Philosophical Review

Essentialism and Semantic Theory in Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, II, 7-10

Author(s): Robert Bolton
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Source: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 85, No. 4 (Oct., 1976), pp. 514-544
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 ThePhilosophical
Review,LXXXV, 4 (October 1976).

ESSENTIALISM AND SEMANTIC THEORY IN

ARISTOTLE: POSTERIOR ANALYTICS, II, 7-10

ROBERT BOLTON

T HE contemporaryrevival of what goes by the name of

Aristotelianessentialismhas partlybrought in its train and
partlybeen generatedbycontemporarydevelopmentsin the theory
of the meaning of certaintypesof expressions-especially proper
names and natural-kindterms.' It is usually acknowledged that a
debt is owed to Aristotlein discussionsof essentialism.But therehas
been no awareness thatcertainof the concurrentdevelopmentsin
semantictheorywere also anticipatedby him. Aristotle'ssemantic
theory,like that of other figuresin his era, has been a victimof
traditionalneglect.My purpose here is to bringto lightone part of
his theory which is particularlydeserving of redemption from
obscurity.
The taskof determiningwhatAristotlethoughtis prior,of course,
to thatof determiningthe preciserelationsbetweenand therelative
meritsof his doctrinesand other similarones. So while I will indi-
cate, in conclusion,whatbasic similaritiesthereare betweenAristo-
tle's doctrinesand those of contemporarysemantic theorists,the
prior task is the one whichwill chieflyoccupy us here.

1 I mean by essentialismhere the metaphysicaldoctrine that individuals have

certainpropertiesnecessarily,not in virtueof havingcertainpredicatestrulyapplica-
ble to thembutsimplyin virtueof beingtheindividualstheyare. (See, e.g., Metaphysics
1022a24ff.; 1029b13ff.)For referencesto contemporaryliteratureconnectingessen-
tialismand the typeof realismwhichaccompanies itwithvarious semanticdoctrines
see below, n. 51.

514
 ESSENTIALISM AND SEMANTIC THEORY

II

The partof Aristotle'ssemantictheoryon whichI wishto focusis

his theoryof definitionfornatural-kindterms.This is displayed in
his expositioninPosteriorAnalytics,
II, 7-10 of whatwecall his distinc-
tion between nominal definitionand real definition.2Aristotle's
theoryof nominal definition,as willbe shown,is his semantictheory
for natural-kindterms.Our main objectivethus willbe to say what
his theoryof nominal definitionis.
Aristotle'sneed for the notion of nominal definitionarises be-
cause of his commitmentto a certainthesisabout scientificknowl-
edge. He claims that "we cannot know a thing'sessence (ro rtLgv
Eivat) withoutknowing that it exists,since while we are ignorant
whether something exists we cannot know what it is (rt so-rT)"
(93a 19-20). A knowledge of existence may come simultaneously
withknowledgeof essence (93a 16-20),but typicallyitwillprecede it
(a20ff,b32f.).If we are aware thatsomethingexistswe maygo on to
inquire what it is but inquiryinto the nature of somethingis vain
withoutknowledgeof the existenceof the thing(93b32; 93a16-20;
cf. 89b38f.). The distinctionbetween nominal and real definition
was inventedto express a corollaryof thisdoctrinewhichmakes its
firstexplicitappearance in PosteriorAnalytics, II, 7.

One whoknowswhatman-or anyotherthing- ismustalsoknowthatthe

thingexists.For no one knowswhatsomething is ('6 rT&1-Trv)ifitdoes not
exist.One mayknowwhatthe phrase,or thename,signifies (o-qraYvEt)
whenI say "goatstag,"but it is impossibleto knowwhata goat-stagis.
[92b4-8]

Aristotleaffirmshere his doctrine that knowledge of an essence

presupposes knowledgethatthereare thingswiththatessence. He
adds thatwhere we do not know the essence of somethingwe may
stillknow what the name of thingswiththat essence signifies.We
may even know what "goat-stag"signifiesthough,as Aristotlesup-
poses, goat-stagshave no essence at all. This corollary offersa

2
Aristotlehimselfuses the locutions "definitionof what the name of a thing
signifies"and "definitionwhich displays what somethingis." See 92b26-28; 93b30,
39f.Strictlyspeaking,a nominaldefinitionis as much a definitionof a thing("of what
somethingis" 93b29-30) as a real definitionis; itdefineswhatsomethingis by means
of an account of whatitsname signifies.For convenience,however,I shall oftenspeak
of words as the subjectsof nominal definition.

515
 ROBERT BOLTON

concession to those who would raise a certainobjectionto the main

doctrine. That objection,which may,be inferredfromthe conces-
sion,is thatone mustknow "whatsomethingis" in advance of know-
ing whetheritexistsor not. Otherwisehow could one come to know
that it exists or does not? The objection poses a version of the
paradox of inquirywell knownto AristotlefromPlato's Meno (80d-
e).3 The objection is forestalledby the claim that we can know
enough merelyby knowing what the name of a kind signifiesto
enable us to be aware of the existenceof objectsof thatkind and to
fixon them for study.Similarlywe can know enough by knowing
whatthe name of a kind signifiesto determinethatthereis nothing
of thatkindand nothingwhichthingsof thatkindare to be studied.
Aristotlelaysemphasisbyhischoice of example on thislastpoint.He
presumesit to be the mosttellingone againstthe Platonicobjection.
He expects Plato to agree thatthere is no essence or formof goat-
stag and that,hence, we need not know the form of goat-stagto
know that there aren't any. If, however, we need not know the
essence of a kindto knowthatithas no instanceswhyshould we need
to know the essence of a kind to know thatit has instances?Earlier
Aristotlehad asserted that knowledge of what the name of a kind
signifiesis in mostcases theonlyforeknowledgerequired forinquiry
concerning the nature of the kind (71a1 1ff.).He there implicitly
assumed thatthiswas enough to yieldthe degree of foreknowledge
required to avoid the paradox in the Meno (see a29-30). In the
passage we have just been consideringhe reveals his explicitargu-
ment against Plato's alternativeview and reveals what led him to
formulatethe distinctionbetween nominal and real definition.
We learn from this passage that any account of what a term
signifies (o-ryaevEs)-a category which includes nominal
definitions-explains whata termsignifiesin a waythatis relatively
pretheoreticand theoryindependent.We mustnow investigatehow
nominal definitionsmanage that feat.

3Meno's paradox is referredto twiceearlierin theAnalytics in connectionwiththe

discussionof the question: What typeof foreknowledgeis required to enable inquiry
to go forward?(67a21, 7 la29). Plato, it is generallyagreed, accepts the claim in the
paradox (Meno 80d5-6) that knowledge of what somethingis must precede any
inquiryabout and, hence, any otherknowledgeof thething.(See R. Robinson,Plato's
EarlierDialectic[Oxford, 1953], pp. 50-51, and referencesthere.) Aristotleis here
denyingthat Platonic claim and offeringan argumentagainst it.

516
 ESSENTIALISM AND SEMANTIC THEORY

III

Before doing thatitis worthnotingcertainproblemsto whichthe

related doctrinesmentioned above give rise-problems which any
adequate account of the doctrinesshould attemptto deal with.First,
even if we may sometimesknow that membersof a certainspecies
existbeforeknowingwhattheessence of thosethingsis,whymustwe
knowof theexistenceof instancesofa kindto knowwhatitis tobe an
instance?Can we not know,indeed do we notknow,whatitwould be
forsomethingto be a goat-stagwhetheror not goat-stagsever have
or ever will exist? Can we not give a nominal definitionwhich
stipulateswhat it would be to be a goat-stag,leaving it quite open
whetherany such thingsexist?4Furthermore,if the membersof a
species have a certainessence, then our knowledgethattheydo will
be knowledgeof a necessarytruth.It is,however,difficult to see how
our knowledge of such a necessarytruthcan depend necessarily on
our knowledgeof a particularcontingentmatterof fact,thatis, that

4 Some willargue thatit is wrong to translatethe phrase '6or i-urtv by the phrase
"thatitexists"in Aristotle'sclaimthatwe mustknowofsomething'15tl 'io-Tvbeforewe
can know what it is. But no other plausible alternativewill do. The phrase cannot
simplymean "thatithas some characteristic." Aristotledenies thataskingof a centaur
whetherit is (ELio-rtv)is askingwhetheritis, forexample,whiteor not (89b32-33,cf.
92b5-8). Nor can it mean "that it has a certaincharacteristicessentially."One can
know of something '6t 'Eo-Tvwithoutknowing the least thing about its essence
(92b10- I1,93a2 1ff.).Nor can itmean "thatithas an essence." Aristotledoes saythatin
seekingto discoverof something,in the scientificsense,whetheritis,simply(EL icrTcv
&7rX63s) we are seekingwhetherithas an essence (89b37-90a 1). But thisis not sought
independentlyof knowledge of existence. To know that the full moon is at times
unable to cast shadows even thoughthe skyis clear and thatwhen thefullmoon is so
unable to cast shadows it is eclipsed,is to knowof eclipse'6rc'&rwtP (93a35-b3). But to
knowthisis primarilyto grasp thateclipsesoccur as wellas, perhaps,thattheyhave an
essence. Aristotleclaims,moreover,thatwe mayknowof something irc'So-rvwithout
havingdiscovered (93a24-27, the "we know"('toreIv) of
in the scientificsense '6TL'u-rutv
a26 is the "we know,havingdiscovered" (tvp6vTeq'lu-pEv) of 89b36). In thiscase we
willnotyethave discoveredthatthereis an explicable natureor essenceto the thingat
all. So to say of something'6t kiorvvis to say of it that it exists,as the traditional
interpretation supposes. If itis an entitywhichcan be scientificallyknownto existthen
foritto existitmusthave an essence. To knowin the scientificsense thatitexistsone
mustknowthatithas an essence; though,still,one need notin thatcase knowwhatits
essence is. None of this,clearly,freesAristotlefromthe troublesraised byhisclaims.
For knowledge of essence stillrequires and may be preceded by a knowledge of
existence ('oft'ku-Tv) of either a scientificor an unscientifickind.

