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Epistemological Contextualism: Problems and Prospects Author(s): Michael Brady and Duncan Pritchard Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 55, No. 219 (Apr., 2005), pp. 161-171 Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Scots Philosophical Association and the
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Vol. The No. Philosophical 55, 219 Quarterly, ISSN oo3-8o94

April 2005

EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONTEXTUALISM: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

BY MICHAEL BRADY AND DUNCAN PRITCHARD

andwidely discussed new contextualism has become oneofthe most Epistemological important inthe This issue contributes tothe debate proposals of knowledge. by bringing together special theory Here a some the main to a state-of-the-art discussion weoffer ofthe of provide proposal. participants main criticism that have been overview contextualist describe some the lines brief of of ofthe position, levelled the and a summary each contributions tothis collection. view, against present of ofthe

I. EPISTEMOLOGICAL ATTRIBUTOR CONTEXTUALISM: THE FIRST WAVE One of the mostimportant in contemporary movements has epistemology been thatof epistemological attributor Like all contextualist contextualism. thesesin epistemology, thisviewholdsthatthe epistemic status ofa belief whether the belief is an instance of can typically, target knowledge depend in a non-trivial factors. More specifically, attributor way upon contextual contextualism is primarily a linguistic thesis, (henceforth just 'contextualism') in thatit holdsthat'knows'is a context-sensitive in the term sense: following assertions of sentencesinvolving this termwill vary in theirtruth-value the This is whythe assertion. ofthe dependingupon the context person making viewis knownas attributor in orderto emphasizethefactthat contextualism, it is the contextof the person makingthe assertionthat is important to rather the context of the substatus, than,wherethisis different, epistemic we here focus on ject who is being ascribed knowledge.(For simplicity, attributor contextualism about 'knows'rather thanon relatedcontextualist thesesregarding otherepistemic such as 'justified' or 'warranted'.) terms, two people could both simultaneously assertthat,say, 'John Accordingly, knowsthat Paris is the capital of France', and be in agreement on every relevantepistemological fact about John, and yet one could be speaking and the otherfalsely because theirrespective assertions are made in truly
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and thus where'knows'is governed contexts different standards, by different in each case is different.' asserted wheretheproposition of thisvariety can be foundin the basis forcontextualism The historical such as Austinand Wittgenstein.2 It of a numberof philosophers, writings untilDavid Lewis' workon how to keep the score in a was not,however, real accountofwhat ofthefirst languagegame thatwe have thebeginnings a context-sensitive account of 'knows'mightlook like and how it can be Lewis' work applied to some of the perennialproblemsof epistemology.3 to a numberofphilosophers at thevanguardofthefirst wave gave impetus a groupwhichincludedas central Keith of attributor contextualism, figures DeRose and Stewart also returned to thefray to Cohen; and Lewis himself of variant on this there out the details his thesis.4 spell particular Although are importantdifferences between the positions advocated by Lewis, DeRose and Cohen, whatis commonto theseviewsis thegeneralidea that thecontextualist us withthebestway of accommodating the thesis presents of data our use while also a terms, linguistic epistemic offering regarding neat and compelling to variousepistemological as resolution such problems, theproblem ofradicalscepticism. It is worth lookingat thislast claimin moredetail,sincemuch of theattractionof the contextualist view has tended to lie in its responseto the the Consider where'e' is some parasceptic. following scepticalargument, all which we would take ourselvesto know digm 'everyday'proposition as that is is a one presently (such seated),and 'sh' (such sceptical hypothesis as the'brainin a vat' hypothesis) withe: whichis inconsistent I don'tknowthatnot-sh IfI don'tknowthatnot-sh, thenI don'tknowe SC. I don'tknowe. SI.
