Southern Africa: Forecasts For Insecurity and Conflict in 2014

Southern Africa
Forecasts for insecurity and conflict in 2014
February 2014
Published by Open Briefing, 28 February 2014 Open Briefing 27 Old Gloucester treet Bloo!sbury "ondon #$1% &'( )nited *ingdo! +el ,44 -0.20 71/& /800 info1openbriefing2org www.openbriefing.org
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(out ern +frica

Forecasts for insecurity and conflict in 2014
Contents
Introduction Angola Botswana Madagascar Malawi Mozambique Namibia !out" A#rica !waziland %ambia %imbabwe 'e#erences
1 3 6 8 10 12 1 1$ 20 22 2& 2$
Introduction
Some narratives have painted Southern Africa as a region largely absent of conflict and insecurity. In reality instability persists beneath the surface due to ine!uitable settlements follo"ing independence or struggles for national liberation. #onflict and insecurity are products of a combination of volatile factors. $nderstanding these underlying drivers is critical to understanding events. %his study from &pen 'riefing attempts to avoid generalisations by analysing specific factors and identifying forecasts for individual countries in the region. %he drivers that are e(amined range from those influencing ongoing events to more structural long) term factors. *ence this report dra"s on a number of themes including: levels of poverty+ socio) political instability+ the democratic deficit+ incomplete transitions from autocracy to democracy+ the role of the armed forces+ youth bulges+ post)conflict environments+ the !uality of governance+ the impact of natural resources+ and small)arms flo"s. %hese factors are analysed "ith the purpose of understanding the "eight that they have in shaping the country,s recent history and its li-ely future. &ver .0 carefully vetted sources of !ualitative and !uantitative data "ere used throughout this study "ith numerous other local sources used for each individual country. Statistics and profiles from sources such as the /orld 'an- the $nited 0ations 1evelopment 2rogramme 3$0124 the 5conomist Intelligence $nit and the annual African Economic Outlook helped to identify the main features of a country. 0e"s articles from the ''# Al 6a7eera 8euters Africa #onfidential and local media provided a descriptive element that contributed to a better understanding of the dynamics of insecurity along the timeframe covered by this study. Intelligence and ris- companies such as #ontrol 8is-s and red24 provided up)to)date on)the)ground security overvie"s. And civil society organisations such as the International #risis 9roup *uman 8ights /atch 9lobal /itness and local 09&s provided bac-ground information on many of the factors outlined in the previous paragraph.
#opyright : 9oogle ;aps 2014
Southern Africa: Forecasts for insecurity and conflict in 2014
%he forecasts set out in this synthesis report derive from the application of the cone of plausibility method, "hich consists of isolating the main drivers that shape events in a country and enables the formulation of fair assumptions. From these assumptions three types of scenarios for 2014 have been developed: the baseline, "hich is the most li-ely outcome+ a plausible alternative, "hich is possible but less li-ely+ and a wildcard, "hich is possible but unli-ely and usually brings about dramatic outcomes. 5ach of the narratives is built around different assumptions for the same drivers "hich allo"s for the generation of differentiated but not impossible scenarios. %hese variables "ere applied according to specific features "ithin a country. Also included are brief country overvie"s and short analyses of the origins of current insecurity in each case.
This synthesis report focusses on 10 countries in Southern Africa whose drivers and internal volatility may create instability and conflict over 2014
%his synthesis report focusses on 10 countries in Southern Africa "hose drivers and internal volatility may create instability and conflict over 2014. /hile the region has in general e(perienced around t"o decades of freedom and prosperity drivers of insecurity remain. 2aramount among them is the gro"ing ine!uality bet"een rich and poor. %he ma<ority of citi7ens in the region are unable to en<oy the same level of prosperity as the small elite that has profited from the natural resource boom in Angola, Mozambique and Zambia, or the "ealthy "hite minority in Namibia and outh Africa! Another ma<or concern is the e(tent to "hich the region,s economies "ere affected by the global financial crisis particularly the diamond e(porters and tourist destinations such as "otswana and South Africa and the degree to "hich the emerging middle class in these countries have become dependent on credit to maintain their ne" lifestyles. 2olitics across the region continues to be dominated by an aging generation of figures involved in national liberation movements and =struggle credentials, "ill play a critical role in leadership successions in Zimbabwe, South Africa 0amibia Angola and ;o7ambi!ue in 2014. %hese !ualifications contrast significantly "ith the priorities of the educated =born free, generation many of "hom have no <ob prospects and feel disconnected from both political elites and popular narratives. A similar picture emerges in agrarian Malawi, "here the political class is engulfed in scandal ahead of elections in 2014 and in waziland, "hich remains an absolute monarchy in a region that leads the continent for political participation and human rights.
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%his report focuses on the above states and e(cludes the stable mountain -ingdom of >esotho and the prosperous island nations of #omoros ;auritius and Seychelles. *o"ever Madagascar is included in the study as it "ill pose a continued test for the Southern African 1evelopment #ommunity 3SA1#4 and international actors in 2014. In terms of the SA1# members not already mentioned the 1emocratic 8epublic of the #ongo "as included in a previous report on #entral Africa and %an7ania "ould be better treated alongside its neighbours in 5ast Africa. %his briefing paper is the last of three planned reports from &pen 'riefing forecasting insecurity and conflict in /est #entral and Southern Africa during 2014.
&pen 'riefing
Angola
2ost)civil "ar Angola has become one of the "orld,s fastest)gro"ing economies. *o"ever this ne"found prosperity is not being shared e!ually and the ma<ority of the population continue to live in poverty. Social indicators remain poor "ith the country ran-ed 14? of 1?@ on the $0 *uman 1evelopment Inde( and a life e(pectancy of .1. Furthermore Angola has the fifth highest democratic deficit on the continent. 6osB 5duardo dos Santos has served as president since 1C@C despite having never been directly elected. Alterations to the constitution sa" him re)inaugurated in 2012 as leader of the party "ith the largest share of the vote. *o"ever "ith his health deteriorating attention is focused on his succession.
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&rigins of insecurity
%he country is still recovering from a protracted civil "ar "aged bet"een different liberation movements "hich lasted from 1C@. to 2002. %he conflict claimed over one million lives e(acerbated by the intervention of #old /ar superpo"ers and apartheid)era South Africa. It only came to an end "hen 6onas Savimbi leader of $niDo 0acional para a IndependEncia %otal de Angola 3$0I%A4 "as -illed allo"ing the ;ovimento 2opular de >ibertaFDo de Angola 3;2>A4 led by dos Santos to triumph. Since the signing of the >uena ;emorandum of $nderstand 3;o$4 in April 2002 there has been no credible threat of a return to arms. 8egrettably the oil boom has led to an upsurge in patronage politics deployed effectively by dos Santos to prolong his rule. As such graft pervades in every level of society. Angola "as ran-ed 1.@th of 1@G countries in the 2012 #orruptions 2erceptions Inde(. *o"ever in recent years the government has ta-en steps to address a lac- of transparency in revenue generation and budget setting. 1omestic trade has been slo" to re-indle despite significant foreign direct investment and infrastructure development. %his is perhaps unsurprising given that the average cost of civil "ar according to the !orld "evelopment #eport 2011 is e!uivalent to more than A0 years of 912 gro"th for a medium)si7e developing country.
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Angola suffers from a significant youth bulge and it has one of the fastest population gro"th rates in Africa at over AH per annum. %he government has been struggling to deliver opportunities for its youth leading to frustration in urban areas culminating in a series of street protests in >uanda "hich "ould have been unthin-able a fe" years ago. %he government has restricted fundamental freedoms in response.
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A lo")level insurgency continues in #abinda province an enclave separated from the rest of Angola by the 8iver #ongo and a strip of the 1emocratic 8epublic of the #ongo. A 200G peace deal signed "ith the Frente para a >ibertaFDo do 5nclave de #abinda 3F>5#4 "as thought to have resolved the conflict until a dissident faction attac-ed the %ogolese national football team during the 2010 African #up of 0ations.
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;a<or protagonists and recent developments

