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URBANA VELASCO AROC VS. PHHCGR L-39674 JANUARY 31, 1978

FACTS:
The case at bar in appeal of the decision to the CA the order of the Court of First Instance dismissing on
the ground of res judicata the complaint to declare null and void the sale of a certain parcel of land.
Appellants are occupants of one-half of a parcel of land. They
constructed a house and made some improvements on the land. They later on filed with appellee
corporation application for the award and sale of such portion of land. They did this for several times
without any action from Appellee Corporation. They later found out that the parcel of land had been
unlawfully and in bad faith awarded and sold to appellee spouses, who according to appellants, are
disqualified from purchasing said land since they have prior purchased a land already from appellee
corporation together with other properties. Appellants filed a case against the appellee corporation and
spouses.In defense of the spouses; they contend that the case should be dismissed due to the ground of
res judicata. A case was already decided in their favor, wherein the issue was regarding quieting of title.
They contend that appellants are barred by prior judgment. The Court of First Instance dismissed the
complaint of the appellants, using the ground raised by the appellees of res judicata. It contended that the
prior case had already been final and executor and that there is nothing else for them to do but to dismiss
the complaint of the appellant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not res judicata is applicable in the case at bar?
HELD:
No, it is not. For the principle of res judicata to apply, fourrequisites must be present: the former judgment
must be final, it must have been rendered by a court with proper jurisdiction over the case,it must be a
judgment on the merits, and there must be, between thetwo cases, identity of parties, subject matter, and
cause of action. In this case, it is only with regard to cause of action that the partiesdisagree.Cause of
action is defined to be an act or omission of second party in violation of the legal rights of the other, and its
essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of thedefendant, and act or omission
of the defendant in violation of said legal right.In the prior judged case, the cause of action was for the
quieting of title or removing the cloud on the title of the land. While in the caseat bar, the cause of action
was not only to ask for the nullification of the award and sale of the parcel of land but also, it questions the
validity of appellee corporations award and sale of the parcel of landto the spouses. Given such, the two
causes of action are different from one another. In the application of the doctrine of res judicata wherein it
issometimes doubtful whether there are same causes of action, the test normally employed is to consider
the identity of the facts or whether the same evidence would sustain both. If the same facts and evidence
would sustain both, then the former would be a bar to any subsequent action. Otherwise, there wouldnt be.
And with applying such test, itis found that more evidence is needed to prove the second cause of action.
Given aforementioned circumstances, the second cause of action is remanded to the Court of First
Instance for further proceedings.

Law of the Case
The principle that if the highest appellate court has determined a legal question and returned the case to
the court below for additional proceedings, the question will not be determined differently on a subsequent
appeal in the same case where the facts remain the same.

The law of the case expresses the rule that the final judgment of the highest court is the final determination
of the rights of the parties. The doctrine of "law of the case" is one of policy only, however, and will be
disregarded when compelling circumstances require a redetermination of the point of law decided on the
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prior appeal. Such circumstances exist when an intervening or contemporaneous change in the law has
transpired by the establishment of new precedent by a controlling authority or the overruling of former
decisions.

Courts have ruled that instructionsdirections given by the judge to the jury concerning the law applicable
to the caseare the "law of the case" where the appealing defendant, the petitioner, accepted the
instructions as correct at the time they were given.


Argel vs. Judge Pascua [A.M. No. RTJ-94-1131, 08/20/01]

Facts:
Argel alleged in his complaint that Judge Pascua rendered decision convicting him of murder
notwithstanding the fact that he had already been previously acquitted by Pascua in her Decision. Argel
contends that respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and of violation his constitutional right
against double jeopardy. Pascua acquitted Argel of murder because she erroneously thought that there
was no witness that could have identified the accused. Her mistake was brought about by the fact that the
testimony of the eyewitness was not attached to the records at the time she wrote her decision. After
reviewing, she revised her decision finding Argel guilty of murder. Pascua ordered the police to bring Argel
to court to inform him of his liabilities arising from the crime. Argel charged Pascua with gross negligence
for not exercising extreme caution in the preparation of her decision by making sure that all the transcripts
of stenographic notes were attached to the records before writing the decision.

Issue:
Is a decision once final no longer susceptible to amendment or alteration?

Ruling:
Yes.

