Mañago, Miguel Luisito G.

Mañago

ANTOLIN T. NAGUIAT v. HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE

APPELATE COURT, THIRD CLASS SPECIAL DIVISION, TIMOG
SILANGAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and MANUEL P.
LAZATIN
G.R. No. 183805,, 18 August 1988, Second Division, Padilla, J.`

FACTS:
1. This is a petition to review on certiorari the decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court, dated 9 October 1985, in Ac-G.R.
SP No. 06521 and AC-G.R. SP No. 06522.
2. Petitioner Antolin T. Naguiat had purchased, on an installment
basis, four lots from TSDC, identified as Lots Nos. 13, 14, 15,
and 16, of block 26 of Timog Park with a collective 1,200
square meter total in area, with a price of P60.00 per square
meter, as alleged by petitioner. Petitioner made a down
payment of P7,200.00 which represents 10% of the alleged
total price of P72,000.00 for the four lots. A corresponding
receipt for the down payment was issued by TSDC to the
petitioner. On 10 August 1983, petitioner paid the sum of
P12,529.30 as his alleged full payment of Lot No. 16, to which
TSDC caused to be issued in the name of the petitioner the title
for the said lot. On 7 November 1983, petitioner paid the
amount of P36,067.97, which was allegedly his full payment of
the remaining three lots of Lot Nos. 13, 14, and 15. TSDC
issued a corresponding receipt to petitioner for said amount.
3. Thereafter, petitioner had demanded TSDC to issue in his
favour the certificates of title for the three lots last paid for,
however private respondent, TSDC, refused on the grounds
that petitioner had not fully paid for the said three lots.
According to respondent, TSDC’s Board of Directors approved
petitioner’s contemplated purchase of the aforesaid lots. To
confirm the agreement, Lazatin wrote to petitioner a letter
reiterating standard conditions of the sale, upon which
petitioner allegedly accepted by affixing his conformity to said
letter. Conditions for the sale of lots were among others:
a. 10% down payment with a commitment to commence
construction thereon in one month’s time;
b. Said construction to be finished within a period of six
months;
c. the effective price was P70.00/sq m with a rebate of
P10.00/sq m upon completion of the house in six months.
4. But respondent alleged that petitioner commenced construction
of a house on one lot but failed to finish it within the stipulated
period, and as for the other lots, petitioner allegedly failed to

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 construct houses on them. Hence why respondent contends
that petitioner had not complied with their agreement, petitioner
was not entitled to the 10% rebate in price, and that petitioner’s
previous payment had not amounted to full payment as
required, and which would have entitled petitioner to the
issuance and delivery of the certificates of title to all the lots.
5. Thereafter, on 26 July 1984, petitioner filed a complaint for
specific performance with damages, with the RTC of Angeles
City docketed as Civil Case No. 4224. Petitioner prayed that
judgment be rendered ordering private respondent to deliver to
him the transfer certificates of title of the aforementioned three
lots which he allegedly paid in full, and which private
respondent refused to do so. However, before petitioner filed
the civil action, petitioner filed on 5 June 1984, with the City
Fiscal of Angeles City, a criminal complaint against respondent
Manuel T. Lazatin, for violation of Section 25 of PD No. 957.
6. Information was filed against respondent Lazatin docketed as
Criminal Case No. 6727, which was raffled to the same branch
where Civil Case no. 4224 was docketed. Upon which
petitioner’s counsel appeared as counsel for the plaintiff of the
civil case and as private prosecutor of the aforementioned
criminal case. Respondent objected and filed a motion and
opposition to appearance of plaintiff as private prosecutor with
respect to the trial court of the Criminal Case to which the
opposition was overruled by the trial court. Private respondent
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the respondent
appellate court, seeking annulment of the orders of the trial
court. The respondent appellate court rendered a decision in
favor to private respondents. Petitioner’s counsel received the
decision and filed with the respondent appellate court a motion
for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration of
aforesaid decision, praying for fifteen days from 31 October
1985, within which to file said motion. Petitioner’s counsel filed
another motion for extension of time, praying for another fifteen
days. Respondent Appellate Court had denied all motions
including the motion for reconsideration that which petitioner’s
counsel had filed after both motions of extension of time.

ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the consolidation was proper.

SUPREME COURT’S RULING:

I. The civil action that may be consolidated with a criminal
action is one for the recovery of civil liabilities arising from
the criminal offense, or ex delicto, as defined by Sec. 3(a) of
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner in this
instance brought a civil action for specific performance and
damages. The main relief sought in the latter case, namely

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 the issuance of certificates of title to the lots for which
petitioner had supposedly completely paid, was based on
the petitioner's and the private respondent's contract to sell.
As a result, the petitioner's civil action was for the
enforcement of a contract obligation, or ex contractu, rather
than for the collection of civil liability stemming from an
infraction, and so the law invoked by the petitioner is
inapplicable.
II. As the court held in Canos v. Peralta, the court has the
authority to consolidate a criminal action with a civil action
that is not ex delicto, as provided in Section 1, Rule 31 of the
Rules of Court, which states: "When actions involving a
common question of law or fact are pending before the court,
it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all of the matters
in issue in the actions; it may order all of the actions
consolidated; and it may order all the actions consolidated;
and it may make such orders concerning proceedings
therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay."
III. Given that the criminal action is for a violation of a special
law, where the mere commission of the act prohibited by
said special law, regardless of motive, constitutes the
offense, the petitioner's counsel's intervention as a private
prosecutor in the criminal action will not prejudice the
accused's substantial rights.
IV. The consolidation of the two (2) cases in question, where
petitioner's counsel may act as counsel for the plaintiff in the
civil case and as a private prosecutor in the criminal case,
will instead be conducive to the termination of the two (2)
cases, and will redound to the benefit and convenience of
the parties, as well as the speedy administration of justice.