Street protests have been gro"ing since ;arch 2011 led by unemployed urban young people "ho do not share their parents, loyalty to the ;2>A. 9radually opposition parties began to find their voice and formulate alternative political visions for the August 2012 general elections. 0evertheless the ;2>A too- @1.?H of the vote "inning 1@. of the 220 seats in the national assembly. $0I%A "on 1?.@H and doubled its representation to A2 seats+ "hile a ne" party #onvergEncia Ampla de SalvaFDo em Angola 3#ASA)#54 "on 10.4H and eight seats.
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&n 2A 0ovember 201A government security forces raided the head!uarters of $0I%A and #ASA)#5 as "ell as a number of provincial offices. &ver A00 people "ere arrested and at least three "ere -illed including ;anuel *ilberto de #arvalho =9anga, a leader of the #ASA)#5 youth "ing. %his has served only to reinforce lin-s bet"een disaffected youth and the opposition parties dividing the country further. >ocal elections scheduled for 2014 have been postponed to 201. officially in order to conduct the first census since 1C@0 but potentially to give the ;2>A additional time to recapture ground in the cities.
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/ithin the ;2>A the focus is on agreeing a successor to dos Santos. Although eligible under the constitution to serve t"o further five)year terms this is unli-ely due to his age and recent ill health. *e is rumoured to have cancer and during 201A spent over t"o months in Spain allegedly receiving treatment. *is li-ely successor is ;anuel Iicente vice)president since September 2012 and former #5& of the state oil company Sociedade 0acional de #ombustJveis de Angola 52 3Sonangol4. *o"ever there is gro"ing speculation that 6osB Filomeno dos Santos the president,s A.)year)old son -no"n as KBnL is in the running. *e is chair of the board of the ne" $SM. billion sovereign "ealth fund Fundo Soberano de Angola but has yet to become involved in daily politics. %he ;2>A old guard disli-e both men due to their lac- of political or military credentials. 9iven the lac- of an endorsed successor the prolonged absence from Angola or sudden death of dos Santos "ould lead to significant instability and the ris- of a coup d,Btat.
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Scenarios for 2014

"aseline% %he protests by unemployed urban youth continue to intensify. %he police respond "ith increased levels of coercion "hile the government further restricts fundamental freedoms. 0evertheless activists continue to ta-e to the streets recruit ne" supporters from among the unemployed youth and strengthen their alliance "ith the ma<or opposition parties #ASA)#5 and $0I%A. %his serves to deepen the divisions bet"een those "ho have profited from the post)"ar prosperity and those e(cluded from the peace dividend. $0I%A resorts to using inflammatory rhetoric concerning the failure of the post)"ar political settlement enabling it to regain the allegiance of the &vimbundu ethnic group from central Angola "hich had been closely aligned to the party during the civil "ar. %he party is thus able to count on support from the largest ethnic group consisting of A.)40H of the population together "ith disaffected urban youth and poses a serious threat to the ;2>A,s hegemony. /hile this does not lead to a resumption of the civil "ar it destabilises the country and gives the government further cause to postpone the local elections.
$ &pen 'riefing
1espite suffering from cancer dos Santos is dissuaded from standing do"n in 2014. *e instead spends increasing amounts of time overseas receiving treatment. As a result he becomes increasingly disconnected from the scale of the domestic unrest undermining e(ecutive decision) ma-ing and e(acerbating the response to protests. 'lausible alternative% 1eclining health forces dos Santos to handover the presidency to his chosen successor during 2014. Iincente assumes the presidency "hich is "elcomed by the international community but resented by many "ithin the ;2>A and civil "ar veterans due to his lac- of struggle credentials. /hile many Angolans respond "ith apathy due to Iincente,s lo" profile his pragmatic and pro)business mentality leads him to negotiate "ith the political opposition and find a solution to their grievances. *e is able to co)opt some youth leaders "ith the promise of reform political representation and patronage thus splitting the opposition before it is able to form a credible threat to his regime. (ildcard% 1os Santos dies in office "ithout officially declaring his successor leaving Iincente as his replacement in line "ith the provisions of the constitution. %he ;2>A splits into factions endorsing different candidates. &ne faction proposes a younger candidate KBnL the president,s eldest son to placate urban protests+ another "ants a man "ith military credentials and ta-es up arms to defend the legacy of the independence struggle. A coup d,Btat occurs undermining the post)"ar stability.
"eclinin$ health forces dos Santos to handover the presidency to his chosen successor durin$ 2014 %incente assumes the presidency& which is welcomed by the international community but resented by many within the '()A and civil war veterans due to his lack of stru$$le credentials
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'ots"ana
>andloc-ed 'ots"ana is often portrayed as one of Africa,s success stories: a "ealthy and democratic oasis of stability in a historically volatile neighbourhood. *o"ever the economy contracted in 200C primarily due to the global recession and the conse!uent decline in demand for diamonds and lu(ury tourism and the country remains vulnerable to changes in /estern fortunes. In 2011 diamond e(traction accounted for @.H of 'ots"ana,s e(port earnings .0H of government revenue and 40H of 912. 'ots"ana scores poorly on the 9ini coefficient "ith a score of GA ran-ing it alongside >esotho and South Africa as one of the most une!ual countries in the "orld. 'ots"ana also has the second highest rate of *IINAids infection on the continent behind S"a7iland. >ife e(pectancy has fallen from G4 years in 1CC0 to .A in 2011.
1C 1? 1@ 1G 1.
'ots"ana,s stability has endured because it has been able to ensure conflicts are limited to the <udicial and political sphere. *o"ever a potential flashpoint is the battle for political po"er both "ithin the ruling 'ots"ana 1emocratic 2arty 3'124 and among opposition political parties ahead of general elections scheduled for &ctober 2014. %he '12 has seen a slo" decline in its fortunes since leading the country to independence in 1CGG. Its ma<ority has gradually declined from ?0H in the 1CG. elections to .2H in 200C. Its current leader and president of 'ots"ana Ian Ohama lac-s the same respect as his predecessors. Ohama is the son of the founding president and his 'ritish "ife and he "as raised in Surrey educated at Sandhurst and does not spea- Sets"ana fluently limiting his popularity in rural areas. Another potential flashpoint is the government,s treatment of the 'asar"a or 'ushmen "ho are members of the indigenous San people. %he 'ushmen first came into conflict "ith the national government in 1CC@ but the situation escalated in 200.)0G and again in 201A "ith the imposition of a relocation policy. In 200. 1 @00 'ushmen "ere moved from their ancestral land on the #entral Oalahari 9ame 8eserve 3#O984 to ne"ly created settlements up to @0 -ilometres a"ay. It "as thought by many that the relocation "as due to diamond prospecting by 1e'eers
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though the
government claimed a desire among the 'ushmen to become settled agriculturists abandoning their hunter)gatherer lifestyle. %his policy embodies the e(clusion of non)%s"ana tribes in the country echoed by the failure of the constitution to recognise tribal chiefs other than of the eight Sets"ana)spea-ing groups that "ere paramount in founding the 'echuanaland 2rotectorate and leading 'ots"ana to independence. ;inority non)%s"ana tribes remain frustrated because they cannot live their traditional cultures and are often impoverished marginalised and e(ploited by the dominant groups.
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*otswana+s stability has endured because it has been able to ensure conflicts are limited to the ,udicial and political sphere
&pen 'riefing

%he president,s tough approach to"ards the trade unions during a t"o)month public)sector stri-e in mid)2011 cost him support in urban areas. A divisive figure Ohama caused the '12 to split in 200C) 10 leading to the emergence of a ne" opposition party the 'ots"ana ;ovement for 1emocracy 3';14. %he ';1 has subse!uently aligned "ith t"o other opposition parties the 'ots"ana 0ational Front 3'0F4 and the 'ots"ana 2eoplePs 2arty 3'224 to form a coalition -no"n as the $mbrella for 1emocratic #hange 3$1#4 under "hich they "ill contest the 2014 elections. %he $1# holds the same number of seats 3seven4 as another opposition party the 'ots"ana #ongress 2arty 3'#24. 2rimarily due to tensions bet"een the '#2 leader 1umelang Saleshando and the ';1 president 9omolemo ;ots"aledi the '#2 has so far refused to <oin the coalition. %ensions "ithin the ruling '12 have seen a change in fortunes for 2onatshego *onorius Oedi-il"e 3-no"n as 2*O4 "ho had served as ;inister of ;inerals 5nergy and /ater 8esources from 200@ and previously as chairman of the '12 until Ohama successfully challenged him for this role in 200A. In 6uly 2012 Oedi-il"e assumed the role of vice)president of 'ots"ana o"ing to the ill health of the incumbent ;ompati ;erafhe "hile in 1ecember 201A he succeeded Samson 9uma ;oyo as chairman of '12. Although too old to challenge or succeed Ohama as president Oedi-il"e "ill no doubt change the direction of the '12 campaign in 2014 and influence the selection of candidates in the forthcoming primaries.
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Scenarios for 2014

