Aristotelian Essentialism Revisited

Charlotte Witt

Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 27, Number 2, April 1989,

pp. 285-298 (Article)

Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press

DOI: 10.1353/hph.1989.0043

For additional information about this article

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hph/summary/v027/27.2witt.html

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 Notes and Discussions
Aristotelian Essentialism Revisited

"Here is a lectern. A question which has often been raised in philosophy is: What are its
essential properties? What properties, aside from trivial ones like self-identity, are such
that this object has to have them if it exists at all, are such that if an object did not have
it, it would not be this object? ''~ "The claim that Caesar is necessarily a man, that he
cannot not (or cannot help but) be a man, is founded then, according to our elucidation
of these matters, in Caesar's being such that it is impossible to envisage with respect to
him his having any attribute or sortal property exclusive of his being a man. ''~
These quotations, the first from Kripke and the second from Wiggins, exemplify a
common conceptual paradigm underlying their theories of the essences of individuals,
theories which in other respects differ quite markedly from one another. I call this
paradigm the object/property model. T h e model expresses the relationship between an
individual object and its essence; the properties in question are restricted, on both
theories, to the necessary ones.~ Contemporary essentialists like Kripke and Wiggins
ask: What are the essential or necessary properties of this table or of this man? Or, the
question might be put in terms of membership in a natural kind: What are the neces-
sary properties of a tiger? Indeed, the object/property distinction is intuitively appeal-
ing as a means of expressing the notion that there is, on the one hand, an individual,
and, on the other, its essence. Certainly there are other possible models for the relation-
ship between individual and essence, but it suffices for the purpose of this paper to
introduce the object/property model by pointing out that it is exemplified by two
recent important theories of the essences of individuals.
In this paper I argue that the relationship between essence and composite sub-
stance, in the central books of the Metaphysics is not accurately represented by the
object/property model.4 Hence, there is a basic conceptual difference between Aris-

' "Identity and Necessity" by S. Kripke in Naming, Necessity and Natural Kinds, ed. by Stephen
Schwartz (Cornell University Press, 1977), 86.
9 D. Wiggins in Sameness and Substance (Blackwell, a98o), 12o.
3 The theories differ, of course, in their explanations of the meaning of the notions of
necessity (and possibility) and hence which properties turn out to be necessary also differ.
4 In addition to rejecting the suitability of the object/property model for the relationship
between a substance and its essence I also reject the position that an Aristotelian substance and its
essence are strictly identical. Advocates of this view are Christopher Kirwan in Aristotle's Metaphysics,
Books F A and E (Clarendon Aristotle Series, Oxford 1971), 1oo, and M.J. Woods in "Substance and

[~85]
a86 JOURNAL OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 27:2 APRIL 1989

totle's t h e o r y a n d the c o n t e m p o r a r y essentialist theories exemplified by the o p e n i n g

quotations. T h e d i f f e r e n c e c a n n o t simply be chalked up to the considerable chronologi-
cal and ideological g u l f which separates Aristotle f r o m us. For it is clear that Aristotle
had the distinction b e t w e e n object and p r o p e r t y within his r e p e r t o i r e and so could
have conceived o f the relationship between substance and essence in the c o n t e m p o r a r y
fashion.5 I n d e e d , Aristotle does use an object/property idiom in discussing essences in
the Metaphysics, but I a r g u e below that this l a n g u a g e does not accurately r e p r e s e n t the
logical relationship b e t w e e n substance and essence. T h e reason the object/property
relationship m o d e l is i n a d e q u a t e for Aristotelian essences is a c o n s e q u e n c e o f the role
played by essences in his metaphysical t h e o r y o f substance. I f this is right t h e n we
should e x p e c t to find i m p o r t a n t systematic differences between the notion and func-
tion o f essence in Aristotle a n d the n e w e r versions o f essentialism. I c o n c l u d e by
describing these differences.
At the outset s o m e c o m m e n t s about the r a n g e o f my description o f essentialism in
Aristotle a r e in o r d e r . I will be primarily interested in d e v e l o p i n g Aristotle's theory as
f o u n d in the central books o f the Metaphysics, a l t h o u g h 1 do not confine my textual
r e f e r e n c e s to those books. T h e restriction makes some sense, since Metaphysics Books
7 - 9 do seem to f o r m a unified t r e a t m e n t o f a nest o f metaphysical problems. In these
books one o f Aristotle's majors c o n c e r n s is the being o f composite substances; living
natural beings like horses a n d h u m a n s are p r i m e e x e m p l a r s o f composite substances. 6

Essence in Aristotle," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 25 0974-75): 167-76. In addition G. E. L.

Owen may be advocating the strict identity view in "The Platonism of Aristotle," Proceedings of the
British Academy 5 ~ (1965): 125-5 o. This view is based on an interpretation of per se predications of
essence as identity statements. The problem with this view arises in connection with the relationship
between individual and essence, for Aristotle says that an individual's essence is predicated per se of
that individual (Metaph. 5.18). But it would be a mistake to interpret these statements as identity
statements since Callias and Socrates would be identical to the same thing and hence identical to
each other. Also, there is explicit textual evidence against the view that a composite substance is
strictly identical to its essence (Metaph. 7.11.1 o 37a33-b7; 8.3.1 o43a37-b4). And this is not surpris-
ing since essence or form is contrasted with matter in the composite, but if it were identical with the
individual composite substance then it would have to include all material aspects of the composite.
There would be no distinction between form or essence, and matter even in thought. These
distinctions also count against Edwin Hartman's argument for the identity of the essence and the
individual substance in "Aristotle on the Identity of Substance and Essence," Philosophical Review
85:4 (October a976): 545-61.
5 My paper argues that Aristotle's essentialism fundamentally differs from contemporary
essentialism, but I do not ascribe the difference to a lack of philosophical equipment on Aristotle's
part. My approach differs from several recent commentators of Aristotelian essentialism who
have explained the difficulty of formulating contemporary essentialist claims using an Aristote-
lian idiom. See Nicholas White's "The Origin of Aristotle's Essentialism," Review of Metaphysics ~6
(September 1972): 57-85; S. Marc Cohen's "Essentialism in Aristotle," Review of Metaphysics 31
(March ~978): 387-4o5; Joan Kung in "Aristotle on Essence and Explanation" Philosophical Stud-
ies 31 0977): 361-83 .
6 In this paper I take it that Aristotle considers horses and humans to be examples of
composite substances and sensible substances. That Aristotle refers to the same class of beings,
exemplified by individual plants and animals, alternately as sensible substances and composite
substances can be seen in a passage in Metaphysics Book 8. In this passage Aristotle begins by
 NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS 287

