KANT THEORY OF CAUSATION

Immanuel Kant shaped modern philosophy enormously and determined its way towards
today. There are two main strands in contemporary Western philosophy: analytic
philosophy, which is widely practiced in Anglo-Saxon World, and Continental
philosophy, which is centered in continental urope. !oth traditions re"er to Kant as a
common root. Kant#s ideas were $ery in"luential in the modern period and still draw
attention o" many intellectuals today. In order to understand the contemporary
intellectual world, we should care"ully examine Kant#s ideas.
An introduction to Kants critical philosophy
!e"ore Kant, there were two important traditions in modern philosophy: rationalism and
empiricism. %n the one hand, the rationalists assumed that we could o&tain 'nowledge
o" the world &y trusting in the power o" our minds. Kant considered them to &e dogmatic
in the sense that they dogmatically assumed this idea without examining the nature and
limits o" our minds so as to see whether we can really achie$e this goal or not. %n the
other hand, the empiricists usually distrusted the power o" the mind in its attempt to
'now the world, and in its most extreme case, in (ume, it led to s'epticism. In response
to these two approaches, Kant suggested examining critically the nature and limits o"
the mind and seeing to what degree we can ha$e 'nowledge at all. This is called
)critical philosophy.*

Causality
+rom a historical point o" $iew, Kant#s account o" causality was a response to (ume#s
s'epticism a&out causation. ,et us "irst see what (ume said a&out this issue. (ume
points out that we only o&ser$e correlated e$ents in nature, and that there are some
regular correlations and some irregular ones. +or instance, we always o&ser$e that
lightning precedes thunder. %n the &asis such regular correlations, we in"er that the
e$ents in -uestion are also causally related. That is to say, lightning causes thunder.
(owe$er, according to (ume, we ne$er o&ser$e causation &etween e$ents. What is
o&ser$ed is .ust that two e$ents are correlated in a regular manner. Causation is what
our mind is inclined to in"er when "aced with such regularities. Causal lin's are
produced &y the human mind as su&.ecti$e mental operations. So, there is no o&.ecti$e
causality &etween e$ents: it is our su&.ecti$e interpretation o" the regularity &etween
them.
I" we consider the "act that electrical charges are regarded as the common causal "actor
&ehind lightning and thunder &y contemporary scientists, we can appreciate what (ume
said. We do not o&ser$e causal lin's. (ume extends this s'epticism so "ar that nothing
really causes anything else. There is no o&.ecti$e causation/ there are .ust correlations
in our experience. In other words, he also denies the o&.ecti$ity o" the uni$ersal causal
principle, namely that e$ery e""ect or e$ent must ha$e a cause. As a response, Kant
distinguishes two di""erent le$els in analy0ing causation. %n the one hand, he tries to
pro$e the o&.ecti$ity o" the uni$ersal principle o" causality. Kant is aware o" the di""iculty
o" pro$ing it on the &asis o" experience. Such a uni$ersal principle cannot &e &ased on
experience. Kant considers this uni$ersal principle as a synthetic a priori truth. It is $alid
"or anything we experience &ecause all our experience is shaped &y the category o"
causality. (e "ormulates this principle in the "ollowing way: e$erything that happens
presupposes that which it "ollows in accordance with a rule.
According to Kant, the phenomena consisting in irre$ersi&le se-uences indicate the
causal order. As an example o" irre$ersi&le se-uence, he mentions the se-uence when
we loo' at a ship mo$ing down the ri$er. In this case, what we apprehend is an
o&.ecti$e process. And its order cannot &e arranged otherwise than in this $ery
succession. So, when we watch the ship#s departure, the order in which our $isual
states occur is not up to us. As a conclusion, Kant argues that in irre$ersi&le cases, the
apprehension o" one perception which occurs necessarily succeeds that o" the other
which proceeded according to a rule called )the law o" the connection o" cause and
e""ect.*
%n the other hand, Kant#s analysis o" irre$ersi&le se-uences does not suggest anything
a&out particular causal relations. A particular se-uence o" irre$ersi&le representations
does not ena&le us to identi"y the cause o" the e$ent in -uestion: it only indicates that
the e$ent in -uestion must ha$e a cause 1in the sense that some other e$ent precedes
it2, e$en i" we do not 'now what this cause is. Kant expresses this point &y saying that
)$erything in nature, as well in the inanimate as in the animated world, happens or is
done according to rules, though we do not always 'now them....*
While there are some am&iguous passages indicating as i" Kant has identi"ied some
necessary causal lin's &etween particular e$ents 1such as that the sunshine caused the
warmth o" a stone2, those passages should &e interpreted under the light o" this general
