GASTECH 2OO2

PROGRAMME
Niall Ramsden, Resource Protection International
Roger Roue, SIGTTO
Roger Roue began his career as a Marine Engineer with Shell Tankers UK, in 1964, being
promoted to Chief Engineer in 1980. In 1986 he left the Shell feet to work as Superintendent
Engineer for a London based tanker operator. Joining British Gas in 1987, as the Mechanical
Engineer at Canvey Methane Terminal, part of his responsibilities included jetty and marine
works. He held this post until 1993 when he transferred to the international arm of British
Gas, as a Project Engineer. This involved working on the front end design of a variety of LNG
projects and latterly developing the long term maintenance programme for BGs LNG carriers.
In January 1997 he joined SIGTTO as a Technical Adviser.
Introduction/SIGTTO Liquefied Gas Fire Hazard Management/Page 1
LIQUEFIED GAS FIRE HAZARD MANAGEMENT
An overview of a forthcoming SIGTTO publication
By
Niall Ramsden
Managing Director - Resource Protection International
&
Roger Roue
Technical Advisor - Society of International Gas Tanker & Terminal Operators
INTRODUCTION
This presentation serves to introduce the forthcoming SIGTTO publication Liquefied
Gas Fire Hazard management, the content of which has drawn upon the combined
experience and expertise of SIGTTO members and independent fire protection
consultants Resource Protection International.
Recent trends in legislation in Europe and elsewhere have moved away from
prescriptive requirements; where oil and gas terminal operators are told precisely
what fire fighting measures they are to provide. Instead a risk based "Safety Case"
type approach is being adopted where it is up to the operator to demonstrate that
risks to life (both of personnel and society) are reduced to acceptable levels by the
provision of suitable "Fire Hazard Management" measures implemented under a
formal Safety Management System.
In particular the Seveso II directive within the European Union has resulted in this
approach with emphasis on a requirement to demonstrate that the Fire Hazard
Management measures, including Emergency Procedures, are implemented,
maintained and exercised on a regular basis.
Although legislators are generally responsible only for life safety and environmental
issues, operators have recognised the benefit of this more flexible approach allowing
the same acceptable levels of risk reduction to be achieved by different
combinations of measures. Consequently they have adopted it to determine polices
for risk reduction to business interruption and asset loss.
In light of these developments SIGTTO are about to publish guidelines on Fire
Hazard Management measures that can be used at terminals and on tankers
handling liquefied gases, (although requirements for tankers are, to a large degree,
still based on prescriptive standards required by SOLAS and flag states). The
publication "Liquefied Gas Fire Hazard Management " outlines the general risk
based approach and gives information and guidance on each of the
options/combinations that can be adopted.
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The Oil and Gas Producers Association has addressed the same topic in its
publication Fire Systems Integrity Assurance. This emphasises the importance of
Fire Hazard Management measures being defined, implemented and maintained
correctly so that they work in the way intended. The SIGTTO publication will
incorporate this philosophy.
This paper outlines the new approach and the input/guidance available from the new
documents. Particular emphasis is placed in training, emergency planning and
system assurance.
Liquefied Gas Fire Hazard Management brings together, in a single volume, the
principles of liquefied gas fire prevention and firefighting. It covers a broad spectrum
of the liquefied gas industry, including large refrigerated and smaller pressurised
storage terminals, ships, cylinder filling plant and road and rail tanker loading racks.
The book has been compiled for operational staff, such as plant supervisors and
ships officers, who are involved in the handling of flammable liquefied gases. It will
also be of benefit to fire officers and emergency planners who have liquefied gas
installations within their jurisdiction. The book has been compiled to provide readers
with an insight into the design and operation of liquefied gas installations and the
equipment essential to the safe and efficient functioning of such installations.
Although not intended to give prescriptive guidance to designers of liquefied gas
installations, the content should provide considerable background information, not
least through the case histories of liquefied gas incidents and the bibliography. The
book also considers many of the most commonly encountered codes and standards
in use throughout the world and the differences between the prescriptive and risk-
based elements of these documents. These are given only as examples and it
should also be noted that many countries have national standards and guidelines
that are mandatory.
