The Farewell Dossier

By WILLIAM SAFIRE Published: February 02, 2004 Intelligen e sh!rt !"ings, as #e see, ha$e a th!usand %athers& se ret intelligen e triu"'hs are !r'hans( )ere is the unre"ar*ed st!ry !% ++the Fare#ell d!ssier++: h!# a ,(I(A( a"'aign !% !"'uter sab!tage resulting in a huge e-'l!si!n in Siberia .. all engineered by a "ild."annered e !n!"ist na"ed /us Weiss .. hel'ed us #in the !ld #ar( Weiss #!r*ed d!#n the hall %r!" "e in the 0i-!n ad"inistrati!n( In early 1234, he #r!te a re'!rt !n S!$iet ad$an es in te hn!l!gy thr!ugh 'ur hasing and !'ying that led the beleaguered 'resident .. d4tente n!t#ithstanding .. t! 'la e restri ti!ns !n the e-'!rt !% !"'uters and s!%t#are t! the 5(S(S(R( Se$en years later, #e learned h!# the 6(/(B( res'!nded( I #as #riting a series !% hard. line !lu"ns den!un ing the %inan ial ba *ing being gi$en M!s !# by /er"any and Britain %!r a "a7!r natural gas 'i'eline %r!" Siberia t! Eur!'e( 8hat 'r!7e t #!uld gi$e !ntr!l !% Eur!'ean energy su''lies t! the ,!""unists, as #ell as generate 9: billi!n a year t! su''!rt S!$iet !"'uter and satellite resear h( President Fran;!is Mitterrand !% Fran e als! !''!sed the gas 'i'eline( )e t!!* President Reagan aside at a !n%eren e in <tta#a !n =uly 12, 12:1, t! re$eal that Fran e had re ruited a *ey 6(/(B( !%%i er in M!s !# ,enter( ,!l( >ladi"ir >etr!$ 'r!$ided #hat Fren h intelligen e alled the Fare#ell d!ssier( It !ntained d! u"ents %r!" the 6(/(B( 8e hn!l!gy ?ire t!rate sh!#ing h!# the S!$iets #ere syste"ati ally stealing .. !r se retly buying thr!ugh third 'arties .. the radar, "a hine t!!ls and se"i !ndu t!rs t! *ee' the Russians nearly !"'etiti$e #ith 5(S( "ilitary.industrial strength thr!ugh the 30+s( In e%%e t, the 5(S( #as in an ar"s ra e #ith itsel%( Reagan 'assed this !n t! Willia" =( ,asey, his dire t!r !% entral intelligen e, n!# re"e"bered !nly %!r the Iran. !ntra %ias !( ,asey alled in Weiss, then #!r*ing #ith 8h!"as ,( Reed !n the sta%% !% the 0ati!nal Se urity ,!un il( A%ter studying the list !% hundreds !% S!$iet agents and 'ur hasers @in luding !ne !s"!nautA assigned t! this 'enetrati!n in the 5(S( and =a'an, Weiss !unseled against de'!rtati!n( Instead, a !rding t! Reed .. a %!r"er Air F!r e se retary #h!se %as inating !ld #ar b!!*, ++At the Abyss,++ #ill be 'ublished by Rand!" )!use ne-t "!nth .. Weiss said: ++Why n!t hel' the S!$iets #ith their sh!''ingB 0!# that #e *n!# #hat they #ant, #e an hel' the" get it(++ 8he at h: !"'uter hi's #!uld be designed t! 'ass S!$iet Cuality tests and then t! %ail in !'erati!n( In !ur !"'le- disin%!r"ati!n s he"e, deliberately %la#ed designs %!r stealth te hn!l!gy and s'a e de%ense sent Russian s ientists d!#n 'aths that #asted ti"e and "!ney(

8he te hn!l!gy t!''ing the S!$iets+ #ish list #as %!r !"'uter !ntr!l syste"s t! aut!"ate the !'erati!n !% the ne# trans.Siberian gas 'i'eline( When #e turned d!#n their !$ert 'ur hase !rder, the 6(/(B( sent a !$ert agent int! a ,anadian !"'any t! steal the s!%t#are& ti''ed !%% by Fare#ell, #e added #hat gee*s all a ++8r!7an )!rse++ t! the 'irated 'r!du t( ++8he 'i'eline s!%t#are that #as t! run the 'u"'s, turbines and $al$es #as 'r!gra""ed t! g! hay#ire,++ #rites Reed, ++t! reset 'u"' s'eeds and $al$e settings t! 'r!du e 'ressures %ar bey!nd th!se a e'table t! the 'i'eline 7!ints and #elds( 8he result #as the "!st "!nu"ental n!n.nu lear e-'l!si!n and %ire e$er seen %r!" s'a e(++ <ur 0!rad "!nit!rs %eared a nu lear det!nati!n, but satellites that #!uld ha$e 'i *ed u' its ele tr!"agneti 'ulse #ere silent( 8hat "ysti%ied "any in the White )!use, but ++/us Weiss a"e d!#n the hall t! tell his %ell!# 0S, sta%%ers n!t t! #!rry( It t!!* hi" an!ther t#enty years t! tell "e #hy(++ Fare#ell stayed se ret be ause the blast in =une 12:2, esti"ated at three *il!t!ns, t!!* 'la e in the Siberian #ilderness, #ith n! asualties *n!#n( 0!r #as the red.%a ed 6(/(B( ab!ut t! !"'lain 'ubli ly ab!ut being tri *ed by b!gus te hn!l!gy( But all the s!%t#are it had st!len %!r years #as suddenly sus'e t, #hi h st!''ed !r delayed the #!r* !% th!usands !% #!rried Russian te hni ians and s ientists( >etr!$ #as aught and e-e uted in 12:D( A year later, Bill ,asey !rdered the 6(/(B( !lle ti!n net#!r* r!lled u', l!sing the Fare#ell d!ssier( /us Weiss died %r!" a %all a %e# "!nths ag!( 0!# is a ti"e t! re"e"ber that s!"eti"es !ur s'!!*s get it right in a big #ay(

The Farewell Dossier Duping the Soviets Gus W. Weiss We communists have to string along with the capitalists for a while. We need their credits, their agriculture, and their technology. But we are going to continue massive military programs and by the middle 1980s we will be in a position to return to a much more aggressive foreign policy designed to gain the upper hand in our relationship with the West. !! Leonid Brezhnev, remarks in 1971 to the Politburo at the beginning of dtente. During the Cold ar, and es!e"iall# in the 197$s, %oviet intelligen"e "arried out a substantial and su""essful "landestine effort to obtain te"hni"al and s"ientifi" kno&ledge from the est. 'his effort &as sus!e"ted b# a fe& (% )overnment offi"ials but not do"umented until 19*1, &hen +ren"h intelligen"e obtained the servi"es of Col. ,ladimir -. ,etrov, .+are&ell,. &ho !hotogra!hed and su!!lied /,$$$ 0)B do"uments on the !rogram. -n the summer of 19*1, President 1itterrand told President 2eagan of the sour"e, and, &hen the material &as su!!lied, it led to a !otent "ounterintelligen"e res!onse b# C-3 and the 43'5 intelligen"e servi"es. President 4i6on and %e"retar# of %tate 0issinger "on"eived of dtente as the sear"h for &a#s of easing "hroni" strains in (%7%oviet relations. 'he# sought to engage the (%%2 in arrangements that &ould move the su!er!o&ers from "onfrontation to negotiation. 3rms "ontrol, trade, and investment &ere the main substantive to!i"s. 'he %oviets vie&ed dtente as .!ea"eful "oe6isten"e. and as an avenue to im!rove their ineffi"ient, if not beleaguered e"onom# using im!roved !oliti"al relations to obtain grain, foreign "redits, and te"hnolog#.(1) -n !ure s"ien"e, the %oviets deserved their im!ressive re!utation, and their s!a"e !rogram demonstrated originalit# and a""om!lishment in ro"ket engineering77but the# la"ked !rodu"tion kno&7ho& ne"essar# for long7term "om!etition &ith the (nited %tates. %oviet managers had diffi"ult# in translating laborator# results to !rodu"ts, 8ualit# "ontrol &as !oor, and !lants &ere badl# organized. Cost a""ounting, even in the defense se"tor, &as ho!elessl# inade8uate. -n "om!uters and mi"roele"troni"s, the %oviets trailed estern standards b# more than a de"ade. Soviet S&T Espionage 'he leadershi! re"ognized these short"omings. 'o address the lag in te"hnolog#, %oviet authorities in 197$ re"onstituted and invigorated the (%%29s intelligen"e "olle"tion for s"ien"e and te"hnolog#. 'he Coun"il of 1inisters and the Central Committee established a ne& unit, Dire"torate ' of the 0)B9s +irst Chief Dire"torate, to !lumb the 2:D !rograms of estern e"onomies. 'he %tate Committee on %"ien"e and 'e"hnolog# and the 1ilitar#7-ndustrial Commission &ere to !rovide Dire"torate ' and its o!erating arm, "alled Line ;, &ith "olle"tion re8uirements. 1ilitar# -ntelligen"e <)2(=, the %oviet 3"adem# of %"ien"es, and the %tate Committee for >6ternal

