ut for our purposes can &e illustrated with a few e5amples# )he distinction &etween su&stance and the rest of the categories, for instance, is &uilt into the su&0ect6predicate structure of our language# >onsider, for instance, the two sentencesA (%) 3ocrates is a human: and (') 3ocrates is white# 1irst, we see that each sentence has a su&0ect, namely -3ocrates.# >orresponding to that su&0ect, one might thin$, is an entity of some $ind, namely a primary su&stance# Noreover, the first sentence contains what might &e called an individuating predicate 2 it is a predicate of the form, a such and such, rather than of the form, such and such# 3o, one might thin$, there are predicates that attri&ute to primary su&stances properties the having of which suffices for that su&stance to &e an individual of some $ind# 7n the other hand, the second sentence contains a non6individuating predicate# 3o &y e5amining the details of the predicates in our language, we have some grounds for distinguishing &etween the category of su&stance and the accidental categories# )he grammatical approach certainly does have some virtues# 1irst, we have ample evidence that Aristotle was sensitive to language and the structures inherent in it# 3o it would not &e all that surprising were he led &y his sensitivity to linguistic structures to his list of categories# Noreover, some of the peculiarities of his list are nicely e5plained in this way# )wo of the highest $inds are action and passion# 9n Physics 999 +, however, Aristotle argues that in the world there is only motion and that the distinction &etween action and passion lies in the way in which one is considering the motion# 3o why should there &e two distinct categories, namely action and passion, rather than 0ust one, namely motion< ;ell, the grammatical approach offers an e5planationA in language we

H differentiate &etween active and passive ver&s# Fence, there are two distinct categories, not 0ust one# Bespite these virtues, the grammatical approach faces a difficult @uestionA why thin$ that the structures we find in language reflect the metaphysical structures of the world< 1or instance, it may simply &e a historical accident that our language contains individuating and non6individuating predicates# Qi$ewise, it may &e a historical accident that there are active and passive ver&s in our language# 7f course, this type of o&0ection, when pushed to its limits, leads to one of the more difficult philosophical @uestions, namely how can we &e sure that the structures of our representations are in any way related to what some might call the &asic metaphysical structures and to what others might call the things in themselves< Iut one might hold out hope that some 0ustification for a categorial scheme could &e given that did not rest entirely on the un0ustified assertion of some deep correspondence &etween linguistic and metaphysical structures# )he Nodal Approach, which traces to Ionit8 (%D(+) and has most recently &een defended &y Pulius Noravsci$ (%C*H), avoids the defects of &oth the previous two approaches# As Noravsci$ formulates this view, the categories are those types of entity to which any sensi&le particular must &e related# Fe saysA According to this interpretation the constitutive principle of the list of categories is that they constitute those classes of items to each of which any sensi&le particular 2 su&stantial or otherwise 2 must &e related# Any sensi&le particular, su&stance, event, sound, etc# must &e related to some su&stance: it must have some @uality and @uantity: it must have relational properties, it must &e related to times and places: and it is placed within a networ$ of causal chains and laws, thus &eing related to the categories of affecting and &eing affected# 9n virtue of its e5plicitly modal nature, the Nodal Approach avoids the defects of the previous two approaches# ;hereas the first two approaches ultimately rely on some connection &etween metaphysical structures and what appear to &e merely contingent features of either our @uestion as$ing proclivities or the structures inherent inherent in our language, the Nodal Approach eliminates contingency altogether# Bespite its e5plicitly modal character, the Nodal Approach does face a difficulty similar to the one faced &y the =uestion Approach# 9t might turn out that employing the approach yields e5actly the list of Aristotle4s categories, &ut then again it might not# 3o, for instance, every material particular must &e related to a particular# Iut there is no category of particulars# )here are, of course, &eings that are not said6of other &eings# Iut not &eing said6of is not one of Aristotle4s categories# Noreover, must not every material particular &e related to matter< Iut matter is not a highest $ind# 9ndeed, it is far from clear where matter &elongs in the categories# 3o, even if the Nodal Approach is a good one for generating some list of $inds, it is not o&vious that it is a good approach for generating Aristotle4s list of $inds# )his pro&lem could of course &e alleviated somewhat if instead of merely appealing to modal structures as such, one could appeal to modal structures that argua&ly Aristotle would have thought are part of the very fa&ric of the world# )hen one would at least have an e5planation as to why Aristotle derived the list he in fact derived, even if one is inclined to re0ect Aristotle4s list#

