The CRB Scam

June 1997
IT all began with a few cheques bouncing. When some fixed depositors in high-profile non-
banking finance company (NBFC) CRB Capital Markets found that the cheques issued to them
by the company were dishonoured, they quickly sat up and took notice. The news spread fast,
and with it came panic, as thousands of depositors thronged CRB'S offices to withdraw their
deposits.
The speed at which things moved thereafter was amazing. CRB's closets, it appeared, stored only
skeletons. Within days, the group which claimed a funds base of more than Rs 1000 crore and
which liked to refer to itself as the "complete global financial house", had collapsed, winding-up
operations had started, and an international manhunt was on for the "CRB" in CRB Capital:
Chain Roop Bhansali.
And what is now clear is that the crash of CRB could have been easily avoided. The Reserve
Bank of India (RBI) Should have seen it coming months before. Indeed, it did in December
1996, an RBI team wrote a damning report on massive irregularities in the way CRB was using
public money, but no follow-up action was taken to save the average investor who had put his
savings into CRB. The RBI did put the in-principle approval it had granted CRB for Setting up a
bank on hold, but it sat and watched as the company collected money from the public, saying, in
its prospectus, that it had "promoted its own private sector bank CRB Global Bank Ltd, and is
shortly to begin commercial operation". For his part, RBI governor R. Rangarajan told a BJP
delegation that he was not aware of this.
Every fixed deposit (FD) scheme that is launched in India has to be rated by one of three credit-
rating agencies; the aim is to give the potential depositor a clear indication of the safety of
putting his money into a scheme. In September 1996, the rating agency Credit Analysis &
Research Ltd (CARE) assigned an A rating to CRB'S FD programme, indicating adequate safety.
This was after noting in its report that the company had liquidity problems, that it defaulted on
loans and that its asset quality was deteriorating. After the RBI stopped CRB from raising fresh
FDs, CARE-which claims to have been monitoring the company all throughquickly
downgraded its rating to C, denoting high risk. Interestingly, CARE has been promoted by the
IDBI, which in turn had given financial assistance to the group.
The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) watched silently as CRB's merchant banking
division handled scores of dubious public issues and went around claiming that it was "the
country's No 1 merchant banker". CRB'S auditors would have been blind not to have read the
signs of imminent collapse when they checked the company's accounts. But the Calcutta-based
D.P. Bhaiya and Company happily gave their seal of approval on CRB'S balancesheet without so
much as a squeak about its rotten core.
Chain Roop Bhansali's story, in fact, is a case study of the classic scamster. An obscure chartered
accountant from Jaipur, Bhansali made his first pile by setting up shell finance companies,
cooking up some accounts and balancesheets for them and selling them off to crooked
businessmen who needed such companies to rotate their black money.
In 1985, Bhansali set up CRB Capital Markets, which started merchant banking operations,
marketing public issues. Its list of clients is a litany of the insignificant and the fly-by-night, but
that list was longer than any other merchant banker's in the country. Naturally, since Bhansali
was willing to handle any issue at all, with scant attention to the ethics and responsibilities of his
profession. By 1994, Bhansali was ready to get into a bigger business: mutual funds. With
SEBI(I) giving him the nod, in 1994, he launched the CRB Arihant Mangal Fund and,
amazingly, raised something around Rs 230 crore when funds with far better pedigrees could not
raise even half the amount. It is now revealed that of this amount, only Rs 6.25 crore came from
small investors. Where did the rest come from? For that, take a look at CRB Arihant's investment
pattern. Eighty per cent of its corpus was in just 65 scrips while the remaining 20 per cent was
distributed over 289 scrips. And around 30 of the 65 scrips on which Bhansali has been so
bullish are in unquoted securities. What almost definitely happened was that Bhansali rounded
up his pals in a quid pro quo deal.
They routed their money into Bhansali's mutual fund, which routed it back to them by buying
shares in their companies from them. That's the oldest trick in town, but no one in authority
appears to have moved a finger, though rumours about CRB have been rife in financial circles
from day one. By now Bhansali was getting really ambitious. The next step-and the crucial one
that would close his money-making circle was to set up a bank. The merchant banking division
would manage shady share issues, raising money from the unsuspecting public and rerouting
crooked promoters' funds. Many of these companies would anyway be finance companies which
would redirect money into Bhansali's NBFC and mutual fund, which would keep the moolah
flowing in an ever-widening circle with Bhansali and his clients/partners taking their cut out at
every orbit. With the bank in operation, Bhansali would have access to more public savings than
ever before, and that circle would reach its apogee, moving funds faster and faster, wider and
wider.
Of course, CRB got the RBI in principle approval to set up his bank in Bhubaneshwar. Why he
got it when applicants like the Tatas and Birlas (Aditya Birla group) were refused a banking
