NCDDR (2003) Tracer Report

TRACER STUDY AND FOLLOW-UP ASSESSMENT
OF THE REINTEGRATION COMPONENT OF SIERRA LEONE’S

DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION
PROGRAMME.
Aki Stavrou
Centre for Sustainable Livelihoods
University of Ireland
Cork, Ireland
James Vincent
ICards
Freetown, Sierra Leone
Krijn Peters
Doctoral Candidate
Wageningen University and Research Centre
Netherlands
Patrick Burton
Development Research Associates International
Johannesburg, South Africa
Samuel Johnson
Freelance Researcher
Freetown, Sierra Leone
th
14 December 2003
Cork, Ireland
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS .........................................................................................................2

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................4
1.1 The Brief .................................................................................................................4
1.2 Purpose of the Study...............................................................................................4
1.3 Significance of the Study.........................................................................................5
1.4 Research Methodology ...........................................................................................6
1.4.1 Research Setting and Study Population..........................................................6
1.4.2 Data Sources and Types .................................................................................6
1.4.3 Data Collection Techniques............................................................................6
1.4.4 Sampling, Size and Methods ..........................................................................6
1.4.5 Training ..........................................................................................................8
1.4.6 Field Work......................................................................................................9
1.4.7 FieldTeam report of the Survey Areas............................................................9
1.5 Report Structure and Limitations .........................................................................12
1.5.1 Outline of this Report ...................................................................................12
1.5.2 Report Style ..................................................................................................13
1.5.3 Research Limitations ....................................................................................13
1.6 The Team ..............................................................................................................13
CHAPTER 2: DEMOGRAPHICS, TRAINING AND TOOLKITS .................................................15

2.1 Demographics.......................................................................................................15
2.2 Housing.................................................................................................................16
2.3 Land and Dwelling Ownership.............................................................................17
2.4 Savings..................................................................................................................17
CHAPTER 3: TRAINING AND TOOLKITS .............................................................................19

3.1 The Training .........................................................................................................19
3.1.1 The Certificates ............................................................................................19
3.1.2 Relevance of Training to Employment.........................................................20
3.1.3 Comments on the Training ...........................................................................21
3.2 The Toolkit............................................................................................................22
CHAPTER 4 : WORK HISTORY AND SAVINGS .................................................................24

4.1 Employed Ex-Combatants ....................................................................................24
4.1.1 Employment and Training ............................................................................25
4.1.2 Earnings........................................................................................................26
4.1.3 Workplace Relations.....................................................................................27
4.2 Unemployed ..........................................................................................................28
CHAPTER 5: SOCIAL CAPITAL .......................................................................................29

5.1 Networks ...............................................................................................................29
5.1.1 Group Membership.......................................................................................29
5.1.2 People and Quarrelling .................................................................................31
5.1.3 Friends ..........................................................................................................31
5.2 Trust and Solidarity..............................................................................................32
5.3 Collective Action and Cooperation ......................................................................35
5.4 Information and Communication..........................................................................35
5.5 Social Cohesion and Inclusion .............................................................................37
5.6 Sociability .............................................................................................................38
5.7 Psycho-Social Issues.............................................................................................38
5.8 Empowerment and Political Action......................................................................40
5.9 Welfare Assessment ..............................................................................................41
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CHAPTER 6: THE 2002/3 TRACKING SURVEY ...................................................................43
6.1 Introduction, Training and Toolkits Tracer Study................................................43
6.2 Employment and Unemployment 2002/3 Tracer Study ........................................44
6.2.1 Experience of Work Since Training .............................................................44
6.2.2 Income from employment ............................................................................45
6.2.3 Workplace Relations.....................................................................................46
6.2.4 The Unemployed ..........................................................................................47
6.3 Social Environment and Social Capital 2002/3 Tracer Study..............................48
6.3.1 Social Environment ......................................................................................48
6.3.2 Social capital ................................................................................................48
6.3.3 Social cohesion and inclusion.......................................................................49
6.3.4 Trust and Solidarity ......................................................................................50
6.3.5 Empowerment and Political Action..............................................................51
6.3.6 Information and Communication..................................................................52
6.4 Welfare assessment...............................................................................................53
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................54

7.1 Summary ...............................................................................................................54
7.2 Conclusion............................................................................................................55
7.2.1 Aim 1: assess the ex-combatants participation.............................................55
7.2.2 Aim 2: assess the socio-economic status ......................................................56
7.2.3 Aim 3: assess the present sector specific interventions. ...............................56
7.2.4 Aim 4: assess parallel partner funded programs...........................................57
7.2.5 Aim 5: Assess parallel partners programs within NCDDR framework........58
7.2.6 Aim 6: Identify transition issues...................................................................58
7.2.7 Aim of Tracer Study.....................................................................................58
7.3 Short comings of the Study ..............................................................................59
7.4 Recommendations.................................................................................................60
APPENDIX 1: QUESTIONNAIRE 61
APPENDIX 1: TABLES 69
APPENDIX 2: MAP 125
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 THE BRIEF

The terms of Reference for undertaking a Tracer Study and Follow-up Assessment
(hereinafter the ‘Tracer Study’) of the reintegration component of Sierra Leone’s
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programme known as the
Training and Education Programme, stated that a de-brief be given at the end of the
in-field mission. The Tracer Study conducted under Multi-Donor Trust Fund is a
follow-up to the earlier assessment of the TEP in 2002.
The Tracer Study was designed to use only quantitative survey instruments and
statistical analysis and to be complementary to a parallel qualitative study on “ ex-
combatants and Post-Conflict Community Dynamics”. The latter was a sub-study of
the World Bank supported Social Assessment and was undertaken two months prior
to this Tracer Study.
1.2 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The purpose of the Tracer Study was two-fold and was designed to allow policy
makers and service providers to investigate how well ex-combatants reintegrated into
society by:
Providing a longitudinal dimension to the social and economic reintegration of

ex-combatants by tracing a cohort of 250 ex-combatants first surveyed as
part of the Reintegration Assessment 2002.
Increasing the coverage and validity of the findings of the Reintegration

Assessment 2002 through replication of the original survey to cover ex-
combatants in newly accessible areas, with a focus on eastern Sierra Leone,
and in particular the districts of Kono, Kailahun, Pujahun and Kenema.
For the first component of the study, it was originally planned to use existing data
files – registration and mid-term evaluation of a sample of 250 ex-combatants (100
from Freetown and 50 each from Bo, Kenema and Port Loco) who would be chosen
to represent various generic groupings of ex-combatants. Although there were
numerous variables that could have been used to distinguish between the different
ex-combatants, the 2002 evaluation found the following to be the most important:
age, gender, spatial location, training organisation and to a lesser extent, entry into
the DDR process. It was hoped that once 250 ex-combatants were identified, they
would have been tracked to their communities, and interviewed on just how well they
had integrated back into civilian life. The aim of this first component of the study was
to:
Document and assess changes in the socio-economic status since the 2002
survey of ex-combatants who completed their participation in programmes;
Assess the degree to which the reintegration support provided has directly
impacted on their current main source of income, i.e. to which degree were
these ex-combatants engaged in economic activities within the sectors they
were trained in.
Assess the degree to which the reintegration support provided has indirectly
impacted on the ex-combatants current livelihood strategy
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Assess whether continued social reintegration was taking place, how this was
expressed, and establish the main factors constraining/promoting these
trends;
Establish the degree to which ex-combatants identify with, and were actively
engaged in economic and social interest-based groups and/or networks;
Suggest indicators to follow the trends of social reintegration identified.
For the second component of the study, it was originally planned to interview a
further 250 ex-combatants who were not interviewed during the previous study.
These would have been selected from Freetown (50) and three other districts (75
each) and interviewed with the same tools. Selection of survey sites was to have
been discussed and agreed to prior to the study with the Executive Secretary
NCDDR. The analysis was to investigate whether there were differential experiences
depending on whether the ex-combatants re-located into their original communities
or elsewhere. The aim of this second component of the study was to:
Assess the ex-combatant participation in NCDDR funded reintegration

opportunities and issues related to access to, participation in and
implementation of the programmes by Implementing Partners.
Assess the socio-economic status (snapshot) of those ex-combatants who

had completed their participation in programmes along with their families and
communities.
Assess the present sector specific interventions and identify ways of

improving service delivery of the reintegration opportunities.
Assess the ex-combatant participation in reintegration opportunities funded by

parallel partners, which were within the NCDDR reintegration framework and
issues related to access and their participation in the programmes.
Assess the socio-economic status of those ex-combatants who had

completed their participation in reintegration opportunities funded by parallel
partners, which were within the NCDDR reintegration framework.
Identify transition issues which the ex-combatants will face as civilian

community members beyond short-term reintegration assistance provided by
NCDDR, and how to link that information for programming purposes to the
larger reintegration and recovery efforts.
1.3 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The main objective of the CIP is to gain knowledge about how a randomly selected
group of ex-combatants have fared with their reintegration process since being
disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated into society. The surveys were designed to
test their perceptions of their training, their vocational experiences and their migration
and settlement back into mainstream society.
This knowledge can be used to assist with the overall assessment of the NCDDR
program and to add to the overall understanding of reintegration and settlement
processes and how the NCDDR program might have facilitated this. By
understanding the Sierra Leone example, might assist a variety of agencies and
community groups who might be developing similar services for future programs..
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1.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
1.4.1 RESEARCH SETTING AND STUDY POPULATION
The target population for this study were 250 ex-combatants out of 400, who had
either been interviewed in the 2002 NCDDR mid-term evaluation and a sample of
250 new ex-combatants located in Freetown and three regions located in the south
and east of the country.
All ex-combatants interviewed were 18 years of age and were interviewed at NCDDR
offices in 6 localities around the country.
1.4.2 DATA SOURCES AND TYPES

Both primary and secondary data were used in the study. Secondary documented
data has been collected from either hard or electronic copies of books, papers,
reports and other official documents.
The secondary sources yielded information and statistical data on:
On the recent socio-political history of Sierra Leone;

Theoretical dissertations on demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration;
Types of interview schedules that could be used and the types of issues that
should be included;
On recent government policies in Sierra Leone from official sources; and
From general website relating to settlement and integration processes.
Primary information was collected from a total of 511 All ex-combatants.
1.4.3 DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUES

Primary data has been obtained using quantitative techniques. A largely structured
questionnaire was administered to 511 ex-combatants. All of these were conducted
face-to-face at NCDDR offices in Freetown, Bo, Kalahun, Kenema, Kono, Port Loko
and Pujuhan.
Each of the face-to-face interview sessions lasted approximately one hour. Twelve
enumerators were used to undertake the interviews, which were wherever possible
administered in the language of the respondent. The questionnaires were
electronically recorded as the survey was being undertaken and the final statistics
available for computation one day after the last questionnaire was completed. Two
data capturers were used to enter the primary data into a Statistical Package for
Social Sciences (SPSS) program. The final interview schedule included the following
thematic sections as they appear in chapters in this report.
The interview schedule can be found in Appendix One of this report.
1.4.4 SAMPLING, SIZE AND METHODS

Following from the above, the following table synthesizes the number of interviews
original expected from each component of the study and breaks them down by
survey area.
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Table 1: Original sample for Tracer Study 2003
ORIGINAL PLAN
Survey Area
Tracer Part I Reintegration Part II
Freetown 100 50
Bo 50 0
Port Loco 50 0
Kenema 50 50
Kailahun 0 50
Pujahun 0 50
Kono 0 50
250 250
As can be seen fro the above table, a total of 500 questionnaires were to have been
completed. However, from the outset the team encountered major problems in its
attempt to undertake the Tracer Study in Freetown. Quite simply, all attempts to
locate and get those ex-combatants who participated in the 2002 evaluation to do so
again, failed.
A dual strategy was used to try and locate these respondents:
for the duration of one week prior to the survey radio time was purchased at
six different stations, and used to create awareness and inform participants of
the study and the various logistics associated to it. Although this proved very
successful in locating about 80% of the required sample of ex-combatants in
Port Loko, Bo and Kenema, in Free Town just two respondents arrived at one
of the advertised survey points.
during the survey, a small team of enumerators who had previously worked
on the 2002 survey, contacted a number of organizations were ex-
combatants might be found, namely – taxi organizations, student movements,
religious groupings, etc. These efforts were rewarded in Port Loko, Bo and
Kenema and the maximum possible sample was located, but in Freetown
they only unearthed a further 11 respondents.
In addition, during the 2002 survey only 42 and 31 interviews had been undertaken
respectively in Kenema and Bo, and therefore, as per the brief, attempting to trace 50
ex-combatants who participated in 2002 was not possible. Once it became evident
that the ex-combatants from the 2002 survey in Freetown were not going to be
traced, a meeting was convened with the Executive Secretary NCDDR and targets
were re-evaluated to reflect the reality of the situation.
Eventually, a total of 117 ex-combatants who were previously interviewed in 2002:

Port Loko (53), Bo (30), Kenema (21) and Freetown (13), were traced. A total of 102
of these agreed to be re-interviewed - Port Loko (50), Bo (29), Kenema (21) and
Freetown (3). The remaining 16 ex-combatants, mainly from Free Town and Port
Loko, refused to be re-interviewed. In order to understand these reasons, the team
leader held discussions with some of these and other ex-combatants who had
completed their training during the same time period. The discussions revealed that
ex-combatants who had finished their training more than 17 months ago felt that had
assimilated into society and that there was no further need to be involved with such
studies. Furthermore, all of them argued that they no longer saw themselves as ex-
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combatants, but rather as citizens of the new Sierra Leone and did not wish to be
categorised as combatants, of any form, again. Indeed, in addition to the refusals, 14
leads as to where some of the ex-combatants might be found resulted in two field
workers being threatened should they pursue their quests to find them. In particular,
those ex-combatants now working in formal employment, were adamant that they
were not to be interviewed.
The second reason given by both this group and other ex-combatants is the many
fear both the Criminal Court and Truth and Reconciliation Committee (TRC) and with
the passage of time prefer the anonymity of society to being once again considered
an ex-combatant. A third reason was that some ex-combatants were displeased with
the NCDDR and so long as they were receiving some form of payment, were willing
to ‘tolerate’ interviews, but once completed with the process, wanted nothing further
to do with it. Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of ex-combatants that were
tracked were more than willing to make time available to complete the interviews.
In order to compensate from the reduced tracking sample, and ensure that there was
a spread of ex-combatants in terms of reintegration time, the research team were
instructed to retain the same sample size – 500, but to ensure that the there was an
equal representation of ex-combatants who had completed their training with three
time cohorts – 1) within 6 month, 2) 6 to 18 months ago and 3) over 18 months ago.
The table below reflects the composition of the final sample by when the ex-
combatants completed their training.
Table 2: Months since training

Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
Less than 6 months 188 36.8 36.8
6 to 17 months 159 31.1 67.9
18 months and longer 164 32.1 100.0
Total 511 100.0
The table below shows the breakdown of the final overall sample by location.
Table 3: Final sample of Tracer Study by area

Percentage of All
Survey Area Total Number
Questionnaires
Kenema 120 23.5%
Free Town 110 21.5%
Kono 60 11.7%
Pujuhan 60 11.7%
Kalahun 60 11.7%
Bo 51 10.0%
Port Loko 50 9.8%
Total 511 100%
1.4.5 TRAINING
Training was undertaken in two separate sessions - in Freetown and Kenema. The
Freetown training, undertaken by the principal researcher, took place during
November 5th and was completed in one day. However, as part of the process,
fieldworkers were asked to complete a few questionnaires in-field which were then
assessed before the fieldworker was formally engaged. The Kenema training took
place on November 7th, and was undertaken by in-country research assistant.
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During the training, the fieldworkers were not only trained on the content of the
questionnaire, but also on how to interview and given a background assessment of
the NDDR and the process to date. The questionnaire applied was based on that
used the previous year, modified appropriately to account for the additional briefs and
overall aims of the study. The same questionnaire was used on the entire sample.
1.4.6 FIELD WORK

Two teams were assembled for the fieldwork: Team A and Team J.
Team-A was allocated Free Town, Bo, Port Loko, and Kalihun and initiated it’s
operations on November 7th with the following Terms of Reference:
To undertake 140 Reintegration Assessment interviews in Free Town,

Kalihun and Bo (50, 60 and 20 respectively).
To undertake Tracer Interviews with 50 and 30 ex-combatants who were
interviewed in 2002 respectively in Port Loko and Bo supplementing any
short-fall with as many ex-combatants that completed their training more than
17 months ago.
To undertake Tracer Interviews with 50 ex-combatants in Free Town who had
completed their training more than 17 months ago.
To prepare and submit a debriefing note to the Team Leader and Lead
Consultant on completion of field work.
Team-J was allocated the South East (Kenema, Kono and Pujehun) and initiated
their research November 8th with the following Terms of Reference:
To undertake 190 Reintegration Assessment interviews in Kenema, Kono and