517
 ROBERT BOLTON

membersof that species exist.5Must it not be possible to come to

know any necessarytruthindependentlyof coming to know any
contingenttruth;will a knowledge of the necessarytruthnot be a
part of some possible world where the contingenttruthdoes not
hold? If notthentheremustbe worldsin whichthereare (necessary)
truthswhich hold which are unknowable.
Aristotle'sdoctrinesalso conflictwithclaimswhichmodern inter-
pretersand borrowersfromAristotlehave taken to be important
parts of his mature thought.It is often said that for Aristotleone
mustidentifyan individualas fallingunder itsproper kind in order
it. If thisis so thenone mustknow
to identify,or at least reidentify,
thekindto whichan individualbelongs toreidentifyit.This conflicts
withAristotle'sclaim thatone can identifysome thingand examine
itover timeand onlylatercome to knowanythingabout itsessence.6
It is also widelybelieved thatfor Aristotle"exists"is an ambiguous
word. To knowthesense in whichthewordis applied to one kindof
thing,on one versionof thisview,is to knowwhatitis forthatsortof
thingto be, to know itsessence.7 If thisis so, then one cannot even
knowwhata sentenceof theform'x'sexist'means, muchless thatan
assertionemployingsuch a sentenceis true,independentlyof know-
ing whatthe essence of the thingssaid to existis-as is supposed in
the Posterior Analytics.

5 Aristotlewould be taken by some to claim thatsince any genuine species always

has membersitnecessarilyhas members.(SeeJ. Hintikka,TimeandNecessity [Oxford,
1973], Ch. V.) I here ignore the complex question of whetherAristotleheld this
doctrine,a doctrinewhich I take in any case to be false,and ask whetherhe has a
solution to the problem I pose independentlyof appeal to thisdoctrine.
6 The claimis thatreidentificationof an individual,forAristotle,is reidentification
of it as the same such-and-such,where the such-and-suchis its kind (specificor
generic)and, hence,at leastan elementin itsessence. So one cannot reidentify a thing
whilelookingto see whatkinditbelongs to. See G. E. M. Anscombe,ThreePhilosophers
(Oxford, 1961), p. 8; and D. Wiggins,Identity and Spatio-TemporalContinuity(Oxford,
1967), esp. Part Two, where Wiggins seems to claim he is reinventingAristotle's
doctrines(p. 28). These doctrinespresumablyinclude the essentialismdiscussed on
p. 42. Anscombe apparently restrictsthe claim to individuals in the categoryof
substance; but this does not, of course, remove the conflict.
7 See G. E. L. Owen, "Aristotleon the Snares of Ontology"in R. Bambrough (ed.),
NewEssaysonPlato andAristotle (London, 1965), pp. 69ff.On another versionof this
viewAristotleclaimsonlythat"exists"has as manysensesas thereare categories.(See
C. Kirwan,Aristotle's Metaphysics,Books F, A, E (Oxford, 1971), pp. 140-143.) In this
case thereis a parallel problem; one mustknowto whatcategorysomethingbelongs
and, hence, somethingabout itsessence,to knoweven the meaningofthe claimthatit
exists.This too is contraryto what is claimed in the PosteriorAnalytics.

518
 ESSENTIALISM AND SEMANTIC THEORY

A proper understandingofAristotle'sdoctrineof nominaldefini-

tion will help us both to see how he would deal withthe problems
raised for his claims and to see which of the conflictingdoctrines
usually ascribed to him are genuinely his. We return now to our
account of nominal definition.

IV

On one widelyheld view,defended by Sir Thomas Heath among

others,Aristotle'sdistinctionbetweennominal and real definitionis
the same as that to be found in Mill and, earlier, in Saccheri.8
Accordingto Mill the distinctionis this.A nominal definitiongives
theconnotationof a term.A statementof the connotationof a term
for Mill involves no assertion,covertor overt,of the existence of
anythingor of any other "mattersof fact." It is "a mere identical
proposition"which specifiesthose attributeswhich belong to any-
thing in virtue of its being in the denotation of the term.9Mill's
doctrine is a version of the familiarview that a definitionof the
meaningof a term,forMill a nominaldefinition,is a specificationof
those general characteristicsthe possession of which is logically
necessary and sufficientfor belonging to the denotation of the
term.10A real definition,on the other hand, is for Mill a nominal
definition"and somethingmore." In a real definitionthe implica-
tion is added "thatthere existsa thingcorrespondingto the word
[defined].""l1
As an accountofAristotle'sdistinctionthisis inadequate. To begin
with,Aristotleclearlyimpliesthatit is possible to know the nominal

8 See J. S. Mill,A System ofLogic,I, viii,5; forthe viewof Gerolamo Saccheri see the
lastchapterofhisLogicaDemonstrativa, 1stedition(Turin 1697), and the referencesin
Sir Thomas Heath, Euclid'sElements,2nd edition (New York, 1956), pp. 144f. For
Heath's discussionof Aristotlesee pp. 143-145 and Mathematics in Aristotle
(Oxford,
1949), p. 70. Cf. here S. Mansion,LeJugementd'Existence chezAristote(Louvain, 1946),
p. 154.
9 See Logic I, viii, 1, 5.
10Mill puts the point in more archaic language. "The definitionof a name ... is
the sum totalof essentialpropositionswhichcan be framedwiththatname for their
subject.All propositionsthetruthofwhichis impliedin the name ... are included in
the definition."Logic I, viii, 1.
II Logic I, viii,5.

519
 ROBERT BOLTON

definitionof some sortof thingand to know thatthingsof thatsort

exist,but not to be able to constructa real definitionof thatsortof
thing.12This is impossiblebydefinitionon Mill'sdistinction,and this
by itselfshows that Mill's distinctionis not Aristotle's.
The mostimportantobjectionto thosewho attributeMill'sdistinc-
tionto Aristotle,however,is thatthe account of whata word means
given in an Aristoteliannominal definitionis not an account of the
connotationof a termin Mill's sense at all.
Before explaining why this is so, we should mention the other
commonwayof understandingthedistinctionbetweennominaland
real definition.On thisview also a nominal definitiongives us the
connotationofa term.A real definitiongivesus an accuratescientific
account of what some kind of thingis.13 This account contains a
more adequate notion of a real definition.But it stillhas its com-
petitor'sviewof a nominaldefinition.On both versionsnominaland
real definitionsare concerned withquite differenttypesof entities.
Crudely put, nominaldefinitionsare concerned withmeaningsand
real definitionswithactual particularsand theirnatures. Nominal
definitionsmake no referenceto actual thingsfallingunder themor
to their natures. They are corrector incorrectindependentlyof
whetherthereare any thingsthatfall under them or what the real
definitionsof such thingsmaybe. This traditionalpictureof the sort
of distinctionwhichAristotleis drawing,one whichputs his theory
of meaning for general terms into the traditionto which Mill's
theorybelongs,is inadequate. Speaking crudelyagain, nominaland
real definitionsare not concerned with two differenttypes of
entities- meaningsand things.Rather,theyare twodifferenttypes
of accounts of the same entities-things. This is not to say that
nominaldefinitionsare notaccountsof whatwordsmean. It is to say
that,for Aristotle,a correct account of what certain words mean
cannot proceed withoutreferenceto actual thingsdenoted bythose
wordsor apart fromreferenceto thereal natureswhichthosethings
have. The best way to show this is to examine in detail Aristotle's
discussion of nominal definitions.

12 93b29-35 showsthatwe can know of the existenceof somethingconformingto a

nominal definitionwithoutknowingthe real definition(the Ti bo-rm) of the thing.

13
This versionof the distinctionis the one Mill himselfattributesto "Aristotelian
logicians" and the one taken now by Ross (Aristotle's Prior and PosteriorAnalytics
[Oxford, 1949], pp. 634-635).

520
 ESSENTIALISM AND SEMANTIC THEORY

We mayconvenientlybegin bylistingthe importantthingswhich

Aristotlesays about nominal definitions.My readings of the pas-
sages mentionedwill be defended below.
(a) A nominal definitionis an account (XAyoq)of what some-
thingis (93b29-32).
(b) A nominal definitionis an account of what a word or
phrase signifies(o-C aVEN) (92b6-7; 15-16; 26-28; 93b30-
31).
(c) A nominal definitionmay specifyonly accidental charac-
teristicsof things which the term names (93b32-38 with
92b30-32).
(d) A nominal definitionis a formula whose understanding
involvesawarenessof the existenceof thingsdenoted bythe
termdefined (93al9-30 with93b30-35 and 94a7-9).
(e) A nominal definitioncontainsa referenceto, but does not
display,the essential nature of thingsnamed by the term
defined (93b38-94a2).
(f) A nominal definitionis the conclusion of a demonstration
which displaysessential nature (94a7-9, 13-14).

VI

An understandingof the featurelistedfourthabove is crucial to

understandingAristotle'sdoctrine.As we have seen, the chieffunc-
tionof nominal definitionsis to enable scientific
inquiryto getoffthe
ground. Nominal definitionsencapsulate informationwhich the
scientisthas about an entitybeforehe has an account of itsnature or
essence. This enables the scientistto fix on suitable objects for
furtherinvestigation.Inquiry into the nature of something can
proceed, however,onlywhen we are aware ofthe existenceofthings
withthatnature (92b4-6). So for nominal definitionsto do theirjob
at all theymustfixnot only on some class of possible objectsbut on
certainactual objectsas well. This suggeststhatnominaldefinitions,
as such, have existentialimport.The suggestionis supported by a
considerationof the wayin whichAristotletreatshis own examples
of nominaldefinitions.He saysat 93a21-24, havingpointedout that
we cannot know the essence of somethingwithoutknowingthat it
exists,that:

521
 ROBERT BOLTON

We are sometimes awarein an accidentalwaythatsomething existsand

sometimes bybeingawareofsomeelementofthethingitself, forexample,
bybeingawarethatthunderis a certainnoisein theclouds,thateclipseis a
oflight,
certainprivation orthatsoulisthat
thatmanisa certainlivingthing,
whichmovesitself.