The book concludes with a selection of case histories of liquefied gas incidents.
These have been selected to cover all facets of the liquefied gas industry, including
LNG, LPG, ships and terminals. Each of the case histories demonstrates either the
lessons to be learned from an actual incident or what can be achieved by informed
and trained responders.
The OGP document Fire Systems Integrity Assurance is available from the
association and the SIGTTO document Liquefied Gas Fire Hazard Management,
is due to be published by Witherby & Co. at the end of 2002.
LIQUEFIED GAS FIRE HAZARD MANAGEMENT Contents
The following topics are covered in the book:-
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Characteristics and Hazards of Liquefied Gases
Liquefied Gas Installations
Liquefied Gas Ships
Principles of Fire and Explosion Hazard Management (FEHM)
Prevention of Fires and Explosions
The Principles of Fire and Gas Detection
Fire and Explosion Mitigation
Emergency Response Strategies
Training for Emergency Responders
Maintenance of Critical Systems
Liquefied Gas Incident case histories
CHARACTERISTICS AND HAZARDS OF LIQUEFIED GASES
Most liquefied gases are hydrocarbons and the key property that makes
hydrocarbons the worlds primary energy source combustibility- also makes them
inherently hazardous. To ensure the safe handling of these materials it is essential
to have some knowledge of their physical properties. Therefore the book contains
essential information on fire and explosion related properties such as; boiling point,
flash point, flammable range and auto ignition temperatures.
Liquefied Gas Installations
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Liquefied gas terminals vary considerably in size and complexity, from the large LNG
export terminal, to the small LPG distribution terminal with limited storage, a bottling
plant and a road tanker loading rack. Each has potential sources of leakage and
ignition, which are considered when designing the layout of a terminal. This section
of the book gives background information on the different types of installation for gas
storage and handling and guidance on how good design can have a significant
contribution to fire hazard management.
Liquefied Gas Ships
This chapter provides an overview of the design and construction of liquefied gas
carriers as they relate to fire hazard management. Liquefied gas carriers (LGCs) are
classified according to the cargoes that they carry and the conditions that these
cargoes are carried under. LGCs vary in size from the small, fully pressurised LPG
carriers, with a capacity of a few hundred cubic metres to the large LNG carriers with
a capacity in the region of 140,000 m3.
All vessels that trade internationally must comply with both the requirements of the
SOLAS regulations and the relevant one of the three Gas Codes. All these
requirements were developed by the International Maritime Organization (IMO). The
Codes prescribe the design and construction standards for vessels carrying liquefied
gases in bulk, including the requirements for specialist fire protection and firefighting
equipment.
PRINCIPLES OF FIRE AND EXPLOSION HAZARD MANAGEMENT (FEHM)
In recent years experts in many countries have recognised that uniform prescriptive
standards specifying exactly what fire prevention and response resources should be
provided at a facility are not always appropriate or effective in reducing fire and
explosion risks to acceptable levels. In every case prescriptive standards can have a
negative effect because operators are not encouraged to fully analyse the hazards
and risks at a facility. They believe that effective risk reduction is achieved merely by
complying with the relevant legislation. Also, prescriptive standards can mean that
the advantages inherent in different approaches, perhaps involving new
technologies such as improved gas detection techniques, cannot be utilised.
As a result of this growing awareness of the shortcomings of the traditional methods
of dealing with fire prevention and emergency response, legislators are now
generally moving towards a risk-based approach. With this method the onus is on
the operator to identify and assess the hazards at the facility and then to develop
appropriate measures in order to reduce the risk to life, property and the
environment to acceptable levels. This can be done through a combination of
prevention and mitigation measures.
The term risk refers to the combination of incident frequency and consequences.
Therefore, risk can be reduced either by reducing the frequency of an incident, i.e.
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prevention, or by reducing its consequences. Having decided upon the measures to
reduce risk, the operator must then submit a safety case for approval by the
appropriate authorities. Normally, a legislator is only concerned with the safety of life
and the environment. The operator will be concerned also about other issues such
as asset loss, business interruption and public image.