"aseline% %he '12 score less than .0H of the popular vote for the first time in the &ctober 2014 elections but retain a ma<ority of the .@ contested seats. 'oth the $1# and '#2 benefit increasing their number of ;2s to double digits for the first time. As the president is indirectly elected by parliament Ohama retains his position but "ith a reduced ma<ority. Furthermore he does not have a clear successor due to Oedi-il"e,s advanced age. Increased criticism of Ohama by both his party and the opposition only e(acerbates his authoritarian tendencies during his second full term. %he 'ushmen continue to be persecuted by the national government. %he buoyed opposition parties drive this issue as a means to undermine the government. In doing so they e(ploit tensions bet"een the Sets"ana)spea-ing tribes and the rest of the population thus highlighting the ine!ualities "hich e(ist in the country. 'lausible alternative% Ohama is able to retain the support of the ma<ority of the population due to the long)standing political dominance of the '12. *o"ever the e(tensive criticism of his leadership and the lac- of a clear successor sees influential members of the party ta-e their disputes out into the open destabilising the regime post)elections. (ildcard% %he '#2 is pressured by its domestic and international supporters to <oin the $mbrella for 1emocratic #hange ahead of the &ctober elections. %his poses a serious threat to the continued '12 hegemony and the election results lead to !uestions over Ohama,s leadership.
;adagascar
Situated in the Indian &cean off ;o7ambi!ue ;adagascar is the second largest island country in the "orld and has its o"n uni!ue ecosystem "hich had made the country an appealing tourist destination until the recent political crisis. *o"ever agriculture remains the primary focus of the economy employing ?0H of the population and accounting for more than a !uarter of 912. &ver G0H of the population of ;adagascar are under 24 years old "ith the median age 1C the same as the mother,s mean age at first birth. %he current population gro"th rate is 2.G.H per annum but li-ely to increase significantly as a result of these demographics.
2.
%he past five years in ;adagascar have been dominated by a political crisis "hich has undermined economic reform and deterred tourism foreign direct investment and aid and resulted in the termination of a free trade agreement "ith the $nited States threatening a nascent te(tiles industry. %hree underlying factors contributed to this crisis: a significant youth bulge divisions bet"een coastal and highland ;alagasy and a faltering economy.
2G
Three underlyin$ factors contributed to this crisis- a si$nificant youth bul$e& divisions between coastal and hi$hland 'ala$asy and a falterin$ economy ;a<or protagonists and recent developments
$nder a ne"ly)elected president ;adagascar is emerging from a long)running political crisis. In ;arch 200C the government of ;arc 8avalomanana 3president since 20024 "as dissolved follo"ing a military)bac-ed uprising led by Andry 8a<oelina a former mayor of the capital Antananarivo. 8a<oelina "as able to count on the support of the ;alagasy youth as leader of a movement named %anora mala9asy Ionona 3%9I4. *e served as president of the *igh %ransitional Authority 3*A%4 "hich governed the country and endorsed a ne" constitution. 2residential and parliamentary elections follo"ed in "hich 8a<oelina and 8avolamana agreed not to run. In the first round in &ctober 201A 6ean)>ouis 8obinson 3endorsed by the ousted 8avolamana4 led a cro"ded field of AA candidates "ith 21H of the vote follo"ed by *ery 8a<aonarimampianina 3the former finance minister supported by the incumbent 8a<oelina4 "ith 1GH. In 6anuary 2014 8a<aonarimampianina "as announced as "inner of a second round run)off "ith .A..H of the vote but on the turnout of only half of the electorate. 8obinson filed A00 complaints on the polls but the special electoral court ruled that the result should be respected.
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8a<oelina had been proposed as candidate for the post of prime minister but in late February committed not to stand averting the ris- of an opposition boycott of the ne" parliament. /ith a political settlement on the hori7on 2014 may be the year in "hich peace and prosperity finally return to ;adagascar.
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&pen 'riefing
Scenarios for 2014

"aseline% 9radually forces aligned to president)elect 8a<aonarimampianina are able to form alliances "ith enough other factions to command a "or-ing ma<ority in both the national assembly and senate. 9iven the polarisation of ;alagasy politics this is preferable to a cohabitation government "hich "ould create deadloc- and prolong the crisis. A council of ministers is not appointed until late ;arch or April 2014 thus delaying the resumption of aid programmes from the /orld 'an- and other donors. Fortunately as the former finance minister 8a<aonarimampianina is "ell placed to negotiate directly "ith international creditors donors and investors and agree a series of !uic- "ins. %his demonstrates that the country is once again =open for business, and in a position to "elcome tourists and investment. *e is able to count on the support of the African $nion and SA1# "hich are due to "elcome ;adagascar bac- follo"ing prolonged suspension. 8a<aonarimampianina is also able to count on the endorsement of former president 8a<oelina and the ;alagasy youth "ho rally around the ne" government eager to put the political crisis behind them and profit from an e(pansion of the mining and agricultural sectors. 8a<aonarimampianina sees these successes combined "ith the dominance of the political scene by the 8a<oelina faction and international support for a resolution of the political crisis as reason to call communal and regional elections in 2014. Irrespective of the election results the president uses his mandate to appoint his statutory !uota of eleven senators thus ensuring a ma<ority in the upper house "hich safeguards his term in office.
.radually& forces ali$ned to president/elect #a,aonarimampianina are able to form alliances with enou$h other factions to command a workin$ ma,ority in both the national assembly and senate
'lausible alternative% 8a<oelina reneges on his commitment not to stand for the role of prime minister. 8obinson 8avolamana and their supporters refuse to accept 8a<oelina,s candidacy. %his results in a series of increasingly violent protests in Antananarivo necessitating military intervention by SA1# and leading to a significant death toll plunging the country into a rene"ed political crisis. %he country,s -ey international partners France and SA1# face distractions else"here on the continent and fail to engage meaningfully "ith either party to the conflict prolonging its severity. %his inevitably deters foreign investment and credit further prolonging the economic crisis. (ildcard% %he military responds poorly to rene"ed protests by the opposition and a lac- of proactive engagement from 8a<aonarimampianina engineering another coup d,Btat but installing a general as head of state this time. %his results in the immediate suspension of ;adagascar from the African $nion and SA1# and necessitates the intervention of a respected e(ternal actor such as France or the $nited States to bro-er a ne" political agreement.
;ala"i
;ala"i is a predominantly agricultural and heavily aid)dependent country. >andloc-ed the country hugs >a-e ;ala"iN0yasa a body of "ater in "hich the precise border is disputed "ith %an7ania undermining prospecting for oil and gas. ;ala"i is already densely populated and has a gro"th rate approaching AH. %"o thirds of the population are under 2. years old.
;ala"i has been peaceful since independence from the $nited Oingdom in 1CG4. %hirty years of one)party rule under 2resident *astings 'anda "as follo"ed by multi)party elections in 1CC4 "hich resulted in 'a-ili ;ulu7i ruling until 2004. *e "as succeeded by 'ingu "a ;uthari-a "ho completed a successful first term but became increasingly autocratic in his second. %his culminated in the brutal repression of anti)government protests in 2011 follo"ed by his death in 2012. &ver the past fe" months ;ala"i has been gripped by a political corruption scandal dubbed =cash)gate, and the country faces highly)contested elections on 20 ;ay 2014.

6oyce 'anda ascended to the presidency in April 2012 succeeding ;uthari-a "ith "hom she had fallen out in 2011 but under the constitution she remained vice)president. *er 2eople,s 2arty 3224 "ill contest the elections against three former ruling parties: the 1emocratic 2rogressive 2arty 31224 led by 2eter ;uthari-a the late president,s brother and former Foreign ;inister+ the $nited 1emocratic Front 3$1F4 led by Austin Atupele ;ulu7i former minister of economic planning and development and son of the former president+ and the ;ala"i #ongress 2arty 3;#24 led by >a7arus #ha-"era a pastor. %he ;#2 "as the only official party follo"ing independence and dra"s its support from the centre of the country "hile the $1F dra"s its support from the south and the ;uslim minority. 'anda "as forced to dismiss her entire cabinet in &ctober 201A due to the =cash)gate, corruption scandal "hich implicated a number of longstanding politicians including some no" in opposition. %his follo"ed the shooting of 2aul ;ph"iyo an anti)corruption activist serving as budget director "ithin the treasury "ho had refused to approve dubious payments. %he $1F "as the only party that remained relatively unscathed by the scandal. 'anda hired the public affairs firm 'ell 2ottinger to restrict the damage to her o"n reputation but the country,s donors have scaled do"n their engagement at a time "hen she most needs their support. 8ecognising that the previous 122 government had profited financially from corrupt practices and accumulated a campaign "ar chest "hile she pays the political cost as the incumbent president 'anda,s ability to "in the 2014 election has been thro"n into <eopardy. It is rumoured that she is turning east to court a significant donation "hich "ould enable her to give hand)outs during the campaign. #hina is the obvious target having constructed a ne" parliament building though %ai"an is a former donor "ith the t"o en<oying diplomatic relations bet"een 1CGG and 200?.
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&pen 'riefing
Scenarios for 2014

