RELIGION AND SCIENCE; DESCRIPTION AND EXPLANATION

Steven Lee
Typically, science and religion are seen as independent, often conflicting disciplines. In
their attempts to resolve social issues such as evolution vs. creationism in public schools,
scholars have sought to harmonize the two disciplines in some way.
1
These attempts, in my
view, are too hasty, for no agreement exists on the roles of science and religion not even when
considered in isolation! or of a definition of the term explanation. "nderstanding the function of
each discipline is a crucial and necessary step to articulating a comprehensive account of the
relationship between science and religion.
In this essay, I argue that science explains phenomena while religion offers the believer a
description of the world. #n my view, much of the conflict between science and religion may be
reassessed when the different and fundamental roles of science and religion are clearly
understood. It is my intention to offer such an account not on the basis of some abstract theory
but on the wor$ings of everyday life. %fter laying down some presuppositions and terminology,
I consider two cases where the roles of description and explanation differ. I investigate these
positions in depth found in the wor$s of &.T. Stace and %.S. &oodburne. I show that, given
their differing opinions as to the nature of science and religion, they both ma$e false assumptions
regarding the nature of language. These misconceptions result in confusing terms such as
description and explanation. %fter these considerations, I then show how clarifying the function
of description and explanation'within the contexts of science and religion'lays the
groundwor$ for critical yet fruitful future discussion.
1
(or an excellent example, see )erald *irney Smith+s ,%n #verloo$ed (actor in the %d-ustment between .eligion
and Science,/ in The Journal of Religion, 012 3uly, 1450!.
I. Presuppositions
There are a number of assumptions I wish to disclose, particularly the precise
terminology given the complexity of the sub-ect. In everyday usage, we use the term
,description/ for communicating the basic properties of an ob-ect or the series of an event or
events. 6xamples include the shape and color of a boo$ or the chronology of my afternoon+s
activities. 7escriptions can and do vary from person to person especially when these individuals
describe the ob-ect or event from different perspectives. (or example, if two people are
describing an accident to a police officer, the descriptions will certainly differ if one person was
in the car and the other person was standing across the street.
*y contrast, we use the term ,explanation/ to establish a causal lin$ between two events
or to give reasons for the existence of something. Stating that the window bro$e because a
baseball flew through it or that I did not attend the game because I was ill are two examples of
explanation. It should be noted that descriptions often precede explanations. (or this reason, we
commonly attach some other term or phrase to ,description/ to distinguish between the
description itself and one which precedes an explanation e.g. ,mere description/!. Thus, when I
spea$ of a ,mere description,/ I am simply treating the term ,description/ in isolation with no
expectation of associating the given description with an explanation.
In this paper, I assume that the meanings of these terms are the common, everyday ones,
not those often used in academic discussions. I will therefore refrain from using the terms
,description/ and ,explanation/ in a higher8ordered context. Instead, I shall use terms li$e
,utterance,/ ,statement,/ ,argument,/ ,articulation,/ ,theory,/ and so on. #therwise, I fear that
discussions of science and religion, of description and explanation may become confused with
discussions of discussions, descriptions of descriptions and so on.
II. W. T. Stace and science as description
5
It is clear, when perusing the literature on the relationship between science and religion as
well as that of explanation and description, that no common agreement exists as to which
discipline performs which function.
5
"pon examining %ppendix %, it is evident that there is no
consensus on this position. 9any scholars believe that science explains but many also believe
that science describes. (ew of the scholars whose wor$ I studied believe that religion serves
either function.
The Second point of contrast entails differing views over the precise nature of description
and explanation. I should li$e to ma$e two brief observations regarding this discrepancy. (irst,
note that some scholars differ widely as to the role of explanation and as it relates to that of
description. "pon investigation, we find that most of these scholars focus on either explanation
or description at length. Sometimes, they -oin one or the other to the disciplines of science or
religion. Second, most scholars, I have found, do not clearly distinguish between description and
explanation at all but use the two terms interchangeably. Third, many scholars treat description
and explanation as complex terms and often articulate different $inds and types of each.