Despite this progress, prescriptive standards are still prevail in some countries and it
is essential that this legislation is met. However, complying with legislation is not
always sufficient to meet the business risk reduction requirements of an operator.
Hence, the risk-based approach can still be used for issues not covered by the
legislator. Insurers often encourage this type of approach and financiers usually
insist upon it.
A major aspect of the risk-based approach is the implementation of a safety
management system through which a companys safety policies are defined and
implemented. Fire and explosion hazard management (FEHM) is an important part
of a safety management system.
Fire and explosion hazard management (FEHM) is an integrated approach to
reducing risk from fires and explosion by the most appropriate means for a specific
facility. The integrated approach means considering the interrelationships between
a full range of factors, including process design, plant layout, prevention measures,
incident detection, protection systems, mobile equipment and training. This risk-
based, integrated approach is described in the SIGTTO publication A Risk-Based
Approach for the Evaluation of Firefighting Equipment on Liquefied Gas Jetties.
Fire and explosion hazard management can be defined as:
A formalised approach to establish a site-specific, rationalised, relevant and cost-
effective policy to reduce potential fire and explosion consequences.
The five basic steps of FEHM are:
Step 1- Review fire and explosion scenarios that can occur
Step 2- Review different policies to reduce fire and explosion risk
Step 3- Decide which policy is the most appropriate
Step 4- Implement and maintain policy
Step 5- Update policy according to changes in facility or operating environment
PREVENTION OF FIRES AND EXPLOSIONS
Obviously prevention is the preferred method of fire hazard management. The book
therefore gives specific emphasis to the control of ignition sources, including:-
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Electrical equipment
Hot surfaces
Hot work
Static and lightning
Radio frequency equipment
Vehicles
Security issues
THE PRINCIPLES OF FIRE AND GAS DETECTION
Early detection of a fire incident or loss of containment facilitates rapid isolation,
shut-down, or other appropriate action to reduce risk and prevent escalation of an
incident.
Manning levels at facilities tend to be determined by the needs of process and
maintenance and may not be sufficient to guarantee early visual detection of a fire or
leak. Hence it is usually necessary to provide automatic incident detection systems.
Significant advances have been made in detection technology for both gas releases
and fire incidents. This section of the document describes the basic principles
behind available fire, gas and leakage detection and the potential applications of
each type. Subjects covered include:-
Catalytic gas detection
Infra red gas detection
Smoke detection
Incipient fire detection
Heat detection
Flame detection
Information is provided for each type of detection device.
FIRE AND EXPLOSION MITIGATION
The various types of both passive and active fire mitigation methods are discussed
and reviewed in the document.
Passive fire protection
The term passive fire protection (PFP) refers to any protection fire measures such as
barriers or special coatings which do not require manual or automatic actuation of a
system for them to be effective.
Within buildings there is always passive protection measures employed to prevent
propagation of smoke, flame or heat. These measures take the form of fire doors,
fire rated wall construction and ceiling void compartmentation, for example. Such
measures are appropriate to all buildings, not just those in the oil and petrochemical
industry. However, the levels of protection required by statutory authorities for life
safety may not be sufficient for protection of critical facilities such as computer suites
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from the point of view of disruption to business continuity. Therefore, it is important
to review PFP measures not only in process areas but also in buildings. This is
particularly true for control buildings in or near to process equipment which might be
subject to fire or explosion effects.
Generally speaking, PFP is used to prevent or delay fire product (heat, flame, smoke
or toxic fumes) spread to critical structures, equipment or enclosures.
Containment and spill control
The fundamentals of liquefied gas containment and spill control can be categorised
as follows:
- Isolation valves
- Blowdown/depressurisation
- Fire divisions
- Limiting and containing spills and releases
Water deluge and spray systems
Water spray systems are systems designed to apply water at a predetermined
application rate to protect specific equipment or areas.