license, is naturally a question worth pondering. Could it have had something to do with
Bhansali recruiting ex-State Bank of India chief M.K. Sinha as the head of his banking outfit?
Could it have had to do with his supposed closeness to Janata Party MP Subramanian Swamy,
who, sources claim, could have pushed a few levers here and there? Then, in November 1996, a
routine RBI inspection revealed that the CRB group was misusing public funds and misreporting
income. The RBI withdrew its banking approval, but Bhansali coolly issued his Esteem Bonds,
and raised money to actually feed the promoter's contribution in his bank. Where did Bhansali
mess up? He needed more and more money to feed his cycle, and his supplies were not matching
his demand, for once the cycle is set in motion, it's hard to get off. He started offering absurd
incentives for making FDs in his company and began borrowing at exorbitant rates from the
inter-corporate market.
Much of that money would go into servicing his depositors, paying back their principal and
interest. The cycle was fast turning vicious, and the only way he could have saved his empire
was to set up the bank and mobilise a new large source of cheap funds. That did not happen. So
he tried the last trick in his book. CRB serviced its depositors through the SBI. The company
paid SBI the money required in advance every three months, and against this, the SBI would
encash the interest warrants and refund orders that CRB depositors sent the bank. In February,
CRB quietly stopped making the advance payments. Amazingly, no one in the SBI seemed to
have noticed. That the SBI suddenly was inundated with redemption requests points to a
colluded conspiracy to defraud the bank.
The bank kept encashing the cheques till the figure hit the Rs 60 crore mark, when someone sat
up and took notice. Then the cheques started bouncing, and the faecal matter hit the air
generator. Chain Roop Bhansali is, however, still absconding. While rumours about him being
sighted at places ranging from Canada to Hong Kong and Peru abound, the Central Bureau of
Investigation is convinced that Bhansali is still in India. There are even rumours that he could be
hiding in a prominent politician's home in Delhi or Chandigarh. For Bhansali has never lacked
friends in need. Are You Interested? CRB could be just the tip of the iceberg as other finance
companies struggle to raise funds. By SHEKHAR GHOSH YOU can almost smell them by now.
The symptoms of diseased non-banking finance companies (NBFCS) are like those of an
epidemic: flashy brochures, media hype, ambitious plans and diversifications, fancy recruitments
at fancier salaries. "When the ego of an NBFC starts riding piggyback on the promoter's id, it's
time to run away as fast and as far as you can," says a BSE broker. CRB is the classic case
from the sudden hype claiming dubiously to be the number one merchant banker in the country
to C.R. Bhansali's pathetic attempts at snatching influential positions. He failed to become
chairman of the Association of Merchant Bankers of India. Organising seminars on financial
markets where he himself would be a prominent speaker was another route to respectability. The
CRB Foundation for philanthropic and religious activities also helped. The reality is that the
CRB debacle will be felt by 45,000-odd finance companies in India. How risk-free are the fixed
deposits that many of these companies are offering? Though several NBFCS had managed to
land respectable ratings from credit rating agencies, the high interest rates offered by these
companies should have made the investors suspicious.
Many of them were offering FD rates of 18 and 19 per cent, with broker incentives of 12 per
cent, plus free gifts ranging from thermos flasks to colour televisions. The cost of funds for these
NBFCs come to over 30 per cent. To make even a minimal profit, they would have to lend it at
35-40 per cent. Says G.C. Garg, managing director of Lloyds Finance: "investors should have
been aware that anyone paying such high interest rates were certain to default in repayment of
principal." The very nature of the NBFC business too make the companies vulnerable to asset-
liability mismatches. Most NBFCS use fixed deposits as their source of funds. Typically, their
borrowings have one-year terms. But, the businesses most of them indulge in are leasing or hire
purchase, which mean an average lock-in period of three to five years. In essence, they were
borrowing for one year and blocking up funds for between three and five years. Thus every year
they needed to raise fresh FDs just to repay the old amounts. This worked as long as interest
rates were rising.
But with a falling interest regime, the bottom was bound to fall out. Besides, instead of blocking
the funds in leasing, many NBFC's started resorting to paper leases, without any assets to exploit
depreciation and tax benefits. Lack of growth has forced many NBFCs to defer their tax
liabilities from one year to the next. "Future tax liabilities of these companies will be far more
than their net worth. ITC Classic's net worth is already in the negative to the tune of Rs 473
crore. The cumulative effect on non-performing assets will be almost exponential," says a dealer
at NSE.. "In three years, the deferred tax liabilities alone could wipe off over 50 per cent of the
NBFCS. " MANY would also be very highly leveraged. After the prosperous markets of 1994
and 1995, many companies have been left holding worthless paper, the result of bought-out deals
or fly-by-night new issue operators. At the BSE 358 NBFCS are languishing below issue prices.