S2.
and Skepticism', Issues, Philosophical 1 See S. Cohen, 'Contextualism Io (2000), pp. 94-107, at p. 94, fora neatpresentation ofthispoint. 2 See Aristotelian J.L. Austin,'Other Minds', Proceedings ofthe Supp. Vol. 20 (1946), Society, On Certainty, ed. G.E.M. Anscombeand G.H. von Wright(Oxpp. 148-87; L. Wittgenstein, ford:Blackwell, thesis can also be found(sometimes injust 1969).Variantson thecontextualist a suggestive in thefollowing texts: A. Goldman,'Discrimination and Perceptual Knowform) ledge', Journalof Philosophy, 73 (1976), pp. 771-91; G.C. Stine, 'Skepticism,Relevant and Deductive Closure', Philosophical Alternatives, Studies, 29 (1976),pp. 249-61; D.B. Annis, 'A Contextualist American Theory ofJustification', Philosophical 15 (1978),pp. 213-19; Quarterly, F. Dretske, 'The Pragmatic Dimension of Knowledge', Philosophical Studies, 40 (1981), Doubts:Epistemological Realism and theBasis of Scepticism pp. 363-78; M. Williams, Unnatural (Oxford:Blackwell, i991). in a Language Game', Journal 3 See D. Lewis, 'Scorekeeping 8 ofPhilosophical Logic, (i979), PP. 339-59. 4 See K. DeRose, 'Solvingthe Skeptical Problem',Philosophical Review, (1995),PP 1-52; o104 and Skepticism'; Cohen, 'Contextualism Lewis, 'Elusive Knowledge', Australasian Journal of 74 (1996),pp. 549-67. Philosophy,
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either some have respondedto thisargument denying by simply Famously, is (SI) or by denying(S2) via a rejectionof the principlethat knowledge closed under known entailment(the 'closure' principle)on which (S2) closureholds thatif one knowsone proappears to depend (veryroughly, position,such as e, and one knowsthat thisentailsa second proposition, in thiscase such as not-sh, then one also knowsthe second proposition, is particularly sinceboth Neithermanoeuvre however, not-sh).5 compelling, (Si) and the closure principleare highlyintuitive. Accordingly, rejecting thesepremises seemstantamount to large-scale revisionism. epistemological This is whatmakesthealternative ofthesceptical diagnosis problemoffered it contextualism so since holds out the ofresolving this attractive, by promise in without to revisionism of this sort. difficulty having engage what is happeninghere is a shift in the Accordingto contextualism, in the epistemic context whichbringsabout a shift standards demandedof an agentbeforethatagent can be truly In partisaid to have knowledge. the idea is in that contexts the standards willbe cular, quotidian epistemic that of assertions sentences sentences low, thereby (i.e., ensuring ascription whichascribeknowledge to an agent)willtendto be true.This accountsfor since normally the assertion of an why we find(SC) so counter-intuitive, sentence an will tend to ascription regarding e-type proposition expressa truth.Moreover, since closure holds, it followsthat our possessionof of e-type relative in play to the epistemic standards knowledge propositions in quotidiancontexts willbe accompanied(provided we knowthe relevant entailment at least) by knowledgeof the denials of scepticalhypotheses, contra (SI). In contrast, in more demandingcontexts, such as contextsin which the scepticalproblemis at issue,the epistemic will rise,so that standards assertionsof ascriptionsentenceswill now no longer tend to be true. it willnow be trueto say thatwe lack knowledge ofthedenials Accordingly, of scepticalhypothesis, which is the intuition (Si), and relativeto driving thesestandards an assertion ofthesceptical be conclusion, (SC), willlikewise truealso, so thereis no tension withclosurehere either. The contextualist - one that therefore has a powerful diagnosisof the problemof scepticism accommodatesboth scepticaland anti-sceptical intuitions while retaining thehighly intuitive closureprinciple forknowledge.
5 The first tacticofsimply called the 'Moorean' anti-sceptical denying strategy, (SI) is often since it sharescertainfeatures withthe responseto scepticism offered by G.E. Moore. See British Moore, 'A Defence of Common Sense', Contemporary (2nd series),ed. J.H. Philosophy Muirhead(London:Allenand Unwin,1925),and 'Proofofan External World',Proceedings ofthe British of the second tacticof denyAcademy, 25 (1939),Pp. 273-300. For the main discussions see Dretske,'EpistemicOperators',Journal ing the closureprinciple, ofPhilosophy, 67 (1970), pp. 1007-23;R. Nozick,Philosophical Explanations (OxfordUP, 1981).
