The Temporal Pattern of Shame and Guilt

21 January 2014

Joost Knaap S1715267 Supervisor: Dr Kai Epstude Faculty of Behavioral and Social Sciences University of Groningen

The temporal pattern of Shame and Guilt

Samenvatting In eerder onderzoek werd bewijs gevonden dat acties (iets gedaan hebben) meer spijt tot gevolg hebben op de korte termijn, terwijl passiviteit (iets niet gedaan hebben) juist meer spijt tot gevolg heeft naarmate een langere tijdsduur verstrijkt. In deze scriptie wordt op deze resultaten voortgebouwd. Onderzocht werd of een dergelijk tijd-effect ook bestaat voor de emoties schaamte en schuld. Schaamte is een emotie die zich vooral richt op het zelf, terwijl schuld zich richt op situaties. De hypothese in het onderzoek was dat voor de ervaring van schaamte niet zou uitmaken of sprake was van iets gedaan of niet gedaan hebben, in tegenstelling met de ervaring van schuld. Dit omdat het voor mensen moeilijk is voor te stellen dat zijzelf anders zouden zijn geweest (zelfbeeld is stabiel door de tijd heen), maar daarentegen juist makkelijker om zich voor te stellen dat een situatie anders zou zijn geweest. Deelnemers lazen verschillende versies van scenarios die ofwel schaamte ofwel schuld opriepen. Daarnaast werd ook handelen versus niet handelen en tijdsduur gemanipuleerd, hetgeen resulteerde in een 2x2x2 tussen proefpersonen onderzoeksopzet. De hypothese werd niet bevestigd. Wel werden significante verschillen gevonden tussen gebeurtenissen die zich kort gelden (1 dag) en lang gelden (6 maanden) hadden voorgedaan voor het schuld-scenario. Daarnaast gaven proefpersonen die het schaamte-scenario hadden gelezen aan meer schaamte te ervaren als gevolg van iets dat ze gedaan hadden ten opzichte van iets dat ze niet gedaan hadden. De implicaties hiervan voor toekomstig onderzoek worden besproken.

The temporal pattern of Shame and Guilt

Abstract In previous research it has been found that actions produce more regret in the short term, but contrarily- failures to act produce more regret in the long run. This thesis draws on these findings, investigating whether such a temporal effect also exists for the other counterfactual emotions shame and guilt. It is hypothesized that for guilt such an effect would exist, but not for shame. Participants read about situations evoking either shame or guilt, over actions and inactions (event type) on the short-term or long run (2x2x2 between subjects design). The results did not give support for this hypothesis. However, significant differences between events that happened in the short term (1 day ago) compared to events that happened in the long run (6 months ago) were found for the participants that read a guilt-inducing scenario. When participants were presented with the shame scenario a significant difference between event type (action and inaction) was found: participants reported more shame because of actions compared to inactions. Implications for further research are discussed.

Keywords: shame, guilt, regret, counterfactual thinking, simulation heuristic, norm theory, action, inaction

The temporal pattern of Shame and Guilt

Foreword I would like to thank Kai for his supervision of this thesis. Not only did he give constructive feedback and inspiration, he also also places a high value in interpersonal relations. I remember him, when we had an appointment, always first asking how I was doing before going to business. I did appreciate that a lot. I would also like to thank my parents for their support throughout my studies and Amy for proofreading parts of it. Conducting a large research project and writing a thesis about is was not always an easy job. However, I found and still find that counterfactual emotions (the topic of this thesis) is one of the most interesting and compelling subjects in (social) psychology and I am glad to have been able to explore it and maybe even having contributed a little to the understanding of the complex functioning of these emotions. Writing this thesis has been a valuable experience.

Amsterdam, January 2014 Joost Knaap

The temporal pattern of Shame and Guilt

For all sad words of tongue or pen, the saddest are these: It might have been! -- John Greenleaf Whittier (1989) If we didnt have birthdays, you wouldnt be you If youd never been born, well then what would you do? If youd never been born, well then what would you be? You might be a fish! Or a toad in a tree! You might be a doorknob! Or three baked potatoes! You might be a bag full of hard green tomatoes! Or worse than that.. You might be a WASNT! A Wasnt has no fun at all. No, he doesnt. A Wasnt just isnt. he isnt present. But you You are YOU! And, now isnt that pleasant. -- Theodor Seuss Geisel (1959)

Every path is the right path. Everything could have been anything else and it would have just as much meaning. -- Quote from the movie Mr Nobody (Van Dormael, 2009)

The temporal pattern of Shame and Guilt

Contents LITERATURE REVIEW ........................................................................................................... 7

SIMULATION HEURISTIC ............................................................................................................................................. 7 REGRET................................................................................................................................................................ 10 SHAME AND GUILT, WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE? ............................................................................................................ 13 HYPOTHESES ......................................................................................................................................................... 14

METHOD ................................................................................................................................. 16 RESULTS................................................................................................................................. 18 DISCUSSION .......................................................................................................................... 21 REFERENCES ......................................................................................................................... 24 APPENDIX A: ADAPTED VERSION OF THE TEST OF SELF-CONSCIOUS AFFECT..27