Ratio:
Except to correct errors which are clerical in nature, to clarify any ambiguity caused by an omission or
mistake in the dispositive portion, or to rectify a travesty of justice brought about by a moro-moro or mock
trial, a final decision is the law of the case and is immutable and unalterable regardless of any claim of error
or incorrectness. In criminal cases, a judgment of acquittal is immediately final upon its promulgation. It
cannot be recalled for correction or amendment

except in the cases already mentioned nor withdrawn by another order reconsidering the dismissal of the
case since the inherent power of a court to modify its order or decision doesnot extend to a judgment of
acquittal in a criminal case



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Solid Manila Corporation vs. Bio Hong Trading [GR No. 90596, 04/08/91]

FACTS: Petitioner Corporation, is the owner of a parcel of land located in Ermita, Manila, The private
respondents (de Guzman) title came from a prior owner, and in their deed of sale, the parties thereto
reserved as an easement of way: a portion thereof measuring NINE HUNDRED FOURTEEN SQUARE
METERS, more or less, had been converted into a private alley for the benefit of neighboring estates, this
being duly annotated at the back of the covering transfer Certificate of title per regulations of the Office of
the City Engineer of Manila and that the three meter wide portion of said parcel along the Pasig River, with
an area of ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY NINE (179) SQUARE METERS, more or less, had actually been
expropriated by the City Government, and developed pursuant to the beautification drive of the Metro
Manila Governor. (p. 3, Record).

The petitioner claims that ever since, it had (as well as other residents of neighboring estates) made use of
the above private alley and maintained and contributed to its upkeep, until sometime in 1983, when, and
over its protests, the private respondent constructed steel gates that precluded unhampered use.

ISSUE/ HELD: Whether or not an easement exists on the property even after the property was sold.
AFFIRMATIVE. Easement cannot be separated from the tenement and maintain an independent existence.


RATIO DICIDENDI:

It is true that the sale did include the alley. On this score, the Court rejects the petitioners contention that
the deed of sale excluded it, because as a mere right-of-way, it cannot be separated from the tenement
and maintains an independent existence. Thus:

Art. 617. Easements are inseparable from the estate to which they actively or passively belong.

The fact, however, that the alley in question, as an easement, is inseparable from the main lot is no
argument to defeat the petitioners claims, because as an easement precisely, it operates as a limitation on
the title of the owner of the servient estate, specifically, his right to use (jus utendi).

Hence, and so we reiterate, albeit the private respondent did acquire ownership over the property
including the disputed alley as a result of the conveyance, it did not acquire the right to close that alley
or otherwise put up obstructions thereon and thus prevent the public from using it, because as a servitude,
the alley is supposed to be open to the public.

The Court is furthermore of the opinion, contrary to that of the Court of Appeals, that no genuine merger
took place as a consequence of the sale in favor of the private respondent corporation. According to the
Civil Code, a merger exists when ownership of the dominant and servient estates is consolidated in the
same person. 15 Merger then, as can be seen, requires full ownership of both estates.

In the case at bar, the defense of merger is, clearly, not a valid defense, indeed, a sham one, because as
we said, merger is not possible, and secondly, the sale unequivocally preserved the existing easement. In
other words, the answer does not, in reality, tender any genuine issue on a material fact and cannot militate
against the petitioners clear cause of action.

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ECHEGARAY VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE301 SCRA 96, JANUARY 19, 1999

Facts:
Leo Echegaray was convicted and was to be executed by lethal injection (RA 8177) The Supreme Court
issued a temporary restraining order restraining the execution of said party. Said execution was set for Jan.
4, 1999 but the petitioner filed his Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of TRO on Dec. 28, 1998. The Court
was in recess at the time but a Special Session was called to deliberate on said matters. Furthermore,
Congress was a new one with about 130new members whose views on capital punishment were still
unexpressed. The suspension was temporary (until June 15, 1999,unless it sooner becomes certain that no
repeal or modification of the law is going to be made). It was alleged that sine it is already final and
executory, the Supreme Court has lost its jurisdiction with the case.

Issue:
Whether or not in issuing the temporary restraining order, the Supreme Court has gone beyond its
jurisdiction since the case is already final.

Ruling:
It is not beyond the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. What the SC could not do is alter the decision. In the
case at hand, the SC did nothing of the sort. Jurisprudence tells us the finality of a judgment does not
mean that the Court has lost neither all its powers nor the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the
court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final,
the court retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. There is a difference between the jurisdiction of
the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. The former
continues even after the judgment has become final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment; the latter
terminates when the judgment becomes final. For after the judgment has become final, facts and
circumstances may transpire which can render the execution unjust or impossible.