2elations "om!leted the list of !arti"i!ants. 'he bulk of "olle"tion &as to be done b# the 0)B and the )2(, &ith e6tensive su!!ort from the >ast >uro!ean intelligen"e servi"es. 3 formidable a!!aratus &as set u! for s"ientifi" es!ionage? the s"ale of this stru"ture testified to its im!ortan"e. 'he "oming of dtente !rovided a""ess for Line ; and o!ened ne& avenues for e6!loitation. %oviet intelligen"e took full advantage. -n the earl# 197$s, the 4i6on administration had no "om!rehensive !oli"# for e"onomi" relations &ith the (%%2. 'he sale of strategi" goods to Communist "ountries &as governed b# the Coordinating Committee of 43'5 <C5C51=, &hi"h administered an 3llian"e7agreed list of !rodu"ts and data embargoed for sale. 4i6on9s !oli"# &orked &ithin this s#stem, and, for the e6!ort of !rodu"ts e6"eeding the a!!roved list, s!e"ial e6"e!tions &ere ne"essar#. 3nd, in a ne& set of "ommer"ial and s"ientifi" arrangements, the (nited %tates and the (%%2 set u! @oint te"hni"al "ommissions to assess !ros!e"ts for "oo!eration. 'o!i"s in"luded agri"ulture, nu"lear energ#, "om!uters, and the environment.3s 0issinger notedA "ver time, trade and investment may leaven the autar#ic tendencies of the $oviet system, invite gradual association of the $oviet economy with the world economy, and foster a degree of interdependence that adds an element of stability to the political relationship.(2) Beginning in 197B, delegations of %oviet s!e"ialists "ame to the (nited %tates to visit firms and laboratories asso"iated &ith their "ommissions. Line ;, ever alert, !o!ulated these delegations &ith its o&n !eo!leA in an agri"ultural delegation of 1$$ about one7 third &ere kno&n or sus!e"ted intelligen"e offi"ers. 5n a visit to Boeing, a %oviet guest a!!lied adhesive to his shoes to obtain metal sam!les. -n another e!isode, the ranking s"ientists and managers of the %oviet "om!uter and ele"troni"s industr# obtained a visa for the s!e"ifi" !ur!ose of visiting the (ranus Li8uid Cr#stal at"h Com!an# of 1ineola, Long -sland <a firm not among the %ortune &00=. 'hree da#s before the delegation9s arrival, the# re8uested an e6!ansion of the itinerar# to in"lude nearl# all (% "om!uter and semi"ondu"tor firms. 'his maneuver &as done to observe <that is, "olle"t= the latest te"hnolog#, and it &as e6e"uted at the last minute so that the Defense De!artment &ould not have time to ob@e"t. -t &as legal77Line ; had studied our regulations and turned them to its advantage. 'o a"8uire the latest air"raft te"hnolog#, the %oviets in 197C !ro!osed !ur"hasing D$ Lo"kheed trans!orts if the firm, then in finan"ial diffi"ult#, &ould build and e8ui! a modern .air"raft "it#. in the (%%2. 3 similar !ro!osition &as !ut to Boeing <it besieges the imagination to !onder Brezhnev a!!earing from the "abin of an 3eroflot 7/7=. Line ; !ra"ti"ed the venerable "a!italist te"hni8ue of !la#ing off "om!etitors, and, from this bidding, the %oviets sought to gain te"hni"al data for use at home. 5n a less loft# te"hni"al !lane, in 197B the %oviets surre!titiousl# bought BD !er"ent of the (% grain harvest, using !hone inter"e!ts of the grain dealers9 net&ork to listen to both sides of the market. 'he !ur"hase led to higher grain !ri"es for "onsumers, and ta6!a#ers !rovided for a BD7!er"ent7a bushel e6!ort subsid#. 'hose of us observing these arabes8ues began to 8uestion the (%%29s total "ommitment to the s!irit of dtente. US Co puter E!port "oli#$

-n late 197C, President 4i6on asked his Coun"il on -nternational >"onomi" Poli"# to determine &hi"h "om!uters and asso"iated !rodu"tion te"hnolog# might be !rudentl# sold to Communist "ountries. 'his stud# &as ne"essar# be"ause dtente im!lied the e6!ansion of "ommer"ial o!!ortunities &ith >astern >uro!e and the (%%2? a ne& and more liberal set of C5C51 rules &as re8uired to fit these !ros!e"ts, ho&ever illusor# the# ma# have been. Data !ro"essing &as the most im!ortant !rodu"t re8uiring revie&. - &as !ut in "harge of the !ro@e"t, and - &as also made res!onsible for the broader !roblem of te"hnolog# transfer. 'he "om!uter stud# &as the first revie& of te"hnolog# !oli"# &ithin dtente? it sought to assess the e"onomi" gain to the (nited %tates from "om!uter sales set against the national se"urit# risk from those sales. 4ot sur!risingl#, the stud# "on"luded that the (%%2 &as short of "om!uters and the means to !a# for substantial "om!uter im!orts. 5ur anal#sis !resumed that the %oviets intended to use their foreign e6"hange to best advantage b# !ur"hasing the most !o&erful "om!uters, those that also held the most national se"urit# risk <large "om!uters &ere used for nu"lear &ea!ons "al"ulations and "r#!togra!h#=. 'he re!ort "on"luded that the e6!ort !otential for 3meri"an data !ro"essing to the (%%2 &as small and the risk great if the more !o&erful "om!uters &ere allo&ed for sale. 'he stud# re"ommended raising moderatel# the !o&er of ma"hines allo&ed for C5C51 release, &hile at the same time restri"ting the sale of te"hnolog#. >6!ort of the largest "om!uters &as to be !rohibited. -n 4ational %e"urit# De"ision 1emorandum <4%D1= B/7, 1/ 1ar"h 197/, '. $. (olicy on the )*port of +omputers to +ommunist +ountries, President 4i6on a!!roved these re"ommendations, and the# be"ame the ne& e6!ort guidelines. 3s a result, the %oviets &ere e6"luded from im!orting signifi"antl# !o&erful estern "om!uters, dtente not&ithstanding. -f the %oviets &ere to rea"h "om!arabilit# &ith the (nited %tates in "om!uters, their engineers &ould on their o&n no& have to "reate designs and !rodu"e e8ui!ment. Line ; &ould have to use its es!ionage resour"es to su!!lement &hat "ould be develo!ed at home. 4%D1 B/7 eliminated the est as an o!en sour"e available to the %oviets, but estern intelligen"e &as una&are of the "olle"tion a!!aratus the %oviets had de!lo#ed to obtain the te"hnolog#. Strong Suspi#ions an% S&epti#is -n the earl# 197$s, there &ere no (% intelligen"e "olle"tion re8uirements for te"hnolog# transfer and s"ientifi" es!ionage, and fe&, if an#, re!orting sour"es. But, b# observing the behavior of %oviet delegations visiting (% !lants and b# kee!ing in mind the "lever 197B grain !ur"hase, a fe& government offi"ials began to sus!e"t that a master !lan &as in !la"e to obtain our kno&7ho&. Dire"t eviden"e &as none6istent77 onl# ane"dotal "lues &ere at hand. -n their intelligen"e histor#, the %oviets "ould !oint to the su""ess of the atom bomb s!ies, and the# also had to their "redit "olle"tion against industrial te"hnolog# in )erman# during the 19B$s. 3fter orld ar --, the %oviets "o!ied the 3meri"an B7B9 and the 2olls72o#"e 4ene @et engine <the "o!# !o&ered the 1i)71D=. '&o former members of the 2osenberg net&ork had set u! the modern %oviet mi"roele"troni"s industr#. %oviet intelligen"e &as !rofessional at ferreting out s"ien"e and te"hnolog# and had the results to !rove it. 'he %oviets &ere ade!t at "o!#ing foreign designs. -n the st#le of %herlo"k Eolmes, the "lues "ould