7espite these fascinating observations, we should now move to particular positions
regarding the nature of description and explanation as well as their relations to science and
religion. 9y first consideration is &.T. Stace+s article, ,Science and the 6xplanation of
:henomena./
;
Stace insists that science provides us with descriptions of phenomena'it has
nothing to do with explanation.
Stace demonstrates his point by way of discernment between two different <uestions1
,what=/ and ,why=/
2
&hen someone as$s ,what happened,/ this is a different <uestion than
5
:lease see my %ppendices at the end of this paper.
;
&.T. Stace, ,Science and the 6xplanation of :henomena,/ in Philooph!, 1>12>, #ctober, 14;?!, 2>4850.
2
Ibid., 2>481>.
;
,why did it happen=/ &hen we as$ ,what happened=/ we are re<uesting a description. Suppose
a child places a glass of water next to a window on a sunny day. &hen the child returns the next
day, the water is gone. The child then as$s ,what happened=/ @ere, Stace argues, the child
wants to $now the current location of the water and the processes! that occurred in between the
time when the water was in the glass to the time when it was not. The child+s parent would
satisfy the child+s curiosity by describing the process of evaporation.
Aould we not use the same example for explanation= %bsolutely. Stace does -ust this.
Suppose, after the description of evaporation is given, the child as$s ,why did the water
evaporate=/ The parent would still describe the process of evaporation involving molecules,
boiling and freezing points, condensation and so on. The point is, Stace asserts, we often
e<uivocate the <uestions ,what=/ and ,why=/ and supply the same answer in the form of a
description. &hen we do this in science, we confuse the proper role of science. ,The function of
science,/ Stace argues, ,is to answer the <uestion Bwhat=+ but never the <uestion Bwhy=+/
?
Stace
notes that this confusion has led science astray in the past and will most li$ely continue to do so
in the future.
Stace briefly recounts the history of science beginning with %ristotle. .ecall that
%ristotle proposed three principles or causes! of an ob-ect. The material cause is what the ob-ect
is made of. The efficient cause relays the events preceding the phenomena that brought that
ob-ect into being. The final cause gives the purpose for which the ob-ect was made. The first
two meet the demand of description of the ob-ect whereas the third attempted to explain the
ob-ect.
?
Ibid., 21>.
2
@ow does this relate to science= The discipline that we call ,science,/ according to
Stace, see$s to give us an account of the physical characteristics of an ob-ect as well as the causal
lin$ that brought about the ob-ects or the events involving those ob-ects. 6xamples include the
chemical ma$eup of a des$ and its assimilation. The material cause of the des$ includes wood
and metal which themselves consist of molecules. The efficient cause of the des$ include
gathering the wood, combining the elements to form the metal and, eventually, assimilating the
various parts of the des$ legs, supports, and so on!. *oth of these answer the <uestion ,what=/
but not the <uestion ,why=/ %ristotle thought that science could explain both <uestions, and this
is where %ristotle went awry at least to Stace!.
To answer the <uestion ,why=/ is to give the final cause or the purpose of something.
Stace reasons that science simply cannot answer this. %gain, science cannot explain anything but
can only offer a description. 6xpecting science to do so would be to expect reasons that lie
outside its scope. In our earlier example, what would we say when the child as$ed why the
molecules behave in a certain way=
The %ristotelian view of science lasted until the scientific revolution of the 10
th
century.
&ith )alileo and Cewton came new theories and realizations, one of which Stace argues! was
that science is never able to explain. Since then, this has been the only proper role of science.
#ne might ob-ect that science commonly reduces particular events to general laws of nature,
thereby explaining the phenomenon in <uestion. Stace agrees but labels this activity as
description and not explanation1 ,It DreductionE does nothing towards explaining "h! it
happens./
F
F
Ibid., 215.
?
To help clarify his point, Stace introduces three $inds of explanation. The first ascribes
purpose to an ob-ect or event. The second reduces the un$nown to the $nown, the strange to the
familiar. The third offers reasons or grounds for a belief. The first and third $inds lie outside the
scope of science. The second is utterly worthless in science.
0
This is because the <uestion
,why=/ proceeds from the emotions'not the intellect.