When I discuss the relationship between substance and essence I should be understood
as referring, for example, to the relationship between a human being and its essence o r
a horse and its essence. My claim then is that Aristotle does not conceive o f the
relationship between an individual substance and its essence on the object/property
model.

1. P E R SE A N D P E R A C C I D E N S PREDICATION

One factor that encourages us to think o f Aristotle's theory in terms of the object/
property model is the way in which the notion o f essence is first introduced in Metaphys-
/cs Book 7, chapter 4. F o r there Aristotle says: "Since in the beginning we distinguished
in how many ways we define substance and one o f these seemed to be the essence, we
must investigate this. A n d first let us say some things about it linguistically. T h e essence
of each thing is what it is said to be per se (• '~tw6). For being you is not being
musical, since you are not per se (• oav~6v) musical. What then you are per se is your
essence" (1o~9b13-16). In these introductory, linguistic comments about essence it is
pretty clear that Aristotle is referring to a distinction found in the Posterior Analytics
between what, for convenience, I call per se (xct0' a ~ 6 ) and per accidens (xaza
o~t[$e[3vl• predications. In Posterior Analytics 1.4 Aristotle distinguishes four kinds of
per se predications; in one o f them the predicate states the definition, or part o f the
definition, o f the subject. T h a t this form o f predication is the one relevant to the notion
o f essence comes as no surprise to those familiar with the Topics where the definition is
described as the "statement indicating the essence" ( l o l b 3 7 ; also l o l b 2 1 , t o 3 b 9 - 1 o ).
It is natural to think o f the predicates in these per se predications as referring to the
essential properties o f the entity r e f e r r e d to by the subject term. For example, it is
natural to think o f the predication "Animal belongs to man per se" as ascribing a
definitional p r o p e r t y to man. Further, since Aristotle is perfectly willing to express the
relationship between an individual substance and its essence in terms of a per se predica-
tion, it is equally plausible to think o f that relationship on the object/property model.7
T h e similarity with c o n t e m p o r a r y essentialist theories is strengthened by the fact
that Aristotle says that in these predications what belongs to the subject belongs to it
necessarily (73b16-18). Not only does Aristotle's description of per se predications
a p p e a r to m i r r o r the object/property model, but his characterization o f the things
predicated in this type o f per se predication as belonging necessarily to the subject
accords with the current notion that essences are the necessary properties of an object, s
It is clear, however, that Aristotle does not identify the essence with all the neces-
sary properties o f an object. For first, not all necessary per se predications are essential
predications since in Metaphysics 7.4 Aristotle limits the notion o f per se predication

pointing out that composite substances are generated and perish (lo39b2o-~2). He then says that
for that reason there is no definition of individual sensible substances 0o39b27-3o).
For examples of per se predications with individual subjects see the text quoted at the
beginning of the paragraph and Metaph. 5.18.1 o~2aa5-29.
In his explanation of the concept of necessity Aristotle differs from the accounts of Kripke
and Wiggins. For a discussion of the differences see White. As 1 mentioned in note 3, there are
also significant differences between Kripke and Wiggins on this issue.
288 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 27:2 APRIL 198 9

a p p r o p r i a t e to essence to the case in which the t h i n g predicated is part of the definition

of the subject.9 A n d , f u r t h e r , in the Topics Aristotle distinguishes between the defini-
tion, which states the essence a n d the proprium. T h e proprium is a p r o p e r t y which does
not display the essence o f the subject, b u t which belongs to the subject alone a n d
necessarily (102 a 1 8 - 3 0 ) ? ~
I n Metaph. 7.4 the p r o b l e m o f which things have essences is a p p r o a c h e d t h r o u g h a
consideration o f which things have definitions. Surely "what belongs" in cases where
there are definitions will be necessary properties of the object. If so, t h e n Aristotle's
essences, like those o f Kripke a n d Wiggins, will consist o f a n object's necessary p r o p e r -
ties. H Unlike its c o n t e m p o r a r y c o u n t e r p a r t , however, the Aristotelian essence does n o t
include all o f a n object's necessary properties.
Aristotle does n o t identify the essence of an object with all its necessary properties.
This leaves o p e n the possibility that he does identify it with a subset o f the object's
necessary properties. W h a t counts as essential is d e t e r m i n e d by the n o t i o n of defini-
tion. With r e g a r d to essences the crucial question for Aristotle is not "What are this
object's necessary properties?" b u t r a t h e r "What is it?" a n d the a p p r o p r i a t e answer to
the latter question is the definition of the object. Still, o n e could argue as follows. T h e
definition o f the object is given by r e f e r r i n g to some of the object's necessary p r o p e r -
ties, a n d so Aristotle's essentialism/s based o n the object/property model.