"aseline% /ith at least four presidential candidates anticipated for the ;ay 2014 elections and no provision for a second)round run)off election 'anda needs to obtain a simple plurality. In order to achieve this she see-s to obtain the support of one of the three other ma<or parties. She promises ;ulu7i the vice)presidency and significant government posts for his party allies and is thus able to co)opt the $1F and "in the elections.
*anda needs to obtain a simple plurality 0n order to achieve this& she seeks to obtain the support of one of the three other ma,or parties
'lausible alternative% A promising alliance "ith either the $1F or ;#2 fails to materialise and 'anda see-s to neutralise the 122 threat by ensuring that the electoral commission or <udiciary rule that ;uthari-a is ineligible to contest the presidential elections. 'anda and her allies pursue allegations surrounding his involvement in an attempt to prevent her succession and engineer his o"n ascent to the presidency in April 2012. %hey also !uestion his continued ;ala"ian nationality "hich he "as obliged to renounce "hen he ac!uired $S citi7enship. (ildcard% 'anda is unable to forge a meaningful alliance or e(clude her competitor and so loses the election resulting in another democratic turnover in ;ala"i. %he ;uthari-a cli!ue that dominated the last 122 and $1F administrations triumph but they need to co)opt members from other parties in order to maintain a ma<ority in the legislative chamber.
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;o7ambi!ue
Since the end of the civil "ar in 1CC2 ;o7ambi!ue has become one of Africa,s most successful e(amples of peacebuilding and post)conflict reconstruction. 0ational elections have been held four times "ith political stability underpinned by progress to"ards national reconciliation and rapid economic gro"th. %he country has begun to e(ploit natural resources in the form of coal and offshore oil and gas. *o"ever poverty remains "idespread and ;o7ambi!ue is ran-ed third from bottom on the *uman 1evelopment Inde(.
A1
%he constitution of 1CC0 entrenched the e(istence of multiple parties and separated the e(ecutive legislative and <udicial po"ers effectively ending 1A years of one)party ;ar(ist rule and paving the "ay for national reconciliation. *o"ever the political landscape remains dominated by the ruling Frente de >ibertaFDo de ;oFambi!ue 3Frelimo4 in po"er since independence in 1C@.. %he current president Armando 9uebu7a first elected in 2004 has reasserted Frelimo,s traditional hegemony over institutions and the political system. 9uebu7a has been accused of undermining political pluralism by opposition parties civil society and international donors "hich led to a brief suspension of aid in 200C. $nfortunately the ma<or opposition party 8esistEncia 0acional ;oFambicana 38enamo4 "as Frelimo,s opponent in the civil "ar and continues to fi(ate on the conflict and its legacy. %he 8enamo leadership no" sees force as its only real bargaining chip "ith Frelimo.
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A crucial test for ;o7ambi!ue,s institutions "ill come "ith the end of 9uebu7a,s second term in 1ecember 2014 "hich is li-ely to be accompanied by escalating tensions "ith the opposition. 8enamo claims that it has not benefited from the dividends of peace or prosperity. Its leader since 1C@C Afonso 1hla-ama has become increasingly desperate to destabilise the regime having failed to defeat Frelimo candidates in four consecutive elections. In 200C his share of the vote declined to an all)time lo" of 1GH. %hese polls "ere mar-ed by the emergence of a ne" opposition party ;ovimento 1emocrQtico de ;oFambi!ue 3;1;4 "hose leader 1avi7 Simago mayor of 'eira "on ?H of the vote.
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A crucial test for 'o1ambi2ue+s institutions will come with the end of .uebu1a+s second term in "ecember 2014
Ahead of local elections in 0ovember 201A 8enamo demanded revisions to the electoral act "hich had been approved "ithout opposition consensus in 201A as a result of Frelimo holding t"o thirds of parliamentary seats. 8enamo boycotted the polls "hile ;1; "on three cities 'eira 0ampula and Ruelimane+ scored around 40H of the vote in 11 others including ;aputo ;atola ;arromeu and 9uruB+ and "on A0H of council seats nation"ide. %he party is currently contesting the results for ;aputo having successfully "on 0ampula after a re)run.
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12
&pen 'riefing
%he polls cemented 8enamo,s "ithdra"al from electoral politics underlining the fact that 1hla-ama has no" resorted to using the threat of force and economic disruption to get the attention of the government. In &ctober 2012 1hla-ama relocated to 8enamoPs former head!uarters near #asa 'anana 3also -no"n as Satun<ira4 in the 9orongosa mountains and set up a training camp for several hundred follo"ers. %he countryPs main north)south high"ay 5strada 0acional 1 passes through 9orongosa and in response to threats of attac- military convoys have been organised to protect roads for the first time since the end of the civil "ar. It has been alleged that 1hla-amaPs plan is to divide the country at the Save 8iver "hich separates the traditionally pro) 8enamo provinces of Sofala and ;anica from Inhambane and 9a7a to the south "hich have historically supported Frelimo.
AG
Frelimo is divided over its response to 8enamo,s military challenge. A number of hardliners including some close to the president "ant to crush 8enamo "hile moderates argue for more fle(ibility in negotiations. Former president 6oa!uim #hissano has argued for a moderate response on the basis that 8enamo must have a sta-e in the peace to maintain stability. /ith the local elections behind them focus has turned to confirming a successor to 9uebu7a.
A@
3relimo is divided over its response to #enamo+s military challen$e A number of hardliners& includin$ some close to the president& want to crush #enamo& while moderates ar$ue for more fle4ibility in ne$otiations Scenarios for 2014
"aseline% 9uebu7a designates a "ea- successor as president 6osB #ondungua 2acheco agriculture minister and former interior minister so that he can retain the leadership of Frelimo and dictate decisions behind the scenes. 2acheco has ho"ever been given the poisoned chalice of leading negotiations "ith 8enamo. *e is unable to resolve the impasse "ith 8enamo and his nomination is met "ith challenges from rivals "ithin Frelimo and from the opposition. %he Frelimo old guard seeto re)introduce a prominent figure from outside mainstream politics: 9raFa ;ichel the "ido" of both 0elson ;andela and Samora ;ichel the first president of ;o7ambi!ue. 1hla-ama continues to mobilise his men in the bush but does not significantly threaten the post) "ar settlement. *is main focus is to obtain a commitment from Frelimo to revise the electoral la" ahead of polls provisionally scheduled for 1. &ctober 2014. *o"ever "ith 9uebu7a eager to bring 8enamo bac- into electoral politics and "illing to delay his handover of po"er polls are deferred until early 201. in order to ensure the participation of all actors. 1espite this olive branch 8enamo boycotts the elections. Impatient "ith 1hla-ama a significant number of the party,s .1 ;2s either defect to the ;1; or form a splinter group. %his results in the opposition ma-ing significant head"ay "inning as much as 2.H of the vote collectively but they fail to threaten Frelimo,s hegemony.
1#
5e$otiations between 3relimo and #enamo stall& and "hlakama tar$ets a vulnerable asset in order to demonstrate his $roup+s reach and continued ability to wa$e $uerrilla warfare
'lausible alternative% 0egotiations bet"een Frelimo and 8enamo stall and 1hla-ama targets a vulnerable asset in order to demonstrate his group,s reach and continued ability to "age guerrilla "arfare. *e hits the ;oati7e coal mines near %ete "hich ma-es use of the Sena rail"ay line to 'eira port and threatens the Feru-a &il 8efinery pipeline "hich runs bet"een 'eira and ;utare in Kimbab"e. %he move discredits 2acheco as a negotiator and potential successor to 9uebu7a. 5lections are postponed but international engagement prevents a return to civil "ar. (ildcard% 1hla-ama is able to re-indle support from his base in central ;o7ambi!ue and allies from the civil "ar including foreign mercenaries. &ffering access to the country,s lucrative fossil fuels he obtains enough resources to reignite the conflict. In an attempt to sho" his leadership of SA1# ;ugabe sends Kimbab"ean troops to intervene prompting a full)scale conflict in central ;o7ambi!ue.
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&pen 'riefing
0amibia
0amibia has the second lo"est population density in the "orld but it has been able to develop a modern economy than-s to sound infrastructure and communications net"or-s e(tensive mineral resources fishing and manufacturing. 0evertheless the legacy of apartheid continues to loom large in 0amibia "hich consistently ran-s as one of the most une!ual countries in the "orld "ith a score of .C.@ on the 9ini coefficient.
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Since independence from South Africa in 1CC0 the primary threat to stability in 0amibia has come from the #aprivi Strip or &-avango 2anhandle in the northeast of the country. %he area had been sub<ect to repeated incursions during the struggle for liberation and #aprivians attempted secession bet"een 1CC4 and 1CCC. %he government indicted 1A2 secessionists in the #aprivi treason trial "hich began in 200A but has yet to end. %he main inhabitants of the #aprivi Strip are the >o7i people a group that feel more of an affinity for their -in in neighbouring Kambia and 'ots"ana than their fello" 0amibian citi7ens. In order to restrain tensions it "as renamed as the Kambe7i 8egion in 201A. Although the secession threat may appear to have been temporarily neutralised the political settlement has become vulnerable to internal "rangling "ithin the ruling party. %he outcomes of these disputes "ill be crucial given that presidential and parliamentary elections are scheduled for 0ovember 2014 "ith a ne" head of state due to ta-e office.
Over the past 26 years& 5amibian politics has turned around the South !est Africa (eople7s Or$ani1ation 8S!A(O9& which led the country to independence ;a<or protagonists and recent developments
&ver the past 2. years 0amibian politics has turned around the South /est Africa 2eoplePs &rgani7ation 3S/A2&4 "hich led the country to independence. In the 0ovember 200C elections S/A2& "on over three !uarters of the vote and .4 of the @2 seats in the national assembly. %hus far the party has retained the loyalty of the &vambo group "hich ma-es up appro(imately half of the population and has provided the t"o S/A2& leaders the founding president Sam 0u<oma and the incumbent *ifi-epunye 2ohamba. As the latter is ineligible to stand for a third term the party,s vice)president *age 9eingob "ill stand as the presidential candidate in 0ovember 2014. 9eingob "as 0amibia,s first prime minister and served as chief "hip and minister of trade and industry before being re)appointed as S/A2& vice)president in 2012. *e is from the minority 1amara community "hich constitute around ?H of the population. %his is li-ely to affect the voting intentions of citi7ens from the north of the country.
1&
%he opposition remains "ea- and divided. In 200@ the 8ally for 1emocracy and 2rogress 38#14 "as founded by *idipo *amutenya. A former foreign minister "ho "as defeated by 2ohamba for the S/A2& presidential tic-et in 2004 *amutenya gained 10.CH of the vote in the 200C presidential elections and too- one of the 812,s eight seats in the national assembly. %he 8#1 re)elected *amutenya as their leader and candidate for the presidency in 201A. S/A2&,s historic rival the 1emocratic %urnhalle Alliance 31%A4 has seen its share of the vote decline over successive elections as other opposition parties have emerged. It currently has only t"o seats in the national assembly but in September 201A appointed a ne" leader ;c*enry Ienaani "ho is only AG years old. >i-e his counterparts from South Africa Ienaani represents a ne" generation of political leaders that place less emphasis on struggle credentials and focuses more on policy. /hile this is unli-ely to affect the 2014 polls it has the potential to contribute to a more balanced emerging democracy.
Scenarios for 2014