G
%s$ing ,why/ something happens is
really an example of psychological desire and not scientific in<uiry. &e as$ this <uestion usually
out of fear or frustration. &e yearn to assimilate phenomena that are un$nown or strange to us
into our own experience.
#bviously, what is strange or un$nown to one person may be <uite familiar to another.
@ence, there is a large degree of relativity in the psychological sphere. *ut science cannot be in
the business of supplying various individuals with different answers to their respective
emotions.
4
:ut simply, the <uestion ,why=/ arises out of a relative state of emotions of the agent.
Science is not relativeH therefore, science cannot answer this <uestion.
This confusion results from our craving for explanations. Stace uses 6instein+s theory of
relativity as an example1 ,It simply says BThis is what happens. *odies move in such and such
curves+. *ut inevitably the human mind as$s, B#h! do they move in these curves=+ There is, of
course, no answer to this <uestion. It is meaningless./
1>
@ere, we have a full, comprehensive view as to the role of description and explanation.
Stace appoints neither description nor explanation to religion so it is difficult to discern the
function of religion. Stace does touch on explanation as a psychological phenomenon which
could be extended to the religious sphere. @owever, it was never the intention of Stace to argue
0
Ibid., 25?.
G
Ibid., 21;.
4
Ibid., 21?.
1>
Ibid., 255.
F
anything save that science is a descriptive discipline. %.S. &oodburne, however, discusses the
function of religion at length, in terms of description.
III. Woodburne and religion as description
In ,The 7escription of .eligion,/ &oodburne argues that religion is an interpretive
phenomenon which $e%ri&e events'in terms of their conse<uences'surrounding a person+s
life.
11
In this article, &oodburne is concerned with the definition of religion and finds that
commonly in our culture the scope of religion is becoming increasingly narrow.
15
&oodburne
attributes several characteristics to religion. (irst, he says that religion is social.
1;
.eligion is
practiced in communities of li$e8minded people in terms of their beliefs!. &hen people are
religious, they adopt a social attitude which is only possible between persons. .eligious rituals
and ceremonies server to reinforce the life and activities of the religious group. @ere,
&oodburne adds, there is a sense of dependence upon something higher than the group.
Second, religion is a matter of faith and not proof.
12
(aith cannot be proven li$e scientific
theories can. .eligion is emphasizes an ideal rather than a set of data. It is a ,minister to life/
because it is concerned with the future as well as the present1 ,It holds up to its adherents the
hope of a tomorrow that will be better than today./
1?
(aith is the best course for attaining the idealH
,It is the lin$, the only available and the only possible lin$ between the ideal and the real./
1F

*y extension, the religious attitude is one of participation.
10
&hen one begins to engage
an analytical or critical tas$, according to &oodburne, one ceases to be religious and begins to be
11
%. S. &oodburne, ,The 7escription of .eligion,/ in The A'eri%an Journal of Theolog!, 521; 3uly, 145>!, 2>08
51.
15
Ibid., 2>G.
1;
Ibid., 21>.
12
Ibid., 210.
1?
Ibid., 21?.
1F
Ibid., 21F.
10
Ibid., 210.
0
scientific. The line between the two disciplines is drawn at this point. Science is abstract while
religion is practical. &hile there is an element of participation in science, that element is on a
higher level than the real. %nalysis, investigation and in<uiry occur in science but are often
absent in religion1 ,%n activity ta$es on the character of religion for the participantsH for the
observers the same activity is scientific data, laboratory material./
1G

&oodburne specifically addresses the function of explanation within science1
The scientist finds his tas$ in offering an explanation of an event in terms of cause
and effect. *ut it is not the business of the scientist, be he never so exact and
thorough, to interpret the significance of the event for life. The fact is that the
more a scientist includes of interpretation and evaluation in his explanations, the
more his explanations themselves are -eopardized and li$ely to be discounted.