Water is cheap and normally readily available. It is non-toxic and does not give rise
to toxic products. It has high heat absorption capability in terms of its specific heat
and latent heat of vaporisation. The major cooling effect is brought about by the
vaporisation of water. Vaporisation means liquid turning to steam and the volume of
steam produced is approximately 1,700 times that of the volume of water. Steam
inerts the surrounding atmosphere by reducing the oxygen content so that
combustion cannot be supported.
Manually operated deluge systems are acceptable in circumstances where a few
minutes delay to evaluate the situation, after receipt of a fire alarm, can be tolerated
before activating the water spray system.
Automatic deluge systems are actuated automatically by a detection system. These
systems are used where a delay is unacceptable in view of the immediate danger of
the incident escalating. A disadvantage of automatic devices is that spurious
actuation of the system may occur. As a result, in critical areas a double-knock
detection system should be provided.
Water monitor systems
In many cases water monitors will be a highly effective way of providing cooling to
heat-exposed liquefied gas vessels and handling areas. The primary concern will be
to ensure that the monitors are located and arranged so that all tank and
containment system surfaces and areas subjected to flame impingement and radiant
heat are wetted and, therefore, cooled. Another important consideration is that the
monitors are capable of both automatic and manual operation. Thus, the primary
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objective of water monitors in liquefied gas facilities is to provide cooling, and not
necessarily to extinguish any fire that may arise.
In the case of liquefied gas terminals with large storage tanks and jetty areas water
monitors may be positioned at high levels. Monitors will generally supplement fixed
water spray systems in the case of storage tanks and it may be necessary to consult
a recognised code such as NFPA 15 Standard for Water Spray Fixed Systems for
Fire Protection.
Foam systems
Foam is one of the most important extinguishing media for contained, low vapour
pressure, hydrocarbon liquid pool fires. It can also provide excellent post-fire security
against re-ignition or help to prevent ignition of unignited spills by suppressing
vapour emission. Research work has been carried out on the use of foam for the
special application of LNG and LPG spill vapour suppression and fire control.
However, no internationally recognised standards regarding this application in terms
of effectiveness or design parameters have yet been developed and accepted, even
though the technique has proved beneficial in some incidents.
Dry chemical systems
Dry chemicals extinguish fires by an inhibition process. They can provide fast fire
knockdown and extinguish solid, liquid and gas fires, provided the correct type of
chemical is used. A range of chemicals is available which include general purpose
chemicals and special chemicals for specific hazards, such as metal fires. They can
be used to extinguish gas jet fires but there is a danger that extinguishment could
lead to an even greater hazard due to a large gas cloud being created.
In the case of flammable liquid spills they are sometimes used in dual agent
systems which combine the knockdown capability of dry chemicals with the vapour-
suppressing qualities of a foam blanket. In such cases it is important that compatible
dry chemical and foam agents are used.
Water mist systems
There are many instances when a conventional water-based firefighting system may
not be suitable, either because the application of large volumes of water would
present a hazard in itself, or because water supplies may be restricted or at a
premium. At other times it may be necessary or desirable to limit the amount of
water damage to a particular process or material. In such cases the solution may be
to design and operate a suitable water mist system. When considering the use of
water mist for any given application, it is necessary to understand the latest
developments, features and limitations so that an informed choice can be made.
Gas dispersion with water spray
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The use of water spray to control the migration of a gas release is discussed. Fixed
systems can be used to help contain gas clouds and prevent their travel to other
areas. However, if spray nozzles devices are used, it is essential that the nozzle
type and system design is such that discharges from adjacent nozzles overlap and a
complete curtain is achieved. Some limited research work has been carried out to
try and establish optimum nozzle and spray characteristics.
Portable Firefighting Equipment
All aspects of portable firefighting equipment are discussed, including:-
Extinguishers
Hand held nozzles
Monitors/cannons
Breathing apparatus
Firefighting (FiFi) tugs
Tugs or vessels intended for use in fighting major fires on sea islands, jetties or oil
terminals have to be equipped with large-capacity fire pumps, fire monitors and, in
some instances, with firefighting foam and dry chemical capability.