Pujehun (70, 60 and 60 respectively).
To undertake Tracer Interviews with 30 ex-combatants who were interviewed
in 2002 in Kenema and a further 20 interviews (or more depending on how
many of the ex-combatants were traced, thus a total of 50 Tracer Interviews)
with ex-combatants that completed their training more than 17 months ago.
To prepare and submit a debriefing note to the Team Leader and Lead
Consultant on completion of field work.
1.4.7 FIELDTEAM REPORT OF THE SURVEY AREAS1
FREE TOWN
Sheku Sherrif initiated research in Freetown and was originally based in an office at
the NCDDR for the first three days and then moved about on location throughout the
city. He was assisted in organising by Balla Sheriff. Radio adverts were placed with
Radio FM, and Radio Democracy. The NCDDR was overwhelmed with ex-
combatants still busy with training or recently graduated and attempting to tell these
that they were ineligible for interviewing proved very difficult. In addition, it had been
decided that not more than 50% of the surveys would be undertaken at the NCDDR,
because it was essential to also interview ex-combatants currently employed, hence
the field team, later supplemented by fieldworkers from Port Loko and Bo, moved
around town. The fieldwork in Freetown lasted for 10 days.
1
These reports were submitted by various field teams members and have been inserted as per their original drafting.
The names refer to field team members.
9
KENEMA
The South-East team traveled together with the Bo Team, arriving in Bo – Southern
Sierra Leone on the night of the 6th November. The Team Leader for the East made
arrangement for announcements to be made in one of the Local FM radio stations
(SLBS 96.5) in Bo. After this, the team left for Kenema where the Team Leader
mobilized the team for training. After the training, the Team Leader met with the
Regional Officer-East (Mr. J.S. Momoh) and briefed him about the purpose of the
study in the region after which the whole team went in field in Kenema Town for rest
of November 7th to see whether they understood the administration of the
questionnaire and it turned out to be satisfactory.
The team was then divided into two as follows:
Sub–team JA - Comprising of two members (Leslie Mokuwa and Abu Bakarr

Bahome) stayed in Kenema Town.
Sub-team JB - Comprising of four enumerators (Patricia Koroma, Ahamoudu

V.Kanneh, Lansana Juana and Peter Koroma) traveled together with the
team leader to Kono on Saturday 8th November to do 60 interviews in two
working days.
The team in Kenema however had some difficulties regarding their workspace and
tracking the 30 tracer interviews. About half of the sample arrived at the NCDDR
office, but for the rest, the team had to move from place to place tracking the
balance. For the new sample, following the announcements in the local FM station
(93.5), a massive turnout of ex-combatants ensued at the NCDDR office. Although
the research proceeded smoothly, there were fears expressed by the NCDDR staff
who felt uncomfortable with the mass turnout, fearing that a ‘situation’ might emerge
whereby the ex-combatants might react to not having received tool kits or late
allowances. However, nothing of the sort happened and the project was timeously
completed.
KONO
The sub-team arrived in Kono on the night of November 9th and the team met with
the NCDDR staff who were very cooperative and well aware of the project. The Kono
NCDDR staff assisted with creating an amicable environment to undertake the
research and where always available to lend a hand should that have been required.
For instance some DDR ID-Cards that were given out during the first phase of the
NCDDR process were noted, mainly the SLA whilst they were in camp at LUNGI in
the early part of the NCDDR process, and the NCDDR staff had to certify that they
were authentic cards given out by the program. To assist with the mobilization of ex-
combatants, Radio UNAMSIL in Kono was used to create awareness. The research
was successfully completed in Kono.
ZIMMI – PUJEHUN DISTRICT

In Zimmi, the situation was different to Kono, and the team had to entirely depend on
announcements made by the SLBS FM 96.3 in Bo and the KISS 104 FM, a privately
owned radio station also in Bo Town. On arrival in Zimmi, the team met with the
chiefs to introduce the team and also tell them the purpose of our visit to Zimmi.
Once homage was paid and greetings to let them traditionally know that the team
were their guests for the period we were in Zimmi Town, were completed, the
research begun. During one courtesy call on the Chief, the team was told that there
was only one former RUF woman in Zimmi and that the rest of the combatants were
all XCDF fighters. Because they were all ex-combatants from the same faction, they
were much easy to control. Whilst the team was with the Chiefs, one former CDF
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commander reporting to the chiefs that he heard the SLA saying that the LURD
rebels from Liberia were planning to attack Zimmi with the aim of eventually freeing
Chief Hinga Norman from prison in Freetown. Knowing that this was a security
concern which was not be downplayed, and the team leader decided that the team
visit the SL Police, UNAMSIL PAKBATT Contingent and the SLA commander in the
area to inform them of the purpose of the mission. This was done to avoid the
confusion that perhaps the research team might be confused as those coming to
mobilize the CDF for their alleged attack on Zimmi. A change of plan was initiated
and rather than sending people to the surrounding villages to mobilize ex-combatants
the chief assisted with his men and the research was successfully completed. The
NCDDR officers were also helpful especially in identifying ex-combatants from the
surrounding in addition to the NCDDR ID cards.
BO
Godwin Mansary, who had previously worked in the same district in the 2002 survey,
undertook fieldwork in Bo. Magnus Conteh and Joseph Kono assisted him. As with
the other areas, radio time was purchased with local FM and community radio
stations and 26 of the 30 ex-combatants that were interviewed in 2002 were traced
and re-interviewed. Many of these interviews were undertaken in villages and on
farms around the district and the team spent five days attempting to complete this
task. However, because of the travel to outlying areas, they only managed 35
questionnaires and on their return, Patrick Mademba who also worked in 2002 in the
region, went up to complete the remaining 16 interviews. He did this in three days
and returned to Freetown on November 15th. The team reported a generally relaxed
atmosphere and found nothing to suggest that life was proceding other than normal.
PORT LOKO
A team of three fieldworkers under the supervision Samuel Johnson, including
Edward Koroma and James Mayau left Freetown November 6th, for Port Loko town.
Samuel Johnson had worked in Port Loko in 2002 on the same survey. The team
was charged with the onus of conducting 50 interviews with ex-combatant, who
specifically under went the previous interviews, conducted in September last year. In
short, the whole exercise was geared towards tracing ex-combatant who were
previously interview last year. Upon arrival at Port Loko, the team contacted the
Caritas office, one of the leading NGO’s in the training of ex-combatant. The NCDDR
had closed down their operation in Port Loko.
After a brief discussion with the head of Organization and few staff members, we
proceeded to put plans in place for effective work the following day. An office space
was provided for the team at the Caritas where work was done. To speed up the flow
of information to the target group, especially so when just under 70% of the ex-
combatant who have gone through the NCDDR process are currently staying in
villages. However, in order to locate more ex-combatants that were interviewed in
2002, the team engaged the services of a group of local men who went door-to-door
announcing the survey. This was undertaken not only in Port Loko, but also in a
number of the surrounding villages. Two groups of these men hired a megaphone
and a motorcycle and proceeded with the task. Publicity was done mainly in the
most commonly used local language Temmne, Krio was also used.
A great deal of help was also received from local community members, who took it
upon themselves in their own way in spreading the information all around town.
Because of this 56% of all the interviews were completed within two days. As the ex-
combatants dwindled, two members of the term left started visiting the surrounding
villages. Directed by local community members they managed to track down the
remaining respondents. Work in the villages lasted for a couple of days. Whilst two
11
members of the team returned to Freetown, one member stayed behind to complete
the process. The whole exercise in Port Loko lasted for six days.
KAILAHUN
A team of three, including the principal researcher - Aki Stavrou, Samuel Johnson
and Sheku Sheriff, left Freetown November 10th for Kailahun Town whereupon arrival
the NCDDR regional office was contacted and assisted the team with setting up a
working space and contacting ex-combatants. Mr. John Saidu of the NCDDR was the
responsible staff member who went out of his way to assist the team.. The team
targeted ex-combatant who have completed training, no matter the length of time
after completion. Effective interview sessions were conducted with sixty ex-
combatants within two days, with the target being achieved by working into the early
evenings. The local community radio station was used to reach ex-combatants and
announcements were made in their local languages- Mende and Krio. Generally the
situation was found to be peaceful and the interactions between the Pakistani peace-
keepers and the local community was perceived to be excellent. The only perturbing
aspect of the fieldwork, was that during off-record interviews with female ex-
combatants, it was claimed that the ‘vast majority’ of women did not go through the
NCDDR program preferring the anonymity of returning quietly to their homes and
families. After having successfully completed the sample, the team returned to
Freetown on the November 13th.
1.5 REPORT STRUCTURE AND LIMITATIONS

1.5.1 OUTLINE OF THIS REPORT
The report is divided into seven chapters:
Chapter one introduces the study, stating both its purposes and significance, outlines
the research methodology and notes any research limitations.
Chapters two reports on the findings of the overall survey of 511 ex-combatants
starting with a section on the demographic details of the ex-combatants. Included
here are also questions on housing, land ownership and savings patterns.
Chapter three details the training process by probing ex-combatant opinions of their
individual training programs and investigates some issues relating to the toolkits.
Chapter four targets economic reintegration deals the work histories of the ex-
combatants who have found or created employment since completing their training
and the also the experiences of those that have not.
Chapter five aims at covering the issue of social reintegration and looks at a
number of issues on social capital, including the social environment, trust and
solidarity, social cohesion, community participation, psycho-social issues and a
concludes with a short section on a self assessment of welfare.
Chapter six is the report of the tracking study, that is, that part of the report that
looks at the comparative study of the 102 ex-combatants who were interviewed both
in the 2003 and 2003 surveys.
Chapter seven concludes and answers the questions asked in the brief.
Finally, Appendix one of the report contains the questionnaire used, whist the
enormous list of tables generated but not displayed in the main body of the report
are listed in Appendix two.
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1.5.2 REPORT STYLE
It should be the noted, that the style of reporting differs throughout the report. This is
deliberate for the issues under consideration demand a differential approach. The
questions used dealing with the training, toolkits, employment and unemployment
sections, force the reporting into the excessive use of data as when analysing, whilst
the section on social environment and capital is best reported in a more flowing and
descriptive manner. Likewise, the second section, the tracking report, needs to adopt
a comparative approach, and as such once again data is excessively used.
Furthermore, it should be noted, that chapter six, the 2002-2003 tracking analysis,
has been written in such a manner so that it can be presented as a freestanding
report.
1.5.3 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS

Despite the fact that efforts were made to reduce the limitations of this study, it must
be recognised that there are various limitations caused by the size and type of
research samples used in the study as well as the restrictions in terms of resources
and time. A number of limitations can be identified; some of these are common to
other research surveys of this kind:
Firstly, it must be recognised that the viewpoints and background of the researcher,
and of his colleagues, who were involved in the research study, inevitably shaped the
research process and final findings.
Secondly, although respondents were assured of confidentiality, in a report that

covers so few respondents and is conducted on the premises of the organisation
whose program is being evaluated, it is impossible to eradicate some direct
reference. Therefore it is very likely that some participants were reserved in both the
manner they responded and in the content of their responses. Furthermore, when
discussing issues relating to authority structures and to cultural differences between
different community members, participants always run the risk of either being, or
thinking that they are being, politically inappropriate. As such, in many instances
respondents restricted or muted their opinions on matters that might have given rise
to either of these perceptions. In addition, as shown in the findings, respondents also
deliberately misinformed enumerators on issues regarding their vocational status.
Although this is understandable as to why it might occur, it nevertheless means that
some form of bias, that cannot be checked and corrected for, has crept into the final
report.
Thirdly, this research project, as with any research project that relies almost entirely
on quantitative data cannot be tested against any set of qualitative criteria. It is
simply hoped that the opinions were honest and representative of what is happening
in terms of service delivery and reintegration experiences to the ex-combatants at the
time when the research was undertaken.
1.6 THE TEAM

The team was led by Aki Stavrou, Centre for Sustainable Livelihoods, National
University of Ireland - Cork, who was responsible for conceptualising the study,
being the lead researcher in field, co-ordinating the analysis and editing the final
documents. He was also a member of the 2002 mid-term evaluation team and thus
was able to apply the knowledge accumulated in that study to this one.
13
James Vincent was the both the Sierra Leone lead researcher and co-led the teams.
He was responsible for generating the publicity, recruiting most of the field team,
providing office backstopping for the project and inputting into the analysis. James
has worked on a number of projects relating to the subject on hand, the most recent
of this was on a qualitative survey that preceded this study by two months. The
experience gained in that study was applied with great effect on this study.
Krijn Peters, a doctoral candidate at Wageningen University and Research Centre in

the Netherlands, has visited Sierra Leone on a regular basis since 1996. He only left
the country in October 2003 after a year of field research and thus his recent
knowledge and experience proved valuable in the analysis on social capital for which
he was primarily responsible.
Patrick Burton, is an independent researcher with Development Research Associates

International, based in South Africa, and has a long-standing experience of work in
the field of victimisation studies and comparative linear research. He was responsible
for much of the tracking analysis.
Samuel Johnson is a post-graduate student in Freetown, who assisted with the

fieldwork in 2002 and was responsible for the management of the research in port
Locko and Kailahun. He assisted with some of the field reporting and was
responsible for the coding and some of the date entry.
Finally, it should be noted that although the study was commissioned by the NCDDR,
it has been carried out as an independent and objective research project. It reflects
an interpretation of views of a sample of 852 ex-combatants, 17 key informants and
21 enumerators (2003 and 2003), Stellios Cominos who led the mid-term evaluation
team in 2002, as well as the five independent researchers who have inputted into this
report. The findings do not necessarily reflect any views of either the NCDDR or the
any funding donor. All conclusions reached and recommendations made are those
for the lead researcher alone, and may not necessarily be shared by any other
members of the team.
14
CHAPTER 2: DEMOGRAPHICS, TRAINING AND TOOLKITS
2.1 DEMOGRAPHICS
The average age of ex-combatants interviewed was 30 years and five months.
However, due to a couple of outliers at the top end of the age scale, the median age,
that is the age group that divided the sample into half, was exactly 28 years. A total
of 37% of the sample fell in the under 25-year age group, almost 43% in the 26 to 35
year age cohort and 20.4% were over the age of 35 years.
The overwhelming majority (85.9%) of ex-combatants were married, with most of the
rest being either single, widowed or divorced. However, for a small minority - 2.9%
they felt a little confused about their marital status, answering, “do not know”. Of the
married ex-combatants, the overwhelming majority had one spouse, however a
minority of men 15.3% had two wives, 2% three wives and 1% four wives.
On average ex-combatants have 2.4 children each, with the median being 2 children.
One-quarter have one child, a little less than another quarter two children and a little
over one sixth three children. A fraction over 7% had more than five children, and
less than 1% having 8 or more children. The average age of the ex-combatants
youngest child is two years and one month with the median being one year, whilst
the same for the oldest child is 7 years and 7 months and the median 5 years. These
average ages for children reflect the median age of the combatants themselves and
could not considered as be anything else than average for the region.
Table 4: What did you do before the war started?

Survey Area Total
Vocation Free Port
Bo Kenema Kono Pujuhan Kalahun
Town Loko
Scholar 33.6% 26.0% 29.4% 52.5% 10.0% 26.7% 60.0% 36.4%
Self employed –
27.3% 28.0% 25.5% 16.7% 23.3% 31.7% 15.0% 23.3%
non farming
Farming 15.5% 22.0% 7.8% 23.3% 51.7% 23.3% 13.3% 22.1%
Unemployed 4.5% 4.0% 33.3% 1.7% 3.3% 10.0% 6.7% 7.4%
Housewife 4.5% 10.0% 2.0% 1.7% 2.3%
Employed –
3.6% 4.0% 2.0% 1.7% 5.0% 3.3% 2.7%
private sector
Employed in civil
.9% 2.0% 4.2% 5.0% 3.4% 5.0% 2.9%
services
Employed as
soldier or police 10.0% 4.0% 1.7% 2.7%
officer
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
One third of the ex-combatants were scholars when the war begun, whilst a little
under one quarter were self-employed elsewhere from the agrarian sector and a little
over one fifth a farmer. Interestingly less than one tenth – 7.4%, claimed to have
been unemployed.
Ex-combatants were asked where they resided and where they wished to reside in
the future. Current residential patterns of the ex-combatants reflected the place
where interviews were undertaken, with only a small minority of ex-combatants
saying that they resided elsewhere. Likewise, with the exception of Freetown and
Koidu, most ex-combatants aspired to continue living in the same place. In the former
two areas, a little over 20% and 50% respectively, wanted to live elsewhere.
15
Interestingly, none of the people interviewed in the areas outside Freetown wanted to
live in Freetown. This contrasted quite significantly with the 2002 survey were some
respondents in locations outside Freetown wished to locate there.
2.2 HOUSING
The conflict in Sierra Leone has been characterized by massive destructions of the
housing infrastructure. Whole villages were burned down, zinc as a roofing material
has been looted on a massive scale and traditional houses collapsed, while their
inhabitants stayed in displaced camps, due lack of general maintenance. At the end
of the conflict, the people of Sierra Leone faced the massive task of rebuilding their
dwelling places and among these people are the interviewees. Furthermore, during
the war combatants occupied houses (often the best ones within the areas they
fought and occupied) to live in. Anecdotal evidence suggested that some now ex-
combatants wanted to continue to occupy some of these places. This has resulted in
some conflict occurring between ex-combatants and the original and rightful owners
of these dwellings. Fortunately, most of the conflicts have been solved in a peaceful
way.
Nevertheless, in order to understand the type of conditions ex-combatants reside in,

they were asked what houses they currently occupied. In addition, they were asked
whether they live alone or together with their family, or whether they live together with
friends. To further understand their social environment, they were asked whether
they have problems with other people around them. And related to this, they were
also probed for whether they have problems of a more psychosocial nature that
might have an impact on their social well-being, as well as on their relationship with
their social environment.
There is an even distribution of ex-combatants amongst different generic types of

housing, with 26.5% living in formal, 35.9% informal and 34.9% traditional houses.
Very few of the interviewees live on the street and an equally low number lived in
incomplete dwellings, meaning that for the majority of the ex-combatants their current
residential status would be classified as being generally good. It is interesting to note
that the period since they have completed their training has little influence on the type
of house they live in. In other words, the type of housing is a static factor.
Looking at the living arrangements it immediately becomes clear that slightly more
than 50% live with the same family as before the war. About 30% live with a different
family than their own, some live together with friends (12%) and a small minority
alone (5%). It should be noted, that it is not unusual for young Sierra Leoneans to
leave their parents and start to live with another family member. For instance if the
parents are living in a village where there is no school nearby, the young person
goes to a relative who lives in one of the bigger towns and thus would be able to
attend school. Others choose to migrate – either temporarily, or as oscillating
migrants or even permanently, to the bigger towns or mining areas in search of
income.
There are several reasons why ex-combatants do not to return to the family or place
where they lived before the war. Some of these reasons are:
Not being used to the rural way of live anymore.