These propositionswhose grasp involvesa nonaccidentalknowl-

edge of the existenceof somethingare examples of nominal defini-
tions.At 94a7-9 the firstof themis offeredas a specimen of the type
of definitionwhichcan functionas the conclusion of a demonstra-
tion. It is evidentfromthe summaryaccount of the typesof defini-
tion givenat 94a 11ff.thatthisis the nominal definition.14All of the
examples are taken in 93a29ff. to have this defining feature of
nominal definitions.So the grasping of these nominal definitions
involvesthe apprehension of the existenceof somethingconform-
ing to them.
The doctrinethat nominal definitionshave existentialimportis
not withoutdifficulties,however.It conflictswithAristotle'sappar-
ent claim that one may have a nominal definitionof a term that
denotes no existingobject. He says we can know what the name
"goat-stag"signifies(rt ucrqavEtTo 6voga), even though we know
that goat-stagsdo not exist (92b5-8). This has led interpretersto
suppose that nominal definitionsdo not have existentialimport.15

14 Of the threetypesof definitionmentionedat 94a 1If. thisis the only one which

can be identical withthe type discussed at 93b29f. Certain commentators,notably

Themistiusand Pacius, have tried to avoid identifyingthe definitionwhich is "the
conclusionof a syllogism"withthe nominaldefinitionbyintroducinga fourthtypeof
definitioninto Aristotle'saccount in PosteriorAnalyticsII, 10. This expedient has
againstitthe factthatin his summaryof the typesof definitiondiscussed in thechapter
(Spa, 94a 11ff.)Aristotlelistsonlythree,and at 75b31-32he claimsthatthereare only
three types.At De Anima413a 11-20,moreover,the typeof definitionwhichis like a
conclusion (rv~u7ripao-,ua) is identifiedwiththe sort which gives an account of the
thingdefinedwhichis "more obvious(to us)" butnot"moreintelligiblein the orderof
explanation." At Physics184a 16ff.nominal definitionsare said to be accounts of
this type. (This provides a clear rationale for identifyingthe third type of defi-
nition mentioned at 94a 11ff.with the nominal definition.Nominal definitions
deal withthe familiarpropertiesof some kindand theseare typicallyones thatcan be
displayed in the conclusionsof demonstrationsdealing withthose kinds.) Also, the
class of assumptionsas to whatis signifiedby(the names of) the proper accidentsof a
science (assumptionsusually and rightlycalled nominal definitions)is identifiedby
Aristotlein his discussionof the typesof propositionswhich figurein a science with
"the thingswhich are proved." (Posterior Analytics, 76b11-16 with2 1-22.)
15
See, e.g. Heath,Euclid'sElements,op. cit.,p. 143; Ross, op. cit.,pp. 55, 635. These

522
 ESSENTIALISM AND SEMANTIC THEORY

Before we deal withthisdifficulty it willbe useful to listthe other

evidence that nominal definitionsdo have existentialimport.The
evidence cited thus far mightbe taken to show only that certain
characteristictypesof nominal definition-of whichAristotlegives
examples -have existentialimport,or thatnominal definitionsmay
serveas vehiclesforexpressingknowledgeof existenceand notthat
theymust do it. Other evidence unambiguouslyrequires us to go
further.
First,Aristotlecharacterizesthe nominal definitionas the conclu-
sion of a demonstration.By this he means that the characteristics
which we use to nominallydefine some entityare ones which can,
eventuallyat least,be demonstratedto belong to it.Given thiswe can
only have nominal definitionsof the names of entitieswhich are
genuine kindswhose naturewe can uncover- sinceonlysuch kinds
can have thingsdemonstratedto belong to them.And forAristotle
any kind whose nature we are in a position to uncover must have
members(93a4, 19-20). Secondly,the syllogismswhich have nomi-
nal definitionsas conclusionsgive the reason forand, hence, prove
the existenceof the kinds defined,unless positingthe existenceof
the kindshas alreadybeen required withoutproof (93a3-4, a 16-b14;
cf. 76a31-6).16 On both counts these definitionsmust be taken to
implythe existence of instancesof those kinds.
A nominal definitionis, furthermore,one sortof account of what

scholars claim that the distinctionwhich Aristotledraws in Posterior AnalyticsI, 10

between definitionsand hypothesesshows that definitionsdo not have existential
import.The passage says,however,thatdefinitionsare nothypothesesin thesense of
explicit assertionswhich do notrequireproof(76a31-36, b35-37). It does not say or
require thatdefinitionshave no existentialimport but onlythatiftheydo then,except
for the case of the primaryobjects of a science, the import cannot be taken as
warranted without proof. At 76b35-37 Aristotlesays "definitions(s6por)are not
hypothesessince nothingis said to be or not to be [in them];hypothesesbelong to the
class of propositions,but definitionsonly require to be understood." Since this
passage supposes thatdefinitionsare not propositions,the term"definition"mustbe
of a full
used here,as it frequentlyis (see, e.g. 90b30-38),to referonly to thedefiniens
definition.(This explains whyAristotlegoes on to say that "definitionsare neither
universal nor particular"(77a3-4), a fact that does not in the least hold of a full
definition(97b26).) The passage then saysthata definiens assertsnothingand has no
existentialimport.It does notsay thata statementof whatthedefiniens of some entity
is, a full definition,has no existentialimport.
16 See below at n. 43 foran account of the two formswhich these conclusionstake.

In both cases the conclusions,and the fullnominal definitionsbased on them,have

existentialimport.

523
 ROBERT BOLTON

somethingis (XAoyos roiriV i-, 93b29). For Aristotle,anydefinition

is an account of whatsomethingis (90b3-4,30-31). And we can only
have an account of what somethingis (ri Eo-rr)if the thing exists
(93a20). (The sense of theexpression"rt &r'e" at 93b29 is fixedbyits
context,92b5-8; 93b21-94a19.) The factthata nominal definitionis
"an account of what somethingis," moreover,is closelyconnected
withthe fact thatit makes a referenceto the essence of what con-
formsto it (93b38f.). A nominal definitionsignifies(craiVEL) the
samethingthatone typeofrealdefinition displays(8rjXo'C,8ELKVvcL);
and thatis an essence (&&,r( '&-Tlv). Aristotlemakestheverycontrast
betweena nominaldefinitionand one typeof real definitionturnon
the differentways in which each focuses on an essence (93b29f.,
b38-94a2). It is clear thatifa nominal definitiondid not focuson an
essence at all it would not be an "account of what a name signifies"
(93b30) since that typeof account is distinguishedfrom others by
referenceto the way it does focus on an essence. Contraryto the
orthodoxinterpretation, describedin SectionIV above, the nominal
definitionis as much an account of a real essence as the real defini-
tion. It signifiesthatessence withoutdisplayingit, however. What
thismeans we willinvestigate.But whateverit means, if a nominal
definitionsignifieswhat a real definitiondisplays then the name
whose significanceis given in the nominal definitionmust denote
actual objects.For the essence whichis theobject of a real definition
must be instantiated.
The evidence, then,thatwe cannot have a nominal definitionof
any term withemptydenotation is very strong. So we must look
more carefullyat the passage where Aristotlehas been supposed to
claim thatwe can have a nominal definitionof "goat-stag"(92b5-8).
Aristotledoes not in fact say there thatwe can have a definition of
what"goat-stag"signifiesbut onlythatwe can knowwhatitsignifies.
This leaves open whattheother evidence requires,thatthe account
of what it signifiesis not even a nominal definition.Aristotleantici-
pates thatsome willwantto treattheaccount as a definition.Later in
thesame chapterhe argues thatno definitioncan merelybe a phrase
whichsignifieswhatanotherexpressiondoes (92b26-30). He objects
on the ground that on this view one can have a definitionwhose
terms signifynon-natural kinds and denote only nonexistentob-
jects. This objection is not only never cancelled in the sequel but is
repeated at Metaphysics 1030a6ff.So, we have everyreason to take it
thattheclaim thatwe can have a nominal definitionof "goat-stag"is
not presentin Posterior AnalyticsII, 7.

524
 ESSENTIALISM AND SEMANTIC THEORY

There is one featureof Aristotle'sdoctrinewhichmightbe taken

to conflictwith the line we have followed here. Aristotlecharac-
terizesa nominal definitionas the conclusion of a demonstration.
This is, it maybe claimed, true forhim onlyin a qualifiedsense. He
argues thatone can knowof the existenceof somethingconforming
to a nominal definitionand stillbe aware of onlyaccidentalcharac-
teristicsof the thing.17In thiscase the definitionwillonly mention
accidental features of the thing or its kind. And the terms of a
definitionwhichmentionsmerelyaccidentalfeaturesof some kind
cannot go to make up the conclusion of a genuine demonstrative
syllogismwhichestablishesthatcertainattributesbelong to thekind.
So, being the conclusion of a syllogismcannot be an absolute re-
quirementfora nominaldefinition.One mighttryto treattheother
featuresofnominaldefinitionwe have been consideringin the same
way.
We should not be misledbythe language of 92a6-14, however,to
an overlyrestrictive viewof the sense in whicha nominaldefinitionis
the conclusion of a demonstration.In an earlier passage, Aristotle
tells us that there is a less than strictnotion of demonstrationin
whichit is possible to demonstratethingsactuallybut onlyacciden-
tallyconnectedwithsome kind(75b2 1-26). He goes on to add that,in
a similarway,thereis a less strictnotionofdefinition.For each of the
threetypesof definitionis definedby use of the concept of demon-
stration(b30-32). This means thatthe typeof definitionwhichis the
conclusionof a demonstrationmay mentioncharacteristicsactually,
but only accidentally,connected withthe kind which theyhelp to
nominallydefine.This stillrequires,however,thatthe termsof the
definition denote actual objects and that the definitionis of a
genuine kind. It leaves no room for a nominal definitionof "goat-
stag."This does notshowthatthereis no wayof explainingwhatthat
term signifies.It only requires that the explanation will not be a
definition of the type described at 93b29ff.-the type traditionally
labeled nominal definition.The theoryof nominal definitionis a
theoryof significationonly fortermsthatstand for kinds of things
whose natureand behavioris scientifically intelligible-for genuine
natural-kindtermsthatis. What we mustattemptto explain is why
definitionsof such terms should have the special features which
Aristotleattributesto them. Why should they have existentialim-

17
See 92b30-32 with93b32-37, and below Sec. X.

525
 ROBERT BOLTON

portand whyshould theyinvolvea referenceto genuine kinds?Why

does Aristotlecall themconclusionsof demonstrationsand accounts
of what somethingis?