The temporal pattern of Shame and Guilt

Literature review Simulation heuristic Humankind has the ability to do a remarkable thing: it can travel forward or backward in subjective time, that is: reviewing and thinking about past events, which can be viewed as mental time travelling (Mandel, Hilton & Catellani, 2005). Mandel and colleagues (2005, p.1) describe this feature of the human mind as a truly outstanding evolutionary feat, one that has propelled our species far beyond even the most formidable powers of retrospection. Kahneman and Tversky (1982) were among the first to theorize about this phenomenon. They describe two classes of mental operations that can bring things to the mind: retrieval or construction. With regard to the construction class they come up with a mental operation they term the simulation heuristic. This simulation heuristic holds that people run events through in their minds chronologically to assess likely consequences and to aid judgement. Examples of judgmental activities in which mental simulation appears to be involved are (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982): prediction (for example when imagining how people will behave in the future), assessing the probability of a specified event (e.g. how do you assess the likelihood of American armed intervention in Saudi Arabia in the next decade?) assessing conditioned probabilities (e.g. if civil war breaks out in Saudi Arabia, what are the likely consequences?) or assessments of causality (to test whether event A caused event B, we may undo event A in our mind, and observe whether B still occurs in the simulation). Another important example of the simulation heuristic (on which the focus lies in this research paper) is counterfactual reasoning; the mental simulation of how events might have occurred in a different manner (Fiske & Taylor, 2008). Roese and Olson (1995) argue that this ability to imagine alternative (i.e. counterfactual) outcomes is an omnipresent and essential feature of our (mental) lives. Counterfactuals are frequently conditional propositions that include both an antecedent and a consequent (e.g. if A (antecedent) than B (consequent); Roese, 1997). Kahneman and Tversky (1982) proposed a series of hypotheses. One of these was that counterfactual simulations are normality-restoring. For example, in their study, participants read a scenario about Mr. Jones, a 47 year old father of three and a successful banking executive. There were two versions of the scenario. In the first version Mr. Jones left his office at the normal time but he took a different route as than he normally did (route-scenario). In the second version of the story, Mr. Jones left the office early to take care of some household chores, but did drive
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home along his normal route. The scenario also included the information that he occasionally took a different route along the shore, but did not do so in this instance. In both versions of the scenario Mr. Jones got involved in a car accident in which he is killed. After reading the scenario participants were asked to produce, if only... statements. It was found that the subjects that read the route-scenario were likely to undo the accident by imagining Mr. Jones driving along his normal route (restoring of normality) instead of leaving office at a different time (introducing an exception). After reading the time-scenario participants were more likely to imagine Mr. Jones leaving office at the usual time (restoring of normality) than think of a version in which he drove along the shore (introducing an exception). It appears that it is easier for a person that engages in counterfactual thinking to imagine that something that rarely happens would not have happened at all (i.e. easier to reason that Mr. Jones would have left the office at the usual time or that he would have driven home along his normal route). Only very rarely people tend to undo events by making mutations that involve mentally deleting normal antecedents or inventing new ones instead of deleting abnormal antecedents. Another idea by Kahneman and Tversky (1982) was that the ease of undoing has implications for the intensity of emotions that people experience and judgements they make. For example, a second scenario depicted two persons, Mr. Crane and Mr. Tees, who were scheduled to leave the airport on different flights, at the same time (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). Both used the same car and were 30 minutes late for their flights, due to traffic congestion. Mr Crane is told that his flight left on time, whereas Mr. Tees is told that his flight was delayed and has just left, only 5 minutes ago. Participants were asked to indicate who they thought would be more upset. Almost every participant (96 %) stated that Mr. Tees would be the person most upset about missing his flight. This is remarkable, because strict objectively seen, there is not a real difference in outcome between the two, both are in the same situation of missing their flights. Kahneman and Tversky (1982) argue that it seems that participants engage in a simulation exercise, in which they test how close they came to reaching their flight in time. Mr. Tees is now thought to be more disappointed because it is easier for him to imagine that he could have still caught his plane if he would have arrived 5 minutes earlier on the airport, whereas it is more difficult for Mr. Tees to imagine a situation in which the 30 minutes delay could have been avoided.