Sixteen are quoted at issue prices while only 357 are quoted above their issue prices. According
to market observers, the CRB fiasco will only accelerate the shakeout, and several NBFCS could
be wiped but as investors get choosy.
The RBI has shortlisted 10 major companies for closer monitoring of their activities: ITC
Classic, Peerless, IFB Finance, Ceat Financial Services, Prudential Capital Markets, Pressman,
Srei International, Magna Leasing and Jenson & Nicholson Financial Services. And yet some 17
NBFCS, all of the above included, have also been registered by the RBI as satellite dealers in the
specialised, high-volume, low-margin government securities market. Strange, for companies like
Kotak Mahindra and DSP Merrill Lynch were given the satellite dealerships much after little
known names with unproven records like RR Financial Consultants, Foresight Financial
Consultants, Hoare (India) Securities, Dil Vikas Finance, Prudential Stock & Securities and A.K.
Capital Services. "This is what makes the RBI suspect," says a banker alluding to the political
connections of the promoters of several of these "dark horses".
For instance, sources refer to the political connections of the Calcutta-based Vinod Bald-
promoted Prudential Stock & Securities, which has taken over the dubious mantle of. "No I
merchant banker" from CRB. Having acquired Sikkim Bank last year, the Hyderabad branch of
the bank was inaugurated by none other than TDP MP Renuka Chowdhry and Prabhakar Rao,
Narasimha Rao's son. The papers carried huge ads of the inauguration to drive the political
connection home. For the time being, the attempt is to avoid a run on the NBFCS. Even the
bluest of the blue chips are running scared. Soon after the CRB exposure, Anagram Finance
issued an ad saying they are open 24 hours, primarily to evade a psychological run on their FD
withdrawals. Some NBFCS are also selling their assets like no other. A lot of assets are being
sold in the bourses these days, mainly by finance companies desperate to recover whatever
liquidity they can.
Market experts are betting that several NBFCS Will soon be offered on the auction block. ITC
tried to sell off ITC Classic, but there were no buyers. "Classic may be the first, but some of the
blue-chip companies are also being negotiated at ridiculous prices," says a chartered accountant.
Call it the wages of sin. WARNING SIGNALS Before putting your money in an NBFC fixed
deposit, check out the following points: * Is the company offering a very high interest rate, and
hefty incentives? * Has the company shot to prominence in the last few years, growing very fast?
* Has it suddenly begun advertising heavily, especially on television? * Does it list plantations
and real estate among its principal businesses? * Is your fixed deposit broker pushing the
company very strongly to you? If the answer to any two of these questions is yes, think twice.
RBI Governor R. Rangarajan claims he was not aware of the irregularities in the way CRB was
using public money.
HOW THE SYSTEM FAILED CREDIT RATING AGENCIES Rating agency CARE assigned
an A rating, signifying investor safety, to CRB's FD programme in September 1996, after noting
in its report that CRB had liquidity problems, defaulted on loans, and that its asset quality was
deteriorating. After RBI stopped CRB from raising fresh FDs; CARE, which claims to have been
monitoring CRB all through, woke up and downgraded its rating quickly to C, denoting high
investment risk. THE AUDITORS CRB's Calcutta-based auditors D.P.Bhaiya and Company
never pointed out any irregularities in CRB's operations, Though the firm would have had to be
blind to miss them. Just as ITC Classic's problems remained unreported by its auditors till the
company collapsed.
The company-auditor nexus is suspected to be fairly common in the country's financial services
industry. THE RBI The July 1996, RBI gave an in-principle banking license to CRB, a rare
honour. In November, an RBI inspection showed massive irregularities, but did nothing about it
while CRB happily went on collecting FDs. In December, RBI put the banking license on hold,
but turned a blind eye to CRB raising money for its bank. Only when reports started appearing in
the media in April did RBI cancel the license and stop CRB from collecting FDS. THE SEBI
SEBI remained a bystander while CRB managed scores of shady share issue to become the
number 1 merchant banker in the country. SEBI gave CRB permission to start a mutual fund and
a share custodial service.
In April 1996, when SEBI discovered irregularities in CRB's mutual fund, it barred it from
launching any new schemes. For just two months. THE SBI CRB's depositors encashed their
interest warrants and refund orders through SBI. CRB was supposed to deposit the amounts in
advance with SBI every three months. In February, CRB stopped this pre-funding and continued
to issue warrants and orders, which SBI faithfully honoured, perhpas reassured by the fact that a
former SBI chief was on the CRB board. Only when the unpre-funded payouts hit a staggering
Rs 60 crore did the bank wake up.
May 2011
Fourteen years is a long wait for those who list their life's savings in a fraud scheme that
promised them fantastic returns. But several victims of the infamous CRB (Chain Roop
Bhansali) scam have been receiving good news in an envelope in their mail box.
Following court orders, CRB Capital Markets Ltd Disbursement Committee has been quietly
disbursing principal amount to its depositors from a nondescript office in Delhi's Panchkuia
district.