"aseline% S/A2& triumphs in the 0ovember 2014 parliamentary elections and 9eingob conformably "ins the presidency. *o"ever promoting a leader from outside of the dominant &vambo group reduces S/A2&,s share of the vote by around 10H in the north of the country "here *amutenya and the 812 are able to gain ground. 'lausible alternative% Although *amutenya uses his status as the only &vambo candidate to increase his share of the vote over the 200C result the 812 lac-s the capacity to significantly increase its number of seats in parliament and thus fails to threaten S/A2&,s dominance of the political scene. (ildcard% %ensions flare up in the #aprivi Strip once again e(acerbated by calls from >o7i in neighbouring Kambia for self)determination. International pressure on the ne" administration to conclude the trial of #aprivian secessionists after over a decade further sto-es frustration in the region.
(romotin$ a leader from outside of the dominant Ovambo $roup reduces S!A(O+s share of the vote by around 10: in the north of the country& where ;amutenya and the #"( are able to $ain $round
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&pen 'riefing
South Africa
201A "as a difficult year for the 8epublic of South Africa+ a series of scandals gripped 2resident 6acob Kuma "hile the country,s first post)apartheid leader 0elson ;andela passed a"ay aged C.. April 2014 "ill mar- t"o decades since the end of apartheid. *o"ever progress since the advent of ma<ority rule has been slo". %he economy is not gro"ing at a rate sufficient to reduce unemployment "hich at ..G million is a million higher no" than it "as t"o decades ago. Access to electricity "ater and sanitation has increased by over 10H but remains far from universal. 9ro"ing frustration among residents of informal settlements has led to "idespread protests over poor service delivery. In a damning indictment of the African 0ational #ongress,s 3A0#4 management of South Africa the country is soon e(pected to lose its status as the continent,s largest economy to 0igeria.
AC
South Africa remains one of the most une!ual countries in the "orld "ith a 9ini coefficient of GA 3the same as the #entral Africa 8epublic4. 1espite t"o decades of freedom ?.H of blac- Africans remain poor "hile ?@H of "hites are of middle or upper income. %his disparity bet"een rich and poor has e(acerbated racial tensions and resulted in a national murder rate five times higher than the global average+ the rate increased from 4A to 4. murders per day in the last year.
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%he leadership of the ruling A0# is increasingly divided. 2residential and legislative elections set for @ ;ay 2014 "ill only e(acerbate the situation. Although the elections "ill li-ely pass peacefully they "ill provide an opportunity for voters to send a message to the A0# that they are dissatisfied "ith the progress that the country has made over the past t"o decades and the gulf in !uality bet"een the present leadership and that offered by the late 2resident ;andela. %he polls "ill li-ely sho" that the A0# can no longer count on the une!uivocal support of blac- South Africans and that it must do more to engage "ith the =born free, generation "hich focuses less on =struggle credentials, and more on economic opportunity.

Although selected as the A0#,s presidential candidate in 1ecember 2012 Kuma faces a split in the tripartite alliance bet"een the A0# and the party,s historic allies the South African #ommunist 2arty 3SA#24 and the #ongress of South African %rade $nions 3#&SA%$4. Kuma is dependent on the unions to deliver votes in the forthcoming elections but tensions have risen during his term as the #&SA%$ membership have opposed reforms related to the 0ational 1evelopment 2lan. %hese reforms "ould undoubtedly do much to enhance South Africa,s global competitiveness reduce unemployment and improve education standards but the plan has been opposed by unions due to its grounding in orthodo( economics and the lac- of a radical immediate solution to ine!uality.
4A
1*
%he 0ational $nion of ;etal"or-ers 30$;SA4 is threatening to leave #&SA%$ "hich "ould li-ely contribute to the formation of an independent labour party. It is "orth recalling that another #&SA%$ member the 0ational $nion of ;ine"or-ers 30$;4 lost credibility follo"ing the deaths of 44 people at ;ari-ana in August 2012. %his resulted in the rival Association of ;ine"or-ers and #onstruction $nion 3A;#$4 increasing its membership dra"ing support a"ay from the tripartite alliance. %he A0# has secured G2)GCH of the national vote since the end of apartheid. It "on G..CH in the 200C election <ust short of the t"o)thirds ma<ority re!uired to alter the constitution. *o"ever a 0ovember 201A poll gave the A0# <ust .AH of the vote a significant drop in its standing. Ahead of the last elections the party had lost a number of prominent supporters of former 2resident %habo ;be-i to a ne" party the #ongress of the 2eople 3#&254 "hich "on @.4H. Although #&25 is no" seen as a spent force this poll demonstrates that the supporters have not returned to the A0#. %he official opposition the 1emocratic Alliance 31A4 has made significant inroads at municipal and provincial levels. %he party,s leader *elen Kille is the former mayor of #ape %o"n and current premier of /estern #ape 2rovince. %he 1A "on 1G.@H of the vote in the 200C elections "ith over"helming support from "hite coloured and Indian voters. %he party,s focus has been to broaden its appeal to middle)class blac- voters and the 1A has sets its sights on "inning 9auteng province the economic heartland of the country incorporating 6ohannesburg and 2retoria in 2014. %o this end the opposition has been able to successfully mobilise voters dissatisfied "ith the introduction of road tolls by the A0#)led 9auteng provincial government. Another prominent opposition figure albeit "ith less organisational capacity is ;amphela 8amphele an academic and business"oman "ho "as the partner of murdered anti)apartheid activist Steve 'i-o. In February 201A 8amphele established her o"n political platform Agang SA promoting similar policies to the 1A and targeting the same demographic albeit "ith a blac- leader endo"ed "ith struggle credentials. &n 2? 6anuary 2014 Kille announced that 8amphele a long) standing friend had accepted an invitation to stand as the 1A,s presidential candidate but by 2 February 8amphele had reneged on the agreement. %he 5conomic Freedom Fighters 35FF4 "as launched in &ctober 201A by the firebrand 6ulius ;alema a populist former leader of the A0#,s youth league. ;alema "as charged for hate speech for singing =Shoot the 'oer, and claimed that a "oman accusing Kuma of rape =had a nice time,. *e "as e(pelled from the A0# in 2012 and no" faces charges of fraud money laundering and rac-eteering. 1espite economic policies resembling 8obert ;ugabe,s and racial nationalist tendencies that are abhorrent to many South Africans ;alema has successfully dra"n other leftists under his banner and "ill be able to count on votes from young indigent males particularly in his home province of >impopo. As such he "ill dra" support a"ay from the A0# landing a blo" against Kuma his former political godfather even if he is unable to ta-e his seat in parliament after the election.
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%he contrast bet"een the respect and adoration for the late ;andela and that afforded to Kuma could not be more mar-ed. %he latter "as booed at ;andela,s funeral because of his use of KA8 21. million of public funds on his private residence at 0-andla in O"aKulu)0atal 2rovince. According to a lea-ed report an investigation led by the public protector found that Kuma had derived =substantial, private benefits from publicly funded building "or-s to ma-e his home secure. %he accounts contradict Kuma,s statement to parliament in 2012 that his family had paid for all the building "or- on his 0-andla home bar the security features. %he impact that this scandal had on his already damaged reputation should not be underestimated.
Scenarios for 2014