The temporal pattern of Shame and Guilt

Norm theory To shortly summarize the key concepts proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1982): counterfactuals are normality restoring (1), some alternatives are closer to reality than others (2) and the effect this has on the ease of undoing is linked with the intensity of emotions experienced (3). These propositions are included and elaborated further upon in norm theory (Kahneman and Miller, 1986). Norm theory states that the judgemental and affective reactions to past events are influenced by a certain standard of comparison; cognitive reference points that are used as a norm (Mandel et al., 2005). People who engage in counterfactual thought seek to find restoration of that norm-state. In norm theory, counterfactual alternatives are thought to be constructed ad hoc (online). An assumption that is derived from norm theory is the emotional amplification hypothesis (Kahneman & Miller, 1986). According to this hypothesis the affective response to an event is enhanced if its causes are abnormal. The findings by Kahneman and Tversky (1982) that Mr. Tees would be most upset after missing his flight (with only 5 minutes), for example, are a clear exhibition of this hypothesis (because Mr. Tees plane was delayed, which is a deviation from normality). Another exhibition of norm theory was demonstrated by Miller and McFarland (1986). Participants were presented with a scenario in which a person fell victim of a shooting incident while walking to a shop (Miller & McFarland, 1986). In one version it was a shop he frequently went by, in another version it was a shop he rarely visited. The dependent variable was the amount of money participants awarded to the victim as compensation. It was found that the participants awarded significantly more money to the victim who went to the shop he usually very rarely frequented (e.g. the more abnormal version). The emotional amplification hypothesis implies that counterfactuals tend to have a direction. They can be either positive when imagined alternative circumstances are evaluated better than actuality (upward counterfactuals), or negative when alternative circumstances are evaluated worse than actuality (downward counterfactuals; Roese, 1997). Both types of counterfactual thinking, downward and upward, seem to have a functional basis. Downward counterfactual thinking, for example, can be adaptive in helping to (re)gain positive affect (Roese, 1994). As for downward counterfactual thinking, feeling bad results in if only-thoughts, which leads to the imagination of a better world (Roese, 1997). In these situations imagining how things could have happened differently facilitates a
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better understanding of the world. This reconsideration of the past, and creating alternatives to what actually has happened, can be useful in helping to adapt, and improve outcomes in the future (e.g. Roese, 1994; Roese, 1997). For example, if Tommy failed an exam and realises that he would have passed it, had he studied more, than he has identified a causally antecedent action that he can use in the future to improve his performance (Roese, 1997). Although upward counterfactuals can have both positive (better understanding of the world) and negative consequences (feeling bad) that often stand in a state of tension with each other, the net result will thus be positive on average (e.g. better future performance; Roese, 1997).

Regret Counterfactual thinking is associated with specific affective experiences. Regret is, together with the self-conscious emotions shame and guilt (see the next paragraph) pre-eminently associated with the production of counterfactual thoughts. Gilovich and Medvec (1994, p.357) use an aptly metaphor: Regrets are like taxes: nearly everyone must suffer them. It seems almost impossible for a person to live his life without regretting anything. Regret is typically felt in response to decisions that produce unfavorable outcomes, compared to the alternative (Van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2006). It has been found that regret leads to feelings that one should have known better, having a sinking feeling, thoughts about the mistake that was made and opportunities that were lost, feeling a tendency to kick oneself, and wanting to undo the event and get a second chance (Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead & van der Pligt, 1998). One important factor determining the amplitude of regret is whether the emotions was caused by actions or inactions. Numerous studies (see for an overview e.g. Gilovich & Medvec, 1995) show that people experience more regret caused by actions than by failures to act (e.g. failing to seize the moment). For example Kahneman and Tversky (1982) let participants read the following scenario: Mr. Paul owns share in company A. During the past year he considered switching to stock in company B, but he decided against it. He now finds out he would have been better off by $1.200 if he had switched to the stock of company B. Mr. George owned shares in company B. During the past year he switched to stock in company A. He now finds that he would have been better off by $1.200 if he had kept his stock in company B. Who feels greater regret?
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Participants answered in great majority (92%) that they thought that Mr. George (who loses money because he fails to act) would experience more regret. Gilovich and Medvec (1994) elaborated on this theory and came up with the notion of a temporal pattern of regret, differentiating between short and long term periods of time after an event took place. When participants were asked what they regretted most in life, among the most common regrets participants reported were: missed educational opportunities, failures to seize the moment, not spending enough time with friends and relatives and rushed in too soon (Gilovich and Medvec, 1994, Study 2). Only the last regret is caused by an action, all the others regrets imply failures to act. In another study (Gilovich & Medvec, 1994, Study 3 and 4) participants were presented with a scenario that read as follows: Dave and Jim do not know each other, but both are enrolled at the same elite East Coast University. Both are only moderately satisfied where they are and both are considering transferring to another prestigious school. Each agonizes over the decision, going back and forth between thinking he is going to stay and thinking he will leave. They ultimately make different decisions: Dave opts to stay where he is and Jim decides to transfer. Suppose their decisions turn out badly for both of them: Dave still doesn't like it where he is and wishes he had transferred, and Jim doesn't like his new environment and wishes he had stayed. After reading the scenario it was asked which of the persons depicted in the story would experience more regret, either in the short term or in the long run. The results were that in the short term subjects actions (Jims transfer to a different university) produced more regret than their inactions (Dave staying at the university), however, in the long run a reverse effect showed. A failure to act led to more regret in the long run than an action. Gilovich and Medvec (1994) give several explanations for this effect. They suggest that there is a asymmetry in how easy people engage in behavioral adjustment a situation they feel bad about. It is easier for people to follows action with another action than it is to follow inaction with an action. Additionally people are more inclined to engage in dissonance reduction for actions than for inactions, because tend to feel more responsible for their actions than inactions (without responsibility there is less dissonance). Both theories (asymmetries in ameliorative behavior and differential dissonance reduction) lead to the diminishing of the string of regrettable action (Gilovich & Medvec, 1994, p. 362). That is: the higher amount of regret experienced after actions in the short run causes psychological (dissonance reduction)
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and behavioral mechanisms (reparative action) to come in place which diminish regret. Contrarily people do use these strategies less when inactions are concerned and end up regretting their failures to act more in the long run. A possible explanation is that the reasons why one did not act in the past seem to become less pressing and harder to image (i.e. less salient), when time passes (Gilovich & Medvec, 1994). Therefore it may be easier to think about why one acted, but more difficult why one did not. In the short-term people rely on bottom-up processes that elicit specific memories, whether over time, people rely top-down processes. Because of this much less accurate and abstract way of processing, it is harder for people to remember the reasons why one did not act, leading to greater regret in the long term (Gilovich & Medvec, 1994). Furthermore, Leach and Plaks (2009) found that the way in which actions and inactions are usually represented plays a major role in assessing the perceived amount of regret of events. That is: actions tend to be more concrete than inactions. For a better understanding the difference between abstract versus concrete representation it can be useful to image a person ringing a doorbell (Leach & Plaks, 2009). This persons behavior can be described either in abstract terms as calling on a friend (which is a higher level representation) or concretely as pushing a button (lower level representation). A change in a high level representation of an event produces major changes in the meaning of the event, whereas a change in a lower level representation produces only relatively minor changes in the meaning of the event, which makes this a key difference between the two (Trope & Liberman, 2003). Construal level theory (Trope & Liberman, 2003) states that details about distant future events are often knowable only as the time draws closer, which causes people to associate distant future events with abstract concepts (e.g. composing of general, superordinate and essential features). When - in contrast - the event is coming nearer, concrete considerations (e.g., subordinate goals, specifics of the situation) are more fruitful for a successful execution of the task at hand. Actions tend to be more concrete in that they are more causal than inactions (Leach & Plaks, 2009). That is: a strong and concrete subjective link exists between action and its effects. Contrarily, such a link is absent for inactions, which leads to a more abstract processing. It was found, for example, that participants greater regret for inactions in the distant term was mediated by the level of abstraction (Leach & Plaks, 2009); distant term inactions were regretted more than actions only when they were represented abstractly. This in turn causes a greater memorability for the event and an increased focus on the broader implications.

