STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER

FR. FERRER
A)
CHAPTER 1
I. IN GENERAL
A. Law, in its jural and generic sense, refers to the whole body or system of law.
(a) In its jural and concrete sense, law means a rule of conduct formulated and made obligatory by
legitimate power of the state.
(b) Includes:
(1) statues enacted by the legislature
(2) presidential decree
() e!ecuti"e orders
#ote: 2 and are made by the president in the e!ercise of his legislati"e power.
($) other presidential issuance in the e!ercise of his ordinance power
(%) rulings of the &upreme 'ourt
(() rules and regulation promulgated by administrati"e or e!ecuti"e officers pursuant to a
delegated power
()) ordinances passed by L*+
B. &tatute is an act of legislature as an organi,ed body, e!pressed in the form, passed according to the
procedure, re-uired to constitute it as part of the law of the land.
1. Laws which has the same category and binding force are: presidential decrees issued during .artial
law and e!ecuti"e orders issued under the /reedom 'onstitution.
2. 0ypes of statutes:
(a) passed by the 1hilippine Legislature
(1) 1hilippine 'ommission
(2) 1hilippine Legislature
() 2atasang 1ambasna
($) 'ongress of the 1hilippines
(b) .ade by the president
(1) 1residential decrees (13) constitution)
(2) 4!ecuti"e orders (/reedom 'onstitution)
. 5ther types of &tatues
(a) 1ublic &tatute: which affects the public at large or the whole community6 classifications:
(1) general7 which applies to the whole state and operates throughout the state ali8e upon all
the people or all of a class6
(2) special7 which relates to a particular persons or things of a class or to a particular
community, indi"idual or thing6
() local7 whose operation is confined to a specific place or locality
(b) 1ri"ate &tatute: applies only to a specific person or subject
$. 0ypes according to 9uration:
(a) permanent statute: whose operation is not limited in duration but continues until repealed6
(b) temporary statute: whose duration is for a limited period of time fi!ed in the statute itself or
whose life ceases upon the happening of an e"ent.
%. In respect to their application:
(a) prospecti"e
(b) retroacti"e.
(. 5peration:
(a) declaratory,
(b) curati"e,
(c) mandatory,
(d) directory,
(e) substanti"e,
(f) remedial, and
(g) penal.
). /orm:
(a) affirmati"e
(b) negati"e
C. .anner of referring to statutes
1. 1ublic :cts:
(a) 1hilippine 'ommission and 1hilippine Legislature 13;1713%
(b) 'ommonwealth :cts: enacted during the 'ommonwealth 13(713$(
(c) <epublic :cts: passed by 'ongress of the 1hilippines 13$(713)2 and from 13=)
#ote: &tatutes may be referred to by its serial number, or its title.
II. ENACTMENT OF STATUTES
A. Legislati"e power is the power to ma8e, alter, and repeals laws.
1. +nder the 13) and freedom constitution, the president e!ercised legislati"e power which remained
"alid until repealed.
2. L*+ can enact ordinances within their own jurisdiction, but such laws are inferior and subordinate to
the laws of the state. (1rimicias ". .unicipality of +rdaneta).
. :dministrati"e or e!ecuti"e officer can ma8e rules and regulations to implement specific laws.
B. 4ssential feature of the legislati"e function is the determination of the legislati"e policy and its formulation
and promulgation as a defined and binding rule of conduct
C. : bill is a proposed legislati"e measure introduced by a member of 'ongress for enactment into law.
D. 1assage of a bill:
1. : bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be e!pressed in the title thereof. It shall be signed
by its author and filed with the &ecretary of the >ouse.
2. : bill may originate in the lower or upper house e!cept appropriation, re"enue or tariff bills, bills
authori,ing increase of public debt, bills of local application, pri"ate bills, which shall originate
e!clusi"ely in the >ouse of <epresentati"es.
. : bill is appro"ed by either house after it has gone three readings on separate days e!cept when the
1resident certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment.
$. &teps:
(a) 0he &ecretary reports for the first reading, which consists of reading the number and title of the
bill, followed by its referral to the appropriate 'ommittee for study and recommendation.
(b) &econd <eading: the bill shall be read in full with the amendments proposed by the 'ommittee, if
any, unless copies thereof are distributed and such reading is dispensed with. :fter the
amendments, the bill will be "oted on second reading.
(c) 0hird reading: the bill appro"ed on second reading will be submitted for final "ote by yeas and
nays. #o amendments may be introduced.
(d) 0he bill appro"ed on the third reading by one house is transmitted to the other house for
concurrence, which will follow the same procedures as a bill originally filed with it.
(e) If the other house introduces amendments and the >ouse from which it originated does not agree
with said amendments, the differences will be settled by the 'onference 'ommittee of both
chambers, whose report or recommendation thereon will ha"e to be appro"ed by both >ouses in
order that it will be considered passed by 'ongress and thereafter sent to the 1resident for
action.
(f) If the 1resident shall "eto it, and if after such consideration, two7 thirds of all the .embers of
such >ouse shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other
>ouse by which it shall li8ewise be reconsidered, and if appro"ed by two7thirds of all the
.embers of that >ouse, it shall become a law.
E. : bill passed by 'ongress becomes a law in either of three ways:
1. ?hen the 1resident signs it
2. ?hen the 1resident does not sign nor communicate his "eto of the bill within thirty days after his
receipt thereof
. ?hen the "etoed bill is repassed by 'ongress by two7thirds "ote of all its members, "oting separately.
F. 1rocedure for enactment of appropriations and re"enue bills is same with ordinary bills, but it may only
come from the lower house. :ppropriations bill are subject to the restrictions or -ualifications as pro"ided
in the 'onstitution @:rt AI, &ec. 2%B and @:rt. AI &ec. 2) (2)B
G. 0he lawma8ing process in 'ongress ends when the bill is appro"ed by the body. :ppro"al is indispensable
to the "alidity of the bill.
H. The system of athe!t"#at"o! de"ised is the signing by the &pea8er and the &enate 1resident of the
printed copy of the appro"ed bill, to signify to the 1resident that the bill being presented to him has been
duly appro"ed by the legislature and is ready for his appro"al or rejection.
I. 0he 'onstitution re-uires that each >ouse shall 8eep a journal @:rt. AI &ec. 1(($)B. 0he Cournal is
regarded as conclusi"e with respect to matters that are re-uired by the 'onstitution to be recorded
therein. ?ith respect to other matters, in the absence of e"idence to the contrary, the Cournals ha"e also
been accorded conclusi"e effect. 'onsiderations of public policy led to the adoption of the rule gi"ing
"erity (truth) and unimpeachability to legislati"e records. DImperati"e reasons of public policy re-uire that
the authenticity of laws should rest upon public memorials of the most permanent character. 0hat the
rights ac-uired today upon the faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed tomorrow,
or at some remote period of time, by facts resting only in the memory of indi"iduals.
J. E!$o%%e& '"%%: +nder the enrolled bill doctrine, the te!t of the act as passed and appro"ed is deemed
importing absolute "eracity and is binding on the courts. It is conclusi"e not only of its pro"isions but also
of its due enactment.
If there has been any mista8e in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officer of the assembly and
appro"ed by the chief e!ecuti"e, the remedy is by amendment by enacting a curati"e legislation, not by judicial
decree ('asco 1hil. 'hemical 'o., Inc. ". *imene,)
?here there is discrepancy between the journal and the enrolled bill, the latter as a rule pre"ails o"er the former,
particularly with respect to matters not e!pressly re-uired to be entered in the journal.
K. 0he legislati"e journals and the enrolled bill are both conclusi"e upon the courts. >owe"er, where there is
discrepancy, the enrolled bill as a rule pre"ails, particularly with respect to matters not e!pressly re-uired
to be entered into the legislati"e journal.
L. ?I0>9<:?:L 5/ :+0>4#0I':0I5#, 4//4'0 5/
0he &pea8er and the &enate 1resident may withdraw their signatures from the signed bill where there is serious
and substantial discrepancy between the te!t of the bill as deliberated and shown by the journal and that of the
enrolled bill. It thus, renders the bill without attestation and nullifies its status as an enrolled bill.
0he court can declare that the bill has not been duly enacted and did not accordingly become a law (:storga ".
Aillegas).

III. PARTS OF STATUTES
A. 0itle: e"ery bill passed shall embrace only one subject which shall be e!pressed in the title. 0his pro"isions
contains dual limitations upon the legislature:
1. 0he legislature is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects.
2. 0he title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and
those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.
. 1urpose of one title7one subject rule:
(a) 0o pre"ent hodge7podge or log7rolling legislation
(b) 0o pre"ent surprise or fraud upon legislature, by means of pro"isions in bills of which the title
ga"e no information, and which might therefore be o"erloo8ed and carelessly and unintentionally
adopted
(c) 0o fairly apprise the people through such publication of legislati"e proceedings as is usually
made, of the subjects of the legislation that are being heard thereon
$. 0hese re-uirements should be liberally construed (1eople ". 2uen"iaje). It should not be gi"en a
technical interpretation, nor narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation
(0obias ". :balos). ('ordero "s. 'abatuando)
%. 0itle of the statute is used as a guide in ascertaining legislati"e intent when the language of the act
does not clearly e!press its purpose.
(. ?hen there is doubt as to whether the title sufficiently e!presses the subject matter of the statute,
the -uestion should be resol"ed against the doubt and in fa"or of the constitutionality of the statute
(Insular Lumber "s. 'ourt of 0a! :ppeals)
#ote: 0here is sufficient compliance with the one7title7subject re-uirement
(a) if the title be comprehensi"e enough to reasonably include the general object which a statute
see8s to effect, without each and e"ery end and means necessary or con"enient for
accomplishing the subject.
(b) if all parts of the law are related and germane to the subject matter e!pressed in the title.
(c) If the title indicates in broad or clear terms, the nature, scope, and conse-uences of the law and
its operations.
(d) 0he tile should not be catalogue or inde! of the bill (1eople ". /errer).
). 0itles ending with Dand for other purposesE e!presses nothing as a compliance with the constitutional
re-uirement.
=. ?>4# <4F+I<4.4#0 #50 :11LI':2L4
It does not apply to laws in force e!isting at the time the 13% 'onstitution too8 effect (1eople ".
Aalensoy), nor to municipal or city ordinances because they do not parta8e of the nature of laws passed by the
legislature.
3. 4ffect pf insufficiency of title
(a) : statue whose title does not conform to the one title7subject or is not related to its subject is
null and "oid.
(b) If subject matter of statute is not sufficiently e!pressed in its title, only the une!pressed subject
matter is "oid lea"ing the rest in force.
B. E!a#t"!( C%ase: part of the statute written immediately after the title thereof which states the authority
by which the act is enacted
C. P$eam)%e* prefatory statement or e!planation or a finding of facts, reciting the purpose, reason, or
occasion for ma8ing the law to which it is prefi!ed. Laws passed by legislature seldom contain the
preamble because the statement embodying the purpose, reason, etc is contained in the e!planatory
note. 1residential decrees and 4!ecuti"e 5rders generally ha"e preambles.
D. P$+"e, o$ )o&y of a statute: part which tells what the law is all about.
#ote: : comple! and comprehensi"e piece of legislation usually contains: a short title, a policy section, definition
section, administrati"e section, sections prescribing standards or conduct, section imposing sanctions for "iolation
of its pro"isions, transitory pro"ision, separability clause, repealing clause, and effecti"ity clause.
0he constitutional re-uirement that a bill should ha"e only one subject matter which should be e!pressed in its title
is complied with where the pro"isions thereof, no matter how di"erse they may be, are allied and germane to the
subject, or negati"ely stated, where the pro"isions are not inconsistent with, but in furtherance of, the single
subject matter (1eople ". 'arlos).
:) Se-a$a)"%"ty C%ase* part of a statute, which states that if any pro"ision of the act is declared in"alid, the
remainder shall not be affected thereby. &uch clause is not controlling and the courts may, in spite of it,
in"alidate the whole statute where what is left, after the "oid part, is not complete and wor8able.
II. PRESI.ENTIAL ISSUANCES/ RULES AN. OR.INANCES
A. Presidential Issuances: those which the 1resident issues in the e!ercise of his ordinance power, which
ha"e the force and effect of law. 0hey include:
B. Administrative orders- acts of the 1resident which relate to the particular aspects of go"ernmental
operations in pursuance of his duties as administrati"e head.
C. Proclamations- acts of the 1resident fi!ing a date or declaring a statute or condition of public moment or
interest, upon the e!istence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend.
D. Memorandum Orders- acts of the 1resident on matters of administrati"e detail or of subordinate or
temporary interest which only concern a particular officer or office of the go"ernment.
E. Memorandum Circulars- acts of the 1resident on matters relating to internal administration which the
1resident desires to bring to the attention of all or some of the departments, agencies, bureaus, or offices
of the go"ernment, for information or compliance.
F. General or specific orders- acts and commands of the 1resident in his capacity as 'ommander7in;'hief
of the :rmed /orces of the 1hilippines.
G. Executive Orders: acts of the 1resident pro"iding for rules of a general or permanent character in the
implementation or e!ecution of constitutional or statutory powers, which do not ha"e the force of statutes.
III. SUPREME COURT CIRCULARS0 RULES AN. REGULATIONS
A. 0he rule ma8ing power of the &upreme 'ourt includes the power to repeal procedural lawsG parts of
statues which deal with procedural aspects can be modified or repealed by the &' by "irtue of its
constitutional rule7ma8ing power. &' does not ha"e the power to promulgate rules which are substanti"e
in nature6 rules promulgated by them must operate only as to regulate procedure. If it operates as a
means of implementing an e!isting right then the rules deals merely with procedure.
B. <ules and regulations issued by administrati"e or e!ecuti"e officers, in accordance with and as authori,ed
by law ha"e the same force and effect of law or parta8e the nature of a statute,
C. In case of discrepancy or conflict between the basic law and the regulations issued to implement it, the
former pre"ails o"er the latter (?ise H 'o. ". .eer). /or it is elementary principle in statutory
construction that a statute is superior to an administrati"e regulation and the former cannot be repealed
or amended by the latter ('hina 2an8ing 'orp. ". '.:.).
D. 0he rule7ma8ing power of a public administrati"e agency is a delegated legislati"e power.
E. 0he power to fill7in details in the e!ecution, enforcement or administration of law, it is essential that the
said law (a) be complete in itself7 it must set forth therein the policy to be e!ecuted, carried out or
implemented by the delegate6 (b) fi! a standard7 the limits of which are sufficiently determinable7to which
the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions, mar8s its limits and maps out its
boundaries.
F. : statutory grant of powers should not be e!tended by implication beyond what may be necessary for
their just and reasonable e!ecution. It is a!iomatic that a rule or regulation must bear upon, and be
consistent with, the pro"isions of the enacting statute if such rule or regulation is to be "alid.
G. ?hen an administrati"e agency promulgates rules and regulations, it Ima8esJ a new law with the force and
effect of a "alid law, which are binding on the courts. ?hen it renders an opinion or gi"es a statement of
policy, it merely interprets a pree!isting law6 it is only ad"isory, for it is the courts that finally determine
what the law means.
H. 2aranggay ordinance:
Sangguniang barangay: smallest legislati"e body6 may pass an ordinance affecting a barangay by a majority
"ote of all its members. Its ordinance is subject to re"iew by sangguniang bayan or panlungsod, to determine
if it is in accordance with municipal or city ordinance. &angguniang 2ayan or panlungsod shall ta8e action on
the ordinance within ; days from submission.
I. .unicipal 5rdinance
Sangguniang Bayan: affirmati"e "ote of a majority of the members of the sangguniang bayan, there being a
-uorum. 5rdinance is then submitted to the municipal mayor, who within 1; days from receipt shall return it with
his appro"al or "eto. 0he ordinance is then submitted to sangguniang panlalawigan for re"iew, who within ; days
may in"alidate it in whole or in part.
J. 'ity 5rdinance
Sangguniang panlungsod- affirmati"e "ote of a majority of the members of the sangguniang panlungsod present,
and there being a -uorum. :ppro"ed ordinance shall be submitted to the mayor, who withn 1; days shall return it
with appro"al or his "eto. 0he &angguniang may repass a "etoed ordinance. If the city is a component city, the
appro"ed ordinance is submitted to the &anguniang panlalawigan, who shall act within ; days.
K. 1ro"incial 5rdinance
Sangguniang panlalawigan- by a "ote of a majority of the members present, there being a -uorum, enact
ordinance that will affect the pro"ince. 0he ordinance is forwarded to the go"ernor who, within 1% days, shall
return it with his appro"al or "eto. : "etoed ordinance may be repassed by two7thirds "ote.
IV. VALI.ITY
A. 4"ery statute is presumed "alid. 0o declare a law unconstitutional, the repugnancy of the law to the
'onstitution must be clear and une-ui"ocal. 0o stri8e down a law, there must be a clear showing that
what the fundamental law condemns or prohibits, the statute allows it to be done.
B. :ll reasonable doubts should be resol"ed in fa"or of the constitutionality of law. 0o doubt is to sustain.
C. 0he final authority to declare a law unconstitutional is the &' en banc by the Dconcurrence of a majority of
the .embers who actually too8 part in the deliberations.E
D. 0rial courts ha"e jurisdiction to initially decide the issue of constitutionality of a law in appropriate cases.
E. 2efore the court may resol"e the -uestion of constitutionality, the following re-uisites should be present:
1. 4!istence of an appropriate case G actual case
2. :n interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutionality
. 0he plea that the function be e!ercised at the earliest opportunity
$. 0he necessity that the constitutional -uestion be passed upon in order to decide the case.
F. Legal &tanding (locus &tandi)7 a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the go"ernmental act that is being challenged.
G. >ow a citi,en ac-uires standing:
1. >e has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of
go"ernment
2. Injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action.
. Injury is li8ely to be redressed by a fa"orable action
H. 0a! payers legal standing:
1. ?hen it is established that public funds ha"e been disbursed in alleged contra"ention of the law or the
constitution, or in pre"enting the illegal e!penditure of money raised by ta!ation.
2. >e will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the -uestioned statute.
I. 0he &' may ta8e cogni,ance of a suit which does not satisfy the re-uirements of legal standing6 the 'ourt
has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an
issue of transcendental significance to the people or paramount importance to the public.
J. 'onstitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible time. If the -uestion is not raised in the pleadings,
ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial, and if not raised in the trial, it will not be considered in appeal.
K. 4!ceptions:
1. the -uestion may raised in a motion for reconsideration or new trial in the lower court, where the
statute sought to be in"alidated was not in e!istence when the complaint was filed or during the trial
2. the -uestion of "alidity may also be raised in criminal cases at any stage of the proceedings.
. In ci"il cases where it appears clearly that a determination of the -uestion is necessary to a decision
and incases where it in"ol"ed the jurisdiction of the court below.
L. 0est of constitutionality
: stature may be declared unconstitutional because:
1. it is not within the legislati"e power to enact
2. or it creates or establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles
. its purpose or effect "iolates the constitution
$. it is "ague. It is "ague when it lac8s comprehensi"e standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application.
%. 0he change of circumstances or conditions may affect the "alidity of some statues, specially those so7
called emergency laws designed specifically to meet certain contingencies.
M. ?ith respect to ordinances, the test of "alidity are:
1. .ust not contra"ene the constitution or any statute
2. .ust not be unfair or oppressi"e
. .ust not be partial or discriminatory
$. .ust not prohibit but may regulate trade
%. .ust be general and consistent with public policy
(. .ust not be unreasonable
N. 4ffects of unconstitutionality
1. 0he general rule is that an unconstitutional act is not a law.
(a) it confers no rights.
(b) it afford no protection
(c) it imposes no duties
(d) it creates no office
(e) it is inoperati"e as though it had ne"er been passed.
2. <egard should be had to what has been done while the statute was in operation and presumed to be
"alid. >ence, its operati"e fact before a declaration of nullity must be recogni,ed.
. 0here are two "iew on the effects of a declaration of the unconstitutionality of a statute:
(a) O$tho&o1 V"e, 77 :n unconstitutional law confers no right, is not a law, imposes no duties,
affords no protection6 in legal contemplation, it is inoperati"e, as if it had not been passed.
(b) Mo&e$! V"e, -- 0he court in passing upon the -uestion of constitutionality does not annul or
repeal the statute if it is unconstitutional, it simply refuses to recogni,e it and determines the
rights of the parties just as if the statute had no e!istence. It does not repeal, supersede, re"o8e
or annul the statute. 0he parties to the suit are concluded by the judgment, but no one else is
bound.
O. In"alidity due to change of conditions
0he general rule as to the effects of unconstitutionality of a statute is not applicable to a statute that is declared
in"alid because of the change of circumstances affecting its "alidity. It becomes in"alid only because the change of
conditions ma8es its continued operation "iolati"e of the 'onstitution, and accordingly, the declaration of its nullity
should affect only the parties in"ol"ed in the case, and its effects applied prospecti"ely.