Fear of repercussion/revenge.
Feeling ashamed to return with ‘empty hands or empty pockets’ after so many
years of absence.
16
Fear that family members will depend on them (especially when you have
been trained in a skill)
Ties with the area where you have been demobilised (for instance if one has
married a woman of the area)
2.3 LAND AND DWELLING OWNERSHIP

Another important issue is whether ex-combatants own land and if so, whether their
claims on their land are recognized. In Sierra Leone about 85% of the total
population depends on semi-subsistence agriculture. Relatively few ex-combatants
choose agriculture as part of their reintegration package but many ended up in
agriculture as they were not able to make a living out of their newly acquired skill.
Access to land is thus of crucial importance for many ex-combatants.
More than 50% of the interviewees state that they own land. Interesting is the fact
that the shorter they have completed their training the more likely is it that they own
land. This figure is probably partly influenced by the geographical spread of the
interviewees as a considerable number of those who have finished their training were
urbanised and therefore less likely to own land.
Ex-combatants were also asked whether or not own a dwelling in any urban or rural
area in Sierra Leone. A total of 60% stated that they indeed did own a dwelling and it
is interesting to note that here is a slight increase in the percentage of people owning
a dwelling house when compared with the number of months since they have
completed training. In other words, the longer since they completed training, the
more likely it is that they own a dwelling house.
2.4 SAVINGS
An often-expressed fear is that ex-combatants do not know how to handle money. It
is felt that through their years in an armed faction, where property was just taken and
looted, they would have lost the ability to use and invest the money wisely. Some
feared that the allowance ex-combatants received upon handing over their guns, the
equivalent of US$ 150, would be directly exchanged for ‘beer and liquor’. This fear
has not materialised, with most anecdotal evidence suggesting that it was used to
create a future life, however, given rising cost of living, this soon dissipated.
In order to understand how ex-combatants presently fare financially, they were asked
about their level of savings.
“Savings is a strange terminology to the ex-combatants, they say they do not

even have enough to eat, so they cannot think of saving money in Banks.”
Only about 16% of the ex-combatants have any savings at a bank or formal credit
institution. Unfortunately, the research failed to ask if they have any savings at
informal institutions, as many Sierra Leoneans make use of these institutions (usually
called ‘susu’) in which the participants make weekly, but small contributions while
once in a while a large amount is returned. However, what is important to note is that
the longer they have finished their training the more likely it is that have savings at a
bank or other formal credit institution. Again there is a close correlation between the
time having elapsed post-training and increased level of savings.
Noticeable is that those ex-combatants interviewed in Kenema, Kono and Pujehun

have almost no savings at a bank or credit institution. This might be partly due to
17
presence of diamonds in those areas. Kono is the diamond area of Sierra Leone par
excellence, in Kenema district is the important diamond area of Tongo located, and in
Pujehun is diamond mining on the increase, in particular around Zimmi. Because
diamond mining is to such a large extend a matter of occasional windfalls and
nothing less than a lottery, there is a general atmosphere in these areas of spending
available money. This is of course not to say that all the interviewees in these areas
are involved in diamond mining.
Conclusion
The housing and living arrangements of the ex-combatants do not differ from
that of most of the Sierra Leoneans.
Many of the ex-combatants own land.
A considerable number of the ex-combatants own a dwelling place and the

probability of ownership increases the longer ex-combatants spend in civilian
life.
Few respondents have savings at a bank or formal credit institution but the
probability of having and increasing savings increases the longer ex-
combatants spend in civilian life.
18
CHAPTER 3: TRAINING AND TOOLKITS
This chapter is designed to capture the ex-combatants opinions on the training

process and the toolkits that they received.
3.1 THE TRAINING

Ex-combatants were asked which organisation they undertook training at, these were
far too numerous to list, however, these can be found in Appendix One. The following
table lists the generic training program within which the ex-combatants were placed.
Table 5: Which training programme were you on?

Generic Training Program Frequency Percent
Vocational or Skills
390 76.3
Training
Apprentice 61 11.9
Public Works 26 5.1
Schooling 19 3.7
Agriculture 15 2.9
Total 511 100.0
The majority (76.3%) of ex-combatants undertook a vocational or skills training

course with the remainder undertaking an apprenticeship 11.9%, public works 5.1%,
schooling 3.7% and agriculture 2.9%. In terms of specific skills, the five most
common training skills undertaken by ex-combatants accounted for almost three
quarters of all respondents. These were: carpentry (27.2%), tailoring (22.3%), auto
mechanic (13.3%), masonry (5.9%) and garatie dying (5.1%)
On average the ex-combatants trained for a little over 7 months, having completed
their training, an average of 11 months ago. A little over two-thirds of all the ex-
combatants spent exactly 6 months in training, with 6.8% spending 9 months, 5.1%
three months and 4.7% 12 and 18 months in training. The rest were scattered
outside these cohorts.
3.1.1 THE CERTIFICATES

The ex-combatants were then asked whether they had received their certificates after
they had they completed their training. This was a major area of contention following
the mid-term evaluation, and a recommendation had then been made that this
process be both improved and speeded up. The results for 2003 are shown below.
Table 6: Did you receive your certificate after your training?

Months since training completed
Total
Response Less than 6 6 to 17 18 months
months months and longer
Yes 18.6% 47.2% 75.6% 45.8%
No 81.4% 52.8% 24.4% 54.2%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
19
Just over half (54.2%) of the ex-combatants had yet to receive their certificate
following the completion of their training. When viewed in terms of how long before
their training was completed, then 24.4% of those completing their course more than
18 months ago had yet to receive their certificates. This figure rises to 52.8% for
those completing their training between six and 17 months before the research, to
81.4% for those who had completed their training within the last 6 months. Those ex-
combatants that had received their certificates did so within two months of having
completed their training. Clearly, the recommendations of the mid-term evaluation
had not been taken into account and the handing out of completion remains a
problem.
Many of the ex-combatants that had not received certificates argued that they could
apply for jobs because they do not have their certificates from their employers. In
some cases, they have not seen their Implementing Partners for the last two to three
months, so they do not have anyone who could identify them to potential employers
in lieu of/in the absence of the certificates.
3.1.2 RELEVANCE OF TRAINING TO EMPLOYMENT

The ex-combatants were then asked whether they had enjoyed their training course.
The response was a mixed to a number of the questions regarding their training
course. On the one hand they mostly agreed that they enjoyed it (82.2%), being
comfortable with the knowledge of their trainers (93.3%), having become good
friends with other ex-combatants on the training regardless of what their previous
alliances were (96.1%) and feeling that socially they grew during the training (91.8%).
Furthermore, the skills learnt during the training were in demand (90.6%), prepared
them well for their future employment (75.5%) and the training was responsible for
their job (63.0%). On the other hand however, they felt that the training could have
been better (89.9%) and that the training did not help their work opportunities
(55.2%), whilst for 67.3% the toolkit was the best thing about the training.
Table 7: The training I received has prepared me well for my work

Response
Total
Less than 6 to 17 18 months
6 months months and longer
Agree 65.4% 76.1% 86.6% 75.5%

. Disagree 31.4% 22.0% 11.6% 22.1%
No comment 3.2% 1.9% 1.8% 2.3%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
When looking at the same data by when the ex-combatants completed their training,
then satisfaction would seem to have marginally decreased amongst the most recent
trainees. Likewise whereas 86.6% of ex-combatants who completed their training 18
months prior to the research claimed that the training prepared them well for their
work, only 65.4% of those completing training within the last six months said the
same.
20
Table 8: The training was responsible for the job I have
Response
Total
Less than 6 6 to 17 18 months
Agree 58.0% 62.9% 68.9% 63.0%
Disagree 38.3% 34.6% 26.2% 33.3%
No comment 3.7% 2.5% 4.9% 3.7%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Compared with the earlier trainees, there was also a drop amongst those claiming
that the training was responsible for their job.
3.1.3 COMMENTS ON THE TRAINING

All the ex-combatants were asked to rate a number of aspects of the training course,
as well as make suggested improvements to it. The findings are noted in the
following two tables.
Table 9: Ex-combatants rating on the training - How would you rate ….

Response ..the training ..the trainers who
..the training
institution - taught the ..fellow
course - materials
teaching materials and trainees?
and content?
conditions? content?
Excellent 25.2% 27.4% 27.8% 20.2%
Good 46.0% 52.1% 53.4% 52.3%
OK 18.2% 16.4% 14.7% 24.9%
Poor 7.2% 3.3% 3.3% 1.6%
Very bad 3.3% .8% .8% 1.2%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
When asked to rate the excellency of their training course materials, institution,
trainers and fellow trainees, ex-combatants were generally favourably inclined, with
61.2%, 79.5%, 81.2% and 72.5% respectively having responded positively to the
relevant question.
Table 10: Ex-combatants suggested improvements on the training

Response What aspects of the Would you want to change with regards to the
…theory ..practical
training training ..length of ..setting of
would you would you the the …trainers? …toolkit?
have have course? training?
changed? changed?
Don't know .8% 1.6% .6% 1.0% .4% .4%
Change nothing 31.3% 23.7% 14.3% 36.8% 36.8% 29.9%
Want more/better 56.6% 70.1% 82.2% 55.4% 56.4% 65.2%
Want less 5.7% 1.6% 1.2% 3.7% 3.3% 2.0%
Would drop 5.7% 3.1% 1.8% 3.1% 3.1% 2.5%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
When asked what aspects of the theory and practical aspects of the training they
would have changed, 31.3% and 23.7% respectively said nothing with 56.6% and
21
70.1% respectively claiming that they would have wished to have had more training
overall. Likewise 82.2% agreed that their courses should have been longer. A little
over had felt that they could have fared better in different and more favourable
surroundings, with better trainers and should have been awarded a better toolkit.
Although more than half of all the ex-combatants would have wanted more
theoretical training, 56.4% enjoyed the practical component of their training more
than any other aspect. Poor training materials were cited by 57.9% of the ex-
combatants as the aspect least liked about the training.
Driving (12.1%), building (11.0%) and auto mechanic (10%) skills training were the
three skills that ex-combatants would have liked to have seen more of during the
training selection. Interestingly, the biggest single group, 29.9% would have changed
nothing.
In addition, it should be noted that some Implementing Partners run special

programmes in which the ex-combatants were ”counselled” or classes of civic
education were given. The results of these seem to be positive, according to the
Implementing Partners, both during the time of the training as well as it is considered
useful in the actual reintegration process after graduation. A correlation of
satisfaction across different training centres, would suggest that there were no major
differences.
Most of the ex-combatants interviewed had gone through training satisfactorily with
problems being attributed not so much towards the actual training itself, but on the
non-receiving, certificates and tool kits. Anecdotal evidence also led to suggestions
of dissatisfaction with the lack of receiving allowances. However, the majority of
those interviewed were highly satisfied with the skills they acquired and were grateful
to the NCDDR making the training available.
3.2 THE TOOLKIT

A total of 86.7% felt that they should have received a toolkit on completion of their
training. Of these ex-combatants (433) that should have received a toolkit, only 191
(43.1%) had done so at the time of the survey, the balance still awaiting their toolkits.
The data however differs quite significantly when viewed in terms of when the ex-
combatants completed their training, with 64.4% of those having completed within the
previous six months, as opposed to 26.2% of those who completed 18 or more
months ago, still awaiting their toolkits.
Table 11: Did you receive a toolkit when you completed your training?
Months since training completed Total
Not applicable 14.4% 15.7% 9.8% 13.3%
Yes 21.3% 28.9% 64.0% 37.4%
No 64.4% 55.3% 26.2% 49.3%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
The handing out, or rather the lack of handing out, of toolkits was identified as the
single biggest problem of the NCDDR training process during the mid-term
evaluation. It would seem that it remained a problem until the very end.
22
Those ex-combatants, who received a toolkit, were asked whether they still had their
toolkit. Only 10 of the 190 who received their toolkit did not currently still posses it,
with half having sold or given it away and the rest having had it stolen. Those who
sold the toolkit did so within one month of having completed their training.
The crucial question related to the toolkits that begs asking, is whether the toolkits
have been beneficial in assisting the ex-combatants either find or create work. The
following table illustrates the responses by the length of time that has elapsed since
the ex-combatant completed their training.
Table 12: Did your toolbox help you find or create work?
Total
Will not answer .6% .2%
Don't know 2.1% 1.3% 1.2% 1.6%
Not applicable 78.2% 70.4% 36.6% 62.4%
Helped find work 5.9% 6.9% 27.4% 13.1%
Helped me create work 8.5% 17.0% 29.3% 17.8%
Not useful at all 5.3% 3.8% 5.5% 4.9%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
A total of 86.3% of those who answered to the question as to whether their toolkit
helped with employment said that either it helped find or create work. The positive
answers were predominately from those ex-combatants who completed their training
more than 18 months ago. Interestingly, it would seem that the latter the training the
less chance the toolkit helped secure employment, but the greater importance of the
toolkit on self created employment. Given the large number that attribute their current
employment to their toolkit, this remains a cause for concern.
23
CHAPTER 4 : WORK HISTORY AND SAVINGS
This chapter is designed to test the economic integration (reintegration) of the ex-
combatants who completed the NCDDR and parallel partner training programs.
4.1 EMPLOYED EX-COMBATANTS

All respondents were asked whether, following their training, they had previously
worked, with 182 or 35.6% answering that they had. However, at the end of the
survey, all the respondents were again asked whether they had either been
employed at any time during 2002 or the previous month and to state the total
amount of monies earned either in cash or in-kind during these periods. In this
second instance, when asked to detail their incomes from employment (as
employees, self employed or in-kind income), 86 of 329 ex-combatants who had
previously stated that they were unemployed, declared such an income. When asked
why they had previously declared that they had not worked, many respondents were
unable to give a coherent response.
Off-record discussions with the same ex-combatants, after the surveys had been
concluded in each of the areas, suggested that at the onset of the interview, these
ex-combatants felt that that perhaps by declaring themselves as unemployed that
might become beneficiaries of some employment program or monies. When it
became apparent that the interview would not result in any tangible benefits to the
respondents, they declared the true nature of their vocation. Some of the ex-
combatants however, argued, that they were self-employed and as such
‘misunderstood’ the question, and thus answered that they had been unemployed.
In some instances the interviewers returned to the earlier sections of the

questionnaire to complete employment details, however in the vast majority of cases,
this was not possible, so for 81 respondents no employment records were tabulated.
The following details the responses given in both the original question and later when
cross-checked.
Table 12: Currently employed (using check-back)

Total
Yes 22.9% 30.8% 51.8% 34.6%
Originally denied working but

13.3% 27.0% 11.0% 16.8%
reported current income
No 63.8% 42.1% 37.2% 48.5%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
From the above table, it can be seen that a fraction over half 51.4% of all the ex-
combatants that had completed a NCDDR training course, were either formally- or
self-employed. Furthermore, there is a direct correlation between length of time since
training was completed and employment, with 62.8% ex-combatants who completed
their training 18 or more months ago employed as opposed to 36.2% of those
completing their training less than 6 months ago.
24
On completion of their training, those ex-combatants that were employed found
employment within three months, with the median being two months. A little under
one third (31.7%), started their work within one month and over half (58.5%) had
started within two months. Just under half (46.4%) of ex-combatants have only
worked in one job since completing their training, however, a little over one fifth
(20.8%) had worked at two different places. On average working ex-combatants had
worked at 2.44 jobs, with the median being two jobs. On average, ex-combatants had
worked with just under 2 employers, with the median being one.
Most of them said they started working with their trainers immediately they completed
training but that the situation changed when the contracts their Implementing
Partners had came to an end. Most of them say the training they received was
satisfactory, the tutors were knowledgeable and employers in their communities
needed the skills they learnt. However they said that the tools are a real stumbling
block in their way to be employed, as contractors did not employ artisans and give
them tools, namely, own tools have to be supplied. A proportion of ex-combatant
have left for nearby towns and villages, most of them in search of jobs relating to
their acquired skills and other in compliance with the reintegration process. Majority
expressed their desires to continue with their jobs in the skills acquired and do it
effectively as a way of contributing to development of this nation.
Asked for the longest they had stayed for, at a particular place of employment, ex-
combatants claimed this to be an average of 6.7 months. However, 79.8% of these
were still at that job and therefore using the above period of time, as a measurement
would be flawed. Those ex-combatants that had noted a job other than their present
as that which they stayed at longest, averaged 14.1 months. Likewise the shortest
that ex-combatants averaged at any particular workplace were 4.4 months, with the
median being two months.
4.1.1 EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING