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Shame and guilt, what is the difference?

Both shame and guilt are negatively valenced, self-relevant emotions (Niedental, Tagney & Gavanski, 1994). Studies suggest that the function of these emotions is to guide behavior that conforms to social and moral norms and to promote restitution from misdeeds (Parrott, 2001). Although most people use the terms shame and guilt in an interchangeable manner, there have been made numerous attempts to differentiate between the two emotions (see for an overview Tangney & Tracy, 2012). The main approach in the field has for long been based on the assumption that shame and guilt can be differentiated by the types of situations that induce these emotions. Shame was thought to be an affective reaction following public exposure (and disapproval) of some shortcoming. Guilt on the other hand was thought to be a reaction of the internalized conscience of a person when ones personal standards are violated and could in this manner be seen a more private emotion. Evidence for this theory is mixed. For example, Walbott and Scherer (1995) conducted a large-scale cross-cultural study in which participants from different cultures were asked to recall situations in which they had experienced a whole range of different emotions including shame and guilt. It was found that shame experiences were elicited significantly more often by other people or by external sources, whereas guilt experiences were more often attributed to the self. Walbott and Scherer (1995, p. 174) conclude: This [finding] is consistent with the idea that guilt is caused by internal sanctions, whereas shame is caused by external sanctions emanating from other people of institutions. On the other hand, there is empirical evidence that although shame and guilt occurred most often in social contexts, also solitary shame experiences were not uncommon (e.g. Tangney, Miller, Flicker & Barlow, 1996). Helen Block Lewis (1971) was the first to come up with a different theory that draws upon the role of the self instead of the role of private-public situations. She theorises that a distinction of shame and guilt can be made on the basis of the functional role of the self. In her theory the experience of shame is associated with the self, which is the focus of evaluation, whereas the self is not the central object of evaluation in guilt. Instead, the focus in guilt lies on the thing done or undone. As a result shame leads to a fairly global self-condemnation, whereas guilt is experienced somewhat apart from the self (Niedenthal et al., 1994). A consequence of this is that shame and guilt seem to be involved in different types of counterfactual thinking. For example, Niedenthal and colleagues (1994, study 1) asked subjects
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to read about two situations inducing shame or guilt and then to undo these situations (i.e. generating counterfactuals). It was found that subjects tended to undo the shame inducing situations by altering the self, whereas subjects tended to undo guilt situations by altering actions (behavior). In a second study (Niedental et al., 1994, study 2), participants read about an ambiguous event that could induce both shame and guilt. Subsequently, participants were asked to produce counterfactuals in which they either altered the self or behavior. This led to similar results. Subjects who were asked to change the self, reported to experience more shame subsequently, whereas subjects who were asked to change behavior experienced more guilt. Tracy and Robins (2006) found that individuals do not regulate feelings of guilt through making external attributions. Instead, they make internal attributions, which lead to an even greater experience of guilt. It seems that guilt is regulated behavioral rather than cognitive (Tracy & Robins, 2006). Guilt motivates reparative behavior (apology, future hard work). In contrast shame leads to blaming stable, uncontrollable aspects of the self (Tracy & Robins, 2006). Therefore, an ashamed person has to adopt a longterm strategy of behavioral modification to reduce the emotional experience of shame. That is: working toward becoming a different kind of person.