"aseline% Kuma is re)elected in April 2014 but he leads the A0# to the party,s "orst ever poll result. #yril 8amaphosa S deputy president of the A0# and party secretary)general during the 1CC0s S is elected as vice)president upon the formation of a ne" government in ;ay 2014. %he recognition that Kuma is more of an electoral liability than an asset leads to divisions "ithin the tripartite alliance and necessitates the transfer of po"er from Kuma to a successor. #alls for 8amaphosa to replace Kuma threaten the president,s position in 201. but he clings to office as long as he can. %he opposition gain from the electoral misfortune of the A0#. An opposition coalition led by the 1A "ins enough seats to govern 9auteng province. %his further alienates the A0# from the blacmiddle class and the party seems increasingly out of touch "ith the electorate. 5FF "ins a small number of seats in the national assembly and secures enough in the >impopo provincial legislature to ensure representation in the 0ational #ouncil of 2rovinces. %he demagogue ;alema and his associates then see- to incense Afri-aner nationalists from the Freedom Front 2lus 3FFT4 undermining many of the gains of the past t"o decades and deterring foreign direct investment. 'lausible alternative% Kuma fails to obtain more than half of the popular vote and is forced out by the end of the year and replaced by the more credible 8amaphosa. Although 8amaphosa is more pro)business and serious about implementing the 0ational 1evelopment 2lan than Kuma his installation e(pedites a brea-do"n in the tripartite alliance leading to the emergence of a ne" independent labour party. %his is both a short)term victory and a long)term threat to the opposition "hich ultimately has profited from Kuma,s unpopularity and the divisions bet"een the A0# and #&SA%$ and no" needs to differentiate itself from a ruling party that is actually committed to national development. (ildcard% ;alema is able to eclipse other minor parties and prove the 5FF a credible opposition party. *e is able to form a ne" left)"ing alliance by forging lin-s "ith more radical elements of the trade union movement and those from the South African #ommunist 2arty fearful of the collapse of the tripartite alliance. %his temporarily provides him "ith the credibility to play a role in national politics "ith devastating effects on national unity policy)ma-ing and foreign direct investment. *o"ever his political longevity remains uncertain due to the charges against him.
1,
S"a7iland
%he landloc-ed -ingdom of S"a7iland is one of the last remaining absolute monarchies in the "orld and has the second)highest democratic deficit on the continent. Oing ;s"ati III "as cro"ned in 1C?G at the age of 1? and has banned political parties trade unions and student associations in order to retain po"er. %he country has an estimated unemployment rate of 40H. A !uarter of the population suffers from *IINAids "hich is the highest infection rate in the "orld.
.0 4C 4?
S"a7iland is dependent on an over)si7ed share of the revenues generated by the Southern African #ustoms $nion 3SA#$4 an annual grant of M200 million a year from %ai"an sugar e(ports and remittances from the diaspora. *o"ever S"a7iland has one of the highest public sector "age bills on the continent relative to its si7e. 2ublic funds have been mismanaged by the monarchy "hile poverty and ine!uality have increased among citi7ens. /hile this approach is evidently unsustainable the absence of an independent media or civil society has mitigated the threat of public discontent.
.A .2 .1
Swa1iland has one of the hi$hest public sector wa$e bills on the continent& relative to its si1e ;a<or protagonists and recent developments
2arliamentary elections too- place in September 201A but "ith political parties banned candidates contested as individuals and turnout fell to 44..H of eligible voters. Indeed 10 of the G. ;2s and t"o thirds of senators "ere actually pic-ed by the -ing himself. Although ;s"ati III reportedly had a vision of =monarchical democracy, hopes of reform "ere dashed "hen this amounted to merely a rebranding of the countryPs tin-hundla system of governance based on traditional administrative subdivisions.
.G .. .4
Activists from a banned opposition party the 2eople,s $nited 1emocratic ;ovement 32udemo4 remain active in the diaspora. 2udemo <oined the Socialist International as a consultative member in 201A
.@
and met "ith A0# Secretary)9eneral 9"ede ;antashe on 12 February 2014. %he party has
.C
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endeavoured to raise a"areness of their peaceful struggle for democracy "ith members of the royal family. *o"ever given that such groups are unable to organise "ithin the country it is difficult to determine "hether a credible opposition could organise a civil uprising "ithout significant e(ternal support.
G0
Scenarios for 2014

"aseline% %he main sources of revenue SA#$ income and sugar e(ports both decline in 2014.
G1
#onse!uently ;s"ati III is forced to enact reforms to lo"er the crippling public sector "age bill and improve the business environment.
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&pen 'riefing
The kin$ is unable to balance the national bud$et a$ain& and followin$ the elections in South Africa& the new administration in (retoria intervenes in support of a new political settlement
'lausible alternative% %he -ing is unable to balance the national budget again and follo"ing the elections in South Africa the ne" administration in 2retoria intervenes in support of a ne" political settlement. In sending a senior envoy to mediate bet"een the opposition and the -ing the A0# is able to distract from domestic issues sho" leadership "ithin the region and the Socialist International and demonstrate a proactive approach to reducing the number of S"a7i migrants to South Africa. (ildcard% &pposition elements from the S"a7i diaspora obtain sufficient funding and unite behind a credible leader. %hey are able to purchase "eapons from post)conflict ;o7ambi!ue and initiate a coup d,Btat.
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Kambia
>andloc-ed Kambia is the continentPs leading copper producer. %he mineral "ealth has ho"ever been une!ually shared "ith a 9ini coefficient of .0.? ran-ing Kambia one of the 20 most une!ual countries in the "orld. %he country is ethnically culturally and linguistically diverse and "hile predominantly peaceful since independence in 1CG4 Kambian politics have been dominated by =tribal balancing, "hich has at times led to a sense of division and resentment among minority groups.
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%hree ma<or sources of instability in Kambia are 2resident ;ichael Sata,s advanced age and reported ill health+ the discord among the ma<or political parties and civil society on constitutional reform+ and calls for independence by 'arotseland separatists. Sata -no"n as =Oing #obra, is due to turn @@ years old in 6uly 2014 and despite repeated denials by officials is rumoured to be seriously ill and receiving treatment in India. *is repeated absences from the country have led to instability "ithin his o"n party. 0ationally divisions have emerged among the political parties and civil society over a constitution) ma-ing e(ercise begun in 2011. %here is a lac- of consensus concerning the manner in "hich the draft document "ill be agreed adopted and enacted "ith Sata insisting that the cabinet see the document first. %here is a ris- that the government might unilaterally enforce a ne" constitution by enacting a bill in parliament "hich could have serious conse!uences for the country,s stability. %he >o7i "hich dominate /estern 2rovince formerly 'arotseland are one minority group that could potentially destabilise the country. In 6anuary 2012 police bro-e up a secessionist meeting "ith live fire resulting in riots that left t"o people dead. In August 201A authorities arrested 4. >o7i activists "ho tried to hoist their o"n flag.
GA
The )o1i& which dominate !estern (rovince& formerly *arotseland& are one minority $roup that could potentially destabilise the country ;a<or protagonists and recent developments
Sata served as a minister during the single)party $nited 0ational Independence 2arty 3$0I24 era and again for the ;ovement for ;ulti)party 1emocracy 3;;14 follo"ing "atershed elections in 1CC1. /hen Sata failed to be elected as ;;1 presidential candidate in 2001 he left the party to establish the 2atriotic Front 32F4. In the 200G election campaign Sata adopted populist and (enophobic policies attac-ing the #hinese mining companies "hich resonated "ith the youth urban poor and miners in the #opperbelt as "ell as his 'emba)spea-ing base. *e finally "on the presidency in in September 2011 ending 20 years of ;;1 rule. &utbursts of violence punctuated the polls and left t"o people dead. *o"ever the ne" president "as s"orn in "ithin hours of the election result being declared and the result "as respected by the ;;1.
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Sata,s period in office has been mar-ed by autocratic and unilateral decision)ma-ing causing schisms "ithin the three main parties. *e stripped former president 8upiah 'anda of his immunity and charged him "ith abuse of po"er. %his destabilised the ;;1 "hich is no" led by 0evers ;umba a televangelist and nephe" of Kambia,s first president Oenneth Oaunda. Sata has also publicly insulted threatened and repeatedly arrested *a-ainde *ichilema leader of the opposition $nited 2arty for 0ational 1evelopment 3$2014. ;oreover he has perpetuated battles "ithin the 2F in order to prevent a natural successor from emerging. *is vice)president 9uy Scott a "hite Kambian has been one of a fe" leading party officials to sho" support for the beleaguered secretary)general and <ustice minister /ynter Oabimba "ho faces a tribunal to investigate an alleged abuse of office and breach of the oath of secrecy. 0either Scott nor Oabimba are part of the 'emba cli!ue "hich has been a"arded the top <obs in Sata,s cabinet in a brea- of practice from the tribal distribution under $0I2 and ;;1. Oabimba,s main critics have been 1efence ;inister 9eoffrey '"alya ;"amba and Finance ;inister Ale(ander #hi-"anda both potential successors to Sata. A further division has arisen over the viability of the 2F,s populist policies "hich included Sata re)imposing a 10H e(port ta( on mining ores and concentrates much to the chagrin of the business community. %his political instability "ithin the ruling party and the opposition has resulted in issues that "ould other"ise be dealt "ith peacefully such as presidential succession constitutional reform and demands for self)government becoming threats to the continued stability of the country.
Scenarios for 2014