The crucial test as to whether the training programs have been successful in
assisting the ex-combatants lies in what proportion of the jobs that the ex-combatants
got relate to the skills they learnt. This question was previously asked of all the
respondents, however, in this instance it only reflects the responses of those who are
in actual employment. The following table shows these findings.
Table 13: Have any of the jobs you have had related back to the skills training
you received?
Frequency Percent
Yes 131 71.6
No 49 26.8
Will not answer 2 .5
Total 183 100.0
Almost three quarters (71.6%) of the ex-combatants felt that the skills training they
received related to at least one of the jobs they worked. This simple question
answers one of the pivotal criteria for the evaluation of the NCDDR program relating
to the validity of the training programs to the workplace. When asked their levels of
satisfaction, a little under one third (32.2%) rated their work satisfaction as being very
high, almost one quarter (23.5%) as high and a further third (35.5%) as average.
Less than one tenth (8.2%) rated it as either low or very low.
25
4.1.2 EARNINGS2
The ex-combatants were asked about their earnings both for the year 2002 and for
the month preceding the survey (October 2003). On average working ex-combatants
earned Le 356,979 during 2002, however a few high earners skewed this, therefore
the median earning of the working ex-combatants being Le 120,000 for 2002. One
fifth of all working ex-combatants earned over Le 400,000 during 2002.
In addition to wages, ex-combatants claimed that they received a further Le 210,714

during 2002 as payments in kind. This would have included, housing, clothing, food,
and transport. The median was Le 53,000.
Table 14: Total earnings 2002

Cumulative
Leones Frequency Percent
Percent
Le 0 17 9.3 9.3
Le 1 to Le 25,000 4 2.2 11.5
Le 25,001 to Le 50,000 12 6.6 18.0
Le 50,001 to Le 75,000 13 7.1 25.1
Le 75,001 to le 100,000 19 10.4 35.5
Le 100,001 to Le 125,000 6 3.3 38.8
Le 125,001 to Le 150,000 10 5.5 44.3
Le 150,001 to Le 175,000 5 2.7 47.0
Le 175,001 to Le 200,000 7 3.8 50.8
Le 200,001 to Le 300,000 10 5.5 56.3
Le 300,001 to le 400,000 12 6.6 62.8
Le 400,001 to Le 500,000 10 5.5 68.3
Le 500,001 to Le 750,000 24 13.1 81.4
Le 750,001 to Le 1,000,000 13 7.1 88.5
Le 1,000,001 + 21 11.5 100.0
Total 183 100.0
Average annual total earnings (wages and value of in-king payments) totalled Le
567,694 for 2003, with the median being 270,000. One quarter of all ex-combatants
earned less than Le75,000 whilst a little under one-fifth earned in excess of Le
750,000.
Those ex-combatants who claimed to have been employed during the study, were
then asked what their wages for October 2003 were. Average earnings for October
2003 were registered as Le 115,698, although the median was Le 60,000. On the
2
The official exchange rate, on which this is based, at the time, was 1:2,300, while on the street a rate
of 1:2,700 was common.
26
bottom end of the earners list, one fifth of all the ex-combatants who were employed
earned less than Le 26,000 during October 2003, whilst at the top end, a little under
one fifth earned over Le 150,000.
Payments in kind during October 2003 were larger than wages, and although some
of this can be related to the fact that many of the newly graduated ex-combatants
were still being treated as “apprentices” and being paid in kind, it does not explain
such a big difference. The field team speculated that many respondents ‘transferred’
income from wages to in-kind payment, for no other reason than having made an
error. Pensions do not feature in the lives of working ex-combatants, with only 4 out
of 179 who answered this question, claiming to have been on some form of pension
scheme.
Table 15: Total earnings October 2003

Cumulative
Leons Frequency Percent
Percent
Le 1 to Le 25,000 17 9.3 9.3
Le 25,001 to Le 50,000 18 9.8 19.1
Le 50,001 to Le 75,000 21 11.5 30.6
Le 75,001 to le 100,000 26 14.2 44.8
Le 100,001 to Le 125,000 10 5.5 50.3
Le 125,001 to Le 150,000 9 4.9 55.2
Le 150,001 to Le 175,000 3 1.6 56.8
Le 175,001 to Le 200,000 6 3.3 60.1
Le 200,001 to Le 300,000 16 8.7 68.9
Le 300,001 to le 400,000 15 8.2 77.0
Le 400,001 to Le 500,000 14 7.7 84.7
Le 500,001 to Le 750,000 15 8.2 92.9
Le 750,001 to Le 1,000,000 4 2.2 95.1
Le 1,000,001 + 9 4.9 100.0
Total 183 100.0
Total monthly incomes (wages and in-kind payments) for October 2003 averaged Le
166,691, with the median being Le 120,000. At the bottom end, thirty percent earned
Le 75,000 or less whilst the top thirty percent earned Le 3000,000 or more.
4.1.3 WORKPLACE RELATIONS

Ex-combatants were then asked a number of questions regarding workplace
relations. On the issue of trust in the workplace, ex-combatants were more likely to
trust am employer all of the time rather than a colleague – 54.1% to 42.1%. However,
when combining with trust some of the time, then colleagues are trusted a fraction
more often than employers 92.9% to 89.1%.
27
On a scale of 1 to 5, with one being excellent and 5 being very poor, ex-combatants
rated their relationship with their employers as excellent - 30.1%, good – 47.5% and
satisfactory – 14.8% of the time. Interestingly, using the same scale of measurement,
relations with colleagues were a little more measured, rated as excellent – 25.7% of
the time, good – 58.5% and average 15.3%.
Asked about quarrels in at the workplace, it was interesting that twice as many ex-
combatants claimed to have previously clashed with their colleagues, as opposed to
their employers 26.8% to 14.2%. Finally ex-combatants were asked whether they
would wish to move from their current place of employment. A total of 40.8% would
do so for more money, 36.1% to get more experience and 21.8% to improve their
current working conditions.
4.2 UNEMPLOYED
As previously noted, originally, a little under two thirds (65.4%) of the respondents
claimed to be unemployed at the time of the survey, however, later in the
questionnaires, it was found that this was actually only 48.5% of the sample.
The longest that any ex-combatant was unemployed was 29 months since
completion of their training. On average however, ex-combatants were unemployed
for 7.3 months, with the median being five months. This was heavily skewed by the
fact that most unemployed had finished their training within the past six months,
although almost two thirds of all those who were unemployed and had finished their
training 18 or more months ago, and had been unemployed for almost the entire
period. This would seem to suggest that unless employment was found almost
immediately after the training ended, then in all likelihood, the trainee would remain
unemployed for a long time. .
Unemployed ex-combatants attributed their current vocational status to the lack of

work opportunities (61.2%), a lack of their own work skills (17.6%), the absence of a
their toolkit (10.9%) and the lack of a ‘contact’ or patron (7.3%). Just over one third
(37.3%) of all ex-combatants claimed that there were too many ex-combatants
trained in too few skills that resulted in such high unemployment.
Surprisingly though, most unemployed (58.8%) were fairly optimistic of getting work
in the near future. The overwhelming majority of unemployed ex-combatants seem to
think that the skills they have learnt will be useful in either getting or helping to create
employment in the near future. Almost three quarters of the unemployed felt that
there was a good chance that in the near future they would use the skills they have
learnt to start up their own business.
28
CHAPTER 5: SOCIAL CAPITAL
This chapter is designed to test the social reintegration of the ex-combatants who
completed the NCDDR and parallel partner disarmament, demobilisation and training
programs.
5.1 NETWORKS
A specific aim of the demobilization process is to break the command structure. If
not, it is assumed that the disarmed ex-combatants remain a potential security threat.
It is also assumed that as long as these ex-combatants stay together, reintegration
into society will be severely frustrated or not taking place at all. To ask to what extend
these ex-combatants are reintegrated in the society is to ask questions about the
social networks they are part of. Ex-combatants were asked whether they are a part
of a social group and if so, how many, how these groups help the individual and the
household and what is the composition of these groups.
5.1.1 GROUP MEMBERSHIP

Clearly the number of social groups the interviewees or their household members
belong to be limited. The period since the ex-combatants finished their training is has
little impact on the number of social groups they or their household members belong
to. Nor is their any significant increase in the number of social groups household
members participate in as compared to two years ago. This may reflect a low number
of social groups Sierra Leoneans participate in anyhow. But it is also possible that
many of the Sierra Leoneans, and at least the interviewees still face such difficulties
in fulfilling their daily needs that they cannot afford it to be a member of several social
groups and fulfilling all the responsibilities which go along with that.
A positive observation is that they majority of the ex-combatants state that they
voluntarily joined a social group. This is an important aspect because it shows both
the willingness of the ex-combatants to take part in social life as part of a group as
well as the readiness of society to accept them back and allow them to be part of a
group.
An average of nearly six days a year is contributed by the household to social group
activities. This somehow low number (according to Sierra Leonean standards) might
reflect the fact that at least a part of the respondents’ household members are
members of multiple groups, but, as mentioned before, it can also reflect the
hardship people still face in the post-war phase in fulfilling their directs needs and
thus have little time to take part in group activities which do not directly benefit them.
According to the ex-combatants, the most important reason to join a social group is
that it benefits the community. Clearly there is strong sense of belonging and
contributing to the community in which one lives. It is likely that the interviewees,
when asking this question, have community labour, such as brushing communal
farms, removing grass on overgrown paths and road or repairing small bridges, in
their minds. Young people – and the majority of the ex-combatants are young people
– in a community can organise themselves in different youth groups who then take
part in above mentioned activities whenever the chiefdom authorities request for it.
Participating in these activities is one of the clearest signs of goodwill towards the
community and a good way to increase one’s acceptance by the community.
If one looks to what is considered as the main benefit of joining a group compared to
the time since they completed training there are a few interesting things to notice. To
29
improve one’s household current livelihood seems to become more important for
those who finished their training between 6 and 17 months ago, as opposed to the
rest who expressed more utilitarian reasons.
Graph 1: What are the benefits of group membership?
30
20
10
Percent
0
N
Im
Im
Be
En
Sp
To
ot
pr
po
ne
jo
iri
as
a
ov
ym
tu
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al
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in
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ab
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in
oc
e
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ec
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ia
ho
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io
eh
un
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ol
i
This might be the period in which on the one hand the initial benefits straight after
their completion of training have dried up but on the other hand are not yet able to
benefit fully from their own work. The most remarkable shift is that the longer the
have finished their training, the more important group membership is considered to
be in overcoming times of emergencies. This clearly reflects their reintegration into
the community and that survival is not only defined on an individual or household
level but also on a community level.
Table 16: Does the group help your household get access to - ….
Response education or health water supply credit or other
training? services? or sanitation? savings? services?
Yes 35.2% 37.8% 27.6% 23.9% 47.6%
No 32.9% 30.3% 40.5% 43.8% 20.0%
Friends 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2%
Don't know 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 0.4%
N/A 31.9% 31.9% 31.9% 31.9% 31.9%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Group support in getting access to education or training and health services seems
to be slightly more important than its support in getting access to water or sanitation
and access to credit and savings. Although in many cases the group indeed can help
in getting access to different services, it is surely not the case that group support is
necessary in Sierra Leone to get access to these.
The members of these social groups seem to be quite diverse. Gender, age and
whether they are ex-combatants or not seems to be of the lowest relevance. In most
cases the composition of the group does not seem to change much with the time the
ex-combatants have finished their training. However, ex-combatants who have
completed their training long since, tend to be members of groups with lower
membership numbers, of greater diversity and of much less involvement of other ex-
combatants.
Demobilisation and reintegration does seem to take place over time. It is however
important to notice that if ex-combatants stick together this does not always have to
be thought of as being neither negative nor a threat to the security. Many ex-
30
combatants come from the same area and were friends prior to the war, then having
fought side by side during a war, may have created very close bonds of friendship
and trust within their group. Whereas such groupings are found, trends show that
generally this is not the case and that over time, ex-combatants tend to socialise
increasingly with people that were not combatants during the war.
Generally, most groups that, ex-combatants belong to are quite divers as far as the
occupation, educational background and political orientation are concerned. They are
also mixed in terms of personal wealth, with some members being better off than
others. Political orientation of group members varies across the survey area. In
Freetown, Port Loko and Kono the groups are politically diverse. In Pujehun, Kenema
but particularly in Kailahun the groups tend to be political more homogenous. These
three districts are the homeland of the Mende people and the present ruling party
‘Sierra Leone People’s Party’.
5.1.2 PEOPLE AND QUARRELLING

In order to gauge the ex-combatants relations with people in their environment, they
were asked a number of questions related with whom they might quarrel with.
Table 17: Do you ever quarrel with-…..

-colleagues -people in
Response family? -friends -neighbours? strangers?
at work? authority?
Yes, all the time 3.3% 3.7% 2.0% 1.0% 1.8% 2.5%
Yes, sometimes 39.6% 43.4% 36.0% 23.5% 7.8% 8.8%
No, never 56.3% 52.4% 61.6% 67.9% 89.8% 88.3%
Don't know 0.8% 0.4% 0.4% 7.6% 0.6% 0.4%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Wherever and with whomever they live, it seems that the interviewees have little
problems with the people they have daily contact with, such as their family, friends
and neighbours. Strangers and the police are among the group they have the fewest
problems, which is very contrite of them for any quarrels could easily lead to
something worse. This is something the ex-combatants clearly try to prevent
happening. Anecdotal evidence would seem to suggest, that as a rule ex-combatants
deliberately shy away from confrontation of any kind.
It is interesting to notice that as the period since they completed their training
increases, the absence of quarrels with people in the direct social environment
(family and neighbours) decreases. It is possible that after an initial period of conflict-
preventing behaviour or keeping a low profile during the first months of their
reintegration process or return to the community, they feel that their position in the
community and family is strong enough to risk quarrels with neighbours or family.
5.1.3 FRIENDS
Ex-combatants were then asked a number of questions about their friends and how
they relate to each other in times of emergencies.
About 70% of the ex-combatants have between one and five close friends. The time
after finishing the training does not have any significant impact on the number of
close friends the ex-combatants have. Clearly, these ex-combatants are in no way
isolated individuals in the wider community and do all have at least one friend with
whom they can talk about private matters.
Friendship is also important in overcoming difficult times, yet the number of people
who could assist them in times of emergencies is limited. Furthermore, borrowing
money seems to be more problematic than finding support for overcoming a long-
31
term emergency, however this should not be seen as anything sinister, for simply,
there is little money to go around. The pattern seems to change little with the time
they completed training, so it suggests that this is more the standard among other
non-combatants Sierra Leoneans as well.
Graph 2: About how many close friends do you have these days?
30
20
10
Percent
0
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 18 21 30 100
Interestingly, in times of emergencies, ex-combatants do not necessarily turn to

friends of a higher economic status. On the contrary, the majority seems to turn to
friends of a lower economic status. Likewise, the friends who approach the
interviewees for assistance are also of either a lower or similar economic status. So
friends with a lower economic status can ask for support, but these same friends will
be approached in difficult times by the interviewee. It seems that the rule of ‘I help
you, if you help me when I need it’ is more important than the economic status.
5.2 TRUST AND SOLIDARITY

This section deals with trust and solidarity. An important factor in a successful
reintegration process of ex-combatants is whether or not the civilian society trusts the
ex-combatants. But equally important is whether or not the ex-combatants trust and
feel any solidarity with the civilians and civil servants. This, to a large extent,
influences whether the ex-combatants separate themselves from the wider society
and rely on their former comrades or that they establish new, or integrate with the
rest of the civilian population. Trust and solidarity amongst within and between
communities were severely undermined during war. People who had lived peacefully
together before the war become ones enemies during the conflict, sometimes as a
result of a deliberate choice, sometimes coincidentally. Increased pressure on
communities proved to be a real test for the solidarity and sometimes, they collapsed
under too much pressure. But at the same time the conflict created new bonds of
trust and solidarity or reinforced already existing bonds. In many instances
combatants and non-combatants alike, found themselves in a position that their lives
depended on the extent to which others could be trusted.
In general, two thirds (65%) of the ex-combatants feel that people can be trusted
while about 30% state that you cannot be too careful. Remarkable is that more than
95% of the ex-combatants in Kailahun strongly feel that most people in general can
be trusted, specifically the people in their neighbourhood - 92%. A first explanation
for this is the ethnic homogenous character of Kailahun district. People belonging to
the Mende and the Kissi tribe dominate Kailahun. And the respondents interviewed in
Kailahun stated that they greatly trust people from the same ethnic group (more than
70%). Another explanation can be that Kailahun has been for the greater part of the
32
war a RUF stronghold. In other districts the faction in control changed several times
during the conflict. Civilians and sometimes, even combatants, changed sides as well
(often forcible), creating a situation where in the end it was difficult to say who
belonged to which party.
Graph 3: Can most people in the neighbourhood be trusted?
Don't know
100%
90%
80%
70%
60% Most people
cannot really
50%
be trusted
40%
30%
20%
Most people
10% can be trusted
0%
Kalahun Free Town Pujuhan Kenema Kono Port Loko Bo
Between 60 to 70% felt that most people in the neighbourhood could be trusted and
are willing to help if required. However, More than 75% stated that they had to be
alert so that people will not take advantage of them. There would seem to be a
contradiction where ex-combatants were saying that on the one hand they generally
trust people but on the other hand consider it possible that the same people might
take advantage of them.
A crucial question also, is whether ex-combatants feel that they are trusted by the
people in their neighbourhood. More than 60% of the interviewees agrees that the
people in the neighbourhood do not trust ex-combatants. Remarkable is that this
figure is increasing with the increase in time since they completed their training. This
can however also reflect the impact of the geographical spread of the interviewees.
Table 18: In this neighbourhood, people generally do not trust ex-combatants