VII

The examples of nominal definitionwhichwe have identifiedat

93a2 1ff.have one featurein common.They all specifyan elementin
the essence of the entitytheydefine,but onlyan element.By grasp-
ing them we grasp Tt ci)ToV ToV' Tpcxay/atoa -"something of the
thing itself."'18
They serve, suitablyframed, as the conclusions of
syllogismswhich manifestthe essence of the thingdefined,where
the terms of the conclusion figurein the account of the essence
(93b39-94a5). To take a particularcase, the termsin the nominal
definitionofthunder("noise in the clouds") figurein thereal defini-
tion of thunder ("noise due to the extinguishingof fire in the
clouds"). (The proposition which is the conclusion of a syllogism
here is, strictlyspeaking, one which has for its termsonly the ele-
mentsof thedefiniens of a fulldefinition(94a7-8).19Aristotleuses the
term "definition"(6pwo60,g or '6pos here) often to cover only the
definiensofa definition.20The statementofwhatthedefiniens of some
entityis will,however,giveboththedefiniens and whatis defined.It is
statementsof thissortwhichwe are callingnominaldefinitionsand it
needs to be pointed out thattheyare "conclusions" only in an ex-
tended sense.)
The examples we have focusedour attentionon show thatcertain
nominal definitionsdo give necessaryconditionsfor being an in-
stanceof the entitydefined.Do theyalso give sufficient conditions?
Beingjust any noise in theclouds is notsufficient forbeing thunder.
Nominal definitionsare supposed, however,to be specificationsof
what certainwords signify.How can theybe if theygive necessary
but not sufficient conditionsforbeing in the denotationof the term

18
Aristotleglossesthe phrase rt ai'rrovrovi7rp6yauaroq
(93a22) by the phrase rtroi3
Ti &iort("an element of what the thing is") at 93a29.
19The matteris more complicatedthanthissincethesubjecttermof theconclusion
whichis a definitionof thistypedoes dutybyitselfforthedefiniendum. See below at nn.
41-43. As we shall see, moreover,some "conclusionsof demonstrations"whichare
nominal definitionsdo not simplyexhibit termsof the definiens of a definition.
20 See n. 15 above.

526
 ESSENTIALISM AND SEMANTIC THEORY

defined?To answerthisquestionwe need to determinewhatAristo-

tle means by the claim thatnominal definitionsspecifywhata word
or phrase signifies.
Aristotlemightmean bywhata word signifies(o-%raivEl) what,as
we saw in Section IV, he has usually been taken to mean-what a
word connotes,or somethingof thatilk. But thispossibilityis ruled
out by Aristotle'suse of the word "signify"in our section of the
PosteriorAnalytics. He claimsthatan expressionmaysignifynonexis-
tent particulars,that "The Iliad" and the whole poem signifythe
same thing,and thata nominal definitionwhichdoes not displayor
reveal the essence associated witha given termwillstillsignifythat
essence (92b28-30, 30-32, 93b39f.). In none of these claims can
"U Lr9v9" mean what "connotes" does. An expression does not
connote non-existentparticulars.21Attributesand not their in-
stances,existentor not,are connoted. "The Iliad" does notconnote
what the whole poem does. I know roughlywhat "The Iliad" con-
notes,namelyThe TrojanSaga (t)'IXta&1To&'qrLs),22 but I don't even
know most of the poem, much less what it all connotes. And a
definitionwhichsignifiesan essence can hardlyconnote thatessence
thereby,if I can know whatit signifiesbut not know at all whatthat
essence is. It isn't that "denotes" will work to translate"ugatvEt"
here. The firsttwo passages above indicate thatif two expressions
have the same significationtheyhave the same denotationor refer-
ence, if we allow nonexistentindividualsto be in the referenceof a
term.23But thelastpassage showsthatthetwoexpressionsalso point

21
The A7 6vra at 92b29 are nonexistentparticulars,as contrastedwith the A)
kob-iatwhich are non-naturalkinds (whetherinstantiatedor not). The do-iat are
essences not substances;thereis no worryat all in thePosteriorAnalytics over whether
nonsubstancescan be defined. Cf. Ross, op. cit.,p. 627. See 92b13 for the sense of
Mcala in question in the context.
22 The understood noun with'IUtXL is 7roiqo-vg,
or one close to it in meaning. See
Liddell and Scott,ad loc. 92b30-32does notabsolutelyrequire that"Iliad" is thename
matchedup with(Oio-Oat)and signifying the same thingas thepoem in the hypotheti-
callypositeddefinitiontherein view.The name could be anotherone inventedforthe
purpose. But Metaphysics 1030b7-10 indicates that Aristotlebelieves that there is a
name in use whichdoes signifythesame thingas the poem, and thatname can onlybe
"Iliad."
23 For otherpassages whereo-r.aivEtv and itscognatesdo notintroducethe notion

of connotationand wherereference is thethingin viewsee Metaphysics 1040a33 (where

the termin question,"the sun," "cAraivEt an individual)and Poetics1457a4ff.where
various expressionswhichhave connotationbut no referenceare said to be nonsig-
nificant.

527
 ROBERT BOLTON

to or stand for the same kind, whether natural or not, without

necessarilydisplayingthat kind.24So significationhas two compo-
nentsone of whichis reference;the other is not, however,sense or
connotationin anythinglike Mill's sense. It involvesa fixingon a
kindbut notnecessarilyvia a specificationof theattributesthatmake
up the kind.
To help us to understandAristotle'sdoctrineof signification here
it will be helpful to compare his theoryof definitionbrieflywith
Plato's. Plato makes no distinctionbetweennominaland real defini-
tion. Genuine kind-termssignify(o-qgativElv) kindsbyconnotingor
revealing(8&qXoiv) thosekinds.25So, forPlato,thereis no explaining
what a kind-termsignifies,giving a nominal definition,without
displayingthe kind which it does signify,givinga real definition.
This requires thatwe understand the correctaccount of the nature
of a givenkindas soon as we understandthe significanceof itsname,
and that those who do not know what some kind is cannot in any
reliable way identifythe kind or any of its instances.Aristotle(Re-
public476c-d) denies thisdoctrine,however,and holds thatone can
reliablyidentifya given kind and instancesof it withoutknowing,
even implicitly,26 what the structureof the kind is. This moves him
to split the signifyingand revealing functionsof kind-terms.27 He
does retainthePlatonicdoctrinethatkind-termsdo signify, do point

24
For other passages where focusingon a (naturalor non-natural)kind is in view
see Physics213b30 and Metaphysics1006a28ff. A name could, conformablywith
Aristotle'susage, signifya kind due to displaying(8,qXoiv)the kind; and Aristotle
often thinksof entitieswhich signifyas also revealing what they signify(see, e.g.,
Categories3b10-12). But they need not and often,at least, do not.
25 Plato uses the words "BAXwa" and "8,qXorv" interchangeablywithand in expli-
cation of his use of "o-qrnL7,ov"and "o-?11uaitvEtv"
in contextswhere he is discussing
semantictheory.See Cratylus422-423 with 427c where Plato specificallymaintains
thatan expression signifiesor is a signof some kinddue to itsrevealingthe elements
of the essence of the kind. In the Sophist(261-262) he continues to think of all
signifiers(o-qA6a) as 8AX6aTra. The word "87X&Aa" is used by Plato to cover ex-
pressions and other objects which fullyand adequately reveal what theyindicate.
(See, e.g. Cratylus435a-b; cf.Statesman287a.) And forPlato everygenuine definition
involvesa 8AXwo-ts of some kind (Phaedrus265d).
26 Plato's doctrinemay be made somewhatpalatable by the theoryof recollection

providing we can construe the realm of innate knowledge of kinds sufficiently

broadly.
27 PosteriorAnalytics93b29-94a2, at b29f. and b39f. where 8,qXovv(treated

as a synonymof 8&ELKVIva)is contrastedwitho-qrnaivEtv. The doctrinethatwordscan

indicatesomething(o-qrnaivEtv) withoutexplicitlydisplayingitgoes back at leastas far
as Heraclitus (Fr. 93).