Hypotheses In the present study the main aim is to investigate whether actions and failures to act have also consequences for the experience of shame and guilt. In addition it is investigated whether the temporal pattern reported by Gilovich and Medvec (1994) exists for the experience of shame and guilt as well. In the literature it has been shown that some aspects of reality are appear more mutable than others, depending on the relative ease to which aspects of reality can be altered to produce counterfactuals (Kahneman & Miller, 1986). This concept could be useful to make a distinction between shame and guilt. Shame is pre-eminently an emotion focused on the self, whereas guilt is focused on situational factors (e.g. Niedenthal et al., 1994). Because the self-concept is viewed as relatively stable over time (e.g. Demo, 1992) it is hypothesized that events inducing shame are less mutable than events inducing guilt. This idea hinges on the premise that it is considerably easier for a person to imagine how a situation could have been different (if only I didt), compared to how he himself could be different (if only I werent). As a result it is assumed that the reversed effect on the time dimension (inactions induce more regret in the long run) will show for situations inducing
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guilt, but not shame.

It short is expected that: - In the short-term subjects experience greater guilt stemming from actions than from inactions (hypothesis 1); - In the long run subjects experience greater guilt stemming from inactions than from actions (hypothesis 2); - No such time effect exists for the experience of shame (hypothesis 3). That is: in both the short-term and long run subjects experience greater shame from inactions than from actions.

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Method Participants and design. 234 undergraduate Psychology students at the University of Groningen took part in the present study, of which 70 were male and 164 female. The youngest participant was 18 years old, the oldest 29, whereas the mean age of all the participants was 20.35. The participants received credits in exchange for their participation and were randomly assigned to one of the six experimental conditions. The study can be characterized as a 2 (shame vs. guilt) x 2 (short vs. long term) x 2 (action vs. inaction) between subjects design. Procedure. After completing an assent form, participants read one of six scenarios, which were an adaption of the original scenarios used by Niedenthal, Tangley and Gavanski (1994). The participants were asked to carefully read the scenario and to imagine experiencing the situation that was described. It was noted that it was not important for the experiment whether they thought the experiences could actually happen, but that the researchers were interested in their thoughts about the experiences if they were to happen. The scenario inducing shame stemming from an action (scenario 1a) read as follows (with the short vs. long term conditions in bold): Imagine yourself sitting in a class of 15 students that is taught by a professor you admire more than any other on campus. You really believe that he/she is brilliant. The professor asks a question about one of the readings/assignments and you immediately volunteer the answer with some enthusiasm. But its the wrong answer, the professor informs you somewhat dryly and he/she turns to address another student in the class. Please image that this event [has happened 1 day ago / has happened six months ago]. The scenario inducing shame stemming from an inaction (scenario 1b) read as follows: Imagine yourself sitting in a class of 15 students that is taught by a professor you admire more than any other on campus. You really believe that he/she is brilliant. The professor asks a question about one of the readings/assignments where you have previously written an essay about. Everybody in class expects you to answer it. But you seem paralyzed and keep quiet. The professor looks disappointed and addresses another

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student in the class. Please image that this event [has happened 1 day ago / has happened six months ago]. The scenario inducing guilt stemming from an action (scenario 2a) read as follows: You are house-sitting for a friends parents. Its a pretty easy task actually. All you have to do is eat their food, collect the mail, and feed their bird. Everything is going just fine until one morning you discover that the bird died during the night. You did not feed him with the bird food as you were instructed but you bought some nuts on the market yourself. The bird died from choking while swallowing a particularly large nut. Please image that this event [has happened 1 day ago / has happened six months ago]. The scenario inducing guilt stemming from an inaction (scenario 2b) read as follows: You are house-sitting for a friends parents. Its a pretty easy task actually. All you have to do is eat their food, collect the mail, and feed their bird. Everything is going just fine until one morning you discover that the bird died during the night. You forgot to turn the air conditioning down at night as you had been instructed. The bird died from the excessive cold. Please image that this event [has happened 1 day ago / has happened six months ago]. After this, participant were asked to indicate to what extent they agreed with a number of statements adapted from the Test of Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA; Tangney, Wagner & Gramzow, 1989). The ratings were done on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from totally agree till totally disagree. An example of a statement measuring shame is You would feel like you wanted to hide. An example of a statement indicating feelings of guilt is You would feel unhappy and eager to correct the situation (the complete survey is added as a supplement to this thesis). Manipulation checks. After these statements participants answered three questions that served as a manipulation check. They were asked how long ago the events portrayed in the scenario were supposed to happen (time manipulation check) and whether he or she thought the event happened because he did something or did not do something (action vs. inaction manipulation check). After this, the participant indicated whether other people knew about the

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events that had happened (guilt-shame manipulation check). Finally the participant was asked how big the change would be that he would feel the same way in a similar situation. Results The data met the assumptions of homogeneity of variance. The dependent variable shame was normally distributed (for the groups that consisted of the combination of the levels of action (action versus failure to act) and time (long versus short; Shapiro-Wilk > .05). There was an indication that the dependent variable guilt was not normally distributed (Shapiro-Wilk <.05). However, since a large sample was used a subsequent ANOVA seemed still feasible. There were no missing data. Cronbachs alpha for the items measuring shame was .90 indicating a high internal consistency, whereas this was .75 for the items measuring guilt. No items were deleted. All data were analysed by two-way analyses of variance with time (long or short) and event-type (action versus inaction) as the independent variables and either shame or guilt as the dependent variable. After this an ANOVA with repeated measures with a GreenhouseGeisser correction (as the data violated the assumption of sphericity) was conducted.