almost s!eak for themselvesA the (%%2 &as behind in im!ortant te"hnologies, their intelligen"e &as a""om!lished at "olle"tion, and dtente had o!ened a !ath. 'hose sus!i"ious of a )reat )ame in te"hnolog# es!ionage found that the (% )overnment &as not BB1 B Baker %treet77&e "ould make little head&a# in !ersuading offi"ials in "harge of intelligen"e re8uirements that the (nited %tates &as fa"ing a signifi"ant threat. e re"eived dis"ouraging res!onses to our !leas for hel!A .4o eviden"e. of a grand design? .not usual %oviet !ra"ti"e?. .no re8uirements and no interest?. 'no sour"es.. -t seemed to have es"a!ed these authorities that having no eviden"e does not mean it is not true. 'he s#stem defied movement. 3 fe& alert "olleagues &ere dis!ersed among the e6e"utive de!artments. -n one e!isode, the De!artment of Commer"e dis"overed a Line ; effort to obtain an embargoed "om!uter through a dumm# "or!oration set u! for this one transa"tion?offi"ials inter"e!ted the shi!!ing "ontainer and substituted sandbags. <3 note &as en"losed, but it &ould not be !oliti"all# "orre"t to 8uote it.= -n 197D, the 3!ollo7%o#uz s!a"e"raft do"king &as used to gain intelligen"e a""ess to the (% s!a"e !rogram. 'his !ro@e"t &as "on"eived b# the 4i6on administration as !art of dtente, and President +ord had no "hoi"e but to "ontinue the effort. 'o the "onsternation of 43%3, a fe& &eeks before the laun"h "ounterintelligen"e sus!e"ted that one of the Cosmonauts &as a 0)B offi"er &ho had been "olle"ting a&a# over the "ourse of the !ro@e"t. "resi%ential (nterest President Carter &as the first "hief e6e"utive to take an interest in te"hnolog# loss. During his administration, C-3 had begun to re!ort the diversion of "om!uters from the est into the %oviet defense "om!le6, and he &anted details. -n res!onse, the 3gen"# assigned staff to this endeavor and !rodu"ed a more "om!lete !i"ture of te"hnolog# loss than had been available sin"e the start of Dire"torate '. Carter also ordered the first "om!rehensive stud# of te"hnolog# transfer, Presidential 2evie& 1emorandum C1, a do"ument that onl# distantl# addressed the threat from "landestine "olle"tion. -t &as largel# a missed o!!ortunit#, but Carter res!onded to the %oviet invasion of 3fghanistan b# instituting san"tions, "an"eling several "om!uter sales, and sto!!ing e8ui!ment destined for the 0ama 2iver tru"k !lant. President 2eagan "ame to offi"e intent on reversing &hat he sa& as the .&indo& of vulnerabilit#. favoring the %oviets in strategi" &ea!ons. Ee also believed that the (%%29s e"onom# did not &ork and that the %oviet s#stem &as on the &a# to "olla!se. Eis intuition led him to believe the Cold ar "ould be &on. Foining 2eagan9s 4%C staff &ere those of us &ho thought similarl# and entertained the idea that e"onomi" !ressure &ould have some effe"t. 'he 4%C staff sought to fashion !oli"ies to take advantage of the (%%29s lo& !rodu"tivit#, its lag in te"hnolog#, o!!ressive defense burden, and ineffi"ient e"onomi" stru"ture. 2eagan &as the first !resident for &hom this line of thought &ould have been even remotel# a""e!table. ) De*e#tor in "la#e -nto the re"e!tive "limate of the 2eagan administration "ame President 1itterrand, bearing ne&s of +are&ell77that is, Colonel ,etrov. -n a !rivate meeting asso"iated &ith

the Ful# 19*1 5tta&a e"onomi" summit, he told 2eagan of the sour"e and offered the intelligen"e to the (nited %tates. -t &as !assed through ,i"e President Bush and then to C-3. 'he door had o!ened into Line ;. ,etrov &as a DC7#ear7old engineer assigned to evaluate the intelligen"e "olle"ted b# Dire"torate ', an ideal !osition for a defe"tor in !la"e. Ee had volunteered his servi"es for ideologi"al reasons. Ee su!!lied a list of %oviet organizations in s"ientifi" "olle"tion and summar# re!orts from Dire"torate ' on the goals, a"hievements, and unfilled ob@e"tives of the !rogram. +are&ell revealed the names of more than B$$ Line ; offi"ers stationed in 1$ 0)B re,idents in the est, along &ith more than 1$$ leads to Line ; re"ruitments.(+) (!on re"ei!t of the do"uments <the +are&ell Dossier, as labeled b# +ren"h -ntelligen"e= C-3 arranged for m# a""ess. 2eading the material "aused m# &orst nightmares to "ome true. %in"e 197$, Line ; had obtained thousands of do"uments and sam!le !rodu"ts, in su"h 8uantit# that it a!!eared that the %oviet militar# and "ivil se"tors &ere in large measure running their resear"h on that of the est, !arti"ularl# the (nited %tates. 5ur s"ien"e &as su!!orting their national defense. Losses &ere in radar, "om!uters, ma"hine tools, and semi"ondu"tors. Line ; had fulfilled t&o7thirds to three7fourths of its "olle"tion re8uirements77an im!ressive !erforman"e. (nterest in Te#hnolog$ Trans*er 5vernight, te"hnolog# transfer be"ame a to! !riorit#, rising from the basement of -ntelligen"e Communit# interest. C-3 set u! a 'e"hnolog# 'ransfer -ntelligen"e Center, and the Pentagon "reated grou!s to assess damage and find &a#s to tighten te"hnolog# "ontrols. But "areful stud# of +are&ell9s material suggested that more than @ust a fe& "ommittees "ould "ome out of this &ealth of intelligen"e. ith the +are&ell re!orting, C-3 had the Line ; sho!!ing list for still7needed te"hnolog#, and &ith the list 3meri"an intelligen"e might be able to "ontrol for its !ur!oses at least !art of Line ;9s "olle"tion, that is, turn the tables on the 0)B and "ondu"t e"onomi" &arfare of our o&n. - met &ith Dire"tor of Central -ntelligen"e illiam Case# on an afternoon in Fanuar# 19*B. - !ro!osed using the +are&ell material to feed or !la# ba"k the !rodu"ts sought b# Line ;, but these &ould "ome from our o&n sour"es and &ould have been 99im!roved,. that is, designed so that on arrival in the %oviet (nion the# &ould a!!ear genuine but &ould later fail. (% intelligen"e &ould mat"h Line ; re8uirements su!!lied through ,etrov &ith our version of those items, ones that &ould hardl# meet the e6!e"tations of that vast %oviet a!!aratus de!lo#ed to "olle"t them. -f some double agent told the 0)B the 3meri"ans &ere alert to Line ; and &ere interfering &ith their "olle"tion b# subverting, if not sabotaging, the effort, - believed the (nited %tates still "ould not lose. 'he %oviets, being a sus!i"ious lot, &ould be likel# to 8uestion and re@e"t ever#thing Line ; "olle"ted. -f so, this &ould be a rarit# in the &orld of es!ionage, an o!eration that &ould su""eed even if "om!romised. Case# liked the !ro!osal. ) De#eption ,peration