528
 ESSENTIALISM AND SEMANTIC THEORY

to and stand for, the kinds themselves.28But since they do not

standardlydo so by connotingor revealingthose kinds to whoever
knows the significanceof the words which stand for those kinds,
theymustbe able to do so in some other way.
Since thedefinition"Thunder is a noise in theclouds" tellsus what
the term "thunder" signifies,it must both point to the essence of
thunderand specifythe referenceof the term"thunder."But how
can it do thiswhen notjust any noise in the clouds is thunder?To
understand how, we need to see thatnominal definitionsnot only
have existentialimport.To grasp thisdefinitionas a nominaldefini-
tion is to construethe definiens as coveringcertainactualinstancesof
thunder.The evidence forthisstartswiththefactthatAristotlegives
as alternativeformulationsof the nominal definitionof thunder
"noise in theclouds" (94a7-8) and "a certaintypeof noise (40640obTtg)

in the clouds" (93a22-23). The formulationof the definitionwhich

contains the key expression "a certain" (Tu) is the revealingone.
In an importantmethodological passage in the Physics(184a 16-
b14) Aristotlesays that nominal definitions"signifya certainwhole
('6XovTt) in a loose way (HloptC'-TwS)"(b 11).This thesisaccounts for
thepresenceof the"'es" in theexamples ofnominaldefinitiongiven
at PosteriorAnalytics93a22ff.And the passage in thePhysicsreveals
the significanceof itspresence. It signalsthefactthatthe account of
some entitygivenin a nominal definitionis of the same sortas that
possessed in the earlystages of scientificinquiryin thatit focuseson
a certain whole in a way that only loosely specifies it (Physics,
184a24-26, blO-I 1). The specificationis loose because the whole is
delimitedbyreferencetowhatis "betterknownto us";29thatis,what

28
ch. 1 forthe doctrineof expressionsas signifiers(o-,q E-Za).
See De Interpretatione,
Even names of non-naturalkindsare signifiers(16a16-17) buttheydo notsignifyin a
waythatdoes notinvolvecombination(o-6v0E0ots) or separation(8taipEo-ts)as expres-
sions which signifyitems in the categories do (a 16-17; cf. 18a 8ff. and Categories
lb25ff.). Aristotle retains Plato's distinctionbetween expressions that stand for
unities,whichare the natural-kindterms,and those thatdo not(Statesman 262a8ff.,at
d5). In Plato onlytheentitieswhichare genuine unitiesare proper subjectsof genuine
division or, hence, of definition(Phaedrus 265d-266b, with Republic 534b). The
influenceof thisdoctrineaccountsforAristotle'srefusalto allow a definition(even a
nominal definition)of goat-stag.
29 The factthatnominal definitions are accounts fromthe pointof viewof what is
more familiar to us makes clear that they are accounts which capture ordinary
conceptions (Topics 141b3ff.at 12-13). This is one reason why the standardlyheld
view thatnominal definitionsdo explicate the ordinarymeaningsof termsis correct
(cf. n. 39, below). My viewsconcern how they do thisand not whethertheydo it.

529
 ROBERT BOLTON

is "betterknown in the order of perception" (a24-25). This is not

merely what is describable in perceptual language. It is what is
actuallyfamiliar tous in perception,at leastto thoseof us who have the
typeof elementaryunderstandingof the "whole" in question which
is a prerequisiteto scientificinquiry.If it were not then Aristotle
would notcharacterizewhatis "bestknownto sense" as "whatis plain
and obvious to us first"in our process of knowledge acquisition
(1 84a2 1).30 So the"certainwhole" signifiedin a nominaldefinitionis
a "certainfamiliar whole." The nominaldefinitionof thundertellsus
that"thunderis a certainfamiliar typeof noise in the clouds," a type
withinstancesof which we are familiar.
Accordingto our passage in thePhysicsthe possessorof a nominal
definitionhas that type of understandingof a universal which is
nearest to sense (184a23ff.). This type of understandingis called
elsewhere by Aristotle "experience" (i1TrELpia, Posterior Analytics,
lOOa3ff.).We can learn more about what type of familiaritywith
instancesof the kind definedthose who grasp a nominal definition
have by investigatingAristotle'snotion of experience.
Experience is thattypeof codificationof informationabout actual
particularsdrawn fromsense experience of themwhichmarksthe
firststage in learning where it is appropriate to speak of concept
acquisition (PosteriorAnalytics,100a3-9, Metaphysics, 980b28-98la2,
a5-7). From thisstage,Aristotlesays,science takes itsstart(Posterior
Analytics, 1OOa6-8,cf.PriorAnalytics, 46a 17f.). This makes clear why
nominal definitions,being startingpoints in science of the type
which are better known to us,31contain informationof the sort
embodied in experience. Experience involves"a universalstabilized
as a complete whole withinthe soul" (though not the finalformof
the universal,100a6-7,.16). It also involvesa "knowledgeof particu-
lars" (100a4-7, Metaphysics98la15-16). Experience is a type of sys-
tematizedmemory(100a4-6) and as such involvesa knowledgeof a
universalwhichis not detached fromtheknowledgeof and memory
The specificationof such a universalrequires
of actual particulars.32
30
For other passages which indicate thatwhat is betterknown to us, and hence
what is better known to sense, is what we are actually familiar with, see Topics
14 b3-14, Ethics1095b2-9,Metaphysics 1029b4ff.
but theyare essentialones and the
31 Not all startingpointsare nominal definitions

only ones which are items of iA7rTEtpi. PosteriorAnalytics71a 11ff.,76a3 1ff. with
7 b33ffE
32
Since ,u7rEtpiais itselfsystematizedmemoryand memorynecessarilyinvolves
referenceto actual particularsthe knowledgeof the universaland the knowledgeof
the particularin iA7rTEtpiaare intimatelyconnected.

530
 ESSENTIALISM AND SEMANTIC THEORY

a referenceto particularsthough not by name or by mention of

uniquely identifyingcharacteristics.33So when Aristotle charac-
terizes nominal definitionsas accounts from the point of view of
whatis betterknownto us and whatis bestknownto sense he means
thattheyfocuson actual familiarperceptibleinstancesof a kindand
define the kind partlyby means of a referenceto those instances.
They focus on particulars,according to the Physics,in the way in
whichthe knowledgeof theuniversalman whichis possessed by the
infant who calls all men father focuses on particulars (Physics,
184b3-5). For the infant,a man is what fatheris.34The focus on
particularsin a nominal definitionis unlike thisin thatno specific
particularsare named therein.
We can illustratehow these elementsare incorporatedin a nomi-
nal definitionby furtherspelling out the import of our nominal
definitionof thunder. "Thunder is a certain noise in the clouds"
conveys the informationthat thunder is a certain familiarnoise-
type,the one to whichthose actual familiarnoises in the clouds that

33 The universal (KacOoXov) of PosteriorAnalytics100a6-7 is 7rTap&r& 7roXX6 in the

sense of beingrightalong side certainactual particulars.But itsspecificationdoes not
include mentionof specificparticularsbyname or byreferenceto uniquelyidentify-
ing characteristics(al5ff.). They are referredto, remembered if you will, under
characteristicscommon to themall. But theyare stillreferredto. How thiscan be has
seemed a mystery.The way in which it is done in nominal definitionsis made clear
here. The application to experience and to memorywill be easy to make.
34 My interpretation ofPhysics184a 16-b14 providesa differentaccount ofthe '6xov
TL ofa25 and b 11 thanthe usual ones. Ross, inAristotle's Physics(Oxford, 1936), treats
the '6XovTL at b11 as a whole in whichdifferentsenses of a termlie undistinguished,
senses whichare somehowdistinguishedfromeach otherbya nominal definition(p.
457). This requires treatingthe definition(6ptcorg6)of b12 as a nominal definition.
But itis the account (X6yoq)whichsignifiesthe '6Xov whichis the nominaldefinition
(b10-11). This is contrastedwiththe 6ptor-6gofb12. The latteris the accountwhichis
reached at the finalstages of inquiry,as the use of "the particulars"(T& KaO' EKaIGa)
in b12, parallelto the use in a24, shows.This is thereal definition.Ross treatsthe'6Xov
TL of a25 as the genus of the object of scientific inquiry.But this requires that the
scientistalwaysmoves froma grasp of the genus of the objectof his search to a grasp
ofitsspecificnature.This is contrarytoPosteriorAnalytics 7 b33-72a5 and the reverse
of what is illustratedat Physics184b12-14. The infantdoes not begin by calling all
fathersmen (and so gettingtheirgenus right)he beginsbycallingall men father.The
scientistmoves froma whole (or a nominaldefinition)whichincludes more elements
(guip-q,a26) than the object of his search-as fatherincludes more elementsthan
man -to a whole (or a real definition)whichseparates offthe elementsbelongingto
theobjectof hissearch fromthe others.The initialwhole is more universal(KacoxoV,
a23-25 in the sense of includingmore gip-q. And these gip-qare not alwaysspecies.
Cf. W. Wieland, Die Aristotelische Physik(2nd edn., G6ttingen,1970), pp. 88ff.

531
 ROBERT BOLTON

we recognizeas thunderbelong. We cannot spell out on the basis of

this definitionjust what that noise-typeis-if we could, we would
have a real definitionof thunderand not merelya nominal defini-
tion. But we can identifyit for study.It is the noise-typeto which
certain actual familiar noises belong. We cannot specifyin any
precise way,either,just which noises those familiarnoises are. We
know only that they are the ones which would be in view, in the
graspingof the definition,as instancesof the typewhose natureis to
be explained (93a31, b32). This is enough, however.For given this,
the nominal definitiongives us an accurate specificationof the
denotationof the term"thunder."Somethingis thunderifand only
ifitbelongsto thesame noise-typeas thoseactual noisesin theclouds
whichwe count as familiarinstancesof thunder.The "we" in ques-
tionhere is the "we" thatis in a positiontobeginto pursue a scientific
inquiryinto the nature of thunder by identifyinginstancesof the
phenomenon.35This includes practicallyeveryonein the language
communityin whichthe termis current.So the familiarcases in this
instanceare the ones agreed to by common consent. In some cases
appropriate familiaritywiththe ordinaryinstancesof some entity
may be restrictedto a special class of persons.36If so the familiar
cases referredto in the nominal definitionare the ones on which
theywould agree. The general principleis thatthe instancesrefer-
red to in the definitionare those whichare "mostfamiliar"to those
language users who are in factfamiliarwithinstances.It is possible
that there will be disagreement over which cases are the "most
familiar"ones among those who are on this principle qualified to
decide. Aristotledoes not say directlywhat the process of adjudica-
tionwould be in such cases. But we knowthathe regards a nominal
definitionas a typeof accepted belief('fvaogov).37 We knowalso that
when there is conflictamong liv~a, in whole or in part, the most
authoritative(KVptrara) ones are to be preferred.These are the
ones held by those most expert in the matterswhich the 'Ev~ofa

35 See the uses of the firstperson plural in 93al7-29.

36
The contentofthe nominaldefinitionof soul as "thatwhichmovesitself'(93a24)
mightput the soul in thiscategory.The othernominal definitionsat a22-24 point to
commonlyfamiliarinstancesof the entitiesdefined.
37 Any nominal definitionspecifiesa signifier(o-teiov) and one whose presence

does notjust entailthatof the thingsignifiedbut is takento do so. So it mustbelong to

theclassofo-)u-tcawhichare accepted as such ('Evaoea).SeeP riorAnalytics 70a3-7 and
n. 47 below.