The present study hinges on three hypotheses, that will shortly be presented here again. First, it is expected that in the short-term subjects experience greater guilt stemming from actions than from inactions (hypothesis 1). Furthermore, it is hypothesized that in the long run subjects experience greater guilt stemming from inactions than from actions (hypothesis 2) and that no such time effect exists for the experience of shame (hypothesis 3), that is: subjects experience more guilt over inactions in both the short term and the long run. Guilt scenario measuring shame A two-way analysis of variance with time and event-type as the independent variables and shame as the independent variable was conducted. A main effect existed on the time dimension for amount of shame experienced for participants who had read the guilt scenario (F(1,100) = 9.11, p < .01). They reported less shame (M = 2.78, SD = .68) when asked to imagine that the events described in the scenario happened a long time ago (6 months), compared to when they were asked to imagine that they happened only a day ago (M = 3.19, SD = .76). No other effects were found to be significant.

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Guilt scenario measuring guilt Similarly, a two-way analysis of variance with time and event-type as the independent variables and guilt as the independent variable showed a main effect on the time dimension (F(1,100) = 10.71, p = .01), for the subjects that were presented with the guilt scenario. Again, participants reported experiencing less guilt if they read about events that happened a long time ago (M = 3.22, SD = .67), versus not long ago (M = 3.63, SD = .57).

Shame scenario measuring shame A significant effect existed between the scenario in which an action was described compared to the scenario in which an inaction was described (F(1,126) = 10.538 , p = .01). It was found that when subjects read about an event that induced shame because they failed to do something, they reported more shame (M = 2.93, SD = .73), than when they read a scenario in which they did something (M = 2.49, SD = .73). No other effects were significant. Shame scenario measuring guilt Interestingly, also a significant difference between actions (M = 2.73, SD = .76) and inactions (M = 3.21, SD = .67) was found for guilt when participants were presented with the shame scenario (F(1,126) = 14.45, p < .01), that is: participants reported more guilt over failures to act. No other significant effects were found. Repeated measures ANOVA for the guilt scenarios A repeated measures ANOVA with a Greenhouse-Geisser correction determined that mean ratings on the guilt scale differed significantly from mean ratings on the shame scale for the participants that were presented with a guilt scenario (F(1, 100) = 56.80, p < 0.01). In accordance with what one might expect, indeed ratings on the guilt scale (M = 3.41, SD = .66) were higher than on the shame scale (M = 2.97, SD = .74). Additionally it was found that a significant effect existed with respect to the time dimension (F(1,100) = 12.16, p < .01). Repeated measures ANOVA for the shame scenarios Similarly, a repeated measures ANOVA with a Greenhouse-Geisser correction showed that mean ratings on the guilt scale differed statistically significantly from mean ratings on the shame scale for the participants that were presented with a shame scenario (F(1, 126) = 26.17, p < .01). Contrary to what one would expect, ratings on the guilt scale were higher (M = 2.75, SD = .76), than on the shame scale (M = 2.73, SD = .76), indicating that participants did
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experience more guilt instead of shame when confronted with a shame scenario. An significant effect existed between the scenario in which an action was described compared to the one in which an failure to act was described (F(1,126) = 14.75, p < 0.01), indicating that ratings on the shame and guilt scales were on average higher for inactions than actions. Manipulation checks Almost all participants answered the time manipulation check (How long ago did the events portrayed in the story happen?) correctly. Two participants answered that they did not now and one answered 34 (without specification whether this were days or months). Another two participants answered that they read about events that happened 2 years ago, whereas another answered 4 weeks (this actually was the 6 months condition), and one participant reported that the events were supposed to happen 3 years ago (whereas he or she was in the 1 day condition). With regard to whether the events in the scenario happened because of an action or an inaction 33 participants (of 234 in total) failed this check, whereas 41 failed the guiltshame manipulation check. The participants indicated a change of average 70.14 % (SD=22.55) that they would feel the same in a similar situation. An additional analysis of the data was carried out, in which all participants that failed one or more manipulation checks were eliminated. In total 79 responses were eliminated. All effects of the previous analysis were found. Only, the finding that the participants that read the guilt scenario reported less shame in the long run was not replicated, that is: in the second analysis no effect was found.