"aseline% 2residential and parliamentary elections are forecast for September 201G but the main political focus of 2014 is the persistence of the protracted constitution)ma-ing crisis. %he president continues to e(clude political parties and civil society from consultations on the document as a means to demonstrate his authority. *o"ever "ithout consensus around the draft the constitution lac-s popular legitimacy further dividing Kambians on ethno)linguistic lines. 0on)'emba spea-ers feel increasingly e(cluded from public life and opposition groups attempt to coalesce in order to increase their voice. %he $201 leader *ichilema garners additional support from beyond the traditional %onga support base of Southern 2rovince but is unable to unite other communities from across the country such as the >o7i in /estern 2rovince "ho have the potential to play a destabilising role. 'lausible alternative% Sata decides to invite Kambian citi7ens to participate in a consultation on the ne" constitution and is able to divide and rule due to the multitude of perspectives across the highly diverse country. *o"ever his failure to unite Kambia ultimately costs him the 201G elections "hich are "on by a <oint ;;1)$201 alliance. (ildcard% >o7i separatists attract international support from their allies in the #aprivi Strip in 0amibia thus presenting a serious threat to the status !uo.
2#
Kimbab"e
%he radical policies implemented by 2resident ;ugabe have both failed to deliver change for ordinary Kimbab"eans and deterred foreign direct investment creating a stagnant economy. 8egrettably income from the lucrative mining sector is not reaching the treasury due to corruption. In 2012 minerals accounted for 4@H of Kimbab"e,s e(ports and ?4H of foreign direct investment but in the same year only M4. million of diamond revenues "ere reported. /ith a 9ini coefficient of .0.1 Kimbab"e is one of the 2. most une!ual countries in the "orld.
G. G4
Kimbab"e is currently ran-ed tenth in the Failed States Inde( and has been consistently in the top five for most of the past decade. It is remar-able that the country survived ;ugabe,s failed land reform policies "hich decimated agricultural output and devastated the economy coupled "ith his brutal repression of the political opposition. Kimbab"e confounded many predictions in 201A holding peaceful 3if potentially fla"ed4 elections in 6uly and returning ;ugabe to the presidency. %he elections brought about an end to the government of national unity formed by ;ugabe,s Kimbab"e African 0ational $nionS2atriotic Front 3Kanu)2F4 and t"o factions of the ;ovement for 1emocratic #hange 3;1#4. %he decision of the SA1# observers to endorse the polls despite alleged manipulation of the electoral roll sent a clear signal that the regional economic community "anted to end this protracted crisis. %he confirmation of ;ugabe as deputy chairperson of SA1# in August 201A underlined this sentiment.
G@ GG

/ith rumours of ;ugabe,s ill health his recent ninetieth birthday and no clearly endorsed successor politicians have begun to openly position themselves ahead of the Kanu)2F congress set for 1ecember 2014. %"o ma<or factions have emerged. &ne led by 6oice ;u<uru the current vice) president and "ife of the late 9eneral Solomon ;u<uru is regarded as the moderate purportedly pro)business bloc open to international engagement. Another led by 5mmerson ;nangag"a the current <ustice minister and former defence minister is more hardline and see-s to maintain the status !uo. /hile the former "as able to profit from the 201A election and secure the ma<ority of Kanu)2F provincial chairs the latter has dominated Kimbab"ean politics since 1C?0 and remains "illing and able to provo-e domestic unrest and international disputes in order to retain po"er. A -ey asset of the ;nangag"a camp is ;inister of Information 6onathan ;oyo a po"erful spin doctor "ell connected to the securocrats that have come to control Kimbab"ean politics. Furthermore ;nangag"a has been seen as a loyal confident of ;ugabe since his spell as minister of state security during the 1C?0s "hen he oversa" the brutal repression of a rebellion in ;atabeleland -no"n as 9u-urahundi by the 0orth Oorean)trained Fifth 'rigade.
GC G?
2$
&pen 'riefing
A ma<or issue remains Kimbab"e,s lin-s to the international community. Follo"ing his recognition as the elder statesman "ithin the SA1# region ;ugabe has turned his attention to formally reconciling "ith the 5uropean $nion "hich has imposed =restrictive measures, 3or sanctions4 on the country and a travel ban on him and his family since 2002. $nder threats of a mass boycott of the 5$)Africa summit in April 2014 ;ugabe appears to have "on the battle. #onse!uently the 5$ is ta-ing steps to normalise relations but has retained an asset free7e and travel ban on the president and his "ife as "ell as an arms embargo. ;ugabe "ill be e(empted from the ban for the 5$ summit in 'russels in April and "ill thus have the opportunity to reengage "ith the 5$ including the former colonial po"er the $nited Oingdom. %he $nited States remains resolute that it "ill not reengage "ith Kimbab"e until there is political change. For ;ugabe the bigger issue remains "hether he can persuade the /orld 'an- and I;F to clear the country,s debts as it seems unable to borro" from #hina despite repeated overtures. Kimbab"e desperately needs to attract foreign direct investment to restart the economy and re-indle the dormant agricultural and manufacturing sectors. %he economy remains poorly managed and this former bread bas-et of Africa no" depends on imports for staple foods. %ogether "ith the legacy of hyper)inflation and the dollarisation of the economy in 200C this has resulted in unaffordable prices for the ma<ority of citi7ens. /hile ;ugabe is due to succeed 'anda as SA1# chair in August 2014 it is unclear "hether his health "ill allo" it. A 200? lea-ed diplomatic cable revealed that the $S ambassador had been told by the governor of the 8eserve 'an- of Kimbab"e that ;ugabe had prostate cancer and been advised that he only had three to five years to live and needed to cut bac- on activities. ;ugabe recently too- a month long brea- in ;alaysia reportedly for treatment but is alleged to have collapsed according to a social media rumours from a self)styled Kanu)2F disgruntled insider calling himself ='aba 6u-"a,. %he possibility of economic recovery is therefore largely dependent on ;ugabe,s successor as leader of Kanu)2F and ultimately president of Kimbab"e.
@0
The possibility of economic recovery is lar$ely dependent on 'u$abe+s successor as leader of <anu/(3 and& ultimately& president of <imbabwe Scenarios for 2014
"aseline% ;ugabe continues to play off different factions of Kanu)2F against one another undermining international support for Kimbab"e. 1ue to ill health he publically anoints ;nangag"a as his successor ahead of the Kanu)2F congress in 1ecember. 1espite progress "ith the 5$ Kimbab"e fails to receive the foreign direct investment necessary to restart the moribund economy and service its debts leading to increasingly erratic decision)ma-ing by the Kanu)2F leadership. /hile generals and securocrats e(press their public support for ;nangag"a the younger generation of Kanu)2F supporters begin to !uestion the succession. %he party congress in 1ecember 2014 results in a split in the ran-s and leads to the emergence of a ne" opposition party "hich is able to gain support from former adherents of the increasingly directionless ;1#.
2&
'lausible alternative% ;ugabe fails to anoint a successor instead dying in office. ;u<uru is legally entitled to succeed him as president of Kimbab"e and does so "ith the support of the international community. %he 5$ leads reengagement providing direct budget support from 0ovember 3"hen the current suspension e(pires4 and the $nited States terminates its sanctions. (ildcard% ;ugabe dies in office. *o"ever prior to ;u<uru being inaugurated as president of Kimbab"e the securocrats stage a coup d,Btat and install ;nangag"a as head of state. International engagement stalls and the country returns to a state of crisis.
The securocrats sta$e a coup d+=tat and install 'nan$a$wa as head of state 0nternational en$a$ement stalls and the country returns to a state of crisis
2)
&pen 'riefing
8eferences
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40
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.?
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GC
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#1
#2
&pen 'riefing