532
 ESSENTIALISM AND SEMANTIC THEORY

concern.38This suggeststhatAristotlewould give added weightin

determiningwhich cases of some kind are genuinely the "most
familiar"ones to thevoice of those mostexpertin the area. This will
not sufficeto settleall conflictsthatone can imagine. But Aristotle
gives us no way of determiningwhich'&vofa are to be preferredas
'v&ofa beyond this.

VIII

Now we can explain whyAristotlethinksthatthereis a reference

to familiaractual objects in nominal definitions.The common un-
derstandingof thosewho knowwhata kind-termmeans is in impor-
tant respects incomplete. The understanding provides language
users witha device directingthemto membersof the kind. But this
device is not normallya set of general characteristicsnecessaryand
sufficientforbelonging to the kind. How, then,can it be a sign for
just thingsof that kind? By using as a crutcha referenceto actual
objectswhichbelong to the kind.Our earlyunderstandingof a kind
alwaysleans heavilyon such a crutch-we knowat firstwhathuman
beings or any other things are only by reference in memoryto
familiarexamples. And the language whichwe learn as we get our
early understanding cannot surpass the limitationsof the under-
standingitself.What counts as somethingnamed by a kind-termat
thatstage mustbe a functionof whatwe would take to belong to the
kind.And whatwe would taketo belong can itselfonlybe specifiedat
that stage by reference to actual familiarexamples. The common
understanding which belongs to all those who know what a term
means never goes beyond this stage, and the account of what the
term means must reflectthis fact.39

38Ethics 1145b2-6, with Metaphysics10lObl1ff.at bl5f. and PosteriorAnalytics

79a23-5.
39 Aristotlemaintainsthe distinctionbetween real and semantic(nominal) defini-
tion even where he thinkshe possesses a real definition(94a5-9). He givesno reason
forthisin theAnalytics. But in TopicsVI, 4, we findthejustification.We have seen that
a semanticdefinitionof a kind-termfocuses on featuresand cases of the kind which
are most familiarto those who understand the use of the term. Unless theydo this
theycannot capture what is commonlyunderstood by "any ordinaryintelligence."
(Topics141b3ff.at b 13, 17-19) Real definitionsdo not do this.They containaccounts
whichare more knowableabsolutely.And these can onlybe grasped by thosewhose
understandingis "precise and above the ordinary."(Topics,141bl3-14)

533
 ROBERT BOLTON

The referenceto familiarexamples in a nominal definitionis not,

in Aristotle'sview, a bare ostensive referencevoid of descriptive
content.Whatwe would countas an instanceof a kindon thebasisof
even the most elementaryunderstandingof the kind is based on a
referenceto familiaractual objectswithcertainproperties.It is not
thatall membersof the kind musthave these properties,nor even
that anythingwhich has these propertiesbelongs to the kind. But
some thingswiththese properties,identifiableby appropriate per-
sons, belong to the kind or nothing does. If nothing has these
propertiestheremaystillbe a kindout therewhichwe weregroping
afterin takingit thatsome thingshad these properties.But ifnone
of theindividualswhichbelong to ithave characteristics whichmake
themat all familiarto us, then none of themis familiarto us. Their
kind is not, then, one of which we have any grasp. This is why
Aristotlespeaks of nominaldefinitionsas theconclusionsof demon-
strations.The featuresof certaininstancesof a kind displayed in a
nominal definitionmust actually,and preferablyalso necessarily,
belong to certaininstancesof the kind. In eithercase a connection
between the kind and these featureswillbe demonstrablein either
the less or the more strictsense referredto earlier.
We can also explain now whyAristotlewants to say thateven a
nominaldefinitionsignifiesan essence and givesone sortof account
of the Ir &nt or essence of something.The definitionof thunder
whichwe have been consideringidentifiesforus what thunderis. It
is that kind whose members have the essence of certain familiar
noise instances. It is thisfactthat allows the nominal definitionto
specifythe referenceof "thunder."It is necessaryand sufficient for
being an instanceof thunderto have the essence whichthose famil-
iar noises in the clouds have. The only way that the definition
achieves an adequate specificationof the referenceof a termis by
invokingthat essence the possession of whichis logicallynecessary
and sufficientfor belonging to the reference of the term. The
necessaryand sufficient conditionswhichactuallyappear in nominal
definitionsare not, however,logical in character. On these condi-
tionsforsomethingto be an instanceofthunderitis necessarythatit
bear a certain relation to actual instances of thunder which are
familiarto certainpersons. This is no logicallynecessarycondition.
There could be thunder even if there were no people. The mo-
dalitiesin theseconditionsare forAristotleepistemic.It is required
for being an instance of an explicablekind that something satisfy
conditions of this sort. This is why Aristotlecharacterizes these

534
 ESSENTIALISM AND SEMANTIC THEORY

definitionsas vehiclesof knowledge of the existenceof something

capable of explanation (93a2 1ff.).

Ix

So farwe have dealt withonlyone typeof nominal definition,the

type we have when we know a part of the essence, and hence a
necessary feature, of some kind of thing and base our working
definitionof the kindon thatfeature.But thisis not the onlytypeof
nominal definition.A nominal definitionis an instrumentwhich
givesus knowledgeof theexistenceof instancesofa kindin advance
of knowledge of its essence. Such knowledge need not involvethe
apprehension of even an elementof the essence of the thing.It may
involve,accordingto thePosteriorAnalytics, onlytheapprehensionof
a feature which directs us "toward the essence" (rpo6 TOr ri BOrt,
93a29). Justwhattypesof characteristic Aristotlewould allow under
thisrubricother than elements of the essence he does not directly
say.An example discussedin hisfurtherexpositionhoweverenables
us to fixon one othertype.40The definitionswhichgive us at least a
part of the essence of the entitydefined are said to provide us not
only with knowledge of the existence or factof the thing (ro '6rt,
93a35) butwithat leasta partof the explanation (Io6&ort, 93a35-36)
for it. If we have as a nominal definition"Eclipse is (a certain)
blockage of light"thenwe have at least a partof theexplanation for
eclipses(93a2 1-24).In contrastto thiswe mayhave knowledgeofthe
existenceof the thingbut no part of the true explanation forit. We
may understand the kind eclipseas "the failureof the full moon to
cast shadows (thatis,to illuminatesomethingagainsta background)
when nothingvisibleis in the way" (93a37-b1). This descriptionof
eclipse functionsas a nominaldefinition.In theexample offereditis
the itemthroughwhichwe have a grasp of the existenceof eclipses
and which servestherebyas the startingpoint in the search for an
adequate explanation of eclipses (93bl-5). It is also explicable in
terms of some more fundamentalfeature of eclipse-in fact the
veryessence of eclipse (93b3-7). So thisitem also can serve as the

40 De Anima402b21-25at b22 uses the 'phrase rposoT6 et~&vatTo Ti OerTrin the way

the shorterphrase is used here and confirmsthe interpretationwhichfollows.

535
 ROBERT BOLTON
conclusion of a syllogismwhich mentions the essence of eclipse.
These are the cardinal featuresof a nominal definition.Aristotle
says,moreover,thatthe search forthe explanation of eclipse of the
moon is,in theexample offered,thesearchfortheri -rntor essence
of "the failureof the full moon to cast shadows when nothingis in
the way" (93b3-5). That explanation, when found, is the one that
givestheessence of eclipse (93b5-7).4' This means that"eclipse"and
"failure of the full moon to cast shadows . . ." have in the passage
the same signification.
This new example of a nominal definitiongives no part of the
essence of eclipse. It doesn't give us even a necessary feature of
eclipses. Not all eclipses take place "when nothingvisibleis in the
way,"thatis,when the skyis clear. What itdoes give us is a sufficient
conditionof eclipse.42A case of the failureof the full moon to cast
shadows under an ordinaryclear skyis a case of eclipse. But thisfact
can be explained by referenceto the essence of eclipse or a part of
the essence. So the feature of eclipse in question is not a merely
accidental feature of eclipse. It is explicable and hence a proper
(KaO' ain-6)accident of eclipse. This typeof featureis, withthe type
alreadydiscussed,one of the twotypesof strictly explicable features
of things(84a 11-17). It is one of the typesthatcan figurein a strict
"conclusion of a demonstration"about a thing and, hence, in a
nominal definitionof the thing.43

41
It isusuallysupposed that in 93b5 standsforsomethingdifferent thanitdoes in
93a37-93b3,but thereis no warrantforthisin the text.Aristotleintroducestheterm
and fixesitssignification at 93a37-39 and does notintroducea newsignification at any
subsequentpoint.Since in theexample we graspthe existenceof eclipse onlybybeing
aware thateclipses are cases ofB (failureof the fullmoon ... .), to say thatin looking
for the explanation of eclipse we are looking for the explanation of B is perfectly
appropriate; the account of eclipse is the account ofB. In similarfashionthe term"(a
certain) noise" which is a part of the nominal definitionof thunder is regarded as
equivalent at 93b9ff.to "thunder" itself.
42 93b12. Definitions whichintroduce"whatis moreintelligibleto us" maygiveonly
sufficientconditionsforbeing an instanceof what theydefine. The definitionof a
point as "the limitof a line," gives only a sufficientbut not a necessaryconditionfor
being a point.It doesn'tcover the pointsin the middle of a line. (See Topics14 1b3-28
withMetaphysics 1060b12-16.)
4The "conclusions" which constitutenominal definitionsgive explicable (KaO'
akTba) propertiesof the entitiesdefined in both cases. But the conclusions are of
different sorts.In the case of the nominal definitionwhichgivesa partof the essence
(e.g. "Thunder is a certainnoise in theclouds") itis thetermsof thedefinienswhichare
the termspfthe conclusion("A certainnoise is in theclouds," see 94a3-9). In thecase
of the typewhichgivesa featurewhichentailsthe presenceof the entitydefined(e.g.