)he last approach to the categories, namely the Nedieval derivational approach, goes some way in the direction suggested &ut not ta$en &y Noravsci$4s Nodal Approach# )here is a rich tradition of commentators including Kadulphus Irito, Al&ert the /reat, )homas A@uinas, and most recently their modern heir 1ran8 Irentano, who provide precisely the $ind of derivation for Aristotle4s categorial scheme found wanting &y Oant# According to the commentators in this tradition, Aristotle4s highest $inds are capa&le of a systematic and argua&ly entirely a priori derivation# )he following @uotation from Irentano captures nicely the philosophical import of such derivations# 7n the contrary, it seems to me that there is no dou&t that Aristotle could have arrived at a certain a priori proof, a deductive argument for the completeness of the distinction of categories L (7n the 3everal 3enses of Ieing in Aristotle, >h#(, section %') Irentano4s enthusiasm a&out the possi&ility of deriving Aristotle4s categories is perhaps un0ustified: &ut the idea that an a priori proof of the completeness of Aristotle4s categories is certainly an intriguing one# Merhaps the &est representative of this type of interpretation occurs in A@uinas4s commentaries on Aristotle4s Metaphysics# All of A@uinas4s derivation deserves considera&le attention: &ut for our purposes it will suffice to @uote 0ust a portion of it so as to &ring out its general character as well as one of its more interesting aspects# A predicate is referred to a su&0ect in a second way when the predicate is ta$en as &eing in the su&0ect, and this predicate is in the su&0ect either essentially and a&solutely and as something flowing from its matter, and then it is @uantity: or as something flowing from its form, and then it is @uality: or it is not present in the su&0ect a&solutely &ut with reference to something else, and then it is relation# (>ommentaries on Aristotle4s Netaphysics, Ioo$ R, Qesson C, 3ection DCE) )his passage illustrates the tenor of the Nedieval derivational approach# A@uinas articulates what appear to &e principled metaphysical principles concerning the way in which a predicate can &e, in his words, -ta$en as &eing in a su&0ect.# )here are two such waysA (%) essentially and a&solutely: or (') essentially and not a&solutely &ut with reference to something else# )he latter way corresponds to the category of relatives: the former, to the categories of @uality and @uantity# A@uinas then divides the former way of &eing in a su&0ect in terms of form and matter# Fe claims, stri$ingly, that the category of @uality flo#s from form and that the category of @uantity flo#s from matter# 9nspecting all of A@uinas4s derivation to determine its cogency is far too large a pro0ect to underta$e here# 9 have @uoted the portion a&ove to show the way in which the Nedieval derivational approach augments in an interesting way Noravsci$4s Nodal Approach# )he Nodal Approach, 9 argued, would gain some plausi&ility if there were some way of seeing Aristotle4s own attitudes a&out the modal structures in the material world somehow determining the generation of the categories# Iy invo$ing a com&ination of a priori sounding semantic principles and theses a&out the relationship &etween form and @uality and matter and @uantity, A@uinas has gone some way toward

C doing this# 1or Aristotle is certainly committed to the claim that form and matter are two of the a&solutely fundamental aspects of the material world# 9ndeed, he argues in the Physics that form and matter are necessary for the e5istence of motion, which, he thin$s, essentially characteri8es &odies# 9f the Nedieval Berivational Approach is correct, Aristotle4s categories ultimately trace to the ways in which form, matter and perhaps motion relate to su&stances and the predicates that apply to them# ;hether the derivations can withstand philosophical scrutiny is of course an important @uestion, one that 9 will not pursue here, though 9 will say that Irentano was pro&a&ly a &it too enthusiastic a&out the prospects for an entirely satisfactory a priori proof of the completeness of Aristotle4s categories# Noreover, the Nedieval interpretations face the charge that they are an over6interpretation of Aristotle# Aristotle simply does not provide in his surviving writings the sort of conceptual connections that underlie the Nedieval derivations# 3o perhaps the Nedievals have succum&ed to the temptation to read into Aristotle4s system connections that Aristotle did not accept# 9ndeed, from a twentieth century perspective, the Nedieval derivations loo$ very strange# 9t is commonplace in contemporary Aristotle scholarship to view the Categories as an early wor$ and to thin$ that Aristotle had not developed his theory of form and matter until later in his career# 9f this general approach is correct, the claim that the categorial scheme can somehow &e derived at least in part from form and matter appears implausi&le# As should &e clear from this &rief discussion, providing a complete derivation of Aristotle4s categorical scheme would &e a difficult, indeed perhaps impossi&le, tas$# After all, someone might conclude that Aristotle4s categorial scheme was either in part or in whole mista$en# Ninimally, the tas$ is a daunting one# Iut of course, the difficulty in esta&lishing its ultimate correctness is not peculiar to Aristotle4s categorial scheme# 9ndeed, it should not &e at all surprising that the difficulties that have &eset metaphysical speculation in the ;estern tradition can &e seen in such a star$ and provocative fashion in one of the great founding wor$s of that very tradition# 9n fact, it is in part due to such difficulties that e5ternal @uestions a&out categorical and other metaphysical structures arise# 3uch difficulties understanda&ly lead to @uestions a&out the legitimacy of category theory and metaphysical speculation in general# Jnfortunately, the history of metaphysical speculation has shown that it is no less difficult to esta&lish answers to e5ternal than to internal @uestions a&out category theory# )hat ac$nowledged, it is noteworthy that @uestions of &oth sorts owe their first formulations, ultimately, to the categorialism of Aristotle4s seminal wor$, the Categories#