While Rs 50,000 the cap set to the disbursement may not seem like a life-altering amount, at
the time when thousands of unsuspecting middle-class families invested in the scheme, it meant
the world.
One of the victims who received the disbursement letter is Mahim resident Mohini Donde (72), a
retired supervisor from Bombay Electric Supply Transport (BEST).
Donde and her family were devastated by the scam. "I lost nearly Rs 1.5 lakh, my mother, lost
Rs 56,000, my husband Sharad lost Rs 30,000 and my son Rajeev lost Rs 20,000. The crisis was
severe as I had invested a chunk of my post-retirement dues in the scheme.
CRB was supposed to pay an interest of 15 per cent. The maturity date of my deposits was in
1997 and the company went bust just a few days before the deposit was supposed to mature,
recalls Mohini, whose mother is no more.
Soon after the scam erupted, Donde made several trips to the various offices of CRB and
consumer guidance units. We also registered our complaints with the Economic Offenses Wing.
I had given up hope when I got this letter about reimbursement, says a moist-eyed Donde.

Saroj Acharekar, a retired BEST officer whose fortunes sank with CRB said, "Soon after
retirement, I had invested Rs 30,000 in CRB while my husband Ashok invested Rs 10,000. I
have received a letter from CRB about returning the principal amount, but my husband is yet to
receive his communication." Saroj has sent all her documents to CRB Delhi address by post and
has kept her fingers crossed. I hope nothing goes wrong this time, she adds.

Many investors have got letters quoting various court orders and mentioning that a division
bench of the Delhi High Court has constituted a seven-member disbursement committee chaired
by a retired additional district and sessions judge to make payments upto Rs 50,000.

The letter also lists the specifics investors have to submit original fixed deposit receipts and
bonds duly discharged and other proofs of identification and bank details to enable payment in
their banks.