2. SUBSTANCES, NON-SUBSTANCES AND THE NOTION OF ESSENCE

Aristotle's i n t r o d u c t o r y c o m m e n t s on the n o t i o n of essence in Metaph. 7-4 describe a

form o f predication a p p r o p r i a t e for talk a b o u t essences. O n e does so by predicating
the definition. But, how o u g h t o n e to answer the "what is it" question? W h a t counts as a
definition? O n e answer favored by Aristotle in m a n y contexts is the definition by genus
a n d differentia. I n the predication "Callias is perse an animal" the genus, an e l e m e n t in
the definition o f m a n , is predicated o f the subject. T h e p r o p e r t y "being a n animal" is a
necessary p r o p e r t y o f Callias a n d a n essential p r o p e r t y since it is part o f his defini-
tion? 2 T h e definition by g e n u s a n d differentia places individuals into kinds; by sin-

9 The other kind of necessary per se predications are those in which the subject is part of the
definition of the thing predicated.
'~ Initially, Aristotle divides the proprium into two kinds, one which indicates the essence and
one which does not. But, he then proposes to call the former the definition, and to reserve the
term proprium for the latter alone (1o 1b 19ff). The proprium "being capable of learning grammar"
belongs to all men necessarily. If something is a man then it is capable of learning grammar, and
vice versa. The proprium is a necessary, but non-essential, property.
H The differentia and genus are not garden variety necessary properties. For example, the
property "being an animal" is related to man in a special way. In the CategoriesAristotle tells us
that both the name and the definition of the genus is predicable of the subject (3a15ff, 3a2 lff).
Not all of the essential properties in the contemporary theories would meet this requirement.
Alan Code pointed this out to me.
'~ Does Aristotle think that individuals have definitions? The argument of Metaph. 7.15
might indicate they do not. There Aristotle argues that a composite substance like Callias is not
definable on two grounds: first, because of his matter and, second, because of his individuality.
On the other hand, we know that individuals are the subjects of essential/definitional predica-
 NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS 289
gling out the c o m m o n definitional properties of a n u m b e r of individuals it explains
why they are all members of the same kind. Clearly, this notion of definition and the
correlative notion of essence, apply equally well to substances and to entitles in the
other categories of being. Qualities, quantities and the rest fall u n d e r genera and have
their appropriate differentia. We find Aristotle using this essentialist framework in the
Topics; there is no restriction of the notions genus, differentia, definition or essence to
the category of substance.
It is surprising, then, to find Aristotle, shortly after the introductory remarks
quoted above, questioning the idea that non-substances have essences at all. Initially,
he does so on the grounds that non-substances are compounds or, to use his own
terminology, because they are not per se beings (to29b22-27).13 They are compounds
beca/ase, as he argued in Book 7, chapter 1, each non-substance inheres in a substance.
Aristotle pursues this line of thought later in the chapter; he claims that only sub-
stances are primary, n o n - c o m p o u n d or per se beings, and he concludes that only they
have definitions and essences (ao3oa2-17). One might think then that Aristotle's re-
vised position is that only substances have essences.
Quite typically, however, Aristotle immediately considers another possibility,
namely that the notion of definition, and by implication the notion of essence, has
more than one m e a n i n g or application. Aristotle's ultimate comment in this section of
text on the question of whether or not non-substances have essences describes two
possibilities: "Clearly, then, definition is the formula of the essence, and essence
either belongs to substances alone or chiefly and primarily and in the unqualified
sense" (1031alo--14).
T h e important element in this discussion for the purposes of this paper is that the
distinction between entities which have essences (or which have them unqualifiedly)
and those which do not (or which have them qualifiedly) depends u p o n whether or not
the definition is of a unified, per se being (lo3ob4-13). But how could composite
substances, compounds of matter and form, satisfy this requirement?

tions. (See footnote 7.) Further, consider the relationship between definition and essence in
Aristotle's thought. If individuals did not have definitions at all, then neither would they have
essences at all. But, surely the individual members of Aristotelian species have their species form
or essence. And the correlative definition will then apply to them. In the light of this line of
thought, how should we understand the argument of Metaph. 7.15 with which we began? I
interpret Aristotle as arguing that no definition includes mention of an individual's matter and
that no definition applies uniquely to an individual--it is always potentially applicable to a range
of individuals. In this sense definition is always of the universal; it is composed of general terms.
,3 Aristotle's per se idiom is confusing because it is complicated. In one use he contrasts per se
and per acc/dens predications. Aristotle also uses the phrase to describe a kind of being, per se being
which is contrasted with per accidens being, the being of compound entities, e.g., a white man. In
Metaph. 5.7 Aristotle says that there are as many kinds of per se being as there are categories of
being. So, substances, qualities, etc. are all per se beings. The final complication comes in Metaph. 7,
where Aristotle seems to reserve the title o f per se being for substances alone, presumably because
all non-substancesinhere in substances (see Metaph. 7.1).
290 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 2 7 " 2 APRIL 1 9 8 9
3" ESSENCE AS THE CAUSE OF BEING OF SUBSTANCES
Imagine that you have analyzed living natural beings into two constituents, matter and
form. T h e matter is, roughly speaking, the body, and the form is the soul or principle
of life. In this paper I am simply assuming the correctness of Aristotle's insistence that
form is required for an adequate understanding of natural beings. Further, these
composite living beings come in natural kinds or species; we would leave something
crucial out if we were to divide the world into two basic classes, souls and bodies, for
example. Rather, these two factors combine (somehow) to produce a new unified
substance--a man or a horse. Aristotle's question is: What is responsible for the being
of these composites, i.e. their substantial being? And this question has two aspects.
First, what causes the substance to be what it is? Second, what unifies the substance,
what makes it one rather than many? For convenience, I shall call the first question, the
question o f substantial identity and the second question, the question of substantial
unity. T h e answers to these two questions are at least a partial resolution of the basic
ontological issue, namely the cause of the substantiality of composite substances. Sub-
stances are differentiated from non-substances in terms of their high degree of unity
and identity; Aristotle's task is to isolate the cause in the case of composite substances.
The questions o f substantial identity and unity require elucidation. In order to
understand the meaning of Aristotle's questions we turn to Aristotle's discussion in
Metaphysics 7-17- I first address the issue of substantial identity and then the issue of
substantial unity.
Aristotle approaches the investigation of substance from a new angle in this chap-
ter. He says "Since therefore substance is a certain principle and cause, one must
inquire (about it) from there" (1o4ia9-1o). To ask a causal question (~6 6tct ~0, he
continues, is to ask a question whose general form is: Why does one thing belong to
another? (lo41alo-11). He adds that the fact (~6 6~t) must be assumed, i.e., the fact
that the one thing in question does belong to the other (xo41al5-2o). Here are two of
Aristotle's examples:
(A) Why is man an animal o f such a kind?
(B) Why are these bricks and stones a house?
Each of these questions satisfies the general requirement governing "why" questions
since in each o f them one thing is predicated of another. But the similarity ends there.
For question (A) seems to be of an entirely different kind from question (B). Question
(A) asks why a property applies to a substance, while questions (B) asks why some
matter composes an object of a determinate kind. We will concentrate on questions o f
type (B).
Questions o f type (B), which I call questions of substantial identity, are answered by
mentioning the appropriate cause. Consider two ways of understanding question (B):
(B 1) What made these bricks and stones into a house?
(B2) Why do these bricks and stones constitute a house?
The first sort of question is one concerning the process of generation, and for that sort
of question, Aristotle tells us, it is appropriate to mention one kind of cause, what first
 NOTES AND D I S C U S S I O N S 991