% within Months since training completed
6 months months and longer Total
In this Will not answer .5% .2%
neighbourhood, Don't know 1.1% .4%
people generally Agree strongly 39.4% 45.3% 50.0% 44.6%
do not trust XCs
Agree somewhat 17.6% 17.0% 19.5% 18.0%
Neither agree nor
18.1% 18.2% 10.4% 15.7%
disagree
Disagree somewhat 10.6% 8.8% 12.8% 10.8%
Disagree strongly 12.8% 10.7% 7.3% 10.4%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Many of those interviewed in Freetown, Port Loko and Bo have completed their
training a long time ago. The majority of those interviewed in Kenema and in
particular Pujehun and Kailahun having only recently completed their training. The
33
results reflect that ex-combatants feel that people in Freetown, Bo and Port Loko
(together with Kailahun) do not trust the ex-combatants. This could be because ex-
combatants have been living in the community longer or that the majority of the
communities have accepted back the ex-combatants and now seem to treat them in
a similar way as any other person. In a few instances it was claimed that some
people will still try to take “revenge or frustrate” them in indirect ways. Another
explanation is that only after feeling assimilated within their society, hence a long
time after training that ex-combatants start to notice such nuances that earlier on
might not have featured very highly in their thoughts.
As already mentioned for the ex-combatants interviewed in Kailahun, nearly 50% of

the interviewees trust the people of their ethnic group. Nurses and doctors are
trusted as well (55%) and teachers are trusted the most (nearly 70%). But the ex-
combatants also have considerable trust in other ex-combatants (51%). And this
figure would likely have been higher if it was asked if they trusted ex-combatants
specifically belonging to their own former faction. As already mentioned, fighting the
war together has created bonds of trust and solidarity. The aim of the demobilisation
process is to break the bonds of command, however not all bonds created in the war
necessarily have to be negative. It is a challenge to create opportunities in which the
positive aspects of the bonds, such as trust and solidarity can be used in a
constructive way. Trust is for instance necessary for the running of any cooperative
business.
Generally however, ex-combatants have little trust in government officials and

strangers. In Kailahun however, the respondents have much more trust in police and
government officials as compared to other areas. Perhaps being isolated and inward
oriented the character of Kailahun better explain this difference. Remarkable is that
the lack of trust in staff of NGO’s, with over half (nearly 54%) of the ex-combatants
not trusting them. The most common complaint is that NGO staffs are strangers that
‘blow into the community’ and make all kind of promises, which are often not fulfilled.
Table 19: How much do trust other ex-combatants

% within Survey Area
Survey Area
Free Port Kene Pujuh Kalah
Town Loko Bo ma Kono an un Total
How To a very small extent17.3% 30.0% 35.3% 8.3% 11.7% 21.7% 10.0% 17.2%
much do To a small extent 19.1% 18.0% 35.3% 5.0% 15.0% 11.7% 3.3% 14.1%
you trust Neither small nor
XCs? 7.3% 24.0% 7.8% 26.7% 35.0% 11.7% 11.7% 17.8%
great extent
To a great extent 17.3% 16.0% 9.8% 25.8% 11.7% 18.3% 21.7% 18.4%
T a very great extent 39.1% 12.0% 11.8% 34.2% 26.7% 36.7% 53.3% 32.5%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
There is a noticeable difference between the respondents in Bo and Kenema as far

as trust in other ex-combatants is concerned. In Bo only few interviewees trust other
ex-combatants while in the nearby Kenema the majority of the interviewees trust
other ex-combatants. It is however promising to see that the majority of the
interviewees (60%) feel that the level of trust in the neighbourhood has improved
over the last two years. People in the neighbourhood help each other out at least
sometimes is the general feeling of about the same percentage of interviewees.
34
5.3 COLLECTIVE ACTION AND COOPERATION
A question that needs to be asked when evaluation reintegration is whether following
the war, society has created a survival mentality of ‘everybody for his- or herself’ or
whether it has stimulated collective action and cooperation. Furthermore, the impact
that the war has had on the ex-combatants in terms of their becoming self-oriented or
even egoistic to others, and whether the reintegration process has changed this
preparing ex-combatants to work for the benefit of their neighbourhoods or
communities.
As already argued, the present post-war situation is for many still one of a daily
struggle to survive. Few can afford not to think about themselves in the first place
and most of their actions are therefore focussed on their own benefit. However, as
we have seen above, taking part in social group activities plays in increasingly
important role both in ordinary times and increasingly so in times of emergencies.
However, this does not necessarily mean that collective action to the benefit of
communities follows.
Furthermore, when community action ensues, there is often the question as to who
really benefits from the chosen community activity. Depending on that, namely, who
benefits from that activity dictates the overall level of involvement. Traditionally only
the chiefs and elders of the community or village decided upon to task to be
executed, where the youth just contributed to the process with their labour. After the
war it has become increasingly common that also representatives of youth groups
take part in the decision making process about what has to be done in the
community. It seems that the war has initiated the emancipation of the youth.
The overwhelming majority of the interviewees) have since the end of hostilities
worked with others for the benefit of the community. And this does not seem to be
influenced by the time they have finished their training. Community work is an
excellent a way to show that you care for the community and that you are a ‘serious’
person. If there is ever a local dispute arising, people will more likely talk on your
behalf if you have always participated in community work. Some projects working on
the reintegration process of ex-combatants realise the important symbolic meaning of
community work, and stimulate ex-combatants to do community work. Obviously
most ex-combatants are aware of, or learn very quickly of the importance of taking
part in community activities.
It is felt that people who do not participate in community activities will be criticised.
Whether it is because of this critique or not, the interviewees state that they
themselves, as well as other ex-combatants (according to the interviewees) will
participate in solving future problems faced by the community.
5.4 INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION

Information and communication has played an important and crucial role in the whole
DDR process. This influence has been both positive as well as negative.
Demobilising more than 70,000 ex-combatants in often difficult accessible terrain
(both because of geographical and human limitations). This meant that the urged
NCDDR had to make use in a creative way of different means of communications.
Unfortunately, sometimes, due to the lack or delay in spreading out information has
led to serious frustrations among the ex-combatants.
The radio has played an important role during the entire DDR process and, as we
can see, is still frequently used by the majority of the ex-combatants to get access to
35
all types of information and without doubt for entertainment purposes as well. More
than 50% of the ex-combatants listen to the radio every day, rising to nearly 90%
who listen at least once a week. The radio is also the most important medium to
receive information, in particular about what the government is doing. Market
information on jobs and education is, besides the radio, also obtained from relatives,
friends and neighbours. The television is obviously less often used. About 60% never
watches television. Those ex-combatants who watch are likely to watch films or
football matches in small - on television operating - cinema’s.
Table 20: Which is the most important source of information about - ….

Communications Medium … what the government is doing …the market (e.g.
(e.g. HIV/AIDS, housing rights, secure jobs, education) ?
tenure, water & sanitation etc.)?
Radio 75.9% 49.5%
Relatives, friends & neighbours 10.2% 30.5%
National newspaper 3.3% 1.8%
Local market 0.4% 3.7%
Community and bulletin board 1.6% 2.0%
Newspaper 0.0% 0.8%
Television 1.0% 0.4%
Groups or associations 1.0% 0.2%
Business or work associates 0.0% 0.4%
Political associations 0.0% 0.4%
Community leaders 1.2% 4.3%
An agent of the government 0.2% .6%
NGOs 1.8% 1.0%
Don't know 2.2% .8%
Will not answer 1.4% 3.7%
Total 100.0% 100.0%
Access to other means of communication is low, but it is interesting to notice that

more than 10% of the ex-combatants own a mobile phone and have an internet
address. Ownership of a mobile phone and having an internet address is the highest
in the capital Freetown3. The mobile phone network covers presently many of the
larger towns in Sierra Leone and is constantly expanding. The very high percentage
of respondents in Kailahun who claim to have access to a fixed phone, a mobile and
an internet address might be based on a mistake as both the mobile network and
internet are not yet accessible/active in Kailahun.
With such a low number of ownership of a mobile or fixed phone, it is not surprising
that the majority of the ex-combatants stated that they had neither received nor made
any phone call over the week preceding the survey. However, not owning a phone
does not mean that they cannot be contacted by phone. Many people in Sierra Leone
give a number of a friend who owns a phone and on which they, although indirectly,
can be contacted. More or less the same mechanism is used on radio, which makes
daily announcements of people who are called upon by friends or relatives. Even if
the specific person is not listening to the radio there is always somebody in his or her
neighbourhood or village who is, and who will contact the person.
A positive development is that access to communication has improved over the last
two years, according to the far majority of the respondents. The radio being
overwhelmingly the most important source of information on socio-political
3
At the time of interviewing internet was only accessible in Freetown, although Bo and Kenema are
soon to be connected.
36
happenings and also, albeit less so, for information on the market place. The
following table lists the communications mediums used by people to receive
information of both general interest and the market place.
5.5 SOCIAL COHESION AND INCLUSION

In general many Sierra Leoneans agree that one of the root causes of the conflict
was the socio-economic exclusion of the young people. At the very least the
exclusion and alienation of youths resulted in large pools of frustrated youngsters
who could be easily tapped by unscrupulous warlords to fight a war. After the war,
the majority of the Sierra Leoneans – including some of the elite’s and local
authorities who contributed to this exclusion in first place –realised that an important
prerogative to prevent the outbreak of another conflict is by including these youths.
Whether this insight is driven by fear or by a genuine understanding of the
importance of including young people in society, is yet to be seen. There are
however promising changes taking place, particular on a micro-level. As already
mentioned, the role and the voice of youth groups in communities and villages has
never been so strong. And young people have a strong hand to play; for their
strength and energy is sorely needed to rebuild the villages and reclaim the
overgrown farmland back from the bush.
But the war has brought more change. Traditionally migration in Sierra Leone was
not an uncommon phenomenon, although it was often on a temporarily or oscillating
basis. Young people left their village to try their luck in the big towns or in the mining
areas. But the war has created mass displacements (at some stage almost 50% of
the population was internally displaced). After the war the majority of the people
returned to their place of origin, a process that is still ongoing. But a considerable
number has decided to settle down in the place where they found themselves during
the war as a displaced person but where they do not come from originally. Among
this group are considerable numbers of ex-combatants. Many ex-combatants who
were recruited in the south and east of the country can be found back in the north
and centre of Sierra Leone and visa versa. This is often as a result of displacement
but also often through deliberate choice. In other words, communities have been
‘mixed up’ as a result of the war. To what extent this process has influenced the
social cohesion and to what extend the newcomers have been included is discussed
in this section.
According to the ex-combatants interviewed, differences between people in the

neighbourhood have little influence on the character of the neighbourhood. However,
the differences that exist often (almost 70%) cause problems. Fortunately, only 6% of
the respondents state that these problems have ever led to violence.
About 70% of the ex-combatants feel somewhat or very close to the other people in
the neighbourhood. This is not a low number, in particular if one takes into account
that about 50% of the respondents do not live with the same family as they lived with
before the war. Interesting, is fact that the time since they completed the training,
which should be a reasonable indicator of the time they have already spend in the
community, has little influence on this feeling of togetherness or closeness. Access
of different groups of people in the community to services such as education, clinics
and transportation does not seem to be a big problem. The fewest problems exist
with access to water and justice.
37
Graph 4: How strong a feeling of togetherness or closeness do you get with
others?
40
30
20
10
Percent
0
Very distant Neither distant nor Very close
Somewhat distant Somewhat close
An important question and yardstick of the success of the reintegration process is

whether or not ex-combatants are allowed to take part in all community activities.
According to the responds there is no reason to for concern that ex-combatants are
excluded, with only very few ex-combatants stated that there are activities in which
they cannot participate. Of particular interest is that ex-combatants, who have just
finished their training, categorically stated that they could participate in almost all
activities they wish to. Slightly more than 1% of the interviewees stated that they
cannot take part in the Secret Societies activities. Whether this is because they are
not yet initiated (and thus are not allowed to do so) or because they are refused entry
by Secret Society members is not clear.
5.6 SOCIABILITY
It is possible that people who have actively taken part in the war as combatants are
isolates in the society; either because they ‘choose’ so themselves (out of fear or
because of a severe trauma) or because they are ignored and isolated by the people
of the community in which they live. However, there are only a few cases known of
this happening in Sierra Leone. And the responses of the ex-combatants interviewed
clearly show that they do not isolate themselves from the society, nor that they are
excluded by it. They visit public places on a regular basis, visit other people in their
homes or receive visitors in their own home.
Most interviewees stated that they met and have been visited by a mix group of
people. Only 5% of the interviewees stated that they mainly met with other ex-
combatants. However, because the number of ex-combatants visiting the
interviewees is not changing with the time they completed training, this suggests that
these other ex-combatants are just like ordinary friends and it does not suggest that
these former comrades in arms would be of any importance in sustaining the
networks the interviewees were used to. If that were the main motivation, one would
expect a considerable decline in this figure as the role of these networks would
become less important the longer the person has completed his or her training (and
lived in a community.
5.7 PSYCHO-SOCIAL ISSUES

Ex-combatants were then asked whether they have difficulties with a number of
psycho-social issues. These are listed in the following table.
38
Table 21: Do you ever have difficulties - …..
concentrating talking listening to
with with your
Response sleeping? when with your
dreams?
people
temper?
working? friends? talking?
Yes all the time 11.6% 9.0% 3.3% 9.2% 6.7% 8.6%
Yes, sometimes 50.0% 35.6% 23.5% 41.3% 17.4% 37.4%
No, never 37.5% 54.4% 72.2% 48.7% 75.1% 53.8%
Don't know 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 0.8% 0.8% 0 .2%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Contrary to expectations, ex-combatants displayed few psycho-social difficulties such

as difficulties with sleeping or dreams, difficulties in concentrating, talking and
listening or with their temper. They however more often have problems of an
individual nature, such as difficulties with their sleep and bad dreams, while having
considerable less difficulties of a more social nature such as talking with friends and
listening to others. In a more collective oriented society, individual problems on a
psychological level will probably receive less attention and care, although still little is
known about the mechanisms of communities to deal with such problems without
professional care. Two other interesting, but difficult observations to explain, are that
the difficulties with concentrating while working is increasing the longer the
interviewees have completed their training and that those interviewees become more
average in having sleeping problems.
Starting with a general question about how happy they consider themselves to be,
almost 50% of the interviewees stated that they feel very happy and another 29%
consider themselves moderately happy. The number of happy feeling interviewees
only increases with the increase in time after they have completed the training, so
this is a positive development.
Graph 5: In general how happy do you consider yourself to be?

50
40
30
20
10
Percent
0
Very happy Neither happy nor un Very unhappy
Moderately happy Moderately unhappy
Almost 65% of the interviewees feel that they either have some control or much
control over decisions that affect their everyday activities. Less than 10% feels that
they do not have any control at all, and less than 15% feel that they only have control
over very few decisions affecting their everyday activities. Few combatants stated
that they do not have any impact at all on their neighbourhood.
39
5.8 EMPOWERMENT AND POLITICAL ACTION
It has already mentioned that many Sierra Leoneans felt that the exclusion -resulting
in alienation- of young Sierra Leoneans had been one of the root causes of the
conflict. Part of this exclusion was political in nature. Traditionally, Sierra Leone is
ruled, both on the national as well as on the local level, by elder men and throughout
society politicians and advisers of the village or town chief are the elders. This status
is only reached after marriage and children. Only then does inclusion in the political
process become a reality for (mostly men) and some influence can be exercised in
local or national political matters.
The majority of the combatants in the conflict in Sierra Leone were young people.
50% of the interviewees were 28 of age or younger, which means that they were 25
years of age or younger when they conflict was over. Without doubt, considerable
numbers started fighting while they were still considered to be minors - under-age of
18 years. One of the effects of being a fighter and carrying a gun is that this endows
considerable power on the bearer of these arms. During the war, youth (and
children) were the commanding forces in society often humiliating non-armed elders.
Following demobilisation and disarmament, this power has been removed and the
status quo returned.
This raises two crucial questions that are discussed in this next section:
Do the ex-combatants completely feel dis-empowered over the course of their

own lives since being reintegrated back into mainstream society?
Do ex-combatants feel that they have any influence or impact on things

happening around them?
Table 22: How much control do you have in making decisions that affect your
everyday life
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid No control 40 7.8 7.8 7.8
Control over very few
68 13.3 13.3 21.1
decisions
Control over some
175 34.2 34.2 55.4
decisions
Control over most
150 29.4 29.4 84.7
decisions
Control over all decisions 78 15.3 15.3 100.0
Total 511 100.0 100.0
Similar percentages show up when they are asked if feel whether or not they have
the power to make important decisions that may change the course of their lives. In
other words, the interviewees feel that they have a considerable impact on their lives.
Ex-combatants were then asked to what extend this feeling actually translated itself
into concrete social action. More than 50% have taken part in a joint petition to alert
government officials or political leaders in the last 12 months and 65% stated that
they at least once attended a public meeting in the same time period. A few have
also sent a letter to a politician on an individual note, alerted the newspapers or radio
or notified the police or the court (all about 20%). Attending hearings or discussion
groups is clearly a much more used mean to take part in political action than these
40
last activities mentioned. This is perhaps because the first two activities have a more
anonymous character than the others.
Ex-combatants were also asked to what extent they felt that local government takes
into account concerns voiced by ex-combatants when they make decisions that
directly impact upon them. The results are listed in the table below.
Table 22: To what extent do local government take into account concerns
voiced by ex-combatants when making decisions that directly impact on you?
% within Months since training completed
To what extent do local A lot
government and leaders 44.7% 30.2% 24.4% 33.7%
take into account
concerns voiced by XCs A little
when they make a 55.3% 69.8% 75.6% 66.3%
decision that effects you?
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
About two thirds of the ex-combatants interviewed felt that their concerns were not
taken into account by local government and local leaders. This feeling increases with
the time they have completed training. In general it was felt that local leaders and
government officials seemed less happy to still treat ex-combatants as a special
group, listening to their concerns as ex-combatants. Where they do so, it is likely that
they do so with those ex-combatants who have been up to recently still together as a
special group (during their period of training). Those ex-combatants who completed
their training long since now find it difficult to find officials who continue to treat them
as special needs category of constituents.
Finally, ex-combatants were asked a number of questions relating to perceived levels

of dishonesty in civil society. Some interesting insights are given by the answers of
the following questions about dishonesty. Considered most dishonest were the
police, followed by the military. Post office staffs were considered as the most
honest.
5.9 WELFARE ASSESSMENT

Where ex-combatants consider themselves to be from a welfare point of few in
relationship to others, is an interesting factor in determining were they position
themselves in society. Furthermore more than the absolute deprivation, is the relative
deprivation that determines how rich or poor people consider themselves to be. If it is
felt that there are large discrepancies between people, it creates future potential flash
point and possibly conflict. The conflict in Sierra Leone has shown that the better off
people in the communities were often among the first targets of the armed groups.
Not only to loot their properties but also to take revenge and ‘pay back’ for the
alleged humiliation the perpetrators claimed to have experienced.
41
Table 23: On a 9-step ladder, where on the first step people are poorest and on
the 9th the richest, on which step are you today?