statement here. The reason simply is that Kant aims to exempli"y his $iew o" causation
in such contexts rather than identi"ying some particular causal lin's. Kant#s $iews on
causality are "amous, and rightly so. 3ot only do they include a stri'ingly no$el account
o" causality that contrasts with &oth the rationalist and empiricist positions o" his
predecessors, &ut they also illustrate in a particularly intuiti$e way Kant#s re$olutionary
Critical philosophy. Speci"ically, in the Critique of Pure Reason#s Second Analogy o"
xperience Kant argues that a causal principle according to which e$ery e$ent has a
cause that acts according to a law cannot &e esta&lished through induction as a purely
empirical claim, since it would then lac' necessity and strict uni$ersality. 3or can it &e
.usti"ied simply on the &asis o" the principle o" su""icient reason, since that principle itsel"
is dogmatic i" it is simply asserted as a &asic ontological claim. Instead, Kant argues,
this principle can &e .usti"ied &y showing that it is re-uired to account "or the $ery
possi&ility o" experience, that is, it must &e presupposed i" we are to ha$e any
experience at all, where experience is understood to &e 'nowledge had &y &eings
endowed with distincti$ely human cogniti$e "aculties. This no$el 'ind o" .usti"ication is
called )transcendental* since it is &ased on the conditions o" the possi&ility o"
experience as contrasted with more traditional purely metaphysical .usti"ications, and
Kant ends up using it to construct much o" his positi$e philosophical account o" the
world. %n the &asis o" inno$ati$e meta-philosophical re"lections, Kant classi"ies the
causal principle o" the Second Analogy neither as synthetic a posteriori 1as empiricists
maintain2, nor as analytic a priori 1as rationalists ha$e it2, &ut rather as synthetic a priori,
&ecause it is a su&stanti$e or in"ormati$e proposition a&out the world that can &e 'nown
to hold independently o" any particular experience, or empirical e$idence, we might
ha$e. Kant argues "urther that synthetic a priori cognition is possi&le only i" one grants
the truth o" his &oldest and most distincti$e doctrine, Transcendental Idealism, the $iew
that the spatio-temporal appearances we can 'now depend in some signi"icant sense
on us and are distinct "rom things in themsel$es that we cannot 'now, &ut only thin' and
whose existence is independent o" us. Since the principle o" causality is a prime
instance o" synthetic a priori cognition that a2 is underwritten &y a transcendental
.usti"ication, &2 entails Transcendental Idealism, and c2 distinguishes his $iew "rom the
core positions o" his main predecessors, Kant#s principle o" causality can &e seen as
"orming a central pillar o" his Critical philosophy as a whole.
!" Th# Rol# o$ Causality %ithin Kants Critical &hilosophy
+undamental to Kant#s Critical philosophy as a whole is the distinction he draws
&etween the "aculties o" the understanding and sensi&ility. The understanding is an
acti$e "aculty &y means o" which we thin' o&.ects through concepts, where concepts are
representations that can, at least in principle, re"er immediately to a plurality o" o&.ects
1regardless o" how many o&.ects they happen to re"er to2. Sensi&ility, &y contrast, is a
passi$e "aculty &y means o" which o&.ects are gi$en to us in intuition, where Kant
understands intuitions to &e representations that necessarily re"er immediately to
singular or particular o&.ects. Kant "amously maintains a strict di""erence in 'ind 1and not
o" degree2 &etween these "aculties 4 one is acti$e and "ul"ills one set o" "unctions, while
the other is passi$e and satis"ies a di""erent set o" roles 4 and &etween the two 'inds o"
representations "or which they are responsi&le 4 concepts 1or thoughts2 re"er
immediately to possi&ly many o&.ects, whereas intuitions re"er immediately to singular
o&.ects. At the same time, he claims that 'nowledge, or cognition, is possi&le only i"
&oth 'inds o" representations are in$ol$ed in our .udgments a&out the world.
+or cognition is possi&le, Kant holds, only i" two distinct epistemic conditions are
satis"ied &y the representations o" two distinct "aculties/ either one, on its own, is
insu""icient. As he puts it: )Without sensi&ility no o&.ect would &e gi$en to us, and
without understanding none would &e thought. Thoughts without content 5i.e., intuitions6
are empty, intuitions without concepts are &lind*. To put these points in less Kantian
terms, we must ha$e direct cogniti$e access to o&.ects 1in intuition2, since otherwise it
would ne$er &e clear which o" the many o&.ects that might satis"y a certain general
description we would &e tal'ing a&out in any gi$en case, which would lea$e our
thoughts )empty*, and we must attri&ute general descriptions to o&.ects 1in the "orm o"
concepts used in .udgments2, since the mere presence o" an o&.ect in our mind does
not amount to an epistemologically signi"icant claim 1i.e., does not constitute a
determinate assertion that could &e meaning"ul, much less true or "alse2, which would
render us )&lind*.