moved, i.e., the efficient cause o f the g e n e r a t i o n ( l o 4 1 a 3 1 - 3 2 ) . But, the question

u n d e r s t o o d as (B2) is o f a n o t h e r sort; it is not a question of becoming, Aristotle says,
but o f b e i n g (~o~ e~vctt). T o answer the question of the being o f a composite substance,
o n e m u s t m e n t i o n the cause o f its being. Aristotle refers to this cause as either the f o r m
or the essence?4 I n some cases, like the house, Aristotle points out, the essence is the
final cause, o r purpose, o f the thing. So, what makes these b u i l d i n g materials compose
a house is that they compose a shelter for h u m a n s (or whatever the a p p r o p r i a t e
specification o f a house's f u n c t i o n might be).
It is n o t yet clear what the puzzle is c o n c e r n i n g substantial identity. Let us consider
Aristotle's e x p l a n a t i o n o f a n o t h e r example, a m a n ; unlike the house a m a n is a clear
case o f a n a t u r a l substance. Aristotle says: "Since we must have the b e i n g of the thing as
s o m e t h i n g given, clearly what is s o u g h t is why the m a t t e r is something; such as why are
these materials a house? Because the essence o f house is present. A n d why is this thing
a man, or this body having this? So that what is sought is the cause o f the matter, b u t
this is the form, in relation to which it is something. This is the substance" (1o41b4-9).
Let us a s s u m e the fact that the t h i n g in question, say that body, is a man. We know,
from section two above, that a given individual like Socrates is a m a n per se, in himself.
However, we also know that Socrates is a composite entity; he can be analyzed into two
c o m p o n e n t s - - - m a t t e r a n d form. Which o f these two c o m p o n e n t s d e t e r m i n e Socrates'
n a t u r e such that Socrates is a m a n per se, i.e., in himself, a n d n o t in relation to some
o t h e r entity? W e can think o f the contrast between b u i l d i n g materials a n d a pile o f
them which constitutes a house quite easily. In living beings the distinction between
form a n d m a t t e r is far m o r e subtle a n d complex, b u t there is n o d o u b t that Aristotle
considers the cases parallel. He contrasts a living h u m a n b e i n g a n d a corpse (Part. An.
64ob34ff.; 641at8ff.). I n o n e case the m a t t e r constitutes a h u m a n being a n d in the
other it does not. T h e difference is w h e t h e r or not the soul is present?5
Aristotle's worries over substantial identity are metaphysical, not epistemological.
He is n o t trying to p r o v i d e a criterion for substantial identity in the sense o f a rule for
sorting cases correctly. After all, we assume the truth o f the j u d g m e n t of identity, i.e.,
that it is a house or a m a n . W h a t is metaphysically puzzling is how o n e thing (e.g., some
bones a n d sinews) can come to compose a n o t h e r thing with its own distinct n a t u r e (e.g.,
a h u m a n being). Or, in the formal mode, what causes some m a t t e r to compose a
substance? ,6

14 He uses essence (~6 xf, ely r ~vat) at lo41a28, lo41b6, and form (e~iSog)at lo4tb8.
15 The contrast between living human being and corpse masks certain complexities and
difficulties which arise in connection with Aristotle's conceptions of matter and form applied to
body and soul which I do not address in this paper. For example, given Aristotle's conception of
the relation between soul and body, how can a fully developed body be identified as matter, and
sharply contrasted with soul or form? And how are we to understand the role of soul in the
generation of a human being--how could it be a human soul prior to the construction of an
appropriate body?
~6 Further, the problem of substantial identity and the terms available for its resolution are
dictated by Aristotle's hylomorphic analysis of substance. On another account this particular
problem might never arise. For example, a materialist could avoid Aristotle's problem by explain-
292 JOURNAL OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 2 7 : 2 APRIL 1 9 8 9