3s &as later re!orted in -viation Wee# and $pace .echnology, C-3 and the Defense De!artment, in !artnershi! &ith the +B-, set u! a !rogram to do @ust &hat &e had dis"ussedA modified !rodu"ts &ere devised and .made available. to Line ; "olle"tion "hannels. 'he C-3 !ro@e"t leader and his asso"iates studied the +are&ell material, e6amined e6!ort li"ense a!!li"ations and other intelligen"e, and "ontrived to introdu"e altered !rodu"ts into 0)B "olle"tion. 3meri"an industr# hel!ed in the !re!aration of items to be .marketed. to Line ;. Contrived "om!uter "hi!s found their &a# into %oviet militar# e8ui!ment, fla&ed turbines &ere installed on a gas !i!eline, and defe"tive !lans disru!ted the out!ut of "hemi"al !lants and a tra"tor fa"tor#. 'he Pentagon introdu"ed misleading information !ertinent to stealth air"raft, s!a"e defense, and ta"ti"al air"raft.(-) 'he %oviet %!a"e %huttle &as a re@e"ted 43%3 design.(.) hen Case# told President 2eagan of the undertaking, the latter &as enthusiasti". -n time, the !ro@e"t !roved to be a model of interagen"# "oo!eration, &ith the +B- handling domesti" re8uirements and C-3 res!onsible for overseas o!erations. 'he !rogram had great su""ess, and it &as never dete"ted. -n a further use of the +are&ell !rodu"t, Case# sent the De!ut# Dire"tor of Central -ntelligen"e to >uro!e to tell 43'5 governments and intelligen"e servi"es of the Line ; threat. 'hese meetings led to the e6!ulsion or "om!romise of about B$$ %oviet intelligen"e offi"ers and their sour"es, "ausing the "olla!se of Line ; o!erations in >uro!e. 3lthough some militar# intelligen"e offi"ers avoided "om!romise, the heart of %oviet te"hnolog# "olle"tion "rumbled and &ould not re"over. 'his mortal blo& "ame @ust at the beginning of 2eagan9s defense buildu!, his %trategi" Defense -nitiative <%D-=, and the introdu"tion of stealth air"raft into (% for"es. /ational Se#urit$ Dire#tive 5n 17 Fanuar# 19*C, to define his !oli"# for !oliti"al, militar#, and e"onomi" relations &ith the (%%2, 2eagan a!!roved 4ational %e"urit# De"ision Dire"tive <4%DD= 7D, '. $. /elations with the '$$/, a do"ument s!elling out !ur!oses, themes, and strateg# for "om!eting in the Cold ar. -t s!e"ified three !oli"# elementsA "ontainment and reversal of %oviet e6!ansionism, !romotion of "hange in the internal s#stem to redu"e the !o&er of the ruling elite, and engagement in negotiations and agreements that &ould enhan"e (% interests. -n e"onomi" !oli"#, 4%DD 7D highlighted the need to "ontrol te"hnolog#? +are&ell9s re!orts had moved those &riting the Dire"tive to !ut em!hasis on !reventing te"hnolog# loss, and the President had agreed <so a 0)B defe"tor &orking for a foreign intelligen"e servi"e !ut his stam! on a !art of !residential !oli"#=. Later in 19*C, 2eagan !ro!osed the %D-, &hi"h )orba"hev and the %oviet militar# took far more seriousl# than 3meri"an "ommentators. %D- &ould, if de!lo#ed, !la"e una""e!table e"onomi" and te"hni"al demands on the %oviet s#stem. >ven 2eagan9s 19*C .evil em!ire. s!ee"h had its e"onomi" effe"t, for immediatel# thereafter the %oviet militar# asked for a budget in"rease, this on to! of alread#7bloated defense e6!enditures. '&o events be#ond !residential "ontrol dovetailed &ith 4%DD 7D. 'he +ederal 2eserve9s restri"tive monetar# !oli"# of the earl# 19*$s led to a fall in gold and !rimar# !rodu"t !ri"es, sour"es of %oviet foreign e6"hange. 3nd the dis"over# of 3laskan 4orth %hore oil "ontributed to the 19*G fall in !etroleum !ri"es, "utting the revenues not onl# of 5P>C but also of the (%%2. Coin"ident events and deliberate government !oli"#

had the t&in effe"ts of adding to the burden on the %oviet s#stem and of shifting the su!er!o&er "om!etition to advan"ed te"hnolog#, &here the (nited %tates held a "lear advantage. Goo%01$ to Farewell 3bout the time - met &ith Case#, ,etrov fell into a tragi" e!isode &ith a &oman and a fello& 0)B offi"er in a 1os"o& !ark. -n "ir"umstan"es that are not "lear, he stabbed and killed the offi"er and then stabbed but did not kill the &oman. Ee &as arrested, and, in the ensuing investigation, his es!ionage a"tivities &ere dis"overed? he &as e6e"uted in 19*C. C-3 had enough intelligen"e to institute !rote"tive "ountermeasures. -n 19*D, the "ase took a bizarre turn &hen information on the +are&ell Dossier surfa"ed in +ran"e. 1itterrand "ame to sus!e"t that ,etrov had all along been a C-3 !lant set u! to test him to see if the material &ould be handed over to the 3meri"ans or ke!t b# the +ren"h. 3"ting on this mistaken belief, 1itterrand fired the "hief of the +ren"h servi"e, Hves Bonnet.(2) )n ( portant Contri1ution -n 199/, )orba"hev9s s"ien"e adviser, 2oald %agdeev, &rote that in "om!uters and mi"roele"troni"s77the ke#s to modern "ivil and militar# te"hnolog#77the %oviets trailed estern standards b# 1D #ears and that the most striking indi"ation of their ba"k&ardness &as the absen"e of a domesti"all# made su!er"om!uter. 'he %oviets "onsidered a su!er"om!uter a .strategi" attribute,. the la"k of &hi"h &as ine6"usable for a su!er!o&er.(3) Line ; did not a"8uire designs for su"h a ma"hine, nor "ould %oviet "om!uter s"ientists build one on their o&n77and 4%D1 B/7 had sto!!ed estern hel!. 3s for +are&ell, his "ontribution led to the "olla!se of a "ru"ial "olle"tion !rogram at @ust the time the %oviet militar# needed it, and it resulted in a for"eful and effe"tive 43'5 effort to !rote"t its te"hnolog#. 3long &ith the (% defense buildu! and an alread# floundering %oviet e"onom#, the (%%2 "ould no longer "om!ete, a "on"lusion rea"hed b# the Politburo in 19*7. hen historians sort out the reasons for the end of the Cold re"eive a footnote. -t &ould be deserved. ar, !erha!s +are&ell &ill

Deliberate Lies, Strange Deaths and Aggression to the World Economy

by Fidel Castro Ruz

)lobal 2esear"h, %e!tember BC, B$$7 Prensa Latina 7 B$$77$B719

Eavana, %e! 19 <Prensa Latina= Cuban President +idel Castro denoun"ed ednesda# that the (nited %tates government is using unimaginable e"onomi" means to defend a right that violates the sovereignt# of all the other "ountries. -n his ednesda#9s arti"le entitled .Deliberate Lies, %trange Deaths and 3ggression to the orld >"onom#,. the leader of the Cuban 2evolution states that it kee!s on bu#ing ra& materials, energ#, advan"ed te"hnolog# industries, the most !rodu"tive lands and the most modern buildings on the fa"e of our !lanet &ith !a!er mone#.

Prensa Latina issues belo& refle"tions b# the Cuban !residentA

2>+L>C'-54% BH 'E> C51134D>2 -4 CE->+

D>L-B>23'> L->%, %'234)> D>3'E% 34D 3)2>%%-54 '5 'E> >C5451H

52LD

-n one of m# refle"tions - made referen"e to gold bars de!osited in the basements of the '&in 'o&ers. 'his time the sub@e"t is 8uite a bit more "om!li"ated and hard to believe. 3lmost four de"ades ago, s"ientists living in the (nited %tates dis"overed the -nternet, the same &a# that 3lbert >instein, born in )erman#, dis"overed in his o&n time the formula to measure atomi" energ#. >instein &as a great s"ientist and humanist. Ee "ontradi"ted 4e&ton9s la&s of !h#si"s, held sa"red until then. Eo&ever, a!!les "ontinued to fall due to the la&s of gravit# that had been defined b# 4e&ton. 'hese &ere t&o different &a#s of observing and inter!reting nature, &ith ver# little information on this in 4e&ton9s da#. - remember &hat