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Discussion Previous research on counterfactual thinking has shown that people tend to experience more regret over actions than inactions on the short run, but as time passes, a shift takes place: people tend to experience more regret because of things they failed to do compared to the things they did (Gilovich & Medvec, 1994). A possible explanation is that the reasons why one did not act in the past seem to become less pressing and harder to image (i.e. less salient), when time passes (Gilovich & Medvec, 1994). Therefore it may be easier to think about why one acted, but more difficult why one did not. Peoples regret may thus intensify because the failure to act in the past seems inexplicable to them in the present. In the present research it was expected that the time effect observed for the experience of regret would exist for the experience of shame and guilt as well. Since shame is pre-eminently an emotion focused on the self (whereas guilt is focused on situational factors) and the selfconcept is viewed as relatively stable over time it was hypothesized that events inducing shame are less mutable than events inducing guilt. This idea hinges on the premise that it is considerably easier for a person to imagine how a situation could have been different (if only I didt), compared to how his own behavior could be different (if only I werent). It was expected that in the short-term subjects experience greater guilt stemming from actions than from inactions (hypothesis 1). Furthermore, it was expected that in the long run subjects would experience greater guilt stemming from inactions than from actions (hypothesis 2) and that no such time effect exists for the experience of shame (hypothesis 3), that is: subjects experience more guilt over inactions in both the short term and the long run. The results did not give support for this hypothesis. When participants were presented with the bird scenario (inducing guilt) they experienced overall more guilt in the short term (compared to the long run), but this was independent of event type (action and inaction). When participants were presented with the professor scenario (inducing shame) a significant difference between event type (action and inaction) was found. That is: overall, participants who read the professor scenario experienced more shame as a consequence of something they failed to do compared to something they did. This finding is in line with the idea that simulations are more likely to increase the perceived likelihood of a potential outcome than to reduce the probability or extent of an outcome. It has been shown in previous research (e.g. Dunning and Parpal, 1989), that in general simulations are more likely to increase the perceived likelihood of a potential outcome
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(mental addition) than to reduce the probability or extent of an outcome (mental subtraction). Dunning and Parpal (1989, study 1) asked subjects to indicate how many more questions on a test they would get right if they studied 3 ours longer. Alternatively they asked how many fewer questions subjects would get right if they studied three hours less. Subjects estimated a greater impact when presented with the additive frame (studying 3 ours longer), than when presented with the subtractive frame (studying three hours less). In other words: although the time period of studying or not-studying was the same, subjects thought that studying for three hours more would result in a greater change in the amount of right answers, than studying less would. In a second study Dunning and Parpal (1989, study 2) asked students at Stanford University in what extent coming to Stanford as opposed to the university of their second choice had influenced their education, social life and future prospects. Other students estimated the potential consequences of attending their second favorite university. Also in this study subjects perceived greater impact when they were confronted with an additive (Stanford) as opposed to a subtractive frame (university of second choice). The effect seems to exist because people give more weight to features of the particular mental stimulation serving as the subject of comparison and place a higher value in factors that produce instead of inhibit the relevant outcome (Dunning & Parpal, 1989). People that engage in counterfactual thought because they have done something are eliminating that outcome (i.e. subtraction; if only I hadnt done that). On the other hand, people that engage in counterfactual thought because they did not do something are adding an outcome (i.e. mental addition; if only I did that). When people are thinking back about an event in which they failed to do something (inaction), compared to when they did do something (action), imagining that they would have acted will have greater impact. In the present study (counterfactual) thinking about not having answered the question of the professor (if only I didnt, which is mental subtraction) is harder for people than thinking about having answered the question (if only I did, which is mental addition). Because it is easier for participants to come up with counterfactuals for the outcome caused by an inaction (death of the bird by leaving a window open), they experience a higher amount of shame. However, a difference in time between actions and inactions (short versus long ago) such as in the classic regret studies by Gilovich and Medvec (1994) was not found. Morrison and Roese (2011, p.580) name an important disadvantage of using students as participants in research: College student samples are quick and cheap, but whether effects gleaned from such samples generalize to the wider population remains a key challenge for psychological theory. In their study they investigated real-life regrets using a national representative sample in the US and they
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did replicate the time effect (regrets over inactions were more common over long term). The notion that using students as participants can be problematic applies to the present study as well: a percentage between 10-20 % of the participants failed multiple manipulation checks. Another important shortcoming of the present study is the use of a scenario design, which leads to a diminishing of experimental realism compared to surveys assessing real life emotions (such as the study by Morrison and Roese, 2011). On the other hand: the participants did indicate indicated a chance of on average 70.14 % that they would feel the same in a similar (real world) situation. The clear disadvantage of asking participants about actual experiences is that it is harder to compare their answers with each other (as opposed to using a scenario). However, Morrison and Roese (2011) give a clear example of the fact that it is possible, however time consuming and costly. A rather curious finding was that participants reported experiencing a higher amount of guilt than shame when they were presented with a shame scenario (about the professor). Apparently the scenario did produce more guilt than shame. Niedenthal and colleagues (1994), however, did find in a pilot study, using the exact same professor scenario, that participants rated the scenario 4.82 on the shame scale and 2.51 on the guilt scale. In the present study the participants rated the professor scenario 2.75 on the guilt scale and 2.73 on the shame scale. Part of the difference can be explained by measurement differences: the scale Niedenthal and colleagues used was a 7 point scale, whereas in the present study a 5 point scale was used. However, why participants rated a higher amount of guilt instead of shame for the professor scenario (that was supposed to induce shame) cannot be explained by this. Conclusion A temporal effect for actions and inactions in the experience of shame and guilt, such as Gilovic and Medvec (1994) found (in which actions produce more regret in the short term and inactions in the long run) failed to show in this study. However, it was found that participants that read a scenario inducing shame experienced more shame as a consequence of something they failed to do compared to something they did (without a time effect). Participants that read a scenario inducing guilt experienced more guilt in the short term, compared to the long run. To further investigate how these emotions operate in time, additional research is needed, in which as a recommendation real life emotional events are taken into account.