T h e form or essence also provides a solution to the problem of substantial unity. A

h u m a n being is a unified entity over and above the sum of its parts. Socrates is a single
being composed (somehow) out of a n u m b e r of organs--head, heart, hand; but Socra-
tes is not simply the sum of the matter which composes him. Why is the composite
substance itself not a heap of bodily organs, but a unified whole? Aristotle tries to
answer this question by likening the composite substance to a paradigmatic non-heap,
the syllable (1o41bl 1ff.). He says: "Now the syllable is not the letters, 'B' and 'A' are not
the same as ' B A ' . . . . T h e syllable, therefore, is something, not only the letters, the
vowels and the consonants, but also something else" (1o41bl 2-17). T h e relationship
between the substance and what it is composed out of is likened to the relationship
between a syllable and the letters which compose it. First point of comparison: T h e
syllable is not identical to the sum of its letters; just so, the composite substance is not
identical to the matter which composes it. Second point of comparison: T h e syllable
and the composite are unities, not heaps. Problem: What is the cause of their unity?
One might think that what causes the unity is just another element, in the case of a
syllable, another letter, in the case of a composite like flesh, another material element
added to the fire and earth which compose flesh. But in these cases we still have to ask:
What makes these three elements one? Aristotle considers one other logical possibility:
What if the cause of unity is itself a c o m p o u n d rather than an element? But, if the
cause of unity is a compound, then we can ask about the cause of its unity and a regress
a r g u m e n t is generated. Aristotle concludes: "But it would seem that this is something
and not an element, and it is the cause of being (which makes) this flesh and that a
syllable. A n d similarly in all other cases. This is the substance of each thing (for this is
the first cause of its being)" 0 o 4 1 b 2 5 - 2 8 ) . Although Aristotle does not mention form
or essence in this resolution of the unity problem, his terminology makes it clear that
he intends to refer to form or essence.
What notion of unity, of being one, is at issue here? Consider the example of the
heap. Surely some notion of unity is applicable to a heap, a pile of stones. After all, we
can count piles of stones. Although Aristotle does recognize as basic the notion of unity
associated with counting and measurement, other senses of the term seem more appro-
priate for the discussion at hand. ~7 Typically, Aristotle's discussions of the notion of
unity are complex; there are different ways in which things are one and different
degrees of unity. I f we asked about the unity of the matter which composes a pile of
stones or the matter which composes a person, for example, Aristotle would invoke the
idea of the continuous to explain why we call each of these one: "There is the continu-

ing the being of different substances in terms of the differing arrangements of matter. There
need be no puzzle about how matter can come to compose a being with its own nature. Rather, the
explanation would go in the other direction, and it would turn out that the substance's identity
was completely explicable in terms of the matter which composes it. This explanation ignores the
terms of Aristotle's problem for it does not grant irreducible identities to substances.
,7 There are two extended discussions of the notion of unity in Metaph. 5.6 and lO. i. In both
texts Aristotle emphasizes the notion of a measure as central to the notion of unity (lo16b17ff;
lo52bl 8ff). This notion is not the most important for our purposes, however, since Aristotle says
that this notion originated in, and most properly applies to, the category of quantity.
 NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS 293

ous, either in general, or especially that which is continuous by nature and not by
contact nor by being tied together" ( l o 5 2 a x 8 - 2 o ) ? 8 According to this criterion of
continuity, it would seem, the totality of the parts of the body compose one thing to a
greater degree than either the stones in a heap or the stones in a wall for the bodily
parts are continuous by nature rather than merely by contact or being b o u n d together.
Aristotle also says that the things which are continuous by nature have "one move-
ment" (lOl 6a5, l o52a2o-~ t). Again, it would seem that the totality of the parts of an
animal could satisfy this requirement while it is doubtful whether the stones which
compose a pile could. Each stone has a single motion, i.e., to move down, but the pile
need not have one motion. T h e case of the body is different; each part has a motion,
but so does the body as a whole. It is fair to conclude then that the parts of a body are
more unified than the stones in a pile. I shall discuss how this ranking according to the
continuity criterion is related to the issue of substantial unity below. It will turn out that
the priority with respect to unity of bodies over piles of stones is a consequence of the
fact that the bodies compose substances.
Aristotle's present concern is with substantial unity, the unity of an animal and not
an animal's body; a kind of unity which he thinks heaps like a pile of stones entirely
lack. For Aristotle accepts the premise that there is a distinction between the material
which composes a substance and the composite substance itself. So, for a substance,
explaining the unity of its matter does not accomplish the task of explaining the unity
of the substance, while for non-substantial heaps, the only unity which requires explain-
ing is the weak degree of unity of its matter. A heap of stones is one just in so far as the
stones are continuous, but for an animal to be one involves more than just the continu-
ity of the body.
In general, then, a more rigorous notion of unity applies to substances, a notion
which is not equivalent to mere continuity: "While in a sense we call anything one if it is
a quantity and continuous, in a sense we do not unless it is a whole, i.e. unless it has
unity of form; e.g. if we saw the parts of a shoe put together anyhow we should not call
them one all the same (unless because of their continuity); we do this only if they are
put together so as to be a shoe and to have already a certain single form" (1 o 16b 12-17;
1o52a21-25). Even if the parts of an entity are continuous, and there is a sense in
which it is appropriate to call them one, there is another sense in which the term does
not apply unless the entity has a single form. This point is easiest to illustrate with an
artifact in the way that Aristotle does in the text just quoted. We can imagine the parts
of a shoe being continuous but misplaced such that they do not function as a shoe,
which is just to say that the object lacks the shoe form or essence. Similarly, continuity
of a h u m a n being's material parts is not sufficient to explain the unity of the h u m a n
being; for the parts have to be continuous in a way which makes them capable of