P. 1artial In"alidity
0he general rule is that where part of a statute is "oid as repugnant to the 'onstitution, while another part is "alid,
the "alid portion, if separable from the in"alid, may stand and be enforced
#ote: 4!ceptions to this rule: when the parts are so mutually dependent and connected. 0he presence of
separability clause creates the presumption that the legislature intended separability, rather than complete nullity
of the statute.
V. EFFECT AN. OPERATION
A. ?hen laws ta8e effect
1. :rt 2 of the 'i"il 'ode pro"ides that DLaws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion
of their publication in the Official Gaette! unless it is otherwise pro"ided#$
2. :ll laws or statutes, including those of local application and pri"ate law shall be published as a
condition for their effecti"ity (0aKada ". 0u"era), otherwise it would "iolate the due process clause of
the constitution.
. 0he general rule is that where the law is silent as to its effecti"ity, or where it pro"ides that it shall
ta8e effect immediately or upon its appro"al, such law shall ta8e effect after 1% days from its
publication in the 5fficial *a,ette.
$. 0he completion of publication, from which date the period of publication will be counted, refers to the
date of release of the 5.*. or newspaper for circulation and not to its date, unless the two dates
coincide.
%. 0he re-uirement of publication as a condition for the effecti"ity of statues applies to 1residential
Issuances, e!cept those which are merely interpretati"e or internal in nature not concerning the
public.
B. ?hen presidential issuance, rules, and regulations ta8e effect
1. 0he re-uirement of publication also applies to 1residential issuances.
4!ceptions: those which are merely interpretati"e or internal in nature not concerning the public.
2. <ules and regulations of administrati"e and e!ecuti"e officers are of two types:
(a) ?hose purpose is to implement or enforce e!isting law pursuant to a "alid delegation or to fill in
the details of a statute6 whether they are penal or non7penal6 this re-uires publication.
(b) those are merely interpretati"e in nature or merely internal in character not concerning the
public, does not need publication.
. In addition, the 13=) :dministrati"e 'ode pro"ides that
(a) 4"ery agency shall file with the +.1. Law center three copies of e"ery rule adopted by it. <ules in
force on the date of effecti"ity of this 'ode which are not filed within months from that date
shall not be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons.
(b) 4ach rule shall become effecti"e 1% days from the date of filing as abo"e pro"ided unless a
different date is fi!ed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health,
safety and welfare.
$. 1ublication and filing re-uirements are indispensable to the effecti"ity of rules and regulations, e!cept
when the law authori,ing its issuance dispenses the filing re-uirements.
C. ?hen local ordinance ta8e effect.
1. Local ordinance shall ta8e effect after 1; days from the date a copy thereof is posted in a bulletin
board at the entrance of the pro"incial capitol or city, municipal, or barangay hall, as the case may
be, and in atleast two other conspicuous places in the local go"ernment unit.
2. the secretary to the sanggunian shall cause the posting of the ordinance within % days after its
appro"al.
. 0he gist of all ordinances with penal sanctions shall be published in a newspaper of general
circulation, within the pro"ince where the local legislati"e body concerned belongs.
$. In case of highly urbani,ed and independent component cities, the main feature of the ordinance or
resolution duly enacted or adopted shall, in addition to being posted, be published once in a local
newspaper of general circulation within the city.
%. +nless a statute is by its pro"isions for a limited period only, it continues in force until changed or
repealed by the legislature. Law once established continues until changed by some competent
legislati"e power. It is not changed by change of so"ereignty.
D. .anner of computing time:
1. ?here a statute re-uires the doing of an act within a specified number of days, such as ten days,
from notice, It means 1; calendar days and not wor8ing days.
2. ?here the word Dwee8E is used as a measure of time and without reference to the calendar, it means
a period of se"en consecuti"e days without regard to the day of the wee8 from which it begins (1#2
". '.:).
(a) Lear: (% days
(b) months: ; days e!cept if the months are designated by their name
(c) days: 2$ hours
(d) nights: from sunrise to sunset
(e) wee8 77 a period of ) consecuti"e days without regard to the day of the wee8 from which it
begins.
. 'i"il code adopts the (% day year and the ;7day month and not the calendar year not the solar
month.
$. 0he e!clude7 the Mfirst and include the last day rule go"erns the computation of a period. If the last
day falls on a &unday or legal holiday, the act can still be done the following day. 0he principle does
not apply to the computation of the period of prescription of a crime, in which the rule is that if the
last days in the period of prescription of a felony falls on a &unday or legal holiday, the information
concerning said felony cannot be filed on the ne!t wor8ing day, as the offense has been by then
already prescribed.
CHAPTER 2
Co!st$#t"o! a!& I!te$-$etat"o!
I. .ef"!"t"o! of Co!st$#t"o!
It is the art or process of disco"ering and e!pounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law, where
that intention is rendered doubtful by reason of the ambiguity in its language or the fact that the gi"en case is not
e!plicitly pro"ided for in the law.
It is the drawing of warranted conclusions respecting subjects that lie beyond the direct e!pression of the te!t,
conclusions which are in the spirit, though not within the letter of the te!t.
II. ."ffe$e!#e )et,ee! #o!st$#t"o! a!& "!te$-$etat"o!
A. Interpretation M art of finding the true meaning and sense of any form of words
B. 'onstruction M process of drawing warranted conclusions respecting subjects that lie beyond the direct
e!pressions or determining the application of words to facts in litigation.
#ote: :lthough there is technical distinction between the two, they are ali8e in practical results. In practice and
common usage, they ha"e the same signification.
III. R%es of #o!st$#t"o!/ (e!e$a%%y
A. <ules of construction are tools used to ascertain the legislati"e intent because in enacting a statute, the
legislature is presumed to 8now the rules of statutory construction.
B. ?hen there is ambiguity in the language of a statute, the rules of statutory construction is employed by
the courts in order to ascertain the true intent and meaning of the law.
C. <ules of statutory construction ha"e no binding effect on the courts. 0hey are only used to clarify, not to
defeat, legislati"e intent.
IV. P$-ose o$ o)3e#t of #o!st$#t"o!
A. 'ardinal rule in interpretation: to ascertain, and gi"e effect to, the intent of law.
B. 0he sole object of all judicial interpretation of a statute is to determine legislati"e intent, what intention is
con"eyed, wither e!pressly or impliedly.
V. Le("s%at"+e "!te!t/ (e!e$a%%y
A. It is the essence of the law.
B. It is the spirit, which gi"es life to legislati"e enactment. Intent must be enforced when ascertained,
although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute.
C. 0>+&, ?>4<4 : &0:0+04 I& &+&'410I2L4 5/ .5<4 0>:# 5#4 '5#&0<+'0I5# 0>:0 '5#&0<+'0I5#
&>5+L9 24 :951049 ?>I'> ?ILL .5&0 04#9 05 *IA4 4//4'0 05 0>4 .:#I/4&0 I#04#0 5/ 0>4
L4*I&L:0+<4 (+& "s. 0oribio).
D. Intent is e-uated with the words: purpose, meaning and spirit.
VI. Le("s%at"+e -$-ose
A. 0he reason why a particular statue was enacted.
B. Legislation defined
It is an acti"e instrument of go"ernment, which, for purposes of interpretation, means that laws ha"e ends to be
achie"ed.
C. &tatutes should be so construed so as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes. (Lite!
4mployees :ssn ". 4du"ala).
VII. Le("s%at"+e mea!"!(
A. It is what the law, by its language, means. ?hat it comprehends, co"ers or embraces, limits and confines
are.
B. Legislati"e intent and meaning are synonymous. 0hus: I/ 0>4<4 I& :.2I*+I0L I# 0>4 L:#*+:*4
+&49 I# 0>4 &0:0+04, I0& 1+<15&49 .:L I#9I':04 0>4 .4:#I#* 5/ 0>4 L:#*+:*4 :#9 L4:9 05
?>:0 0>4 L4*I&L:0IA4 I#04#0 I&.
C. 0he courts, by judicial construction will gi"e effect to such intent.
VIII. Matte$s "!4"$e& "!to "! #o!st$"!( a statte
1. ascertain the intention or meaning of the statute (internal element)
2. see whether the intention or meaning has been e!pressed in such a way as to gi"e it legal effect and
"alidity (e!ternal element)
#ote: Legal act then o$"("!ates "! "!te!t"o! and is -e$fe#te& )y e1-$ess"o!. /ailure of the latter may defeat
the former.
IX. So$#e of %e("s%at"+e "!te!t
A. 1rimary source: statute itself.
1. L4*I&L:0IA4 I#04#0 .+&0 24 9I&'5A4<49 /<5. 0>4 /5+< '5<#4<& 5/ 0>4 L:? (<egalado "s.
Lulo)
2. ?here the words and phrases of a statute are not obscure or ambiguous, its meaning and the
intention of the legislature must be determined from the language employed. (2.4. &an 9iego, Inc.
"s. ':)
B. 5ther sources:
1. purpose of the statute
2. the reason or cause which induced the enactment of the law
. the mischief to be suppressed
$. the policy which dictated its passage.
C. If these sources fail, the court may loo8 into the effect of the law.
#ote: Cudicial legislation M happens when the court loo8s into the effect of the law without ascertaining the other
sources of legislati"e intent.
X. Co!st$#t"o! "s a 3&"#"a% f!#t"o!
A. 0he power and duty to interpret or construe a statue or the 'onstitution belong to the judiciary.
B. : &upreme 'ourt construes the applicable law in contro"ersies which are ripe for judicial resolution..
C. .oot and academic cases M cases wherein:
1. purpose has become stale
2. where no practical relief can be granted
. which ha"e no practical effect
D. 0he court may nonetheless resol"e a moot case where public interest re-uires its resolution.
E. Laws are not interpreted in a "acuum, they are always decided based on facts. 0hus, DL:?& :<4
I#04<1<4049 :L?:L& I# 0>4 '5#04N0 5/ 0>4 14'+LI:< /:'0+:L &I0+:0I5# 5/ 4:'> ':&4. 0>4
'I<'+.&0:#'4 5/ 0I.4, 1L:'4, 4A4#0, 14<&5# :#9 1:<0I'+L:<LL :004#9:#0 'I<'+.&0:#'4&
&>5+L9 24 0:O4# I# 0>4I< 050:LI0L &5 0>:0 C+&0I'4 ':# 24 <:0I5#:LLL :#9 /:I<LL 9I&14#&49E
(1hilippines 0oday, Inc "s. #L<').
XI. Le("s%at$e #a!!ot o+e$$%e 3&"#"a% #o!st$#t"o!
A. Legislature may indicate its construction of a stature in the form of a resolution or declaratory act 2+0 it
has no power to o"errule the interpretation or construction of a statute or the constitution by the &upreme
'ourt, for interpretation is a judicial function assigned to the latter by the fundamental law.
B. <eason: 2ecause of the principle of separation of powers. 0he legislature may enact and ma8e laws but
as to interpretation and application of said laws belong e!clusi"ely to the judicial department.
XII. Whe! 3&"#"a% "!te$-$etat"o! may )e set as"&e*
1. 0he &upreme 'ourt itself may, in appropriate case, change or o"errule its pre"ious construction.
2. 0he rule that &upreme 'ourt has the final word in the interpretation of a statue merely means that
the legislature cannot, by law or resolution, modify or annul the judicial construction without
modifying or repealing the "ery statute which has been the subject of construction.
XIII. Whe! #o$t may #o!st$e statte*
A. 0here must be doubt or ambiguity in its language. 5#LL &0:0+04& ?I0> :# :.2I*+5+& 5< 95+20/+L
.4:#I#* .:L 24 0>4 &+2C4'0 5/ &0:0+05<L '5#&0<+'0I5#. (9aong "s. .unicipal Cudge)
B. :mbiguity M a condition of admitting two or more meanings, of being understood in more than one way or
of referring to two or more things at the same time.
XIV. Co$t may !ot #o!st$e ,he$e the statte "s #%ea$.
A. 'onstruction or interpretation comes only after it has been demonstrate that application is impossible or
inade-uate without it. It is the last function the court should e!ercise, for if there is more application and
less construction, there would be more stability in law.
B. 'ourt may not construe a statute that is clears and free from doubt. ?>4# 0>4 L:? I& 'L4:<, 0>4<4 I&
#5 <55. /5< I#04<1<40:0I5#. 0>4<4 I& 5#LL <55. /5< :11LI':0I5# ('ebu 1ortland 'ement 'o.
"s. .unicipality of #aga)
C. /idelity to such tas8 precludes construction and interpretation, unless application is impossible or
inade-uate without it.
D. ?hen the law is free from ambiguity, the court may not engraft into the law -ualifications not
contemplated.
E. : meaning that does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the "ery language of the statute cannot be
placed therein by construction.
F. It is a principle in statutory construction that where the two statutes that applies in a particular case, that
which was specifically designed for the said case must pre"ail o"er the other. (Lapid "s. ':)
XV. R%"!(s of the S-$eme Co$t as -a$t of the %e(a% system.
A. Legis interpretato legis "im obtinet Mauthoritati"e interpretation of the &upreme 'ourt or a statute
ac-uires the force of law by becoming a part thereof.
B. <ulings of the &' are laws in their own right because they interpret what the law say or mean.
C. &tare decisis et non -uieta no"ere M rulings of the supreme court, until re"ersed, are binding upon inferior
courts.
NAI. Cudicial rulings ha"e no retroacti"e effect
:. Cudicial ruling cannot be gi"en a retroacti"e effect because dong so will impair "ested rights. #or may
judicial ruling o"erruling a pre"ious one be applied retroacti"ely so as to nullify a right which arose under
the pre"ious ruling before its abandonment
2. Le! prospicit, non respicit (the law loo8s forward not bac8ward) M :rt. $ of the ci"il code.
'. 0he &upreme 'ourt may abandon or o"errule its earlier decision construing a statute whene"er it is right
and prosper to do so.
9. #o doctrine or principle of law laid down by the 'ourt in a decision rendered en banc or in di"ision may be
modified or re"ersed e!cept by the court sitting en banc. &aid ruling must be applied prospecti"ely.
4. 0he interpretation of a statute by the &upreme 'ourt remains to be part of the legal system until the latter
o"errule it and the new doctrine o"erruling the old is applied prospecti"ely in fa"or of the persons who
ha"e relied thereon in good faith.
XVI. COURT MAY ISSUE GUI.ELINE IN CONSTRUING STATUTE NOT TO ENLARGE OR RESTRICT IT
'UT TO CLEARLY .ELINEATE WHAT THE LAW RE5UIRES (e!. 'ase of 1eople "s. /errer where the
court issued guidelines for prosecution under the :nti7&ub"ersion Law).
XVII. LIMITATIONS ON THE POWER TO CONSTRUE*
1. 'ourts may not enlarge nor restrict statutes (doing so would be considered law ma8ing).
(a) 'ourts may not re"ise e"en the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislature
(b) 'ourts may not rewrite the law to conform with what they thin8 should be the law.
(c) 'ourts may not interpret into the law a re-uirement which the law does not prescribe.
2. 'ourts must not be influenced by -uestions of wisdom.
(a) 0hey must not pass upon -uestions of wisdom, justice, or e!pedience of legislation, for it is not
within their pro"ince to super"ise legislation.
(b) :s long as laws do not "iolate the constitution, the courts merely interpret and apply them
regardless of whether or not they are wise or salutary.
(c) Fuestions regarding wisdom, morality or practicability of statutes are not addressed to the
judiciary by may be resol"ed only the legislati"e and e!ecuti"e departments.
CHAPTER 6
I. GENERALLY : ?here the meaning of a statute is ambiguous, the court may a"ail itself of all legitimate
aids to construction in order that it can ascertain the true intent of the statue.
II. THE TITLE OF THE STATUTE
1. It ser"es as aid in case of doubt in its language, to its construction and ascertaining legislati"e will.
2. +sed by the court to clear the obscurity.
. :n aid when there is doubt as to the meaning of the law.
III. WHEN THE TE7T OF THE STATUTE IS CLEAR AN. FREE FROM .OU'T/ IT IS IMPROPER TO
RESORT TO ITS TITLE TO MA8E IT O'SCURE.
IV. PREAM'LE
1. that part of the statute written immediately after its title, which states the purpose, reason or
justification for the enactment of the law.
2. 4!pressed in the I?hereas 'lauseJ
. +sually omitted in statutes made by the congress. In its place, these legislati"e bodies used the
e!planatory note to e!plain the reasons for the enactment of statutes.
$. #ot an essential part of a statute.
(a) 0hus, where the meaning if a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither e!pand
nor restrict its operation, much less pre"ail o"er its te!t.
(b) It cannot be used as basis for gi"ing a statute a meaning not apparent on its face.
%. It may clarify ambiguities (thus it is the 8ey of the statute)
(. It may e!press the legislati"e intent to ma8e the law apply retroacti"ely, in which case the law has to
be gi"en retroacti"e effect, so as to carry out such intent (1#2 ". 5ffice of the 1resident).
V. CONTE7T OF WHOLE TE7T
Legislati"e intent should accordingly be ascertained from a consideration of the whole conte!t of the stature and
not from an isolated part of particular pro"ision (:boiti, &hipping 'orp. ". 'ity of 'ebu).
0he best source from which to ascertain the legislati"e intent is the statute itself M the words, phrases, sentences,
sections, clauses, pro"isions M ta8en as a whole and in relation to one another. ('ommissioner of Internal <e"enue
". 0.N &ales).
VI. PUNCTUATION MAR8S: aids of low degree and can ne"er control the intelligible meaning of written
words6 may be used to clear ambiguities.
1unctuation mar8s are aids of low degree and can ne"er control against the intelligible meaning of written word.
0he reason is that punctuation mar8s are not part of a stature6 nor are they part of the 4nglish language (/eliciano
". :-uino).
A. &emi7colon M indicates a separation in the relation of the thought, a degree greater than that e!pressed
by a comma. .a8es the difference being that the semi7colon ma8es the di"ision a little more pronounced
B. 'omma M also separates the parts and sentences, but less pronounced than the comma.
C. 1eriod M used to indicate the end of a sentence.
#ote: :n argument based upon punctuation alone is not persuasi"e, and the courts will not hesitate to change the
punctuation when necessary, to gi"e the statute the effect intended by the legislature.
VII. CAPITALI9ATION OF LETTERS M also an aid of low degree in the construction of statute.
VIII. HEA.NOTES OR EPIGRAPHS M con"enient inde! to the content of its pro"isions.
(a) In case of doubt or ambiguity in the meaning of the law or the intention of the legislature, they
may be consulted in aid or interpretation.
(b) 0hey are not part of the law thus, they can ne"er control the plain terms of the enacting clauses.
(c) ?hen the te!t of the statute is clear and unambiguous, there is neither necessity nor propriety to
resort to headings and epigraphs for the interpretations of the te!t.
(d) 0hese secondary aids may be consulted to remo"e, but not to create, doubt nor to limit or control
the plain language of the law.
IX. LINGUAL TE7T
A. 1hilippines laws are official promulgated either in:
1) 4nglish
2) &panish
) /ilipino
$) 5r either in two such languages
B. <ules:
(a) if te!t is in 4nglish and &panish, 4nglish te!t shall go"ern.
(b) 2ut in case of ambiguity, omission, or mista8e, the &panish te!t may be consulted to e!plain the
4nglish te!t.
(c) If statute is officially promulgated in &panish, 4nglish or in /ilipino with translations into other
languages, the language in which it is written pre"ails o"er its transaction.
(d) In the interpretation of a law or administrati"e issuance promulgated in all the official languages
(/ilipino), the 4nglish te!t shall control, unless otherwise specifically pro"ided. In case of
ambiguity, omission or other mista8e, the other te!ts may be consulted.
X. INTENT OR SPIRIT OF THE LAW
A. 0he intent or spirit of the law is the law itself, thus the legislati"e intent is the controlling factor, the
leading star and the guiding light in the application and interpretation of a statute.
B. 0he spirit rather than the letter of a stature determines its construction.
C. If legislati"e intent is not e!pressed in the law, the courts cannot by interpretation speculate as to an
intent and supply a meaning not found in the phraseology of the law. 0hey cannot assume an intent,
otherwise, they would be usurping legislati"e power.
XI. 1olicy of law.
A. 0he policy of the law, once ascertained should be gi"en effect by the judiciary.
B. In order to accomplish this, a statue of a doubtful meaning must be gi"en a construction that will promote
public policy.
C. : construction which would carry into effect the e"ident policy of the law should be adopted in fa"or of
that interpretation which would defeat it.
XII. PURPOSE OF THE LAW OR MISCHIEF TO E' SUPPRESSE..
A. 0he following factors must be considered in the construction of a law:
1. the purpose or object of the law
2. mischief intended to be remo"ed or suppressed
. causes which induced the enactment of the law.
B. 0he purpose of a statute is more important than rules of grammar and logic in ascertaining its meaning.
XIII. .ICTIONARIES
A. 0he courts may consult dictionaries, legal, scientific or general as aid in determining the meaning of words
or phrases in a statute if said statutes does not define the word and phrases used therein.