536
 ESSENTIALISM AND SEMANTIC THEORY
How does the new definitionmeet the conditions for nominal
definitionwhich Aristotlelays down? It serves to fix attentionon
certainactual familiarinstancesof eclipse forfurtherinvestigation.
It points to totaleclipses of the moon which occur when the skyis
clear-the mostfamiliarcases of lunar eclipseto us. But how can the
definitionindicate what the name "eclipse" signifies(o-%xat'vEt)?It
gives us a sufficientconditionforbelonging to the class of eclipses.
How, then,can itgiveus an accountofconditionsformembershipin
theclass generally?The device employedis thesame as in theearlier
cases. Since the definitionincorporatesa referenceto familiarin-
stances of eclipse-events whichhave the essence of eclipse ifany-
thingdoes-it gives us the means for a general account of condi-
tions for membershipin the class. Like examples of the firsttype,
this definitionmakes an oblique reference to the essence of the
entityit defines. The nominal definition"Eclipse is the failure of
the fullmoon to cast shadows. . ." tellsus thatthe kindeclipseis the
essence possessed by certaincases of the failureof the moon to cast
shadows. Hence ittellsus thatsomethingis an eclipse ifand onlyifit
has the essence of these familiarcases.
Both typesof nominal definitionshare the followingtypicalfea-
tures: They identifynatural kinds by way of a referenceto certain
actual instancesof those kindsand to the essence of thoseinstances;
they mention explicable featuresof those kinds and so can serve,
suitablyframed,as the conclusionsof demonstrationsdealing with
those kinds; theyfixthe referenceof the names of those kinds by
givingnonlogical necessaryand sufficientconditionsfor member-
ship in those kinds;44and they fix the reference of those names

"Eclipse is the failureto cast shadows. ) it is the whole definitionwithits terms

reversed which is the conclusion (see 93a37-67). "Eclipse is an failure . . ." is an
appropriate way of puttingthisdefinitioneven thoughexpressed as a "conclusion"
the order of the termsis reversed. It says that the failurebelongs nonaccidentally
(KaOf' aT6) to eclipse, and one meaning of this for Aristotleis that the failure is a
certain sort of sufficient condition of eclipse.
44 There is no reason in principle why the second type of definition-which
mentionsexplicable (KaOf'aT6) propertiesof the entitydefined-cannot mention
propriaand, hence, give logicallynecessaryand sufficient conditionsformembership
in a kind. Such a definitionwould howeverhave convertibletermsand so would the
syllogisticconclusion expressingit; and it is Aristotle'sconvictionthatsuch conclu-
sions,and, hence, such definitions,are veryrare (73a17-18). This is in line withhis
generalconvictionthatnominaldefinitions,being accounts fromthe point of viewof
whatis more familiarto us, mentionfeaturesofinstancesof a kindwhichonlyloosely
determinethe kind.

537
 ROBERT BOLTON

withoutgiving anythinglike their connotation or sense as those

notions have normallybeen understood. With their import fully
bared, definitionsof both typesconformto the followingpattern
which we may call the standard schema for a nominal definition.
4 is the essentialnatureof thoseactual fit's
withpropertiesA, B,
C ... whichappropriate persons would count as familiarcases
of+.

We have now discussedtwotypesof nominaldefinition.There is a

thirdless importanttype.Aristotleclaimsthatit is possibleto know
of the existenceof somethingconformingto a nominal definition
and stillknow onlyaccidentalcharacteristicsof thatthing(93a2 1ff.
with93b29-35). It would be convenientifthesewere all proper (KaO'
ain-ci)accidents of the type already discussed. But the textwill not
allow this.When we have accidental knowledgeof the existenceof
somethingwe are in no waydirectedeven towarda knowledgeof the
essence (93a25-6). And all proper accidents do have thisdirecting
function(De Anima402b16ff.).Accidentalknowledgeof existenceis,
moreover,expressiblein an account (Xoyos)whose termsdesignate
entities which form a unity merely by conjunction, as the Iliad
designatesa unity,a complex event,whose partsgo togethermerely
by conjunction(93b34-37).45The connectionsbetween the partsof
merelyaccidental.So nomi-
the Iliad (the event) are, transparently,
nal definitionswhichonlygive us accidentalknowledgeof the exist-
ence of thingsconformingto them (93a2if., b34f.) must specify
merely accidental characteristicsof instances of the kinds they
define. In fact,some writershave taken it thatnominal definitions
can specifyonlyaccidentalcharacteristics. At 93b32-35Aristotlehas
been thoughtto say thatitis difficult "bygraspinga nominal defini-

45 For the senses of "one account" (as X6yoq)and "conjunction" (ovv8ecruosq) at

93b35-37 see Metaphysics 1030b7-10 with1030a6f. (The doctrineofDe Interpretatione
17al5ff. is of no relevance here.) It is not required by 93b35-37 that the Iliad, the
poem, is a definition.This is ruled out by 92b30-32. The passage only requires that
definitionsof one type are similarin an importantrespectto the poem.

538
 ESSENTIALISM AND SEMANTIC THEORY

tion"(o4rws) to uncover the essence of thingswhichwe do notknow

to exist (6 pt) '(o-ytEv'o6t io-wtv), since in this case we only know that
they exist accidentally.46This reading does require that nominal
definitionsonlyspecifyaccidentalcharacteristics, but the reading is
incorrect.The antecedent of the crucial expression "in this way"
(oircnw)is not some unexpressed phrase "by grasping a nominal
definition."Its natural and correctantecedent is the nearest pre-
ceeding adverbial clause, "when we simplygrasp ('eXovrEsg) that it
exists"(b32). So read, the passage says thatit is difficultto uncover
the essence of thatwhichwe do notknowto exist(E'JEivat),,"whenwe
simplygrasp ('iXovrEg)thatit exists,"since in thiscase we onlyknow
thatitexistsaccidentally.These lines exploitthe thesisof a preceed-
ing passage (93a26-9) thatthereare manywaysof grasping('ixEtv)
that somethingexists,the simplestof which does not involveknow-
ledge in the strictsense (E'Evat) of its existence since it does not
involvea grasp of any of its nonaccidentalcharacteristics.This sort
of grasp, whichaccompanies the grasp of onlyone typeof nominal
definition,is the one in view at 93b32 (see b34-5). This reading is
confirmedbythe contrastsubsequentlydrawn betweentwotypesof
account (Xoyog)one of which deals with accidental characteristics
and one nonaccidental (93b35-7). This is most naturallytaken as a
contrastbetween typesof nominal definitionsince thatis the only
type which has been introduced up to that point.
The claim thata nominal definitioncan never mentionany but
merely accidental characteristicsof that to which a given term
applies is also in conflictwithanother featureof Aristotle'ssemantic
theory.Any nominal definitionis an account of whatan expression
signifies.The accountitselfsignifiesthesame thingas theexpression
does (93b39f.). Given this, any nominal definitionwill introduce
characteristics or signs(o,,utEa) of something.47
whichare signifiers
Aristotle'smostextensivetreatmentof signifiersis in PriorAnalytics
II, 27.48 He there says that signifiersare of three types. One type
introducesa necessaryconditionof the presence of the entitysig-
nified,as paleness is a sign that a woman is with child; another a

46
See JonathanBarnes, Aristotle's PosteriorAnalytics(Oxford, 1975), p. 213.
47Not only words are signifiersbut the things signifiedby words as well. (De
InterpretationeI, withCategories,lb26ff.,3b 0ff.)The characteristicsmentionedin a
definiensare signifiersas much as the words that introducethem.
48 See also RhetoricI, 2. But there Aristotlegives preferenceto the account in the
Analytics.

539
 ROBERT BOLTON

sufficientcondition,as having milk is a sign that a woman is with

child; the thirda merelyaccidental concomitant,as being wise is a
signof being good (70a6-38). It willbe apparent thatthe threetypes
of nominal definitionwhich we have found evidence for in the
PosteriorAnalyticscorrespond exactly to these three types of sig-
nifiers.Each of thememploysa sign of one of these three typesto
signifythe entitybeing defined.This makes it furtherapparent that
it would be a mistake to allow, as a nominal definition,only a
linguisticspecificationof a sign which is an accident of the kind
signified.
Some nominal definitions,however,do specifymerelyaccidental
characteristicsof instancesof the kinds theydefine. How are they
related to the other types?In most importantrespectstheydo not
differ.They conform in their general structureto the schema to
whichthe othertypesconform.They offeraccountsof whatcertain
names signifyin the sense in whichwe have explained thatnotion.
As such,theymake a referenceto the kindtheydefinebymeans of a
referenceto an actual typeof instanceof that kind. By this means
theyprovide one sortof account of the essence of what theydefine.
The one thingtheycannot do is to serve strictlyas conclusions of
demonstrationssince the features they detail are not explicable
featuresof what theydefine (75a3 1-34). But, as we have seen, they
can do even this in a qualified way.

XI

This is a convenientpointto sum up the case againsttheviewthat

a nominal definitiongives the connotationof a term. For the fact
that the characteristicsmentioned in a nominal definitionmay be
only accidental characteristicswhich do not always belong to all
thingsdenoted by the termdefined shows directlythat thisview is
wrong. Besides this,no nominal definitionsdelineate the attributes
which are signifiedby the termswhose significancetheygive. They
do not normallygivelogicallynecessaryand sufficient conditionsfor
belongingto thedenotationsof those terms.And theyincorporatea
reference to actual kinds and their instances, which gives them
existentialimport.In all these respects nominal definitionsdiffer
essentiallyfromaccountsof theconnotationsof termsas thattypeof
account has standardlybeen construed.