,s There is a discrepancy between the two discussions of unity with respect to whether or not
an entity which is continuous by being bound or fastened together counts as being one by nature.
In one text (Metaph. 5.6.1o16a l) pieces of wood glued together would seem to count as being one
by nature while in Metaph. xo. x it would not (1o52a19-21). This discrepancy is not central for our
purposes, however, since the texts agree with respect to our example, a pile of stones, and neither
classifies it as being continuous and one by nature.
294 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 2 7 : 2 APRIL 1 9 8 9

functioning humanly. But it is the presence o f soul which accomplishes this. Living
natural beings are different from artifacts like shoes in that what is required for them
to be able to function is more than just the correct a r r a n g e m e n t o f the parts. T h e parts
of a corpse could be continuous and a r r a n g e d in the right way yet they are not capable
of functioning humanly. T h e matter o f a corpse has the same sort of low grade unity
which attaches to piles o f stones.
It is worthwhile to return for a moment to the "one movement" criterion which
Aristotle says discriminates between things which are naturally continuous and those
which are not. I suggested that the matter o f a composite substance, e.g., a body,
fulfilled this criterion while the stones in a heap did not. One might think that the body
or matter had "one movement" quite independently o f the soul or form, and that the
fact that the body is more one than the stones is entirely i n d e p e n d e n t o f the issue o f
substantial unity. A moment's reflection on the difference between corpses and ani-
mals, however, will convince us that this is not so. For Aristotle does not think that the
body alone is causally responsible for the animal's movement. In his view, it is the form
which causes the body to have one movement, whether that be locomotion, growth, or
reproduction. T h e body has one movement not by itself but by virtue o f the soul. T h e
two criteria for unity we have considered are not completely independent; the high
degree o f unity by continuity o f the matter in the case of animals in contrast with stones
in a pile is a consequence o f the fact that the matter is the matter of an animal, i.e., a
substance.
Aristotle's view is that substances are prior to other beings with respect to
"whatness" and "oneness."'9 I have not examined Aristotle's arguments for this rank-
ing nor shall I do so. In the text we have been considering Aristotle uses the notion o f
substantial form or essence to provide a metaphysical foundation for his ranking; they
explain the priority o f substantial identity ("whamess") and substantial unity ("one-
ness") in relation to other beings. Formally, it is the substantial form or essence which
accounts for the substantiality o f composite substances. Form or essence is the cause o f
being o f composite substances. Concretely, the substantial form or essence causes a
given substance to be one and to be what it is, e.g., a human being.
Substances in turn are the causes o f being for nonsubstances. In Metaph. 7.1 Aris-
totle says: "But rather it appears these things (i.e., non-substances) are beings because
there is a determinate substratum underlying them (but this is the substance and
individual), the very thing which is reflected in such a predicate. For 'the good' or 'the
seated' is not said without this. Therefore it is clear that each of these is because of this (i.e.,
substance)" 0 o 2 8 a 2 5 - 3 o, my emphasis). T h e role assigned to form or essence in rela-
tion to the composite substance, is assigned to substance in relation to non-substances.
That the being o f non-substances is d e p e n d e n t upon substance being is the reason

19 That unity is multivocal in accordance with the categories of being is stated in Metaph.
7.4.1o3ob8-1o (see also 4.1oo3b33, 5Ao18a35, 1o. lo53b25; De An. 412b8). The discussion in
Metaph. 7-4 makes it clear that substantial unity is prior to the unity attaching to the other
categories of being.
 N O T E S AND D I S C U S S I O N S 295

Aristotle thinks that they, unlike substances, are c o m p o u n d , and not per se beings. 2~
Substantial f o r m o r essence is the principle which Aristotle invokes to e x p l a i n the
special metaphysical status o f c o m p o s i t e substances.

4. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ESSENCE AND COMPOSITE SUBSTANCE

W h a t has any o f this to d o with my o p e n i n g claim that it is w r o n g to conceive o f the

relationship b e t w e e n a substance a n d essence on the object/property model? T h a t the
o b j e c t / p r o p e r t y relationship does not apply to the relationship between a composite
substance a n d its essence can be shown by e x a m i n i n g the logical relationship between
composite substance a n d essence.
In the first place, the essence is not a p r o p e r t y o f the substance. T h e easiest way to
explain Aristotle's view is to p o i n t out that a c c o r d i n g to his metaphysics t h e r e is no
substance lacking essence o r f o r m o f which f o r m or essence could be a property. No
individual substance has its n a t u r e ; t h e r e is no individual substance u n d e r l y i n g its
essence. 21 In a substantial c h a n g e no substance persists which goes f r o m the lack o f a
p r o p e r t y to the h a v i n g o f that p r o p e r t y .
I illustrate these points in Aristotelian fashion by using as my e x a m p l e an artifact.
W h e n a table is m a d e o u t o f wood, t h e r e is no individual which persists t h r o u g h the
change a n d receives the p r o p e r t y " b e i n g a table." T h e quasi-individual h u n k o f w o o d
does not persist t h r o u g h the c h a n g e ; the m a t t e r which persists is not an individual, not
even a quasi-individual. T h e table is not the h u n k o f wood, which has a certain f o r m ,
for the original h u n k o f w o o d n o l o n g e r exists.
T h e only c a n d i d a t e for an object which could receive the essence as a p r o p e r t y is the
m a t t e r which is the s u b s t r a t u m o f substantial change. O n e m i g h t t h e n object to my
account by c l a i m i n g that what receives the essence o r f o r m as a p r o p e r t y is the m a t t e r
which u n d e r l i e s the change. T h e m a t t e r is not, g r a n t e d , the h u n k of wood, but r a t h e r the
wood. A n d , i n d e e d , Aristotle seems to e n d o r s e this suggestion w h e n he states that the
f o r m is p r e d i c a t e d o f m a t t e r (Metaph. 7.3.1 o 2 9 a 2 3 - 2 4 ; 9.7.1 o 4 9 a 3 4 - b 6 ; 7.13. lo38b5).
T h e s e relations b e t w e e n f o r m a n d m a t t e r which are f o u n d in Aristotle's analysis o f
both the b e i n g a n d the b e c o m i n g o f composite substances d o not u n d e r c u t the claim
that the relationship b e t w e e n a substance and its essence is not an object/property
relationship. F o r the most these points have shown is that the f o r m o r essence is a
p r o p e r t y o f the matter. But the m a t t e r is not identical to the composite substance. T o