Tugs or vessels with water monitors are sometimes incorrectly identified as holding
a firefighting (FiFi) tug notation from one of the ship classification societies when, in
fact, the tug may hold no firefighting notation whatsoever. In order to have a
classification society firefighting notation and approval, a tug or vessel must have a
given firefighting capability as defined by a classification society.
EMERGENCY PROCEDURES AND LOCAL RESPONSE PLANS
SIGTTO has produced a document outlining the requirements for emergency
planning at terminals entitled A Guide to Contingency Planning for Marine
Terminals Handling Liquefied Bulk Gases. This publication is intended for use as a
policy forming document to assist in emergency planning/management for terminals.
The following chapter outlines the basic elements that need to be considered when
developing an emergency response strategy for a liquefied gas installations and
ships.
General objectives
Emergency procedures, incident response planning and overall preparedness are
essential to ensure that, in the event of an emergency incident, all necessary actions
are taken for the protection of personnel, environment, the public and assets. In
many countries there is a legal requirement to prepare and maintain a site
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emergency plan for terminals. There is also a recommended minimum requirement
for a tanker emergency plan.
These emergency procedures should be based on the following priorities:
- Protection of crew/personnel
- Protection of the environment
- Protection of property/assets
- Protection of business or the return to production with the minimum delay
Emergency planning should normally provide a two-tier response. The higher level
emergency procedure, as given in A Guide to Contingency Planning for Marine
Terminals Handling Liquefied Bulk Gases, provides the overall scope and
encompasses instructions and procedures to be followed in an emergency by all
relevant personnel. Backing this up are lower level emergency procedures
covering particular incidents, areas, enclosures, plant and equipment. Each of these
latter scenarios has either a generic or specific emergency response plan (ERP)
which active responders should utilise to deal with the incident in the first 15-20
minutes.
It is necessary for all tanker crews and terminal personnel to fully understand the
tanker or terminal emergency procedures and the generic or specific emergency
response plans.
In all cases emergency procedures should ensure that the following conditions are
met:
- Plans are based on the risks that will potentially impact the company and
employees.
- Plans are controlled documents, accessible and clearly communicated.
- Equipment, facilities and personnel identified for emergency response are tested
and available at all times.
- Personnel are trained and understand procedures and plans, their roles and
responsibilities, and the use of emergency management tools and resources.
- Drills and exercises are conducted to assess and improve emergency
response/crisis management capabilities, including liaison with external
organisations.
- Periodic updates of plans and training are carried out to incorporate lessons
learned from previous incidents and exercises.
TRAINING FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE
Emergency responders dealing with liquefied gas incidents need to be
knowledgeable and competent in a wide variety of gas process skills.
In many cases the first line responders will be terminal operators and technicians
and ship crew members who may, in fact, have only a few tasks to perform as part
of their responsibilities under the emergency response plan (ERP). In other cases,
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due to facility size, complexity or proximity to neighbouring facilities or public areas,
the responders may have a high number of tasks.
At the heart of any training programme is the assessment of competence. To be fully
effective, training programmes need to be based on the range of tasks and
associated knowledge that responders will need when dealing with the envisaged
credible major accident scenarios.
Therefore, it is necessary to first identify, in a logical and progressive manner, all the
core tasks that individual responders may carry out for all scenarios. This applies to
fire responders and process operators who are required to carry out shutdown or
other emergency process control actions. Analysis of these tasks will result in clear
sets of competencies for responders, in terms of knowledge, understanding and
skills. From these sets of core tasks and their competencies, a training matrix is
developed that should match every aspect of emergency response at a facility. The
specific emergency response plans are also used to ensure that competencies
include specific credible accident scenario response.
MAINTENANCE
The term fire systems integrity assurance has been adopted by the Oil and Gas
Producers Associations to define a comprehensive scheme including, but not limited
to, maintenance of fire detection and protection systems. FSIA is a structured
approach that enables the implementation of test, inspection and maintenance
procedures, taking into account performance-based criteria defined at the design
and implementation stages of a project. Full information on the subject is contained
in the Oil and Gas Producers Association document Fire System Integrity
Assurance which is drawn upon heavily for information for this section.