B. >owe"er, these definitions are not binding
XIV. CONSE5UENCES OF VARIOUS CONSTRUCTIONS
In construing a statute, the objecti"e should always be to arri"e at a reasonable and sensible interpretation that is
in full accord with the legislati"e intent. :s a general rule, a construction of a statute should be rejected that will
cause
1. injustice or hardship6
2. result in absurdity6
. defeat legislati"e intent or spirit6
$. preclude accomplishment of legislati"e purpose or object6
%. render certain words or phrases a surplusage6
(. nullify the statute or ma8e any of its pro"ision nugatory.
XV. PRESUMPTIONS
A. In construing a statue, the court may properly rely on presumptions as to legislati"e intent in order to
resol"e doubts as to its correct interpretation.
B. 1resumption are based on:
1. logic
2. e!perience
. common sense
C. 0hese presumptions include presumptions in fa"or of:
1. constitutionality of a statute
2. of its completeness
. of its prospecti"e operation
$. of right and justice,
%. of its effect, sensible, beneficial and reasonable operation as a whole,
(. as well as those against impossibility, absurdity, injustice and hardship, incon"enience and
ineffecti"eness.
XVI. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
?>4<4 : &0:0+04 I& &+&'410I2L4 5/ &4A4<:L I#04<1<40:0I5#& 5< ?>4<4 0>4<4 I& :.2I*+I0L I# I0&
L:#*+:*4, 0>4<4 I& #5 24004< .4:#& I/ :&'4<0:I#I#* 0>4 ?ILL :#9 I#04#0I5# 5/ 0>4 L4*I&L:0+<4
0>:# 0>:0 ?>I'> I& ://5<949 2L 0>4 >I&05<L 5/ 0>4 &0:0+04.
XVII. WHAT CONSTITUTES LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A. all antecedents from the statutes inception until its enactment into law.
(a) Includes the presidents message if bill was enacted in response thereto
(b) 4!planatory note accompanying the bill
(c) 'ommittee reports of legislati"e in"estigations
(d) 1ublic hearings on the subject of the bill
(e) &ponsorship speech
(f) 9ebates and deliberations concerning the bill
(g) :mendments and changes in phraseology it has undergone before final appro"al.
B. If statute is a re"ision of prior statute, the latterJs practical application and judicial construction
amendments it underwent and contemporary e"ents during the time of its enactment shall form part of its
legislati"e history.
C. /oreign statute, history includes:
1) history of :nglo7:merican precedents or other foreign sources
2) their practical application and the decision of the courts construing and applying such precedents in the
country of origin.
D. 1residentJs message to the legislature
1. 1residentJs address (&tate of the #ation :ddress) M address to the 'ongress at the opening of the
regular session. 'ontains:
(a) proposed legislati"e measures
(b) indicates the presidentJs thin8ing on the proposed legislation, which when enacted into law,
follows his line of thin8ing
E. 4!planatory #ote M a short e!position of e!planation accompanying a proposed legislation by its author or
proponent. 'ontains:
(a) statement of the reason or purpose of the bill
(b) arguments ad"anced by its author in urging its passage
?>4<4 0>4<4 I& :.2I*+I0L I# : &0:0+04 5< ?>4<4 : &0:0+04 I& &+&'410I2L4 5/ .5<4 0>:# 5#4
I#04<1<40:0I5#, '5+0& .:L <4&5<0 05 0>4 4N1L:#:05<L #504 05 'L:<I/L 0>4 :.2I*+I0L :#9
:&'4<0:I# 0>4 1+&15&4 5< I#04#0 5/ 0>4 &0:0+04.
#ote:
(a) 0he e!planatory not be used as basis for gi"ing a statute a meaning that is inconsistent with
what is e!pressed in the te!t of the statute.
(b) 4!planatory note is only resorted to only for clarification in case of doubt, and not where there is
no ambiguity in the law.
(c) 0his is a mere e!pression of authorJs "iews and reasons for the proposed legislation and may not
accordingly o"erride the clear intent as e!pressed in the statute
F. Legislati"e debates M may be resorted to when there is doubt as to what a pro"ision of a statute means.
>owe"er, the "iews e!pressed by the legislators during deliberations of a bill as to the billJs purpose are
not controlling in the interpretation of the law.
0he opinions and "iews e!pressed by the legislators during floor deliberations of a bill may not be gi"en weight at
all in any of the following instances:
a) where the circumstances indicating meaning of a statute other than that e!pressed by the legislators
b) where the "iews e!pressed were conflicting
c) where the intent deducible from such "iews is not clear
d) where the statute in"ol"ed is free from ambiguity.
?>4<4 0?5 5< .5<4 &0:0+04& <4L:0I#* 05 0>4 &:.4 &+2C4'0 .:004< ?4<4 4#:'049 2L 9I//4<<4#0
:&&4.12LI4&, #4I0>4< I& F+:LI/I49 05 &14:O :25+0 0>4 I#04#0 5/ 0>4 50>4<.
G. <eports of commissions
1) 'ommissions M are usually formed to compile and collate all laws on a particular subject and to prepare
the draft of the proposed code.
2) &pecial commissions were created to draft the te!t of the <1' and 'i"il 'ode.
H. 1rior laws from which statute is based
1) In ascertaining the intention of the lawma8er, courts are permitted to loo8 to prior laws on the same
subject and to in"estigate the antecedents of the statute in"ol"ed.
2) 0his is applicable in the interpretation of:
(a) 'odes
(b) <e"ised or compiled statutes
) 1rior laws, which ha"e been codified, compiled or re"ised, re"eal the legislati"e history that will clarify the
intent of the law or shed light on the meaning and scope of the codified or re"ised statute.
I. 'hange in phraseology by amendments M also indicates legislati"e intent to change the meaning of
pro"ision from that or originally had.
J. :mendment by deletion
1. :mendment by deletion of certain words or phrases in a statute indicates that the legislature intended
to change the meaning of the statute, for the presumption is that the legislature would not ha"e
made the deletion had the intention been not to effect a change in its meaning.
2. 0he amended statute should accordingly be gi"en a construction different from that pre"ious to its
amendment.
<+L4: :n :mendment of a statute indicates a change in meaning from that which the statute originally had.
(a) 0his applies only when the deleted words or phrases are not surplusage or when the intention is
clear to change the pre"ious meaning of the old law.
(b) 0he rule does not apply where the intent is clear that the amendment is precisely to plainly
e!press the construction of the act prior to its amendment.
(c) In codification of statues or re"ision, neither alteration in phraseology not the omission or
addition of words in the latter statute will be held to alter the construction of the former act or
acts.
K. :dopted statues
1. 0he general rule is that where local statues are pattered after or copied from those of another
country, the decision of the courts in such country construing those laws are entitled to great weight
in the interpretation of such local statues and will be generally followed if found reasonable and in
harmony with justice, public policy and other local statues on the subject.
2. 4!ample of such statues:
(a) corporation law
(b) ta! code
(c) labor laws
(d) naturali,ation law
(e) <ules of court
. Limitations of the rule:
(a) where the local law and id the foreign statute from which the former was patterned differ in
some material aspects
(b) foreign construction is clearly erroneous or has not become settled
(c) where the adopting state has gi"en the statute its own interpretation
L. 1rinciples of 'ommon law
If there is a conflict between the common law principle and statutory principle, the latter pre"ails.
I. VIII. CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION
A. 9efinition: these are constructions placed upon statues at the time of, or after, their enactment by the
e!ecuti"e, legislature or judicial authorities, as well as by those who, because of their in"ol"ement in the
process of legislation, are 8nowledgeable of the intent and purpose of the law.
B. 'ontemporanea e!positio est optima et fortissima in lege M the contemporary construction is strongest in
law.
C. 'ontemporaneous construction is the construction placed upon the statute by an e!ecuti"e or
administrati"e officer called upon to e!ecute or administer such statue.
D. 4!ecuti"e and administrati"e officers are generally the "ery first official to interpret the law. 0hese
interpretations are in the form of:
1. rules
2. regulations
. circulars
$. directi"es
%. opinions and
(. rulings.
E. 0ypes of e!ecuti"e interpretation:
1. construction by an e!ecuti"e or administrati"e officer directly called to implement the law which may
be:
(a) e!pressed (e!. Interpretation embodied in circulars, directi"e or regulation)
(b) implied. (a practice of enforcement of not applying the statute to certain situations)
2. 'onstruction by the &ecretary of Custice in his capacity as the chief legal ad"iser of the go"ernment in
the form of opinions. In the absence of the ruling of a president, the opinions of &ec. 5f Custice is
controlling among administrati"e and e!ecuti"e officials.
. Interpretation handed down in and ad"ersary proceeding in the form of a ruling by an e!ecuti"e office
e!ercising -uasi7judicial power.
#ote: In the absence of error or abuse of power or lac8 of jurisdiction or gra"e abuse of discretion clearly
conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislati"e enactment creating or changing a go"ernmental
agency, the action of the agency would not be disturbed by the courts.
4. <eason why contemporaneous construction is gi"en much weight: it comes from the particular branch of
go"ernment called upon to implement the law thus construed M these same people are the drafters of the law they
interpret.
F. ?hen to disregard 'ontemporaneous construction
0his contemporaneous construction is not binding upon the court. 0he court may disregard it:
1. where there is no ambiguity in the law
2. where the construction is clearly erroneous
. where strong reason to the contrary e!ists
$. where the court has pre"iously gi"en the statue a different interpretation
G. If there is an error in implementation of the law, such error may be corrected. 0he doctrine of estoppel
does not apply.
H. :s a rule, erroneous contemporaneous construction creates no "ested right on the part of those who relied
and followed such construction. 2ut this rule is not absolute. 0here may be e!eptions in the interest of
justice and fair play (e!. 0a! cases)
I. Legislati"e interpretation: the legislature may pro"ide an interpretation or declaration clause in a statue
by they cannot limit or restrict the power granted to courts.
1. ?hile legislati"e interpretation is not controlling, courts may resort to it to clarify ambiguity in the
language.
2. such legislati"e interpretation is entitled of respect especially of the e!ecuti"e department has
similarly construed the statute.
J. Legislati"e appro"al M the legislature, by action or inaction appro"e or ratify such contemporaneous
construction. &uch appro"al may manifest in many ways such as:
1. when it reenacts statute pre"iously gi"en a contemporaneous construction
2. when it amends a prior statute without pro"iding anything which would restrict, change, nullify the
pre"ious contemporaneous construction.
. appropriation of money for the officer designated to perform a tas8 pursuant to an interpretation of a
stature
$. non7repudiation of the construction.
#ote: <atiohabitio .andati ae-uiparatur Mlegislati"e ratification is e-ui"alent to mandate.
K. &tare decisis
1. &tare decisis et non -uieta mo"ereP one should follow past precedents and should not disturb what
has been settled.
<eason for such doctrine: the supreme court has a duty not only of interpreting and applying the law but also
in protecting the society from needless uphea"als. Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium M interest of then
state demands that there be an end to litigation.
2. : ruling in order to come within the doctrine of stare decision must be categorically stated in the issue
e!pressly raised by the parties6 must be a direct ruling.
. <ulings that are merely sub silencio are merely obiter dictum (an opinion of the court upon some
-uestion of law which is not necessary to the decision of the case before it6 not binding)
$. 0his doctrine is not absolute because &upreme 'ourt may change or abandon a precedent enunciated
by it.
CHAPTER :
GENERAL RULE*
&tatute must be gi"en its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation regardless of who
may be affected, e"en if it may be harsh or onerous.
WHEN A STATUTE IS AM'IGUOUS/ THEN THE COURT MAY RESORT TO .EPARTURE FROM LITERAL
INTERPRETATION. IN SUCH A CASE/ THE STATUTE MUST 'E INTERPRETE. IN SUCH A WAY THAT*
1 Interpretation will gi"e the statute efficacy
2 1urpose will be achie"ed
:bsurdity and incon"enience will be a"oided
$ Impossible will not be re-uired
% <ight and justice will be fa"ored
( Injustice will be a"oided
) 9anger to public interest will be a"oided
COURTS IN CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE MAY*
1 'orrect clerical errors
2 &upply the omissions
9isregard surplus and superfluity
$ 9isregard redundant words
% 9isregard looser obscure words
IT MUST 'E NOTE. THAT*
1 ?hen the reason for the law ceases, the law itself ceases
2 ?ords in the plural include the singular and "ice7"ersa
0he masculine (not the feminine), includes all genders
$ ?ords in plural include the singular and "ice "ersa
% 4A4<L <+L4 >:& 4N'410I5#&
IMPLICATIONS*
1 *rant of the greater power includes the lesser
2 *rant of the lesser power does not include the greater
?here there is right there is a remedy for "iolation thereof
$ 'ourtJs jurisdiction cannot be implied from the language of the statute nor can the <ules of 'ourt confer it.
% In the grant of jurisdiction to a court, it is implied to carry with it necessary and incidental powers and means
essential to ma8e its jurisdiction effecti"e
( ?here a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, e"ery particular power necessary for the e!ercise of one
is also conferred.
) ?hat is implied should not be against the law
= :uthority to charge against public fund may not be implied
3 ?hat cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly
1; :n act in "iolation of a statute prohibiting such act shall be implied as null and "oid
1L:I# .4:#I#* <+L4
?hen the words and phrases of the statute are clear and une-ui"ocal, their meaning must be determined from the
language employed and the statute must be ta8en to mean e!actly what it says. ?hat is not clearly pro"ided in the
law cannot be e!tended to those matters outside of scope. ?here the law is clear, appeals to justice and e-uity as
justification to construe it differently are una"ailing.
%erba legis7 plain meaning rule
&nde' animi sermo7 speech is the inde! of intention
%erba legis non est recedendum7 from the words of a statute, there must be no departure
(aledicta est e'positio )uae corrumpit te'tum7 it is dangerous construction which is against the te!t
*bsoluta sentetia e'positore non indiget M when the language of the law is clear, no e!planation is re-uired
9+<: L4N &49 L4N
+ura le' sed le' M the law may be harsh, but it is still the law
,oc )uidem per)uam durum est! sed ita le' scripta est M it is e!ceedingly hard but so the law is written.
*e)uitas nun)uam contra"enit legis7 4-uity ne"er acts in contra"ention of the law
&0:0+04 .+&0 24 ':1:2L4 5/ I#04<1<40:0I5#, 50>4<?I&4 I#514<:0IA4
?here the statute totally fails to e!press a meaning, and no judicial certainty can be had, then it is necessarily
inoperati"e
&nterpreatio fienda est ut res magis "aleat )uam pereat M interpretation as will gi"e the thing efficacy is to be
adopted.
?>:0 I& ?I0>I# 0>4 &1I<I0 I& ?I0>I# 0>4 L:?
0he spirit of the law controls the letter.
-atio legis M reason of the law
LI04<:L I.15<0 .+&0 LI4L9 05 I#04#0
?here legislati"e intent apparently conflicts with the letter of the law, the former pre"ails o"er the latter. 1rimary
rule in construction is to ascertain and gi"e effect to the intent.
%erba intentioni! non e contra! debent inser"ire M words ought to be more subser"ient to the intent and not the
intent to the words.
'5#&0<+'0I5# 05 :''5.1LI&> 1+<15&4
If the statute needs construction, the most dominant in that process is the purpose of the act. It is imperati"e that
the law be interpreted in a manner that would sta"e off any attempt at circum"enting the legislati"e purpose.
?>4# <4:&5# 5/ L:? '4:&4&, L:? I0&4L/ '4:&4&
.essante ratione legis! cessat ipsa le'
-atio legis est anima M reason of the law is its soul
&+11LLI#* L4*I&L:0IA4 5.I&&I5#
CHAPTER ;
I. Ge!e$a%%y
2 : word or phrase used in a statute may ha"e an ordinary, generic, restricted, technical, legal, commercial or
trade meaning.
?hich meaning should be gi"en depends upon what the legislature intended. :s a general rule in interpreting
the meaning and scope of a term used in the law, a careful re"iew of the whole law in"ol"ed, as well as the
intendment of law, ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole and not of an isolated part or a
particular pro"ision alone, must be made to determine the real intent of the law.
II. Statto$y .ef"!"t"o!
2 0he legislati"e definition controls the meaning of a statutory word, irrespecti"e of any other meaning the word
or phrase may ha"e in its ordinary or usual sense.
/or the legislature, in adopting a specific definition is deemed to ha"e restricted the meaning of the word
within the terms of the definition.
$ ?hen the legislature defines a word, it does not usurp the courtJs function to interpret the laws but it merely
legislates what should form part of the law itself.
% ?hile the definition of terms in a statute must be gi"en all the weight due to them in the construction of the
pro"ision in which they are used, the terms or phrases being part and parcel of the whole statute must be
gi"en effect in their entirety as a harmonious, coordinated and integrated unit, not as a mass of
heterogeneous and unrelated if not incongruous terms, clauses and sentences.
III. 5a%"f"#at"o! of $%e
2 0he statutory definition of a word or term Das used in this :ctE is controlling only in so far as said act is
concerned.
0he general rule that the statutory definitions control the meaning of statutory words does not apply where its
application creates ob"ious incongruities in the language of the statute, destroys one of its major purposes, or
becomes illogical as a result of a change in its factual basis.
$ >owe"er, in a subse-uent case, it was held that of a statute remains unchanged, it must be interpreted
according to its clear, original mandate until the legislature amends it.
IV. Wo$&s #o!st$e& "! the"$ o$&"!a$y se!se
2 In construing words and phrases, the general rule is that in the absence of legislati"e intent to the contrary,
they should be gi"en their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning.
/or words are presumed to ha"e been employed by the lawma8er in their ordinary and common use and
acceptation.
$ 0he grammatical and ordinary reading of a statute must be presumed to yield its correct sense.
/ 0bi le' non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus
V. Ge!e$a% Wo$&s #o!st$e& (e!e$a%%y
2 Generalia "erba sunt generaliter intelligenda or what is generally spo8en shall be generally understood or
general words shall be understood in a general sense.
Generale dictum generaliter est interpretandum# : general statement is understood in a general sense.
$ ?here a word used in a statute has both a restricted and general meaning, the general must pre"ail o"er the
restricted unless the nature of the subject matter or the conte!t in which it is employed clearly indicates that
the limited sense is intended.
% : general word should not be gi"en a restricted meaning where no restriction is indicated.
VI. Ge!e$"# te$m "!#%&es th"!(s that a$"se the$eafte$
2 progressi"e interpretation: e!tends by construction the application of a statute to all subjects or conditions
within its general purpose or scope that come into e!istence subse-uent to its passage and thus 8eeps
legislation from becoming ephemeral and transitory unless there is a legislati"e intent to the contrary.
It is a rule of statutory construction that legislati"e enactments in general and comprehensi"e terms,
prospecti"e in operation, apply ali8e to all persons, subjects and business within their general pur"iew and
scope coming into e!istence subse-uent to their passage.
VII. Wo$&s ,"th #omme$#"a% o$ t$a&e mea!"!(
2 ?ords and 1hrases, which are in common use among merchants and traders, ac-uire trade or commercial
meanings which are generally accepted in the community in which they ha"e been in common use.
&ettled is the rule that in the absence of legislati"e intent to the contrary, trade or commercial terms, when
used in a statute are presumed to ha"e been used in their trade or commercial sense.
VIII. Wo$&s ,"th te#h!"#a% o$ %e(a% mea!"!(
2 :s a general rule, words that ha"e or ha"e been used in, a technical sense or those that ha"e been judicially
construed to ha"e a certain meaning should be interpreted according to the sense in which they ha"e been
pre"iously used, although the sense may "ary from the strict or literal meaning of the words.
0he technical or legal, not the ordinary or general meaning of a word used in a statute should be adopted in
the construction of the statute, in the absence of nay -ualification or intention to the contrary.
I7. Ho, "&e!t"#a% te$ms "! same statte #o!st$e&
2 0he general rule is that a word or phrase repeatedly used in a statute will bear the same meaning throughout
the statute.
0he same word or substantially the same phrase appearing in different parts of a statute will be accorded a
generally accepted and consistent meaning, unless a different intention appears or is clearly e!pressed.
$ 0he reason for the rule is that a word used in a statute in a gi"en sense is presumed to be used in the same
sense throughout the law.
% It is particularly applicable where in the statute the words appear so near each other physically and
particularly where the word has a technical meaning and that meaning has been defined in the statute.
7. Mea!"!( of ,o$& 4a%"f"e& )y -$-ose of statte
2 0he meaning of a words or phrase used in a statute may be -ualified by the purpose which induced the
legislature to enact the statute.
In construing a word or phrase, the court should adopt that interpretation that accords best with the manifest
purpose of the statute or promotes or reali,es its object.
$ It is generally recogni,ed that if a statute is ambiguous and capable of more than one construction, the literal
meaning of the word or phrase used therein may be rejected if the result of adopting such meaning will be to
defeat the purpose which the legislature had in mind.
7I. Wo$& o$ -h$ase #o!st$e& "! $e%at"o! to othe$ -$o+"s"o!s
2 0he general rule is that a word, phrase or pro"ision should not be construed in isolation but must be
interpreted in relation to other pro"isions of the law. 0his rule is a "ariation of the rule that a statute should be
construed as a whole, and each of its pro"isions must be gi"en effect.