9o By parity of reasoning, however, one might argue that composite substances are not per se
beings either since their being is dependent upon form or essence. Can this difficulty be resolved
by claiming that the composite substance and its essence are the same in a way that an accident is
not the same as the substance upon which it depends? I shall not pursue this problem here except
to say that it is clearly relevant to Aristotle's reflections in Metaph. 7.6 concerning which entities
are the same as their essences and which are not.
'~ Although Aristotle sometimes refers to material substance (Metaph. 8.4.1o44a~ 5,
9.7.1o49a36) or lists matter along with form and the composite as one of the things said to be
substance (Metaph. 7.1o.lo35a~, 8.1o43a14-21, 1~.1o7oa 9, ao7oba3; DeAn. 412a6, 414a15), it is
at least clear that matter is not what is substantial about the composite substance in Aristotle's
view. There are many reasons for this; one of them is that matter is not an individual (xo6e T0.
See Aristotle's discussion in Metaph. 7-3.
296 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 27:2 APRIL 198 9

say that f o r m o r essence is p r e d i c a t e d o f the w o o d m i g h t m e a n that it is a p r o p e r t y o f

the w o o d but it does not imply that it is a p r o p e r t y o f the composite, the w o o d e n table. I
pass o v e r the issue o f w h e t h e r o r not it is right to conceive o f the relationship between
m a t t e r a n d f o r m o r essence on the o b j e c t / p r o p e r t y model. I believe it is not, but for
quite d i f f e r e n t reasons t h a n in the case o f the substance and its essence. 22
T h e f o r m o r essence is not a p r o p e r t y o f the substance o f which it is the f o r m o r
essence. But earlier, in the first section o f this paper, it s e e m e d as t h o u g h the per se
predications o f essence m i r r o r e d a special relationship between an object and some o f
its properties. H o w are we to reconcile these d i v e r g e n t descriptions o f the relationship
between substance and essence? Has Aristotle c h a n g e d his property-like notion o f
essence? O r was it an e r r o r in the first place to extract an ontological relationship f r o m
a f o r m o f predication? T h e difficulty which these questions pose is not simply a conse-
q u e n c e o f their specific content, but is i n h e r e n t in their type. W h a t counts as a c h a n g e
o f concepts?
I d o not i n t e n d to adjudicate this issue. I think it is m o r e helpful to explain
Aristotle's t e n d e n c y in Metaph. 7 - 8 to identify the essence with the f o r m o f the compos-
ite substance by c o n s i d e r i n g this view in relation to the general orientation o f his
investigation o f the n o t i o n o f substance. First, Aristotle argues that substance being is
prior to all o t h e r f o r m s o f b e i n g a n d so, he claims, we can study being by studying
substance being. Aristotle concentrates on c o m p o s i t e substances as a means o f getting
clearer a b o u t the notion o f substantial being; they are a familiar, non-controversial
sample o f substances. But, as it turns out, the h y l o m o r p h i c c h a r a c t e r o f composite
substances poses a difficult q u e s t i o n - - w h a t is substantial about them?
W h e r e does the n o t i o n o f essence fit into this problematic? One o f the criteria o f
substance b e i n g is that substance provides an answer to the question " W h a t is it?" O n e
way to answer that q u e s t i o n is to give the definition by genus and differentia; a n o t h e r
is to m e n t i o n the f o r m that is p r e s e n t to s o m e matter.2a For m a n y reasons in Metaph. 7 -
8 Aristotle tends to f a v o r the substantial f o r m answer to the question " W h a t is it?" o v e r
the definition by g e n u s and differentia.24 But if substantial f o r m provides the right sort

9~ The following reasoning has convinced me that the form is not a property of the matter.
Form is not an accidental property of the matter since (i) according to Gen. et Corr. 1.4 the form,
viewed as a contrary, cannot have the relationship to matter that "being musical" has to man. For
if it did, Aristotle reasons, there would be no class of generations distinct from alterations; (ii) the
form/matter relationship is described using the potentiality/actuality vocabulary which suggests at
least that Aristotle is trying to describe a different relationship than that between a subject and its
accident. Neither, however, is form per se or a necessary property of matter. For, the proximate
matter is notperse the form. Wood is notperse or necessarily a table. It might be that there is some
other way of understanding the form as a property of the matter but I do not know what that
might be.
'~ See J. M. Le Blond's "Aristotle on Definition" in Articles on Aristotle, vol. 3, ed. by Barnes,
Schofield, Sorabji (London, 1975), 63-79, for a discussion of these two approaches to definition.
24 A full discussion of Aristotle's philosophical motivations on this issue is impossible here. I
mention only one consideration as an example. Aristotle does not think that anything common to
many individuals, like the genus, could be substance. Further, he thought a non-substance like the
genus could not be the cause of being of a substance.
 NOTES AND D I S C U S S I O N S 297

of answer to the question "What is it?" then, given the connection between the notion
of essence and the response to that question, it makes sense for Aristotle to identify
essence and substantial form.