Test procedures should be based on ensuring that the critical performance criteria
defined at the design stage are met, and maintenance schedules on ensuring that
any system problems will be quickly identified. When defining schedules and
procedures, it will be necessary to consider the reliability of system components and
the levels of risk reduction that the system is designed to provide. For example, a
system that is critical to life safety may require a more rigorous testing regime than a
similar system designed purely for asset protection.
Any system testing should be relevant to the role of the system and either a direct
measure of functional performance criteria or a measurement of a parameter that
will demonstrate that the functional performance can be achieved.
CASE HISTORIES
Gaz Fountain
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The 1984 fire onboard the fully refrigerated LPG carrier Gaz Fountain is interesting
for the following reasons:
- It illustrates the fact that occasionally it is necessary to break the rules to achieve
success. In this case it was done by extinguishing an LPG fire before the source of
fuel had been isolated, for the very good reason that the pipework and a cargo tank
were badly damaged.
- It gives a practical demonstration of the sound design of these vessels and their
ability to survive.
- It shows that a refrigerated LPG tank, contrary to popular belief, when ignited is
highly unlikely to explode,. Experts who studied this incident concluded that, had the
vessel not been salvaged, the fire would have continued to burn until the cargo had
been consumed.
- It is an account of a brave and successful attempt to salvage a ship and her cargo
of LPG.
On 12 October 1984, during the height of the Iran-Iraq war and whilst carrying 6,300
tonnes of propane and 12,140 tonnes of butane from Ras Tanura to Fujairah, the
Gaz Fountain was attacked by an Iranian aircraft and suffered three hits from air-to-
ground, armour-piercing missiles. The crew shut down the propulsion and cargo
refrigeration systems and abandoned ship. The following account describes how a
salvage team quenched the fires and salvaged the vessel and over 90 per cent of
her cargo.
One missile exploded on deck above No 2 cargo tank, severely damaging much of
the pipework in this area and setting off fires fuelled by escaping gas. The other two
missiles hit the vessels deck in the vicinity of No 3, or aftermost, tank. One of these
penetrated the deck and blew a hole of several square metres in the roof of No 3
tank. A severe fire resulted, fed by the butane in No 3 tank. This quickly spread to
the accommodation block, gutting it but, luckily, leaving the engine room relatively
undamaged.
The following day a salvage tug approached Gaz Fountain and started cooling the
main fire areas. The salvors later experimented with dousing the torch fires using
powerful water jets. This was an unconventional procedure, but one which was the
only option as there was no means of isolating the ruptured tank and pipework.
The salvage crew used various combinations of wooden plugs, canvas patches,
cement boxes and sandbags to stop the gas leaks in the damaged deck and
pipework. A temporary gas vent was rigged to control tank pressures and the vessel,
which by now had been anchored, was towed across the wind to aid the safe
dispersal of gas.
Most of the power cables to the vessels submerged electric cargo pumps had been
destroyed, but the pumps were intact. Temporary power cables were rigged across
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the deck and the vessels engine room was reactivated. Much of the firefighting
equipment was repaired or replaced and the emergency shutdown (ESD) system
and instrumentation were reinstated, such that the cargo could be safely discharged.
A ship-to-ship transfer was started a month after the missile attack and 17,200
tonnes of cargo were successfully transferred over four days. On the 12 December
the operation, was concluded and vessel was handed back to her owners.
Full details of this incident were presented at the Gastech 1985 conference in Nice,
France, in a paper by Captain J A Carter entitled Salvage of Cargo from the War
Damaged Gaz Fountain.
Cleveland Ohio LNG Disaster
The catastrophic failure of a storage tank and the subsequent loss of 3,000 tonnes
of LNG in the town of Cleveland, Ohio on 20 October 1944 probably put the US LNG
industry back by over a decade. The death toll was established at 128 while the
number of injured was estimated at between 200 and 400. The fire destroyed the
LNG plant and 10 business premises and 80 houses in the vicinity. Damage was
estimated at $6.8 million at the time of the disaster.