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In general, has been to use thisthesis thecontextualist about the strategy of 'knows' to capture the intuitions we have regarding context-sensitivity the varying conditions underwhichwe deem it appropriate to ascribe(or It for that where there a lot is at stakein seems, deny)knowledge. example, an ascription, thatthe subjectneeds to meet in orderto be the standards ascribedknowledge rise accordingly, and contextualism is clearlyin truly a strong to this accommodate intuition. seriMoreover,by taking position the of contextualists have terms, ously apparentcontext-sensitivity epistemic argued thatthisview can be employedto cast lighton a numberof other centralissuesin epistemology aside from the sceptical such as, for problem, the It is thus little wonder that has so contextualism example, lottery puzzle. become one of the in most discussed quickly positions contemporary ifnotin philosophy as a whole. epistemology, II. REACTIONS AND REFINEMENTS thisfirst wave ofworkon contextualism was followed Inevitably, by thefirst wave ofcritique. this is not at all an exhaustive one can regard list, Although thefirst wave ofcriticism as focused on thefollowing three issues: The contextualist claimthatwe are able to knowthedenialsofsceptical in contexts hypotheses undemanding 2. The intellectual of to scepticism adequacy thecontextualist response The basis for in contextualism; particular,whether the 3. linguistic 'data' could not be better accountedforby a non-contextualist linguistic view. (i.e.,invariantist) I. The first of the problemconcernsthe unusual statusof our knowledge denials of scepticalhypotheses on the contextualist view. It is essentialto contextualism that we are able to possess thisknowledge, since, shortof to at the retention of closure willdemand rate, surrendering scepticism any it.The problemis thatthisputative an has odd accordknowledge standing to this since it is one can never ing theory, although possessed, apparently assert a sentence which ascribes this in since truly knowledge, raisingthe in this one raises the scepticalpossibility standards, way epistemic thereby makingwhat is assertedfalse. At the very least, then,it seems to be a thatepistemologists, who are concerned with consequenceof contextualism like a this as matter of are able to know much.6 course, rarely problems very
thatwe are 'compartmentalized' suggestion such that one 'compartment' is able to know a great deal even while a second thinkers, thatwhichis concernedwiththe scepticalproblem,knowsnext to nothing. 'compartment', See Lewis,'ElusiveKnowledge'.
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6 At least unlesswe can make sense of Lewis'

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A relatedproblemis thatifwe can make sense of the idea thatwe are thenitis farfrom clearwhy able to knowthedenialsofsceptical hypotheses, we would also wantto endorsecontextualism. of (SI) After all, the rejection willbyitselfsuffice ofwhether it is to blockthesceptical argument, regardless allied to a contextualist thesis. Rememberthattheproblemwith(SI) wasn't forknowthatwhile we approximate to meetingthe standards necessary thatthisis thesortof butrather ledge,in thiscase we don'tquitemeetthem, for creatureslike us to know, whatever propositionthat it is impossible incremental we might Thus make to our epistemic positions. improvements it is farfromclear thatmerely the epistemic forknowstandards lowering - iftheproblem And notethatifthisdoes do thetrick ledgewilldo thetrick. hereis simply thatwe don'tquitemeetausteresceptical standards epistemic - thenthisinvites thethought thatperhapsthemoralto be drawnis notthat we should regard'knows' as a context-sensitive term,but ratherthatwe shouldresist themove to thesceptic's austereepistemic standards and insist instead on evaluatingassertions of ascription sentencesrelativeto more relaxedquotidianepistemic standards (in every context).7 As we just noted,thecontextualist of scepticism treatment seemsto leave the contextualist witha muteresponseto the sceptic, sincethe challengeis contextwhere assertions of always,by its verynature,posed in a sceptical will tend This sentences to be false. sort of for the view ascription difficulty has led manyto questiontheintellectual antiadequacy of thecontextualist thesis. since the it contextualist allows that is the Indeed, sceptical sceptic who is working withthe higherepistemic it is easy to see why standards, some commentators have claimed that the contextualist 'resolution'to leaves one with the we don't that, scepticism uneasyfeeling strictly speaking, have knowledge after it's that it's OK all, just (though strictly false) speaking to say thatwe do whenwe are speaking looselyin quotidianconversational In short, contexts. the worry here is thatcontextualism seemsto leave the door open to infallibilism in earlyworkby PeterUnger, ofthesortdefended where 'knows',ratherthan being treatedas a context-sensitive term,is in facttreatedas an absolute termsuch thatno one, strictly ever has speaking, since the standards demanded for any knowledge, knowledgepossession are so strong thatno one can evermeetthem.8 (infallibility)