- read more than D$ #ears ago about the famous theor# of relativit# elaborated b# >insteinA energ# is e8ual to mass times the s!eed of light, "alled C, s8uaredA > 1CB. 'he (nited %tates mone# e6isted and the resour"es ne"essar# for su"h e6!ensive resear"h. 'he !oliti"al "limate resulting from the generalized hatred against the brutalities of 4azism in the ri"hest and most !rodu"tive nation in the &orld destro#ed b# the &ar, transformed that fabulous energ# into bombs that &ere dro!!ed over the defenseless !o!ulations of Eiroshima and 4agasaki, "ausing hundreds of thousands of deaths and a similar number of !eo!le &ho &ere e6!osed to radiation and subse8uentl# died in the follo&ing #ears. 3 "lear e6am!le of the use of s"ien"e and te"hnolog# &ith the same hegemoni" goals is des"ribed in an arti"le &ritten b# the former offi"ial of (nited %tates 4ational %e"urit#, )us . eiss? it originall# a!!eared in the magazine %tudies in -ntelligen"e, in 199G, even though it &as more &idel# distributed in B$$B under the title of De"eiving the %oviets. 'here, eiss "laims the idea of sending the (%%2 soft&are that the# needed for their industries, but alread# "ontaminated, &ith the aim of making that "ountr#9s e"onom# "olla!se. 3""ording to notes taken from Cha!ter 17 of the book 3t the 3b#ssA 3n -nsider9s Eistor# of the Cold ar, b# 'homas C. 2eed, former %e"retar# of the (nited %tates 3ir +or"e, Leonid Brezhnev told a grou! of senior Part# offi"ials in 197BA . e Communists have to string along &ith the "a!italists for a &hile. e need their "redits, their agri"ulture and their te"hnolog#. But &e are going to "ontinue massive militar# !rograms, and b# the mid719*$s &e &ill be in a !osition to return to an aggressive foreign !oli"# designed to gain the u!!er hand &ith the est.. 'his information &as "onfirmed b# the Defense De!artment in hearings before the Eouse Committee on Banking and Curren"# in 197/. -n the earl# 97$s, the 4i6on9s government advan"ed the idea of dtente. Eenr# 0issinger ho!ed that .over time, trade and investment ma# leaven the autarki" tenden"ies of the %oviet s#stem., he "onsidered that dtente might .invite gradual asso"iation of the %oviet e"onom# &ith the &orld e"onom#, and foster a degree of interde!enden"e that adds an element of stabilit# to the !oliti"al relations.. 2eagan tended to ignore 0issinger9s theories about dtente and to take President Brezhnev9s &ord, but all doubts &ere removed on Ful# 19, 19*1 &hen the ne& (.%. President met &ith President +ran"ois 1itterand, of +ran"e, at the e"onomi" )77 summit in 5tta&a. -n a "onversation off to the side, 1itterand informed 2eagan about the su""ess his intelligen"e servi"es had in re"ruiting a 0)B agent. 'he man belonged to a se"tion that &as evaluating the a"hievements of %oviet efforts to a"8uire &estern te"hnolog#. 2eagan e6!ressed great interest in 1itterand9s deli"ate revelations and also thanked him for his offer to have the material sent to the (nited %tates government. 'he dossier, under the name of +are&ell, rea"hed the C-3 in 3ugust 19*1. -t made it 8uite "lear that the %oviets had been s!ending #ears "arr#ing out their resear"h and develo!ment a"tivities. )iven the enormous transfer of te"hnolog# b# radar, "om!uters, ma"hine7tools and semi7"ondu"tors from the (nited %tates to the %oviet (nion, one "ould sa# that the Pentagon &as in an arms ra"e &ith itself.

'he +are&ell Dossier also identified hundreds of "ase offi"ials, agents at their !osts and other su!!liers of information through the est and Fa!an. During the first #ears of dtente, the (nited %tates and the %oviet (nion had established &orking grou!s in agri"ulture, "ivil aviation, nu"lear energ#, o"eanogra!h#, "om!uters and the environment. 'he aim &as to begin to "onstru"t .bridges of !ea"e. bet&een the su!er!o&ers. 'he members of the &orking grou!s had to e6"hange visits to their "enters. Besides identif#ing agents, the most useful information brought b# the Dossier "onsisted of the .sho!!ing list. and its aims in terms of a"8uisition of te"hnolog# in the "oming #ears. hen the +are&ell Dossier rea"hed ashington, 2eagan asked Bill Case#, the C-3 Dire"tor, to "ome u! &ith a se"ret o!erative use for the material. 'he !rodu"tion and trans!ortation of oil and gas &as one of the %oviet !riorities. 3 ne& trans7%iberian gas !i!eline &as to "arr# natural gas from the gas fields of (rengoi in %iberia, through 0azakhstan, 2ussia and >astern >uro!e to&ards the &estern dollar markets. -n order to automate the o!eration of valves, "om!ressors and storage installations of su"h an immense enter!rise, the %oviets needed so!histi"ated "ontrol s#stems. 'he# bought some of the first "om!uters on the o!en market, but &hen the authorities of the gas !i!eline took off for the (nited %tates to bu# the ne"essar# soft&are, the# &ere turned do&n. (ndaunted, the %oviets sear"hed else&here? a 0)B o!erative &as sent to !enetrate a Canadian soft&are su!!lier in an attem!t to a"8uire the ne"essar# "odes. 'he (nited %tates intelligen"e, &arned b# the agent in the +are&ell Dossier, ans&ered and mani!ulated the soft&are before sending it. 5n"e, in the %oviet (nion, "om!uters and soft&are &orked in unison and the# made the gas !i!eline &ork s!lendidl#. But this tran8uilit# &as misleading. -nside the soft&are that &as o!erating the gas !i!eline, there &as a 'ro@an horse, a term used to des"ribe soft&are lines hidden in the normal o!erative s#stem &hi"h make that s#stem lose "ontrol in the future, or &henever it &ould re"eive an order from abroad. -n order to affe"t the dollar !rofits "oming in from the est and the domesti" 2ussian e"onom#, the soft&are for the gas !i!eline &hi"h &as to o!erate the !um!s, turbines and valves had been !rogrammed to breakdo&n after a !rudent interval and reset 7that9s ho& it &as des"ribed7 the s!eeds of the !um!s and the valve ad@ustments so that the# &ould &ork at !ressures mu"h higher than those that &ere suitable for the !i!eline9s gaskets and &elding seams. .'he result &as the most monumental non7nu"lear e6!losion and fire ever seen from s!a"e. 3t the hite Eouse, &e re"eived &arning from our infrared satellites of some bizarre event out in the middle of %oviet no&here. 4523D <4orth 3meri"an 3eros!a"e Defense Command= feared a missile liftoff from a !la"e &here no ro"kets &ere kno&n to be based. 5r !erha!s it &as the detonation of a small nu"lear devi"eI'he# <the satellites= had dete"ted no ele"tromagneti" !ulse, "hara"teristi" of nu"lear detonations. Before these "onfli"ting indi"ators "ould turn into an international "risis, )us eiss "ame do&n the hall to tell his fello& 4%C staffers not to &orr#., affirmed 'homas C. 2eed in his book.

'he "am!aign of "ountermeasures based on +are&ell Dossier &as an e"onomi" &ar. >ven though there &ere no "asualties in terms of lives lost be"ause of the gas !i!eline e6!losion, signifi"ant damage &as made to the %oviet e"onom#. 3s a grand finale, bet&een 19*/ and 19*D, the (nited %tates and its 43'5 allies !ut an end to this o!eration &hi"h ended &ith effi"a"# the "a!a"it# of the (%%2 to "a!ture te"hnolog# at a time &hen 1os"o& &as "aught bet&een a defe"tive e"onom#, on one side, and a (% President determined to !revail and end the "old &ar on the other. -n the above "ited arti"le b# eiss, it is stated thatA .-n 19*D, the "ase took a bizarre turn &hen information on the +are&ell Dossier surfa"ed in +ran"e. 1itterand "ame to sus!e"t that ,etrov had all along been a C-3 !lant set u! to test him to see if the material &ould be handed over to the 3meri"ans or ke!t b# the +ren"h. 3"ting on this mistaken belief, 1itterand fired the "hief of the +ren"h servi"e, Hves Bonnet.. )us . eiss is the one &ho "laimed, as alread# said, the evil !lan to have the defe"tive soft&are taken to the (%%2, &hen the (nited %tates had the +are&ell Dossier in its !ossession. Ee died on 4ovember BD, B$$C at the age of 7B. 'he ashington Post did not re!ort his death until De"ember 7, that is, 1B da#s later. 'he# said that eiss .had fallen. from his a!artment building, the atergate, in ashington, and that a forensi" do"tor from the (% "a!ital had de"lared his death a .sui"ide.. Eis hometo&n ne&s!a!er, the 4ashville 'ennessean, !ublished the death noti"e a &eek after the ashington Post and advised that at that time all the# &ere able to sa# &as that .the "ir"umstan"es surrounding his death have not #et been "onfirmed.. Before d#ing, he left some un!ublished notes titled .'he +are&ell Dossier.A the strategi" de"e!tion and the e"onomi" &ar in the Cold ar. eiss had graduated from ,anderbilt (niversit#. Ee had !ostgraduate degrees from Earvard and 4e& Hork (niversit#. Eis &ork for the government "on"entrated on matters of 4ational %e"urit#, intelligen"e organizations and "on"erns dealing &ith the transfer of te"hnolog# to Communist "ountries. Ee &orked &ith the C-3, the Pentagon9s Defense %"ien"e Board and &ith the %ignals -ntelligen"e Committee of the -ntelligen"e Board of the (nited %tates. Ee &as de"orated &ith the C-3 1edal of 1erit and the .Ci!her. 1edal from the 4ational %e"urit# Coun"il. 'he +ren"h gave him the .Lgion d9Eonneur. in 197D. Ee had no surviving relatives. eiss had de"lared himself to be against the &ar in -ra8 a short &hile before his .sui"ide.. -t is interesting to note that 1* da#s before eiss9 death, another Bush government anal#st also "ommitted sui"ide 7Fohn F. 0okal <D* #ears old= on 4ovember 7, B$$C. 'his man lea!t to his death from an offi"e in the %tate De!artment &here he &orked. 0okal &as an intelligen"e anal#st for the De!artment of %tate in matters dealing &ith -ra8. -t is re"orded in alread# !ublished do"uments that 1ikhail )orba"hev be"ame furious &hen arrests and de!ortations of %oviet agents began in various "ountries, sin"e he &as una&are that the "ontents of the +are&ell Dossier &ere in the hands of the main