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References Demo, D. (1992). The self-concept over time: Research issues and directions. Annual Review of Sociology, 18(1992), 303326 Dunning, D., & Parpal, M. (1989). Mental addition versus subtraction in counterfactual reasoning: on assessing the impact of personal actions and life events. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57(1), 515. Fiske, S., & Taylor, S. (2008). Social cognition. From brains to culture. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. Gilovich, T., & Medvec, V. H. (1994). The temporal pattern to the experience of regret. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67(3), 35765. Retrieved from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/7965599 Gilovich, T., & Medvec, V. H. (1995). The experience of regret: what, when, and why. Psychological Review, 102(2), 37995. Retrieved from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22115451 Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. (1986). Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives. Psychological review. Retrieved from http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/rev/93/2/136/ Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1982). The simulation heuristic. In D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, & A. Tversky, Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (pp. 201-208). New York: Cambridge university press. Leach, F. R., & Plaks, J. E. (2009). Regret for errors of commission and omission in the distant term versus near term: the role of level of abstraction. Personality & social psychology bulletin, 35(2), 2219. doi:10.1177/0146167208327001 Lewis, H. B. (1971). Shame and guilt in neurosis. New York: International Universities Press. Mandel, David R. Hilton, D. J., & Catellani, P. C. (Eds.). (2005). The Psychology of Counterfactual Thinking. London: Routledge.

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Morrison, M., & Roese, N. J. (2011). Regrets of the Typical American: Findings From a Nationally Representative Sample. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 2(6), 576583. doi:10.1177/1948550611401756 Miller, D. T., & McFarland, C. (1986). Counterfactual Thinking and Victim Compensation: A Test of Norm Theory. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 12(4), 513519. doi:10.1177/0146167286124014 Miller, Dale T., & Gunasegaram, S. (1990). Temporal order and the perceived mutability of events: Implications for blame assignment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59(6), 11111118. doi:10.1037//0022-3514.59.6.1111 Niedenthal, P. M., Tangney, J. P., & Gavanski, I. (1994). If only I werent versus if only I hadnt: distinguishing shame and guilt in counterfactual thinking. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67(4), 58595. Parrott, W. (2001). The nature of emotion. In T. A., & N. Schwarz, Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology: Intraindividual Processes (pp. 376-390). Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Roese, N. J., & Olson, J. M. (1995). What Might Have Been: The Social Psychology of Counterfactual Thinking. New Jersey: Erlbaum. Roese, N J. (1997). Counterfactual thinking. Psychological bulletin, 121(1), 13348. Roese, Neal J. (1994). The functional basis of counterfactual thinking. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66(5), 805818. doi:10.1037//0022-3514.66.5.805 Tangney, J. (1996). Conceptual and methodological issues in the assessment of shame and guilt. Behaviour research and therapy, 34(9), 741754. Tangney, J., & Dearing, R. (2003). Shame and guilt (pp. 447450) New York: Guilford. Tangney, J. P., Miller, R. S., Flicker, L., & Barlow, D. H. (1996). Are shame, guilt, and embarrassment distinct emotions? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70(6), 125669.

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Tangney, J., & Tracy, J. L. (2012). Self-conscious emotions. In M. Leary & J. Tangney (Eds.), Handbook of self and identity (pp. 446478).

Tangney, J.P., Wagner, P., & Gramzow, R. (1989). The Test of Self-Conscious Affect. (TOSCA). Fairfax: George Mason University. Tracy, J. L., & Robins, R. W. (2006). Appraisal antecedents of shame and guilt: support for a theoretical model. Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin, 32(10), 133951. doi:10.1177/0146167206290212 Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2003). Temporal construal. Psychological Review, 110(3), 403 421. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.110.3.403 Van Dijk, E., & Zeelenberg, M. (2006). The dampening effect of uncertainty on positive and negative emotions. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 19(2), 171176. doi:10.1002/bdm.504 Wallbott, H., & Scherer, K. (1995). Cultural determinants in experiencing shame and guilt. In: J.P. Tangney & K.W. Fischer (Eds.), Self-conscious emotions. New York: Guilford Zeelenberg, Marcel, van Dijk, W. W., Manstead, A., & der Pligt, J. (1998). The Experience of Regret and Disappointment. Cognition & Emotion, 12(2), 221230. doi:10.1080/026999398379727

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Appendix A: adapted version of the Test of Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA; Tangney, Wagner & Gramzow, 1989). Totally disagree You would feel like you wanted to hide You would feel inadequate You would feel stupid You would feel incompetent You would feel disgusted with your lack of will power and self-control You would feel immature You would feel like a coward You would think you are basically lazy You would think: This is making me anxious. I need either fix it or get someone else to x x x x x x x x x x Totally agree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

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Totally disagree You would think: Im terrible You would feel small ... like a mouse You would probably avoid eye-contact for a long time You would feel alone and apart from other people You would think about quitting You would feel: I deserve to be reprimanded You would keep quiet and avoid other people You would feel unhappy and eager to correct the situation You would feel you should not accept it x x x x x

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Totally agree

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Totally disagree You would probably think it over several times wondering if you could have avoided it You would regret that you put it off x

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Totally agree x

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