: word or pro"ision should not be construed in isolation from, but should be interpreted in relation to, the
other pro"isions of a statute or other statutes dealing on the same subject.
$ 0he word or pro"ision should not be gi"en a meaning that will restrict or defeat, but should instead be
construed to effectuate, what has been intended in an enacting law.
7II. Mea!"!( of te$m &"#tate& )y #o!te1t
2 ?hile ordinarily a word or term used in a statute will be gi"en its usual and commonly understood meaning,
the conte!t in which the word or term is employed may dictate a different sense.
0he conte!t in which the word is used oftentimes determines its meaning.
$ : word is understood in the conte!t in which it is used. %erba accipienda sunt secundum materiam
% 0he conte!t may li8ewise gi"e a broad sense to a word of otherwise ordinarily limited meaning.
( 0he conte!t may also limit the meaning of what otherwise is a word of broad signification.
7III. Whe$e the %a, &oes !ot &"st"!("sh
2 ?here the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. 0bi le' non distinguit! nec nos distinguere
debemus#
0he rule founded on logic, is a corollary of the principle that general words and phrases in a statute should
ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance
$ 0he rule re-uires that a general term or phrase should not be reduced into parts and one part distinguished
from the other so as to justify its e!clusion from the operation of the law.
% : corollary of the principle is the rule that where the law does not ma8e any e!ception, court may not e!cept
something therefrom, unless there is compelling reason apparent in the law to justify it.
( 0bi le' non distinguit! nec non distinguere debemus! applies not only in the construction of general words and
e!pressions used in a statute but also in the interpretation of a rule laid down therein.
) 0his principle assumes that the legislature made no -ualification in the use of a general word or e!pression.
= 0he courts may distinguish when there are facts or circumstances showing that the legislature intended a
distinction or -ualification, for in such a case, the courts merely gi"e effect to the legislati"e intent.
7IV. ."s3!#t"+e a!& #o!3!#t"+e ,o$&s
2 0he word DorE is a disjuncti"e term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from each of the
other things enumerated. It should be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjuncti"e
word.
0he use of the disjuncti"e word DorE between two phrases connotes that either phrase ser"es as -ualifying
phrase.
$ 0he term DorE has sometimes been held to mean DandE, when the spirit or conte!t of the law so warrants.
% 0he word DorE may also be used as the e-ui"alent of Dthat is to sayE gi"ing that which it preceded it the same
significance as that which follows it. It is not always disjuncti"e and is sometimes interpretati"e or e!pository
of the preceding word.
( 0he word DorE may also mean successi"ely.
) 0he word DandE is a conjunction pertinently defined as meaning Dtogether withE, Djoined withE, Dalong or
together withE, Dadded to or lin8ed toE, used to conjoin word with word, phrase with phrase, clause with
clause.
= 0he word DandE does not mean DorE6 it is a conjunction used to denote a joinder or union, Dbinding togetherE,
Drelating the one to the otherE.
3 >owe"er, DandE may mean DorE as an e!ception to the rule. 0he e!ception is resorted to only when a literal
interpretation would per"ert the plain intention of the legislature as gleaned from the conte!t of the statute or
from e!ternal factors.
XV. Noscitur a sociis
2 ?here a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is e-ually susceptible of "arious meanings, its
correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is found
or with which it is associated.
?here the law does not define a word used therein, it will be construed as ha"ing a meaning similar to that of
words associated with or accompanied by it.
$ : word, phrase should be interpreted in relation to, or gi"en the same meaning of, words with which it is
associated.
% ?here most of the words in an enumeration of words in a statute are used in their generic and ordinary sense,
the rest of the words should similarly be construed.
( ?here a word with more than one meaning is associated with words ha"ing specific or particular signification,
the former should be gi"en a specific or particular signification.
XVI. Eusdem !eneris
2 ?hile general words or e!pressions in a statute are, as a rule, accorded their full, natural, and generic sense,
they will not be gi"en such meaning if they are used in association with specific words or phrases.
*eneral rule is that where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of
the same class or where the latter follow the former, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include,
or to be restricted to, persons, things, or cases a8in to, resembling, or of the same 8ind or class as those
specifically mentioned.
$ ?here a statute describes things of particular class or 8ind accompanied by words of a generic character, the
generic words will usually be limited to things of a 8indred nature with those particularly enumerated, unless
there be something in the conte!t of the statute to repel such inference.
% 1urpose: gi"e effect to both the particular and general words, by treating the particular words as indicating the
class and the general words as indicating all that is embraced in said class, although not specifically named by
particular words.
( 0his principle is based on the proposition that had the legislature intended the general words to be used in
their generic and unrestricted sense, it would not ha"e enumerated the specific words.
) :pplication: where specific and generic terms of the same nature are employed in the same act, the latter
following the former.
7VII. L"m"tat"o!s of Eusdem !eneric
2 0o be applicable, the following must concur:
o &tatute contains an enumeration of particular and specific words, followed by a general word or
phrase.
o 0he particular and specific words constitute a class or are of the same 8ind
o 4numeration of the particular and specific words is not e!hausti"e or is not merely by e!amples
o #o indication of legislati"e intent to gi"e the general words or phrases a broader meaning
0he rule of e1usdem generic does not re-uire the rejection of general terms entirely.
$ 0he rule is not of uni"ersal application, it should be used to carry out, not to defeat, the intent or purpose of
the law.
% If that intent clearly appears from other parts of the law, and such intent thus clearly manifested is
contrary to the result which will be reached by applying the rule of e1usdem generic, the rule must gi"e
way in fa"or of the legislati"e intent.
XVIII. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius
2 4!press mention of one person, thing or conse-uence implies the e!clusion of all others.
It is formulated in a number of ways:
a. 5ne "ariation of the rules is the principle that what is e!pressed puts an end to that which is
implied 2'pressum facit cessare tacitum
b. *eneral e!pression followed by e!ceptions therefrom implies that those which do not fall under
the e!ceptions come within the scope of the general e!pression. 2'ceptio firmat regulam in
casibus non e'ceptis
c. 4!pression of one or more things of a class implies the e!clusion of all not e!pressed, e"en
though all would ha"e been implies had none been e!pressed.
$ 0he rule e'pressio unius est e'clusio alterius and its "ariations are canons of restricti"e interpretation.
% 2asis: legislature would not ha"e made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to
restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those e!pressly mentioned. 0hey are opposite the doctrine of
necessary implication.
7I7. Ne(at"+e<o--os"te &o#t$"!e
2 0he principle that what is e!pressed puts an end to that which is implied is also 8nown as negati"e7positi"e
doctrine or argumentum a contrario#
77. A--%"#at"o! of expressio unius $%e
2 0he rule of e'pressio unius est e'clusio alterius and its corollary canons are generally used in the construction
of statutes granting powers, creating rights and remedies, restricting common rights, and imposing penalties
and forfeitures, as well as those statutes which are strictly construed.
?here a statute directs the performance of certain acts by a particular person or class or persons, it implies
that it shall not be done otherwise or be a different person or class of persons.
$ If a statute enumerates the things upon which it is to operate, e"erything else must necessarily, and by
implication, be e!cluded.
77I. L"m"tat"o!s of $%e
2 0he rule e'pressio unius est e'clusio alterius is not a rule of law. It is a mere tool of statutory construction or
a means of ascertaining the legislati"e intent.
0he rule, not being infle!ible nor a mechanical or technical tool, must yield to what is clearly a legislati"e
intent.
$ It is no more than an au!iliary rule of interpretation to be ignored where other circumstances indicate that the
enumeration was not intended to be e!clusi"e.
% It should applied only as a means of disco"ering legislati"e intent and should not be permitted to defeat the
plainly indicated purpose of the legislature.
( It will not apply where the enumeration is by way of e!ample or to remo"e doubts only.
) It will not apply in case a statute appears upon its face to limit the operation of its pro"isions to particular
persons or things by enumerating them, but no reason e!ists why other persons or things not so enumerated
should not ha"e been included and manifest injustice will follow by not including them.
= 0he rule may be disregarded of it will result to incongruities or a "iolation of the e-ual protection clause of the
constitution, incon"enience, hardship and injury to the public interest.
3 ?here the legislati"e intent shows that the enumeration is not e!clusi"e, the ma!im does not apply.
77II. .o#t$"!e of casus omissus
2 0he rule of casus omissus pro omisso habendus est states that a person, object or thing omitted from an
enumeration must be held to ha"e been omitted intentionally.
1rinciple proceeds from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from
a legislati"e enumeration
$ 0he rule does not apply where it is shown that the legislature did not intend to e!clude the person, thing,
object from the enumeration. If such legislati"e intent is clearly indicated, the court may supply the omission if
to do so will carry out the clear intent of the legislature and will not do "iolence to its language.
77III. .o#t$"!e of %ast a!te#e&e!t
2 5ualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated. 0hey
do not -ualify words or phrases which are distantly or remotely located.
In the absence of legislati"e intent to the contrary, preferential and -ualifying words and phrases must be
applied only to their immediate or last antecedent, and not to the other remote or preceding words or
association of words.
$ 0he ma!im e!pressi"e of this rule is pro'imum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sententia! or relati"e
words refer to the nearest antecedents, unless the conte!t otherwise re-uires.
% 0he use of comma to separate an antecedent from the rest e!erts a dominant influence in the application of
the doctrine of last antecedent.
77IV. 5a%"f"#at"o! of the &o#t$"!e
2 9octrine of last antecedent is subject to the e!ception that where the intention of the law is to apply the
phrase to all antecedents embraced in the pro"ision, the same should be made e!tensi"e to the whole.
&light indication of legislati"e intent so to e!tend the relati"e term is sufficient. #or does the doctrine apply
where the intention is not to -ualify the antecedent at all.
XXV. "eddendo sin!ular sin!ulis
2 0he "ariation of the doctrine of last antecedent is the rule of reddendo singular singulis. 0he ma!im means
referring each to each6 referring each phrase or e!pression to its appropriate object, or let each be put in its
proper place, that is, the words should be ta8en distributi"ely.
-eddendo singular singulis re-uires that the antecedents and conse-uences should be read distributi"ely to the
effect that each word is to be applied to the subject to which it appears by conte!t most appropriately related
and to which it is most applicable.
77VI. P$o+"sos/ (e!e$a%%y
2 0he office of a pro"iso is either to limit the application of the enacting clause, section, or pro"ision of a statute,
or to e!cept something therefrom, or to -ualify or restrain its generality , or to e!clude some possible ground
of misinterpretation of it, as e!tending to cases not intended by the legislature to be brought within its
pur"iew.
Its primary purpose is to limit or restrict the general language or operation of the statute, not to enlarge it.
$ : pro"iso is commonly found at the end of a section, or pro"ision of a statute and is introduced, as a rule by
the word D1ro"idedE
% ?hat determines whether a clause is a pro"iso is its substance rather than its form. If it performs any of the
functions of a pro"iso, then it will be regarded as such, irrespecti"e of what word or phase is used to introduce
it. It is a -uestion of legislati"e intent.
77VII. P$o+"so may e!%a$(e s#o-e of %a,
2 It has been held that De"en though the primary purpose of the pro"iso is to limit or restrain the general
language of a statute, the legislature, unfortunately, does not always use it with technical correctness6
conse-uently, where its use creates an ambiguity, it is the duty of the court to ascertain the legislati"e
intention, through resort to the usual rules of construction applicable to statutes generally and gi"e it effect
e"en though the statute is thereby enlarged, or the pro"ision made to assume the force of independent
enactment and although a pro"iso as such has no e!istence apart from which it is designed to limit or -ualify.
: pro"iso may thus enlarge, instead of restrict or limit, what otherwise is a phrase of limited import has there
been no pro"iso -ualifying it.
77VIII. P$o+"so as a&&"t"o!a% %e("s%at"o!
2 : pro"iso may also assume the role of an additional legislation.
: clear and un-ualified purpose e!pressed in the opening statement of a section of a statute comprising
se"eral subdi"isions has been construed as controlling and limiting a pro"iso attached to one of the
subdi"isions, where the pro"iso, if segregated therefrom, would mean e!actly the re"erse of what it
necessarily implied when read in connection with the limitation.
77I7. What -$o+"so 4a%"f"es
2 The general rule is that the office of the pro"iso -ualifies or modifies only the phrase immediately
preceding it or restrains or limits the generality of the clause that it immediately follows.
It should be confined to that which directly precedes it, or to the section to which it has been appended,
unless it clearly appears that the legislature intended it to ha"e a wider scope.
777. E1#e-t"o! to the $%e
2 ?here the legislati"e intent is to restrain or -ualify not only the phrase immediately preceding it but also
earlier pro"isions of the statute or e"en the statute itself as a whole, then the pro"iso will be construed in
that manner, in order that the intent of the law may be carried out.
777I. Re-(!a!#e )et,ee! -$o+"so a!& ma"! -$o+"s"o!
2 : pro"iso should be so construed as to harmoni,e and not to repeal or destroy, the main pro"ision of the
statute.
?hen there is an irreconcilable conflict or repugnancy between a pro"iso and the main pro"ision of a
statute, that which is a located in a later portion of the statute pre"ails, unless there is a legislati"e intent
to the contrary or such construction will destroy the whole statute itself.
$ 0he latter pro"ision, whether a pro"iso or not, is gi"en preference because it is the latest e!pression of the
intent of the legislation.
777II. E1#e-t"o!s (e!e$a%%y
2 :n e!ception consists of that which would otherwise be included in the pro"ision from which it is e!cepted.
:n e!ception will be construed as such if it remo"es something from the operation of a pro"ision of law.
$ It is often said that an e!ception confirms the general rule. It should not be construed to -ualify the words
or phrases constituting the general rule.
% It is well settled that the e!press mention of e!ceptions operates to e!clude other e!ceptions and
con"ersely, those which are not within the enumerated e!ceptions are deemed included in the general
rule.
( 4!ceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed.
777III. E1#e-t"o! a!& -$o+"so &"st"!("she&
2 an e!ception differs from a pro"iso. :n e!ception e!empts something absolute from the operation of a
statute, by e!press words in the enacting clause.
: pro"iso defeats its operation conditionally.
$ : pro"iso a"oids them by way of defeasance or e!cuse. :n e!ception is generally a part of the enactment
itself, absolutely e!cluding from its operation some subject or thing that otherwise would fall within its
scope.
% 2ut when the enactment is modified by engrafting upon it a new pro"ision by way of amendment,
pro"iding conditionally for a new case, it is in the nature of a pro"iso.
( 5ne of the functions of a pro"iso is to e!cept something from an enacting clause. In this sense, an
e!ception and a pro"iso are similar.
777IV. Sa+"!( #%ase
2 It is a clause in a pro"ision of law which operates to e!cept from the effect of the law what the clause
pro"ides or to sa"e something which would otherwise be lost.
It is used to e!cept or sa"e something from the effect of a repeal of a statute.
$ It should be construed in the light of the intent or purpose of the legislature (the principal consideration
being to effectuate such intent or carry out such purpose).
% It should be gi"en a strict or liberal construction depending upon the 8ind of interpretation that should,
considering its nature, be gi"en to the statute as a whole.
CHAPTER =
(.;1 *enerally
: statute is passed as a while and not in parts or sections and is animated by one general purpose and intent.
'onse-uently, each part or section should be construed in connection with e"ery other part and section so as to
produce a harmonious whole. ?hole and e"ery part of statute should be construed together.
(.;2 Intent ascertained from statue as whole
0he intent or meaning of a statue should be ascertained from the statute ta8en as a whole and not from an isolated
part or pro"ision thereof. 0he legislati"e meaning is to be e!tracted form the statue as a whole. Its clauses are not
to be segrated, but e"ery part of a statute is to be construed with reference to e"ery other part and e"ery word
and phrase in connection with its conte!t. Optima statute interpretatri' est ipsum statutum# 0he best interpreter of
a statute is the statue itself.
(.; 1urpose or conte!t as controlling guide
: statute must always be construed as a whole, and the particular meaning to be attached to any word or phrase is
usually to be ascertained from the conte!t, the nature of the subject treated and the purpose or intention of the
body which enacted or framed the statute. &tatute must recei"e a reasonable construction, reference being had to
their controlling purpose, to all their pro"isions, force and effect being gi"en not narrowly to isolated and disjoined
clauses, but to their spirit, broadly ta8ing all their pro"isions together in one rational "iew.
(.;$ *i"ing effect to statute as a whole
2ecause a statute is enacted in whole and not in parts or sections, which implies that one part is as important as
the other, the statue should be construed and gi"en effect as a whole. : pro"ision or section which is unclear by
itself may be made clear by reading and construing it in relation to the whole statute. 4"ery part of a statute
should be gi"en effect because a statute is enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodgepodge of
conflicting pro"isions.
'ourt should adopt a construction that will gi"e effect to e"ery part of a statue, if at all possible. 0his rule is
e!pressed in the ma!im ut res magis "aleat )uam pereat or the construction is to be sought which gi"es effect to
the whole of the statutePits e"ery word.
(.;% :pparently conflicting pro"isions reconciled
0he rule that a statute must be construed and gi"en effect as a whole re-uires that apparently conflicting
pro"isions should be reconciled and harmoni,ed, if at all possible. :ll the pro"isions, e"en if apparently
contradictory, should be allowed to stand and gi"en effect by reconciling time. 0he statute must be so construed as
to pre"ent a conflict between parts of it. /or it is only by so construing a statute that the statute will be gi"en effect
as a whole.
(.;( &pecial and general pro"isions in same statute
?hen there is a particular or special pro"ision and a general pro"ision in the same statue and the latter in its most
comprehensi"e sense would o"errule the former, the particular or special pro"ision must be operati"e and the
general pro"ision must be ta8en to affect only the other parts of the statute to which it may properly apply. 0he
particular or special pro"ision is construed as an e!ception to the general pro"ision.
(.;) 'onstruction as not to render pro"ision nugatory
0he whole state should, if possible, be gi"en effect is that a pro"ision of a statute should be so construed
as not to nullify or render nugatory another pro"ision of the same statute.
&nterpretatio fienda est ut res magis "aleat )uam pereat! which means that a law should be interpreted
with a "iew to upholding rather than destroying it. : construction that would render a pro"ision inoperati"e or
ineffecti"e should be a"oided.
(.;= <eason for the rule
0he construction that re-uires that apparently conflicting pro"isions of a statute be reconciled and
harmoni,ed, if at all possible and that a pro"ision should be so construed as not to nullify another, is based on the
presumption that the legislature has enacted a statute whose pro"isions are in harmony and consistent with each
other and that conflicting intentions in the same statue are ne"er supposed or regarded.
(.;3 Fualification of rule
5ne part of a statute cannot be reconciled or harmoni,ed with another part without nullifying one in fa"or
of the other, the court should, in construing the statue, choose one which will best effectuate the legislati"e intent.
<ule: where absolute harmony between parts of a statue is demonstrably not possible, the court must reject that
one which is least in accord with the general plan of the whole statue. >owe"er, if there be no such ground for
choice between inharmonious pro"isions or sections, the latter pro"ision or section, beign the last e!pression of the
legislati"e will, must, in construction, "acate the former to the e!tent of the repugnancy.

(.1; 'onstruction as to gi"e life to law
Law must recei"e sensible interpretation to promote the ends for which they are enacted. 0hey should be
gi"en reasonable and practical construction as will gi"e life to them, if it can be done without doing "iolence to
reason. 'on"ersely, a law should not be construed as to allow the doing of an act which is prohibited by law, nor so
interpreted as to afford an opportunity to defeat compliance in terms, create an inconsistency, or contra"ene the
plain words of the law. &nterpretatio fienda est ut res magis "aleat )uam pereat or that interpretation that will gi"e
the thing efficacy is to be adopted.
0he court should start with the assumption that the legislature did not do a "ain thin gin the enactment of
the statute. It is to be presumed that the law is complete by itself. 0t res magis "aleat )uam pereat, that the
courts should, if reasonably possible to do so without "iolence to the spirit and language of an act, so interpret a
statute as to gi"e it efficient operation and effect as a whole.
(.11 'onstruction to a"oid surplusage
0he rule that a statue should be gi"en effect as a whole re-uires that the state be so construed as to
ma8e no part of pro"ision thereof surplusage. : legal pro"ision must not be so construed as to be a useless
surplusage, and accordingly, meaningless in the sens of adding nothing to the law or ha"ing no effect whatsoe"er
therein. #or should a word be so construed as to render other words or phrases associated with it ser"es no
purpose. /or the legislature, in enacting a law, is presumed to ha"e used the word or phrase for a purpose. In
short, the legislature, in enacting a statute, is supposed not to insert a pro"ision which is unnecessary and a
surplusage.
(.1 &tatute and its amendments construed together
:ll parts of a statute are to be harmoni,ed and reconciled so that effect may be gi"en to each and e"ery
part thereof applies to the construction of a statute and its amendments. :mendments should be gi"en effect. It is
to be presumed that the changes ha"e some purpose, which should be ascertained and gi"en effect.