'Recent Work on Radical Skepticism', 7 For more on this problem,see D. Pritchard, American Philosophical 39 (2002), pp. 215-57,in ?6. CrispinWrightalso exploresthis Quarterly, ofscepticism treatment in hiscontribution to thisvolume. problemforthecontextualist 8 See P. 8o (I97I), pp. 198-219,and Review, Unger,'A Defence of Skepticism', Philosophical Ignorance (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975). In more recentwork Unger has argued for the weakerthesisthatthereis no way of adjudicating betweena contextualist accountof 'knows' whichenablesus to avoid scepticism, and an infallibilist non-contextualist accountwhichdoes not. Accordingly, we are in no better positionas regardsthe scepticalproblem,sincewe still have no reasonnotto be sceptics. See Unger,Philosophical Relativity (Oxford:Blackwell, 1984).
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views A similar problemin thisregardis thatwhiletheearlycontextualist could be raised so for were veryclear about how the standards knowledge itwasn'tat sentences thatitwas no longerpossibleto assert truly, ascription the standards in lowering all clearwhatwouldbe involved again afterwards sentenceswould now express of these same ascription so that assertions This is the so-calledproblemof 'epistemic truths. descent',and it is crucial have an account of such descentif theyare to explain thatcontextualists consideredthe scepticalproblemcan, once how those who have actively in return to asserting more normal once quotidiancontexts, theyengage did before.9 as sentences truly they ascription raised for This last issue relatesto the thirdtype of probleminitially of the view. The the basis concerns which contextualists, challenge linguistic stanfactors can altertheepistemic hereis to specify just how conversational the dardsin play,and do so in a way thatdoes not offend against linguistic it seems descent data. For example,in the case of epistemic just described, in of behaviour is willthatwhat the contextualist terms predicts linguistic the relevant sentence of the to assert on the ascription agent(i) ingness part in a quotidian conversational context;(ii) to assert the negationof this sentenceonce the agent moves into the scepticalconversational ascription have the knowledge that context(i.e., to say thatthe targetsubjectdoesn't to the to and to back was previously ascribed her); (iii) go asserting original On when the quotidianconversational context returns. sentence ascription thisprediction is notborneout by thelinguistic data. thefaceofit,however, ifshe altered her In general, we wouldnottreat someoneas a good 'asserter' in this in thelight ofconversational factors assertions way.'0 merely a further line of critiquein thisregardhas concerned More generally, whetherthe apparent context-sensitivity of 'knows' could not be simply accommodatedwithina Gricean picture.On thisview, certainassertions become unassertable as the conversational contextchanges- perhapsbecontext meansthattheassertion cause, forexample,thenew conversational now carries different conversational ones which are now implicatures, do not shift in their It could be, false even truth-value. though they mostly forexample,thatit is conversationally one knows to that inappropriate say ofa sceptical thatone is notthevictim even this hypothesis, though is in fact what because of this assertion would true, imply."I
9 For a development ofthisline ofcritique, see Pritchard, and 'Contextualism, Skepticism, theProblemofEpistemic Descent',Dialectica, 55 (2oo0), pp. 327-49. 10For more on this point, see Pritchard,'Contextualism, Skepticismand Warranted inJ. Keim-Campbell, M. O'Rourke and H. Silverstein Assertability (eds),KnowManoeuvres', andSkepticism ledge (MIT Press,forthcoming). " For thefirst sustained ofthissortofobjection, see P. Rysiew,'The Contextdevelopment ofKnowledgeAttributions', Sensitivity pp. 477-514. Noas,35 (200oo),