7i$en Kant#s distinction &etween our "aculties and representations and his claim a&out
the conditions o" cognition, the &asic structure and content o" the Critique of Pure
Reason is readily intelligi&le. 8uch o" the "irst hal" o" the Critique of Pure Reason is
de$oted to pro$iding a positi$e analysis o" the distincti$e contri&ution to cognition o" 1the
respecti$e representations o"2 sensi&ility and the understanding. The Transcendental
Aesthetic argues that space and time are purely su&.ecti$e "orms o" sensi&ility#s
intuitions, which underlie the possi&ility o" synthetic a priori cognition in geometry. The
so-called 8etaphysical and Transcendental 9eductions and :rinciples o" :ure
;nderstanding 1including, most nota&ly, the Analogies o" xperience2 attempt to show
a2 what the "orms o" our thought o" o&.ects are 1i.e., what "orms o" .udgment and
categories are essential to our understanding2, &2 why we must use them in our
cognition o" the world, and c2 how they are used in particular contexts to ma'e possi&le
cognition o" the world on the condition that they are applied to o&.ects gi$en in
sensi&ility. In the Transcendental 9ialectic, which constitutes much o" the second hal" o"
the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant then pro$ides an analysis o" the mista'es that his
predecessors ha$e &een led to ma'e &y trying to o&tain cognition without "irst
distinguishing ade-uately &etween our "aculties and then using &oth o" them in the
proper way. In the :aralogisms, Kant pro$ides an analysis o" how the rationalists are
guilty o" attempting to draw 1empirically signi"icant2 in"erences a&out the soul 1and its
alleged immortality2, &ased merely on an analysis o" the proposition )I thin'* 1and thus
independently o" o&.ects &eing gi$en to us in sensi&ility2.
In the Antinomies, Kant argues that &oth rationalists and empiricists "all pray to
contradictions 1in$ol$ing the world as a totality and our "reedom within it2 &y not
distinguishing &etween appearances, which re-uire the representations o" &oth
sensi&ility and understanding, and things in themsel$es, which are understood
independently o" what is gi$en to us in sensi&ility. In the Ideal o" :ure <eason, Kant
mounts a power"ul case that all three traditional theistic proo"s, which draw conclusions
a&out an o&.ect 17od2 that cannot &e gi$en to us in intuition, cannot &e success"ul. In
this way, Kant shows that one cannot attain cognition o" the traditional o&.ects o"
metaphysics 4 7od, "reedom, and the immortality o" the soul 4 since they all necessarily
lie &eyond the limits o" our sensi&ility. While Kant is thus highly critical o" metaphysics
inso"ar as it promises theoretical cognition o" the traditional o&.ects o" metaphysics, in
the Appendix to the Transcendental 9ialectic he argues 1in a "urther twist2 that such
metaphysical o&.ects are nonetheless essential to the systematic cognition o" nature as
su&.ecti$e, regulati$e principles 1&e"ore then arguing, in the Critique of Practical
Reason, that &elie" in such o&.ects is an indispensi&le presupposition o" our moral
agency and the ends that we necessarily pursue as a result2. 7i$en the re$olutionary
status o" Kant#s account o" cognition in the Critique of Pure Reason and the central role
that causality plays in it, it is no surprise that his account o" causality contrasts with
those o""ered &y his empiricist and rationalist predecessors, such as (ume and ,ei&ni0.
As "ar as our sensory impressions reach, there are thus no truly necessary connections
in the world, &ut rather only constant con.unctions 1regularities2 and su&.ecti$e
expectations.
'" Kants Account o$ Causality in th# S#cond and Third Analo(i#s o$ E)p#ri#nc#
The "oundation o" Kant#s positi$e account o" causality is "ound in the Second and Third
Analogies o" xperience. The principle o" the Second Analogy reads: )$erything that
happens 1&egins to &e2 presupposes something which it "ollows in accordance with a
rule* 1A=>>2. :ut into somewhat more straight"orward language, the claim o" the Second
Analogy o" xperience is that causality 1?rule2 is a condition o" the possi&ility o" our
experience o" succession 1?what happens, or &egins to &e2. This claim is an especially
important instance o" his more general claim in the Analogies that experience, in this
case temporal experience, is possi&le only i" &oth o" the intellectual and sensi&le
conditions descri&ed a&o$e are satis"ied, more speci"ically, only i" the categories, in this
case that o" causality, are applica&le to what is gi$en to us through the senses, in this
case, successi$e states o" an o&.ect. Inso"ar as the Second Analogy claims that
causality is a condition o" the possi&ility o" experience 1o" temporal relations2 o"
o&.ecti$e succession, Kant is proposing a transcendental argument.