heads of 43'5 governments. -n a meeting of the Politburo on 5"tober BB, 19*G, "alled to inform "olleagues about the 2e#k@avik %ummit, he alleged that the 3meri"ans &ere .a"ting ver# dis"ourteousl# and behaving like bandits.. >ven though he sho&ed a "om!la"ent fa"e to the !ubli", !rivatel# )orba"hev &ould refer to 2eagan as .a liar.. During the final da#s of the %oviet (nion, the %e"retar# )eneral of the Communist Part# of the (%%2 had to &ork blind. )orba"hev had no idea about &hat &as ha!!ening in the laboratories and high te"hnolog# industries in the (nited %tates? he &as totall# una&are that %oviet laboratories and industries had been "om!romised and to &hat !oint. 'he hite Eouse !ragmatists &ere also blind about these o""urren"es.

President 2onald 2eagan !la#ed his trum! "ardA %tar ars 'he %trategi" Defense -nitiative. Ee kne& that the %oviets "ould not "om!ete in that league, be"ause the# "ouldn9t sus!e"t that their ele"troni"s industr# &as infe"ted &ith virus and 'ro@an horses !la"ed there b# the (nited %tates intelligen"e "ommunit#. 'he former British Prime 1inister, in her memoirs, !ublished b# an im!ortant >nglish !ublisher in 199C under the title of 1argaret 'hat"her, 'he Do&ning %treet Hears, states that the &hole 2eagan !lan related to %tar ars and the intent to make the %oviet (nion "olla!se e"onomi"all# &as the most brilliant !lan of that administration, and it lead definitivel# to the "olla!se of so"ialism in >uro!e. -n Cha!ter ;,- of her book, she e6!lains the !arti"i!ation of her government in the %trategi" Defense -nitiative. 'o "arr# that out, in 'hat"her9s o!inion, &as 2eagan9s .most im!ortant de"ision., and it .&as to !rove "entral to the est9s vi"tor# in the Cold ar.. -t .im!osed more e"onomi" tension and greater austerit#. on %oviet so"iet#, and finall#, its .te"hnologi"al and finan"ial im!li"ations for the (%%2 &ere devastating.. (nder the subtitle of .2eassessing the %oviet (nion., she des"ribes a series of "on"e!ts &hose essen"e is "ontained in the !aragra!hs taken literall# from that long !assage, &here she re"ords the brutal !lot. .3s 19*C dre& on, the %oviets must have begun to realize that their game of mani!ulation and intimidation &ould soon be u!. >uro!ean governments &ere not !re!ared to fall into the tra! o!ened b# the %oviet !ro!osal of a 9nu"lear7free zone9 for >uro!e. Pre!arations for the develo!ment of Cruise and Pershing missiles &ent ahead. -n 1ar"h President 2eagan announ"ed 3meri"an !lans for a %trategi" Defense -nitiative <%D-= &hose te"hnologi"al and finan"ial im!li"ations for the (%%2 &ere devastating.. .I- had no doubt about the rightness of his "ommitment to !ress ahead &ith the !rogram. Looking ba"k, it is no& "lear to me that 2onald 2eagan9s original de"ision on %D- &as the single most im!ortant of his !residen"#.. .-n formulating our a!!roa"h to %D-, there &ere four distin"t elements &hi"h - bore in mind. 'he first &as the s"ien"e itself. 'he 3meri"an aim in %D- &as to develo! a ne& and mu"h more effe"tive defense against ballisti" missiles..

.'his "on"e!t of defense rested on the abilit# to atta"k in"oming ballisti" missiles at all stages of their flight, from the boost !hase &hen the missile and all its &arheads and de"o#s &ere together 7the best moment7 right u! to the !oint of re7entr# of the earth9s atmos!here on its &a# to the target.. .'he se"ond element to be "onsidered &as the e6isting international agreements limiting the de!lo#ment of &ea!ons in s!a"e and 3B1 s#stems. 'he 197B 3B1 'reat#, as amended b# a 197/ Proto"ol, allo&ed the (nited %tates and the %oviet (nion to de!lo# one stati" 3B1 s#stem &ith u! to one hundred laun"hers in defense either of either an -nter7Continental Ballisti" 1issile <-CB1= silo field or the national "a!ital.. .'he +oreign 5ffi"e of the 1inistr# of Defense al&a#s sought to urge the narro&est !ossible inter!retation, &hi"h the 3meri"ans 77rightl# in m# vie&77 believed &ould have meant that %D- &as stillborn. - al&a#s tried to steer a&a# from this !hraseolog# and made it "lear in !rivate and !ubli" that resear"h on &hether a s#stem &as viable "ould not be said to have been "om!leted until it had been su""essfull# tested. (nderneath the @argon, this a!!arentl# te"hni"al !oint &as reall# a matter of straight "ommon sense. But it &as to be"ome the issue dividing the (nited %tates and the (%%2 at the 2e#k@avik summit and so assumed great im!ortan"e. .'he third element in the "al"ulation &as the relative strength of the t&o sides in Ballisti" 1issile Defense. 5nl# the %oviet (nion !ossessed a &orking 3B1 s#stem <kno&n as )3L5%E= around 1os"o&, &hi"h the# &ere "urrentl# u!7grading. 'he 3meri"ans had never had an e8uivalent s#stem.. .3lso the %oviets &ere further advan"ed in anti7satellite &ea!ons. 'here &as, therefore, a strong argument that the %oviets had alread# a"8uired an una""e!table advantage in this &hole area. .'he fourth element &as the im!li"ations of %D- for deterren"e. - started off &ith a good deal of s#m!ath# for the thinking behind the 3B1 'reat#. 'his &as the most so!histi"ated and effe"tive the defense against nu"lear missiles, the greater the !ressure to seek hugel# e6!ensive advan"es in nu"lear &ea!ons te"hnolog#. - &as al&a#s a believer in a slightl# 8ualified version of the do"trine kno&n as 13D7 9mutuall# assured destru"tion9. 'he threat of <&hat - !referred to "all= 9una""e!table destru"tion9 &hi"h &ould follo& from a nu"lear e6"hange &as su"h that nu"lear &ea!ons &ere an effe"tive deterrent against not @ust nu"lear but also "onventional &ar.. .But - soon began to see that %D- &ould strengthen not &eaken the nu"lear deterrent. (nlike President 2eagan and some other members of his 3dministration - never believed that %D- "ould offer one hundred !er"ent !rote"tion, but it &ould allo& suffi"ient (nited %tates missiles to survive a first strike b# the %oviets.. .-t &as the sub@e"t of %D- &hi"h dominated m# talks &ith President 2eagan and members of his 3dministration &hen - &ent to Cam! David on %aturda# BB De"ember 19*/ to brief the 3meri"ans on m# earlier talks &ith 1r. )orba"hev. 'his &as the first o""asion on &hi"h - had heard President 2eagan s!eaking about %D-. Ee did so &ith !assion. Ee &as at his most idealisti". Ee stressed that %D- &ould be a defensive s#stem and that it &as not his intention to obtain for the (nited %tates a unilateral advantage. -ndeed, he said that if %D- su""eeded he &ould be read# to internationalize