14
*y contrast, ,the religionist is an interpreter, the medium of evaluation being the social
categories of cosmic relationships. The religious man see$s to $now the meaning and value of
events in view of his understanding of his relation to the environing cosmos./
5>
.eligion interprets events whereas science analyzes them. .eligion+s method of
interpretation strives to maintain values and right conduct while the scientific method attempts to
remain ob-ective and consistent in its in<uiries. The function of religion is to describe
phenomenaH the -ob of science is to explain.
IV. Critiques of Stace and Woodburne in light of Wittgensteins language game analogy
1G
Ibid.
14
Ibid., 21G.
5>
Ibid., 214.
G
Thus far, I have discussed two different categorical problems in relation to each other.
The first problem is the science8religion debate. &hat belongs to science and what belongs to
religion= The second problem is the difference between description and explanation and which
function belongs to which discipline. To reiterate my thesis, I believe that we cannot begin to
answer the first problem until we answer the second. This can only be accomplished when we
ta$e the meaning of these words seriously.
The chief problem I find in the wor$s of Stace and &oodburne is that they fail to do -ust
this. .eturning to Stace+s assertion that to as$ why bodies move in such and such curves is
meaningless, it is clear that Stace is using the word ,meaning/ in a universal sense. Stace
envisions an ob-ective status called ,meaningful/ and then loo$s upon <uestions, propositions
and statements as either matching this state or not. To be sure, consider one of the first
statements in Stace+s article1 ,Iou must stand outi$e science to investigate it./
51
In order to
determine the ,special function/ of science, Stace argues that one must remove oneself from
science in order to investigate the discipline. Similarly, when one loo$s upon such <uestions as
,why do certain bodies have such and such curves=/ one is ma$ing a higher8ordered -udgment.
&hen pressed with the <uestion ,where does one stand when one stands outside of
science=/ many will reply that these sorts of operations exist in the metaphysical realm or on the
metaphysical level. *ut this is a dangerous move for when one does this, he or she sublimes the
logic of our language. The terms or phrases in <uestion are lifted out of their regular contexts,
their surroundings which give them the meaning that they have, and places them on this
metaphysical plane for observation, investigation or whatever. #n this plane, scientists no longer
do science and theologians no longer practice theology. They both engage in metaphysics.
51
Stace, ,Science and the 6xplanation of :henomena,/ 2>4.
4
To thin$ that metaphysics is a more sophisticated way of operating within a discipline is
folly. .ather, metaphysics is the attempt, be it out of frustration, hubris or ignorance, to get
behind our language or to reach something that we feel is beyond our grasp. In truth, meaning is
not something hidden behind our language or something utterly beyond us. The meaning of
words is their use, nothing more. #ur words are meaningful because they operate within our
real, concrete lives. To ,transcend/ our language is to strip it of its meaning.
In Stace+s example, it is not the case that the <uestion is meaningless, but it is perhaps
meaningless within a scientific context. Imagine a parent whose child is learning about
6instein+s theory of relativity in an advanced science course. If as$ed this <uestion, depending
on the beliefs of the parent, he or she may answer ,I do not $now/ or ,*ecause )od created the
world in that way/ or even ,So that intelligent life could flourish on these planets./
&oodburne+s view suffers from a different problem, that proof and faith are words
reserved for science and religion, respectively. .ecall that he argues ,.eligion is indeed a matter
of faith rather than proof./
55
@e rightfully says that a religious believer cannot call on science to
demonstrate his beliefs. *ut this is not the same as saying that the believer cannot give reasons
for his or her beliefs. If we are to as$ believers why they believe in a divine entity, many of them
would provide us with answers. Some would entail near8death experiences, others would include
a religious upbringing and still others would involve human relationships e.g. converting for a
spouse!. In other words, when these people give us their testimonies, they are supplying reasons
for their belief. This is very different from saying that x, y and z %aue$ them to believe in the
scientific sense!.
55
&oodburne, ,The 7escription of .eligion,/ 210.