'. STATUTE CONSTRUE. IN RELATION TO CONSTITUTION AN. OTHER STATUTES
(.1$ &tatute construed in harmony with the 'onstitution
:s the 'onstitution is the fundamental law to which all laws are subser"ient, a statute should not be
interpreted independently of the 'onstitution. 0he statute should be construed in harmony with and not in "iolation
of the fundamental law. It is presumed that the legislature in enacting a law, ha"e adhered to the constitutional
limitations.
: statute should be construed whene"er possible in a manner that will a"oid conflict with the 'onstitution.
It should not be construed in such a way as will gi"e rise to a constitutional doubt. #or should it be interpreted in
such a manner as will render its application "iolati"e of a constitutional inhibition. It should be interpreted in
consonance, rather than repugnant to, any constitutional command or prescription.
?here a statute is reasonable susceptible of two constructions, one constitutional and the other
unconstitutional, that construction in fa"or of its constitutionality shall be adopted and the construction that will
render it in"alid rejected. 4"ery intendment of law should lean towards its "alidity and the court should fa"or that
construction which gi"es it the greater chance of sur"i"ing the test of constitutionality.
If there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning of the legislature, if the words or pro"isions are
obscure, or if the enactment is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that interpretation will be adopted
which will a"oid the effect of unconstitutionality, e"en though it may be necessary, for this purpose, to disregard
the more usual or apparent import of the language employed. >owe"er, the court cannot, in order to bring a
statute within the fundamental law, amend it by construction.
(.1% &tatutes in pari materia
&tatutes are in pari material when they relate to the same person or thing, or ha"e the same purpose or
object, or co"er the same specific or particular subject matter. 0he later statute may specifically refer to the prior
statutes. 0he fact that no reference is made to the prior law does not mean that the two laws are not in pari
materia. It is sufficient, in order that they may be considered in pari materia, that the two or more statute relate to
the same specific subject matter. 0wo laws are not in pari materia if they refer to different specific matters,
although they both fall under the same broad subject.
(.1( >ow statutes in pari materia construed
: statute should be construed as to harmoni,e with other laws on the same subject matter as to form a
complete, coherent and intelligible system. &nterpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi
modus or e"ery statute must be so construed and harmoni,ed with other statutes as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence.
&tatutes in pari materia should be construed together to attain the purpose of an e!press national policy.
/or the assumption is that whene"er the legislature enacts a law, it has in mind the pre"ious statutes relating to
the same subject matter, and in the absence of any e!press repeal or amendment, the new statute is deemed
enacted in accord with the legislati"e policy embodied in the prior statutes and they should be construed together.
1ro"isons in an act which are omitted in another act relating to the same subject matter will be applied in a
proceeding under the other act when not inconsistent with its purpose. 1rior statutes relating to the same subject
matter are to be compared with the new pro"isions, and if possible by reasonable construction, both are to be
construed that effect is gi"en to e"ery pro"ision of such. &tatutes in pari materia, although in apparent conflict, are
so far as reasonably possible construed to be in harmony with each other. &nterpretare et concordare leges
legibus! est optimus interpretandi modus! which means that the best method of interpretation is that which ma8es
laws consistent with other laws.
?hen two or more statutes on the same subject were enacted at different times and under dissimilar
circumstances or conditions, their interpretation should be in accordance with the circumstances or conditions
peculiar to each, in order that the statutes may be harmoni,ed or better understood. <ule based on: distingue
tempora et concordabis 1ura, or distinguish times and you will harmoni,e laws.
: statute will not, howe"er, be construed as repealing prior act on the same subject in the absence of
words to that effect, unless there is an irreconcilable repugnancy between them or unless the new law is e"idently
intended to supersede all prior acts on the matter and to comprise itself the sole and complete system of legislation
on the subject.
(.1) <easons why laws on same subject are reconciled
In enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to ha"e been aware of, and ha"e ta8en into account,
prior laws on the subject of legislation. It cannot be said that they intended the establishment of conflicting and
hostile systems on the same subject, or to lea"e in force pro"isions of a prior law which may thwart and o"erthrow
the will of the legislature.
(.1= ?here harmoni,ation is impossible
If two or more laws on the same subject cannot possibly be reconciled or harmoni,ed, one has to gi"e
way in fa"or of the other. 0here cannot be two conflicting laws on the same subject. 0he earlier one must yield to
the later one, it being the later e!pression of the legislati"e will.
(.13 Illustration of the rule
(.2; *eneral and special statutes
: general statute is a statute which applies to all of the people of the state or to all of a particular class of
persons in the state with e-ual force. It is one which embraces of a class of subject or places and does not omit
any subject or place naturally belonging to such class. : special statute is one which relates to particular persons or
things of a class or to a particular portion or section of the state only.
: general law and special law on the same subject are statutes in pari material and should, accordingly be
read together and harmoni,ed, if possible, with a "iew to gi"ing effect to both. <ule: where there are two acts, one
of which is special and particular and the other general which, if standing alone, would include the same matter
and thus conflict with the special act, the special must pre"ail since it e"inces the legislati"e intent more clearly
than that of a general statute and must be ta8en as intended to constitute an e!ception to the general act.
0he circumstance that the special law is passed before or after the general act does not change the
principle. ?here the special law is later, it will be regarded as an e!ception to or -ualification of, the prior general
act6 and where the general act is later, the special statute will be construed as remaining an e!ception to its terms,
unless repealed e!pressly or by necessary implication.
?here two statutes are of e-ual theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed therefore
specially should pre"ail.
(.21 <eason for the rule
<eason: (special as e!ception to the general) the legislature in passing a law of special character has its
attention directed to the special facts and circumstance which the special facts and circumstances which the special
act is intended to meet.
(.22 Fualifications of the rule
0he rule is not absolute. 5ne e!ception is that where the legislature clearly intended the later general
enactment to co"er the whole subject and to repeal all prior laws inconsistent therewith, the general law pre"ails
o"er a special law on the subject. In such case, there is a repeal of the special law.
:nother e!ception: where the special law merely establishes a general rule while the general law creates a
specific and special rule, in which case the general law pre"ails o"er the special law.
0he rule does not apply where the situation is re"ersed, that is, the general law treats the subject in
particular and the special law refers to it in general. In this situation, the general law pre"ails o"er the special law
in the e"ent of repugnancy or conflict between the two laws.
(.2 <eference statutes
: reference statute is a statute which refers to other statutes and ma8es them applicable to the subject of
legislation. It is incorporation in a statute of another statute by reference. It is used to a"oid encumbering the
statute boo8s of unnecessary repetition, and they ha"e been recogni,ed as an appro"ed method of legislation, in
the absence of constitutional restrictions.
0he adoption by reference of a statute that was pre"iously repealed re"i"es the statute. 0he adoption
ta8es the adopted statute as it e!ists at the tie of adoption and does not include the subse-uent changes or
modification of the statute so ta8en, unless it does so e!pressly.
: reference statute should be so construed as to harmoni,e with, and to gi"e effect to, the adopted
statute.
(.2$ &upplemental statutes
: supplemental act is one intended to supply deficiencies in an e!isting statute and to add, to complete, or
e!tend the statute without changing or modifying its original te!t. 0he original statute and the supplemental act
should be read and construed together to ma8e an intelligible whole.
(.2% <eenacted statutes
: statute which reenacts a pre"ious statute or the pro"isions thereof is 8nown as reenacted statute. :
reenactment is one in which the pro"isions of an earlier statute are reproduced in the same or substantially the
same words. 0he reenactment may also be made by reference. 0hus, where a statute pro"ides that all laws not
inconsistent with the pro"isions thereof are deemed incorporated and made integral parts thereof by reference,
such pre"ious laws on the same subject matter are deemed enacted.
0he reenactment is a legislati"e e!pression of intention to adopt the construction as well as the language
of the prior act. <ule: when a statute or a pro"ision thereof has been construed by the court of last resort and the
same is substantially reenacted, the legislature may be regarded as adopting such construction, and the
construction which the adopted statute pre"iously recei"ed.
0he rule is that two statute with a parallel scope, purpose and terminology should, each in its own field,
ha"e a li8e interpretation, unless in particular instances there is something peculiar in the -uestion under the
consideration, or dissimilar in the terms of the act relating thereto, re-uiring a different conclusion.
(.2( :doption of contemporaneous construction
0he reenactment of a statute which has recei"ed a practical or contemporaneous construction by those
charged with the duty of e!ecuting it is a persuasi"e indication of the adoption by the legislature of the prior
practical or e!ecuti"e construction, the legislature being presumed to 8now the e!istence of such construction
when it made the reenactment.
(.2) Fualification of the rule
the rule that when a judicial or contemporaneous construction has been gi"en to a statute, the
reenactment of the statute is generally held to be in effect a legislati"e adoption of the construction, applies only
when the statute is capable of the construction gi"en to it and when the construction has become a settled rule of
conduct.
(.2= :dopted statutes
:n adopted statute is statute patterned after, or copied from a statute of a foreign country. In
construing it, the court should ta8e into consideration the construction of the law by the courts of the country from
which it is ta8en, as well as the law itself and the practices under it, for the legislature is presumed to ha"e
adopted such construction and practices with the adoption of the law. 0he presumption does not, howe"er, apply to
construction gi"en the statute subse-uent to its adoption, although it had persuasi"e effect on the interpretation of
the adopted statute
CHAPTER >
).;1. *enerally:
?hether a statute is to be gi"en a strict or liberal construction will be depend upon the nature of
the statute, the purpose to be subser"ed and the mischief to be remedied, and a strict or liberal
interpretation will be gi"en a statute that will best accomplish the end desired and effectuate legislati"e
intent.
).;2. &trict construction, generally
&trict construction is that construction according to the letter of a statute, which recogni,es
nothing that is not e!pressed, ta8es the language used in its e!act meaning, and admits no e-uitable
consideration. It does not mean gi"ing a statute its narrowest meaning of which it is susceptible. #or
does it mean that words shall be so restricted as not to ha"e their full meaning. &cope of statute shall
not be e!tended or enlarged by implication, intendment, or e-uitable consideration beyond the literal
meaning of its terms.
).;. Liberal construction, defined.
Liberal constructions means such e-uitable construction as will enlarge of a statute to accomplish
its intended purpose, carry out its intent, or promote justice. It does not mean enlargement of a pro"ision
which is clear, unambiguous and free from doubt, for a statute which is plain and clear is not subject to
construction. Liberal construction is that construction which e!pands the meaning of a statute to meet
cases which are clearly within the spirit or reason thereof or within the e"il which the statute was designed
to remedy, or which gi"e the statute its generally accepted meaning to the end that the most
comprehensi"e application thereof maybe accorded, without being inconsistent with its language or doing
"iolence to any of its terms. Liberal construction means that the words should recei"e a fair and
reasonable interpretation, so as to attain the intent, spirit and purpose of the law.
).;$. Liberal construction applied, generally.
0he literal meaning of the words used may be rejected if the result of adopting said meaning
would be to defeat purpose of the law. Liberal interpretation so as to sa"e the statute from obliteration,
ut res magis "aleat )uam pereat. 'onstruction by this nature and the act of the court in engrafting upon a
law something which its belie"es ought to ha"e been embraced therein. 0he former is liberal construction
and is a legitimate e!ercise of judicial power. 0he latter is judicial legislation forbidden by the tripartite
di"ision of powers among the three departments of go"ernment, the e!ecuti"e, the legislati"e and the
judicial. : statute may not be liberally construed to read into it something which its clear and plain
language rejects.
).;%. 'onstruction to promote social justice.
DIt (social justice mandate) is meant for the three departments: the legislati"e, e!ecuti"e, and
judicial, because the latter two are no less than the agencies of the state than the first. 4nhance social justice.
).;(. 'onstruction ta8ing into consideration general welfare or growth of ci"ili,ation.
&ome authorities ad"ocate a construction which see8s an e!pansi"e application of statutes to
attain the general welfare. salus populi est suprema le'. &tatute enacted for the public good are to be construed
liberally. Statuta pro publico commodo late interpretantur. :n authority on the subject e!pounds on this type of
construction: D0here is for me in all cases a principle of statutory construction not to be found on the boo8s, but
which for the 1hilippine Islands is all7important. In the resolution of all -uestions, I begin with these -ueries:
what is for the best interest of the /ilipino peopleQ
D0he statute in general has two, articulate organs for lawma8ing purposes M the legislature and the
tribunal. /irst organ ma8es new law, the second attests and confirms old law. &tatutes must be interpreted in the
light of the growth of ci"ili,ation and "arying conditions.
).;). 1enal statutes, generally.
1enal statutes refer to those laws by which punishments are imposed for "iolation or
transgression of their pro"isions. :cts of the legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their
"iolation6 or those that define crimes, treat of their nature and pro"ide for their punishment. 1enal or criminal laws
are those which impose punishment for an offense committed against the state, and which the chief e!ecuti"e has
the power to pardon. : statute which decrees the forfeiture in fa"or of the state of une!plained wealth ac-uired by
a public official while in office is criminal in nature.
).;=. 1enal statutes strictly construed.
1enal or criminal laws are strictly construed against the &tate and liberally in fa"or of the
accused cannot be enlarged or e!tended by intendment, implication, or any e-uitable consideration. 0he language
of a penal statutes cannot be enlarged beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms in order to carry into effect the
general purpose for which the statute was enacted. <esol"ed in fa"or of the person accused of "iolating the
statute.
#o person should be brought within the terms of a statute who is not clearly within them, nor should any act be
pronounced criminal which is not clearly made so by the statute.
0he rule that penal statutes are strictly construed does not mean that e"ery penal law must be so
narrowly construed as to defeat the law itself6 it merely means that they are not to be construed so strictly as to
nullify or destroy the ob"ious purpose of the legislature. 2e construed with such strictness as to carefully
safeguard the rights of the defendant and at the same time preser"e the ob"ious intention of the legislature. It will
endea"or to effect substantial justice.
'areful scrutiny safeguard the rights of the accused. 0wo reasonable but contradictory constructions, that
which operates in fa"or of a party accused under its pro"ision is to be preferred. 0he principle is that acts in and of
themsel"es innocent and lawful cannot be held to be criminal unless there is a clear and une-ui"ocal e!pression of
the legislati"e intent to ma8e them such.
).;3. <eason why penal statutes are strictly construed.
Law is tender in fa"or of the rights of an indi"idual6 the object is to establish a certain rule by
conformity to which man8ind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited. 0he purpose of strict
construction is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a technicality but to pro"ide a precise
definition of forbidden acts.
).1;. :cts mala in se and mala prohibita.
*eneral rule is that a penal statute will not be construed to ma8e the commission of certain
prohibited acts criminal without regard to the intent of the doer, unless there is a clear legislati"e intent to the
contrary6 e"il intent must combine with an act. *ctus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, the act itself does not ma8e
a man guilty unless his intention were so. *ctus me in"ito factus non est meus actus, an act done by me against
my will is not my act. (ala in se, criminal intent, apart from the act itself, is re-uired but in those which are mala
prohibita the only in-uiry is, has the law been "iolated.
).12 Limitation of the rule.
0he rule that penal statutes are gi"en a strict construction is not the only factor in the
interpretation of the criminal laws6 merely ser"es as an additional factor to be considered as an aid in ascertaining
the meaning of penal laws. : strict construction should not be permitted to defeat the intent, policy, and purpose
of the statute. 0he court should consider the spirit and reason of a statute where a literal meaning would lead to
absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law, for strict construction of a criminal
statute does not mean such construction as to depri"e it of the meaning intended.
'apable of two interpretations, one which will operate to e!empt an accused from liability for "iolation
thereof and another which will gi"e effect to the manifest intent of the statute and promote its object, the latter the
interpretation should be adopted6 they are not to be so strictly construed as to defeat the ob"ious purpose of the
legislature.
).1 &tatutes in derogation of rights.
1eople in republican state enjoy certain rights, which are either inherent or guaranteed by the
constitution or protected by law6 rights are not absolute, and the state, in the e!ercise of its police power, may
enact legislations curtailing or restricting their enjoyment. :s these statutes are in derogation of common or
general rights, they are generally strictly construed and rigidly confined to cases clearly within their scope or
purpose.6 two reasonably possible constructions, one which would diminish or restrict fundamental right of the
people and the other of which would not do so, the latter construction must be adopted so as to allow full
enjoyment of such fundamental right.
).1$ &tatutes authori,ing e!propriations.
0he power of eminent domain is essentially legislati"e in nature. 0he legislature may not,
howe"er, by itself, e!ercise such power by enacting a law directly e!propriating a particular land and fi!ing the
amount of just compensation thereof. It may delegate the power, by law, subject to hearing as to just
compensation to the president, local go"ernment units, or a public utility company.6 strictly construed against the
e!propriating authority and liberally in fa"or of property owners6 De!ercise of the right of eminent domain, whether
by the state or by its authori,ed agents, is necessarily in derogation of pri"ate rights, and the rule in that case is
that the authority must be strictly construed6 right to freehold inhabitants.
).1% &tatutes granting pri"ileges.
&tatutes granting ad"antages to pri"ate persons or entities ha"e in many instance created special
pri"ileges or monopolies for the rantees and ha"e thus been "iewed with suspicion and strictly construed6 public
ad"antage is gained by the grant, it narrowly appears to be secondary significance compared with the ad"antage
gained by the grantee.
&trict construction re-uires that those who in"o8e a special pri"ilege granted by the statute must
comply strictly with its pro"isions. 3ri"ilegia recipient largam interpretationem "oluntati consonam concedentis, or
pri"ileges are to be interpreted in accordance with the will of him who grants them.
).1( Legislati"e grants to local go"ernment units.
Legislati"e grants in fa"or of local go"ernment units are grants of a public nature, and hence,
should be strictly construed against the grantee.6 there is in such a grant a gratuitous donation of public money or
property which results in an unfair ad"antage to the grantee and for that reason, the grant should be narrowly
restricted in fa"or of the public.
).1) &tatutory grounds for remo"al of officials.
&tatutes relating to suspension or remo"al of public officials are strictly construed. 6 remo"al is to
be confined within the limits prescribed for it6 the causes, manner and conditions fi!ed must be pursued with
strictness6 where the cause of remo"al is specified, the specification amounts to a prohibition to remo"e for a
different cause, which is a paraphrase of the ma!im e'pressio unius est e'clusion alterius. 6 remedy of remo"al is
drastic one and penal in nature.6 where a statute pro"ides that a public official may be remo"ed for Dneglect of
duty, oppression, corruption or other forms of maladministration in office,E the phrase Iin officeE should be
construed to -ualify the enumerated grounds, in that the grounds must be such as affect the officerJs performance
of his duties as an officer and not such as affect only his character as a pri"ate person.
).1= #aturali,ation laws.
Laws on naturali,ation are strictly construed against an applicant for citi,enship and rigidly
followed and enforced. 6 right of an alien to become a citi,en by naturali,ation is a statutory rather that a natural
one, and it does not become "ested until he files a petition and establishes by competent and satisfactory e"idence
that he has all the -ualifications and none of the dis-ualifications specified by law.
).13 &tatutes imposing ta!es and custom duties.
0he power to ta! is an incident of so"ereignty and is unlimited in its range, ac8nowledging in its
"ery nature no limits, so that security against its abuse the is to be found only in the responsibility of the
legislature which imposes the ta! of the constituency who are to pay it. 6 Dpower to ta! in"ol"es the power to
destroy.E 6 ta! statutes must be construed strictly against the go"ernment and liberally in fa"or of the
ta!payer. 6 the statute is to be construed strictly against the subjection to ta! liability, and it will not be construed
as imposing a ta! unless it does so clearly, e!pressly and unambiguously . a ta! cannot be imposed without clear
and e!press words for that purpose. 0a! or customs laws may not be e!tended by implication beyond the clear
import of their language, nor their operation enlarged so as to embrace matters not specifically pro"ided. 6
<eason M ta!ation is a destructi"e power which interferes with the personal and property rights of the
people and ta8es from them a portion of their property for the support of the go"ernment.6 burdens are not to be
imposed, nor presumed to be imposed, beyond what the statutes e!pressly and clearly import.
).2; &tatutes granting ta! e!emptions.
0a!es are what the people pay for ci"ili,ed society. 6 lifeblood of the nation. 0he law frowns
against e!emptions from ta!ation. Laws granting ta! e!emptions are thus construed strictissmi 1uris against the
ta!payer and liberally in fa"or of the ta!ing authority. 0a!ation is the rule and e!emption is thee!ception. 0he
burden of proof rests upon the party claiming e!emption to pro"e that it is in fact co"ered by the e!emption so
claimed. &tatutes granting ta! e!emptions are construed strictissimi 1uris against the ta!payer and liberally in
fa"or of the ta!ing authority. 2asis M to minimi,e the different treatment and foster impartiality, fairness and
e-uality of treatment among ta!payers. /or e!emptions from ta!ation are not fa"ored in law, nor are they
presumed. 0hey must be e!pressed in the clearest and most unambiguous language and not left to mere
implications. De!emptions are ne"er presumed, the burden is on the claimant to establish clearly his right to
e!emption and an alleged grant of e!emption will be strictly construed and cannot be made out by inference or
implications but must be beyond reasonable doubt. In other words, since ta!ation is the rule and e!emption the
intention to ma8e an e!emption ought to be e!pressed in clear and unambiguous terms.