1 47.9% 36.5% 37.8% 41.1%
2 18.1% 20.8% 16.5% 18.4%
3 12.2% 14.5% 17.1% 14.5%
4 9.6% 18.2% 10.4% 12.5%
5 11.7% 6.9% 11.6% 10.2%
6 .5% 2.5% 3.0% 2.0%
7 .6% 2.4% 1.0%
9 1.2% .4%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
It is clear from the statistics that the ex-combatants consider themselves as among
the poorest people (although that does not influence their feeling of happiness as we
have noted). Of particular note is that the number of people who consider themselves
presently at the lowest step has increased as compared to how they rated
themselves the previous year. However, it is not completely clear whether the ex-
combatants consider them to have fallen back compared to a year ago or that they
feel that other people around them have made faster improvements. But it is a
positive development that those interviewees who have completed their training long
since feel being better off, compared to those who have just recently completed
training. Also noted were large differences between survey areas. There is no factor
that can explain why 85% of the ex-combatants in Kailahun consider themselves at
the lowest step on the welfare ladder while in bordering Pujehun only 3% of the ex-
combatants consider themselves at that level.
Respondents were also asked whether they felt that their situation would improve in
the future. The majority of either hoped it would or felt that it was up to divine
intervention and nothing themselves as mortals could influence. Again a positive
development is that those who have completed their training for 18 months or more
were more likely to think that their situation would improve in a relatively short period.
42
CHAPTER 6: THE 2002/3 TRACKING SURVEY
This chapter reports on the findings of the tracking component of the survey, that is
reflects the data from those ex-combatants who were interviewed both in 2002 and
2003.
6.1 INTRODUCTION, TRAINING AND TOOLKITS TRACER STUDY

As noted in the first chapter, the ex-combatants for the tracer study were interviewed
in four locations. In Freetown, only three respondents were interviewed. Fifty, or
48% of the sample, were interviewed in Port Loko, 29, or 28.2% of the sample, were
interviewed in Bo, and 21 respondents, or 20.4% of the sample, were interviewed in
Kenema.
The average age of the ex-combatants interviewed in 2002 was 28 years and eight
months and the median, that is, the point below which half of the sample fall, was 27
years. The average age of the ex-combatants interviewed in 2003 was 30 years of
age, and the median was 28 years of age. This would reflect that the sample was
undertaken 14 months apart.
Results comparing opinions expressed on training and toolkits change considerably.

On the issue of enjoyment those who agreed dropped from 92.3% in 2002 to 59.2%
in 2003. This may reflect the fact that the training was not recent to the memories of
the ex-combatants, and also the fact that many were trying to forget their combatant
experiences and thus their levels of satisfaction decreased.
There were also small decreases in agreement to the fact that socially the training
made them into better persons – from 86.5% in 2002 to 93.2% in 2003, in the fact
that co-trainees were still friends from 98% to 93.2% and that the trainers were
knowledgeable – from 97.3% to 94.2%. in addition there was a drop from 97.3% to
72.8% in the notion that the skills they learnt were still in demand.
However, increases were registered in those agreeing to the fact that the training
prepared them well for work from 87.5% in 2002 to 97.1% in 2003, in the fact that the
training was responsible for the job they had – from 60.5% in 2002 to 88.3% in 2003.
Concomitant to this, there was an increase in those who disagreed with the notion
that the training did not help their job opportunities, rising from 28.3% to 73.8%. An
increase was also registered in the fact that the toolkit was one of the best things
about the training – from 61% in 2002 to 93.2% in 2003. Finally those who felt that
the training could have been better dropped from 82.5% in 2002 to 90.3% in 2003.
Opinions expressed on the course material, training institution, the trainers and fellow
trainees changed very little and any changes that were recorded were merely within
positive responses, namely excellent and good, rather than shifts from positive to
negative and visa versa. Overwhelmingly in both years over two thirds thought all
were either excellent or good.
With regards to the toolkit, whereas in 2002 42% and 13.4% respectively claimed
that it helped them create and find work, in 2003, opinions were reformulated to read
39.8% and 38.8% respectively. Therefore, this would demonstrate an increase of
190% in terms oif those for whom the toolkit helped them get jobs. Many of the
respondents in 2002 had been interviewed as they had completed their training, and
now 14 months later a good number of these were employed.
43
On the issue of housing, slightly more than half (51%)of the ex-combatants
interviewed in 2003 lived in informal housing, while more than a third (35%) lived in
traditional houses. Just one tenth lived in formal housing. This is substantially lower
than those interviewed in 2002, when one fifth of those interviewed lived in formal
housing of some kind. One ex combatant interviewed in 2003 in fact did not have
anywhere to live, and rather made the bushes and streets his home. There is further
evidence of such dislocation: one third (33%) live with family, but different to those
lived with before the trouble started. On the more positive side, however, more than
half (55%) were living with the same family that they had lived with before the war.
This is marginally more than the 54% that reported such arrangements in 2002. In
total, just six respondents lived with friends, but benefiting from the family structure of
the friend with whom they were living.
The challenges faced by ex-combatants in living what might be considered a normal

life are seriously hampered by the poor social conditions in which they live. This is in
part due to the lack of social and other structures around them, and the poor
infrastructure available to all in Sierra Leone. Less than three out of ten (28%)
reported that they had any savings or a bank account at a formal institution, while two
out of five (41%) reported owning land in either urban or rural parts of the country.
However, more then three out of five (62%) reported that they owned a house. This
last figure does include those who live in informal dwellings, and reflects the findings
often presented elsewhere that even when people live in shack dwellings, they
consider themselves to own the dwelling, regardless of how unstable, or
impermanent it may be.
6.2 EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT 2002/3 TRACER STUDY

6.2.1 EXPERIENCE OF WORK SINCE TRAINING
The integration of ex-combatants into the mainstream economy can be measured in
a number of ways. It is inadequate simply to use employment figures as an indicator,
but rather, the nature and quality of the employment, the permanence of the
employment, and the interaction with both employees and colleagues are essential in
assessing the success with which such integration has occurred. Respondents in
the survey were thus asked a series of questions on all of these issues. In some
instances, the results are directly comparable with the study conducted in 2002; in
others, additional, and more detailed questions were asked, thus allowing for a more
nuanced understanding of the dynamics around employment of ex-combatants.
A higher percentage of respondents interviewed in 2003 had found employment

since their training, with three out of five respondents having found work, as opposed
to two out of five in 2002. In 2003, slightly less than one tenth (8.7%) of those ex-
combatants interviewed claimed that they had no work, despite that when probed,
provided details of income from employment. The more recently interviewed
respondents also clearly faced less difficulty finding work, with almost one half
(46.6%) finding work less than one month after completing training, as opposed to
less than one fifth in 2002. The number of those finding work immediately after
training is negligible, and has changed little since 2002 (2.9% as opposed to 2.0%).
There is some evidence to suggest that those completing the more recent training
have more success in finding employment than those trained previously; more than
nine out of ten (92.2%) of those working found work within six months of completing
training in 2003 as opposed to two out of four trainees in 2002.
However, those trained in 2003 in employment may find some difficulty in retaining
their employment: while one fifth (20.4%) of all those interviewed had only one job
since training, more than tenth (15.5%) had two jobs, and more than another fifth
44
(23.3%) had between three and six jobs since completing training. This is further
borne out by the fact that less than one third (31.1%) of those interviewed in 2003
have worked for just one employee, and more than one tenth (11.7%) report that one
or two months is the longest that they have stayed in one job.
When compared to the length of time the 2002 interviewees remained in their first
job, it is cause for some concern. Just less than one third (30.1%) reported that their
shortest stay in a job was less than one month. Just under one tenth (8.9%) had
stayed at a job for only two months, while the same percentage recorded their
shortest stay at a job as between three and six months. However, on the more
positive side, slightly less than one fifth (18.8%) of those interviewed in 2003 had
retained a job for more than 12 months, since completing their training.
Unsurprisingly, almost all of those reporting a maximum employment length in

excess of one year were generally in the same job at the time of the interview. This
is an issue that perhaps warrants further exploration in the future, as it is unclear
whether the transient nature of the employment experienced by most of those ex-
combatants who are, or have been employed, is a result of a shortcoming in the
person themselves, or their ability to perform the functions required of them, or
whether the economy is unable to sustain or offer any form of prolonged
employment.
There is also some indication that trainees are finding the training more relevant to
their employment than previously. In 2003, half of those interviewed reported that
the skills they had received through the training process were related to their
employment, as opposed to less than two out of five (38.2%) in 2002. However,
almost all (89.2%) of those interviewed in 2002 did feel that the training did prepare
them well for work, and in fact, a little under one quarter (72.5%) of the 2002
respondents felt that their employment was directly attributable to the training they
had received.
The level of satisfaction expressed by the ex-combatants with their jobs has changed
very little. While more than one quarter (27.5%) of all interviewees expressed high
job satisfaction in 2002, fractionally higher (28.2%) expressed similar feelings in
2003.
6.2.2 INCOME FROM EMPLOYMENT

The income received in the past year by those interviewed in 2003 varied
considerably. Ex-combatants who were employed were asked what income they
received from employment during the whole of 2002, and what monies they had
received in kind during the same period. The mean income for the period from all
monies, including wages, salaries and gifts or payments in kind was Le 312,115,
translating to US$ 135.704. The median total income for the whole of the previous
year, perhaps a better indication, was Le 70,000, or US$30.43. The mean income
from gifts in kind was valued at Le 54,091, or US$ 23.52, while the median was Le
10,000 or US$ 4.35
Income from wages in over the past year was distributed relatively evenly, with most
respondents reporting earnings of between Le 50,000 and Le 750,000, and
surprisingly, in excess of Le 1000,000 (both 8.7%). This was followed by those who
reported earning between Le 75,000 to Le 100,000 (7.8%), and between Le 200,000
4
The official exchange rate, on which this is based, at the time, was 1:2,300, while on the street a rate
of 1:2,700 was common.
45
and Le 300,000 (6.8%). The mean income from wages in 2002 was Le 312,115, and
the median was Le 70,000.
While more than one third (36%) of those interviewed received no income at al over
the period, more than one fifth (22.3%) received less than Le 25,000 in payments in
kind, followed by one tenth (11%) who received between Le 50,000 and Le 75,000
for the whole year.
Just less than one fifth (19.45%) received no wages or income of any kind at all at all
the previous year, while the highest percentage (11.7%) received between Le 50,000
to Le 75,000, followed by 8.7% who received relatively high amounts from both
wages and other sources of income, between Le 500,001 and Le 750,000. One
tenth also received a total income from all sources of in excess of Le 1000,000.
However, it must be noted that this last category accounts for just eleven
respondents of the whole sample.
The mean income for the last month worked in 2003 from wages was Le 107,155,
while the median was Le 45,000. This compares very favourably to a mean monthly
wage of Le 50,791 reported in the 2002 survey.
Employment benefits are almost non-existence, with just a single respondent in the
2003 survey reporting that they had received a pension from a former employer the
previous month.
6.2.3 WORKPLACE RELATIONS

The relations between ex-combatants and their employees, as well as between them
and colleagues, may go some way in determining the success of any programme
targeting the economic (and social) reintegration of such ex combatants. The
emotional trauma undergone by such people inevitably impact on the ability to
interact and engage within many “normal” environments, and thus effectively
addressing the results of such trauma is usually required before successful
integration.
When asked if they trust their employers all of the time, the majority of respondents
who were working responded that they did. Indeed, more than one third (34%)
reported they trust their employers all the time, while one fifth reported trust some of
the time. Similar, if marginally lower, levels of trust were evident between the
respondents and their colleagues: a little over one quarter (26%) reported trusting
their colleagues all the time, and 32% some of the time.
Generally, the ex-combatants who were employed evidenced relatively good

relations with their employers, with one fifth of all those interviewed rating their
relationship excellent, and another quarter 23.3% good. This accounts for almost all
of those who were employed at the time. Similarly, over one fifth (22%) reported
their relationship with their colleagues to be excellent, and 28.2% rated it good.
These findings tend to be significantly higher than those from 2002, where just 12.7%
rated their relationship with their employer to be excellent and less than one fifth
(16.7%) reported that they trust their employer all of the time.
However, despite this apparent trust, there are important signs that the majority of
ex-combatants who are employed are unhappy with their work situation. Three out of
ten reported having clashed with their employees, but more importantly, 87%
reported that if they had the opportunity, they would work elsewhere, suggesting
some level of dissatisfaction with their current employment situation. This is primarily
due to the need for greater and more diverse work experience, and for a higher
46
salary. This is slightly different from those interviewed in 2002, who rather suggested
that the need for more money was the biggest factor driving a potential move from
their current employer elsewhere, followed by the desire for better working
conditions, and only then the need for greater experience.
6.2.4 THE UNEMPLOYED

Of the third of the respondents who were unemployed, most (31%) had been
unemployed for either one or two years (15.9% respectively). However, one quarter
had been unemployed for between three and ten years, while seven respondents
reported that they had been unemployed in excess of 20 years. This last category
clearly includes the time being unemployed well before the NCDDR came into being,
and while possibly technically correct, cannot be related directly to the training or
integration initiatives. This does compare favourably with the findings in 2002, as
one quarter (24.5%) of all those interviewed reported that they had been unemployed
for six years, and the minimum length of time that respondents had been
unemployed was three years. This suggests that even those who are employed may
battle to retain jobs in many instances, the periods between employment is
significantly shorter, and further suggests that the training is going some way to make
the ex-combatants more marketable.
It is in fact the depressed economy, and resulting lack of job opportunities that the
ex-combatants view as responsible for their lack of employment (61%), rather then
the lack of skills or a patron (13% respectively). This is further reflected by the fact
that there is a clear perception that the demand for labour is restricted within a semi-
skilled level; three out of five reported that there were two many ex-combatants
trained in too few skills, thus saturating the demand for low or semi-skilled labour.
The implication here is that there is perhaps a need for some level of greater, more
specialised training for some ex combatants.
Despite this, there is still some level of optimism that exists within those who have
undergone training, with slightly more reporting that they thought there was a good
chance that they would find work in the future, than those who thought the chances
were poor (53% as opposed to 47%). Regardless of their feelings of optimism or
pessimism regarding the future, almost all those unemployed who were interviewed
felt that the skills that they had received during training would benefit them, and
would be used, sometime in the near future. This reflects the findings amongst the
unemployed ex-combatants in 2002, when more than three quarters of those who
were unemployed reported that the skills they had learnt would be important to them
in finding future work.
Entrepreneurialism is one means of generating employment within recovering

economies, and as such, can be an important tool in generating incomes for
individuals, and potential employees. This is clearly something that has been
realised by most of those ex-combatants who are unemployed, with four out of five of
those who are unemployed considering starting a business with the skills leant in
training. This is significantly higher than amongst those interviewed in 2002, where
just two out of five had paid any consideration to starting a business in the future with
their newly gained skills. Depending on the training, however, substantial additional
training may be required to ensure that any such entrepreneurial moves are
sustainable. Notwithstanding this, there are clear ideas as to what sectors, or
activities would be most profitable. Auto mechanic training, followed by masonry and
then carpentry were the most training courses most recommended by ex-combatants
for those new ex-combatants likely to take up training.
47
6.3 SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL CAPITAL 2002/3 TRACER STUDY
6.3.1 SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT
The level of social dislocation, and the impact of the wars on development are clearly
evident, and will in all likelihood impact negatively on effective integration into society
if not addressed.
One of the most profound impact of engagement in the type of past experienced by
most of the ex-combatants is the effect on the inter-personal relations of the
individual, with family, friends, and indeed most people. This is clearly evident in the
tendency to quarrel with various categories of people with which the ex-combatants
engage. For example, half (52.9%) of those interviewed reported that they
sometimes quarrel with family, almost three out of five (58.3%) reported quarrelling
with friends, and more than half (53.4%) reported quarrelling with neighbours. This
compares rather unfavourably with the findings of the 2002 survey, where one
quarter (24.5%) reported sometimes quarrelling with family, another quarter (26.5%)
sometimes quarrelling with friends, and only 16.7% quarrelling with neighbours.
However, when interacting with colleagues and strangers, the tendencies identified in
this latest 2003 survey were much more subdued. Only fractionally more than one
third reported quarrelling with colleagues, and only 15% reported that they quarrel
with strangers. Only one fifth reported that they quarrel with people in authority, such
as the army and the police.
One of the best indicators of the potential emotional and psychological impact of their
experiences are the sleep patterns, of any disruptions in sleep, experienced by the
ex combatants. While just 6.8% reported experiencing sleep difficulties all the time, a
significant 67% reported that they sometime experienced difficulties in sleeping.
More indicators for concern include the fact that more than half (55%) of the ex-
combatants reported difficulty concentrating at work some of the time, almost two out
of five (385) reported difficulties engaging with friends some of the time, two thirds
(66%) sometimes had difficulties with their dreams, more than one third (35%) had
difficulties listening to people when talking, and almost three out of five (58%)
experience difficulty controlling their temper sometimes.
These findings again compare unfavourably with those of 2002, where 46% reported
difficulties in sleeping sometimes, and 7% all of the time; less than one quarter
(23.5%) experiencing difficulties concentrating at work some of the time and 3.9% all
of the time, 13.6% difficulties sometimes when talking with friends; 40.2%
experiencing difficulties with dreams, 9.9% difficulties listening, and 31% having
difficulties controlling their tempers.
All of these are flags of sever emotional stress and trauma, and suggest the need for
some emotional and psychological support or intervention, to complement the skills
training provided. Without such interventions, it is unlikely that any re-integration
attempt will be wholly successful.
6.3.2 SOCIAL CAPITAL