The CRB Capital Markets Ltd Disbursement Committee has been functioning out of a small
office in Delhi from 10 am to 6 pm every day for a month now, processing applications of the
depositors, from the original base of 42,000.

For the team that is working at disbursing the amount, it is a slow, painstaking effort.

Every day we receive about 250 letters. It will take us at least one month to process each
request. We expect to complete the work in six months, said Rajinder Bisht, a member of the
staff. Six months is a target set by the court which has also sanctioned a disbursal up to Rs 97
crore as an initial step.
The division bench of the Delhi High Court headed by Justice Gita Mittal has appointed a
committee of eminent people to supervise the release of the money to the small depositors.
These include S K Tandon, (retd), additional district judge Delhi as Chairman, Mamta Mehra,
advocate, P K Sharma, (retd) Joint Registrar of Delhi High Court, C.R. Bhansali, and Riasuddin,
Dy Official Liquidator as a Member of the committee.

Scheme of a scam
The CR Bhansali scam, in which investors lost over Rs 1,200 crore, came to light in 97 Bhansali
finance firms CRB Capital Markets, CRB Mutual Funds and CRB Share Custodian Services
offered investment schemes.
He raised about Rs 900 crore from the public and transferred it to non-existent companies. In
95, when he tried to borrow money from the market, it led to a financial crisis.
In 1997, Bhansali was arrested in Delhi and released on bail a few weeks later. In 2002, he
suggested revival of CRB Group so he could repay investors.
MUMBAI: C R Bhansalis web of deceit was elaborate. He had floated 133 companies to pull in
funds and suck them out. Money came easy; he was inspiring with his grandiose plans, high
interest rates and entry into mutual fund and banking. CRBs meteoric rise in the early 90s
coincided with the boom in the Non-Banking Finance Company (NBFC) sector. His fall in 1996
was equally fast.
Forget investors, even credit-rating agencies didnt see it coming. CARE, a leading agency, gave
AAA rating at a time when the company was going down.
How to become chairman of top 3 finance companies
Born in Rajasthan, raised in Kolkata, Bhansali became a dada in the financial capital Mumbai
before he turned 40.
First came the finance company (CRB Capital Markets), after which the mutual fund (CRB
Mutual Fund) and CRB Share Custodial Services followed. Then he planned to get into banking,
and he almost made it.
He had a dream run from 1992 to 1996 collecting money from the public through fixed deposits,
bonds and debentures. He floated around 133 subsidiaries and unlisted companies. Most of the
money was transferred to these dummy companies.
The flagship company, CRB Capital Markets, went public in 1992 and raised a record Rs 176
crore in three years. In 1994 CRB Mutual Funds, through its Arihant Mangal Growth Scheme,
raised Rs 230 crore. Another Rs 180 crore came through fixed deposits.
CRB Corporation Ltd raised Rs 84 core through three public issues between May 1993 and
December 1995. CRB Share Custodial Services raised a further Rs 100 crore in January 1995 to
set up operations.
Between 1992 and 1995, when the market was in the post-Harshad Mehta bear phase, Bhansali
managed to raise close to Rs 900 crore.
Post-1995, he got a beating on the stock markets. His investments in the property market did not
pay off because of the slump.
Caught in a financial trap, Bhansali tried borrowing more money from the market. To repay the
interest rate on amounts he borrowed later, Bhansali was forced to borrow once again. This went
on and on, and he got stuck in a financial quicksand, says a former employee, refusing to be
named.
Going down, he even tried to invest in Bollywood
Bhansali made a determined effort to get out of the trap by investing in some high-risk ventures.
He is believed to have even made a Hindi commercial film. Again, the gamble failed.
In the end, Bhansali was borrowing funds from banks through questionable means. All was well
till December 1996. Then the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) refused banking status to CRB and
contemplated action for various irregularities.
Pradip Bhavnani, President of National Association of Small Investors, says: There was a lot of
confusion about how to act against CRB, considering its NBFC status. When he started
defaulting, public sector banks like the State Bank of India were the first to be hit. Had the SEBI
and RBI acted fast, investors wouldnt have lost money.
Bhansali spent three months in jail in 1997. He is out now but nobody knows where he lives and
if they do, they are not snitching.