The plant was built for peak-shaving LNG storage. At the installation LNG was
stored in three 1,050-tonne spherical tanks and one toro-segmental tank of 1,900
tonnes capacity. The spherical tanks were constructed of low carbon, 3.5 per cent
nickel steel, insulated with cork and provided with a carbon steel outer tank. The
toro-segmental tank was constructed in a similar manner, but insulated with
rockwool.
Although the Cleveland storage tanks did not have full capacity bunding, there were
2-metre high walls close to the tanks to contain small leaks.
Immediately prior to the disaster an earth tremor was reported by witnesses,
followed by streams of gas or liquid issuing from the toro-segmental tank. Shortly
afterwards, the toro-segmental tank collapsed. The escaping LNG followed the
sloping ground off the site and entered nearby storm drains and sewers. Ignition of
the LNG followed, as did a number of explosions under the remaining storage tanks
and in the basements of nearby buildings. There were also rapid phase transition
explosions, or RPTs, in the storm drains and sewers. Some of these resulted in
craters 10 metres in diameter and 8 metres deep. Twenty minutes after the collapse
of the first tank one of the spherical tanks failed, releasing a further 1,000 tonnes of
LNG. At the height of the conflagration flames from pool fires were reported to have
reached 900 metres into the air.
The enquiry carried out by the US Bureau of Mines to establish the cause of the
accident concentrated on the 3.5 per cent nickel steel used to construct the inner
tanks at the Cleveland installation. Not only was this material known to be
excessively brittle at low temperatures, it also appeared that it had not been
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normalised as specified prior to fabrication of the storage tanks. Ground shock from
a railway locomotive or steam hammer most likely initiated the crack in the toro-
segmental tank, resulting in its catastrophic failure of the tank. Why 3.5 per cent
nickel steel was used to construct the inner tanks, when it was known to be
unsuitable, remains unclear.
The lessons learned from the Cleveland, Ohio LNG incident have been incorporated
into the design of all subsequent LNG plant. They can be itemised as follows:
- The layout of the site was such that a fire on one tank could easily spread to
adjacent tanks
- The tank supports were not protected from flame impingement
- The tanks were not provided with bunds of sufficient capacity to hold the tank
contents and allow for overtopping due to catastrophic failure
- The site was too close to an urban conurbation and, as a result, uncontrolled
sources of ignition.
- The drainage system was not designed to prevent the spread of an LNG spill
- The incorrect material was used for the tank construction
- The material itself was also of the incorrect specification
Val Rosandra Incident
On 28 April 1990 the ethylene carrier Val Rosandra, laden with 2,250 tonnes of fully
refrigerated propylene, was discharging at Brindisi in Italy when a violent explosion
occurred in the cargo compressor motor room. The motor room was so severely
damaged that a switch panel was blown onto the deck and
cargo pipework outside the room ruptured. In addition, the port and starboard domes
of No 3 cargo tank also ruptured. As a result of the explosion, the escaping
propylene ignited and the fire continued to be fed by cargo evaporating from the
damaged domes.
The explosion most likely occurred as a result of a release of gas being ignited by
electrical equipment in the compressor motor room. This equipment was not
designated for use in hazardous areas, but relied on the pressurisation of the room
with fresh air drawn from a safe area. Therefore, the release of gas would have had
to be considerable to encroach into a ventilation system specifically designed to
avert this possibility.
As local emergency services responded to the incident, the crew abandoned ship.
The vessel was subsequently towed to the edge of the port limits where the fire was
monitored from a safe distance. Although the fire showed no signs of escalation over
a number of days, it was decided not to attempt to salvage the vessel or her cargo.
Instead, charges were detonated around the domes of the remaining four tanks to
allow the propylene cargo to escape gradually and burn off. It was agreed that once
this had been accomplished, the vessel would be scuttled.