Social capital extends some of the issues of interaction discussed above to a more
comprehensive perspective. Generally social capital refers to the networks and
interactions between within communities and societies, and between individuals.
When asked about the groups or networks to which they belonged, the ex-
combatants interviewed in 2003 showed some level of interaction with groups within
their communities. While slightly more than one fifth (22%) reported that they did not
belong to any groups, almost two out of five (38%) belonged to one group, another
48
fifth (21%) belonged to two groups, and another tenth (9.7%) to three groups. In total
7.8% belonged to more than three social groups. While this appears positive, of
concern is the fact that more respondents reported that in fact membership, either by
themselves or their families, had in fact decreased over the past two years, than
those whose engagement with such groups had increased (36% as opposed to
29%).
The engagement with, or participation in, such groups is clearly not premised on
shared political viewpoints, as more than three out of five respondents reported that
other members of the groups in which they participated were not necessarily of the
same political viewpoint, or belonged to the same political parties.
It is difficult to assess the extent to which the ability of ex-combatants to form close
relations has been compromised as a result of their ordeal. Only two respondents
had not forged close relations with any friends in recent days. Half (50%) of those
interviewed reported that they had two close friends, while another 15% had three
such friends, and a little over another tenth (12%) had four close friends. Less than
one tenth (6.8%) reported that they only had a single close friend. These findings
suggest that the respondents are able to form some close relations following their
demobilisation.
The extent of these close friends is given some measure by the fact that when asked
how many people they could turn to who would be willing to provide money should
they suddenly need a small amount, half of the ex-combatants reported that they had
one or two people who would be willing to help, while another tenth had three or four
people. This correlates with those who reported having two or more close friends.
However, more than one third (34%) reported that there were no such people to
whom they could turn for such monetary assistance.
Of more significance, especially in a recovering, and often unstable environment

such as that characterising Sierra Leone, more than half (52%) of the ex-combatants
had one or two people they could turn to, outside of their family, should they be faced
with a long term emergency such as job loss, or the death of a breadwinner. Further,
three out of ten ex-combatants reported that they could turn to either three of four
people (17.5%) or even five or more such people (12.6%), suggesting that there is
some stability and formality to some of the close relations forged by the ex-
combatants following demobilisation. What does remain unexplored, however, is
whether such relations were forged during combat, or in the post-demobilisation
stages.
6.3.3 SOCIAL COHESION AND INCLUSION

The neighbourhoods in which ex-combatants reside are by no means homogenous
communities. Rather, they tend to be made up of both ex-combatants and non ex-
combatants. As within any diverse communities or societies, various dynamics may
exist between any of the groupings comprising that society, which may be either
constructive or destructive to the sense of inclusion and belonging that exists. With
this in mid, respondents were asked to what extent such differences characterise the
neighbourhood in which they lived. More than two out of five (42%) through that
such differences characterised the neighbourhood to a very small degree, while a
little more than another fifth (22.3%) thought that they characterised the
neighbourhood to a small degree. Only 22.4% of those interviewed felt that such
differences characterised the neighbour to a large or very large degree (10.7% and
11.7% respectively). Despite this view that these differences were not seem to be
overly characteristic of the neighbourhood, almost two thirds (63%) of the ex-
combatants thought that these differences cause difficulties in the area. However,
49
these difficulties tend not to be of the nature that leads to violence, with only four
respondents reporting that such difficulties had ever led to violence.
It is also important to note that one third of the respondents felt very close, or a
strong sense of togetherness with others in their neighbourhood, while only slightly
less (29.3%) felt a strong sense of closeness. Another tenth felt neither closeness
nor distance, while a little under one fifth (19.4%) felt distant, or very distance (7.8%).
Such general feelings of closeness are further borne out by the inclusion of the ex-
combatants into many of the community activities, and it is perhaps in part this
inclusion that leads to such a high participation in activities that might benefit the
community. Only seven respondents (6.8%) reported that there were any activities in
which they, as ex combatants, could not participate. These activities tended to be
social dance clubs, secret societies and film clubs.
6.3.4 TRUST AND SOLIDARITY

The levels of trust between the ex-combatants and those with whom they interact
shape the nature of the experience, and once again, the ability to achieve some level
of normal interaction within communities. It is thus reassuring to note that the
majority of those interviewed show some level of trust in those around them. Three
out of five respondents reported that most people could be trusted in their dealings
with them, while just under one third (30%) thought that one could not be too careful.
Extrapolating this to a more immediate context, just fewer than three out of ten (28%)
strongly agreed with the fact that most people in the neighbourhood could be trusted,
while another 34% agreed. Of more concern is the fact that the majority of those
interviewed also thought that within their neighbourhood, most people do not trust ex-
combatants (43% strongly agreed to this, while 26.2% agreed). Thus, regardless of
the trust that the ex-combatants may have in others in the community or
neighbourhood, the fact that there is a feeling that they are themselves not trusted is
likely to impact negatively on their interaction with others.
Levels of trust between ex-combatants and others within the same ethnic group are
low. Less then two out of five report that they trust others from the same ethnicity
either to a great extent or to a very great extent. Unsurprisingly perhaps, levels of
trust between ex-combatants and those from other ethnic or linguistic groups are
significantly lower than even this. Less than one fifth (19.5%) report that they trust,
either a great deal, or a very great deal, those from other ethnic groups. Indeed,
despite the levels of trust that respondents indicated when asked about people from
their community, when probed regarding trust in specific categories of people, these
levels all dropped somewhat.
A little over one tenth (14%) trust government officials to a great or very great extent,
while almost two third (64%) trust them to a very small or small extent. The police
fare only slightly better, with less than one fifth (18.5%) reporting a large or very large
degree of trust. NGO staff, perhaps due to their tendency to equate and engage
more constructively with individuals, are trusted slightly more: A little under one
quarter of the ex-combatants trust these staff a great deal. It is interesting to note
that government officials are trusted less than strangers to the area, with 17.5% of
those interviewed reporting that they had a great deal of trust in strangers. This
suggests that there is an inherent distrust of those in positions of authority, and
officials, amongst the ex combatants.
The engagement in war tends to lend a level of solidarity, with trust in other ex-
combatants measuring higher than any of the other categories. A little less than
three out of ten (28%) reporting trusting to a very, or great extent, other ex
50
combatants, while more than one fifth (22%) said that they trusted other ex-
combatants to a small or great extent. These levels of trust reflect those identified in
2002. In that interview, almost all (88%) of those interviewed did not trust their
families, almost two thirds (65%) did not trust their friends, and the same percentage
did not trust their neighbours.
Despite these relatively low levels of trust exhibited amongst those interviewed on
the 2003 survey, the ex-combatants clearly realise the importance of building
community, and engaging in community development, to the benefit of all. Almost all
(95%) of those interviewed reported that they had worked with others in the
neighbourhood to do something to the benefit of the community. While this may be
slightly over-reported, or exaggerated, it is clear that there is a commitment to
constructively playing some role in the development of the neighbourhood in which
the respondents reside.
6.3.5 EMPOWERMENT AND POLITICAL ACTION

Perhaps enhanced by the levels of acceptance and community participation exhibited
earlier, more than three out of five (63%) of the ex-combatants interviewed in 2003
felt very happy, while another fifth (21.4%) felt moderately happy. Just 5.8%, or six
respondents, felt very unhappy, and three felt moderately unhappy. The findings in
2002 were not that different. At that time, while only one fifth (19.6%) felt very happy,
more than one half (56.9%) felt happy, and only 5.9% felt unhappy.
Feelings of control over decision-making affecting their everyday life were varied.
Most (36.9%) felt that they had control over some decisions, while one quarter felt
that they had control over most of the decisions that affect their lives. More felt that
they had control over all such decisions (14.6%) than those who felt that they had
control over very few such decisions (13.6%), or had no control whatsoever of these
decisions (8.7%). These feelings of empowerment were generally extended to
decision-making that might influence respondent’s life in a more profound way, that
is, decisions that may change the course of their lives. Half of those interviewed felt
that they had the power to make such decisions, while one fifth (21.4%) felt that they
were neither able nor unable to make such decisions. Another tenth (10.7%)
reported that they felt totally able to make decisions that would change their life.
The lack of trust in officials reported earlier is again evident when respondents were
asked whether they thought various structures, or officials were honest. Almost one
third (32.4%) reported that the police were very dishonest, and another quarter
(24.5%) thought they were dishonest. A little over one fifth reported that the police
were neither dishonest not honest. A similar pattern was identified of the military:
three out of ten thought that the military were mostly dishonest, and one quarter
(25.2%) felt they were very dishonest. The same percentage felt that the military
were neither honest nor dishonest.
The trend varied slightly with the justice system, the judges and court staff. Of these,
most (30%) thought they were neither honest nor dishonest, while 23.3% thought
they were mostly dishonest, and 22.3% thought they were very dishonest. The postal
staffs were seen as just as bad as the police and military: 32% thought that they were
mostly dishonest, while 29.1% of ex-combatants were of the opinion that they were
neither honest nor dishonest. Just less than one fifth (17.5%) felt that they were very
dishonest. Despite these perceptions, the majority of the ex-combatants did feel that
in general, the honesty of local government had actually improved over the past two
years, with only a little less than one fifth (17.5%) reporting that in their view the
honesty of these officials had actually got worse over this period.
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6.3.6 INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION
Access to information, and some means of communication, were important not only
in that they are services to which all should have access, but more practically, in that
they are essential in assisting in finding employment opportunities. A number of
questions were thus put to those interviewed to assess the levels of access to
information and communication. Access to a regular mail is low, which may be as
much a product of an undeveloped mail system as anything else. Less than one
tenth (7%) of all those interviewed had a post box.
Two of the primary means of communicating information is via television and radio.
Even where there exists no regular power supply, communities formulate alternative
means to support radios, and to a lesser degree, television. It is often though these
mediums that public announcements, as well as health awareness, such as
HIV/AIDS programmes, is disseminated. Marginally more than half (52%) of all those
interviewed reported listening to the radio every day, followed by another quarter
(26%) who listen a few times a week, and a tenth who listen once a week. Access to
television is clearly more limited, with a little over one quarter (27%) viewing
television once a week, followed by one fifth who watch several times a week, and a
little more than on tenth (13.6%) who view it less than once a week. However, a little
less than two out of five (38.8%) never watch television.
It is also unsurprising, given very low levels of teledensity in Sierra Leone, that
ownership of various means of telephony is low. Less than one tenth (8.7%) of the
ex-combatants reported that they had a fixed line phone in the house, while only
fractionally less (7.8%) reported owning a mobile phone. It is likely to the latter may
very well outstrip the former, as mobile networks in the region expand.
Given the low levels of telephony again, it is also to be expected that access to
internet services is also low. This is influenced by the lack of connectivity around the
country, but also may also be influenced by low levels of computer literacy. Just
5.8% of those interviewed, or six respondents, had an internet address, while the
vast majority (88%) had not visited a cyber cafe in the past month. However, seven
respondents had visited a cyber café once in this period, while three had visited one
twice, and a single respondent had visited a cyber café three times in the past month.
The extensive use of radios pre-empts the most effective means of government
communication. Indeed, three quarters of those interviewed cited this medium as the
most important source of information about what the government is doing, its
programmes, and initiatives. This was followed by what is clearly word of mouth from
those that have access to this and other mediums, with 4.9% reporting friends, family
and neighbours as the most important source of such information, and another 3.9%
reporting NGOs as the most important source of such information. The same broad
trend is followed when identifying the most important source of market-oriented
information, such as information on employment, education and so on. However,
here less than half (45.6%) identified radio as the most important source of
information, followed by friends and family (24.3%), and then the local market
(13.6%). Community leaders were the fourth most important source of such
information.
Undoubtedly as initiatives to extend infrastructure expand, so access to information

should follow. Indeed, almost seven out of ten (68.9%) of those interviewed reported
that access to information had improved over the past two years, while a little under
one fifth (17.5%) reported that it has stayed the same.
52
6.4 WELFARE ASSESSMENT
In conclusion, the ex-combatants who participated in the 2003 survey were asked
where on a nine-step ladder representing the poorest (lowest step) and richest (top
step) in Sierra Leone they stood. Most (35.9%) responded that they were on the
lowest step, thus the poorest, followed by a little over one fifth (21.4%) who were on
the third step from the bottom, and just less than one fifth (18.4%) who were on the
second step from the bottom. Interestingly, only one single respondent considered
himself on the top step, and so amongst the richest, and three respondents felt they
were on the eighth step, or second from the top. Unsurprisingly, there was some
correlation between those who were unemployed at the time, and those who thought
they were on the bottom few steps of the ladder.
Respondents were also asked where, using the same scale, they thought they were
one year ago. There appears to have been on a fraction of change deterioration,
with 75% this year reporting they were on the bottom three steps, as opposed to 72%
last year. There is also a significantly higher percentage reporting that they are on
the bottom step this year than last year (35.9% as opposed to 10% last year).
Despite this apparent deterioration in their situation over the past year, there was still
a level of optimism that things would in fact improve. One quarter (25%) felt that the
situation would improve in the next few weeks, less than one fifth (18%) felt it would
improve in some years, and 13% felt that improvement in this situation would occur
over the next few months. A little more than one quarter (28%), however, reported
that they thought it was up to God as to whether and when the situation would
improve.
53
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
7.1 SUMMARY
The majority of the ex-combatants interviewed had gone through their training
program satisfactorily with problems being attributed not so much towards the actual
training itself, but on the non-receiving, certificates and tool kits. These problems
tended to blight their overall experience and many of the ex-combatants that had not
received certificates argued that they could not apply for jobs because they do not
have their certificates from their employers. Likewise many of the ex-combatants that
had not received toolkits argued that this prevented them from either seeking or
creating self-employment. According to them matters are even made worse when
they volunteer to work with people, for they are usually asked to come with their own
tools. Given the large number that attribute their current employment to their toolkit,
this remains a cause for concern.
Some ex-combatants claimed they would have desired to undergo agricultural

training but could not because of the limited nature of its availability. Furthermore, the
tracking survey found that although the training has clearly enhanced the
employment potential of the ex-combatants, and provided them with useful technical
skills, there perhaps needs to be slightly better targeting of the relevant skills to the
specific market opportunities that exist at any one time. Notwithstanding these
problems, the majority of those interviewed were highly satisfied with the skills they
acquired and were grateful to the NCDDR making the training available.
On employment, most of the ex-combatants that had found employemnt or started

their own work, did so very soon after the completion of training, suggesting that the
longer an ex-combatant took to find or create employment, the odds of actually do
so, diminished. Most ex-combatants felt that their training skills were highly beneficial
to them having gained or started employment. It would seem that when employment
was not secured within a short while of completing the training program, ex-
combatants were less likely to either get or start employment and more likely to
remain unemployed.
Further, given the number of ex-combatants who remain unemployed, or drift in and
out of employment, and are considering starting their own business, specific training
in business skills could further enhance the potential of these individuals to sustain
any such venture. Nevertheless, most the unemployed ex-combatants continue to be
upbeat about their possibility of finding work.
The housing and living arrangements of the interviewees do not seem to be different
to those of most of the other Sierra Leoneans. A considerable number of the
interviewees own a dwelling place and this increases with the amount of time since
their completion of the training program. The fact that many of the ex-combatants
indicate that they do own land, can become an important factor whenever the
(informal) economy is not considerably improving to provide enough job opportunities
for the ex-combatants trained in vocational skills.
On social issues, ex-combatants are members of social groups just like other
members of the community. Furthermore, these groups tend to reflect a diversity of
people being mixed as far as their composition is concerned and clearly not made up
out of other ex-combatants suggesting that they are reintegrated into their community
or village. The study found that there is no suggestion that ex-combatants hang out
together as units following their demobilisation
54
Ex-combatants also displayed a balance in terms of people whom they could turn to
in times of negative shocks. In addition, they also demonstrated that they themselves
are available to others whom might require assistance.
The ex-combatants have considerable trust in the people around them although they
feel that feel generally the rest of the community does still not trust them. This was
very clear in the 2002-2003 study that found some lack of trust being evident
amongst the ex-combatants. In general the trust in people in their neighbourhood is
increasing.
However, most appear to have integrated relatively well into the neighbourhoods in
which they reside, with few reporting any exclusion from community or
neighbourhood activities on the basis of their past. Ex-combatants continue to take
part in activities benefiting their communities and by working for the benefit of the
community play an important role in accelerating their acceptance. Further, the
majority appear to have been absorbed into various types of family structures, either
that of friends, or family, both family that they might have lived with prior to fighting,
or other family. This suggests that any further interventions or support could be
designed to engage with ex-combatants at the community level, thus enhancing the
impact that any such cohesion already achieves.
The majority of the interviewees are connected to the wider world through radio.
Radio plays an important role in getting official information. With so many listeners
radio should be used in any future programmes (if applicable) for ex-combatants, for
example to promote further reintegration and reconciliation. Social networks of
relatives, friends and neighbours play, besides the radio, an important role in getting
market information.
While the vast majority of ex-combatants report that they are happy and feel that they
have a considerable impact on the course of their own lives and in the
neighbourhood, there remains clearly evident signs of post-traumatic stress disorder
and lack of trust suggest the urgent need for some form of ongoing psycho-social
support. This is also likely to have a wider impact on the long-term employability of
the ex-combatants.
Finally, most ex-combatants consider themselves among the poorest people, but
their situation was said to have improved during the past year. Those ex-combatants
who have completed their training long since, were more likely to feel that their
situation would improve in the near future.
7.2 CONCLUSION
The aims of this study were outlined right at the very outset. This section concludes
by through these aims.
7.2.1 AIM 1: ASSESS THE EX-COMBATANTS PARTICIPATION.