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has come under pressurefroman alternative Relatedly,contextualism invariantism' account, known as 'subject-sensitive (SSI), which has been Whereascontextualism proposedbyJohnHawthorneand Jason Stanley.'2 holds that it is the contextof the person makingthe assertionthat is to the truth-value of a knowledge SSI deniesthisand ascription, important maintainsinstead that epistemicstatusdepends upon the contextof the to SSI holdsthatit is the salienceof error possibilities subject.In particular, rather not she knows some the that determines whether or subject proposition, In thisway,proponents thanthesalienceofsuchpossibilities to theascriber. so as to avoid a of SSI reinterpret the phenomenonof context-sensitivity of SSI maintainthat the conclusion.Moreover,supporters contextualist a contextualist construal evidencefrom ordinary languageno moresupports invariantist than it supports a subject-sensitive of such sensitivity reading. Contextualists thus owe us an explanation as to why we should be rather thaninvariantists ofthissort. contextualists III. CONTEXTUALISM AND ANTI-CONTEXTUALISM: THE NEW WAVE refineand deThe recentworkon contextualism has seen contextualists to objections ofthissort, and has also seen those viewin response velop their to contextualism unsympathetic develop theircritiquesas a result.This a broad cross-section of thisnew wave of debate special issue represents about contextualism. The first two papers focuson the critiqueof contextualism raised by Hawthorneand Stanley, and hence on the relative merits of contextualism of thesepapers, 'The OrdinaryLanguage Basis for versus SSI. In the first and the New Invariantism', Keith DeRose arguesthatthe Contextualism, data supportcontextualism over this rival approach. DeRose is linguistic concernedto set the contextualist of projectsquarelywithinthe tradition as in the work of and Austin, 'ordinary language' philosophy, exemplified argues that the best grounds for contextualism concerningknowledge attributions come from how knowledge-attributing (and knowledge-denying) sentences are used in ordinary talk.(DeRose thinks itbest non-philosophical to put the sceptical one to because it is not clear what side,largely problem in the sceptical case, but also because it is to make of disagreements can be motivatedon grounds that are importantthat contextualism of this independent problem.) Building on his earlier work, but going
andLotteries 12 See especially, 'On the J. Hawthorne, (OxfordUP, 2004);J.Stanley, Knowledge Basis forContextualism', Studies, Linguistic Philosophical I19 (2004),pp. 1I9-46.
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DeRose identifies various aspects of ordinary beyond it in key respects, language use and explains why they provide such strongsupport for contextualism. to therivalSSI account,and thesupport this He thenturns his attention is to from certain receive are ordinary judgements speakers position thought the of various assertions inclined to make about how contents allegedly data do not leave relateto one another.DeRose arguesthatthe linguistic in an impasse, thetworivalpositions as Hawthorne and Stanleyclaim,butin factprovidemuchgreater forcontextualism. support In 'Knowledge, Speaker and Subject', Stewart Cohen also defends contextualism how contextualism againstSSI. Cohen beginsby discussing to resolve the and then lottery paradox, goes on to consideran attempts to to and due Hawthorne to theeffect that objection contextualism, Stanley, in propositional-attitude it cannot account for how 'knows' functions Cohen arguesthaton closeranalysisthisobjectiondoes not hold reports. and aftercomparingcontextualism with Hawthorneand Stanley's water, alternative for the proposal resolving lottery paradox, concludesthat the latter fallsshort ofproviding a satisfactory resolution. Cohen thusconcludes that contextualism has significant advantagesover SSI when it comes to our epistemic intuitions. accommodating The thirdpaper in this collectionalso focuseson the debate between contextualists and invariantists, but seeks to defendinsensitive invariantism and SSI. In 'Contextualism, againstboth contextualism Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and Knowledge of Knowledge',TimothyWilliamsonargues thatinsensitive invariantism has the explanatory resources to accommodate the standard cases used to support both contextualism and SSI, and concludesthattheusual motivation offered forthesetheories is undermined. Williamson contextualism and SSI rely beginsby arguingthatalthough a of in their of assertions upon principle charity interpretation