Southern Africa: Forecasts For Insecurity and Conflict in 2014

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Southern Africa

Forecasts for insecurity and conflict in 2014

(out ern +frica

#opyright : 9oogle ;aps 2014

Southern Africa: Forecasts for insecurity and conflict in 2014

Southern Africa: Forecasts for insecurity and conflict in 2014

;a<or protagonists and recent developments

Scenarios for 2014

Southern Africa: Forecasts for insecurity and conflict in 2014

;a<or protagonists and recent developments

Scenarios for 2014

Southern Africa: Forecasts for insecurity and conflict in 2014

Scenarios for 2014

Southern Africa: Forecasts for insecurity and conflict in 2014

;a<or protagonists and recent developments

Scenarios for 2014

Southern Africa: Forecasts for insecurity and conflict in 2014

;a<or protagonists and recent developments

Southern Africa: Forecasts for insecurity and conflict in 2014

Southern Africa: Forecasts for insecurity and conflict in 2014

Scenarios for 2014

;a<or protagonists and recent developments

Southern Africa: Forecasts for insecurity and conflict in 2014

Scenarios for 2014

Southern Africa: Forecasts for insecurity and conflict in 2014

Scenarios for 2014

Southern Africa: Forecasts for insecurity and conflict in 2014

Scenarios for 2014

Southern Africa: Forecasts for insecurity and conflict in 2014

;a<or protagonists and recent developments

Southern Africa: Forecasts for insecurity and conflict in 2014

>nit& 3April 201A4 p.?: http:NNelibrary.acbfpact.orgNacbfNcollectNacbfNinde(NassocN*AS*bA?C.dirNdoc.pdf

peaceU, 0nstitute for Security Studies p.@

>nit& 3April 201A4 p.11: http:NNelibrary.acbfpact.orgNacbfNcollectNacbfNinde(NassocN*AS*bA?C.dirNdoc.pdf

>nit& 3April 201A4 p.1: http:NNelibrary.acbfpact.orgNacbfNcollectNacbfNinde(NassocN*AS*bA?C.dirNdoc.pdf

succession, African Ar$uments 2@ 0ovember: http:NNafricanarguments.orgN201AN11N2@Nangola) violent)repression)of)peaceful)protests)highlights)ris-s)of)dos)santos)succession)by)<on)schubertN

succession, African Ar$uments 2@ 0ovember: http:NNafricanarguments.orgN201AN11N2@Nangola) violent)repression)of)peaceful)protests)highlights)ris-s)of)dos)santos)succession)by)<on)schubertN

succession, African Ar$uments 2@ 0ovember: http:NNafricanarguments.orgN201AN11N2@Nangola) violent)repression)of)peaceful)protests)highlights)ris-s)of)dos)santos)succession)by)<on)schubertN

Southern Africa: Forecasts for insecurity and conflict in 2014

>nit& 3April 201A4 p.2: http:NNelibrary.acbfpact.orgNacbfNcollectNacbfNinde(NassocN*AS*bA?C.dirNdoc.pdf

succession, African Ar$uments 2@ 0ovember: http:NNafricanarguments.orgN201AN11N2@Nangola) violent)repression)of)peaceful)protests)highlights)ris-s)of)dos)santos)succession)by)<on)schubertN

#IA /orld Factboo-:

$0 AI1S 8eport on the 9lobal AI1S epidemic:

8epublic of 'ots"ana "ebsite 3cached from 200?4:http:NN"eb.archive.orgN"ebN200?122G22.C.GN

6anuary 200C: http:NN""".ref"orld.orgNdocidN4CGdc0c?2.html

'ots"ana, 3April 201A4 p.1: http:NNelibrary.acbfpact.orgNacbfNcollectNacbfNinde(NassocN*AS*2a1f.dirNdoc.pdf

;adagascar country profile #IA /orld Factboo-:

;adagascar country profile #IA /orld Factboo-:

=;adagascar election: *ery 8a<aonarimampianina "ins, The .uardian& A 6anuary 2014:

$012 *uman 1evelopment 8eports ;o7ambi!ue:

0ntelli$ence >nit& 3April 201A4 p.1: http:NNelibrary.acbfpact.orgNacbfNcollectNacbfNinde(NassocN*AS*010aNAccbGaab.dirNdoc.pdf

0ntelli$ence >nit& 3April 201A4 p.2: http:NNelibrary.acbfpact.orgNacbfNcollectNacbfNinde(NassocN*AS*010aNAccbGaab.dirNdoc.pdf

5lisabete A7evedo)*arman =;o7ambi!ue,s 2olitical Setbac-, ?hatham ;ouse& 14 &ctober 201A:

=;o7ambi!ue political process bulletin, ?0(/A!E(A 2A 1ecember 201A:

=;o7ambi!ue: 1efence ;inistry #onfirms 8enamo 9unmen in *omoine, All Africa

@ 6anuary 2014: http:NNallafrica.comNstoriesN2014010@1A1A.htmlUaaWsourceXmf)hdlns

=8enamo ramps up the pressure, Africa ?onfidential& 1. August 201A:

#IA /orld Factboo-:

0eeds %o 'e 1one, 4 0ovember 201A: http:NN""".goldmansachs.comNour)thin-ingNfocus) onNgro"th)mar-etsNcolin)colemanN20)yrs)of)freedom.pdf

#IA /orld Factboo-:

0eeds %o 'e 1one, 4 0ovember 201A: http:NN""".goldmansachs.comNour)thin-ingNfocus) onNgro"th)mar-etsNcolin)colemanN20)yrs)of)freedom.pdf

Southern Africa: Forecasts for insecurity and conflict in 2014

September 201A: http:NN""".issafrica.orgNiss)todayN"here)do)murders)occur)in)south)africa

>nit& 3April 201A4 p.?: http:NNelibrary.acbfpact.orgNacbfNcollectNacbfNinde(NassocNASbA?C.dirNdoc.pdf

>nit& 3April 201A4 p.11: http:NNelibrary.acbfpact.orgNacbfNcollectNacbfNinde(NassocNASbA?C.dirNdoc.pdf

>nit& 3April 201A4 p.1: http:NNelibrary.acbfpact.orgNacbfNcollectNacbfNinde(NassocNASbA?C.dirNdoc.pdf

>nit& 3April 201A4 p.2: http:NNelibrary.acbfpact.orgNacbfNcollectNacbfNinde(NassocNASbA?C.dirNdoc.pdf

'ots"ana, 3April 201A4 p.1: http:NNelibrary.acbfpact.orgNacbfNcollectNacbfNinde(NassocNAS2a1f.dirNdoc.pdf

0ntelli$ence >nit& 3April 201A4 p.1: http:NNelibrary.acbfpact.orgNacbfNcollectNacbfNinde(NassocNAS010aNAccbGaab.dirNdoc.pdf

0ntelli$ence >nit& 3April 201A4 p.2: http:NNelibrary.acbfpact.orgNacbfNcollectNacbfNinde(NassocNAS010aNAccbGaab.dirNdoc.pdf