540
 ESSENTIALISM AND SEMANTIC THEORY

XII

With a proper understandingof Aristotle'sdoctrine,we can see

how he would defend himselfagainsttheobjectionsraised earlierto
various of his claims. He would deny thatwe can know what it is to
belong to some kindwithoutknowingthatthereare membersofthat
kind in the case where we can give a stipulativedefinitionof the
name of the kind. Providingwe are dealing witha natural-kindthe
behaviorof whose memberscan onlybe understood and explained
withinthe contextof a scientifictheorywe simplycannot stipulate
what it is to fallinto the kind. We mustlearn fromscientificinquiry
whatthe real nature of such kindsis. And thereis onlyone waythat
such inquirycan reliablyget offtheground-by beginningwith,as a
nominal definition,an account of the kind based on what is more
familiarto us. Such accounts are in fact based on a reference to
actual instancesof a kind and onlybymeans of such a referencecan
theyhope to fixon the essence whichdeterminesthe extentof the
kind.There is no guarantee or even any likelihoodthata stipulative
definitionwillcapture or point to the real nature of a kind and it is
that nature which determinesthe extentof the kind and nothing
else.
We can also see now whyAristotlewants to require that knowl-
edge of certainnecessarilytrue statementspresupposes knowledge
of contingenttruths.The content of necessarilytrue statements
about natural kinds is fixed by the significanceof the natural-kind
termsin question. And theirsignificancefor us is fixed only via a
referenceto certainactual entities.
The detailsof the doctrineof nominal definitionenable us to see,
too, where the writersmentioned in Section III above, who have
attributedto Aristotlepositionsinconsistentwiththose he takes in
thePosterior Analytics,have gone wrong. Many have supposed that,
forAristotle,identification, of an object
or at least reidentification,
requires knowledgeof the kind to whichthe object belongs. In this
case knowledge of the existenceof somethingsufficient forreiden-
tifyingit could not accompany complete ignorance of its essence.
Our investigationsshow, however,thatAristotledoes not hold this
doctrine.All thatis required to identifysomethingas an object for
study is a grasp of its nominal definition.This does not require
knowledge of any part of itsessence. Aristotledoes believe thatthe
identityof an individual is fixed,in part at least, by its having the

541
 ROBERT BOLTON

essence it does.49But nominaldefinitionsprovide adequate criteria

for reidentificationeven where they do not provide us with any
knowledge of an essence.
Many interpretershave also supposed that,forAristotle,"exists"
has many senses and to know the sense appropriate to anything
requires knowledge of the thing's essence. This conflictsdirectly
withthe doctrineoftheAnalytics thatone can knowthetruthofsome
statementof the form"x's exist"withoutknowingthe essence of the
things known to exist. Those who have claimed that "exists" has
manydifferentdefinitionsforAristotlehave gone wrongby failing
to attend to the details of Aristotle'sdoctrineof nominal definition
and to the distinctionbetweennominaland real definition.Accord-
ing to thePosteriorAnalytics,Aristotledid wantto denythatthereis a
single real definitionof the existent-a single essential property
common to all thingsthatare qua thingsthatare (92b14-15). He also
wanted to deny that there is a single nominal definitionof the
existent,or of theword."exists."A nominaldefinitionalwayssignifies
a real essence and existentsdo not have a common genus. This does
not mean thatthereare manynominaldefinitionsof "exists."There
isno nominaldefinitionofthe termor anyof itscognatesjustas there
is no nominal definitionof "goat-stag."Any such definitionwould
have to focus on an essence and be capable of playinga certainrole
in a scientifictheory,and in neither instance is this possible. But
none of thisrequiresthattheword"exists"has no, or many,senses. It
leaves itopen thatthereis a singleaccountof whattheword signifies
whichmakesclear how thewordapplies to everythingthatis without
everythinghaving some common essentialpropertythereby.It no
more followsfromthe factthatthereis no singleaccountof whatit is
to existthatthereis no singleaccountofwhat"exists"signifiesthanit
followsfrom the fact that there is no account of what it is to be a
goat-stagthat there is no account of what "goat-stag"signifies.

XIII

If we have arrivedat an understandingofthe doctrineof nominal

definitionand of its implicationsfor the interpretationof various

of a thingand itsformor
49 The connectionbetweenthe "thisness"or individuality
1029a26-30, among other places.
essence is made at Metaphysics

542
 ESSENTIALISM AND SEMANTIC THEORY

Aristoteliandoctrines,what can we say about its importance and

what can we say about its truth?
On the matterof itsimportanceit is easy to speak. It is Aristotle's
view that the explanation of the meaning of at least some words
should proceed not byspellingout the componentsof some idea or
conceptofthesortwe are familiarwithfromtheempiricisttradition,
but ratherbyfixingon certaincases of actual objectswhichhave the
naturewhichtheworddesignates.This doctrinehas no precedentin
ancienttimes.Even in modern timesthe spell of the empiricistview
thatexplanation of meaning is merelythe spelling out of the com-
ponents of some nominal essence which is a complex of general
ideas and can involveno referenceto particularsor to an actual real
essenceat all50has so transfixedphilosophersthatonlyveryrecently
has the force of views like Aristotle'sbegun again to be felt. So
pervasivelyinfluentialhas the empiricistview been that even inter-
pretersof Aristotlehave uncriticallytakenhis nominaldefinitionto
be no differentthan Mill's nominal definition.
On the matterof the truthof Aristotle'sdoctrine,as a semantic
theoryfornatural-kindterms,it is less easy to speak. We can point
here to the contemporaryrevivalof similardoctrines.5' Contem-
porarytheoristshave revivedAristotle'snotion thatan explanation
of the meaning of a natural-kindterminvolvesa referenceto actual
objects52and a referenceto the basic underlyingstructureof those

50
This view has oftenbeen attributedto Locke. See An EssayConcerning Human
Understanding, III, ii, 5; III, vi, 7-20. Whetherthe view is in Locke may be doubted.
But the view is clearlyin Hobbes (De Corpore,I, 2, iv-vi)and in Mill (Logic,I, viii).
51 See, e.g., S. Kripke,"Naming and Necessity"(NN, below) in Semantics ofNatural
Language,eds. G. Harman and D. Davidson (New York, 1972), pp. 309ff.at p. 328; H.
Putnam,"Meaning and Reference,"Journal ofPhilosophy, LXX, 1973, pp. 699ff.and
"The Meaning of 'Meaning'" (MM, below) in Philosophical Papers,v. 2 (Cambridge,
1975). My own discoveryof Aristotle'sviewswas independent of acquaintance with
the views of these theorists.(See note 55.)
52 Aristotle's doctrineis verysimilarto the one Kripkeand Putnamhave in mindin
callingkind-terms "rigiddesignators"and "indexicals"respectively.The referenceof
a kind-termfor all these theorists,in any possible world, is the class of all entities
whichhave the same basic underlyingstructureor essence as certainobjects in the
actual world.Aristotle'stheorydiffersfromthemodernones in itsaccountofhow the
relevant actual objects are picked out. For Kripke they are (most of) the ones
somehow baptized as members of the kind at the point when the kind-termis
introducedintothe language (NN, p. 328). For Putnamtheyare apparently(mostof)
the ones to which the termis applied in the actual world by those who knowits use
(MM, pp. 225, 232; but see p. 238). For Aristotletheyare those actual objectswith
certainstereotypicalcharacteristics to whichthe termwould be applied bythosewho

543
 ROBERT BOLTON

objects,53and his doctrine thatexperts oftenplay a special role in

fixingthe meaning of a kind-term.54 As to the respectivemeritsof
Aristotle'stheoryand the more contemporaryones, it mustsuffice
here to assert baldly that those who wish to compare Aristotle's
theorywiththedoctrinesof contemporarysemantictheoristswhose
viewsare closestto his willfindthe comparisonhighlyinstructive.55

RutgersCollege
RutgersUniversity

know its use (giving a weighted voice, and in some cases sole voice, to appropriate
experts in the science in whichthe termis used). These stereotypicalcharacteristics
are, however,builtintothe account of thereferenceof the term,forAristotle,in such
a way that their possession, individuallyor collectivelyor disjunctively,is neither
necessarynor sufficient for belonging to the referenceof the term.Thus, Aristotle
avoids certain objectionsof Kripke and Putnam to building in such characteristics
(NN, pp. 327ff.,MM, pp. 235ff.);and he can use such characteristicsforpurposes of
disambiguation.
53 This featureof a semantictheoryfor natural-kindtermsPutnam thinksof as a

varietyof realism(MM, p. 235ff.).For Aristotlethe underlyingstructurereferredto

in the account of the denotationof a kind-termis always the essence, i.e., the most
determinateor specificunderlyingstructurepossessed by members of the kind.
Putnam, in his examples, seems to allow a referenceto more generic underlying
structures.See e.g.,MM, p. 323. This differencehas implicationsforhow ambiguityis
to be explained on the two theories.
54 Putnam calls his version of this doctrine"divisionof linguisticlabor" (MM, p.

227f.). For Aristotle,language users in general relyon experts as a court of final

appeal to determine whichof the itemsin the actual world are the ones genuinely
referredto in theaccountof the denotationof a kind-term.For Putnam,experts are
relied on in that they are often the only ones who possess reliable criteria for
identifying instancesof a kind. This is a differentpoint fromAristotle's,though itis
possible to construe it so that it includes Aristotle's.
55 Earlier versionsof this paper have been read, beginningin 1968, at Berkeley,

Bielefeld, Brown, Indiana, Illinois, Princeton, Rochester and Sussex. I am most

gratefulfor the forumofferedme by these institutionsfor the development of my
views. In preparing the finalversionof the paper I have benefitedfromdiscussion
withmany people, especiallyJonathan Barnes and Michael Frede.

544