~. CONCLUSION
In conclusion I return to the comparison between contemporary and Aristotelian
essentialism. I said at the beginning of this paper that despite some apparent similari-
ties the differences between them are systematic and basic. Why is the object/property
model the wrong model for Aristotle's theory? Because, as I have argued, the Aristote-
lian essence is not a property of the substance. But the deeper issue is why this very
familiar conceptual model for essentialist theories is not Aristotle's model.
Here is a plausible answer. Aristotle's metaphysics is discriminatory in favor of
substances; substance being is basic and prior to other kinds of being. His essentialism
reflects this valuation in distinguishing the kinds of essences assigned to substances and
to non-substances. Aristotle's metaphysics discriminates along another axis as well in
connection with his hylomorphic analysis of composite substances. Here, the notion of
essence finds its function as the cause of substantial unity and identity within an analysis
which favors form or essence over both the composite and its matter. Aristotle's essen-
tialism is embedded within a system of priorities--substances are prior to non-
substances; within the composite the form or essence is its substance and is prior to the
matter.
Contemporary essentialists devise their theories totally independently of both Aris-
totle's metaphysical hierarchy of being, and his metaphysical analysis of substance.
Quite naturally, their essences do not reflect and underlie that picture of reality.
Indeed, their independence from Aristotle's metaphysic of substance might be consid-
ered a major theoretical advance. Unimpressed by Aristotle's arguments for the prior-
ity of substance, one might try to salvage what is valuable in his thought by adopting
the clearly non-discriminatory object/property model.
If one counts as essential the necessary properties of objects quite generally, how-
ever, there is no obvious justification for restricting the things which have essences. So,
not only tables and persons, the examples from the opening quotes, have essences but
also a wide variety of things which have necessary properties. Or, to put the point in
another way,/f tables and persons have essences, then there seems to be no clear non-
arbitrary way to exclude other less intuitive cases, e.g., a pile of stones. In general, the
contemporary discussions of essences tend to focus on the intuitively appealing cases,
the essences of members o f natural kinds and artifacts, rather than less appealing
examples, the essences o f parts of animals or table legs or heaps. The choice of
substance-like objects as their primary examples exploits our Aristotelian intuitions
about substances and essences, but it neither justifies those intuitions nor does it justify
the exclusion of less palatable examples.
Could the object/property model be enriched or supplemented in order to capture
the Aristotelian set of priorities? The answer is, yes and no. The restriction of essences
to a given population, e.g., substances, and the denial of essences to non-substances,
e.g., parts and lumps, can be approached through the development of a set of princi-
298 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 2 7 : 2 APRIL ~989

pies which is i n d e p e n d e n t o f the m o d e l itself a n d which can be a p p e n d e d to it to

restrict admission. A n e x a m p l e o f this a p p r o a c h is Wiggins' a t t e m p t to restrict what
counts as a g e n u i n e natural kind term, a n d so to restrict what sorts o f things have
essences.~5
W h a t the o b j e c t / p r o p e r t y m o d e l c a n n o t express, even if s u p p l e m e n t e d , is Aris-
totle's n o t i o n that f o r m o r essence is the cause o f being o f that substance o f which it is
the f o r m o r essence. W h y not? In Aristotle's view the principles and causes o f sub-
stances c a n n o t be non-substances, but p r o p e r t i e s are non-substances. F r o m Aristotle's
perspective, if a p r o p e r t y o r b u n d l e o f p r o p e r t i e s were the essence o f some substance,
t h e n the essence, like any o t h e r p r o p e r t y , would i n h e r e in that substance. But the
i n h e r e n c e relationship implies the lack o f unity o f the i n h e r e n t , the property, and its
d e p e n d e n c e u p o n , a n d posteriority to, the substance in which it inheres. T h e Aristote-
lian priority relation is reversed. Aristotle's t h e o r y o f essences in the central books o f
the Metaphysics does not fit the o b j e c t / p r o p e r t y m o d e l because o f the role played by
f o r m o r essence in his metaphysical t h e o r y o f substanceY 6
CHARLOTTE WITT
University of New Hampshire

25 Wiggins' essentialism is derived within a theory of identity ostensibly restricted to sub-

stances. "It is the aim of this book to propose and elaborate a theory of the individuation of
continuants, both living substances and other substances" (x). But what is a substance or
continuant for Wiggins? His answer to this question is given via a particular theory of the seman-
tics of natural kind words. "For the name to stand for a natural kind, everything depends on
whether there is some nomological grounding for what it is to be of the kind. If there is, and if the
predicate is worthy to survive as a natural kind term, then the holding of the relevant principles is
nothing less than constitutive of its exemplification by its instances. To be something of that kind
is to exemplify the distinctive mode of activity that they determine" (8o). Substances or
continuants are referred to by natural kind terms, i.e., terms associated with law-like activities. It
turns out that for Wiggins parts of animals as well as geographical and geological objects can be
collected by terms which satisfy this stipulation (86). And, with some restrictions, so can artifacts
(9o-99, 124-26). Hence, Wiggins' adoption of Putnam's semantics for natural kind terms does
not reproduce exactly Aristotle's substance population. Nonetheless, it does provide a criterion
for determining whether or not a given object counts as a substance. The criterion, the
"nomological grounding" explains the centrality of Aristotelian composite substances in Wiggins'
theory. This explanation entitles Wiggins to capitalize upon the Aristotelian intuitions of his
readers.
,6 I would like to thank Wayne State University for supporting my research with a Faculty
Research Grant. During the writing of this paper I received generous and stimulating written
comments on earlier drafts from Joan Kung, Frank Lewis and Don Morrison. My thinking was
also influenced by conversation with Alan Code, Mark Okrent, and Michael Philips.