involving neither thisprinciple in whichcase terms, epistemic approachsatisfies fully, insensitive invariantism should not be dismissed(as it usuallyis) on the that it alone violates such a principle.Since all theoriesare grounds committedto the view that speakers make systematic errors in using the choice between the theories seem now to reston terms, epistemic might how well theycan explainsuch errors. Williamson how proceedsto sketch insensitive invariantism can explainthe 'illusionof ignorance'surrounding our denialsofknowledge in highstandards contexts by appealingto psychobias caused salience effects. One logical by possibilityis that the of salience psychological high practicalcosts or vivid scepticalscenarios focusesour attention on certainerrorpossibilities in such a way as to give rise to psychological bias effects. Williamsonargues thata more plausible
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proposal emerges once we focus on the proprietyof employingour in practical On thefaceofit,thisshift offocuswould knowledge reasoning. seem to favour contextualism and SSI, sincewhileit is appropriate from a in low standards it to relyon one's knowledge contexts, practicalstandpoint to relyon the same propositions when the stakesare becomes too risky raised and standardsbecome high. Williamsonargues, however,that a can be an appropriate even to use in practical reasoning premise proposition is not in a that it is and so one to know though position appropriate, maintainsthat one can therefore know something withoutbeing in a view,thisfactcan be positionto knowthatone knowsit. On Williamson's used to explain why we are mistakenly to of tempted deny ascriptions in contexts. knowledge highstandards In 'Contextualism and Surand Scepticism: Even-handedness, Factivity two key strandsof reptitiously Raising Standards',CrispinWrightoffers criticism to scepticism. The first arguesthat againstcontextualist responses is unable to mainthe factivity of knowledgeensuresthat contextualism tain the even-handedtreatment that it of scepticism and anti-scepticism itself as that That maintains contextualist is, offering. presents Wright to scepticism are appealing,at leastin part,because theyseem to responses allow us to be sympathetic to both sides of the traditional scepticism/antiand to in theassertions recover some truth made by both debate, scepticism that is examinathis since closer parties.Wright argues,however, illusory, tionoftheroleoffactivity forknowledge indicates thatthecontextualist is in factunable to maintainany such dialecticaldistanceand thus musttake sidesin thisdebateafter all. The second strandof criticism that Wrightlevels againstcontextualist is thattheyare unable to respondadequatelyto the to scepticism responses main scepticalarguments. This is because the contextualist diagnosisof thesceptical threat treats thatthreat as arising out ofa raising oftherelevant epistemicstandards,and yet, argues Wright,many of the key sceptical do not trade on a raisingof the epistemicstandardsat all. arguments contextualism is impotent at dealingwithscepticalarguments Accordingly, ofthissort. The fifth paper in thisspecial issue, JessicaBrown's'Adapt or Die: the Death of Invariantism?', on another focuses issueof contextualism, namely, the questionof whether the context-sensitivity of 'knows'can be straightaccommodatedwithina Gricean picture, as a numberof comforwardly mentators have claimed.'3DeRose has arguedagainstthisviewby claiming thatthereis no way of explaining in away the apparentcontext-sensitivity
'The Context-Sensitivity ofKnowledge Attributions'. Rysiew, '3 See especially
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terms of our usage ofepistemic by solelyappealingto thecontext-sensitivity It is this of sentences thatemploythoseterms.14 the assertability-conditions thatBrowntakesissuewith. DeRosean thesis Brown begins by notingthat the classic argumentfor contextualism to a correct to ascribeknowledge thefactthatitcan seemintuitively exploits in even she is in the same in not one but another, context, though subject In response,however,an invariantist positionin both contexts. epistemic manoeuvre (or WAM) accordingto assertability may exploita warranted reflect merechangesin the conversational whichtheproblematic intuitions of the relevantassertions, rather than changes in the truthpropriety on DeRose's attack ofthesentences Brownthenfocuses conditions asserted. that his argument on the possibility of an invariantist WAM, notingfirst and not the more recently directlyaffectsonly classical invariantism, developed