).21 Fualification of rule.
#ot absolute. ?here the pro"ision of the law is clear and unambiguous , so that there is no
occasion for the court see8ing the legislati"e intent, the law must be ta8en as it is, de"oid of judicial addition or
subtraction. Law pro"ides no -ualification for the granting of ta! e!emption, the court is not at liberty to supply
one..6 does not apply in the case of ta! e!emptions in fa"or of the go"ernment itself or its agencies.
).22 &tatutes concerning the so"ereign.
<estricti"e statutes which impose burdens on the public treasury or which diminish rights and
interest are strictly construed. /or this reason, such statutes , no matter how broad their terms are, do not
embrace the so"ereign, unless the so"ereign is specifically mentioned.
).2 &tatutes authori,ing suits against the go"ernment.
D&tate may not be sued without its consent.E M reaffirms uni"ersal rule that the so"ereign is
e!empt from suit, in the absence of its consent to be sued usually in the form of a statute to that effect, not
because of any formal conception or absolute theory but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no
legal right depends. 4ullum tempus occurrit regi. : statute whereby the state gi"es its consent to be sued is
strictly construed, and the wai"er of immunity from suit, being in derogation of so"ereignty, will not be lightly
inferred.
).2$ &tatutes prescribing formalities of will.
&tatutes prescribing the formalities to be obser"ed in the e!ecution of wills are strictly construed,
6 a will must be e!ecuted in accordance with the statutory re-uirements, otherwise it is entirely "oid. 6 apply the
intent of the legislators and not that of the testator, and the latterJs intention is fre-uently defeated by the non7
obser"ance of what the statute re-uires.
).2% 4!ceptions and pro"isos.
:s a rule, e!ceptions should be strictly but reasonably construed6 they e!tend only so far as
their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resol"ed in fa"or of the general pro"ision rather than the
e!ception. 0he court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication, and it is a rule that an e!press
e!ception e!cludes all others, although it is always proper in determining the applicability of this rule to in-uire
whether, in the particular case, it accords with reason and justice.
&imilarly, a statute, rule or situation which allows e!ceptions to the re-uirement of warrant of
arrest or search warrant must be strictly construed. : preference is an e!ception to the general rule and it is what
its name implies.
: pro"iso should be interpreted consistently with the legislati"e intent. 0he reason is that the
legislati"e purpose set forth in the general enactment e!presses the legislati"e policy and only those e!pressly
e!empted by the pro"iso should be freed from the operation of the statute.
'. &0:0+04& LI24<:LLL '5#&0<+49
).2( *eneral social legislation
Implement the social justice and protection7to7labor pro"isions of the 'onstitution are 8nown as
general welfare legislations. 0hese statutes are construed liberally. *eneral welfare legislations, the courts will be
guided by more than just an in-uiry into the letter of the law as against its spirit and will ultimately resol"e any
doubt in fa"or of the persons whom the law intended to benefit.
Labor laws, tenancy laws, land reform laws and social security laws. >owe"er, while general
welfare legislations are construed liberally in fa"or of those intended to be benefited, this principle holds true only
when there is doubt or ambiguity in the law and not when the law itself is clear and free doubt.
?or8ingmanJs welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration. :rticle $ of the
#ew Labor 'ode which states that Iall doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the pro"isions of the
Labor 'ode including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resol"ed in fa"or of labor. 2ased on the
premise that the statute is ambiguous.
).2) *eneral welfare clause.
0he general welfare clause on the power of local go"ernment has two branches. 5ne branch
attaches itself to the main trun8 of municipal authority and relates to such ordinances and regulations as may be
necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon local legislati"e bodies by law.
0he second branch is much more independent of the specific functions enumerated by law. It authori,es such
ordinances as shall seem necessary and proper to pro"ide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity,
impro"e the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and con"enience of the local go"ernment unit and the inhabitants
thereof, and for the protection of the property therein.
0he general welfare clause should be construed liberally in fa"or of the local go"ernment units.
).2= *rant of power to local go"ernments.
Limited self7go"ernment to full autonomy. 0he old rule is that municipal corporations, being
mere creatures of the law, ha"e only such powers as are e!pressly granted to them and those which are
necessarily implied or incidental to the e!ercise thereof and that grants of power to them are to be construed
strictly and any doubt should be resol"ed in fa"or of the national go"ernment and against the political subdi"ision
concerned.
0he rule of construction change with the enactment of <epublic :ct #o.22($, otherwise 8nown as
the Local :utonomy :ct. &ection 12 of said :ct pro"ides in part that the Iimplied power of a pro"ince, a city or a
municipality shall be liberally construed in its fa"or. :ny fair and reasonable doubt as to the e!istence of the power
should be interpreted in fa"or of the local go"ernment and it shall be presumed to e!ist. 0his liberal construction is
fortified by the 'onstitution. 13) 'onstitution is towards the fullest autonomy of local go"ernment units.
Local *o"ernment 'ode M Iany power of a barangay, municipality, city or pro"ince shall be
liberally construed in its fa"or.
&hall be resol"ed in fa"or of de"olution of powers and of the lower local go"ernment unit. 0a!
ordinance or re"enue measure shall be construed strictly against the local go"ernment unit enacting it, and
liberally in fa"or of the ta!payer. :ny ta! e!emption construed strictly against the person claiming it6 Liberally
interpreted to gi"e more powers to local go"ernment units in accelerating economic de"elopmet and upgrading the
-uality of life for the people in the community6 go"erned by the original terms and conditions of said contracts or
the law in force at the time such rights were "ested6 resolution of contro"ersies may be had to the customs and
traditions in the place where the contro"ersies ta8e place.
).23 &tatutes granting ta!ing power.
2efore the 13) 'onstitution, the rule is that a local go"ernment unit, unli8e the so"ereign state
is clothed with no inherent power of ta!ation. :nd the ta!ing power when granted is to be construed strictissimi
1uris. :ny doubt or ambiguity arising out of the terms used in granting that power must be resol"ed against the
local go"ernment unit. Inferences, implications, and deductions ha"e no place in the interpretation of the ta!ing
power of a municipal corporation.
2ased on the concept that local go"ernment, unli8e the so"ereign state, are allocated with no
inherent power to ta!. 0he #ew 'onstitution has changed such concept. 0he 'onstitution pro"ides that D4ach local
go"ernment unit shall ha"e the power to create its own sources of re"enue and to le"y ta!es, fees and charges
subject to such guidelines and limitations as the congress may pro"ide, consistent with the basic policy of local
autonomy. &tatutes prescribing limitations of the ta!ing power of local go"ernment units must be strictly
construed against the national go"ernment and liberally in fa"or of the local go"ernment units.
).; &tatutes prescribing prescripti"e period to collect ta!es.
&tatutes prescribing the period of limitation of action for the collection of ta!es is beneficial both
to the go"ernment because ta! officers would be obliged to act promptly in the ma8ing of assessment, and to
citi,ens because after the lapse of the peiod of prescription, citi,ens would ha"e a feeling of security against
unscrupulous ta! agents who will always find an e!cuse to inspect the boo8s of ta!payers, not to determine the
latterJs real liability, but to ta8e ad"antage of e"ery opportunity to molest peaceful, law7abiding citi,ens.
).1 &tatues imposing penalties for non7payment of ta!.
&tatues imposing penalties for non7payment of ta!es within the re-uired period are liberally
construed in fa"or of the go"ernment and strictly obser"ed and interpreted against the ta!payer. &trong reasons
of public policy support this rule. &uch laws are intended to hasten ta! payments or to punish e"asions or neglect
of duty in respect thereto.
0hey will not place upon ta! laws so loose a construction as to permit e"asions on merely fanciful
and insubstantial distinctions. ?hen proper, a ta! statute should be construed to a"oid the possibilities of ta!
e"asions.
).2 4lection Laws.
4lection laws should be reasonably and liberally construed to achie"e their purpose M to
effectuate and safeguard the will of the electorate in the choice of their representati"es M for the application of
election laws in"ol"es public interest and imposes upon the 'ommission on 4lections and the courts the imperati"e
duty to ascertain by all means within their command who is the real candidate elected by the people.
4lections laws may be di"ided into three parts for purposes of applying the rules of statutory
construction. 0he first part refers to the pro"isions for the conduct of elections which elections officials are
re-uired to follow. 0he second part co"ers those pro"isions which candidates for office are re-uired to perform.
0he third part embraces those procedural rules which are designed to ascertain, in case of dispute, the actual
winner in the elections.
Drules and regulations for the conduct of elections are mandatory before the election, but when it
is sought to enforce them after the elections they are held to be directory only, if that is possible, especially where,
if they are held to be mandatory, innocent "oters will be depri"ed of their "otes, without any fault on their part.
*enerally, Dthe pro"isions of a statute as to the manner of conducting the details of an elections are not
mandatory, but directory merely, and irregularities in conducting an elections and counting the "otes, not
proceeding from any wrongful intent and which depri"es no legal "oter of his "otes, will not "itiate an election or
justify the rejection of the entire "otes of a precinct.
0he pro"isions of the election law which candidates for the office are re-uired to comply are
generally regarded as mandatory. Fualifications of candidates, re-uiring the filing of certificates of candidacy,
defining election offenses, and limiting the period within which to file election contests, are mandatory and failure
to comply with such pro"isions are fatal.
0he pro"isions of the election law designed to determine the will of the electorate are liberally
construed. 0echnical and procedural barriers should not be allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle in the
choice of their electi"e officials.
4lection law intended to safeguard the will of the people in their choice of their representati"es
should be construed liberally to achie"e such purpose.
4lection protest, which should be liberally construed to the end that the popular will e!pressed in
the election of public officers will not, by reason of purely technical objections, be defeated.
<igid application of the law that will preclude the court from ascertaining the popular will should
be rejected in fa"or of a liberal construction thereof that will subser"e such end, where a rigid and strict application
and enforcement of pro"isions of the election law will safeguard popular will and pre"ent transgression of suffrage
and the mandate of the majority, the pro"isions will be gi"en strict construction. 4lection contest, especially
appreciation of ballots, must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public
officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities.
). :mnesty proclamations.
:mnesty proclamations should be liberally construes so as to carry out their purpose, which is to
encourage the return to the field of the law of those who ha"e "eered from the law. :mnesty and pardon are
synonymous, and for this reason, the grant of pardon should li8ewise be construed liberally in fa"or of those
pardoned and strictly against the state, for where two words are synonymous, the rules for interpreting one will
apply to the other.
).$ &tatues prescribing prescriptions of crimes.
: stature of limitation or prescription of offenses is in the nature of amnesty granted by the state,
declaring that after a certain time, obli"ion shall be cast o"er the offense. >ence, statutes of limitations are
liberally of construction belongs to all acts of amnesty and grace, but because the "ery e!istence of the statute is a
recognition and notification by the legislature of the fact that time, while it gradually wears out proofs and
innocence, has assigned to it fi!ed and positi"e periods in which it destroys proofs of guilt.
).% :doption statues.
:doption statutes are construed liberally in fa"or of the child to be adopted with the liberal
concept that adoption statutes, being humane, and salutary, hold the interest and welfare of the child to be a
paramount consideration and are designed to pro"ide homes, parental care and education for the unfortunate,
needy or orphaned children and gi"e them the protection of a society and family in the person of the adopter.
).( Aeteran and pension laws
Aeteran and pension laws are enacted to compensate a class of men who suffered in the ser"ice
for the hardships they endured and the dangers they encountered in line of duty. 0hey are e!pression of gratitude
to and recognition of those who rendered ser"ice tot eh country by e!tending to them regular monetary benefit.
/or these reasons, such statutes are construed liberally to the end that their noble purpose is best accomplished.
>owe"er, while "eteran and pension laws are to be construed liberally, they should be so construed as to pre"ent a
person from recei"ing double pension or compensation, unless the law pro"ides otherwise. <etirement or pension
laws are also liberally construed. 2eing remedial in character, a statute creating pension or establishing retirement
plan should be liberally construed and administered in fa"or of the persons intended to benefited thereby.
).) <ules of 'ourt.
0he <ules of 'ourt, being procedural, are to be construed liberally with the end in "iew of
reali,ing their purpose M the proper and just determination of a litigation. : liberal construction of the <ules of
'ourt re-uires the courts, in the e!ercise of their functions, to act reasonably and not capriciously, and enjoins
them to apply the rules in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy and
ine!pensi"e determination of their cases, means conduci"e to the reali,ation of the administration of law and
justice.
Lapses in the literal obser"ance of a rule of procedure will be o"erloo8ed when they do not
in"ol"e public policy, when they arose from an honest mista8e or unforeseen accident, when they ha"e not
prejudiced the ad"erse party and ha"e not depri"ed the court of its authority. 'oncei"ed in the best traditions of
practical and moral justice and common sense, the <ules of 'ourt upon7splitting technicalities that do not s-uare
with their liberal tendency and with the ends of justice.
0he literal stricture of the rule ha"e been rela!ed in fa"or of liberal construction in the following
cases: 1. where a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice 2. where the interest
of substantial justice will be ser"ed . where the resolution of the emotion is addressed solely to the sound and
judicious discretion of the court and $. where the injustice to the ad"erse party is not commensurate with the
degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed procedure.
).= 5ther statues.
'urati"e statutes are enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to "alidate legal proceedings which
would otherwise be "oid for want of conformity with certain legal re-uirements. 0hey are intended to supply
defects, abridge superfluities and curb certain e"ils. 0heir purpose is to gi"e "alidity to acts done that would ha"e
been in"alid under e!isting laws ha"e been complied with. 'urati"e statutes, by their "ery nature, are retroacti"e.
<edemption laws, being remedial in nature are to be construed liberally to carry our their
purpose, which is to enable the debtor to ha"e his property applied to pay as many debtorJs liabilities as possible.
4!ecution are interpreted liberally in order to gi"e effect to their beneficent and humane purpose6 and to this end,
any reasonable doubt be construed in fa"or of the e!emption from e!ecution. Laws on :ttachment are also
liberally construed in order to promote their projects and assist the parties in obtaning speedy justice.
:n instrument of credit, warehouse receipts play a "ery important role in modern commerce, and
accordingly, warehouse receipt laws are gi"en liberal construction in fa"or of bona fide holders of such receipts.
0he purpose of the probation being to gi"e first7hand offenders a second chance to maintain his
place in society through the process of reformation, it should be liberally construed to achie"e its objecti"e. 0hus,
the probation law may liberally construed by e!tending the benefits thereof to any one not specifically dis-ualified.
CHAPTER ?
A. IN GENERAL
1 &tatutes may be classified either as mandatory or directory.

Ma!&ato$y a!& &"$e#to$y stattes/ (e!e$a%%y
1 .andatory statute is a statute which commands either positi"ely that something be done, or performed in
a particular way, or negati"ely that something be not done, lea"ing the person concerned no choice on the
matter e!cept to obey.
2 :ct e!ecuted against the pro"isions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be "oid, e!cept when the law
itself authori,es their "alidity.
?here a statute is mandatory, the court has no power to distinguish between material and immaterial
breach thereof or omission to comply with what it re-uires.
$ : directory statute is a statute which is permissi"e or discretionary in nature and merely outlines the act
to be done in such a way that no injury can result from ignoring it or that its purpose can be accomplished
in a manner other than that prescribed and substantially the same result obtained.
% 0he nonperformance of what it (directory statute) prescribes, though constituting in some instances an
irregularity or subjecting the official concerned to disciplinary or administrati"e sanction, will not "itiate
the proceedings therein ta8en.
Whe! statte "s ma!&ato$y o$ &"$e#to$y
( 0he primary object is to ascertain legislati"e intent.
) Legislati"e intent does not depend upon the form of the statute.
= 'onsideration must be gi"en to the entire statute, its object, purpose, legislati"e history and the
conse-uences which would result from construing it one way or the other, and the statute must be
construed in connection with other related statutes.
3 0he language of the statute, howe"er mandatory in form, may be deemed directory whene"er the
legislati"e purpose can best be carried out by such construction, but the construction of mandatory words
as directory should not be lightly adopted and ne"er where it would in fact ma8e a new law instead of that
passed by the legislature.
1; ?hether a statute is mandatory or directory depends on whether the thing directed to be done is of the
essence of the thing re-uired, or is a mere matter of form, and what is a matter of essence can often be
determined only by judicial construction.

Test to &ete$m"!e !at$e of statte
11 0he test generally employed to determine whether a statute is mandatory or directory is to ascertain the
conse-uences that will follow in case what the statute re-uires is not done or what it forbids is performed.
12 ?hether a statutory re-uirement is mandatory or directory depends on its effects.
1 If no substantial rights depend on it and no injury can result from ignoring it6 and the purpose of the
legislature can be accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed and substantially the same results
obtained, then the statute will generally be regarded as directory6 but if not, it will be mandatory.
1$ : statute will not be construed as mandatory and re-uiring a public officer to act within a certain time limit
e"en if it is couched in words of positi"e command if it will cause hardship or injustice on the part of the
public who is not at fault. #or will a statute be interpreted as mandatory if it will lead to absurd,
impossible or mischie"ous conse-uences.

La!(a(e se&
1% &tatutes using words of command, such as DshallE, DmustE, DoughtE, or DshouldE, or prohibition, such as
DcannotE, Dshall notE or Dought notE, are generally regarded as mandatory.
1( 0he use of words of command or of prohibition indicates the legislati"e intent to ma8e the law mandatory.
1) It has been held that the intention of the legislature as to the mandatory or directory nature of particular
statutory pro"ision is determined primarily from the language thereof.
Use of @sha%%A o$ @mstA
1= :s a general rule, the use of the word DshallE in a statute implies that the statute is mandatory.
13 It means Dought toE, DmustE, and when used in a statute or regulation, e!presses what is mandatory.
2; 0he term DshallE is a word of command, and one which has or which must be gi"en a compulsory meaning
and it is generally imperati"e or mandatory.
21 If a different interpretation is sought, it must rest upon something in the character of the legislation or in
the conte!t which will justify a different meaning.
22 It connotes compulsion or mandatoriness.
2 0his rule is not absolute. 0he import of the word depends upon a consideration of the entire pro"ision, its
nature, object and the conse-uences that would follow from construing it one way or the other.
2$ 0he word DmustE in a statute, li8e DshallE is not always imperati"e. It may be consistent with discretion. If
the language of a statute considered as a whole and with due regard to its nature and object re"eals that
the legislature intended to use the word DmustE to be directory, it should be gi"en that meaning.
2% 5ne test used to determine whether the word DshallE in mandatory or discretionary is whether non7
compliance with what is re-uired will result in the nullity of the act. If it results in the nullity of the act, the
word is used as a command.
Use of @mayA
2( 0he word DmayE is an au!iliary "erb showing, among others opportunity or possibility. +nder ordinary
circumstances, the phrase Dmay beE implies the possible e!istence of something.
2) *enerally spea8ing, the use of the word DmayE in a statute denotes that it is directory in nature. 0he word
DmayE is generally permissi"e only and operates to confer discretion.
2= 0he word DmayE as used in adjecti"e laws, such as remedial statutes which are construed liberally, is only
permissi"e and not mandatory.
Whe! @sha%%A "s #o!st$e& as @mayA a!& +"#e +e$sa
23 9epending upon a consideration of the entire pro"ision, its nature, its object, and the conse-uences that
would follow from construing it one way or the other, the con"ertibility of said terms either as mandatory
or directory is a standard recourse in statutory construction.
; It is well7settled that the word DmayE should be read as DshallE where such construction is necessary to
gi"e effect to the apparent intention of the legislature.
1 0he word DmayE will, as a rule, be construed as DshallE where a statute pro"ides for the doing of some act
which is re-uired by justice or public duty, or where it "ests a public body or officer with power and
authority to ta8e such action which concerns the public interest or rights of indi"iduals.
2 0he word DshallE may be construed as DmayE when so re-uired by the conte!t or intention of the
legislature. It shall be construed merely as permissi"e when no public benefit or pri"ate right re-uires that
it be gi"en an imperati"e meaning.

Use of !e(at"+e/ -$oh")"to$y o$ e1#%s"+e te$ms
: negati"e statute is mandatory. : negati"e statute is one e!pressed in negati"e words or in the form of
an affirmati"e proposition -ualified by the word DonlyE, said word ha"ing the force of an e!clusionary
negation.
$ 0he use of the legislature of negati"e, prohibitory or e!clusi"e terms or words in a statute is indicati"e of
the legislati"e intent to ma8e the statute mandatory.
% 1rohibiti"e or negati"e words can rarely, if e"er, be directory, for there is but one way to obey the
command, Dthou shall notE, and that is to completely refrain from doing the forbidden act.