The first aim was to assess the ex-combatant participation in NCDDR funded
reintegration opportunities and issues related to access to, participation in and
implementation of the programmes by Implementing Partners.
In general it seems that the ex-combatants are positive about the NCDDR funded
reintegration opportunities. The vast majority enjoyed the training and felt that it was
worthwhile and relevant to their vocational opportunities. In addition they felt the skills
levels of their trainers was good and the conditions within which they trained
acceptable to good. Relations forged amongst ex-combatants during the training
55
were also viewed positively. None of the ex-combatants interviewed suggested that
they had wasted their time and that perhaps they would have been better off as per
their previous vocation.
The training component of the DDR must therefore be said to have been successful.
7.2.2 AIM 2: ASSESS THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS

The second aim was to assess the socio-economic status (snapshot) of those ex-
combatants who have completed their participation in programmes along with their
families and communities.
This study has produced findings that give positive responses to the socio-economic
status of the ex-combatants. Ex-combatants have benefited from the training that
opportunities afforded to them that they have largely found be positively related to
work opportunities. Over half of these ex-combatants are currently either employed
or self-employed. As such, it must be concluded that in terms of economic success,
those ex-combatants who completed their participation in the programmes and who
found or created employment within a three months of completing the program the
program succeeded.
The overall success must be particularly viewed in light of the general socio-
economic difficulties of the majority of the (young) Sierra Leoneans. It also suggests
that young people in general and perhaps ex-combatants in particular use varies
strategies to maximise their socio-economic status; ranging from conflict-preventing
behaviour upon return to not returning to their family and/or place of birth to increase
the opportunity to find work or decrease the likeliness of having to be financial
responsible for their family members, (or tell enumerators that they are unemployed).
In this light the NCDDR funded reintegration opportunities are just one set of
opportunities that are used by ex-combatants in their socio-economic reintegration
process. They have however been a positive set of opportunities.
Undoubtedly, the economic success of those ex-combatants must be of benefit not

only to their immediate families but also to those families within which one third of
those resided. This economic success must have spilt over to communities, which
might to some degree be evidenced by the successful reintegration that he ex-
combatants have claimed.
The training was successful in terms of economic integration and reintegration, for
over half of the ex-combatants are employed or working for themselves. Although
comparative data for the rest of the population does not exist, this compared to other
countries in the region, seems high.
7.2.3 AIM 3: ASSESS THE PRESENT SECTOR SPECIFIC INTERVENTIONS.

The third aim was to assess the present sector specific interventions and identify
ways of improving service delivery of the reintegration opportunities.
The NCDDR has chosen to focus mainly on supporting the economic part of the
reintegration process through providing vocational training via their IP to the majority
of the ex-combatants. This in itself is not a bad choice as economic reintegration
(having a job) is probably to single largest concern of the ex-combatants. Moreover,
while a six to nine months training programme is provided, it is anticipated that the
ex-combatants in training also have time to ”cool down” and relearn social skills if
necessary.
56
However with so much focus on the economic side, this should than really enable the
graduates to significantly increase their chances of employment. Not only should the
toolkit come in time, but business training and micro-funds should also be part of the
programme for those who are not able to find work and need to create self-
employment. The delay in toolkits was down to purely mismanagement and a
particularly point which the NCDDR and the Implementing Partners cannot be proud
of. The limited amount of micro-credit that was made available could have been
greater and better conceptualised. In particular micro-credit made available to those
wishing to go into the agricultural sector. The lack of this for the prospective
agriculture trainees made vocational training much more attractive (due to the
monthly allowance the ex-combatants received while being in training and the toolkits
they got afterwards). Future programs elsewhere must correct for this oversight.
The DDR program necessitated that ex-combatants locate themselves at specific

urban centres around the country. And this has merit for many ex-combatants would
have wanted the anonymity of such centres and that economies of scale could be
achieved. However, for future consideration, one way to improve the sector specific
interventions is to explore the possibilities to make more use of already existing
systems of master-apprentice, rather than to set up special training centres. A
positive aspect of this is that ex-combatants do not have to come to the major urban
centres to receive training, but can become an apprentice in their own village or
nearby town, and perhaps have more chance to automatically migrating into or
creating employment opportunities. It can also contribute to the social reintegration
process as the community can clearly see the efforts the ex-combatant is taken to
contribute to reconstruction of Sierra Leone; an ex-combatant as blacksmith
apprentice making tools for the farmers in his village. Of course a different set of
logistical problems have to be solved, but in such a way the reintegration process
would more directly also benefit the reconstruction of communities.
Notwithstanding some of the problems with agricultural training, toolkits, allowances,

certificates and locations, it has to be concluded that the present sector specific
interventions were largely successful.
7.2.4 AIM 4: ASSESS PARALLEL PARTNER FUNDED PROGRAMS

The fourth assess the ex-combatant participation in reintegration opportunities
funded by parallel partners, which are within the NCDDR reintegration framework
and issues related to access and their participation in the programmes.
The study was not specifically geared to test the performance of different parallel
partners for the random nature of the selection process meant that only through
chance would there have been sufficient ex-combatant trainees from any individually
funded program. However, the results suggest that there was little to differentiate
between parallel partner funded programs and those funded directly by the NCDDR.
There was no evidence anywhere to suggest that there was a differential success
rate between those ex-combatants who attended programs funded by the NCDDR or
those funded by parallel partners, who operated within the NCDDR reintegration
framework. As such, it must be said that all the programs succeed in their
reintegration efforts.
Therefore it must be concluded that the study would indicate that ex-combatant
participation in NCDDR funded reintegration opportunities and issues related to
access to, participation in and implementation of the programmes by Implementing
Partners has been a success.
57
7.2.5 AIM 5: ASSESS PARALLEL PARTNERS PROGRAMS WITHIN NCDDR FRAMEWORK
The fifth aim was to assess the socio-economic status of those ex-combatants who
have completed their participation in reintegration opportunities funded by parallel
partners, which are within the NCDDR reintegration framework.
See comments in the previous section. To reiterate - there is no data available to

conclude that ex-combatants who have completed their participation in reintegration
opportunities funded by parallel partners, are better or worse off than those within the
NCDDR reintegration framework.
7.2.6 AIM 6: IDENTIFY TRANSITION ISSUES

It is unfair to complete the report on a negative comment, particularly in light of the
fact that those aspects of the NCDDR program being evaluated have been largely
successful. However, the sixth aim was to identify transition, which the ex-
combatants will face as civilian community members beyond short-term reintegration
assistance, provided by NCDDR, and how to link that information for programming
purposes to the larger reintegration and recovery efforts.
One of the main issues which is clearly beyond the short-term reintegration
assistance by NCDDR (and was not even part of the short-term assistance at all) is
the psycho-social well being of the ex-combatants. Although it seems that only few
ex-combatants suffer from severe trauma, this can change in the future if the low
figure of present day is only the result of mechanisms of distraction or forcible
neglect. Means of monitoring the psycho-social well-being on a regular basis would
be useful. It is important to realise that the ex-combatants may always remain a
group vulnerable to re-conscription if a conflict starts again or that they perhaps (no
data available yet) more likely to involve themselves in illegal activities if they feel
there are no good legal alternatives.
However, the authors are quick to note that not being trained in psycho-social
development, are very reluctant to dwell on this issue. Ex-combatants noted sleep
problems, but these could be as a result of environmental noise, overcrowding
insects, poor residential structure with for example a leaking roof or by the fact that
there is no proper bed or bedding. As such this might not be attributed to the trauma
of the past. The authors therefore feel that there might be problems, and as such
recommend that consideration be given to this possibility.
Furthermore, large groups of ex-combatants have not yet decided to return/settle

themselves to their place of birth (perhaps because they anticipate that their
reintegration will be less smooth). This process needs to be monitored as well to be
able to fully evaluate the success of the DDR programme.
Finally, the process of delivery of certificates and toolkits on completion of the

training programs can at best be described as being shoddy. There was no reason,
apart from very poor management, that this part of the process was so poorly
handled in the manner that it was. There was also no evidence to suggest, that any
of criticisms of the mid-term evaluation having been taken into consideration and any
effort made to improve performance. As a matter of extreme urgency the NCDDR
must ensure that before they have completed their operations, that all ex-combatants
who participated in the program are supplied with their certificates and toolkits.
7.2.7 AIM OF TRACER STUDY

There were also six aims of the tracer study:
58
Tracer aim one, was to document and assess changes in the socio-economic status
since the 2002 survey of ex-combatants who have completed their participation in
programmes. This was undertaken in Chapter Six of this report, which compared and
contrasted those aspects of the 2002 study that were probed for again in 2003. In
addition, the ex-combatants who were interviewed in 2003, were also separately to
the overall sample analysed in terms of social reintegration.
Tracer aim two, was to assess the degree to which the reintegration support provided
has directly impacted on their current main source of income, i.e. to which degree are
these ex-combatants engaged in economic activities within the sectors they were
trained in. There was no difference with sub-sample as opposed to the larger sample
of ex-combatants and therefore the conclusions of Section 7.2.2 above hold true here
as well.
Tracer aim three, was to assess the degree to which the reintegration support
provided has indirectly impacted on the ex-combatants current livelihood strategy. As
per above, which in this instance, the conclusions of Section 7.2.3 hold true here as
well.
Tracer aim four, was to assess whether continued social reintegration is taking place,
how this is expressed, and establish the main factors constraining / promoting these
trends. The analysis has shown that indeed over time, social integration progresses
very well indeed. The same factors noted for the larger group also hold true for this.
Namely, gaining or starting employment within three months of completing the
program, a welcoming local community and ex-combatants who through participation
in regular community activities ingrain themselves further into these communities.
Tracer aim five, was to establish the degree to which ex-combatants identify with,
and are actively engaged in economic and social interest-based groups and/or
networks. The report certainly showed that the involvement of ex-combatants in such
group is high and that there were no impediments to participation in any group.
Tracer aim six, was to Suggest indicators to follow the trends of social reintegration
identified. These have been done in both the following Section (7.3 and 7.4) of the
report.
7.3 SHORT COMINGS OF THE STUDY

It would be amiss of the authors not to note the shortcomings they found with the
study itself and as such these place on record in the hope that any future work will
take cognisance of these and perhaps ensure that they are not repeated.
Firstly, the study did not interview ex-combatants who had not been able to
register for the DDR programme. They were left out of the study.
Secondly, the study failed to collect information on what the average time was
between disarmament and demobilisation and the actual start of their training
as part of the reintegration process. Likewise, information on allowances and
payments to ex-combatants was not collected.
Thirdly, the questionnaire itself failed to collect information on the gender of

the ex-combatant, the military unit they were previously attached to and
informal savings networks. In addition, there was insufficient probing on the
type of employment and the relationship between employers and
Implementing Partners.
59
Fourthly, the study failed to evaluate the differences in quality between the
different Implementing Partners. These differences (levels of skilled teachers,
corruption among staff/trainers, withholding of allowances/toolkits, etc.) have
been noted in other studies and might have had a bearing on the overall
evaluation.
In hindsight, these problems seem simple and failure to have ensured that more
information was collected seems almost to verge on the neglectful, however at the
time some of the issues were:
Outside the ambit of the study but should have been thought of and
discussed with the NCDDR prior to the research – as in critique one.
Simply not considered because they were not conceptualised as having a

bearing on the study - as in critiques two and three. In the case of information
related the military unit to which the ex-combatants were attached, it was
decided to omit any probing as it was felt that this may have been insensitive.
Or decided that they should have been covered by other more qualitative
research and were not suitable to a quantitative questionnaire.
Failure to account for these does diminish the overall quality of the report, it is
however hoped that the rest of the document contributes to the understanding of the
subject matter.
7.4 RECOMMENDATIONS
Finally, the brief asked for which indicators could be used to follow future trends of
both the economic and social reintegration of ex-combatants in Sierra Leone. It is
suggested, notwithstanding the comments made in Section 7.3 above, that with the
exception of some modifications and additions, that the same questionnaire used for
this study could be used for future tracking.
Furthermore, it is recommended that any future tracking be undertaken in conjunction

with qualitative research. This is necessary to allow for more in-depth probing of
many of the issues that emerge during the quantitative survey, which due to the
nature of the tools and techniques used will always limit the totality of information that
could be collected.
A sampling change is also recommended for future studies, to include ex-combatants

who did not benefited from the DDR and also other constituents of communities
where ex-combatants reside in. The reasons are two-fold: firstly, it are the ex-
combatants who might live in the more socio-economic deprived situations, which
make them, besides the individual misery, more vulnerable for re-conscription to
violent groups and thus is a potential security threat. Secondly, the outcomes of this
study might present a more picture of the reintegration process of ex-combatants
than is actually a little more positive in reality than on the ground. The fact that some
ex-combatants did not registered is in the end a failure of NCDDR. Moreover, the
impact of the DDR programme can only be really tested if this second excluded
group is compared to the ones who benefited from the programme. Also non-ex-
combatants can act as a control group whose own circumstances can be used to
benchmark ex-combatants against. By so doing one can state what is the norm in
Sierra Leone society and compare that to the ex-combatants.
60

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TRACER STUDY AND FOLLOW-UP ASSESSMENT

OF THE REINTEGRATION COMPONENT OF SIERRA LEONE’S

TABLE OF CONTENTS .........................................................................................................2

CHAPTER 2: DEMOGRAPHICS, TRAINING AND TOOLKITS .................................................15

CHAPTER 3: TRAINING AND TOOLKITS .............................................................................19

CHAPTER 4 : WORK HISTORY AND SAVINGS .................................................................24

CHAPTER 5: SOCIAL CAPITAL .......................................................................................29

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................54

APPENDIX 2: MAP 125

1.1 THE BRIEF

1.2 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

Providing a longitudinal dimension to the social and economic reintegration of

Increasing the coverage and validity of the findings of the Reintegration

Suggest indicators to follow the trends of social reintegration identified.

Assess the ex-combatant participation in NCDDR funded reintegration

Assess the socio-economic status (snapshot) of those ex-combatants who

Assess the present sector specific interventions and identify ways of

Assess the ex-combatant participation in reintegration opportunities funded by

Assess the socio-economic status of those ex-combatants who had

Identify transition issues which the ex-combatants will face as civilian

1.3 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

1.4.2 DATA SOURCES AND TYPES

The secondary sources yielded information and statistical data on:

On the recent socio-political history of Sierra Leone;

Primary information was collected from a total of 511 All ex-combatants.

1.4.3 DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUES

The interview schedule can be found in Appendix One of this report.

1.4.4 SAMPLING, SIZE AND METHODS

A dual strategy was used to try and locate these respondents:

Eventually, a total of 117 ex-combatants who were previously interviewed in 2002:

Table 2: Months since training

Table 3: Final sample of Tracer Study by area

1.4.6 FIELD WORK

To undertake 140 Reintegration Assessment interviews in Free Town,

To undertake 190 Reintegration Assessment interviews in Kenema, Kono and

1.4.7 FIELDTEAM REPORT OF THE SURVEY AREAS1

The team was then divided into two as follows:

Sub–team JA - Comprising of two members (Leslie Mokuwa and Abu Bakarr

Sub-team JB - Comprising of four enumerators (Patricia Koroma, Ahamoudu

ZIMMI – PUJEHUN DISTRICT

1.5 REPORT STRUCTURE AND LIMITATIONS

1.5.3 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS

Secondly, although respondents were assured of confidentiality, in a report that

1.6 THE TEAM

Krijn Peters, a doctoral candidate at Wageningen University and Research Centre in

Patrick Burton, is an independent researcher with Development Research Associates

Samuel Johnson is a post-graduate student in Freetown, who assisted with the

Table 4: What did you do before the war started?

Nevertheless, in order to understand the type of conditions ex-combatants reside in,

There is an even distribution of ex-combatants amongst different generic types of

Not being used to the rural way of live anymore.

2.3 LAND AND DWELLING OWNERSHIP

“Savings is a strange terminology to the ex-combatants, they say they do not

Noticeable is that those ex-combatants interviewed in Kenema, Kono and Pujehun

Many of the ex-combatants own land.

A considerable number of the ex-combatants own a dwelling place and the

This chapter is designed to capture the ex-combatants opinions on the training

3.1 THE TRAINING

Table 5: Which training programme were you on?

The majority (76.3%) of ex-combatants undertook a vocational or skills training

3.1.1 THE CERTIFICATES

Table 6: Did you receive your certificate after your training?

Yes 18.6% 47.2% 75.6% 45.8%