it so that it &as at the servi"e of all "ountries, and that he told 1r. )rom#ko as mu"h. Ee reaffirmed his long7term goal of getting rid of nu"lear &ea!ons entirel#. .'hese remarks made me nervous. - &as horrified to think that the (nited %tates &ould be !re!ared to thro& a&a# a hard7&on lead in te"hnolog# b# making it internationall# available.. . hat - heard, no& that &e got do&n to dis"ussion of the likel# realit# rather than the grand vision, &as reassuring. President 2eagan did not !retend that the# #et kne& &here the resear"h "ould finall# lead. But he em!hasized that 77in addition to his earlier arguments in favor of %D-77 kee!ing u! &ith the (nited %tates &ould im!ose an e"onomi" strain on the %oviet (nion. Ee argued that there had to be a !ra"ti"al limit as to ho& far the %oviet (nion "ould !ush their !eo!le do&n the road of austerit#.. .- no& @otted do&n, &hile talking to 4ational %e"urit# 3dviser Bud 1"+arlane, the four !oints &hi"h seemed to me to be "ru"ial. .1# offi"ials then filled in the details. 'he President and - agreed a te6t &hi"h set out the !oli"#. .'he main se"tion of m# statement readsA .- told the President of m# firm "onvi"tion that the %D- resear"h !rogramme should go ahead. 2esear"h is, of "ourse, !ermitted under e6isting (% %oviet treaties? and &e, of "ourse, kno& that the 2ussians alread# have their resear"h !rogramme and, in the (% vie&, have alread# gone be#ond resear"h. e agreed on four !ointsA <1= the (%, and &estern, aim &as not to a"hieve su!eriorit#, but to maintain balan"e, taking a""ount of %oviet develo!ments? <B= %D-7related de!lo#ment &ould, in vie& of treat# obligations, have to be a matter for negotiation? <C= the overall aim is to enhan"e, not under"ut, deterren"e? </= >ast7 est negotiation should aim to a"hieve se"urit# &ith redu"ed levels of offensive s#stems on both sides. 'his &ill be the !ur!ose of the resumed (%7 %oviet negotiations on arms "ontrol, &hi"h &arml# &el"ome. .- subse8uentl# learnt that )eorge %"hultz thought that - had se"ured too great a "on"ession on the 3meri"an9s !art in the &ording? but in fa"t it gave them and us a "lear and defensible line and hel!ed reassure the >uro!ean members of 43'5. 3 good da#9s &ork.. Later on, under the subtitle of .,isit to statesA ashingtonA +ebruar# 19*D., 1argaret 'hat"her

.- again visited ashington in +ebruar# 19*D. 3rms talks bet&een the 3meri"ans and the %oviet (nion had no& resumed, but %D- remained a sour"e of "ontention. - &as to address a @oint meeting of Congress on the morning of ednesda# B$ +ebruar# and brought &ith me from London as a gift a bronze statue of inston Chur"hill, &ho had also man# #ears before been honoured &ith su"h an invitation. - &orked es!e"iall# hard on this s!ee"h. - &ould use the 3uto"ue for its deliver#. - kne& that Congress &ould have seen the 9)reat Communi"ator9 himself delivering faultless s!ee"hes and &ould have a dis"riminating audien"e. %o - resolved to !ra"tise s!eaking the te6t until had got ever# intonation and em!hasis right. <%!eaking to 3uto"ue, - should add, is a totall# different te"hni8ue to s!eaking from notes.= -n fa"t, - borro&ed President

2eagan9s o&n 3uto"ue and had it brought ba"k to the British >mbass# &here - &as sta#ing. Earve# 'homas, &ho a""om!anied me, fi6ed it u! and, ignoring an# @etlag, !ra"tised until / a.m. - did not go to bed, beginning the ne& &orking da# &ith m# usual bla"k "offee and vitamin !ills, then gave television intervie&s from GA/D a.m., had m# hair done and &as read# at 1$AC$ to leave from the Ca!itol. - used m# s!ee"h, &hi"h ranged &idel# over international issues, to give strong su!!ort for %D-. - had a terrifi" re"e!tion.. .'he follo&ing month <1ar"h 19*D= sa& the death of 1r. Chernenko and, &ith remarkabl# little dela#, the su""ession of 1r. )orba"hev to the %oviet leadershi!. 5n"e again - attended a 1os"o& funeralA the &eather &as, if an#thing, even "older than at Huri 3ndro!ov9s. 1r. )orba"hev had a large number of foreign dignitaries to see. But had almost an hour9s talk &ith him that evening in %t. 0atherine9s Eall in the 0remlin. 'he atmos!here &as more formal than at Che8uers <the offi"ial "ountr# residen"e of British !rime ministers sin"e 19B1= and the silent, sardoni" !resen"e of 1r. )rom#ko did not hel!. But - &as able to e6!lain them the im!li"ations of the !oli"# - had agreed &ith President 2eagan the !reviousl# De"ember at Cam! David. -t &as "lear that %D&as no& the main !reo""u!ation of the %oviets in arms "ontrol.. .1r. )orba"hev brought, as &e had e6!e"ted, a ne& st#le to the %oviet )overnment. Ee s!oke o!enl# of the terrible state of the %oviet e"onom#, though at this stage he &as still rel#ing on the methods asso"iated &ith 1r. 3ndro!ov9s drive for greater effi"ien"# rather than radi"al reform. 3n e6am!le of this &as the dra"onian measures he took against al"oholism. 3s the #ear &ore on, ho&ever, there &as no eviden"e of im!rovement in "onditions in the %oviet (nion. -ndeed, as our ne& 7and first "lass7 ambassador to 1os"o&, Brian Cartledge, &ho had been m# foreign affairs !rivate se"retar# &hen - first be"ame Prime 1inister, !ointed out in one of his first dis!at"hes, it &as a matter of, 9@am tomorro& and, mean&hile, no vodka toda#9.. .3 distin"t "hill entered into Britain9s relations &ith the %oviet (nion as a result of e6!ulsions authorized of %oviet offi"ials &ho had been s!#ing.. .-n 4ovember President 2eagan and 1r. )orba"hev had their first meeting in )eneva. 4ot mu"h of substan"e "ame out of it 77the %oviets insisted on linking "uts in strategi" nu"lear &ea!ons to an end to %D- resear"h77 but a good !ersonal ra!!ort 8ui"kl# develo!ed bet&een the t&o leaders. But he &as not, &hi"h - found not at all sur!rising. +or 2onald 2eagan had had !lent# of !ra"ti"e in his earl# #ears as President of the %"reen 3"tors )uild in dealing &ith hard7headed trade union negotiation, and no one &as more hard7headed than 1r. )orba"hev.. .During 19*G 1r. )orba"hev sho&ed great subtlet# in !la#ing on &estern !ubli" o!inion b# bringing for&ard tem!ting, but una""e!table, !ro!osals on arms "ontrol. 2elativel# little &as said b# the %oviets on the link bet&een %D- and "uts in nu"lear &ea!ons. But the# &ere given no reasons to believe that the 3meri"ans &ere !re!ared to sus!end or sto! %D- resear"h. Late in the #ear it &as agreed that President 2eagan and 1r. )orba"hev7 &ith their +oreign 1inisters7 should meet in 2e#k@avik, -"eland, to dis"uss substantive !ro!osals..