'. MAN.ATORY STATUTES
Stattes #o!fe$$"!( -o,e$
( &tatutes which confer upon a public body or officer power to perform acts which concern the pubic
interests or rights of indi"iduals, are generally regarded as mandatory although the language used is
permissi"e only since such statutes are construed as imposing rather than conferring pri"ileges.

Stattes ($a!t"!( )e!ef"ts
) &tatutes which re-uire certain steps to be ta8en or certain conditions to be met before persons concerned
can a"ail of the benefits conferred by law are, with respect to such re-uirements, considered mandatory.
= 0he rule is based on the ma!im "igilantibus et non dormientibus 1ura sub"eniunt or the laws aid the
"igilant, not those who slumber on their rights.
3 3otior est in tempoe! potior est in 1ure7 he who is first in time is preferred in right.
Stattes -$es#$")"!( 3$"s&"#t"o!a% $e4"$eme!ts
$; 0he general rule is that statutory re-uirements by which courts or tribunals ac-uire jurisdiction to hear
and decide particular actions must be strictly complied with before the courts or tribunals can ha"e
authority to proceed.
$1 >ence, statutes prescribing the "arious steps and methods to be ta8en for ac-uisition by the courts or
tribunals o"er certain matters are considered mandatory.

Stattes -$es#$")"!( t"me to taBe a#t"o! o$ to a--ea%
$2 &tatutes or rules prescribing the time for litigants to ta8e certain actions or to appeal from an ad"erse
decision is generally mandatory.
$ &uch statutes or rules ha"e been held as absolutely indispensable to the pre"ention of needless delays
and to the orderly and speedy discharge of business and are a necessary incident to the proper, efficient,
and orderly discharge of judicial functions.
$$ &uch statutes or rules re-uire strict, not substantial, compliance. :ccordingly, they are not wai"able, nor
can they be the subject of agreements or stipulations by litigants.
Stattes -$es#$")"!( -$o#e&$a% $e4"$eme!ts
$% In statutes relating to procedure, e"ery act which is jurisdictional, or of the essence of the proceedings, or
is prescribed for the protection or benefit of the party affected, is mandatory. : statute which re-uires a
court to e!ercise its jurisdiction in a particular manner, follow a particular procedure, or subject to certain
limitations, is mandatory, and an act beyond those limits is "oid as in e!cess of jurisdiction.
$( 0he statute prescribing such re-uirements is regarded as mandatory, e"en though the language used
therein is permissi"e in nature.
E%e#t"o! %a,s o! #o!&#t of e%e#t"o!
$) 0he pro"isions of election laws go"erning the conduct of elections and prescribing the steps election
officials are re-uired to do in connection therewith are mandatory before the elections6 howe"er, when it
is sought to enforce them after the elections, they are held to be directory only, if that is possible,
especially where, if they are held to be mandatory, innocent "oters will be depri"ed of their "otes without
any fault on their part.
$= +nless of a character to affect an obstruction to the free and intelligent casting of the "otes, or to the
ascertainment of the result, or unless the pro"ision affects an essential element of the election, or unless
it is e!pressly declared by the statute that the particular act is essential to the "alidity of an election, or
that its omission shall render it "oid.
E%e#t"o! %a,s o! 4a%"f"#at"o! a!& &"s4a%"f"#at"o!
$3 0he rule that election laws are mandatory before but not after the elections applies only to those
pro"isions which are procedural in nature affecting the conduct of the election as well as to those which
direct or re-uire election officials to do or perform certain acts, the purpose of such construction being to
preser"e the sanctity of the ballot and carry out the will of the electorate.
%; 0he rule does not apply to pro"isions of the election laws prescribing the time limit to file certificates of
candidacy and the -ualifications and dis-ualifications to electi"e office.
%1 0hese pro"isions are considered mandatory e"en after elections.
Stattes -$es#$")"!( 4a%"f"#at"o!s fo$ off"#e
%2 4ligibility to a public office is of a continuing nature and must e!ist at the commencement of the term and
during the occupancy of the office. &tatutes prescribing the eligibility or -ualifications of persons to a
public office are, as a rule, regarded as mandatory.
Stattes $e%at"!( to assessme!t of ta1es
< It is a general rule that the pro"isions of a statute relating to the assessment of ta!es, which are intended for the
security of the citi,ens, or to insure the e-uality of ta!ation, or for certainty as to the nature and amount of each
otherJs ta!, are mandatory6 but those designed merely for the information or direction of officers or to secure
methodical and systematic modes of proceedings are merely directory.
Stattes #o!#e$!"!( -)%"# a#t"o! sa%e
% &tatutes authori,ing public auction sale of properties and prescribing the procedure to be followed are in
derogation of property rights and due process, and are construed, with respect to the prescribed
procedure, to be mandatory.
%$ 0he prescribed steps must be followed strictly6 otherwise, the sale at public auction shall be "oid.
C. .IRECTORY STATUTES
Stattes -$es#$")"!( ("&a!#e fo$ off"#e$s
%% 0here are statutory re-uisitions intended for guidance of officers in the conduct of business de"ol"ed upon
them which do not limit their power or render its e!ercise in disregard of the re-uisitions ineffectual.
%( 1ro"isions of this character are not usually regarded as mandatory, unless accompanied by negati"e words
importing that the acts re-uired shall not be done in any other manner or time than that designated.
Stattes -$es#$")"!( ma!!e$ of 3&"#"a% a#t"o!
%) &tatutes prescribing the re-uirements as to the manner of judicial action that judges should follow in the
discharge of their functions are, as a rule, merely directory.
%= It should not be assumes in the absence of specific language to the contrary that the legislature intended
that the right of parties should be seriously affected by the failure of a court or some officer to comply
strictly with the statutory re-uirements of official action.
%3 1rocedure is secondary in importance to substanti"e right, and the non obser"ance of such procedure
should ne"er be permitted to affect substanti"e right, unless the intention of the legislature is clearly
e!pressed.
(; It is uni"ersally held that statutes of this nature are merely directory and noncompliance therewith is not
necessary to the "alidity of the proceedings.
Stattes $e4"$"!( $e!&"t"o! of &e#"s"o! ,"th"! -$es#$")e& -e$"o&
(1 0he constitution pro"ides that the ma!imum period within which a case or matter shall be decided or
resol"ed from the date of its submission, shall be 2$ months for the &upreme 'ourt, and unless reduced
by the &upreme 'ourt, 12 months for lower collegiate courts and months for all other lower courts.
(2 4ach 'onstitutional 'ommission shall decide any case brought before it within si!ty days from the date of
its submission for resolution.
( : judgment promulgated after the e!piration of the said period is not null and "oid, although the officer
who failed to comply with the lay may be dealt with administrati"ely in conse-uence of his delay7unless
the intention to the contrary is manifest.
($ ?here a statute specifies the time at or within which an act is to be done by a public officer or body, it is
generally held to be directory only as to the time, and not mandatory, unless the time is of the essence of
the thing to be done, or the language of the statute contains negati"e words, or shows that the
designation of the time was intended as a limitation of power, authority or right.
(% 0he better rule is that where a construction of a time pro"ision as mandatory will cause great injury to
persons not at fault or result in a miscarriage of justice, such conse-uence should be a"oided by
construing the statute as directory, for reasons of fairness, justice and fair play re-uire such construction.
(( It has been held that a statute re-uiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally
construed to be merely directory, so that non7compliance with them does not in"alidate the judgment on
the theory that if the statute had intended such result, it would ha"e clearly indicated.
() >owe"er, while the period fi!ed by law to resol"e a case is merely directory, it cannot be disregarded or
ignored completely with absolute immunity.
(= It cannot be assumed that the law has included a pro"ision that is deliberately intended to become
meaningless and to be treated as a dead letter.
Co!st"tt"o!a% t"me -$o+"s"o! &"$e#to$y
(3 9oes the 'onstitution alter the general rule and render time pro"ision to decide mandatoryQ Is a decision
rendered beyond the period prescribed in the 'onstitution7 2$ months for the &upreme 'ourt, 12 months
for the lower collegiate courts and months for other lower courts7 null and "oidQ
); 0>4 &upreme 'ourt ga"e negati"e answers (.arcelino ". 'ru,)
CHAPTER C
I. P$os-e#t"+e A!& Ret$oa#t"+e Stattes* .ef"!"t"o!
2 1rospecti"e statute is one, which operates upon facts loo8s and applies to the future.
: retroacti"e law is a law which disability in respect to a transaction already past.
II. La,s O-e$ate P$os-e#t"+e%y/ Ge!e$a%%y
A. <ule: statutes are to be construed as ha"ing only prospecti"e operation, unless the intent of the
legislature to gi"e them retroacti"e effect is e!pressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language
used (.ontilla "s. :gustinia 'orp.)
2 4mbodied in :rticle $ of the ci"il code
Le' prospicit! non respicit M the law loo8s forward, not bac8ward
$ Le' futuro! 1ude' de praeterito M the law pro"ides for the future, the judge for the past
% 0he fact that the law is silent as to the date of its application and that is couched in the past tense does not
necessarily imply that it should ha"e retroacti"e effect.
B. <eason for the general rule
2 0he law has no binding effect until it is enacted hence it has no application to past but only to future times.
4o"a consitutio futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis M a new statute should affect the future, not
the past.
III. P$esm-t"o! a(a"!st $et$oa#t"+"ty
2 0he presumption is that all laws operate prospecti"ely unless the contrary clearly appears or is clearly plainly
and une-ui"ocally e!pressed or necessarily implied ('ebu 1ortland "s. 'ommission of Internal <e"enue).
In e"ery case of doubt, doubt must be resol"ed against retroacti"e operation of laws
IA. Wo$&s O$ Ph$ases I!&"#at"o! P$os-e#t"+"ty
(1) >ereafter
(2) 0hereafter
() In the enacting clause: Dfrom and after the passing of this actE
($) DshallE ('ebu 1ortland "s. 'I<
(%) D&hall ta8e effect upon its appro"alE ('ommissioner of Internal <e"enue "s. /ilipinas
'ompania de &eguros
A. Ret$oa#t"+e stattes
2 0he constitution does not prohibit the enactment of retroacti"e statutes, which do not impair the obligations of
contract, depri"e persons of property without due process of law, or di"est rights that ha"e already become
"ested.
4! post facto laws are prohibited.
AI. States G"+e! P$os-e#t"+e Effe#t
A. 1enal statutes, generally
2 :rticle 21 <1' M no felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed to its commission
2asis of :rticle 21: 4ullum crimen sine poena! nulla poena sine legis: there is no crime if there is no law
punishing it.
B. 4! post facto laws
2 <ule: #o e! post facto laws shall be enacted
.a8es an act done before the passage of the law and which is innocent when done, and punishes such act.
$ :pplies only to criminal or penal matters and not to ci"il laws
C. 2ill of attainder
2 <ule: #o bill of attainder shall be enacted
2ill of attainder is a legislati"e act, which inflicts punishment without judicial trial.
$ If a law is bill of attainder, it is an e! post facto law. If it is not an e! post facto law, it is not a bill of
attainder.
D. ?hen penal laws apply retroacti"ely
+nless it is fa"orable to the accused (:rticle 22, <1')
0his is founded on conscience and good law and contained in aphorism: 5a"orabilia sunt amplianda! adiosa
restringenda (laws that are fa"orable to the accused are gi"en retroacti"e effect.
4!ception:
a) ?hen the accused is a habitual delin-uent.
b) ?here the later statute e!pressly pro"ide that it shall not apply to e!isting actions or pending cases
c) :ccused disregards the later law and in"o8es the prior statute under which he was prosecuted.
d) :mendatory statute which renders an illegal act prior to enactment legal is generally gi"en retroacti"e
effect unless it is e!pressly pro"ide that such statute will not apply retroacti"ely.
E. &tatutes substanti"e in nature
2 &ubstanti"e law, which creates, defines or regulates rights concerning life, liberty or property (creates
substanti"e rights)
In the absence of legislati"e intent, substanti"e laws should apply prospecti"ely.
$ 1rocedural laws are retroacti"e.
F. 4ffects of pending actions
2 : later statute restricting the jurisdiction of the court will not be so construed as to affect the pending action,
unless the statute itself pro"ides or unless e!press prohibitory words are used,
?here a court which has no jurisdiction o"er a certain case but ne"ertheless decides it, from which appeal is
ta8en, a statue enacted during the pendency of the appeal "esting jurisdiction upon such trial court o"er the
subject matter or such case may not be gi"en retroacti"e effect so as to "alidate the judgment of the court
$ &ubstanti"e laws are generally not applicable to pending cases and proceedings unless pro"ided by the law.
G. Fualification of rule
2 &ubstanti"e law only applies to pending action of such is the clear intent of the law, or it is a measure to
promote social justice or in the e!ercise of police powers.
'ases must be decided in the light of the law as it e!ists at the time of the decision by the appellate court
H. Stattes affe#t"!( +este& $"(hts
2 : statute may not be construed and applied retroacti"ely if it impairs substanti"e right that has become
"ested.
I. &tatutes affecting obligation of contract.
Laws e!isting at the time of the e!ecution of contract are the one applicable to such transactions and not later
statutes, unless the latter pro"ide that they shall ha"e retroacti"e effect.
$ Later statutes shall not be gi"en retroacti"e effect if it impairs obligations of contracts.
J. <epealing and amendatory acts
2 &tatutes which repeal earlier or prior laws operate prospecti"ely unless it is the intent of the legislature to gi"e
them retroacti"e effect.
<epealing statue will not be gi"en retroacti"e effect if it will impair "ested rights of the obligation of contract.
AII. Stattes that a$e ("+e! $et$oa#t"+e effe#t
A. 1rocedural laws M adjecti"e laws which prescribe rules and forms of procedure of enforcing rights or
obtaining redress for their in"asion.
2 0he general rule that statutes are prospecti"e and not retroacti"e does not ordinarily apply to procedural laws.
<emedial laws M laws relati"e to remedies or confirmation of rights already e!isting.
$ :dministrati"e rule M interpretati"e of a pre7e!isting statute and not declarati"e of certain rights with
obligations is gi"en retroacti"e effect as of the date of the effecti"ity if the statute
AIII. E1#e-t"o!s to the $%e
2 *eneral rule: procedural laws are applicable to pending actions or proceedings
4!ceptions:
1. ?hen statute e!pressly pro"ides or by necessary implication
2. If applying procedural laws retroacti"ely would not be feasible or would wor8 injustice.
. If it would in"ol"e intricate problems of due process or impair independence of the court.
IN. C$at"+e stattes
2 >ealing acts6 cures defects and adding to the means of enforcing e!isting obligations. .a8es "alid that which
before the enactment if the statute was in"alid.
<ule: if the thing omitted or failed to be done and which constitutes the defect sought to be remo"e or made
harmless is something which the legislature might dispensed with by a pre"ious statute, it may do so by a
subse-uent one.
$ <etroacti"e
N. L"m"tat"o!s to the $%e
2 *eneral rule: 'urati"e and remedial statutes ill not be applied retroacti"ely if they impair "ested rights
4!ception: If the curati"e or remedial statute is enacted as police power measure: applies retroacti"ely e"en
if it curtails "ested rights.
NI. Po%"#e -o,e$ %e("s%at"o!s
2 <eason for the e!ception: the non7impairment of obligations of contract or of "ested rights must yield to the
legitimate e!ercise of power, by the legislature, to prescribe the regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order, safety and general welfare of the people.
NII. Stattes $e%at"!( to -$es#$"-t"o!
*eneral rule: statute relating to prescription of action, being procedural in nature, applies to all actions filed
after its effecti"ity.
$ It is prospecti"e (applies to causes that accrued and will accrue after it too8 effect) and retroacti"e (it applies
to causes that accrued before its passage)
% 4!ceptions to retroacti"ity:
1. If to do so will remo"e the bar of limitation, which has become complete or disturb e!isting claims
without allowing a reasonable time to bring actions thereon.
2. If it will impair "ested rights
NIII. P$es#$"-t"o! "! #$"m"!a% a!& #"+"% #ases
2 *eneral rule: laws on prescription of action apply as well to crimes committed before the enactment as
afterwards
9ifference:
A. 'i"il suit: the statute is enacted by legislature as an impartial arbiter between two contending parties, not
intended to be made in fa"or of either party
B. 'riminal suite: statutes of limitation is a grantor surrendering by act of grace its right to prosecute or
declare that the offense is no linger subject of prosecution after the prescripti"e period: till be applied
retroacti"ely if fa"orable to the accused.
NIA. Stattes $e%at"!( to a--ea%s
2 *eneral rule: right to appeal from an ad"erse judgment is statutory and may be ta8en away.
<emedial or procedural in nature and applies to pending actions.
$ 'annot be applied retroacti"ely if it will impair "ested rights
% In absence of a clear legislati"e intent to the contrary, a statue shortening the period for ta8ing appeals is to
be gi"en prospecti"e effect and may not be applied to pending proceedings in which judgment has already
been rendered at the time of its enactment.
CHAPTER 1D
II. Ame!&me!t
:. 1ower to amend
2 Legislature has the power to amend, subject to constitutional re-uirement, any e!isting law
&upreme court, in the e!ercise of its rule7ma8ing power or of its power to interpret the law, has no authority
to amend or change the law
2. >ow amendment effected
2 2y addition, deletion, or alteration of a statute which sur"i"es in its amended form.
2y enacting amendatory act modifying or altering some pro"isions of the statue either e!pressly or impliedly
4!press amendment: done by pro"iding amendatory act that specific sections or pro"isions of a statute are
amended6 indicated as : D to read as follows.
'. :mendment by implication
2 0here is implied amendment where a part of a prior statute embracing the same subject as the later act may
not be enforced without nullifying the pertinent pro"ision of the latter in which e"ent, prior act is deemed
amended to the e!tent of the repugnancy.
9. ?hen amendment ta8es effect
:fter 1% days following the publication in the 5fficial *a,ette or newspaper of general circulation
4. >ow construed
$ : statute and its amendment should be read together as a whole meaning, it should be read as if the statue
has been originally enacted in its amended form.
% 1ortions not amended will continue to be in force with the same meaning they ha"e before amendment.
/. .eaning of law changed by amendment
2 *eneral rule: an amended act would be gi"en a construction different from that of the law prior to its
amendment for it is presumed that legislatures would not ha"e amended the statue if it did not intend to
change its meaning.
*. :mendment operates prospecti"ely
*eneral rule: amendatory act operates prospecti"ely unless the contrary is pro"ided or the legislati"e intent to
gi"e it a retroacti"e effect is necessarily implied from the language used and no "ested rights is impaired.
$ >owe"er, amendments relating to procedures should be gi"en retroacti"e effect.
>. 4ffect of amendment in "ested rights
2 <ule: after the statute is amended, the original act continues to be in force with regard to all rights that had
accrued prior to the amendment or to obligations that were contracted under the prior act.
I. 4ffect of amendment on jurisdiction
<ule: a subse-uent statute amending a prior act with the effect of di"esting the court of jurisdiction may not
be construed to operate to oust jurisdiction that has already attached under the prior law.
C. 4ffect of nullity of prior or amendatory act
$ :n in"alid or unconstitutional law does not in legal contemplation e!ist.
% ?here a statute amended in in"alid, nothing in effect has been amended. 0he amended act shall be
considered the original or independent act.
( ?hen the amended act is declared unconstitutional, the original statute remains unaffected and in force.
III. Re+"s"o! a!& Co&"f"#at"o!
:. *enerally: restating the e!isting laws into one statute in order to simplify complicated pro"isions.
2. 'onstruction to harmoni,e different pro"isions
2 0he different pro"isions of a re"ised statute or code should be read and construed together.
?here there is irreconcilable conflict: that which is best in accord with the general plan or, in the absence of
circumstances upon which to base a choice, that which is later in physical position, being the latest e!pression
of legislati"e will, will pre"ail.
'. ?hat is omitted is deemed repealed
2 ?hen both intent and scope clearly e"ince the idea of a repeal, then all parts and pro"isions of the prior act
that are omitted from the re"ised act are deemed repealed.
9. 'hange in phraseology
<ule: #either an alteration in phraseology nor omission or addition of words in the later statute shall be held
necessarily to alter the construction of the former acts.
4. 'ontinuation of e!isting law
$ <ule: the rearrangement of section or parts of a statute, or the placing of portions of what formerly was a
single section in separate section, does not operate to change the operation, effect and meaning of the
statute, unless changes are of such nature as to manifest the cleat intent to change the former laws.
IV. Re-ea%s
:. 1ower to repeal
% Legislature has plenary power to repeal, &upreme court, while it has the power to promulgate rule of
procedure, it cannot in the e!ercise of such power alter, change or repeal substanti"e laws.
2. <epeal: total or partial, e!press or implied
1. 0otal: rendered re"o8ed completely
2. 1artial: Lea"es the unaffected portion of the statue in force
. 4!press: there is a declaration in a statute (repealing clause)
$. Implied: all other repeals
'. <epeal by implication
( 0wo well7settled categories:
1. ?here the pro"isions in the two acts on the same subject matter are irreconcilable, the later act
repeals the earlier one
2. Later act co"ers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as substitute.
9. Irreconcilable inconsistency
) <ule: repugnancy must be clear and con"incing or the later law nullifies the reason or purpose of the earlier to
call for a repeal. .ere difference in terms will not create repugnance.