In the @Second Analogy o" xperience#, Kant argues that we can 'now a priori that @5a6ll
alterations ta'e place in con"ormity with the law o" the connection o" cause and e""ect#.A
In his proo" o" this principle, Kant claims that the concept o" causality is necessary "or
distinguishing an o&.ecti$e se-uence o" states in the world "rom the merely su&.ecti$e
se-uence o" perceptions. Thus, Kant points out that in any experience, whether it &e the
experience o" an e$ent or that o" a stationary o&.ect, we are con"ronted with a
succession o" perceptions. In the case o" an e$ent, as opposed to that o" an o&.ect,
howe$er, we concei$e o" this succession as necessarily ordered.
To employ Kant#s well-'nown example, when we o&ser$e a house we can imagine that
the successi$e perceptions o", "or instance, the walls, the windows and the roo", could
ha$e &een ordered di""erently. The order o" perceptions depends on us, on the way we
mo$e around the house and turn our head, "or example. Kant concludes that it is
determined &y the understanding 5B6/ and in this case it is the concept o" the relation of
cause and effect, o" which the "ormer determines the latter in time, as the conse-uence,
and not as something that could precede solely in the imagination.
%nly i" we can concei$e o" the states o" an e$ent as necessarily ordered as causes and
e""ects, Kant thus argues, can we regard these states as "orming part o" an o&.ecti$e
process in time. The principle o" the relation o" cause and e""ect is an a priori law o" the
understanding that ma'es the experience o" o&.ecti$e succession possi&le.
The principle o" causality is thus $alid, Kant claims, without exception "or all o" nature: it
is a uni$ersal law o" the $ery possi&ility o" all experience that e$erything which happens
has a cause. (ence the causality o" the cause, which itself happens or comes to &e,
must itsel" in turn ha$e a cause/ and thus the entire "ield o" experience, howe$er "ar it
may extend, is trans"ormed into a sum-total o" mere nature. According to Kant, it is thus
an a priori and constituti$e law that e$ery change in nature has a natural cause. The
principle o" causality is a uni$ersal law o" nature as such, that is, o" all that which can, in
principle, &e experienced.
A $unda*#ntal pro+l#* %ith Kants analysis o$ causality
As we ha$e seen, Kant treats the uni$ersal principle o" causality as a synthetic a priori
truth. In doing so, he limits causal ascriptions to the phenomenal realm &ecause it is the
phenomenal realm not the noumenal realm, which is shaped &y our minds. So,
according to Kant, causal tal' a&out noumena, things in themsel$es, is not legitimate
and does not gi$e us theoretical 'nowledge. (owe$er, the -uestion that should &e
answered in this regard is i" the human mind interacts with noumena, i" so, how does it
interactC In some passages, Kant seems to consider noumena to &e an empty and
limiting concept. We cannot 'now anything a&out this realm 1e$en whether or not
noumenal o&.ects such as "ree will, soul and 7od exist2, there"ore it is .ust a heuristic
de$ice indicating what is &eyond our theoretical 'nowledge. Thus, we cannot say
anything a&out the relationship &etween the mind and noumena, &ecause noumena are
&eyond our understanding. %therwise, anything we say can only &e an illegitimate
speculation.
3e$ertheless, such passages do not represent Kant#s whole philosophical outloo'. As a
"undamental aspect o" his critical philosophy, Kant assumes that our experience is
shaped &y us &ut not totally created &y us. There is an external element to experience
that is independent o" us. (e must accept that there are noumenal o&.ects e$en though
we do not 'now what they are. They are not .ust conceptual tools "ormulated to de"ine
the phenomenal realm. In "act, there are se$eral passages in which Kant explicitly
ascri&es causal e""iciency to the noumenal realm. +or instance, when Kant distances
himsel" "rom the idealist philosophers who claim that e$erything we percei$e is mind-
dependent and there is no o&.ecti$e reality outside the mind, he claims that )there are
&odies without us, that is, things which, though -uite un'nown to us as to what they are
in themsel$es* and that we 'now them )&y their representations which their in"luence on
our sensi&ility procures us.*
As another example, this time regarding the "ree will o" human &eings, Kant thin's that
human &eings are "ree with respect to the noumenal realm &ut under causal
determination with respect to phenomenal realm. When he tries to account "or moral
responsi&ility, he presents the "ree will as ha$ing its own causal power to &e a&le to
appropriate particular human actions. The "ollowing is an explicit remar': )The will is a
'ind o" causality o" li$ing &eings so "ar as they are rational.*
Conclusion
Kant certainly has an insight in ma'ing a distinction &etween phenomena and noumena/
howe$er, his way o" distinguishing these two realms undermines his own critical
philosophy. As a conclusion, Kant#s distinction &etween phenomena and noumena
should &e impro$ed so that it ena&les us to ascri&e existence and causality to the
noumenal realm e$en in a minimal sense.
Atul !hose'ar
8.A - II 1!uddhist Studies2