.-t &as that #ou "ould not ultimatel# hold ba"k resear"h on %D- an# more than #ou "ould !revent resear"h into ne& kinds of offensive &ea!ons. e had to be the first to get it. %"ien"e is unsto!!able? it &ill not be sto!!ed for being ignored. . .-n retros!e"t, the 2e#k@avik summit on that &eekend of 11 and 1B 5"tober <19*G= "an be seen to have a 8uite different signifi"an"e than most of the "ommentators at the time realized. 3 tra! had been !re!ared for the 3meri"ans. >ver greater %oviet "on"essions &ere made during the summitA the# agreed for the first time that the British and +ren"h deterrents should be e6"luded from the -4+ negotiations? an that "uts in strategi" nu"lear &ea!ons should leave ea"h side &ith e8ual numbers7 rather than a straight !er"entage "ut, &hi"h &ould have led the %oviets &ell ahead. 'he# also made signifi"ant "on"essions on -4+ numbers. 3s the summit dre& to an end President 2eagan &as !ro!osing an agreement b# &hi"h the &hole arsenal of strategi" nu"lear &ea!ons7 bombers, long7range Cruise and ballisti" missiles7 &ould be halved &ithin five #ears and the most !o&erful of these &ea!ons, strategi" ballisti" missiles, eliminated altogether &ithin ten. 1r. )orba"hev &as even more ambitiousA he &anted the elimination of all strategi" nu"lear &ea!ons b# the end of the ten7#ear !eriod.. .But then suddenl#, at the ver# end, the tra! &as s!rung. President 2eagan had "on"eded that during the ten7#ear !eriod both sides &ould agree not to &ithdra& from the 3B1 'reat#, though develo!ment and testing "om!atible &ith the 'reat# &ould be allo&ed.. But 2eagan suffered a strange amnesia about the triggering of the brutal militar# "om!etition that had been for"ed on the (%%2, &ith its e6traordinar# e"onomi" "ost. Eis famous diar# doesn9t sa# one &ord about the +are&ell Dossier. -n his dail# notes &hi"h &ere !ublished this #ear, 2onald 2eagan s!eaks of his so@ourn in 1ontebello, CanadaA .%unda#, Ful# 19 <19*1= .'he hotel is a marvelous !ie"e of engineering, totall# made u! of logs. .Ead a one on one &ith Chan"ellor %"hmidt. Ee &as reall# do&n and in a !essimisti" mood about the &orld. .+ollo&ing 77met &ith Pres. 1iterrand77 e6!lained our e". !rogram and that high interest rates &ere not of our doing. .Dinner that night &as @ust the * of us. 'he 7 heads of %tate and the Pres. <'horn= of the >uro!ean Communit#. -t be"ame a reall# free &heeling dis"ussion of e". issues, trade et". due to a suggestion b# P.1. 'hat"her.. 'he final result of the great "ons!ira"# against the %oviet (nion and the "raz# e6!ensive arms ra"e that &as im!osed, &hen it &as mortall# &ounded in an e"onomi" sense is des"ribed in the introdu"tion of the book b# 'homas C. 2eed, &ritten b# )eorge E. . Bush, the first President in the Bush D#nast#, &ho !arti"i!ated in a ver# real &a# in orld ar --. Literall#, he &ritesA .'he Cold ar &as a struggle for the ver# soul of the mankind. -t &as a struggle for a &a# of life defined b# freedom on one side and re!ression on the other. 3lread# - think

&e have forgotten &hat a long and arduous struggle it &as, and ho& "lose to nu"lear disaster &e "ame a number of times. 'he fa"t that it did not ha!!en is a testimon# to the honorable men and &omen, both sides &ho ke!t their "ool and did &hat &as right7 as the# sa& it7in times of "risis.. .'his "onfli"t bet&een the surviving su!er!o&ers of orld ar -- began as - "ame home from that &ar. -n 19/*, the #ear of m# graduation from Hale, the %oviets tried to "ut off estern a""ess to Berlin. 'hat blo"kade led to the formation of 43'5, &as follo&ed b# the first %oviet 37bomb test, and turned blood# &ith the invasion of %outh 0orea. +our de"ades of nu"lear "onfrontation, !ro6# &ars, and e"onomi" !rivation follo&ed.. .- &as !rivileged to be President of the (nited %tates &hen it all "ame to an end. -n fall of 19*9 the satellite states of >astern >uro!e began to break free, and mostl# !ea"eful revolution s&e!t through Poland, Eungar#, Cze"hoslovakia, and 2omania. hen the Berlin all fell, &e kne& the end &as near.. .-t took another t&o #ears to "lose do&n the em!ire of Lenin and %talin. - re"eived that good ne&s in t&o tele!hone "alls. 'he first "ame on De"ember *, 1991, &hen Boris Heltsin "alled me from a hunting lodge near Brest, in Belarus. 5nl# re"entl# ele"ted President of the 2ussian 2e!ubli", Heltsin had been meeting &ith Leonid 0rav"huk, President of (kraine, and %tanislav %hush"hevik, President of Belarus. .'oda# a ver# im!ortant event took !la"e in our "ountr#,. Heltsin said. .- &anted to inform #ou m#self before #ou learned about it from the !ress. 'hen he told me the ne&sA 'he President of 2ussia, Belarus, and (kraine has de"ided to dissolve the %oviet (nion. .'&o &eeks later a se"ond "all "onfirmed that the former %oviet (nion &ould disa!!ear. 1ikhail )orba"hev "onta"ted me at Cam! David on Christmas 1orning of 1991. Ee &ished Barbara and me a 1err# Christmas, and then he &ent on to sum u! &hat had ha!!ened in his "ountr#A the %oviet (nion had "eased to e6ist. Ee had @ust been on national ', to "onfirm the fa"t, and he had transferred "ontrol of %oviet nu"lear &ea!ons to the President of 2ussia. 9Hou "an have a ver# 8uiet Christmas evening,9 he said. 3nd so it &as over.. -t is re"orded in an arti"le !ublished in 'he 4e& Hork 'imes that the o!eration used almost all of the &ea!ons &ithin the C-39s rea"h 77!s#"hologi"al &arfare, sabotage, e"onomi" &arfare, strategi" de"e!tion, "ounterintelligen"e, "#berneti" &arfare77 all "ollaborating &ith the 4ational %e"urit# Coun"il, the Pentagon and the +B-. -t destro#ed the burgeoning %oviet es!ionage ma"hiner#, it damaged the e"onom# and destabilized the %tate in that "ountr#. -t &as a "om!lete su""ess. -f the o!!osite had ha!!ened <the %oviets doing it to the 3meri"ans=, it &ould have been vie&ed as an a"t of terrorism. 'here is another book &hi"h deals &ith this to!i"? it is "alled Lega"# of 3shes and it has @ust been !ublished. 5n the book9s dust "over &e "an read thatA 'im einer is a re!orter for 'he 4e& Hork 'imes. Ee has &ritten on 3meri"an intelligen"e for t&ent# #ears, and &on the Pulitzer Prize for his &ork on the se"ret national se"urit# !rograms. Ee has traveled to 3fghanistan and other nations to investigate C-3 "overt o!erations firsthand. 'his is his third book.

Lega"# of 3shes is based on more than D$ thousand do"uments basi"all# "oming from the ver# ar"hives of the C-3, and hundreds of intervie&s &ith veterans of that agen"#, in"luding ten dire"tors. Ee reveals to us a !anorama of the C-3 from the da#s of its "reation after orld ar --, going through its battles during the Cold ar and the &ar against terrorism begun on %e!tember 11, B$$1. 'he arti"le b# Ferem# 3llison, !ublished in 2ebeliJn in Fune B$$G, and the arti"les b# 2osa 1iriam >lizalde &hi"h &ere !ublished this #ear on the %e!tember C and 1$, denoun"e these events em!hasizing the idea of one of the founders of free soft&are &ho !ointed out thatA .as te"hnologies gro& more "om!le6, it &ill be more diffi"ult to dete"t a"tions of this kind.. 2osa 1iriam !ublished t&o straightfor&ard o!inion arti"les, ea"h one onl# D !ages in length. -f she &ants to, she "ould &rite a book &ith man# !ages. - remember her &ell from that da# &hen, a #oung @ournalist, she nervousl# asked me, in the middle of a !ress "onferen"e 1D #ears ago no less, &hether - thought &e "ould survive the %!e"ial Period that had befallen us &ith the demise of the %o"ialist blo". 'he (%%2 "olla!sed &ith a "rash. %in"e then &e have graduated hundreds of thousands of #oung !eo!le from the higher levels of edu"ation. hat better ideologi"al &ea!on do &e have than the higher level of "ons"ien"eK e had it &hen &e &ere a largel# illiterate and semi7illiterate !eo!le. -f #ou reall# &ant to see &ild animals, then let instin"ts !revail in the human being. e "ould sa# a lot on this sub@e"t. -n the !resent da#, the &orld is threatened b# a devastating e"onomi" "risis. 'he (nited %tates government is using unimaginable e"onomi" means to defend a right that violates the sovereignt# of all the other "ountriesA to kee! on bu#ing ra& materials, energ#, advan"ed te"hnolog# industries, the most !rodu"tive lands and the most modern buildings on the fa"e of our !lanet &ith !a!er mone#. +idel Castro 2uz

%e!tember 1*, B$$7.