= Leges posteriors priores contraries abrogant: : later law repeals an earlier law on the same subject which is
repugnant thereto.
4. Implied repeal by re"ision or codification
2 <ule: ?here a statute is re"ised or a series of legislati"e acts on the same subject are re"ised and
consolidated into one, co"ering the entire field of subject matter, all parts and pro"isions of the former act or
acts that are omitted from the re"ised act are deemed repealed.
/. <epeal by reenactment
?here a statute is a reenactment of the whole subject in substitution of the pre"ious laws on the matter, the
latter disappears entirely and what is omitted in the reenacted law is deemed repealed.
*. 5ther forms of implied repeal
1. ?hen two laws is e!pressed in the form of a uni"ersal negati"e: a negati"e statute repeals all
conflicting pro"isions unless the contrary intention is disclosed.
2. ?here the legislature enacts something in general terms and afterwards passes another on the same
subject, although in affirmati"e language, introduces special condition or restrictions.
>. <epealing clause
$ :ll laws or part thereof, which are inconsistent with this act, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
% #ature of this clause: not an e!press repeal rather, it is a clause which predicates the intended repeal upon
the condition that a substantial conflict must be found on e!isting and prior acts of the same subject matter
( 4! proprio "igore
) <ule: the failure to add a specific repealing clause particularly mentioning the statute to be repealed indicated
the intent was not to repeal any e!isting law on the matter unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and
repugnancy e!ist in the terms of the new and old laws.
I. <epeal by implication not fa"ored
2 <ule: <epeals by implication not fa"ored
1resumption is against inconsistency and against implied repeals for it is presumed that legislatures 8now
e!isting laws on the subject and not to ha"e enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes.
C. #e!es posteriores priores contraries a$ro!ant M later statue repeals prior ones which are repugnant
thereto. :s between two laws, on the same subject matter, which are irreconcilable inconsistent, that
which is passed later pre"ails.
O. *eneral law
2 <ule: *eneral law on a subject does not operate to repeal a prior special law on the same subject unless
clearly appears that the legislature has intended the later general act to modify the earlier special law.
Generalia specialibus non derogant : a general law does not nullify a specific or special law.
$ <eason: the legislature should ma8e pro"isions for all circumstance of the particular case.
L. ?hen special or general law repeals the other
2 <ule: ?here a later special law on a particular subject is repugnant to or inconsistent with a prior general law
on the same subject, a partial repeal of the latter is implied to the e!tent of the repugnancy or e!ception
granted upon the general law.
Legislati"e intent to repeal must be shown in the act itself, the e!planatory not to the bill before its passage
into a law, the discussion on the floor of the legislature and the history of the two legislations.
$ <ule: *eneral law cannot be construed to ha"e repealed a special law by mere implication.
% <ule: If intention to repeal the special law is clear, the special law will be considered as an e!ception to the
general law will not apply. &pecial law is repealed by implication.
.. 4ffects of repeals
1. &tatute is rendered inoperati"e
2. 9oes not undo the conse-uences of the operation of the statute while in force
. 9oes not render illegal what under the repealed act is legal
$. 9oes not la8e legal what under the former law is illegal
#. 5n jurisdiction
2 Curisdiction to try and decide actions is determined by the law in force at the time the action is filed.
*eneral rule: where the court or tribunal has already ac-uired and is e!ercising jurisdiction o"er a
contro"ersy, its jurisdiction to proceed to final determination of the cause is not affected by the new legislation
repealing the statue which originally conferred jurisdiction unless the repealing statute pro"ides otherwise
e!pressly or by necessary implication.
5. 5n jurisdiction to try criminal cases
2 Curisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force at the time the action is
instituted.
1. 5n actions pending or otherwise
0he general rule is that the repeal of a statue defeats all actions and proceedings including those which are still
pending.
F. 5n "ested rights
<epeal of a statute does not destroy or impair rights that accrued and became "ested under the statute before
its repeal.
<. 5n contracts
$ ?hen a contract is entered into by the parties on the basis of the law when obtaining, the repeal or
amendment of said law does not affect the terms of the contract not impair the right of the parties thereunder.
&. 4ffect of repeal of ta! law
% <epeals does not preclude the collection of ta!es assessed under the old law before its repeals unless the
repealing statute pro"ides otherwise
0. <epeal and enactment
( &imultaneous repeal and reenactment of a statue does not affect the rights and liabilities which ha"e accrued
under the original statute since the reenactment neutrali,es the repeal and continues the law in force without
interruption.
+. 4ffect of repeal of penal laws
) <epeal without -ualification of penal law depri"ed the court of the jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a
"iolation of the old law prior to its repeal.
= ?here repeal is absolute, crime no longer e!ists.
3 4!ception:
1. 0he repealing act reenacts the statute and penali,es the same act pre"iously penali,ed under the
repealed law, the act committed before the reenactment continues to be a crime.
2. ?here the repealing act contains a sa"ing clause pro"iding that pending actions shall not be affected,
the latter will continue to be prosecuted in accordance with the old law.
o 9istinction as to effect of repeal and e!piration of law
2 In absolute repeal, the crime is obliterated
In e!piration of penal law by its own force does not ha"e that effect
A. 4ffect of repeal of municipal charter
2 &uperceding of the old charter by a new one has the effect of abolishing the offices under the old charter.
?. <epeal or nullity of repealing law
Law first repealed shall not be re"i"ed unless e!pressly pro"ided
$ ?here a repealing statute is declared unconstitutional, it will ha"e no effect of repealing the former statute.
CHAPTER 11 ECONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTIONF
'5#&0I0+0I5#
1 /undamental law which sets up a form of go"ernment and defines and delimits powers thereof.
2 Is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable e!cept by the authority from which it emanates
:uthority of which emanates from the so"ereign people
5<I*I# :#9 >I&05<L
13% 'onstitution
1 :ct of +& 'ongressG0ydings7.cduffie Law authori,ed the people of 1.I. to adopt a 'onstitution
2 &teps
1 9rafting and appro"al of the 'onstitutional 'on"ention
2 'ertification of the +& 1resident
<atification by the /ilipino people7 .ay 1$, 13%
13)% 'onstitution
1 <.:. (12 M call for a con"ention to propose amendments of the 13% 'onstitution
2 :ug 2$, 13);7 election of delegates
&ept 21, 13)27 declaration of .artial Law
$ Can 1), 13)7 13) 'onstitution is proclaimed ratified
/reedom 'onstitution
1 .arch 2%, 13=(7/eb 2, 13=)
13=) 'onstitution
1+<15&4 5/ '5#&0I0+0I5#:L '5#&0<+'0I5#
2 0o ascertain intent or purpose of the framers of the 'onstitution as e!pressed in the language of the
fundamental law, and thereafter to assure reali,ation.
.59:LI0I4& 5/ '5#&0I0+0I5#:L '5#&0<+'0I5#
I#0<I#&I'
0e!tualGLiteral interpretationG1lain7meaning
0erms must be construed in their general and ordinary sense
*eneral pre"ails o"er the restricted unless the limited sense is intended
$ &tructural
% 9rawing inferences from the architecture of the 'onstitution
( 'onstruction as a whole
: pro"ision in the 'onstitution should not be construed in isolation rather as a whole and
apparently conflicting pro"isions should be reconciled and harmoni,ed in a manner that may gi"e
to all of them full of force and effectB
4N0<:#45+&
$ >istorical
<elying on circumstances, historical e"ents and ideological positions upon the adoption of the
'onstitution
% 1roceedings of the 'on"ention
9ebates, interpretations, and opinions e!pressed concerning particular pro"isions yield additional
insight on the intent and meaning thereof but are not absolute and conclusi"e for the 'onstitution
does not deri"e its force from the con"ention but from the people who ratified it. .oreo"er,
opinions e!pressed by some indi"iduals during the con"ention, do not necessarily reflect the state
of mind of those who did not e!press their opinion.
( 9octrinalG1re"ious laws and judicial rulings
<elying on established precedents
'ourts are bound to presume that the people adopting a constitution are familiar with the
pre"ious and e!isting laws upon the subjects to which its pro"isions relate and upon which they
e!press their judgment and opinion in its adoption
) 'ontemporaneous construction and writings
<elying on construction of the legislati"e and e!ecuti"e departments
?here a legislature has re"ised a statute after a constitution has been adopted, such a re"ision is
to be regarded as a legislati"e construction.
= 'hanges in 1hraseology
3 : change in phraseology of the present 'onstitution may indicate an intent t modify or change
the meaning of the old pro"ision and thus reflect a different intent
1; 'onse-uence of alternati"e constructions
?here a constitutional pro"ision is ambiguous, that construction which lead to absurd, impossible
or mischie"ous conse-uences must be rejected
50>4< <+L4&:
'onstitution construed as a whole
$ : pro"ision in the 'onstitution should not be construed in
isolation rather as a whole and apparently, conflicting pro"isions
should be reconciled and harmoni,ed in a manner that may gi"e to all
of them full force and effect.
% .andatory or 9irectory
( 0he established rule is that constitutional pro"isions are
to be construed as mandatory, unless by e!press pro"ision or by
necessary implication, a different intention is manifested. It is a
general rule to regard constitutional pro"isions as mandatory and
not to lea"e any discretion to the will of a legislature to obey or
to disregard them. 0his presumption as to mandatory -uality is
usually followed unless it is unmista8ably manifest that the
pro"isions are intended to be merely directory. 0he reason why
pro"ision of the constitution are generally regarded as mandatory is
that in a constitution, the so"ereign itself spea8s and is laying
down the rules which for the time being at least are to control
ali8e the go"ernment and the go"erned. Its pro"isions are binding
upon all departments of the go"ernment.
) 1rospecti"e or <etroacti"e
= 0he rule is that a constitution should operate prospecti"ely
only, unless the words employed show a clear intention that it
should ha"e a retroacti"e effect.
3 :pplicability of &tatutory 'onstruction to 'onstitutional 'onstruction
1; &ome of the rules in statutory construction are applicable to the construction of the 'onstitution
11 *enerally, 1ro"isions of the 'onstitution are self7e!ecuting in nature
12 0he general rule is that constitutional pro"isions are self7
e!ecuting, e!cept when the pro"isions themsel"es e!pressly re-uire
legislations to implement them or when, from their language or
tenure, they are merely declarations of policies and principles. :
self7e!ecuting pro"ision is one which is complete by itself and
becomes operati"e without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the
right it grants may be enjoyed or protected. 0he rule is that in
case of doubt, the 'onstitution should be considered self7e!ecuting
rather than non7self7e!ecuting
LATIN MA7IMS
*bsoluta sententia e'positore non indiget
?hen the language of law is clear, no e!planation of it is re-uired. (p.12))
*e)uitas nun)uam contra"enit legis
4-uity ne"er acts in contra"ention of the law. (p.12=)
.asus omissus pro omisso habendus est
: person, object, or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to ha"e been omitted intentionally. (p.21)
.essante ratione legis! cessat et ipsa le'
?hen the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases. (p.1$2)
.ontemporanea e'positio est optima et fortissima in lege
0he contemporary construction is strongest in law. (p.11;)
+ura le' sed le'
0he law may be harsh, but that is the law. (p.12) and p.23=)
2a est accipienda interpretatio )uae "itio caret
0hat interpretation is to be adopted which is free from e"il or injustice. (p.1%)
2' dolo malo non oritur action
#o man can be allowed to found a claim upon his own wrongdoing. (p.1)$)
2' necessitate legis
2y necessary implication of law. (glossary)
/rom the necessity of the law. (p.1($)
2'pressio unius est e'clusio alterius
0he e!press mention of one person, thing, or conse-uence implies the e!clusion of all others. (p.222)
5alsa demonstratio non nocet! cum de corpore constat
/alse description does not preclude construction nor "itiate the meaning of the statute. (glossary)
/alse description does not preclude construction nor "itiate the meaning of the statute which is otherwise unclear.
(p.1(1)
5iat 1usticia! ruat coelum
Let right be done, though the hea"ens fall. (p.1%$)
,oc )uidem per)uam durum est! sed ita le' scripta est
It is e!ceedingly hard but so the law is written. (p.12))
&bi )uid generaliter conceditur6 inest haec e'ceptio! si non ali)uid sit contras 1us bas)ue
?here anything is granted generally, this e!ception is implied6 that nothing shall be contrary to law and right.
(p.1(1)
&mpossibilium nulla obligatio est
0here is no obligation to do an impossible thing. (p.1(2)
&n eo )uod plus sit! semper inest et minus
0he greater includes the lesser. (p.1($)
&n pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis (p#789)
(in the boo8, this ma!im appears to mean D#o man should be allowed to ta8e ad"antage of his own wrong,E but
that is also the meaning of 4ullus commodum potest de in1uria propriasua)
&nde' animi sermo (p#7:9)
&nde' animi sermo est (glossary)
&peech is the inde! of intention.
&nterest reipublicae ut sit finis litium
0he interest of the &tate demands that there be an end to litigation. (p.122)
1ublic interest re-uires that by the "ery nature of things there must be an end to a legal contro"ersy. (glossary and
p.$;)
&nterpretatio fienda est ut res magis "aleat )uam pereat
0hat interpretation as will gi"e the thing efficacy is to be adopted. (p.11)
: law should be interpreted with a "iew to upholding rather than destroying it. (glossary and p.2%()
&nterpretatio talis in ambiguis semper fienda est ut e"itetur incon"eniens et absurdum (p#79; and glossary)
&nterpretato talis in ambiguis semper frienda est! ut e"itatur incon"eniens et absurdum (p#7/:)
?here there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will a"oid incon"enience and absurdity is to be adopted.
<ure naturae ae)uum est neminem cum alterius detrimento et in1uria fieri locupletiorem
0he fact that a statute is silent, obscure, or insufficient with respect to a -uestion before the court will not justify
the latter from declining to render judgment thereon. (p.1%))
Legis interpretatio legis "im obtinet (glossary)
Legis interpretato legis "im obtinet (p.())
0he authoritati"e interpretation of the court of a statute ac-uires the force of law by becoming a part thereof.
(glossary)
0he authoritati"e interpretation of the &upreme 'ourt of a statute ac-uires the force of law by becoming a part
thereof. (p.())
Le' prospicit! non respicit
0he law loo8s forward, not bac8ward. (p.(= and p.%2)
(aledicta est e'positio )uae corrumpit te'tum
It is dangerous construction which is against the te!t. (p.12()
4emo tenetur ad impossibile
0he law obliges no one to perform an impossibility. (p.1(2)
4ullus commodum potest de in1uria propriasua (glossary)
#ullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria (p#789)
#o man should be allowed to ta8e ad"antage of his own wrong.
Obiter dictum
:n opinion e!pressed by a court on some -uestion of law which is not necessary to the decision of the case before
it. (p.122)
Optimus interpres rerum usus
0he best interpreter of the law is usage. (p.11$)
=uando ali)uid prohibetur e' directo! prohibetur et per obli)uum
?hat is prohibited directly is prohibited indirectly. (glossary)
?hat cannot, by law, be done directly cannot be done indirectly. (p.1)()
-atihabito mandato a)uiparatur (glossary)
-atihabitio mandato ae)uiparatur (p#7:>)
Legislati"e ratification is e-ui"alent to a mandate.
-atio legis
Interpretation according to spirit. (glossary)
Interpretation according to the spirit or reason of the law. (p.12)
-atio legis est anima legis (glossary)
-atio legis est anima (p.1$2)
0he reason of the law is its soul.
Stare decisis et non )uieta mo"ere
/ollow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled. (glossary)
5ne should follow past precedents and should not disturb what has been settled. (p.121)
Summum 1us! summa in1uria
0he rigor of the law would become the highest injustice. (p.1(2)
Surplusagium non nocet (glossary)
Surplusagium non noceat (p.1%3)
&urplusage does not "itiate a statute.
0bi 1us! ubi remedium
?here there is a right, there is a remedy. (glossary)
?here there is a right, there is a remedy for "iolation thereof. (p.1(()
0tile per inutile non "itiatur
0he useful is not "itiated by the non7useful. (p.1%3)
%erba intentioni! non e contra! debent inser"ire
?ords ought to be more subser"ient to the intent and not the intent to the words. (p.1)
%erba legis
1lain7meaning rule. (p.12$)
%erba legis non est recedendum
/rom the words of the statute there should be no departure. (p.12$)
1ost7.idterms ('hapters %71;)
*ctus me in"ito factus non est meus actus
:n act done by me against my will is not my act. (p.232)
*ctus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea
0he act itself dos not ma8e a man guilty unless his intention were so. (p.232)
*d pro'imum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sentential
<elati"e words refer to the nearest antecedents, unless the conte!t otherwise re-uires. (p.22)
*rgumentum a contrario
#egati"e7opposite doctrine (p.22)
.asus omissus pro omisso habendus est
: person, object, or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to ha"e been omitted intentionally. (p.21)
+issimilum dissimilis est ratio
5f things dissimilar, the rule is dissimilar. (p.2;$)
+istingue tempora et concordabis 1ura
9istinguish times and you will harmoni,e laws. (p.2)1)
+ura le' sed le'
0he law may be harsh, but that is the law. (p.12) and p.23=)
21usdem generis
5f the same 8ind or specie. (p.21)
2'ceptio firmat regulam in casibus non e'ceptis
: thing not being e!cepted must be regarded as coming within the pur"iew of the general rule. (pp.222722)
2'pressio unius est e'clusion alterius
0he e!press mention of one person, thing, or conse-uence implies the e!clusion of all others. (p. and p.222)
2'pressum facit cessare tacitum
?hat is e!pressed puts an end to what is implied. (p.222)
5a"orabilia sunt amplianda! adiosa restringenda (p.(;)
5a"ores ampliandi sunt6 odia restringenda (glossary)
1enal laws which are fa"orable to the accused are gi"en retroacti"e effect.
Generale dictum generaliter est interpretandum
: general statement is understood in a general sense. (p.1=)
Generalia specialibus non derogant
: general law does not nullify a specific or special law. (p.$1%)
Generalia "erba sunt generaliter inteliigenda
?hat is generally spo8en shall be generally understood. (p.1=)
&nterest reipublicae ut sit finis litium
0he interest of the &tate demands that there be an end to litigation. (p.122)
1ublic interest re-uires that by the "ery nature of things there must be an end to a legal contro"ersy. (glossary and
p.$;)
&nterpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus (p.2(=)
&nterpotare et concordare legibus est optimus interpotandi modus (glossary)
0he best method of interpretation is that which ma8es laws consistent with other laws. (p.2(=)
4"ery statute must be so construed and harmoni,ed with other statutes as to form uniform system of law.
(glossary)
&nterpretatio fienda est ut res magis "aleat )uam pereat
0hat interpretation as will gi"e the thing efficacy is to be adopted. (p.11)
: law should be interpreted with a "iew to upholding rather than destroying it. (glossary and p.2%()
Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant Later statute repeals prior ones which are repugnant thereto (p.$1)
: later law repeals a prior law on the same subject which is repugnant thereto. (glossary)
Le' de futuro! 1ude' de praeterito
0he law pro"ides for the future, the judge for the past. (p.%2)
Le' prospicit! non respicit
0he law loo8s forward, not bac8ward. (p.(= and p.%2)
4oscitur a sociis
?ords construed with reference to accompanying or associated words. (p.2;()
4o"a constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis
: new statute should affect the future, not the past. (p.%)
4ullum crimen sine poena! nulla poena sine legis
0here is no crime without a penalty, and there is no penalty without a law. (p.%))
4ullum tempus occurrit regi (p.;))
4ullum tempus occurit (glossary)
0here can be no legal right as against the authority that ma8es the law on which the right depends.
Optima statuti interpretatri' est ipsum statutum
0he best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself. (p.2$=)
3ari materia
<elating to same matter (p.2(=)
3otior est in tempoe! potior est in 1ure
>e who is first in time is preferred in right. (p.=)
3ri"ilegia recipiunt largam interpretationem "oluntati consonam concedentis (p#:?;)
3ri"ilegia reciprint largan interpretationem "oluntate consonan concedentis (glossary)
1ri"ileges are to be interpreted in accordance with the will of him who grants them.
-eddendo singula singulis
<eferring each to each6 referring each phrase or e!pression to the appropriate object6 or let each be put in its
proper place. (p.2$)
Salus populi est suprema le'
0he "oice of the people is the supreme law. (p.2==)
Statuta pro publico commodo late interpretantur
&tatutes enacted for the public good are to be construed liberally. (p.2==)
0bi le' non distinguit! nec nos distinguere debemus
?here the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. (p.13))
%erba accipienda sunt secundum sub1ectam materiam (glossary)
%erba accipienda sunt secundum materiam (p.13()
: word is to be understood in the conte!t in which it is used.
%igilantibus et non dormientibus 1ura sub"eniunt
0he laws aid the "igilant, not those who slumber on their rights. (p.=)