1>
Cevertheless, when one undergoes an experience which leads to his or her conversion,
the existence of the divine is proven. The $ey difference between the scientist and the religious
believer if we can even -uxtapose such a pair! is not the level or degree of evidence that is
re<uired to prove the respective beliefs. .ather, the difference lies in what each person considers
as proof. There is not a shared ob-ective notion of proof which -ust happens to be satisfied in
most scientific cases but lac$ing in most religious ones. &hat the religious believer accepts as
proof is evidence that the believer is in fact of religious. The religion that believer adheres to
frames what constitutes proof. The same is true for the scientist. &hen pressed, different
scientists with different educational bac$grounds different ,schools/! will view the same
phenomena but arrive at different conclusions e.g. is the universe expanding or contracting=!
The beliefs of the religious believer and the scientist show themselves in their respective
behaviorsH they do not first believe and then attempt to map their beliefs onto reality.
Ludwig &ittgenstein, in his Philoophi%al In(etigation, draws an analogy between
language and games. There are various games that one can play with language1 singing a songH
giving an orderH receiving an orderH play8actingH $e%ri&ing somethingH explaining something and
so on.
5;
&ittgenstein urges us to, instead of viewing phenomena with a priori, metaphysical
lenses to -ust observe the phenomena and then analyze, investigate, experiment and believe.
&hen philosophizing, &ittgenstein notes in his )lue an$ )ro"n )oo*, ,#ur method is purel!
$e%ripti(e, the descriptions we give are not hints of explanations./
52
@ere, the role of
philosophy is clear1 to clear the way of conceptual confusions by accurate description.
&e may use &ittgenstein+s analogy as a model for our present difficulty. &hen we say
that science merely describes, we fail to do conceptual -ustice to the discipline for science goes
5;
Ludwig &ittgenstein, Philoophi%al In(etigation, 9alden, 9%1 *lac$well, 5>>1!, 1>.
52
Ludwig &ittgenstein, The )lue an$ )ro"n )oo*, Cew Ior$1 @arper J .ow, 14F>!, 15?.
11
further to attribute causal lin$s to phenomena and subsume similar occurrences under general
laws. &hen we say that religion explains, we place a burden upon it'one too heavy to bear.
The ideas that evil and suffering in the world are -ustified by a divine plan, that the world came
into existence only thousands of years ago and that temptation arises out of a divine, cosmic
battle in which we are pawns are all destructive to the reality that we call religion.
Science deepens our understanding of the natural world by explaining the nature and
function of various creatures and events. Science explains phenomena. .eligion offers us a
description of the world where good and evil coincide, where moral agents struggle to better
themselves within a finite period of time in the midst of other moral agents. #ne might say that
this distinction lies somewhere between the independent and integrationist approaches. I thin$
the distinction pays proper respect to both disciplines and allows meaningful dialogue to flourish.
%::6C7IK %
5?
Came Science L
6xplanation
Science L
7escription
.eligion L
6xplanation
.eligion L
7escription
*arbara Tuchens$a K
.ollin &. &or$man K
)erald *irney Smith K K
7aniel L. :ais K K
.obert %. SegalH
7onald &iebe
K K
:eter %lexander K K
Cormal .. Aampbell K K
.. *. %ngel K K
9ichael (riedman K
5?
*elow is a table showing the combination of beliefs of each scholar whose wor$ I researched.
15
3ohn &. Iolton K
*. 6llis K
%. Aornelius
*en-amin
K
:aul &. Murtz K K
6dgar Sheffield
*rightman
K
%.S. &oodburne K K
&arren &eaver K
.ay @. 7otterer K
&. T. Stace K
Aarl ). @empelH
:aul #ppenheim
K K
%::6C7IK *
5F
Name ole of !"planation
*arbara Tuchans$a Cot clearly distinct from description.
.ollin &. &or$man 6xplanation goes beyond mere description.
7aniel L. :als To explain is to account for
9ichael (riedman 6xplanations explain by relating one phenomenon to another in
terms of a pattern or behavior or a law.
3ohn &. Iolton 6xplanation must involve references to causes and functions.
*. 6llis 6xplanation is a special class of description.
%. Aornelius *en-amin To explain means to remove puzzlement.
&arren &eaver &hen one explains something, one is able to predict and control.
@empel J #ppenheim 7escription is a part of explanation.
5F
@ere, I have included the same list of scholars as well as their respective views or definitions of explanation.
1;