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On the 21 May 1990, over three weeks after the initial explosion and with the fire still
burning at No 3 tank, the vessel was towed out to sea. The tank domes of the four
undamaged tanks were breached with explosive charges. Although this resulted in
some escalation of the fire, it was to nothing like the extent the authorities had
anticipated. The slow burn rate was attributed to the fact that the cargo was fully
refrigerated and would only burn as fast as heat penetrated the insulated tank walls
and domes and evaporated the propylene. On 8 June 1990, 41 days after the initial
explosion and fire, a large quantity of explosive was detonated on Val Rosandras
hull. This resulted in a massive fireball and pool fire, and on this occasion the
ethylene carriers demise was not long in coming.
In hindsight, Val Rosandra and most of her cargo could almost certainly have been
salvaged, albeit not without a certain degree of attendant risk. The damage was not
as serious as that suffered by Gaz Fountain described earlier. Also, the condition of
the ethylene carrier did not significantly deteriorate until 21 days after the initial
explosion when the tank domes were deliberately breached. This would have given
adequate time for planning and implementing the salvage operation. However, the
underlying fear of the Italian authorities and other involved parties appeared to be
that the vessel was a floating bomb about to explode. They considered that their
safest option was to scuttle the vessel in deep water, rather than attempt a salvage
operation.
Like Gaz Fountain, the Val Rosandra incident shows how resilient robustly
constructed are gas tankers and how wrong the public perception of the risks they
may pose.
Mexico City Disaster
Early on the morning of Monday, 19 November 1984 a number of explosions and a
severe fire completely destroyed the LPG distribution terminal at San Juan
Ixhuatepec on the outskirts of Mexico City. The exact number of casualties was
never determined, but is known that in excess of 500 were killed as a result of the
destruction of the installation, which incorporated six spherical and 48 cylindrical
storage tanks and road tanker and rail tank car filling facilities.
It was impossible to ascertain the cause of the disaster as the site was completely
destroyed. Also, all the employees on the site at the time died in the incident.
During the fire four 1600 m
3
spheres disintegrated and at least 15 of the cylindrical
pressure vessel storage tanks ruptured. Although the remaining two spheres were
still in position and intact, the legs on one side had collapsed. All but two of the 48
cylindrical vessels had been moved from their concrete saddles, in some instances
by tens of metres. Many were badly distorted. Most of the connecting pipework had
disappeared or was torn away from the vessels. Many pieces of the storage vessels,
some very large, had become projectiles, landing considerable distances outside the
site.
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Introduction/SIGTTO Liquefied Gas Fire Hazard Management/Page 16
A housing area, within 300-350 metres of the spheres, was severely damaged by
fire. Very little fire damage occurred outside that area, although trees over 1 km
away had scorched leaves on the side facing the site.
The arrangement of the bunding around the tanks at the facility was such that LPG
would have built up under the tanks following a leak. This layout is believed to have
resulted in a very severe fire after initial ignition from one of the flare pits within the
site. Any gas discharging from the storage tank relief valves was piped to these flare
pits.
There were two main explosions in this incident and both were accompanied by very
large fireballs. They occurred about half an hour apart, the first being about 15 to 20
minutes after the start of the incident. These main explosions would be at the time
the four spheres BLEVEd. There were also a number of smaller explosions when
cylindrical tanks ruptured.
The tanks were enclosed in a large bunded area approximately 120 metres square,
divided into 13 sub-areas. The bund walls were about 0.5 metres high. The legs of
the two remaining spheres had apparently not been fireproofed.
SUMMARY
This paper has given a brief overview of the forthcoming SIGTTO Publication
Liquefied Gas Fire Hazard Management, which, it hoped will become the definitive
book on the subject. It is intended that it will be of use to all those who are directly or
indirectly, such as emergency services, involved in the liquefied gas industries.
It concentrates on the methodologies for prevention and mitigation of fires and
explosions rather than the actions and techniques of liquefied gas firefighting, which
are covered in the SIGTTO publication Cargo Firefighting on Liquefied Gas
Carriers and the accompanying training video. It is also biased towards the risk-
based approach to hazard management, which more and more authorities are
requiring.
P R O G R A M M E