view of SSI. Brown proceeds to considerDeRose's use of the as popularizedby Williamson, and claims accountof assertion, knowledge (withWilliamsonin mind) that there is an important equivocationhere in play when one talksabout 'warranted' the notionof 'warrant' regarding a classical assertions.With these considerations outlined,Brown offers invariantist of how the relevant data one understand theory might linguistic thatworkswithinany reasonableconstraints we mightplace on a WAM. On the basis of the linguistic data alone, then,the stateof play as regards contextualism and invariantism as Brownsees it is one of impasse rather than thedefault for contextualism that DeRose claims. support In thefinalfull-length paper in thisissue,'A Sense of Occasion', Charles Travis draws connectionsbetween epistemological contextualism and a in the of He seeks different, related, although position philosophy language. to explain a view of knowledge of the which emergesout of the writings British Cook Wilsonand features in thework philosopherJohn prominently of Austinand John McDowell. Travis beginswithCook Wilson'sconceptionofknowledge, itas havingtwocentral whichtreats features: (i) itis 'irreducible'(inparticular, itis nota speciesof,and does notinvolve, and belief); so forone). (ii)itis 'unmistakable' (ifone knows p, then p is unmistakably Accordingto Austin,argues Travis, we need to appeal to a speaker's in orderto fixa standard circumstances oftruth forthespeaker's utterances. As Travisputsit,'whatone does say ... in saying to be suchand such things a way will depend upon the circumstances in which one says it'. Travis points out that similarthingscan be said forsuch notionsas 'evidence', 'what mightbe', and, importantly in Cook Wilson's picture,for 'factive
14 See DeRose, 'Contextualism: an Explanationand Defense',inJ. Greco and E. Sosa (eds), and Context', (Oxford:Blackwell, Epistemology 1999),pp. 187-205,and 'Knowledge,Assertion, Review,I11 (2002), pp. 167-203. Philosophical
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in thisway,and too willbe occasion-sensitive knowledge meaning'.Giventhis, and contempto externalist Travis goes on to explainhow thisis relevant In the finalsectionTravis explainshowJohn orarycontextualist thought. Cook Wilson'score conceptionof knowledge, McDowell incorporates but of epistemic withoutacceptingAustin'saccount of the occasion-sensitivity notions.Travis argues that thisis a mistakeon McDowell's part,since it leads to a tension whichMcDowell cannotresolve.Occasion-sensitivity thus appearsobligatory. The issuecloseswithdiscussions offourofthearticles. In 'Contextualism, Hawthorne'sInvariantism and Third-Person Cases', AnthonyBrueckner castsa critical to thisissue.In particular, he eye overDeRose's contribution focuseson DeRose's treatment in thirdof knowledge-attributing sentences thatthereare some important in critical lacunae personcases and maintains DeRose's arguments. In her discussionof Williamson'sarticle,'Williamsonon Luminosity and Contextualism', Brown claims that Williamson'sappeal to the non- beingsuchthatone can knowa proposition of withluminosity knowledge out knowing thatone knowsit - is unnecessary, since the critique Williamson offers of contextualism in termsof psychological bias would suffice by itself. this account of how bias can Moreover,arguesBrown, psychological affect our knowledgeattributions also offers the best account of why the cases that contextualists oftenappeal to are characterized by a failureof luminosity. Tim Black's discussionpiece, 'Classic Invariantism, Relevance and Warranted offers a critique ofBrown'sfull-length Assertability Manoeuvres', and along theway also criticizes an earlierarticle article, by DeRose. Brown offers a broadlyGriceanaccountofhow one could accountfortheapparent in our epistemic terms context-sensitivity by appealingonlyto the shifting forknowledge claims.This account makesuse of the propriety-conditions ruleofrelevance, and itis thisfeature ofBrown'sthesis thatBlacktakesissue withhere,arguing otherthings, the correct Griceanaccount that,amongst oftheapparent of our terms lies elsewhere. context-sensitivity epistemic in 'Travis' Sense of Alan Millar a critical offers disOccasion', Finally, cussionof Travis' paper. In particular, Millar raisessome issuesregarding and queries the extentto exactlyhow Travis' view is to be understood, whichTraviscan employ considerations to reregarding occasion-sensitivity solvetheepistemological he is concerned with. problems University ofStirling

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